Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The things which are denominated universal truly exist in reality.—At the outset it must be laid down that those natures which we denominate universal and common are real and truly exist in things themselves; for we do not feign them in the mind, but rather apprehend them, and understand them to be in things, and of them so conceived we hand down definitions, make demonstrations, and seek science. So Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 6, and Book IV, c. 5, reproves Heraclitus and Cratylus for saying that there is nothing in things besides singulars. And Metaphysics VII, text 56, he teaches that universals are not separated from things, and in texts 37 and 53 he says that definitions are given of universal things; and Posterior Analytics I, texts 5, 11, 33, 39, 43, he says that science is of universals, which exist in singulars and are abstracted from them; and he has the same in Metaphysics I, c. 1. And in the same sense, De Interpretatione I, c. 5, he says that of things some are universal, others singular. And in this all philosophers and interpreters of Aristotle agree, the nominalists excepted, who say that only words are universal in signifying, and concepts universal in representing, and that definitions and sciences are proximately concerned with these, as may be seen in Ockham, In I, dist. 2, q. 4, and Quodlibet V, qq. 12 and 13, and Gabriel, In I, dist. 7, qq. 7 and 8; whom Fonseca attacks at length, Book V, c. 28, q. 2. And they are deservedly to be reproved as regards some manners of speaking, for in the thing perhaps they do not dissent from the true opinion; for their reasons tend only to this, to prove that universality is not in things, but belongs to them as they are objectively in the intellect, or by denomination from some work of the intellect, which is true, as I shall say below. And therefore there is no reason why we should linger in reporting and solving their arguments; for they in no way stand in the way of its being true that the natures which are denominated universal are in singulars, and that the singulars themselves have among themselves something in which they agree or are similar, and something in which they differ or are distinguished. Whence they falsely deny that demonstrations or definitions are given of things, because the sciences are not about our names and formal concepts, but directly about things or objective concepts. Wherefore, although the denomination of universality comes to things from concepts, nevertheless the things so denominated are real and exist in things.

2. Universals in the thing are not separated from singulars.—Secondly it must be supposed that these things or natures which we denominate universal are not really separated from singular things; because, as was demonstrated above, every thing which exists is necessarily singular and individual; and it involves an open repugnance that man, for example, should exist really separated from all singular men, and be universal with respect to all of them. For, if he is separated, he is not in them intrinsically and essentially; but if he is universal, he must be in them intrinsically and essentially, because this is of the notion of such a universal; nor can he at the same time be separated from them and intrinsically in them; because these two, taken in the thing itself, involve a repugnance. Likewise, because either man as such is a thing really distinct from Peter, Paul, etc., or he is not a distinct thing; if this second is said, this is what we intend, for in this sense universals are said not to be separated, because they are not things really distinct from singulars, nor do they have a proper entity and real unity distinct from them; but if the first is said, it openly follows that man as such is a certain thing distinct from Peter and Paul, for a real distinction cannot be understood except between certain and determinate things; that thing, therefore, will be a certain man distinct from the other men. Whence neither will he be able to be of their essence, nor will he be able to be at the same time in all of them. Likewise, otherwise by the same reason there would have to be granted an animal separated from all species of animals, and a living thing separated from all genera of living things, and so of the other quidditative predicates; all of which are impossible and altogether useless, because neither for science nor for handing down definitions is it necessary to feign such monsters of ideas.

3. In what sense Plato asserted universals to be separated.—Which is so manifest and self-evident that it seems incredible to many that Plato taught the contrary in the sense in which Aristotle, in Metaphysics I and VII and in other places, attributes it to him and attacks it most fully. St. Thomas reports that Eustratius and Simplicius so thought, De regimine principum IV, c. 4; and Augustine, treating in particular of the ideas, Eighty-three Questions, q. 46, and City of God VII, c. 28, declares that Plato spoke of the ideas which are in the divine mind; which Seneca too thinks, Book VIII, letter 66. Indeed this seems to be indicated by Plato himself, in the Parmenides and Timaeus. Let Eugubinus be read, De perenni philosophia I, c. 10. But if this is so, it must consequently be said that Plato did not posit the ideas on account of our mode of conceiving, defining or knowing things in the universal; for to this the ideas, as they are in the mind of God, contribute nothing; because neither do we conceive or define them; and if per impossibile there were no such ideas, universals could be conceived and defined by us in the same way. But ideas of this kind are posited in order that they may be the first exemplars of these inferior things, and may flow into them as the first and immutable principle in their genus; of which ideas under this consideration the theologians treat, In I, dist. 36, with St. Thomas, I, q. 15; and below, in treating of causes, we shall touch on something. But, whatever may be the case with Plato’s mind, this consideration matters nothing to the present purpose, because we are not treating of the universal which they call universal in causing, whether after the manner of an efficient or after the manner of an exemplar, but of the universal in being or in predicating.

The sense of the question and various opinions

4. These things, then, being supposed, the question remains whether the nature which is denominated universal, although it is in singular things, nevertheless has of itself a sufficient unity on account of which it is denominated universal, so that not only the universal nature but also its universality is in things. Three opinions are current on this matter. The first is that the nature so has of itself and per se some universality that, even really existing in the individuals themselves, it retains it and is actually universal; which opinion John Monlorius defends at length, in a special disputation on this matter, cc. 5 and 6; and it is commonly attributed to Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and Metaphysics VII, q. 18, where Antonius Andreae defends it, q. 16. Although Scotus, in the aforesaid distinction, rather speaks so as simply to deny that the universal in act is in things, and seems to admit only the universal in aptitude or potency, which Aristotle and all concede. Wherefore in expounding the opinion of Scotus his disciples vary, as Fonseca, to be cited below, treats at length, where he too, as others also, tries to bring him over to his own opinion. But, lest we labour in an equivocation, it is necessary to declare these terms, universal in act and universal in potency.

5. If, then, by universal in act is understood the nature abstracted from all individuation, which is conceived after the manner of one being undivided and common to many and having a proximate aptitude to be predicated of them, then it is self-evident that the universal in act as such is not in things; and in this way Scotus explained this universality above, and Aristotle speaks in the same way when he denies against Plato that there is a universal in things, namely subsisting universally and separated from every singular and individual contraction. This universal, therefore, is given only through the intellect, as we shall declare in the following section. Again, if whatever does not have actual universality explained in the said way, but affords the intellect a foundation by which it can conceive or feign it, is called universal in potency, then too it is certain that there is in things universality in potency, because there is in them some foundation of the abstraction or universal conception which the intellect makes. But of what kind is this foundation? For in this lies the point of the controversy. The opinion cited, then, affirms that this foundation is a certain universality which belongs of itself and really to the nature, as it is prior in nature to its inferiors contracting it. For, although in the thing it is not separated from them, nevertheless in truth it is common to all of them according to the same notion and formal unity. And so this universality, although with respect to the former it is called aptitudinal or fundamental, nevertheless, with respect to the singularity or individuation of the nature, is a true, real and actual universality, which differs from formal unity only in this, that beyond the negation of division in itself it expresses indifference and community to many.

6. The opinion so declared, then, is proved, first, because the nature, for example human, has of itself formal unity, as has been said; it also has of itself that it is communicable to many; therefore of itself and before every intellect it is one in many and of many, in which the notion of the universal consists, on the testimony of Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, text 25; the nature, therefore, has of itself and in things themselves some universality which is a real property of it, and not only of reason. The minor, in which the force of the argument lies, is proved, first, because human nature of itself is not incommunicable; otherwise it could not be multiplied according to number; it is therefore of itself communicable; because between communicable and incommunicable there is no medium with respect to the same nature, for they are contradictorily opposed. Secondly, because the nature is not of itself this and individual, as was proved in the preceding disputation; but it needs something adjoined by which it is individuated; therefore of itself it is apt to be contracted by individuating principles; indeed, since it is not apt to subsist abstractly and universally, it postulates and requires this determination in order to be able to subsist; it is therefore of itself apt for it; therefore it is also of itself communicable to many individuals. This last consequence is proved, because such a nature is not adequately contractible by one individual difference alone; indeed this is repugnant to it; therefore this repugnance which such a nature has to being adequately contracted in one individual alone is founded in the natural aptitude which it has to be able to be in many; this aptitude, therefore, belongs to it really and according to itself. Thirdly, the same is proved from the attributes of universal natures as they are universal; for they are said to be the proper objects of the sciences, immutable and perpetual, ingenerable and incorruptible; they are also said to be the things immediately signified by common words or concepts, to which essential predicates and intrinsic properties belong per se primarily; but all these are not feigned by the intellect, nor do they consist in some extrinsic denomination coming from some act of the intellect; therefore the nature has in things themselves some universality which is the reason and foundation of all these. And it is confirmed, because otherwise we can scarcely avoid falling into the opinion of the nominalists, who deny that there are universal natures in things, but only singular things; because, if the nature in the thing has no universality, nor is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals, as was shown above, it does not appear what can immediately correspond in things to common terms or their concepts besides the singulars themselves, which the nominalists teach; and consequently there will not be able to be science of common things, but only of words, as the same contend.

7. The second opinion is that the nature existing in individuals is not actually universal, but nevertheless does not have from the intellect alone that it is actually universal, but of itself and before the operation of the intellect, and before every contraction to individuals, and so before every existence both in the intellect and in the thing itself, is actually universal. Fonseca treats and defends this opinion at length, Metaphysics V, c. 28, through the first five questions. Whose foundations we shall see afterwards, while we confirm the true opinion; for this opinion is intermediate between the two others, and therefore takes arguments from the same partly to refute them, partly to protect and persuade itself.

8. The third opinion is that natures become actually universal only by the work of the intellect, some foundation preceding on the side of the things themselves, on account of which they are said to be in reality universals in potency. This opinion is common to the ancient and recent philosophers, with Aristotle very often in these books of the Metaphysics, especially in VII; and the Commentator, De Anima I, comm. 8, saying that it is the intellect which makes universals in things; and Avicenna, who in this sense said, Metaphysics V, at the beginning: Horseness according to itself is only horseness, neither one nor several; and St. Thomas speaks in the same way, opusc. De ente et essentia, c. 4, where he says that the nature according to itself is neither universal nor singular, and in other places in the same sense he says that the intention of universality is from the intellect, as I, q. 85, a. 1, and I-II, q. 29, a. 6, and In Metaph. VII, lect. 13; and all his disciples agree in the same opinion: Cajetan, in the cited place of De ente et essentia; Soncinas and Javellus, cited in the preceding section; Soto on the Logic, q. 2 on universals, and others.

Resolution of the question

9. This last opinion is without doubt true. In order, however, to explain and confirm it, two things which we proposed in the title of the question must be declared. First, how the unity which is necessary for the universality of the nature differs from formal unity. Second, how the aptitude of being in many belongs to the nature so one. From which a third will finally be evident, namely, how the universality of the nature cannot be found in things themselves. I suppose, however, what Aristotle often taught, that the notion of universality as such consists in two things, namely in unity and communicability. For these two are contained in that definition by which the universal is called one in many and of many, or besides many, which is taken from various places of Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias I, c. 5; Posterior Analytics I, c. 18; Metaphysics VII, c. 13. For if the nature is not in some way one, it will not be something universal, but a multitude or aggregation of things; but if it is not apt to be in several, it will not be universal but singular; and therefore it is necessary that it be in many in a mode opposed to singularity or individuation, that is, that it be in many inferiors which under that common notion can be multiplied and numbered. These two, then, namely unity and community, must be explained, in order that it may be evident that the notion constituting the proper universal is not found in things, the intellect being excluded.

10. I say, first: formal unity by itself alone does not suffice for the unity which the universal nature requires, as it is and is denominated universal, but some greater unity is required. It is proved, first, because the unity of a universal thing as universal must be such that it is proper to it, and cannot belong to a singular thing as singular; but formal unity is not of this kind; therefore as such it does not suffice for the unity of the universal nature as such. The major is evident from the common consent of all, and from the opposition which is between the singular and the universal as they are such; for, since they are opposed as communicable and incommunicable, that unity which is indifferent to both of these cannot be sufficient for the notion of the universal, as will be more evident from the following reason. But the minor is evident from what was said above of formal unity; for it was shown that it is of itself indifferent to the nature either universally conceived or contracted in individuals. Secondly it is proved, because formal unity is multiplied in individuals together with the nature itself; but the unity which is proper to the universal nature as universal cannot be multiplied in inferiors, for rather they are one under that notion; in which way Porphyry said that by participation of the species several men are one man; therefore the universal nature as such has another mode of unity besides formal unity. The major was proved above. For we showed that each individual nature is formally one in itself by a proper and intrinsic formal unity distinct from that which is in another similar nature, because each, through what it is in itself, is formally undivided in itself. And hence the minor proposition is easily proved, because, if the unity of the universal nature as universal were multiplied in inferiors, specific unity would be multiplied in individuals, or generic in species, which is impossible; otherwise both several men would be several species, and each of them would have in himself the unity of universality, and consequently each would be one universally as he is one formally, which is plainly false. Whence I argue, thirdly, because formal unity expresses only the formal or essential indivision of that thing which is so denominated one; whence to this unity it is irrelevant whether that thing is singular or common; but universal unity intrinsically expresses the indivision of many in that thing or notion which is universally denominated one, so that none of the inferiors which are contained under such a notion, taken by itself, has that whole universal unity, but all are one under that notion; in which way all the species of animal are one in the notion of animal; but no species taken by itself has in itself the universal unity of animal, which is as it were potential, although it has in itself its formal unity. Although, therefore, formal unity is prerequired for the unity of the universal and is its foundation, it is nevertheless not per se sufficient, but universal unity adds something beyond it.

11. You will say: what, then, or of what kind can this unity of the universal nature as such be? For every unity, as was indicated above, must be either formal or numerical; because every division is either formal or material; but universal unity cannot be numerical unity, because this is proper to singular things; if, therefore, it is not formal either, what can it be? The answer is that it is a certain unity distinct from these, having a proper name and a proper notion. For this unity is called universal, and its notion consists in the indivision of some nature into several similar natures under the same name and notion, with an aptitude to be divided into them. And so a unity of this kind includes both, namely indivision, and aptitude for division into several of the same name and notion, or such that each encloses and contains in itself the whole divided thing as regards its actuality. Whence this indivision approaches most nearly to proper privation, because it expresses the negation of division in a nature apt for such division. In which this unity differs from individual unity, which expresses not only indivision but also inaptitude for division into several which would be such as the divided thing itself is. From formal unity it differs, because that unity, although it is not repugnant to that aptitude or communicability to several, nevertheless does not require it. Whence in God there can be understood formal unity with incommunicability to several natures. When, therefore, it is said that every unity is either formal or numerical, that is true of the unities which belong to things themselves according to themselves, or in the thing itself; but besides these there can be another unity which is completed through the intellect; and of this kind is universal unity, as we shall show.

12. Whence it is further added that this unity can be reduced to numerical unity, which nevertheless is not simply real, but of reason or objective. It is declared, for the human species in the notion of species is so one that with others it makes up the number three, or four, etc., of the species contained under animal; but every unity which can make up a number can under that notion be called numerical. On account of which, although man and horse differ absolutely essentially and in species, nevertheless in the notion of universals or species they differ in number. Likewise the formal concept of man as such is one in number; whence its object in the notion of object can also be called one in number; and so man, in so far as he is presented to that concept, is said to have numerical objective unity, or in the notion of object, which is also a unity of reason, or by extrinsic denomination from the concept of the mind; this unity, therefore, is necessary for the notion of the universal, and under that notion can be reduced to the numerical. Which can also be explained in this way; for if we feigned, according to the opinion of Plato as it is explained by Aristotle, that universals are things separated from singulars, it would necessarily have to be understood that man as such, subsisting in himself, is a certain thing in itself transcendentally numerable with others, and so one in number, although at the same time he would be feigned as existing in several distinct in number, which otherwise involves a repugnance, as has been said, which does not matter to the present point; for hence we only intend to declare that the universal, in the way in which it is or is apprehended, must be understood as undivided in itself and numerable, either according to the thing, if it is feigned as separated in the thing itself, or according to reason and concept, if it is only abstracted in the mind.

13. Universal unity is not before the operation of the mind.—From these things I say, secondly, the unity of the universal nature as universal is not real, nor is it in things as they exist in the thing itself and precede every operation of the intellect. This conclusion follows openly from the preceding; because in things no unity can be understood besides formal and numerical; but neither of these suffices for the notion of the universal as such. It will perhaps be said that in things there is found not only that formal unity by which each human nature, for example, is said to be formally one in itself, but also a unity by which all human natures are said to have the same formal notion, and consequently formal unity, by reason of which they participate the same definition, and all men in reality are said to be of the same nature. But against this, for this in truth is not unity but only likeness; for nothing truly one and undivided in the thing is in reality in this and in that human nature, but only in this there is something to which something is similar in the other nature; but this is not real unity but likeness. Whence several things can only be said in reality to be of the same nature, that is, similar; for this identity, since it is said to be between distinct things, cannot in the thing itself be anything besides likeness, by reason of which they are also said to participate, or have, the same definition—fundamentally indeed by virtue of the said likeness, but formally through reason, for definition is a work of reason.

14. The real relation of likeness is neither sufficient nor necessary for the notion of the universal.—This likeness, however, is neither simply necessary for the notion of the universal nor sufficient. I understand, however, that it is not necessary according to actual existence and relation, because it is not of the notion of the universal that it actually be in many; for, if the ideas of Plato were true, they would be universal of themselves, although no other individual actually existed; and in fact the natures of the heaven and of Gabriel are universal, whether in the thing there are several of their individuals having among themselves the aforesaid likeness or not. But if the discussion were of that likeness in potency, then it is necessary for the universality of the nature, because otherwise the nature could not be understood as common, as we shall immediately explain more fully. But that that likeness does not suffice for the notion of the universal is proved, because by virtue of that likeness precisely, whether taken in act or in potency, something is not conceived as one common to many, but many are conceived as similar among themselves; but the universal as such must be conceived as one. Likewise, because the universal as universal is conceived as actually undivided, in so far as it is such, and divisible and communicable in aptitude; but things, as in reality they are similar in nature, are rather actually divided, and in aptitude or fundamentally unitable (so to speak) in one nature universally conceived.

15. And hence the conclusion posited is more openly confirmed. For universality as such expresses some indivision; otherwise it would not be universality but only multitude; but that cannot be an indivision which belongs to things as they are in themselves, but only as they underlie the concepts of the mind; therefore the unity which is taken thence is not real but of reason. The minor is declared, for, as Aristotle rightly said, Metaphysics VII, c. 14, and often elsewhere, to be undivided in the thing itself and at the same time to be actually divided into several of the same name and notion involves a repugnance; for if the thing is undivided in reality, in reality it is singular and one in number; but if it is divided into several similar things of the same name and notion, it will also be several in number, which cannot happen. And this repugnance followed from the position of Plato, which ceases if the universal is understood to have indivision only according to reason; because to be undivided according to reason and divided according to the thing are not opposed among themselves. And in this way all men in the notion of species are said to be one man, because in the concept of man as such they are not divided; and so the unity of man, in so far as it is universal, is completed through reason, because man as such has indivision only as he underlies the conception of the mind. Which indivision consists in this, that man, for example, abstractly conceived, is not communicable to many men or objective concepts so abstracted, although he is communicable through contraction to many individuals.