Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Universality is through the intellect with a foundation in the thing.—From all that has been said the true resolution concerning universal unity, and the answer to the arguments which were proposed in sect. 2, is easily gathered. It must be said, then, that universal unity arises through the function of the intellect, a foundation or occasion being taken from the singular things themselves. And so it is a certain unity of reason, belonging to natures as they are presented to the mind, and arising by denomination thence. I think this is the opinion of Aristotle in the places cited, who for this reason said, De Anima I, text 8, that the universal is either nothing or posterior, that is, after the operation of the intellect, as St. Thomas, Albert the Great and all the others understand there; and on this account the Commentator said there that the intellect makes universality in things. And in Metaphysics XII, comm. 4, he says that universals in Aristotle are collected from particulars in the intellect, which grasps the likeness among them and makes them one intention; and in comm. 27 he says that universals do not have being outside the soul; and in comm. 28 he says that there is no demonstration of the particular, although it alone is a thing in truth. The same is the opinion of St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4, and in the other places cited above, who cites Avicenna, Metaphysics V, c. 1. All the Thomists also agree in this: Capreolus, Cajetan, Soncinas and the others cited above. Durandus holds the same, In I, dist. 3, q. 5, and In II, dist. 3, q. 7; Giles, In I, q. 2 of the Prologue, and dist. 19, p. 1; and Scotus could be drawn into the same opinion, for his words are not repugnant, since he says that only the universal in potency is in things, not in act; and so his disciples seem to expound him, as Fonseca reports and treats at length, in the said c. 28, q. 5, sect. 2; but there is no reason why we should linger on him; for it matters little to us what Scotus thought, especially since his words are very equivocal. And Damascene is cited for this opinion, De fide III, c. 11, where he says that the nature is contemplated either by thought alone, or in all the hypostases of the same species, which it joins together, or in one individual only. Where by the nature contemplated by thought alone he understands the nature as universal; in which way he says that it does not exist, but is only thought; but in individuals he said that it exists, either in all according to its whole specific breadth as really existing, or in one only.

2. It is proved by reason, because the unity and the aptitude of being in many, in so far as they are necessary for the notion of the universal, do not belong to the nature itself really, but through the intellect; therefore universality too belongs to it in the same way. It is confirmed and declared, because, if the nature has universality before the intellect, then either in the individuals or in itself; not in the individuals, because neither as in one only, since in it it is individual and determined to one; nor in many or all at once, both because the nature can be universal even if it is found in one individual only; and also because no real property belongs to the nature as existing in many individuals which does not belong to it in each or in some of them, besides the very multitude of individuations or singularities, in which universality does not consist, as is self-evident. Nor can universality belong to the nature in itself, prescinding from the individuals, except through the intellect; because, if such a nature is taken as existing in the thing itself, it does not prescind from the nature of the thing from the individuals, since it is not distinguished from them from the nature of the thing, as has been shown; but if the nature is not existing in itself, it cannot be conceived what or of what kind that state of it is unless it has it objectively in the intellect, because it does not have it really nor can have it, nor is it distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals according to the being of essence or possible being either, considered in the same state, as has often been said. Finally, if to be universal belongs to the nature really, it belongs either per se or by accident; neither can be said; therefore it does not belong really; therefore only through reason. The minor as regards the first part is evident, because, if to be universal belonged per se to man, it would also belong to all individuals; for whatever belongs per se in the first or second mode to the superior belongs also to the inferior; and because no property can be adjoined to a superior nature by reason of the inferior which is repugnant to the essence or the properties belonging per se to it, since neither can these be separated from it nor remain together with repugnant properties. But as regards the latter part the minor is proved, because, if universality belongs really and contingently or accidentally, it will be some accident of the nature; therefore, if it is a real accident, it will belong to it by reason of some singular, as we argued above of unity and of the aptitude of being in many. Likewise this accident will belong to it through some action of an extrinsic agent, or through the lack of action, if it is feigned to be a privative accident; but every action of this kind regards individuals per se. Finally, it can neither be feigned nor explained what kind of real accident this is; it is, therefore, of reason and through reason.

3. The opposing reasons are solved.—To the contrary foundations posited in the second section, it has already been declared how the nature in the thing is communicable to many, not through some aptitude or indifference which belongs to the nature itself according to itself, but only through the non-repugnance of the singular things themselves to be able to have others similar to themselves; which non-repugnance is not enough for the notion of the universal, as has been declared. Whence to the first that consequence is denied: human nature is not of itself incommunicable; therefore it is of itself communicable; for rigorously it is from a negative to an affirmative on the side of that mode or term of itself; and it can happen that neither of them belongs to it of itself, although in the thing one of them is always in it. But if that particle of itself is not taken in that rigour, namely as the same as per se and from within, but only so that the nature of itself signifies the same as the nature from its formal notion and prescinded from every inferior difference, then the consequence can be conceded, rather by reason of the matter than by reason of the form. For the nature can be called communicable of itself in the sense explained above, because it is not repugnant to it to have several individuals similar among themselves in essence and nature, nor is it repugnant to one individual to have another similar to itself; which non-repugnance, however, does not suffice for the notion of the universal, as has been said. And the same answer is to be accommodated to the second argument; for in the real nature itself there is no positive and real aptitude to several individual differences, but there is only a non-repugnance, even in the individuals themselves, to be able to have others similar to themselves. And thence it comes both that the nature is called communicable, or apt to be in many, and that such a nature cannot be adequately contracted through one individual difference, as has been sufficiently expounded. To the third the answer is that all those attributes express in some way order to the intellect; but they are founded in things themselves, not in so far as in them the nature has some universality, but in so far as in the individuals themselves there is agreement and likeness in essence and its properties, and in the intrinsic connection which essence and properties have among themselves, by reason of which common objective concepts are abstracted, from which universal predications are made, of necessary and perpetual truth, as they are abstracted from time. And in this way science is said to be of universals and not of singulars, not because it is of common names,¹ but because it is of common objective concepts, which, although in the thing itself they are not distinguished from singulars, are nevertheless distinguished by reason; and this is enough for all the aforesaid expressions. Which the nominalists did not sufficiently notice, and therefore they spoke otherwise, although in the thing they do not differ much from us, as we have said. Through which the last confirmation has been answered. To the other foundations nothing remains to be answered, for satisfaction has been made to all from what has been said.