Disputationes metaphysicae

1. From what has been said, various questions which are wont to be treated about universals can easily be dispatched.

The first doubt is dispatched

2. It is asked, then, first, whether universals are beings or not. Which can be asked either of the nature which is denominated universal, or of the intention or denomination of universality itself. Of the nature we have already said that it is in things themselves; whence it comes about that, as regards the thing denominated, universals are real beings; but this is to be understood either permissively, or of those universals which fall per se into the direct operation of the intellect, so that either per se primarily, or at least through their own singulars directly known, they can also be directly conceived. Which is said for this reason, that in the very beings of reason which are feigned through reflection and the manifold operation of the intellect, the intellect can proceed so far as to abstract universal and common notions from these too, and make up a universal even in feigned things, which are not true beings; in which way the dialecticians say that genus taken in second intention is a certain specific universal, common to many genera, which in the intention or notion of genus differ only in number; and so of the others. But the reason is that the universal in act has being only objectively in the intellect; but to be objectively in the intellect can belong not only to true beings but also to feigned ones; and therefore to them too can be attributed those relations or denominations which require only this being, such as are the notion of subject and of predicate; and the same holds of the notion of universal. And therefore we say permissively or indefinitely that universals are real beings, yet not necessarily and altogether universally. But because the knowledge of the intellect necessarily begins from real beings, both because reflex operation supposes direct, and also because feigned beings are not conceived except through some relationship or proportion to true beings, therefore it is also rightly said that those universals are real beings which can be abstracted through the direct operation of the intellect. But if the discussion is of universality itself, or of the intention of universality, then it is commonly wont to be said that it is not a real being but of reason; which is true in this sense, namely that it is not some property nor something intrinsically and really inhering in the nature which is denominated universal, according to what we have said. Yet in another sense some distinction and declaration is needed. For we said that the nature can be denominated universal in two ways: first, by an absolute denomination, as if it subsisted universally; secondly, by a respective denomination. In the former way universality is not a being of reason as something properly feigned by reason, but only as an extrinsic denomination coming from an act of reason, as to be abstract, known, and other things of this kind, which do not express something existing really in the nature denominated, nor properly express some being of reason fashioned by the intellect as something objectively feigned by it, because such beings are only feigned while they are thought; but then the intellect thinks or knows nothing of the kind. It is therefore an extrinsic denomination from the concept of the intellect; for, because it is represented abstractly and universally through the concept, it is therefore denominated universal in the aforesaid way. Wherefore, in order that this universality be said to be, it is not necessary that it itself be formally and as it were reflexly known, as it were in signified act, but it is enough that the nature itself be known in such a way, namely prescinded and abstract, so that as it were in exercised act the nature is constituted universal. And in this manner Soto explains this universality through extrinsic denomination, on the Logic, q. 3 on universals, a. 1, dub. 2; and he adduces Scotus and St. Thomas for this opinion.

3. But speaking in the latter way of the universal relatively, or of the relation of universality, it is sufficiently evident from what has been said that the universal is not a real being, because that relation is not real but of reason. Which is briefly declared in this way. For a manifold relation can be feigned or thought out in the universal nature: one in order to the act of being, another in order to the act of predicating; but each can be apprehended either according to aptitude or according to act; for the common nature is conceived as apt to exist in many, and as such it can be conceived as having a relation of aptitude to communicating its being to them; it can likewise be conceived as actually existing in them, and as such having an actual relation, or that of a thing actually communicating itself to many. For just as in an accident we understand a relation of aptitudinal or actual inherence, so we can feign or think it out in the universal nature as communicable or as communicated to many. And the universal is wont to be defined in each way; yet the aptitudinal relation suffices for the nature to be judged completely universal. For that it is actually in many which exist is contingent, and does not change the nature of the thing; but the aptitude is simply necessary, for in it the universal is distinguished from the singular. Whence those involve a repugnance who say that angelic natures are universal and are incommunicable to many.

4. Similarly in order to the act of predicating the nature can be conceived either as apt to be predicated of many or as actually predicated of many; but the former consideration properly denominates the nature predicable. All these relations, however, are only of reason; for the universal nature is not in many except through identity, and therefore under that notion it cannot be really referred to those many. Likewise because, as we have said, in the thing there is no nature which is in many or which is apt to be in many; therefore the proximate foundation of those relations is not in the thing but in the mode of conceiving of the intellect; therefore a relation founded in it cannot be real; and this reason plainly proves the same of the relation of the predicable or the predicated, for all these too are founded in extrinsic denominations of the intellect, and therefore cannot be real.

The second doubt is dispatched

5. Whether universals are corporeal or not.—And according to these things another question is to be defined, which Porphyry proposes in the predicables, namely whether universals are corporeal. For it must be said in the same way that some universals can indeed be corporeal, namely those which belong to things composed of matter and form, as is evident of the concept of man, horse, animal, body; indeed these universals are most of all accommodated to the human intellect conjoined to a body; for it receives its knowledge from sensible things, and therefore these universals, speaking per se, it conceives and abstracts first. Absolutely, however, the notion of the universal is not limited to corporeal natures; for it is found in spiritual natures; for in them too there are singulars having among themselves some agreement and difference or distinction, by reason of which common and universal natures can be conceived in them. But because not only spiritual things among themselves and corporeal among themselves, but also corporeal with spiritual, have some agreement and likeness, therefore not only are there some corporeal universals and others incorporeal, but also some common to both, such as substance, quality, etc. For these abstract from corporeal and incorporeal things.

The third doubt

6. Whether universals are substances or accidents.—Whence a similar question is also easily dispatched, whether universals are substances or accidents. For this question, as also the preceding, is not properly about the intention of universality; for that, since it is not something real but only a denomination or relation of reason, is not truly either substance or accident, nor body nor spirit, although it is to be conceived after the manner of an incorporeal accident. The aforesaid question, then, is about the nature which is denominated universal; and this can be not only substantial but also accidental, as is self-evident. Aristotle, however, is sometimes wont to say that universals are not substances, as Metaphysics III, text 20, and Book VI, text 45; but he understands that they are not things subsisting per se and in themselves outside singulars. And therefore in the Categories, chapter on Substance, he calls substantial universals second substances; but the individuals of substances, or supposits, he calls first substances, which he says are more substances than the second, because these subsist first, but the others in them.

The fourth doubt

7. In what sense universals are called eternal.—An objection is resisted.—Another question about universals is defined from what has been said, namely whether they are eternal. For they are commonly thought to be such, because, since they are the proper objects of the sciences, they must be necessary and immutable and consequently eternal. But how this is to be understood is not explained in the same way by all. For Plato for this reason posited the ideas, which are eternal and immutable forms, as Aristotle reports. But Aristotle himself would perhaps say that in these corruptible things universals are eternal because some of their singulars in which they subsist are never lacking. We, however, suppose that these singulars do not always exist, and that outside them universals do not exist; whence we conclude that these cannot be called eternal according to the real existence which they have outside their causes. These universals, then, are called perpetual according to the being of essence or potential being. You will say: in this way individuals too are eternal, because they too are possible from eternity and have their essences immutable according to the being of essence. Whence of them too propositions can be made which have perpetual truth, as they are abstracted from time. The answer is that as regards the thing indeed it is so; yet in the mode of conceiving and speaking there is a difference; for universals as such, by the very fact that they are abstracted from singulars, are consequently also separated from time and place and from every change, beginning and ceasing; and therefore St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 2, that universals are wont to be said to be everywhere and always, not positively but negatively, that is, not because they are in every place and time, but because as such they do not determine for themselves place and time, in so far as they are abstracted from here and now. But this does not properly belong to individuals; for actions and changes, beginnings and ceasings, are concerned with them. Whence, although some universals are generable and corruptible, as man, animal and similar things, which from their formal notion bring with them such a potency or postulate such a mode of beginning and ceasing, nevertheless they do not have this very property except in order to individuals; for man as such can neither be generated nor corrupted, yet he is called generable and corruptible because he is of such a nature that he cannot be connaturally communicated to individuals except through generation, and the individual itself which participates such a nature is of itself subject to corruption. Some also add that universals are called eternal because the unity of prescission and the aptitude of existing in many belong to them perpetually, even when they do not exist, in the way in which other properties are said to belong to them perpetually, the copula being absolved from the existence of time. So Fonseca, Book V, c. 28, q. 8, sect. 3. But I do not see how this can be true unless we confess that some universality belongs per se and necessarily to the nature; for a proposition which is said to be of perpetual truth must be necessary from the connection of the terms; but it cannot be so necessary unless in some way it is per se; and therefore I think that universals cannot be called eternal in that way, except in order to some intellect which is eternal, as St. Thomas expressly said in the said solution ad 2.

The fifth doubt

8. Whether there are causes of universals or not.—Finally it is understood from what has been said whether and how universals have causes; for either the discussion is of universal natures or of their universality. In the former way, just as universal natures do not come about except in individuals, so they do not have causes except in them, nor other than those which they have; for they are both made by the same efficient cause and (if they are composite) consist of the same principles, or the same matter and form, and are ordered by their nature to the same end. But if we speak of universality itself, since it is not a real being, it is not necessary that it have proper and real causes; yet, in the way in which it is being, or rather imitates being, it has in its own way a material and an efficient cause; for the nature itself which is denominated universal imitates the material cause in so far as it is as it were the subject which is laid under the intention of universality and is denominated universal by it; but because that form is not real and intrinsic, therefore that subject is not of inherence but of denomination, and is rather the matter about which than in which or from which. But the efficient cause is the intellect itself, which makes the concept representing the nature itself abstractly, or the comparison of the same nature so abstracted to its inferiors; for it does not properly effect the relation of reason, but considers or feigns it not so much in signified act as in exercised act, as I said, namely by so conceiving the relationship as if it were a true relation. But a formal or final cause need not be sought here, for of the universal in act so considered universality itself is as it were the form, which is nothing other than either a denomination coming from an act of the intellect, or the relation of reason founded and conceived in it. But of this universality either there is no end, properly speaking, because it is only something resulting from the conception of the intellect intending the knowledge of things; or, if some end must be assigned, it is only the knowledge itself of the intellect, because, by considering the essences of things, it abstracts their grades and formal notions; and because it has the power of perceiving and discerning all things and of reflecting upon itself and its actions, it intends to know not only the natures of things but also the denominations or relationships which they seem to have as they are presented to the intellect itself; and for this end it fashions universals and feigns their relations.