Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This question is wont to be treated in other words at the beginning of dialectic, namely, whether the universal comes about through abstraction or through the comparison of the intellect. It is also wont to be treated, and more properly, in De Anima III, in explaining the object of the intellect, which is said to be the universal. But since it has been said by us that universal unity results through the work of the intellect, we cannot omit declaring what and of what kind this work of the intellect is. It is necessary, however, briefly to distinguish a twofold intellect, agent and possible; the function of the former is to effect intelligible species; of the latter to operate and understand through them; and the latter has a twofold operation (others being passed over which do not pertain to the present purpose): one is called direct, by which it tends directly into the thing which the intelligible species represents and to which it leads the intellect per se and simply. The other is called reflex, by which the intellect turns back upon the prior knowledge, or upon its object according to those conditions or denominations which it receives from the knowledge.

Three opinions are proposed

2. There can, then, be three opinions in this matter: the first is that the universal comes about through an operation of the agent intellect which precedes every operation of the possible intellect, and consists in the production of an intelligible species representing the nature prescinded and abstracted from all individuals; which is therefore wont to be called the abstraction of the common nature made by virtue of the agent intellect. So St. Thomas indicates, I, q. 85, a. 1, in the body and ad 4, and a. 3, ad 4; In Metaph. VII, lect. 13; De ente et essentia, c. 4; and the Commentator, De Anima II, comm. 10, saying that the intellect is moved to its ultimate perfection by universal things, namely as represented in intelligible species. And therefore, De Anima III, text 8, he says that, if universals were outside the soul, the agent intellect would be in vain. Flandria, Metaphysics III, q. 2, a. 2, and Metaphysics VII, q. 16, a. 1; Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 28, qq. 5 and 6; Soto, on the Logic, q. 3 on universals. Which opinion supposes first of all that the possible intellect directly, and by virtue of the species which it receives from the agent intellect, does not know material singulars but only common natures. From which it infers that the species produced by the agent intellect directly represents only the common nature prescinded from all individuals, and consequently is universal in representing. From which it finally comes about that the nature so represented becomes universal objectively and by extrinsic denomination through this kind of abstraction; for, if by contraction it becomes singular and individual, by abstraction it will become universal and common. And it is confirmed, because the universal is the object of the agent and the possible intellect, of the former as an active power, of the latter as a passive or receptive one; therefore it comes about through the action of the agent intellect, but precedes the operation of the possible intellect; for it is of the notion of an active power that it makes its object, but a passive power supposes it; for it is wont to undergo from it.

3. The second opinion is that the universal is not made by the agent intellect, but by the possible intellect, through the direct operation by which it knows the common nature according to its precise formal notion and essence, considering nothing of the inferior notions or of the individuals, nor considering formally and as it were in signified act the community of the nature itself, but only the essence, which is common. This opinion, as regards the former negative part in which it differs from the preceding, those must necessarily teach who hold that the possible intellect knows singulars directly, even material ones. For according to that opinion it must consequently be said that the agent intellect, speaking per se, effects a singular species, not only in being but also in representing an individual and singular thing; because the intellect could not know it first and directly unless it received a species properly and in particular representing it. From which it comes about that according to this opinion the agent intellect does not abstract the universal from singulars, and is only said to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm because it separates it from the conditions of matter as regards its real being, but not as regards the object which it represents; for it produces a species spiritual and immaterial in its entity, representing the same individual thing in number which the phantasm represents; for it is not repugnant that a material individual be intentionally represented by an immaterial form or quality. And in the universality of the genus this can be confirmed in every opinion, because, although we grant that the agent intellect abstracts the specific nature from individuals in that way, it is nevertheless not necessary that it abstract the generic nature from the species; because it is certain that the possible intellect can be borne directly and immediately to knowing the specific nature, and that the agent intellect can effect an intelligible species which in its representation does not abstract from the specific difference, whatever may be the case with the individual; therefore the universal which is the genus will not then come about through the abstraction of the agent intellect.

4. But the other, affirmative, part of the opinion, namely that this universal is sufficiently made through the abstraction of the possible intellect, can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 2, and Opusc. 42, c. 5, at the end, where he adduces that saying of the Commentator, De Anima I, text 8: The intellect makes universality in things; which, although it could be thought to have been said of the agent intellect, will nevertheless be true a fortiori of the possible intellect, of which Averroes speaks; for he is treating of the intellect defining and demonstrating. Finally, the authors cited in the preceding opinion, although they teach that the first universality is made by the agent intellect, nevertheless cannot consistently deny that this operation of the possible intellect suffices for a similar or more perfect universality. And so St. Thomas in other places cited speaks indifferently of the abstracting intellect, whether agent or possible. But more expressly Durandus teaches this of the possible intellect alone, In I, dist. 3, q. 5, n. 27, and In II, dist. 3, q. 7, n. 12. And it can be proved a fortiori by the reasons of the first opinion, because the concept or expressed species of the possible intellect represents more formally than the impressed species; therefore, if the intellect contemplates man precisely and abstractly, man, as represented in that concept, will be universal objectively, much better than if he were represented in the impressed species, because he has a more actual and more proper objective being, and according to that being he is universal. And it is confirmed, first, for man becomes singular through individuating differences; therefore, by the very fact that he prescinds from all of them through an actual abstract concept, he will become universal. It is confirmed, secondly, because, if man existed in the thing as he is presented to that concept, he would be universal in being, such as is attributed to Plato; therefore also now he is universal by denomination from the intellect. It is confirmed, thirdly, for if the intellect reflects upon man so conceived, considering his condition or as it were state, it knows that he is not some singular but something common to all singulars; in which conception the intellect is not deceived, as is evident, nor does it attribute to man so conceived something new, but conceives what was already in him; therefore before this reflection man was already universal through the prior direct conception. And to this can also serve the reason adduced for the preceding opinion, that the operation of the intellect supposes its object; for this is true of the object which is known through the operation, but not of the condition which results in the object in so far as it is known, when that condition is not known through such an act; because, since such a condition results from the act, it is compared to the power rather as active than as passive; and so it is in the present case; for the universality which is in a certain way said to be in, or belong to, the nature abstractly known is a certain condition or denomination resulting from such an act and mode of knowing, which nevertheless is not known through that act, but only the nature itself which is denominated universal; and therefore it is not necessary that the universality of that object be supposed before that action. But when afterwards the intellect reflects and contemplates that very condition or state of the abstract nature, it is then the object known through such an act; it is therefore supposed to that act; and yet that condition is nothing other than the universality of the nature; therefore universality is supposed before this reflexive, or (what is the same) comparative, knowledge; but it comes about through abstractive, or (what is the same) through direct and precise, knowledge of the universal nature.

5. The third opinion is that the universal comes about through comparative knowledge, by which the possible intellect, after it has apprehended the nature precisely and abstractly, compares it, so conceived, with the things in which it exists, and understands it as something one apt to be in many inferiors and to be predicated of them. And so according to this opinion the nature existing in singulars has universality only in remote potency, because it is not common either positively, as something truly one existing in many, or even negatively, as something proper to no singular thing. But there is only in it a certain likeness and agreement of several things among themselves which affords the occasion and remote foundation for universality. But the nature abstractly known can be called universal in proximate potency, because it is already common negatively, because it is conceived according to itself and not as proper to some individual; yet it is not yet judged to be actually universal, because it is not yet conceived as having an aptitude and relation to the many in which it is, which relation it receives through comparative knowledge; and therefore through that it is said ultimately to be constituted the universal in act. Which is further proved, because universality is not some thing having true existence, but is only a being or relation of reason; therefore it has being only objectively in the intellect; therefore it only is when it is actually made by the intellect, for then alone is it objectively in the intellect; therefore it only is through comparative knowledge, because through that alone is it made or thought out by the intellect. It is confirmed, for the universal as universal is relative, as is evident both from its definition, for it is defined through its correlative, namely: It is one in many and of many; and from its species, such as genus, species, difference, etc.; for these are said relatively, as is evident from the definitions given by Porphyry in the predicables; but relatives are simultaneous in nature and in knowledge; therefore the universal in act is not in the way in which it can be, namely objectively in the intellect, until its correlative is in the same way; but it cannot be in that way until one is compared to the other, which comes about only through the said comparative knowledge; therefore. And St. Thomas favours this opinion, who everywhere teaches that relations of reason are only in the apprehension of reason comparing one to another, as I, q. 28, a. 1, in the body and ad 4, and De potentia, q. 7, a. 1; and he indicates it in In Metaph. IV, lect. 4, and In Peri Hermeneias I, lect. 10. Cajetan too indicates it, treating in common of the relation of reason in the said q. 28 of the First Part, and in particular of the relation of universality, De ente et essentia, c. 4, q. 7, and a little before it. Scotus too is cited, Metaphysics VII, q. 11; Antonius Andreae, q. 17; and Antonius Trombeta, Metaphysics, q. 2, a. 1; for in the way in which they posit the universal in act through the intellect, they seem to place it in comparative knowledge rather than in prescissive. There is a difference, however, among these authors, in that some of them by comparative knowledge understand direct knowledge, by which the universal is compared with its inferiors as existing in them or predicable of them. So St. Thomas seems to think, and more clearly Scotus above, and In IV, dist. 2, q. 2; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, q. 18. But others understand reflex knowledge, by which, after the aforesaid comparison, the intellect conceives the comparison itself as a certain relation, and the nature compared as genus or species, etc., with respect to its inferiors.

Judgement is passed on the first opinion

6. Among these opinions the first is indeed probable on the supposition of that opinion that the agent intellect does not produce species representing individuals; and even that being supposed, it does not proceed generally of every universal, but at most of the specific one, and of that alone formally speaking, as a certain reason made above proves. And it can be declared more fully, because first of all it is certain that the agent intellect never impresses a species representing the difference alone, as it is a difference, but the whole specific nature. Because, just as the phantasm does not represent in the individual something after the manner of a form but after the manner of the whole individual, so the agent intellect produces a species representing the whole specific nature of the individual after the manner of a whole, nor can it prescind or change that action so as then to produce one species representing the difference after the manner of a form, and afterwards produce another representing the whole specific nature after the manner of a whole; because it is neither free in acting, but naturally impresses the species as much as it can, such a phantasm being supposed; nor is it cognitive so that it could now conceive the nature in one way, afterwards in another. Whence also in property and accident, although we grant that it effects species representing them in common, abstracting from individuals, nevertheless each of them by virtue of such an intelligible species is only represented as something common to many individuals similar in that notion. And the same holds in its own way in the generic grade, if perhaps sometimes on account of the weakness of the phantasm an intelligible species is produced representing precisely that grade; for, as the phantasm then represents only this animal, for example, so the intelligible species taken from it will represent the grade of animal only as abstracted and prescinded from similar individuals. And by this reason we say that, even that opinion being supposed, through this abstraction of the agent intellect nothing is per se abstracted except the specific nature. You will object that this discourse can be made of the abstraction made through the conception of the possible intellect, especially as regards the universal of property and accident. I answer that the reason is not equal, as will be evident from what we shall say in the following section.

7. I add, then, further that, if the notion and nature of the intelligible species is properly and truly understood, it is said quite improperly that the nature becomes universal through this abstraction; because, according to the true opinion, the impressed species is neither a formal image nor does it in any way represent formally, but effectively, in so far as it is as it were a seed or instrument of the object for effecting the formal intentional representation, which comes about through the concept of the mind. Whence the nature is not properly said to be objectively represented in the impressed species except very remotely and mediately, in so far as that species is effective of the act to which that nature is presented. And finally, even if we grant that the universal comes about in some way through the abstraction of the agent intellect, it will only be in habit or in first act; from which it comes about that it comes about much more and more perfectly through the second act proportioned to that first act, as I argued above. I omit that that first opinion proceeds from a false hypothesis; for it is simply truer that the species impressed by the agent intellect does not abstract from the representation of the same individual represented in the phantasm, but only from the real and entitative materiality of the phantasm itself, without which there can be a representation of the same individual, however material; for it is not repugnant that this be or come about through a spiritual form or quality or entity, as is evident in the angels and in God himself. And if it is not repugnant, no physical reason can be brought forward why such a form or species could not be made by the agent intellect; and without reason this is not to be denied, since it is more consonant both with various experiences and with the natural order of knowing, and with the end and natural activity of the agent intellect itself, which is given for this, that by means of a spiritual action it may render the possible intellect similar to the representation of the phantasm as far as it can; which it would be foreign to the present purpose to pursue and prove more fully here. But according to this opinion it is evident that the abstraction of the universal in no way comes about of necessity from the agent intellect, indeed perhaps cannot come about in any way; for, if the agent intellect is once posited as productive of species of singular things, it is probable that it can never produce species representing natures abstracted from singulars; but of this more fully in its place.

The other two opinions are examined and the question is resolved

8. The first opinion, then, being omitted, in order that we may judge of the other two, it is to be noticed that the universal can be conceived or denominated by us in two ways. First, as something absolute according to being, which can found some relation. Secondly, as relative according to being, expressing order to its inferiors. In the first way universal substance would be understood if man in reality were subsisting separated from every contraction, according to the Platonic opinion; nor would he be universal on account of a real relation according to being to his inferiors, but on account of his unity with an intrinsic and substantial aptitude to existing in many. In almost which way the Doctors cited in the preceding section said that the nature in the potential state, which it is feigned to have before existence in individuals, has a certain universality which does not consist in relation according to being, but in a certain absolute property of the nature having such unity and community; this is wont to be called by some the universal before the thing; which, if it were, would be absolute; yet in truth it is none. Indeed, even those who posit the universal actually really existing in the individuals themselves, which they call the universal in the thing, do not place its universality in relation. For they think that universality is real, but relation not at all, because either between the nature and the individuals there is not a sufficient distinction in the thing for a real relation, or the nature, as it prescinds from the individuals, does not have sufficient entity to found a real relation, since as such it does not have a singular entity in which such a relation could be founded. They place this universality, therefore, in an absolute property, which is a certain unity and community of such a nature. These examples, then, although they are not true, nevertheless declare that the concept of the universal as such is not the concept of a thing relative according to being, but of an absolute thing having such a mode of being, in which it has indifference and aptitude of being in many. Nor does it matter that this aptitude seems to be explained after the manner of a respect. For, just as in a real potency we understand a transcendental respect, and according to expression, prior to the predicamental respect according to being and included in the absolute thing, so in the present case we can conceive this aptitude of the universal thing as absolute indeed in itself, although it is explained after the manner of a transcendental respect. And hence it further comes about that this aptitude, because it is conceived after the manner of a potency having at least a transcendental order to those things to which it can communicate itself, can also be understood as a sufficient foundation for a relation or relationship to those to which it can communicate itself; which relationship is conceived as a certain relation according to being, and can also be called a certain universality, since it is a relationship of one to many in which it can be, or of which it can be predicated.

9. The universal, then, conceived in the former way, comes about through the direct operation of the intellect, which precisely and abstractly conceives the common nature without the contracting differences; which the reasons made in the second opinion sufficiently prove. And it can be confirmed by overthrowing the foundation of the third opinion; because no relation according to being is of the notion of the universal; therefore, although in the nature so abstracted no relation according to being to its inferiors is understood, it can be understood as actually universal. The consequence is evident, because, if that relation is not necessary, nothing else can be lacking, because there there is a common nature and after the manner of something subsisting abstractly from the individuals. Whence in that state through the intellect it is so related as it would be related really if in reality it subsisted outside the individuals; but then it would be really universal; therefore now too it is intellectually universal, so to speak. Finally, in the nature so conceived there is a new unity of reason, because it has one objective concept indivisible into several similar ones; it has also community, or aptitude to be in many and to be predicated of them; therefore nothing is lacking to it for the notion of the universal.

10. But speaking of the relation of universality as it is conceived by us after the manner of a relation according to being, this cannot result through abstraction alone, but, in the way in which it is, it comes about through comparison, because, as I suppose, this relation is not real but of reason; therefore it is not in the nature itself while it is thought absolutely and abstractly, because by virtue of that action it is not referred through the intellect, because the intellect does not yet compare it to its inferiors, nor is it referred really; therefore there is not yet such a relation. And the reasons adduced in the third opinion also sufficiently prove this. Wherefore, if those two opinions affirm one thing and do not exclude another, they are not contrary among themselves, nor do the reasons of one proceed against the other. Because nothing prevents that a twofold notion of universality can belong to the same nature through the intellect, namely absolute and respective, and that these are fashioned through diverse operations of the intellect, and that one, namely that which is absolute, is the proximate foundation of the other, namely the relative. Nor is it repugnant either that something belong to the nature through the intellect and be after the manner of something absolute, when it is such that it belongs only by extrinsic denomination; for in this way for the nature to be abstract, or universally conceived, adds to the nature only a certain being belonging to it by extrinsic denomination, which is called objective being. Just as to be seen or to be known is not some real being added to things, nor does it formally consist in a relation of reason, but in a denomination coming from the act of seeing or knowing, upon which the intellect can fashion a relation of reason if it compares one with the other; so, then, it is in the present case.

11. But it still remains to explain, concerning these opinions, of what kind is this prescissive or comparative knowledge through which the universal, said in each way, comes about. For in various ways the universal nature can be prescinded or compared. For, first, the common nature can be abstracted through pure prescission of the nature from one inferior, without any comparison either of the superior concept to some inferior or of the inferiors among themselves; as when from Peter alone I simply prescind the individuating properties and stop at the consideration of human nature. And through this purely prescissive knowledge some think that no universal comes about. It is truer, however, that through it too the absolute universal comes about, according to what we said of the second opinion. For the reasons made also prove this; although this knowledge does not suffice for knowing in the nature so conceived the universality or superiority which it has, as I shall say now.

12. Secondly, the common nature can be abstracted through the comparison of singulars or inferiors among themselves, as when, comparing Peter with Paul, I know that they are similar among themselves in human nature. Which comparison supposes the prior prescission, for it supposes that of each singular it is known that it is of such a nature; whence it supposes the concept of such a nature as it is prescinded from each individual. Whence through this comparison there is only added the knowledge of the agreement and likeness of several inferiors in such an abstract and prescinded nature. This comparison, however, can be further subdivided, in so far as through it can be considered either only the relationship of the particulars among themselves, as they have among themselves the relationship of similar things; and this comparison as such does not pertain to the constitution of the universal, but to the consideration of a certain mutual relation among the particulars themselves. Or in so far as through it is considered the relationship of the common nature to the particulars in which it exists. For after the intellect has apprehended that Peter and Paul are similar in being man, it again considers that this predicate man is related to Peter and Paul as something common to particulars; and in this comparison the notion of the universal, even respective, seems to be completed; for through it there arises in the mind, or rather in the thing presented to the mind, a relationship of reason of one common thing to several. But beyond this can be understood another more reflex knowledge, which the intellect makes by knowing, as it were in signified act, that the nature so abstracted and compared with its inferiors thence has the denominations of genus, species and the like, and that these denominations are of reason, not of the thing. But this knowledge is no longer the fashioning of universality, but is a certain more formal and express contemplation of it.