Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting is sufficiently evident from what was said in the two preceding sections, and chiefly from the arguments proposed in sect. 2; for this doubt has been proposed in order to solve them more clearly.

2. The aptitude to be in many is nothing in the nature as it exists in reality.—I say, first: the aptitude of the common nature to be in many is not something belonging to the nature itself as it exists in reality. This conclusion is very widely received, and, as it seems, evident, especially if we suppose what has often been said, that the universal is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the singulars or inferiors. It is proved, then, because in reality there is nothing but the singular and individual, and in the singulars themselves there is nothing distinct from them from the nature of the thing; therefore in the nature, as it exists in reality, there cannot be any aptitude to being in many. The consequence is evident, because in the individual thing as such there is not such an aptitude or non-repugnance, but rather the opposite repugnance; but the nature, as it exists in the nature of things, is individual, altogether undistinguished in the thing from the individuals themselves. Some say that, although in the existing nature there is not a proximate potency to be in many, because as such it is contracted and determined to one, there is nevertheless a remote aptitude, because as far as depends on itself, if the contraction is taken away, it can be communicated to many; just as prime matter existing under one form and under dispositions accommodated to it is not proximately apt for other forms, yet retains its remote aptitude for them. But the example is not to the point, because matter and its substantial aptitude to form is one singular entity in number, really distinct from the form and from the dispositions which it now has, which can lose this form and receive another; and therefore it is not wonderful that matter existing under one form retains a radical aptitude to receive others. But the common nature as contracted to this individual is not something distinct from the nature of the thing from it or from the contracting difference; nor can it happen that human nature, for example, existing in Peter, the same according to the thing, should lose the individuation which it has in Peter and acquire another; and therefore, as it exists in the thing, it has neither a proximate nor a remote relationship to existing in many, neither at the same time nor successively.

3. Whence I argue, secondly, because every common nature, as it exists in the thing in each individual, is so determined to it that the same according to the thing cannot be determined to another; therefore in no individual is it undetermined to several individuals; for to be determined to this and to be undetermined to several are opposed contradictorily or privatively; therefore in no individual does it have a real aptitude to being in many, because this aptitude cannot be without indifference; therefore absolutely, as it exists in the nature of things, it does not have that aptitude, because it does not exist except determined in the aforesaid way in the individuals. You will say that it is not repugnant that it be of itself indifferent, but determined by the individual difference; both, therefore, the nature existing in individuals will be able to have. The answer is: whatever may be the case with the true sense of that assumed proposition, The nature is of itself indifferent, of which I shall speak immediately, nevertheless from it it is only gathered that the nature does not have determination without the individual difference; which, although it is so, nevertheless, after such an individual difference is adjoined to the nature, the nature so contracted cannot remain actually indifferent. But at most it can be said that, if it did not have that contraction, it would be indifferent; but because in fact it is never without such contraction, therefore in fact it never exists indifferent nor with an aptitude to be indifferent.

4. Thirdly this is declared, because the universal nature does not exist in many except through identity with each of them; but such a nature, identified with one individual, cannot, the same according to the thing and according to real existence, be identified with others; therefore such a nature, as it is in the thing itself communicated to individuals and exists in them, cannot have a real aptitude to being in many. The major is certain from what was said above, in which we showed that the universal is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the singulars. Indeed for the efficacy of the aforesaid reason real identity suffices; for by reason of identity itself a genus already contracted to one species cannot, the same according to the thing and real existence, be contracted to another. In genus, then, species and essential difference the major proposition assumed is evident, because, since these are essential to their inferiors and are essentially predicated of them, not after the manner of a part but after the manner of a whole, because a part is not predicated of the whole, it is necessary that, in so far as they are predicated of them, they be in them through identity, because nothing is more identified with each thing than its essence. But of property and accident someone may hesitate, because these do not seem to be in their inferiors through identity, but through information. But we are speaking chiefly of the former universals; for the most proper unity of the universal nature is with respect to the inferiors which are essentially contained under it. Nevertheless, even in property and accident as they are universals, the proposition assumed holds true. For property and accident do not have the notion of universal as they are certain physical forms informing their subjects; both because under this notion they are considered in the abstract, in which way they are not predicated of their subjects; and also because even in this way there is no property or accident in the thing itself which is of itself universal for informing several subjects. And although, according to the common notion of some property or accident, for example whiteness or risibility, it can in some way be called a universal form with respect to such subjects, nevertheless this very thing does not belong to this form except in so far as its common notion exists through identity in the individual forms informing such subjects. And in this way such an aptitude to being in many is reduced to the mode of being in inferiors through identity. But properly these are called universals in so far as, taken in the concrete, they are apt to be predicated of their subjects; and so they too are in them through identity, not by reason of the accidental form but by reason of the supposit. For one thing is truly predicated of many and of each in so far as it is the same with them; for an affirmative proposition stating that this is that, in order to be true, requires some identity between predicate and subject, because it is necessary that they stand for the same thing and that they signify the same either explicitly or implicitly. So, then, it is true that every universal is in its inferiors through identity, which was the major proposition assumed. But the minor has been sufficiently proved in the preceding reason, and is almost evident from the terms, because the specific nature, for example, as it exists in the thing, is so identified with each individual in which it is that, in so far as it is in it, it cannot lose identity with it, and consequently as such cannot have real identity with others; it is therefore repugnant to such a nature that in the thing it should have an aptitude to being in many through identity; therefore, since the act of being in many of the universal nature is through identity, a real aptitude for such an act is repugnant to be found in the nature existing in reality.

5. A third reason can be adjoined, because, if this aptitude is in the existing nature, then the aptitude itself also exists in the thing; therefore the aptitude itself too is singular and individual, for whatever exists in the thing is singular and individual; therefore such an aptitude will be in some individual nature; for it cannot be separated by itself, but in the nature, since it is its property and aptitude; but since it is really existing and individual, it is necessary that it be in a nature really existing and individual; and consequently, since there is no greater reason concerning one individual nature than concerning others, such an aptitude will be in all and each individual natures. But hence many absurdities follow. The first, that there are as many universal human natures as there are natures contracted in individuals, because each of them is one in itself, having its proper and real aptitude of being in many distinct from the aptitude of another. For it cannot be feigned that the same aptitude in number of being in many is in all individual natures. Otherwise it would also have to be said that the same nature in number is contracted to each individual, than which nothing can be more absurd. The consequence is evident because the aptitude is only in the nature; indeed it cannot even be feigned as a thing distinct from the nature; therefore, if the aptitude is one in number in all, the nature too will be one in number in all. Likewise, either that aptitude is called one in number as it were collectively, so that it is not whole in each nature, but in each there is something of that aptitude and from all results one aptitude to several individuals; and this is beside the point, because according to that explanation in each individual nature there is only an aptitude of being in itself, and none has an aptitude of being in many. But if the discussion is of a collection, just as the whole collection of aptitudes is considered after the manner of one, so also the whole collection of natures can be considered; but that, as such, that is, as one collectively, is not in many, because the whole collection is not in each individual nature but in the aggregate of all; this unity of collection, therefore, is irrelevant to the notion of the universal, which must be in many in such a way that the whole is in each of them. Or that aptitude is simply one in itself and is whole in each and in all individuals; and then the same will have to be said of the nature itself, for the same reason, and because it is not a greater inconvenience to admit this in the nature itself than in that aptitude. But that each is most absurd is evident; both because this is much more than to posit one accident in number at the same time in diverse subjects; and also because a repugnance is involved in the terms when it is said that the same nature in number is contracted to several individuals; because, if it is the same in number, then it is one in number and individual; therefore incommunicable to many individuals. Again, it follows that in each individual there is some intrinsic real aptitude to the individual difference of another individual; but this is impossible, because to what is altogether repugnant there cannot be a real aptitude; but it is altogether repugnant that something which is essentially and really in me should be contracted and individuated through the individual difference of another man; therefore there cannot be in me a real aptitude to this.

6. The aptitude to existing in many does not belong to the common nature according to itself before the intellect.—I say, secondly: the aptitude to existing in many is not some real property belonging to the common nature according to itself before the operation of the intellect. This assertion can be proved by almost the same reasons by which we showed a little before that the nature according to itself does not have unity of prescission except through the intellect; for these two follow each other. For if the nature as actually existing is not really apt to be in many, it is because it does not exist except contracted and determined to this or that individual; therefore such an aptitude to being in several cannot belong except to the nature as prescinded from every contraction; therefore, if the nature does not have this prescission of itself, but through the intellect, neither will it be able to have this aptitude according to itself before every intellect. Secondly, because, if this aptitude belongs to the nature according to itself before every intellect, it belongs either to the existing nature or to the non-existing one; not indeed to the existing nature, as has been shown, because it does not exist except made individual through identity; nor can it belong to the non-existing nature, because, in order that a non-existing nature can be conceived as having this aptitude, it must at least be conceived as possible, because to be able to be in many intrinsically includes and supposes to be able to be; but it has been shown that the nature as possible is as individual as the nature as existing; it cannot, therefore, be more in the nature as possible than as existing.

7. Thirdly: for I inquire what this aptitude is. They answer that it is a certain positive mode belonging to the nature according to itself, in which the non-repugnance of the nature to being in many is founded; yet that that mode is not actual but potential, that is, such that it cannot belong to the actually existing nature, but only to the nature existing in potency or objectively. From which it also comes about that such a mode is not altogether inseparable from the nature, but rather separable, because the actually existing nature does not have such an aptitude nor such a mode of being. Just as (they say) the mode of being which a thing has in its causes is a real mode, belonging to things as long as they do not exist, which ceases to belong to them as soon as they are produced, because they are now said to be not in their causes but outside their causes. But these things do not meet with my approval: for I do not sufficiently conceive a real and positive mode which it is impossible should exist in the nature of things. For, in the way in which something is called positive and real, it is enclosed under the breadth of real being; but real being is not except in order to the act of being; therefore that to which the act of being is altogether repugnant cannot be comprehended under the breadth of real being; therefore it can be neither a thing nor a real positive mode. But if it is not a real mode, it will be a mode of reason, and consequently will not belong to the nature before the intellect. Moreover here too the argument made above urges, that contingent predicates do not belong to the nature according to itself, but by reason of something added, or of the state which it has in the thing or the intellect; if, therefore, this aptitude belongs to it of itself, and not by reason of some state, it will also belong to it per se and not contingently; therefore it will belong to it inseparably, which they deservedly deny, because in the individuals it does not belong to it.

8. Next, of that aptitude which is said to be conceived as a certain real potential mode, I shall also inquire whether it is to be conceived as one in number, or as one only in species and multipliable in number. This latter cannot be said, because it would be necessary to conceive it as multipliable in individuals, which is repugnant. The first too can scarcely be conceived by the mind; for how can one real aptitude in number be conceived in order to several distinct individual differences, when in truth there is none which, the same in number, can at the same time or successively be contracted in all of them? But if it is said that that is not one in number simply, but in a certain respect, namely by common numerical unity, it has already been shown that no such unity can be understood except through reason. Finally, either that aptitude intrinsically follows upon the formal unity of the specific nature, or it comes to it from without. If the first is said, it follows that it can no more be one in number than formal unity itself is, which we showed is not one in number, since it is multipliable in number. It follows also that that aptitude is found wherever formal unity is found, which is false; otherwise it would be found in the individuals. But if the second is said, it will have to be assigned whence, or from what principle or cause, this aptitude comes to the nature having such a formal notion; it will then have to be declared in what state or under what condition, which holds itself on the side of the nature itself and not on the side of the intellect, that nature is to be feigned or conceived which is as it were the adequate subject of that aptitude; and it will plainly be understood that neither of these can be declared except in order to the abstraction and separation which is made in the mind, because, this being excluded, there is no common nature distinct from the nature of the thing from the individuals, either in the state of actual existence or in the potential state, or in the being of essence or possible being, as has often been declared.

9. Whether the mode of being in the cause is something real in the effect.—But that example of the potential mode which a thing is said to have in its cause before it exists in no way helps the aforesaid opinion. First, because that mode, in so far as it is said or thought to be real, is sometime in the nature of things, namely as long as the thing is said to be in its cause. Next, because that mode too either does not cease to be when the thing is produced outside its causes, or, in so far as it ceases to be, it is not a positive mode but rather a privative one; for when a thing is said to have being only in its causes before it exists, two things are said: the first is that in the cause there is a power for giving being to such a thing, which power as it were by extrinsic denomination denominates the effect to be, not simply but in its cause; and as regards this such being in the cause is not lost even if the thing is produced in itself and outside the cause, because the power of the cause remains integral. The other thing which is indicated when a thing is said to have being in its cause is that it does not yet exist in itself; and this is what is lost when it is produced in itself; but this is not positive but privative, as is evident. You will say that beyond these there is on the side of the effect a certain potential mode by which it is called possible, which mode is lost from the moment it begins to exist. The answer is that this is not a positive mode on the side of the effect distinct from the aforesaid, because, as will be said below in treating of essence and existence, the objective aptitude of possible things to exist is on their side nothing but a certain non-repugnance, and on the side of the cause denotes the power to produce them. Although, as regards the present point, even if we granted that that aptitude is a positive mode, it would consequently have to be said that, when the thing is produced, it does not lose that aptitude as regards the positive, but only as regards the lack of its act; for the thing, when it exists, is not less apt to exist than before; but it only has the act of existing which it did not have before; nor is it likely that it loses a real positive mode precisely through this, that it actually begins to exist.

10. I say, thirdly: the aptitude of the common nature to be in many is only a certain indifference or non-repugnance, which has a foundation in the nature itself according to itself, but actually belongs to it only as it underlies the abstraction of the intellect. This assertion is common, and the authors cited seem to agree in it, especially Cajetan and the other Thomists. But it is first to be declared, then proved. For in two ways it can be understood that this indifference belongs to the nature according to itself. First, that the non-repugnance itself belongs per se to the nature by virtue of its formal unity. And this sense is false; otherwise the non-repugnance or indifference (which is the same) would be inseparable from the nature, and consequently the nature, as existing in the thing, would have that non-repugnance, which is openly false; for as it is in the thing it is so intrinsically and through identity made individual that to be in many is repugnant to it. In another way it can be understood merely negatively, namely that the nature by virtue of its formal unity precisely taken does not have repugnance to being in many. And this sense is true. From which the conclusion is easily evident as regards each part; for first of all such a non-repugnance so explained is founded in the formal unity itself, which of itself is not individual; and in this way the nature, even existing in the thing, can be said to have this non-repugnance, because even in the thing itself it is not incommunicable by virtue of its formal unity but by virtue of individual unity; for although the whole nature and the formal unity which is in the individual is incommunicable, and it is repugnant to it to be in many, nevertheless it does not have this by virtue of the formal unity of the nature, but from individuation.

11. And hence the other part is confirmed, namely that this aptitude to being in many, even explained through non-repugnance, does not belong to the common nature as existing in reality in so far as it is necessary for the notion of the universal. Because, in order that the nature be universal, it is not enough that of itself it not have determination to one, if from elsewhere, at least from the adjoined individual difference, it has it; but it is required that it be absolutely and simply indifferent. But as it exists in reality it is not so indifferent, but rather is simply determined to one wherever it exists; therefore the nature, as it exists in the thing, does not have indifference or non-repugnance. It is confirmed and declared, because the repugnance of being in many belongs to the existing nature by reason of the individual difference; therefore for the nature to be apt to exist in many through non-repugnance is nothing other than to be apt to exist in many through abstraction or prescission from every individual difference; but this prescission and abstraction does not belong to the nature as existing in reality, nor does it belong to it in some state which precedes every consideration of the intellect, because there is no such state in which the nature according to itself abstracts from individuals, either existing or possible, as was declared above; therefore. Finally it is confirmed from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, because this aptitude or repugnance does not belong to the existing nature according to itself before every act of the intellect; therefore it can only belong to it as it underlies the conception of the intellect. Especially because it has already been declared that this non-repugnance or indifference consists in, or arises from, the separation of all inferior or individual differences; but this separation in no way precedes in the nature itself, neither in the existing thing nor taken in some state of possibility, but only as it is objectively in the intellect; therefore.

12. Objection. Answer. Why several individuals can be under one species and not under another.—But someone will press: that several individuals can be multiplied under the same species does not come from the intellect, but is founded in the very nature of the thing; therefore also the aptitude of being in many belongs to the nature of itself and not from the intellect. The consequence is evident, because these two are either the same or in the thing itself follow each other mutually, namely that individuals can be multiplied under the same species and that the specific nature can be communicated to them. But the antecedent is evident, both because that individuals are multipliable under the same species is not something feigned through reason but found in things themselves; and also from the contrary, because, if the angelic nature (as many wish) is not multipliable in number, this comes from some real and intrinsic property of it, which is most certain in the divine nature; therefore conversely that human nature is multipliable in number is a real property of it and not something thought out by reason. The answer is that this argument confirms the conclusion, and concludes that the aptitude of being in many is fundamentally and remotely in things themselves, but not proximately as it expresses the indifference and indetermination of the common nature to one. But this remote and proximate aptitude is not used by us in the sense in which some (as I was saying above) assert that an aptitude or potency under one act is remote to others, and that the nature existing in the thing has this aptitude; for this has been sufficiently disproved by us. But I call the remote foundation of this aptitude the natural condition or property of such a nature, by reason of which the multiplication of individuals within the same species is not repugnant to it; but this property is not some aptitude of the common nature as such, which would be understood as a certain potency actuable through several differences, but is only such a perfection and limitation of a nature of this kind. Whence this property which founds this indifference or non-repugnance can be understood not only in the common and prescinded nature, but also in the particulars or individuals themselves, as they are such. As, for example, in the human species each individual is of such a condition that it is not repugnant to it to have another similar in species; and it is common to both or all the individuals of that species that it is not repugnant to them to have others similar only according to some genus and not in species, which comes to them either from the fact that they are material or from the fact that they are finite substances, to which it is not repugnant to have among themselves univocal likeness or agreement. So, then, it is rightly understood both that this aptitude of being in many has a foundation in things themselves, and that such a foundation is not to be feigned as some positive aptitude in the thing itself, common and indifferent, but as the limitation or condition of such things which include nothing in their entity by reason of which it is repugnant to them to have other things similar to themselves in perfection, or equal. And finally it is understood that this foundation of indifference or non-repugnance is not to be feigned only in the common nature according to itself, but in the individuals and singular things themselves; because, although in each individual the nature is determined to it only, nevertheless it is so in it that by virtue of it it is not repugnant that it be in another similar one, or rather that a similar nature be in another individual; and this alone is the sufficient foundation of its indifference and aptitude of being in many, which is in the common nature as abstracted by the intellect, and is not some indetermination which the nature itself has of itself or in the individuals.

13. Answer.—To the objection in form, then, I concede the antecedent, namely that it is founded in things themselves, and not in the operation of the intellect, that some individual things similar in species can be multiplied; but I distinguish the consequent, namely that the aptitude of being in many belongs to the nature of itself. For it can be understood of the proximate aptitude, that is, that which is conceived by us after the manner of a certain capacity prescinded from all contracting differences and actuable by them; and in this sense the consequence is denied, because, in order that individuals can be multiplied in the thing in the same species, such a capacity which precedes in the thing in the nature is not necessary, but it suffices that in the individuals there be no property by reason of which it is repugnant to them to have other similar ones. But if that consequent is understood of the remote foundation in the aforesaid sense, then the consequence is conceded; yet it is not against what we have said, as is evident. Whence what is said in the proof of the consequence, namely that these two are the same, that individuals can be multiplied in the same species and that the specific nature can be communicated to them, is also equivocal. For in the multiplication of individuals of the same species there is in the thing no other communication of the nature than a certain assimilation and agreement among the individuals themselves; whence neither is there in the common nature according to itself another aptitude to be communicated to many than there is in the individuals themselves the non-repugnance of having other similar ones. If, therefore, by the communication of the specific nature nothing else is understood, the whole is conceded and nothing is inferred against what has been said. But if (as the words rather sound) it is understood that the nature can be multiplied in many after the manner of a certain aptitude of a superior common nature, which, since it is one, is conceived as diffusing and communicating itself to many, this is a work of reason and our mode of understanding; for in the thing nothing of this kind precedes, nor is it necessary for the multiplication of individuals similar among themselves.