Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Before we answer the arguments of the contrary opinion, an objection which occurs here must be treated, and a certain opinion which has seemed to me almost singular and new. It can be objected, then, against the preceding resolution, that any common nature, for example human, not only in so far as it has been abstracted by the intellect, but also in so far as of itself it prescinds from the individual differences and is prior in the order of nature to them, has a certain unity; because as such it is not several, but one only; but that unity, since it belongs to the nature of itself, will be real; therefore it will suffice for the notion of the universal. Concerning this Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 28, q. 3, sects. 2, 3 and 4, thinks that there belongs to the universal nature taken according to itself a certain unity which it does not communicate to its inferiors, but which belongs to it alone and precisely before it exists, both in the nature of things and in the intellect; which unity he says is distinct from formal unity, because the latter is multiplied in individuals, but not the former. He calls that unity, however, a unity of prescission, or numerical, not simply and absolutely, but of the common nature, which is a diminishing condition; whence he also calls it in a certain way mixed of formal and numerical. And for this opinion he cites St. Thomas, Opusc. 42, De natura generis, cc. 7 and 8, where he indicates that there are universal natures having a certain unity belonging to the nature absolutely taken, which is not communicated to the individuals of such a nature, nor belongs to the nature through the intellect. He cites also Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 40, where he says that the nature considered according to itself, that is, neither as it is in individuals nor as it is in the intellect, has a certain unity; and he does not seem to speak of formal unity, because he adds that the nature does not communicate this unity to its inferiors; and Capreolus thinks the same, In III, dist. 5, q. 5, a. 3, on the arguments of Scotus against the first conclusion, where he affirms this not of all universals but of some, from St. Thomas in the place cited, namely of those which have not only logical but also physical unity and agreement. Which limitation makes the matter more difficult and more obscure, because it is impossible to find a universal unity not founded in formal unity, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said; but formal unity being supposed, the reason is the same as regards every other unity in any universal nature whatever; because every such nature can be considered according to itself and absolutely, and as such the same non-repugnance, indifference or indivision is found in any one whatever; and therefore Fonseca does not admit that limitation, but generally attributes this unity of prescission to all universal natures.

2. But if you ask where or when this unity belongs to such a nature, he answers that the existing nature never has a unity of this kind, because in the individuals it does not have it, since in them it is contracted; but the nature has existence only in individuals; nor does it belong to it only as it is in the intellect, because it belongs to it according to itself before it is understood to have anything from the intellect; nor does it belong to it by mere extrinsic denomination, but through a true negation or indivision belonging to the nature itself according to itself. And Soncinas, above, thinks this very thing, who on this account says that this unity is not actual but potential; and each explains it through this conditional, that, if the nature existed without contraction to individuals, it would have this unity. But if you object again that, if this unity belongs per se to the nature absolutely taken, it will be inseparable from it, for what belongs per se to something always belongs, nor can its opposite belong to it; but in the individuals the nature does not have that unity, but rather the opposite multitude; therefore that unity cannot belong per se to such a nature: they answer that that per se, or according to itself, can be taken in two ways: first, as signifying the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject, as of its essence or intrinsically flowing from it; in which way Aristotle took it when he enumerated two modes of per se, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4; and in this way the argument rightly proves that the aforesaid unity does not belong per se to the universal nature; in another way per se is taken for that which is absolutely or solitarily, and in this way this unity is said to belong to the nature taken according to itself or per se; because, that nature being considered absolutely and solitarily, that is, in so far as it does not have the contracting or individuating differences adjoined, it at once has that unity. For it is not necessary that whatever belongs to the nature taken according to itself in this latter way should also belong per se in the former way, that is, from within and necessarily; for many predicates, especially negative ones, can belong contingently to it so taken, such as not to exist, not to be generated or corrupted, not to be white, black, or all similar things which do not belong to the common nature except by reason of the individuals. So, then, this unity of prescission, which consists in a negation or privation, belongs to the nature considered according to itself and absolutely, because as such the differences by which it is contracted and divided do not belong to it; yet it does not belong to it per se and necessarily, because by means of the inferiors its opposite can belong to it.

3. Refutation of the preceding opinion.—Predicates belonging to the nature solitarily belong per se in the posterior-analytic sense.—Porphyry.—But nevertheless this opinion cannot meet with my approval; for (to omit that it is plainly contrary to St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4, and Cajetan there, and other authors cited and to be reported below, concl. 4) I do not sufficiently understand of what kind can be a unity which belongs to the nature before the intellect and yet can never belong to it as existing in inferiors or in singulars; for, if that unity belongs to the nature before the intellect, then it is real unity; therefore it can sometime really belong to the nature itself; therefore it is necessary that it can belong to it in the individuals or in some individual; for nothing belongs really to the nature at all except what can belong to it as existing in some individual. For what they say, that this unity belongs really to the nature according to the being of essence, not according to the being of existence, does not seem able to be understood; because, as I said above in treating of the concept of being and shall say again below in treating of the essence and existence of creatures, the being of essence cannot be conceived as real unless it at least in aptitude includes order to existence; therefore, if this unity cannot belong to the essence as existing, neither does it belong to it as apt to exist; because, just as it does not exist except as individual, so neither is it apt to exist except as individual; therefore it in no way belongs to it really. And it is confirmed, because no predicate, either positive or negative, belongs to the nature taken according to itself and solitarily, unless either it belongs to it per se in the posterior-analytic sense, or it can belong to the individuals; but this unity does not belong in the said per se way to the nature taken according to itself, as they themselves confess; nor can it belong to it by reason of the individuals, because rather as such it is repugnant to it; indeed, by the very fact that it is taken in the individuals, it is no longer considered per se and solitarily; therefore it in no way belongs per se primarily. The major is evident from Porphyry, chapter on Common Features; from St. Thomas, Cajetan and others in the places cited. And by induction it is evident in negative predicates too (for of positive ones there is no reason for doubting), because not to be white, or black, etc., belong to man as such in so far as they can belong to some individual of man; indeed even not to exist, although it cannot belong to man by reason of some existing individual, nevertheless belongs to him in so far as either some or all individuals of human nature do not exist. The reason is that these predicates are contingent, and therefore do not belong to the species except by reason of the individuals.

4. An objection is answered.—But if anyone objects that there are some negative predicates which belong to the common nature according to itself and yet do not belong to the individuals, as seem to be these, not to be generated, not to be corrupted (for it is repugnant that the universal nature absolutely taken be generated, or created, or even exist), it must be said that this is a sophistical equivocation; for the sense of those negations can be manifold. The first is that the abstract nature can neither be generated nor corrupted nor be; and in this way those negations are true; yet, if they are rightly understood, they are not said of the nature according to itself and absolutely taken, but as having a certain state which it can have only through the intellect; for really there is no nature so abstract and solitary, but it is considered through the intellect, and such a negation is attributed to it as so considered. Wherefore it is not wonderful that it does not belong to it in the individuals, because through existence in the individuals that state is destroyed by reason of which such a negation belongs to the nature. Whence, if that unity of prescission is to be compared with these negations, it is rather gathered hence that it does not belong to the nature except as it underlies the operation of the intellect abstracting and prescinding it. Another sense of those negations is that the common nature absolutely is not generated nor corrupted; and this can be understood either that it is not generated in any way, and so it is false, for at least secondarily it is generated and exists in the individuals; or that it is not generated per se primarily, but by reason of the individuals, and this is true; yet this can also be said of the nature existing in the individuals, as Aristotle says that second substances exist in first ones and by reason of them, and consequently not per se primarily. Whence this negation taken in this sense does not belong to the nature contingently, but per se and necessarily; just as conversely to become and to be per se primarily belong to individuals, if they must belong to anything. No contingent predicates, therefore, even negative ones, belong to common natures except either by reason of the individuals, or in the individuals themselves, or by reason of the state which they have in the intellect.

5. Finally I argue in this way against the said opinion: because the common nature is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals, but only through the intellect; therefore it cannot have some unity according to itself which it does not have in the individuals, except only through the intellect. The antecedent has often been proved; the consequence is proved, first, because real one follows upon being; therefore, if the nature according to itself does not have an entity distinct from the entity of the individuals, neither can it have a real unity distinct from the unity of the individuals; therefore it can have of itself no unity which it does not have in the individuals, but every other is through the intellect. Secondly, the same consequence is proved from the very terms which the other opinion uses; for it calls this unity a unity of prescission; if, therefore, prescission is not in the thing, nor belongs to the nature according to itself, but only through the intellect, neither can unity belong to the nature according to itself, the intellect being excluded. Indeed, if anyone considers rightly, by the very fact that according to itself is said in the sense declared above, the operation of the intellect is involved, because the nature is not prescinded or separated from all individual differences except by the work of the intellect. Whence, whatever belongs to the nature taken according to itself, properly and peculiarly by reason of that condition or state which is explained by that particle according to itself in the aforesaid sense, belongs to it through the intellect; but the aforesaid unity is of this kind, as has been shown.

6. A vindication from a charge.—And hence it is understood in passing that no equivocation is committed by St. Thomas, Cajetan and others (as Fonseca thought) when they say that whatever belongs to the nature according to itself or per se belongs to it as existing in the individuals, because whatever belongs per se to something always belongs; for in each place they take per se in the same way, namely in the posterior-analytic sense, as in truth it is to be taken. And similarly, when the same authors distinguish that something belongs to the nature in three ways, namely either as existing in individuals, or as in the intellect, or according to itself, they take according to itself in the same sense, namely for that which belongs to the nature per se and from within, and not by reason of some state of contraction or of prescission or abstraction. For they suppose (what we have shown is true) that nothing can belong proximately and immediately to the nature, in so far as it is such a nature, unless it also belongs per se; and conversely that whatever belongs contingently to the common nature belongs to it by reason of the state of individuation which it has in the thing, or of the separation which it has through the intellect. Whence, in order that the equivocation may be more openly removed, every predicate which is said immediately (so to speak) of the common nature, that is, not by reason of the individuals, can be said to belong to it according to itself; yet this predicate can be twofold: one belonging to the nature as precisely having such a formal notion, as to be a rational animal, and consequently to be risible, capable of wonder, etc.; and predicates of this kind are said most properly to belong to the nature according to itself and per se, that is, from the precise fact that it is such a nature. And in this way is the discussion of St. Thomas and others of the nature according to itself, when they distinguish it from its twofold state, namely in the individuals or in the intellect; and therefore they rightly conclude that whatever belongs in this way to the nature according to itself belongs to it wherever and however it exists. But other predicates can be said to belong to the nature according to itself, that is, taken in common, yet not by reason of the nature itself but by reason of that prescission and separation which that particle according to itself circumscribes. And such a consideration of the nature coincides with the state which the nature has through the intellect, and those predicates similarly coincide with the attributes which belong to that nature by reason of that state; otherwise it would be necessary to apply a fourth consideration of the nature besides the threefold one just expounded, which is unheard of. Since, therefore, that unity is said to belong to the nature according to itself, yet not by the very fact that the nature is such, but by the precise fact that it is taken or considered according to itself, it is plainly convinced that that unity does not belong to the nature except according to the state which it has in the intellect.

7. Thirdly, the same principal consequence of the argument is proved and declared more fully, because the actually existing nature is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individual, and therefore as such it cannot have a real unity repugnant to individuation, such as a common unity would be; but the nature even taken in common as possible, or according to the being of essence, is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals, taken also in possible being or according to the being of individual essence; therefore by the same reason there cannot belong to such a nature according to itself and before the intellect some unity repugnant to individual unity, such as that unity of prescission or common numerical unity would be. The major is evident from what has been said, and is not denied by the others. The minor is easily proved, because the proportion of possible things among themselves is the same as that of existing things among themselves, because no other things exist or come to be except those which are possible. Nor does possible humanity have another essence than that which it has while it exists; therefore, if humanity as such, when it actually exists, is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from this and that humanity, neither is humanity as possible distinguished from the nature of the thing from this and that possible humanity. Indeed, if we speak properly, humanity is not possible except in so far as this and other individual humanities are possible, just as humanity does not exist except in so far as an individual humanity exists. But the consequence is proved by the same reason and proportion, because possible humanity is not other than this and that humanity according to the thing and the intellect being excluded; therefore repugnant unities cannot belong to it. And it is confirmed, for if this unity belongs to the nature before the intellect, to what nature, I ask, does it belong? To the singular? And this not, as is self-evident and they themselves confess. Or to the common in so far as it is common? And this not, because there is no such nature even possible, the operation of the intellect being taken away. Or to the nature as it is nature, adjoining nothing else even through the intellect? And this not either, because as such the nature has only formal unity, which is communicated to the individuals and multiplied in them; therefore, the intellect being excluded, there can be no adequate subject and foundation of such a unity.

8. The foundation of the opposite opinion is overthrown.—To the difficulty, then, the answer is by denying what is assumed in it, namely that human nature, for example, has of itself some unity distinct from formal unity. That objection proceeds from a false principle, namely that the specific nature of itself prescinds from the individuals by some real prescission, or one which belongs to it from the nature of the thing; whereas in truth it does not prescind except through the intellect abstracting and conceiving the common nature without the individuals, of which prescission there is indeed a foundation in the nature itself; but this is not other than formal unity, which is multiplied in the individuals and is in them through identity. Another false thing too seems to be supposed in that objection, namely that the specific nature, for example, is prior in the order of nature to the individuals and as such has that unity of prescission or common numerical unity; for, if the discussion is of real priority, that is, founded in some real causality or relationship or real order, this is not true; both because where there is no distinction from the nature of the thing there cannot be real order or causality; and also because neither in the notion of existing nor in the being of essence can such a priority be understood. The first is evident because, if there is any order, rather the specific nature exists because some individual of it exists, as Aristotle said of first and second substances. The second is evident, because the being of essence prescinded from existence is nothing other than the entity of the thing in possible being, as will be shown below; but we have proved that also in this way universals are possible by reason of possible singulars. But if the being of essence is taken for the quidditative predicates precisely taken and abstracted from the individuating differences, such a being of essence involves an operation of reason conceiving the common notion in which the individuals agree, abstracted from their proper differences. But if the common essence taken in this way is said to be prior in nature, not by a proper and real priority, but by that which is called priority in the consequence of subsisting, that is rather a priority of reason; for it involves a concept of the mind abstracting the common notion from singulars; whence to be prior in this way is nothing other than to be more universal. But from this priority no numerical unity can be gathered which would belong to the nature according to itself before the individuals and before every intellect; there is, therefore, no such unity except only through reason and the concept of the mind, as we said in the conclusion.

9. But against what has been said it can be objected that the universal nature as such cannot be called one in number in the notion of universal by extrinsic denomination from the formal concept of the mind, namely because it is represented by one concept in number; therefore it is necessary that it be called one in number in the notion of universal from some other unity which precedes in the nature itself and is represented through that concept; therefore such a unity belongs to the nature of itself and not through the intellect. The first antecedent is evident, first, because rather the concept has its unity from the object than conversely; therefore the object is not one because the concept is one, but conversely. Secondly, because otherwise the same nature represented by diverse men by distinct concepts would be several universals in number, for when the form giving unity is multiplied the unity will be multiplied. But the consequent is plainly false; for we shall not say that there are several human species in number because human nature is represented by several concepts; just as there are not several faces of Christ the Lord because it is represented by several images; just as, therefore, several concepts do not give plurality to the universal nature, so neither does one concept give unity, but supposes it; therefore this unity of which we speak is not made through reason but belongs to the nature of itself in so far as it can be presented to several similar concepts.

10. It can be answered that it is only proved that formal unity belongs to the nature according to itself and is supposed to the conception of the mind, and that by reason of it human nature, for example, can have the notion of one object with respect to the concept abstracting and prescinding it; and because that is not multiplied even if the formal concepts of the same nature are multiplied, therefore a universal of this kind, as it is universal, is simply not multiplied in number. But against this, because formal unity alone does not suffice to constitute this universal in number unless something else is added, because such a unity is common to individual things and multipliable in them; therefore besides formal unity another unity is necessary from which the common nature as such is called one in number in the notion of universal; for nothing can be denominated one in number except from a unity which under that notion is numerical; and of this the argument proceeds. As, for example, human nature is called one species in number; it cannot, therefore, have that unity from its formal unity as such, because Peter has a similar formal unity and is not such a species; therefore there is another unity of human nature, incommunicable to individuals, from which it is denominated one species. Either, then, it has that unity from the concept of the mind, and so this unity will be multiplied when the concept is multiplied, as the argument made contends; or it is not made through the concept, and so it will belong to the nature of itself, as the opposite opinion said. The answer is by declaring the answer given more fully: that it is indeed true that formal unity does not suffice for the unity of universality, or for the nature to be called one universal in number, but that the prescission of the mind is necessary, by reason of which there belongs to the nature so abstracted a unity incommunicable to individuals, which consists in indivision or incommunicability to several natures so abstract and common, with an aptitude to be communicated to several contracted natures or individuals; but this negation or incommunicability is not multiplied in the nature even if the formal concepts are multiplied in number; and therefore it is not necessary that on account of several formal concepts distinct in number the conceived nature be called several universals distinct in number.

11. To the objection in form, then, the answer is by denying the first antecedent in the sense already expounded. To the first proof the answer is that for the unity of the formal concept it is enough that on the side of the object there be supposed the fundamental unity of the objective concept, which consists in the likeness or agreement of several singulars in formal unity; for this is enough that the intellect by its power and efficacy of understanding can abstract the common objective concept; whence, as regards this prescission of such a common and universal object, the intellect does not suppose its object but makes it, or rather confers on it that state of prescission by extrinsic denomination. To the second proof the answer is that the form from which the nature is properly denominated so one is not the concept of the mind itself, but the negation of incommunicability to several natures so common, which negation is founded in the abstraction of the mind; but such a negation is the same whether this abstraction is made through one or through various formal concepts distinct in number.

12. It could also be said otherwise that, although in the abstract the intentions of universality are multiplied from the multiplication of formal concepts about the same nature (in which way the dialecticians are wont to say that a relation of reason of species distinct in number arises in human nature through a distinct comparison of it to individuals made by Peter and Paul, or by the same at diverse times), nevertheless the universal in the concrete is simply not multiplied, because that which underlies such an intention of universality is formally not multiplied, but is taken as having altogether the same formal unity with the same prescission. Just as, although several whitenesses distinct in number could inhere in the same man, he would not be called several white things but one; and a wall, although in the notion of seen it is constituted or denominated by the vision which is in the eye, is not denominated several things seen but one, although it is seen by several visions at the same time; for in concretes of this kind unity is taken from the supposit or subject, or from what is related after the manner of subject. But in the present case the nature which is denominated universal is related after the manner of subject with respect to the intention of universality; and therefore, although the denominating forms or concepts are multiplied, the universal is not multiplied, because all are concerned with the same nature and prescind it according to the same formal unity.