Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting on each side.—The reason for doubting is that it was said in the preceding disputation that all things which are in the world are individual, so that it is repugnant that there be in things any true being which is not individual and singular; therefore neither can there be in things any true and real unity besides numerical or individual unity. On the contrary, however, is the fact that one is nothing other than undivided being, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics IV, text 3, and Book X, text 2; but besides individual numerical indivision, which is called material, there is in things an essential or formal indivision, in which way several men, for example, although they are materially or in number distinct, are nevertheless of the same essence and nature; therefore besides numerical unity there is in things formal unity.

In what authors agree or dissent

2. In this matter Thomists and Scotists agree, teaching that there is in things a formal unity in some way distinct from numerical unity. So Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and Metaphysics VII, q. 10; and there Antonius Andreae, q. 17; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 4, q. 6; and Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 4, says that the nature considered according to itself, that is, as it prescinds from the being which it has in individuals or through the intellect, has some unity; and Javellus thinks the same, Metaphysics VIII, q. 13; indeed St. Thomas seems openly to teach this opinion, opusc. De natura generis, c. 7, which cannot be true except of formal unity, because it cannot be individual, since the nature so taken is said to prescind from the being of individuals. But in the mode of explaining this formal unity the aforesaid authors dissent; and the difference seems to consist chiefly in two things. First, in this, that Scotus thinks this formal unity, or the nature itself as formally one, to be formally and from the nature of the thing distinct from the individual unity or difference. But others think that it is distinguished only by reason; whose opinion is more approved by us, as was treated in the preceding disputation, sect. 2, and we shall touch upon it again in the following sections. Secondly, they differ in this, that Scotus does not think that this formal unity, or the nature as having this formal unity, is multiplied in number in the individuals themselves, but that all individuals of the same nature have one and the same formal unity—one (I say) not only in reason but in reality; or that the nature, as it exists in reality in many individuals, has a single formal unity. But others think that in each individual the nature has a formal unity distinct by reason from the numerical one, but that this is multiplied in the individuals together with the individual unities, and consequently that there is not some unity which according to true real unity is the same in many individuals, but only according to a certain agreement or likeness. And on this point too the latter opinion is more approved, although some think the difference is in the mode of speaking; for what the Thomists call a distinction of reason, Scotus and others call formal; and what the former call agreement or likeness, Scotus calls unity; but whatever may be the case with the intention of this or that author, we have not sufficiently explained what the distinction from the nature of the thing is which we deny intervenes between the individual and the common essence; for we deny every distinction which can in any way actually be in the thing itself before the function of the mind. And in the same sense and by proportional reason we must speak of unity, which is opposed to distinction, when we ask whether the nature, either according to itself or in the thing itself, every act of the intellect being excluded, has such a formal unity, which is a true and real unity, so that it has and retains altogether the same unity in all individuals.

Foundations of the former opinion

3. The first.—In order that the truth may be better explained, the opinion of Scotus must be in some way urged. First, because Aristotle, Metaphysics V, texts 8 and 12, among the modes of one posits the unity of species and of genus, in so far as they are in some way real unities; for there the discussion was not of intentions of reason, but of the unity which is an attribute of being, which must necessarily be in some way real; but the unity of species and genus can most of all be real on account of formal unity. Whence in Metaphysics VII, text 51, the same Aristotle says that the notion of animal is the same in all species; and in De Anima II, text 88, he says that the nature of transparency is the same in air and in water.

4. The second.—Secondly, by a reason taken from St. Thomas, above, because the human nature which exists in Peter and Paul can be defined by a single and most proper definition, as is self-evident; therefore as such it has some unity; but it does not have it through the intellect; therefore of itself; therefore it is a true and real unity. The first consequence is evident, because nothing can be defined except in so far as it is one, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 10, and Metaphysics VII, text 13. The minor is proved, because the nature does not have it from the intellect that it is definable, but of itself; therefore neither does it have from the intellect that unity which is necessary for definition; but everything which belongs to a nature, and not through the intellect, is real, either positive or after the manner of a privation, which is enough for unity, which formally consists in privation.

5. The third.—An objection is dissolved.—Whence I argue, thirdly: unity consists in indivision; but human nature of itself has formal indivision; therefore of itself it has formal unity. The minor is evident, because human nature of itself does not have formal division, because, if it had it of itself, it would have it everywhere and always, nor could it be conceived without it; but it is excellently conceived without such division; therefore of itself it does not have it; therefore of itself it has indivision; because indivision is nothing other than the lack of division. For that which the Thomists are frequently wont to say does not seem to satisfy, namely that the nature of itself is negatively one and undivided, because of itself it does not have it that it is divided and manifold, yet that of itself it is not positively one or undivided. For in this distinction a repugnance seems to be involved; because nothing is positively one, but negatively, nor can indivision as such belong to anything otherwise than through the negation of division; therefore, if of itself it has this negation of division, of itself it has indivision; therefore also unity, which consists in indivision. And it is confirmed and declared, for if of itself it has the negation of division, then division is repugnant to it; because what belongs to a nature of itself is inseparable from it, and therefore its contradictory is always repugnant to it; therefore the lack of division belongs to it intrinsically, and consequently belongs positively as far as it can belong by reason of a foundation. It will perhaps be said that neither formal division nor non-division belongs to the nature of itself, but that it is in a certain way indifferent to both, as a surface of itself is neither white nor not-white, but can only negatively be said not to be white. In which sense that common answer seems to be understood, that indivision, or the negation of division, does not belong to the nature of itself positively but negatively; for these terms do not fall on indivision, but on this, to belong of itself, so that the sense is that the nature does not of itself postulate division, nor does it of itself postulate the lack of division or unity. For in this sense a negation can rightly belong to something of itself sometimes positively, sometimes negatively; for the lack of rationality belongs to animal as such of itself negatively, but to the brute of itself positively, because it so belongs that the opposed positive form is repugnant to it. But against this I press, for even in this sense the nature seems of itself positively undivided formally, for it so has of itself the negation of division that formal division is altogether repugnant to it; for, although in the individuals it is divided materially, it is not divided formally, because to be divided formally is nothing other than to be divided essentially; but man, for example, cannot be divided essentially, although he is divided materially into several individuals.

6. Whence I argue, fourthly: because human nature, for example, of itself and positively is being; therefore of itself and positively (in the said sense) it has some unity, and not material or individual, as was proved at length above and is self-evident, because otherwise it could not be multiplied in number, indeed could not even be truly conceived without numerical unity; therefore at least formal, because no other medium can be thought out. The first antecedent is manifest, because being belongs intrinsically and essentially not only to singular things but also to natures which are universally conceived by us; for these neither are altogether nothing, nor of themselves are they several individual beings, because they do not include proper singularities or individuating principles, but only essential principles; therefore each nature of itself is neither several beings nor altogether nothing, but real being, and consequently something one in some way, because some unity follows upon every being. And it is confirmed, because human and equine nature, of themselves and all individuating principles being excluded, are several and really and essentially distinct; therefore each of them of itself is one formally and essentially, for multitude supposes unities, and division from others supposes indivision in itself.

7. And from these things it can further be concluded that this formal unity is common to all the individual things to which the nature which is said to be formally one is common; because a nature cannot be common unless its unity is common. Likewise, because this formal unity has nothing through which it could be divided into several unities. For either it is divided into several formal unities; and this not, because it is of its notion that it be formally undivided; and in this its unity consists. Or it is divided into several material and individual unities, and so the formal unity as such is not divided, but is communicated to many, which is what we intend. Finally, because otherwise the formal and the individual unity could not be distinguished in the individuals themselves; for in what would they be distinguished, if both were multiplied in number? For whatever is multiplied in this way is individual.

The true opinion is confirmed

8. In order, however, to explain the contrary and true opinion, it must be said, first, that there is in things a formal unity belonging per se to each essence or nature. In this all agree, and the arguments made in favour of Scotus prove this. Likewise, because, since unity expresses the lack of division, as many genera of divisions as there are, so many unities there can be; but in things there is material and formal division, or entitative and essential; therefore similarly there will be formal unity besides material. Finally any individual whatever, for example Peter, is not only one in number, but also one essentially; and he has each unity in himself, and not through the thinking of the mind; for, just as in reality he lacks numerical division, so also he lacks essential division, whether specific or generic; but formal unity is nothing other than essential unity; therefore.

9. Formal unity is distinct from singular unity through reason.—Secondly it must be said that this formal unity is distinguished at least by reason from individual unity. This too the arguments made for Scotus prove. And it is evident briefly, because the common nature is in some way, at least by reason, distinct from the individuals, and as so distinct it does not have individual unity, but retains formal unity; these unities therefore differ at least by reason. Likewise individual unity does not belong to the common essence by itself, but it is necessary to understand something added, at least distinct by reason, by which that common essence becomes individual; but formal unity belongs per se immediately to the common essence itself without any addition even according to reason. Finally, by this reason the essence cannot be understood without this formal unity accompanying it, from which it cannot altogether be prescinded, whereas it can be prescinded from individual unity; these unities, therefore, are distinct by reason, in the way in which in an individual thing the essence as essence is distinguished from it as such an individual and singular entity.

10. It is not distinguished from the nature of the thing.—Whence I say, thirdly: these unities are not distinguished in reality, or from the nature of the thing. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding disputation. And it is proved, because the common essence and the singular entity are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, but by reason only; therefore neither can the formal and the individual unity be distinguished from the nature of the thing, but by reason only. Moreover, the nature itself, although it can be considered by us according to itself, that is, according to what belongs to it of itself, as it is prescinded by reason from the individuals, nevertheless such a nature is not true real being except in individuals, because, the first substances being destroyed, it is impossible for anything to remain, as Aristotle said in the chapter on Substance, because outside individuals nothing can have real existence, without which nothing can be true real being, either in act or in potency, according to what was said above of being; the nature, therefore, according to itself has no reality except in individuals; therefore neither can it have true and real unity except in individuals; therefore neither can it have a formal unity which in the thing itself would be distinct from the nature of the thing from the singular unity of each individual. This last consequence is evident, because whatever is intrinsic and essential to an individual thing is not distinguished from it from the nature of the thing.

11. Formal unity, as it exists in the thing, is incommunicable.—From these things it is concluded, fourthly, that this formal unity, as it exists in things before every operation of the intellect, is not common to many individuals, but that formal unities are multiplied as many as there are individuals. It is proved, first, because this formal unity accompanies the nature according to itself; but in the thing there is not some common nature, but natures and essences are multiplied as many as there are individuals, as is evident from what has been said above, and we shall say again in what follows; therefore the same must be said of formal unity, which is as it were an intrinsic and transcendental property of such a nature, and therefore they follow each other mutually, and when one is multiplied the other is multiplied, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 3. Secondly, because formal unity existing in reality is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from individual unity, as has been said; therefore it is necessary that it be multiplied in the thing itself when the individuals and their individual unities are multiplied; therefore there is no formal unity in the thing itself common to many things of the same nature. The first consequence is proved, because, if formal and individual unity are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, then in each individual, in Peter for example, his formal and individual unity are not distinguished in the thing; therefore they are distinguished from the formal and individual unity of Paul; because, by the very fact that the formal unity of Peter is in the thing altogether the same as his individual unity, it is necessary that it be distinguished from the individual unity of Paul, because it cannot in the thing be the same with things altogether distinct and in a certain way opposed. Thirdly, because whatever exists in reality is singular, and consequently incommunicable, or not common to several inferiors, as was shown in the preceding disputation, sect. 1, and will also be said in the following section; but this unity is real and in its own way exists in reality, as has been declared; therefore it is singular; therefore it is not in the thing itself common. The last consequence is evident, because what is singular is proper to some individual, and therefore cannot be common to many; and on this account such community requires abstraction from all individuals, which cannot belong to things really, but only through the intellect.

12. And from these things it follows, first, that, although each individual in reality is formally one without the thinking of the mind, nevertheless several individuals which are said to be of the same nature are not one something by a true unity which is in things, but only either fundamentally or through the intellect. And on this account Aristotle, whenever he says that several things are one in essence or formal notion, explains that unity through order to the intellect; namely, because they are conceived under one notion or definition, as is evident from Metaphysics V, c. 6, text 11, and Book X, at the beginning. And St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4, said in this sense that the nature of itself does not have common unity, because otherwise it could not become singular. Secondly it follows that it is one thing to speak of formal unity, another of the community of that unity; for the unity is in things, as has been declared; but community properly and rigorously is not in things, because no unity which exists in the thing is common, as we have shown; but there is in singular things a certain likeness in their formal unities, in which is founded the community which the intellect can attribute to such a nature as conceived by itself; which likeness is not properly unity, because it does not express the indivision of the entities in which it is founded, but only agreement, or the relation or coexistence of each.

The foundations of the former opinion are solved

13. To the first foundation of the former opinion the answer is that Aristotle numbered among the modes of one generic and specific unity either on account of the formal unity which they express in the individual things in which they exist, or because they are in some way fundamentally in things, as we shall declare afterwards; and in this way several things are said to be of the same nature, either by identity of reason, or in fundamental unity, which consists in likeness. Whence it is said to the second that, in order that a nature can be defined, this unity suffices, because definition properly is not in things but in reason; and therefore there is not one common definition except in so far as the mind conceives something as common, separating it from any singular, for which the formal unity which the nature has in each individual suffices, with the likeness of all such unities among themselves; for thence it comes about that the intellect conceives and defines that formal notion by one common concept. Whence, when it is said that the nature does not have from the intellect that it is definable, it must be said that this is true fundamentally and remotely, but not proximately; or (what is the same) that it is true as regards the essence which is explained by the definition, for that precedes in things, but not as regards the condition which it requires in order to be defined by us, which is community; for this it has only through the thinking of the mind.

14. To the third it is said, first, that it concludes that the nature of itself has formal unity, but not the community of that formal unity. Whence it has unity altogether inseparable, but community not at all; for in each individual the nature is formally one, yet it is not common, nor indifferent to several, but in each it has been made singular and proper to it. Wherefore, when it is said that the nature of itself is so formally undivided that it is repugnant to it to be formally divided, this can be equivocal; for either the sense is that the nature which is thus formally one is not further divisible through formal and essential differences; and in this sense, in generic natures, it is simply false; for the generic nature has its formal unity, and nevertheless is formally divisible through specific differences. In specific natures it is indeed true, yet it matters nothing to what we are dealing with; for, although the specific nature is not further divisible through essential differences, it is nevertheless divisible through individual differences, and in each individual it has its formal unity, distinct from that which it has in others; and this is enough for such a unity to be unable to be common in the thing. Or the sense is that the nature is so undivided of itself that every division or multiplication of its formal unity is repugnant to it; and in this sense the assumption is simply false, even in specific natures. Because, as we were saying above, although in individuals there is not an essential division or distinction, there is nevertheless a division or distinction of essences; so it must be said in the present case that, although individuals of the same species are not simply said to differ formally, they nevertheless have distinct formal unities proper to each. For to be distinguished essentially or formally signifies not only to have a distinct essence or form, but also to have according to it dissimilitude and disagreement, and so to be distinguished not only according to the thing, but also according to the common notion and definition which the mind can fashion. But to have a distinct essence or formal unity expresses only entitative and real distinction; in which way, just as Peter has a humanity distinct from Paul’s, so also he has a distinct essence and a distinct formal unity, although in it they are similar. To the nature, therefore, which of itself is said to be formally one, it is not repugnant to be multiplied according to that unity in many, and in each to have that unity incommunicable and consequently distinct from others; but only dissimilitude, or disagreement according to that notion, is repugnant to it; that is, that the things which participate that formal unity be not similar in it and agree among themselves.

15. To the fourth, with its confirmation, the answer is the same; for it proves that the common nature has of itself a formal unity, according to which one specific nature differs formally and specially from another, but it does not prove that that formal unity is in the thing itself common, except according to likeness or agreement, as has been declared. And in almost the same way the answer is given to the arguments by which it is finally proved that this formal unity is common in the thing; for it is common in the way in which the nature itself is, whose unity it is. But the nature is not common according to the thing, but according to reason or fundamental likeness, as has often been touched upon and will be professedly said in the following section. In the same way, therefore, the formal unity is common, which in the thing is divided into several formal unities, each of which is formally undivided in itself; but among themselves, or one from another, they are not in the thing formally undivided, except according to likeness and agreement, by reason of which they are not called simply and properly formally distinct, as has been said, but are formal unities distinct entitatively or individually. For these two are not repugnant, namely that the formal unities themselves are multiplied, and are not multiplied formally, but materially, or in the individual; for the formal unity itself in each individual is singular and individual, although it does not have this by virtue of formal unity, but from the individual difference. We confess, therefore, that every formal unity, as it is in the thing, is individual and singular, yet that it nevertheless differs according to reason from individual unity, because formal unity per se and from its proper concept expresses only indivision in essential predicates; but individual unity expresses indivision in the entity itself. Whence formal unity expresses in the thing a foundation of likeness with another thing of the same nature; but individual unity expresses absolutely and simply a foundation of distinction; and finally formal unity expresses a foundation of communicability at least according to reason; but individual unity expresses every kind of incommunicability, both according to the thing and according to reason.