Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting on each side.—The reason for doubting is that it was said in the preceding disputation that all things which are in the world are individual, so that it is repugnant that there be in things any true being which is not individual and singular; therefore neither can there be in things any true and real unity besides numerical or individual unity. On the contrary, however, is the fact that one is nothing other than undivided being, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics IV, text 3, and Book X, text 2; but besides individual numerical indivision, which is called material, there is in things an essential or formal indivision, in which way several men, for example, although they are materially or in number distinct, are nevertheless of the same essence and nature; therefore besides numerical unity there is in things formal unity.

In what authors agree or dissent

2. In this matter Thomists and Scotists agree, teaching that there is in things a formal unity in some way distinct from numerical unity. So Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and Metaphysics VII, q. 10; and there Antonius Andreae, q. 17; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 4, q. 6; and Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 4, says that the nature considered according to itself, that is, as it prescinds from the being which it has in individuals or through the intellect, has some unity; and Javellus thinks the same, Metaphysics VIII, q. 13; indeed St. Thomas seems openly to teach this opinion, opusc. De natura generis, c. 7, which cannot be true except of formal unity, because it cannot be individual, since the nature so taken is said to prescind from the being of individuals. But in the mode of explaining this formal unity the aforesaid authors dissent; and the difference seems to consist chiefly in two things. First, in this, that Scotus thinks this formal unity, or the nature itself as formally one, to be formally and from the nature of the thing distinct from the individual unity or difference. But others think that it is distinguished only by reason; whose opinion is more approved by us, as was treated in the preceding disputation, sect. 2, and we shall touch upon it again in the following sections. Secondly, they differ in this, that Scotus does not think that this formal unity, or the nature as having this formal unity, is multiplied in number in the individuals themselves, but that all individuals of the same nature have one and the same formal unity—one (I say) not only in reason but in reality; or that the nature, as it exists in reality in many individuals, has a single formal unity. But others think that in each individual the nature has a formal unity distinct by reason from the numerical one, but that this is multiplied in the individuals together with the individual unities, and consequently that there is not some unity which according to true real unity is the same in many individuals, but only according to a certain agreement or likeness. And on this point too the latter opinion is more approved, although some think the difference is in the mode of speaking; for what the Thomists call a distinction of reason, Scotus and others call formal; and what the former call agreement or likeness, Scotus calls unity; but whatever may be the case with the intention of this or that author, we have not sufficiently explained what the distinction from the nature of the thing is which we deny intervenes between the individual and the common essence; for we deny every distinction which can in any way actually be in the thing itself before the function of the mind. And in the same sense and by proportional reason we must speak of unity, which is opposed to distinction, when we ask whether the nature, either according to itself or in the thing itself, every act of the intellect being excluded, has such a formal unity, which is a true and real unity, so that it has and retains altogether the same unity in all individuals.

Foundations of the former opinion

3. The first.—In order that the truth may be better explained, the opinion of Scotus must be in some way urged. First, because Aristotle, Metaphysics V, texts 8 and 12, among the modes of one posits the unity of species and of genus, in so far as they are in some way real unities; for there the discussion was not of intentions of reason, but of the unity which is an attribute of being, which must necessarily be in some way real; but the unity of species and genus can most of all be real on account of formal unity. Whence in Metaphysics VII, text 51, the same Aristotle says that the notion of animal is the same in all species; and in De Anima II, text 88, he says that the nature of transparency is the same in air and in water.

4. The second.—Secondly, by a reason taken from St. Thomas, above, because the human nature which exists in Peter and Paul can be defined by a single and most proper definition, as is self-evident; therefore as such it has some unity; but it does not have it through the intellect; therefore of itself; therefore it is a true and real unity. The first consequence is evident, because nothing can be defined except in so far as it is one, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 10, and Metaphysics VII, text 13. The minor is proved, because the nature does not have it from the intellect that it is definable, but of itself; therefore neither does it have from the intellect that unity which is necessary for definition; but everything which belongs to a nature, and not through the intellect, is real, either positive or after the manner of a privation, which is enough for unity, which formally consists in privation.

5. The third.—An objection is dissolved.—Whence I argue, thirdly: unity consists in indivision; but human nature of itself has formal indivision; therefore of itself it has formal unity. The minor is evident, because human nature of itself does not have formal division, because, if it had it of itself, it would have it everywhere and always, nor could it be conceived without it; but it is excellently conceived without such division; therefore of itself it does not have it; therefore of itself it has indivision; because indivision is nothing other than the lack of division. For that which the Thomists are frequently wont to say does not seem to satisfy, namely that the nature of itself is negatively one and undivided, because of itself it does not have it that it is divided and manifold, yet that of itself it is not positively one or undivided. For in this distinction a repugnance seems to be involved; because nothing is positively one, but negatively, nor can indivision as such belong to anything otherwise than through the negation of division; therefore, if of itself it has this negation of division, of itself it has indivision; therefore also unity, which consists in indivision. And it is confirmed and declared, for if of itself it has the negation of division, then division is repugnant to it; because what belongs to a nature of itself is inseparable from it, and therefore its contradictory is always repugnant to it; therefore the lack of division belongs to it intrinsically, and consequently belongs positively as far as it can belong by reason of a foundation. It will perhaps be said that neither formal division nor non-division belongs to the nature of itself, but that it is in a certain way indifferent to both, as a surface of itself is neither white nor not-white, but can only negatively be said not to be white. In which sense that common answer seems to be understood, that indivision, or the negation of division, does not belong to the nature of itself positively but negatively; for these terms do not fall on indivision, but on this, to belong of itself, so that the sense is that the nature does not of itself postulate division, nor does it of itself postulate the lack of division or unity. For in this sense a negation can rightly belong to something of itself sometimes positively, sometimes negatively; for the lack of rationality belongs to animal as such of itself negatively, but to the brute of itself positively, because it so belongs that the opposed positive form is repugnant to it. But against this I press, for even in this sense the nature seems of itself positively undivided formally, for it so has of itself the negation of division that formal division is altogether repugnant to it; for, although in the individuals it is divided materially, it is not divided formally, because to be divided formally is nothing other than to be divided essentially; but man, for example, cannot be divided essentially, although he is divided materially into several individuals.

6. Whence I argue, fourthly: because human nature, for example, of itself and positively is being; therefore of itself and positively (in the said sense) it has some unity, and not material or individual, as was proved at length above and is self-evident, because otherwise it could not be multiplied in number, indeed could not even be truly conceived without numerical unity; therefore at least formal, because no other medium can be thought out. The first antecedent is manifest, because being belongs intrinsically and essentially not only to singular things but also to natures which are universally conceived by us; for these neither are altogether nothing, nor of themselves are they several individual beings, because they do not include proper singularities or individuating principles, but only essential principles; therefore each nature of itself is neither several beings nor altogether nothing, but real being, and consequently something one in some way, because some unity follows upon every being. And it is confirmed, because human and equine nature, of themselves and all individuating principles being excluded, are several and really and essentially distinct; therefore each of them of itself is one formally and essentially, for multitude supposes unities, and division from others supposes indivision in itself.

7. And from these things it can further be concluded that this formal unity is common to all the individual things to which the nature which is said to be formally one is common; because a nature cannot be common unless its unity is common. Likewise, because this formal unity has nothing through which it could be divided into several unities. For either it is divided into several formal unities; and this not, because it is of its notion that it be formally undivided; and in this its unity consists. Or it is divided into several material and individual unities, and so the formal unity as such is not divided, but is communicated to many, which is what we intend. Finally, because otherwise the formal and the individual unity could not be distinguished in the individuals themselves; for in what would they be distinguished, if both were multiplied in number? For whatever is multiplied in this way is individual.

The true opinion is confirmed

8. In order, however, to explain the contrary and true opinion, it must be said, first, that there is in things a formal unity belonging per se to each essence or nature. In this all agree, and the arguments made in favour of Scotus prove this. Likewise, because, since unity expresses the lack of division, as many genera of divisions as there are, so many unities there can be; but in things there is material and formal division, or entitative and essential; therefore similarly there will be formal unity besides material. Finally any individual whatever, for example Peter, is not only one in number, but also one essentially; and he has each unity in himself, and not through the thinking of the mind; for, just as in reality he lacks numerical division, so also he lacks essential division, whether specific or generic; but formal unity is nothing other than essential unity; therefore.

9. Formal unity is distinct from singular unity through reason.—Secondly it must be said that this formal unity is distinguished at least by reason from individual unity. This too the arguments made for Scotus prove. And it is evident briefly, because the common nature is in some way, at least by reason, distinct from the individuals, and as so distinct it does not have individual unity, but retains formal unity; these unities therefore differ at least by reason. Likewise individual unity does not belong to the common essence by itself, but it is necessary to understand something added, at least distinct by reason, by which that common essence becomes individual; but formal unity belongs per se immediately to the common essence itself without any addition even according to reason. Finally, by this reason the essence cannot be understood without this formal unity accompanying it, from which it cannot altogether be prescinded, whereas it can be prescinded from individual unity; these unities, therefore, are distinct by reason, in the way in which in an individual thing the essence as essence is distinguished from it as such an individual and singular entity.

10. It is not distinguished from the nature of the thing.—Whence I say, thirdly: these unities are not distinguished in reality, or from the nature of the thing. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding disputation. And it is proved, because the common essence and the singular entity are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, but by reason only; therefore neither can the formal and the individual unity be distinguished from the nature of the thing, but by reason only. Moreover, the nature itself, although it can be considered by us according to itself, that is, according to what belongs to it of itself, as it is prescinded by reason from the individuals, nevertheless such a nature is not true real being except in individuals, because, the first substances being destroyed, it is impossible for anything to remain, as Aristotle said in the chapter on Substance, because outside individuals nothing can have real existence, without which nothing can be true real being, either in act or in potency, according to what was said above of being; the nature, therefore, according to itself has no reality except in individuals; therefore neither can it have true and real unity except in individuals; therefore neither can it have a formal unity which in the thing itself would be distinct from the nature of the thing from the singular unity of each individual. This last consequence is evident, because whatever is intrinsic and essential to an individual thing is not distinguished from it from the nature of the thing.

11. Formal unity, as it exists in the thing, is incommunicable.—From these things it is concluded, fourthly, that this formal unity, as it exists in things before every operation of the intellect, is not common to many individuals, but that formal unities are multiplied as many as there are individuals. It is proved, first, because this formal unity accompanies the nature according to itself; but in the thing there is not some common nature, but natures and essences are multiplied as many as there are individuals, as is evident from what has been said above, and we shall say again in what follows; therefore the same must be said of formal unity, which is as it were an intrinsic and transcendental property of such a nature, and therefore they follow each other mutually, and when one is multiplied the other is multiplied, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 3. Secondly, because formal unity existing in reality is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from individual unity, as has been said; therefore it is necessary that it be multiplied in the thing itself when the individuals and their individual unities are multiplied; therefore there is no formal unity in the thing itself common to many things of the same nature. The first consequence is proved, because, if formal and individual unity are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, then in each individual, in Peter for example, his formal and individual unity are not distinguished in the thing; therefore they are distinguished from the formal and individual unity of Paul; because, by the very fact that the formal unity of Peter is in the thing altogether the same as his individual unity, it is necessary that it be distinguished from the individual unity of Paul, because it cannot in the thing be the same with things altogether distinct and in a certain way opposed. Thirdly, because whatever exists in reality is singular, and consequently incommunicable, or not common to several inferiors, as was shown in the preceding disputation, sect. 1, and will also be said in the following section; but this unity is real and in its own way exists in reality, as has been declared; therefore it is singular; therefore it is not in the thing itself common. The last consequence is evident, because what is singular is proper to some individual, and therefore cannot be common to many; and on this account such community requires abstraction from all individuals, which cannot belong to things really, but only through the intellect.

12. And from these things it follows, first, that, although each individual in reality is formally one without the thinking of the mind, nevertheless several individuals which are said to be of the same nature are not one something by a true unity which is in things, but only either fundamentally or through the intellect. And on this account Aristotle, whenever he says that several things are one in essence or formal notion, explains that unity through order to the intellect; namely, because they are conceived under one notion or definition, as is evident from Metaphysics V, c. 6, text 11, and Book X, at the beginning. And St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4, said in this sense that the nature of itself does not have common unity, because otherwise it could not become singular. Secondly it follows that it is one thing to speak of formal unity, another of the community of that unity; for the unity is in things, as has been declared; but community properly and rigorously is not in things, because no unity which exists in the thing is common, as we have shown; but there is in singular things a certain likeness in their formal unities, in which is founded the community which the intellect can attribute to such a nature as conceived by itself; which likeness is not properly unity, because it does not express the indivision of the entities in which it is founded, but only agreement, or the relation or coexistence of each.

The foundations of the former opinion are solved

13. To the first foundation of the former opinion the answer is that Aristotle numbered among the modes of one generic and specific unity either on account of the formal unity which they express in the individual things in which they exist, or because they are in some way fundamentally in things, as we shall declare afterwards; and in this way several things are said to be of the same nature, either by identity of reason, or in fundamental unity, which consists in likeness. Whence it is said to the second that, in order that a nature can be defined, this unity suffices, because definition properly is not in things but in reason; and therefore there is not one common definition except in so far as the mind conceives something as common, separating it from any singular, for which the formal unity which the nature has in each individual suffices, with the likeness of all such unities among themselves; for thence it comes about that the intellect conceives and defines that formal notion by one common concept. Whence, when it is said that the nature does not have from the intellect that it is definable, it must be said that this is true fundamentally and remotely, but not proximately; or (what is the same) that it is true as regards the essence which is explained by the definition, for that precedes in things, but not as regards the condition which it requires in order to be defined by us, which is community; for this it has only through the thinking of the mind.

14. To the third it is said, first, that it concludes that the nature of itself has formal unity, but not the community of that formal unity. Whence it has unity altogether inseparable, but community not at all; for in each individual the nature is formally one, yet it is not common, nor indifferent to several, but in each it has been made singular and proper to it. Wherefore, when it is said that the nature of itself is so formally undivided that it is repugnant to it to be formally divided, this can be equivocal; for either the sense is that the nature which is thus formally one is not further divisible through formal and essential differences; and in this sense, in generic natures, it is simply false; for the generic nature has its formal unity, and nevertheless is formally divisible through specific differences. In specific natures it is indeed true, yet it matters nothing to what we are dealing with; for, although the specific nature is not further divisible through essential differences, it is nevertheless divisible through individual differences, and in each individual it has its formal unity, distinct from that which it has in others; and this is enough for such a unity to be unable to be common in the thing. Or the sense is that the nature is so undivided of itself that every division or multiplication of its formal unity is repugnant to it; and in this sense the assumption is simply false, even in specific natures. Because, as we were saying above, although in individuals there is not an essential division or distinction, there is nevertheless a division or distinction of essences; so it must be said in the present case that, although individuals of the same species are not simply said to differ formally, they nevertheless have distinct formal unities proper to each. For to be distinguished essentially or formally signifies not only to have a distinct essence or form, but also to have according to it dissimilitude and disagreement, and so to be distinguished not only according to the thing, but also according to the common notion and definition which the mind can fashion. But to have a distinct essence or formal unity expresses only entitative and real distinction; in which way, just as Peter has a humanity distinct from Paul’s, so also he has a distinct essence and a distinct formal unity, although in it they are similar. To the nature, therefore, which of itself is said to be formally one, it is not repugnant to be multiplied according to that unity in many, and in each to have that unity incommunicable and consequently distinct from others; but only dissimilitude, or disagreement according to that notion, is repugnant to it; that is, that the things which participate that formal unity be not similar in it and agree among themselves.

15. To the fourth, with its confirmation, the answer is the same; for it proves that the common nature has of itself a formal unity, according to which one specific nature differs formally and specially from another, but it does not prove that that formal unity is in the thing itself common, except according to likeness or agreement, as has been declared. And in almost the same way the answer is given to the arguments by which it is finally proved that this formal unity is common in the thing; for it is common in the way in which the nature itself is, whose unity it is. But the nature is not common according to the thing, but according to reason or fundamental likeness, as has often been touched upon and will be professedly said in the following section. In the same way, therefore, the formal unity is common, which in the thing is divided into several formal unities, each of which is formally undivided in itself; but among themselves, or one from another, they are not in the thing formally undivided, except according to likeness and agreement, by reason of which they are not called simply and properly formally distinct, as has been said, but are formal unities distinct entitatively or individually. For these two are not repugnant, namely that the formal unities themselves are multiplied, and are not multiplied formally, but materially, or in the individual; for the formal unity itself in each individual is singular and individual, although it does not have this by virtue of formal unity, but from the individual difference. We confess, therefore, that every formal unity, as it is in the thing, is individual and singular, yet that it nevertheless differs according to reason from individual unity, because formal unity per se and from its proper concept expresses only indivision in essential predicates; but individual unity expresses indivision in the entity itself. Whence formal unity expresses in the thing a foundation of likeness with another thing of the same nature; but individual unity expresses absolutely and simply a foundation of distinction; and finally formal unity expresses a foundation of communicability at least according to reason; but individual unity expresses every kind of incommunicability, both according to the thing and according to reason.

1. The things which are denominated universal truly exist in reality.—At the outset it must be laid down that those natures which we denominate universal and common are real and truly exist in things themselves; for we do not feign them in the mind, but rather apprehend them, and understand them to be in things, and of them so conceived we hand down definitions, make demonstrations, and seek science. So Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 6, and Book IV, c. 5, reproves Heraclitus and Cratylus for saying that there is nothing in things besides singulars. And Metaphysics VII, text 56, he teaches that universals are not separated from things, and in texts 37 and 53 he says that definitions are given of universal things; and Posterior Analytics I, texts 5, 11, 33, 39, 43, he says that science is of universals, which exist in singulars and are abstracted from them; and he has the same in Metaphysics I, c. 1. And in the same sense, De Interpretatione I, c. 5, he says that of things some are universal, others singular. And in this all philosophers and interpreters of Aristotle agree, the nominalists excepted, who say that only words are universal in signifying, and concepts universal in representing, and that definitions and sciences are proximately concerned with these, as may be seen in Ockham, In I, dist. 2, q. 4, and Quodlibet V, qq. 12 and 13, and Gabriel, In I, dist. 7, qq. 7 and 8; whom Fonseca attacks at length, Book V, c. 28, q. 2. And they are deservedly to be reproved as regards some manners of speaking, for in the thing perhaps they do not dissent from the true opinion; for their reasons tend only to this, to prove that universality is not in things, but belongs to them as they are objectively in the intellect, or by denomination from some work of the intellect, which is true, as I shall say below. And therefore there is no reason why we should linger in reporting and solving their arguments; for they in no way stand in the way of its being true that the natures which are denominated universal are in singulars, and that the singulars themselves have among themselves something in which they agree or are similar, and something in which they differ or are distinguished. Whence they falsely deny that demonstrations or definitions are given of things, because the sciences are not about our names and formal concepts, but directly about things or objective concepts. Wherefore, although the denomination of universality comes to things from concepts, nevertheless the things so denominated are real and exist in things.

2. Universals in the thing are not separated from singulars.—Secondly it must be supposed that these things or natures which we denominate universal are not really separated from singular things; because, as was demonstrated above, every thing which exists is necessarily singular and individual; and it involves an open repugnance that man, for example, should exist really separated from all singular men, and be universal with respect to all of them. For, if he is separated, he is not in them intrinsically and essentially; but if he is universal, he must be in them intrinsically and essentially, because this is of the notion of such a universal; nor can he at the same time be separated from them and intrinsically in them; because these two, taken in the thing itself, involve a repugnance. Likewise, because either man as such is a thing really distinct from Peter, Paul, etc., or he is not a distinct thing; if this second is said, this is what we intend, for in this sense universals are said not to be separated, because they are not things really distinct from singulars, nor do they have a proper entity and real unity distinct from them; but if the first is said, it openly follows that man as such is a certain thing distinct from Peter and Paul, for a real distinction cannot be understood except between certain and determinate things; that thing, therefore, will be a certain man distinct from the other men. Whence neither will he be able to be of their essence, nor will he be able to be at the same time in all of them. Likewise, otherwise by the same reason there would have to be granted an animal separated from all species of animals, and a living thing separated from all genera of living things, and so of the other quidditative predicates; all of which are impossible and altogether useless, because neither for science nor for handing down definitions is it necessary to feign such monsters of ideas.

3. In what sense Plato asserted universals to be separated.—Which is so manifest and self-evident that it seems incredible to many that Plato taught the contrary in the sense in which Aristotle, in Metaphysics I and VII and in other places, attributes it to him and attacks it most fully. St. Thomas reports that Eustratius and Simplicius so thought, De regimine principum IV, c. 4; and Augustine, treating in particular of the ideas, Eighty-three Questions, q. 46, and City of God VII, c. 28, declares that Plato spoke of the ideas which are in the divine mind; which Seneca too thinks, Book VIII, letter 66. Indeed this seems to be indicated by Plato himself, in the Parmenides and Timaeus. Let Eugubinus be read, De perenni philosophia I, c. 10. But if this is so, it must consequently be said that Plato did not posit the ideas on account of our mode of conceiving, defining or knowing things in the universal; for to this the ideas, as they are in the mind of God, contribute nothing; because neither do we conceive or define them; and if per impossibile there were no such ideas, universals could be conceived and defined by us in the same way. But ideas of this kind are posited in order that they may be the first exemplars of these inferior things, and may flow into them as the first and immutable principle in their genus; of which ideas under this consideration the theologians treat, In I, dist. 36, with St. Thomas, I, q. 15; and below, in treating of causes, we shall touch on something. But, whatever may be the case with Plato’s mind, this consideration matters nothing to the present purpose, because we are not treating of the universal which they call universal in causing, whether after the manner of an efficient or after the manner of an exemplar, but of the universal in being or in predicating.

The sense of the question and various opinions

4. These things, then, being supposed, the question remains whether the nature which is denominated universal, although it is in singular things, nevertheless has of itself a sufficient unity on account of which it is denominated universal, so that not only the universal nature but also its universality is in things. Three opinions are current on this matter. The first is that the nature so has of itself and per se some universality that, even really existing in the individuals themselves, it retains it and is actually universal; which opinion John Monlorius defends at length, in a special disputation on this matter, cc. 5 and 6; and it is commonly attributed to Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and Metaphysics VII, q. 18, where Antonius Andreae defends it, q. 16. Although Scotus, in the aforesaid distinction, rather speaks so as simply to deny that the universal in act is in things, and seems to admit only the universal in aptitude or potency, which Aristotle and all concede. Wherefore in expounding the opinion of Scotus his disciples vary, as Fonseca, to be cited below, treats at length, where he too, as others also, tries to bring him over to his own opinion. But, lest we labour in an equivocation, it is necessary to declare these terms, universal in act and universal in potency.

5. If, then, by universal in act is understood the nature abstracted from all individuation, which is conceived after the manner of one being undivided and common to many and having a proximate aptitude to be predicated of them, then it is self-evident that the universal in act as such is not in things; and in this way Scotus explained this universality above, and Aristotle speaks in the same way when he denies against Plato that there is a universal in things, namely subsisting universally and separated from every singular and individual contraction. This universal, therefore, is given only through the intellect, as we shall declare in the following section. Again, if whatever does not have actual universality explained in the said way, but affords the intellect a foundation by which it can conceive or feign it, is called universal in potency, then too it is certain that there is in things universality in potency, because there is in them some foundation of the abstraction or universal conception which the intellect makes. But of what kind is this foundation? For in this lies the point of the controversy. The opinion cited, then, affirms that this foundation is a certain universality which belongs of itself and really to the nature, as it is prior in nature to its inferiors contracting it. For, although in the thing it is not separated from them, nevertheless in truth it is common to all of them according to the same notion and formal unity. And so this universality, although with respect to the former it is called aptitudinal or fundamental, nevertheless, with respect to the singularity or individuation of the nature, is a true, real and actual universality, which differs from formal unity only in this, that beyond the negation of division in itself it expresses indifference and community to many.

6. The opinion so declared, then, is proved, first, because the nature, for example human, has of itself formal unity, as has been said; it also has of itself that it is communicable to many; therefore of itself and before every intellect it is one in many and of many, in which the notion of the universal consists, on the testimony of Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, text 25; the nature, therefore, has of itself and in things themselves some universality which is a real property of it, and not only of reason. The minor, in which the force of the argument lies, is proved, first, because human nature of itself is not incommunicable; otherwise it could not be multiplied according to number; it is therefore of itself communicable; because between communicable and incommunicable there is no medium with respect to the same nature, for they are contradictorily opposed. Secondly, because the nature is not of itself this and individual, as was proved in the preceding disputation; but it needs something adjoined by which it is individuated; therefore of itself it is apt to be contracted by individuating principles; indeed, since it is not apt to subsist abstractly and universally, it postulates and requires this determination in order to be able to subsist; it is therefore of itself apt for it; therefore it is also of itself communicable to many individuals. This last consequence is proved, because such a nature is not adequately contractible by one individual difference alone; indeed this is repugnant to it; therefore this repugnance which such a nature has to being adequately contracted in one individual alone is founded in the natural aptitude which it has to be able to be in many; this aptitude, therefore, belongs to it really and according to itself. Thirdly, the same is proved from the attributes of universal natures as they are universal; for they are said to be the proper objects of the sciences, immutable and perpetual, ingenerable and incorruptible; they are also said to be the things immediately signified by common words or concepts, to which essential predicates and intrinsic properties belong per se primarily; but all these are not feigned by the intellect, nor do they consist in some extrinsic denomination coming from some act of the intellect; therefore the nature has in things themselves some universality which is the reason and foundation of all these. And it is confirmed, because otherwise we can scarcely avoid falling into the opinion of the nominalists, who deny that there are universal natures in things, but only singular things; because, if the nature in the thing has no universality, nor is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals, as was shown above, it does not appear what can immediately correspond in things to common terms or their concepts besides the singulars themselves, which the nominalists teach; and consequently there will not be able to be science of common things, but only of words, as the same contend.

7. The second opinion is that the nature existing in individuals is not actually universal, but nevertheless does not have from the intellect alone that it is actually universal, but of itself and before the operation of the intellect, and before every contraction to individuals, and so before every existence both in the intellect and in the thing itself, is actually universal. Fonseca treats and defends this opinion at length, Metaphysics V, c. 28, through the first five questions. Whose foundations we shall see afterwards, while we confirm the true opinion; for this opinion is intermediate between the two others, and therefore takes arguments from the same partly to refute them, partly to protect and persuade itself.

8. The third opinion is that natures become actually universal only by the work of the intellect, some foundation preceding on the side of the things themselves, on account of which they are said to be in reality universals in potency. This opinion is common to the ancient and recent philosophers, with Aristotle very often in these books of the Metaphysics, especially in VII; and the Commentator, De Anima I, comm. 8, saying that it is the intellect which makes universals in things; and Avicenna, who in this sense said, Metaphysics V, at the beginning: Horseness according to itself is only horseness, neither one nor several; and St. Thomas speaks in the same way, opusc. De ente et essentia, c. 4, where he says that the nature according to itself is neither universal nor singular, and in other places in the same sense he says that the intention of universality is from the intellect, as I, q. 85, a. 1, and I-II, q. 29, a. 6, and In Metaph. VII, lect. 13; and all his disciples agree in the same opinion: Cajetan, in the cited place of De ente et essentia; Soncinas and Javellus, cited in the preceding section; Soto on the Logic, q. 2 on universals, and others.

Resolution of the question

9. This last opinion is without doubt true. In order, however, to explain and confirm it, two things which we proposed in the title of the question must be declared. First, how the unity which is necessary for the universality of the nature differs from formal unity. Second, how the aptitude of being in many belongs to the nature so one. From which a third will finally be evident, namely, how the universality of the nature cannot be found in things themselves. I suppose, however, what Aristotle often taught, that the notion of universality as such consists in two things, namely in unity and communicability. For these two are contained in that definition by which the universal is called one in many and of many, or besides many, which is taken from various places of Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias I, c. 5; Posterior Analytics I, c. 18; Metaphysics VII, c. 13. For if the nature is not in some way one, it will not be something universal, but a multitude or aggregation of things; but if it is not apt to be in several, it will not be universal but singular; and therefore it is necessary that it be in many in a mode opposed to singularity or individuation, that is, that it be in many inferiors which under that common notion can be multiplied and numbered. These two, then, namely unity and community, must be explained, in order that it may be evident that the notion constituting the proper universal is not found in things, the intellect being excluded.

10. I say, first: formal unity by itself alone does not suffice for the unity which the universal nature requires, as it is and is denominated universal, but some greater unity is required. It is proved, first, because the unity of a universal thing as universal must be such that it is proper to it, and cannot belong to a singular thing as singular; but formal unity is not of this kind; therefore as such it does not suffice for the unity of the universal nature as such. The major is evident from the common consent of all, and from the opposition which is between the singular and the universal as they are such; for, since they are opposed as communicable and incommunicable, that unity which is indifferent to both of these cannot be sufficient for the notion of the universal, as will be more evident from the following reason. But the minor is evident from what was said above of formal unity; for it was shown that it is of itself indifferent to the nature either universally conceived or contracted in individuals. Secondly it is proved, because formal unity is multiplied in individuals together with the nature itself; but the unity which is proper to the universal nature as universal cannot be multiplied in inferiors, for rather they are one under that notion; in which way Porphyry said that by participation of the species several men are one man; therefore the universal nature as such has another mode of unity besides formal unity. The major was proved above. For we showed that each individual nature is formally one in itself by a proper and intrinsic formal unity distinct from that which is in another similar nature, because each, through what it is in itself, is formally undivided in itself. And hence the minor proposition is easily proved, because, if the unity of the universal nature as universal were multiplied in inferiors, specific unity would be multiplied in individuals, or generic in species, which is impossible; otherwise both several men would be several species, and each of them would have in himself the unity of universality, and consequently each would be one universally as he is one formally, which is plainly false. Whence I argue, thirdly, because formal unity expresses only the formal or essential indivision of that thing which is so denominated one; whence to this unity it is irrelevant whether that thing is singular or common; but universal unity intrinsically expresses the indivision of many in that thing or notion which is universally denominated one, so that none of the inferiors which are contained under such a notion, taken by itself, has that whole universal unity, but all are one under that notion; in which way all the species of animal are one in the notion of animal; but no species taken by itself has in itself the universal unity of animal, which is as it were potential, although it has in itself its formal unity. Although, therefore, formal unity is prerequired for the unity of the universal and is its foundation, it is nevertheless not per se sufficient, but universal unity adds something beyond it.

11. You will say: what, then, or of what kind can this unity of the universal nature as such be? For every unity, as was indicated above, must be either formal or numerical; because every division is either formal or material; but universal unity cannot be numerical unity, because this is proper to singular things; if, therefore, it is not formal either, what can it be? The answer is that it is a certain unity distinct from these, having a proper name and a proper notion. For this unity is called universal, and its notion consists in the indivision of some nature into several similar natures under the same name and notion, with an aptitude to be divided into them. And so a unity of this kind includes both, namely indivision, and aptitude for division into several of the same name and notion, or such that each encloses and contains in itself the whole divided thing as regards its actuality. Whence this indivision approaches most nearly to proper privation, because it expresses the negation of division in a nature apt for such division. In which this unity differs from individual unity, which expresses not only indivision but also inaptitude for division into several which would be such as the divided thing itself is. From formal unity it differs, because that unity, although it is not repugnant to that aptitude or communicability to several, nevertheless does not require it. Whence in God there can be understood formal unity with incommunicability to several natures. When, therefore, it is said that every unity is either formal or numerical, that is true of the unities which belong to things themselves according to themselves, or in the thing itself; but besides these there can be another unity which is completed through the intellect; and of this kind is universal unity, as we shall show.

12. Whence it is further added that this unity can be reduced to numerical unity, which nevertheless is not simply real, but of reason or objective. It is declared, for the human species in the notion of species is so one that with others it makes up the number three, or four, etc., of the species contained under animal; but every unity which can make up a number can under that notion be called numerical. On account of which, although man and horse differ absolutely essentially and in species, nevertheless in the notion of universals or species they differ in number. Likewise the formal concept of man as such is one in number; whence its object in the notion of object can also be called one in number; and so man, in so far as he is presented to that concept, is said to have numerical objective unity, or in the notion of object, which is also a unity of reason, or by extrinsic denomination from the concept of the mind; this unity, therefore, is necessary for the notion of the universal, and under that notion can be reduced to the numerical. Which can also be explained in this way; for if we feigned, according to the opinion of Plato as it is explained by Aristotle, that universals are things separated from singulars, it would necessarily have to be understood that man as such, subsisting in himself, is a certain thing in itself transcendentally numerable with others, and so one in number, although at the same time he would be feigned as existing in several distinct in number, which otherwise involves a repugnance, as has been said, which does not matter to the present point; for hence we only intend to declare that the universal, in the way in which it is or is apprehended, must be understood as undivided in itself and numerable, either according to the thing, if it is feigned as separated in the thing itself, or according to reason and concept, if it is only abstracted in the mind.

13. Universal unity is not before the operation of the mind.—From these things I say, secondly, the unity of the universal nature as universal is not real, nor is it in things as they exist in the thing itself and precede every operation of the intellect. This conclusion follows openly from the preceding; because in things no unity can be understood besides formal and numerical; but neither of these suffices for the notion of the universal as such. It will perhaps be said that in things there is found not only that formal unity by which each human nature, for example, is said to be formally one in itself, but also a unity by which all human natures are said to have the same formal notion, and consequently formal unity, by reason of which they participate the same definition, and all men in reality are said to be of the same nature. But against this, for this in truth is not unity but only likeness; for nothing truly one and undivided in the thing is in reality in this and in that human nature, but only in this there is something to which something is similar in the other nature; but this is not real unity but likeness. Whence several things can only be said in reality to be of the same nature, that is, similar; for this identity, since it is said to be between distinct things, cannot in the thing itself be anything besides likeness, by reason of which they are also said to participate, or have, the same definition—fundamentally indeed by virtue of the said likeness, but formally through reason, for definition is a work of reason.

14. The real relation of likeness is neither sufficient nor necessary for the notion of the universal.—This likeness, however, is neither simply necessary for the notion of the universal nor sufficient. I understand, however, that it is not necessary according to actual existence and relation, because it is not of the notion of the universal that it actually be in many; for, if the ideas of Plato were true, they would be universal of themselves, although no other individual actually existed; and in fact the natures of the heaven and of Gabriel are universal, whether in the thing there are several of their individuals having among themselves the aforesaid likeness or not. But if the discussion were of that likeness in potency, then it is necessary for the universality of the nature, because otherwise the nature could not be understood as common, as we shall immediately explain more fully. But that that likeness does not suffice for the notion of the universal is proved, because by virtue of that likeness precisely, whether taken in act or in potency, something is not conceived as one common to many, but many are conceived as similar among themselves; but the universal as such must be conceived as one. Likewise, because the universal as universal is conceived as actually undivided, in so far as it is such, and divisible and communicable in aptitude; but things, as in reality they are similar in nature, are rather actually divided, and in aptitude or fundamentally unitable (so to speak) in one nature universally conceived.

15. And hence the conclusion posited is more openly confirmed. For universality as such expresses some indivision; otherwise it would not be universality but only multitude; but that cannot be an indivision which belongs to things as they are in themselves, but only as they underlie the concepts of the mind; therefore the unity which is taken thence is not real but of reason. The minor is declared, for, as Aristotle rightly said, Metaphysics VII, c. 14, and often elsewhere, to be undivided in the thing itself and at the same time to be actually divided into several of the same name and notion involves a repugnance; for if the thing is undivided in reality, in reality it is singular and one in number; but if it is divided into several similar things of the same name and notion, it will also be several in number, which cannot happen. And this repugnance followed from the position of Plato, which ceases if the universal is understood to have indivision only according to reason; because to be undivided according to reason and divided according to the thing are not opposed among themselves. And in this way all men in the notion of species are said to be one man, because in the concept of man as such they are not divided; and so the unity of man, in so far as it is universal, is completed through reason, because man as such has indivision only as he underlies the conception of the mind. Which indivision consists in this, that man, for example, abstractly conceived, is not communicable to many men or objective concepts so abstracted, although he is communicable through contraction to many individuals.

1. Before we answer the arguments of the contrary opinion, an objection which occurs here must be treated, and a certain opinion which has seemed to me almost singular and new. It can be objected, then, against the preceding resolution, that any common nature, for example human, not only in so far as it has been abstracted by the intellect, but also in so far as of itself it prescinds from the individual differences and is prior in the order of nature to them, has a certain unity; because as such it is not several, but one only; but that unity, since it belongs to the nature of itself, will be real; therefore it will suffice for the notion of the universal. Concerning this Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 28, q. 3, sects. 2, 3 and 4, thinks that there belongs to the universal nature taken according to itself a certain unity which it does not communicate to its inferiors, but which belongs to it alone and precisely before it exists, both in the nature of things and in the intellect; which unity he says is distinct from formal unity, because the latter is multiplied in individuals, but not the former. He calls that unity, however, a unity of prescission, or numerical, not simply and absolutely, but of the common nature, which is a diminishing condition; whence he also calls it in a certain way mixed of formal and numerical. And for this opinion he cites St. Thomas, Opusc. 42, De natura generis, cc. 7 and 8, where he indicates that there are universal natures having a certain unity belonging to the nature absolutely taken, which is not communicated to the individuals of such a nature, nor belongs to the nature through the intellect. He cites also Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 40, where he says that the nature considered according to itself, that is, neither as it is in individuals nor as it is in the intellect, has a certain unity; and he does not seem to speak of formal unity, because he adds that the nature does not communicate this unity to its inferiors; and Capreolus thinks the same, In III, dist. 5, q. 5, a. 3, on the arguments of Scotus against the first conclusion, where he affirms this not of all universals but of some, from St. Thomas in the place cited, namely of those which have not only logical but also physical unity and agreement. Which limitation makes the matter more difficult and more obscure, because it is impossible to find a universal unity not founded in formal unity, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said; but formal unity being supposed, the reason is the same as regards every other unity in any universal nature whatever; because every such nature can be considered according to itself and absolutely, and as such the same non-repugnance, indifference or indivision is found in any one whatever; and therefore Fonseca does not admit that limitation, but generally attributes this unity of prescission to all universal natures.

2. But if you ask where or when this unity belongs to such a nature, he answers that the existing nature never has a unity of this kind, because in the individuals it does not have it, since in them it is contracted; but the nature has existence only in individuals; nor does it belong to it only as it is in the intellect, because it belongs to it according to itself before it is understood to have anything from the intellect; nor does it belong to it by mere extrinsic denomination, but through a true negation or indivision belonging to the nature itself according to itself. And Soncinas, above, thinks this very thing, who on this account says that this unity is not actual but potential; and each explains it through this conditional, that, if the nature existed without contraction to individuals, it would have this unity. But if you object again that, if this unity belongs per se to the nature absolutely taken, it will be inseparable from it, for what belongs per se to something always belongs, nor can its opposite belong to it; but in the individuals the nature does not have that unity, but rather the opposite multitude; therefore that unity cannot belong per se to such a nature: they answer that that per se, or according to itself, can be taken in two ways: first, as signifying the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject, as of its essence or intrinsically flowing from it; in which way Aristotle took it when he enumerated two modes of per se, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4; and in this way the argument rightly proves that the aforesaid unity does not belong per se to the universal nature; in another way per se is taken for that which is absolutely or solitarily, and in this way this unity is said to belong to the nature taken according to itself or per se; because, that nature being considered absolutely and solitarily, that is, in so far as it does not have the contracting or individuating differences adjoined, it at once has that unity. For it is not necessary that whatever belongs to the nature taken according to itself in this latter way should also belong per se in the former way, that is, from within and necessarily; for many predicates, especially negative ones, can belong contingently to it so taken, such as not to exist, not to be generated or corrupted, not to be white, black, or all similar things which do not belong to the common nature except by reason of the individuals. So, then, this unity of prescission, which consists in a negation or privation, belongs to the nature considered according to itself and absolutely, because as such the differences by which it is contracted and divided do not belong to it; yet it does not belong to it per se and necessarily, because by means of the inferiors its opposite can belong to it.

3. Refutation of the preceding opinion.—Predicates belonging to the nature solitarily belong per se in the posterior-analytic sense.—Porphyry.—But nevertheless this opinion cannot meet with my approval; for (to omit that it is plainly contrary to St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4, and Cajetan there, and other authors cited and to be reported below, concl. 4) I do not sufficiently understand of what kind can be a unity which belongs to the nature before the intellect and yet can never belong to it as existing in inferiors or in singulars; for, if that unity belongs to the nature before the intellect, then it is real unity; therefore it can sometime really belong to the nature itself; therefore it is necessary that it can belong to it in the individuals or in some individual; for nothing belongs really to the nature at all except what can belong to it as existing in some individual. For what they say, that this unity belongs really to the nature according to the being of essence, not according to the being of existence, does not seem able to be understood; because, as I said above in treating of the concept of being and shall say again below in treating of the essence and existence of creatures, the being of essence cannot be conceived as real unless it at least in aptitude includes order to existence; therefore, if this unity cannot belong to the essence as existing, neither does it belong to it as apt to exist; because, just as it does not exist except as individual, so neither is it apt to exist except as individual; therefore it in no way belongs to it really. And it is confirmed, because no predicate, either positive or negative, belongs to the nature taken according to itself and solitarily, unless either it belongs to it per se in the posterior-analytic sense, or it can belong to the individuals; but this unity does not belong in the said per se way to the nature taken according to itself, as they themselves confess; nor can it belong to it by reason of the individuals, because rather as such it is repugnant to it; indeed, by the very fact that it is taken in the individuals, it is no longer considered per se and solitarily; therefore it in no way belongs per se primarily. The major is evident from Porphyry, chapter on Common Features; from St. Thomas, Cajetan and others in the places cited. And by induction it is evident in negative predicates too (for of positive ones there is no reason for doubting), because not to be white, or black, etc., belong to man as such in so far as they can belong to some individual of man; indeed even not to exist, although it cannot belong to man by reason of some existing individual, nevertheless belongs to him in so far as either some or all individuals of human nature do not exist. The reason is that these predicates are contingent, and therefore do not belong to the species except by reason of the individuals.

4. An objection is answered.—But if anyone objects that there are some negative predicates which belong to the common nature according to itself and yet do not belong to the individuals, as seem to be these, not to be generated, not to be corrupted (for it is repugnant that the universal nature absolutely taken be generated, or created, or even exist), it must be said that this is a sophistical equivocation; for the sense of those negations can be manifold. The first is that the abstract nature can neither be generated nor corrupted nor be; and in this way those negations are true; yet, if they are rightly understood, they are not said of the nature according to itself and absolutely taken, but as having a certain state which it can have only through the intellect; for really there is no nature so abstract and solitary, but it is considered through the intellect, and such a negation is attributed to it as so considered. Wherefore it is not wonderful that it does not belong to it in the individuals, because through existence in the individuals that state is destroyed by reason of which such a negation belongs to the nature. Whence, if that unity of prescission is to be compared with these negations, it is rather gathered hence that it does not belong to the nature except as it underlies the operation of the intellect abstracting and prescinding it. Another sense of those negations is that the common nature absolutely is not generated nor corrupted; and this can be understood either that it is not generated in any way, and so it is false, for at least secondarily it is generated and exists in the individuals; or that it is not generated per se primarily, but by reason of the individuals, and this is true; yet this can also be said of the nature existing in the individuals, as Aristotle says that second substances exist in first ones and by reason of them, and consequently not per se primarily. Whence this negation taken in this sense does not belong to the nature contingently, but per se and necessarily; just as conversely to become and to be per se primarily belong to individuals, if they must belong to anything. No contingent predicates, therefore, even negative ones, belong to common natures except either by reason of the individuals, or in the individuals themselves, or by reason of the state which they have in the intellect.

5. Finally I argue in this way against the said opinion: because the common nature is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals, but only through the intellect; therefore it cannot have some unity according to itself which it does not have in the individuals, except only through the intellect. The antecedent has often been proved; the consequence is proved, first, because real one follows upon being; therefore, if the nature according to itself does not have an entity distinct from the entity of the individuals, neither can it have a real unity distinct from the unity of the individuals; therefore it can have of itself no unity which it does not have in the individuals, but every other is through the intellect. Secondly, the same consequence is proved from the very terms which the other opinion uses; for it calls this unity a unity of prescission; if, therefore, prescission is not in the thing, nor belongs to the nature according to itself, but only through the intellect, neither can unity belong to the nature according to itself, the intellect being excluded. Indeed, if anyone considers rightly, by the very fact that according to itself is said in the sense declared above, the operation of the intellect is involved, because the nature is not prescinded or separated from all individual differences except by the work of the intellect. Whence, whatever belongs to the nature taken according to itself, properly and peculiarly by reason of that condition or state which is explained by that particle according to itself in the aforesaid sense, belongs to it through the intellect; but the aforesaid unity is of this kind, as has been shown.

6. A vindication from a charge.—And hence it is understood in passing that no equivocation is committed by St. Thomas, Cajetan and others (as Fonseca thought) when they say that whatever belongs to the nature according to itself or per se belongs to it as existing in the individuals, because whatever belongs per se to something always belongs; for in each place they take per se in the same way, namely in the posterior-analytic sense, as in truth it is to be taken. And similarly, when the same authors distinguish that something belongs to the nature in three ways, namely either as existing in individuals, or as in the intellect, or according to itself, they take according to itself in the same sense, namely for that which belongs to the nature per se and from within, and not by reason of some state of contraction or of prescission or abstraction. For they suppose (what we have shown is true) that nothing can belong proximately and immediately to the nature, in so far as it is such a nature, unless it also belongs per se; and conversely that whatever belongs contingently to the common nature belongs to it by reason of the state of individuation which it has in the thing, or of the separation which it has through the intellect. Whence, in order that the equivocation may be more openly removed, every predicate which is said immediately (so to speak) of the common nature, that is, not by reason of the individuals, can be said to belong to it according to itself; yet this predicate can be twofold: one belonging to the nature as precisely having such a formal notion, as to be a rational animal, and consequently to be risible, capable of wonder, etc.; and predicates of this kind are said most properly to belong to the nature according to itself and per se, that is, from the precise fact that it is such a nature. And in this way is the discussion of St. Thomas and others of the nature according to itself, when they distinguish it from its twofold state, namely in the individuals or in the intellect; and therefore they rightly conclude that whatever belongs in this way to the nature according to itself belongs to it wherever and however it exists. But other predicates can be said to belong to the nature according to itself, that is, taken in common, yet not by reason of the nature itself but by reason of that prescission and separation which that particle according to itself circumscribes. And such a consideration of the nature coincides with the state which the nature has through the intellect, and those predicates similarly coincide with the attributes which belong to that nature by reason of that state; otherwise it would be necessary to apply a fourth consideration of the nature besides the threefold one just expounded, which is unheard of. Since, therefore, that unity is said to belong to the nature according to itself, yet not by the very fact that the nature is such, but by the precise fact that it is taken or considered according to itself, it is plainly convinced that that unity does not belong to the nature except according to the state which it has in the intellect.

7. Thirdly, the same principal consequence of the argument is proved and declared more fully, because the actually existing nature is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individual, and therefore as such it cannot have a real unity repugnant to individuation, such as a common unity would be; but the nature even taken in common as possible, or according to the being of essence, is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals, taken also in possible being or according to the being of individual essence; therefore by the same reason there cannot belong to such a nature according to itself and before the intellect some unity repugnant to individual unity, such as that unity of prescission or common numerical unity would be. The major is evident from what has been said, and is not denied by the others. The minor is easily proved, because the proportion of possible things among themselves is the same as that of existing things among themselves, because no other things exist or come to be except those which are possible. Nor does possible humanity have another essence than that which it has while it exists; therefore, if humanity as such, when it actually exists, is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from this and that humanity, neither is humanity as possible distinguished from the nature of the thing from this and that possible humanity. Indeed, if we speak properly, humanity is not possible except in so far as this and other individual humanities are possible, just as humanity does not exist except in so far as an individual humanity exists. But the consequence is proved by the same reason and proportion, because possible humanity is not other than this and that humanity according to the thing and the intellect being excluded; therefore repugnant unities cannot belong to it. And it is confirmed, for if this unity belongs to the nature before the intellect, to what nature, I ask, does it belong? To the singular? And this not, as is self-evident and they themselves confess. Or to the common in so far as it is common? And this not, because there is no such nature even possible, the operation of the intellect being taken away. Or to the nature as it is nature, adjoining nothing else even through the intellect? And this not either, because as such the nature has only formal unity, which is communicated to the individuals and multiplied in them; therefore, the intellect being excluded, there can be no adequate subject and foundation of such a unity.

8. The foundation of the opposite opinion is overthrown.—To the difficulty, then, the answer is by denying what is assumed in it, namely that human nature, for example, has of itself some unity distinct from formal unity. That objection proceeds from a false principle, namely that the specific nature of itself prescinds from the individuals by some real prescission, or one which belongs to it from the nature of the thing; whereas in truth it does not prescind except through the intellect abstracting and conceiving the common nature without the individuals, of which prescission there is indeed a foundation in the nature itself; but this is not other than formal unity, which is multiplied in the individuals and is in them through identity. Another false thing too seems to be supposed in that objection, namely that the specific nature, for example, is prior in the order of nature to the individuals and as such has that unity of prescission or common numerical unity; for, if the discussion is of real priority, that is, founded in some real causality or relationship or real order, this is not true; both because where there is no distinction from the nature of the thing there cannot be real order or causality; and also because neither in the notion of existing nor in the being of essence can such a priority be understood. The first is evident because, if there is any order, rather the specific nature exists because some individual of it exists, as Aristotle said of first and second substances. The second is evident, because the being of essence prescinded from existence is nothing other than the entity of the thing in possible being, as will be shown below; but we have proved that also in this way universals are possible by reason of possible singulars. But if the being of essence is taken for the quidditative predicates precisely taken and abstracted from the individuating differences, such a being of essence involves an operation of reason conceiving the common notion in which the individuals agree, abstracted from their proper differences. But if the common essence taken in this way is said to be prior in nature, not by a proper and real priority, but by that which is called priority in the consequence of subsisting, that is rather a priority of reason; for it involves a concept of the mind abstracting the common notion from singulars; whence to be prior in this way is nothing other than to be more universal. But from this priority no numerical unity can be gathered which would belong to the nature according to itself before the individuals and before every intellect; there is, therefore, no such unity except only through reason and the concept of the mind, as we said in the conclusion.

9. But against what has been said it can be objected that the universal nature as such cannot be called one in number in the notion of universal by extrinsic denomination from the formal concept of the mind, namely because it is represented by one concept in number; therefore it is necessary that it be called one in number in the notion of universal from some other unity which precedes in the nature itself and is represented through that concept; therefore such a unity belongs to the nature of itself and not through the intellect. The first antecedent is evident, first, because rather the concept has its unity from the object than conversely; therefore the object is not one because the concept is one, but conversely. Secondly, because otherwise the same nature represented by diverse men by distinct concepts would be several universals in number, for when the form giving unity is multiplied the unity will be multiplied. But the consequent is plainly false; for we shall not say that there are several human species in number because human nature is represented by several concepts; just as there are not several faces of Christ the Lord because it is represented by several images; just as, therefore, several concepts do not give plurality to the universal nature, so neither does one concept give unity, but supposes it; therefore this unity of which we speak is not made through reason but belongs to the nature of itself in so far as it can be presented to several similar concepts.

10. It can be answered that it is only proved that formal unity belongs to the nature according to itself and is supposed to the conception of the mind, and that by reason of it human nature, for example, can have the notion of one object with respect to the concept abstracting and prescinding it; and because that is not multiplied even if the formal concepts of the same nature are multiplied, therefore a universal of this kind, as it is universal, is simply not multiplied in number. But against this, because formal unity alone does not suffice to constitute this universal in number unless something else is added, because such a unity is common to individual things and multipliable in them; therefore besides formal unity another unity is necessary from which the common nature as such is called one in number in the notion of universal; for nothing can be denominated one in number except from a unity which under that notion is numerical; and of this the argument proceeds. As, for example, human nature is called one species in number; it cannot, therefore, have that unity from its formal unity as such, because Peter has a similar formal unity and is not such a species; therefore there is another unity of human nature, incommunicable to individuals, from which it is denominated one species. Either, then, it has that unity from the concept of the mind, and so this unity will be multiplied when the concept is multiplied, as the argument made contends; or it is not made through the concept, and so it will belong to the nature of itself, as the opposite opinion said. The answer is by declaring the answer given more fully: that it is indeed true that formal unity does not suffice for the unity of universality, or for the nature to be called one universal in number, but that the prescission of the mind is necessary, by reason of which there belongs to the nature so abstracted a unity incommunicable to individuals, which consists in indivision or incommunicability to several natures so abstract and common, with an aptitude to be communicated to several contracted natures or individuals; but this negation or incommunicability is not multiplied in the nature even if the formal concepts are multiplied in number; and therefore it is not necessary that on account of several formal concepts distinct in number the conceived nature be called several universals distinct in number.

11. To the objection in form, then, the answer is by denying the first antecedent in the sense already expounded. To the first proof the answer is that for the unity of the formal concept it is enough that on the side of the object there be supposed the fundamental unity of the objective concept, which consists in the likeness or agreement of several singulars in formal unity; for this is enough that the intellect by its power and efficacy of understanding can abstract the common objective concept; whence, as regards this prescission of such a common and universal object, the intellect does not suppose its object but makes it, or rather confers on it that state of prescission by extrinsic denomination. To the second proof the answer is that the form from which the nature is properly denominated so one is not the concept of the mind itself, but the negation of incommunicability to several natures so common, which negation is founded in the abstraction of the mind; but such a negation is the same whether this abstraction is made through one or through various formal concepts distinct in number.

12. It could also be said otherwise that, although in the abstract the intentions of universality are multiplied from the multiplication of formal concepts about the same nature (in which way the dialecticians are wont to say that a relation of reason of species distinct in number arises in human nature through a distinct comparison of it to individuals made by Peter and Paul, or by the same at diverse times), nevertheless the universal in the concrete is simply not multiplied, because that which underlies such an intention of universality is formally not multiplied, but is taken as having altogether the same formal unity with the same prescission. Just as, although several whitenesses distinct in number could inhere in the same man, he would not be called several white things but one; and a wall, although in the notion of seen it is constituted or denominated by the vision which is in the eye, is not denominated several things seen but one, although it is seen by several visions at the same time; for in concretes of this kind unity is taken from the supposit or subject, or from what is related after the manner of subject. But in the present case the nature which is denominated universal is related after the manner of subject with respect to the intention of universality; and therefore, although the denominating forms or concepts are multiplied, the universal is not multiplied, because all are concerned with the same nature and prescind it according to the same formal unity.

1. The reason for doubting is sufficiently evident from what was said in the two preceding sections, and chiefly from the arguments proposed in sect. 2; for this doubt has been proposed in order to solve them more clearly.

2. The aptitude to be in many is nothing in the nature as it exists in reality.—I say, first: the aptitude of the common nature to be in many is not something belonging to the nature itself as it exists in reality. This conclusion is very widely received, and, as it seems, evident, especially if we suppose what has often been said, that the universal is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the singulars or inferiors. It is proved, then, because in reality there is nothing but the singular and individual, and in the singulars themselves there is nothing distinct from them from the nature of the thing; therefore in the nature, as it exists in reality, there cannot be any aptitude to being in many. The consequence is evident, because in the individual thing as such there is not such an aptitude or non-repugnance, but rather the opposite repugnance; but the nature, as it exists in the nature of things, is individual, altogether undistinguished in the thing from the individuals themselves. Some say that, although in the existing nature there is not a proximate potency to be in many, because as such it is contracted and determined to one, there is nevertheless a remote aptitude, because as far as depends on itself, if the contraction is taken away, it can be communicated to many; just as prime matter existing under one form and under dispositions accommodated to it is not proximately apt for other forms, yet retains its remote aptitude for them. But the example is not to the point, because matter and its substantial aptitude to form is one singular entity in number, really distinct from the form and from the dispositions which it now has, which can lose this form and receive another; and therefore it is not wonderful that matter existing under one form retains a radical aptitude to receive others. But the common nature as contracted to this individual is not something distinct from the nature of the thing from it or from the contracting difference; nor can it happen that human nature, for example, existing in Peter, the same according to the thing, should lose the individuation which it has in Peter and acquire another; and therefore, as it exists in the thing, it has neither a proximate nor a remote relationship to existing in many, neither at the same time nor successively.

3. Whence I argue, secondly, because every common nature, as it exists in the thing in each individual, is so determined to it that the same according to the thing cannot be determined to another; therefore in no individual is it undetermined to several individuals; for to be determined to this and to be undetermined to several are opposed contradictorily or privatively; therefore in no individual does it have a real aptitude to being in many, because this aptitude cannot be without indifference; therefore absolutely, as it exists in the nature of things, it does not have that aptitude, because it does not exist except determined in the aforesaid way in the individuals. You will say that it is not repugnant that it be of itself indifferent, but determined by the individual difference; both, therefore, the nature existing in individuals will be able to have. The answer is: whatever may be the case with the true sense of that assumed proposition, The nature is of itself indifferent, of which I shall speak immediately, nevertheless from it it is only gathered that the nature does not have determination without the individual difference; which, although it is so, nevertheless, after such an individual difference is adjoined to the nature, the nature so contracted cannot remain actually indifferent. But at most it can be said that, if it did not have that contraction, it would be indifferent; but because in fact it is never without such contraction, therefore in fact it never exists indifferent nor with an aptitude to be indifferent.

4. Thirdly this is declared, because the universal nature does not exist in many except through identity with each of them; but such a nature, identified with one individual, cannot, the same according to the thing and according to real existence, be identified with others; therefore such a nature, as it is in the thing itself communicated to individuals and exists in them, cannot have a real aptitude to being in many. The major is certain from what was said above, in which we showed that the universal is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the singulars. Indeed for the efficacy of the aforesaid reason real identity suffices; for by reason of identity itself a genus already contracted to one species cannot, the same according to the thing and real existence, be contracted to another. In genus, then, species and essential difference the major proposition assumed is evident, because, since these are essential to their inferiors and are essentially predicated of them, not after the manner of a part but after the manner of a whole, because a part is not predicated of the whole, it is necessary that, in so far as they are predicated of them, they be in them through identity, because nothing is more identified with each thing than its essence. But of property and accident someone may hesitate, because these do not seem to be in their inferiors through identity, but through information. But we are speaking chiefly of the former universals; for the most proper unity of the universal nature is with respect to the inferiors which are essentially contained under it. Nevertheless, even in property and accident as they are universals, the proposition assumed holds true. For property and accident do not have the notion of universal as they are certain physical forms informing their subjects; both because under this notion they are considered in the abstract, in which way they are not predicated of their subjects; and also because even in this way there is no property or accident in the thing itself which is of itself universal for informing several subjects. And although, according to the common notion of some property or accident, for example whiteness or risibility, it can in some way be called a universal form with respect to such subjects, nevertheless this very thing does not belong to this form except in so far as its common notion exists through identity in the individual forms informing such subjects. And in this way such an aptitude to being in many is reduced to the mode of being in inferiors through identity. But properly these are called universals in so far as, taken in the concrete, they are apt to be predicated of their subjects; and so they too are in them through identity, not by reason of the accidental form but by reason of the supposit. For one thing is truly predicated of many and of each in so far as it is the same with them; for an affirmative proposition stating that this is that, in order to be true, requires some identity between predicate and subject, because it is necessary that they stand for the same thing and that they signify the same either explicitly or implicitly. So, then, it is true that every universal is in its inferiors through identity, which was the major proposition assumed. But the minor has been sufficiently proved in the preceding reason, and is almost evident from the terms, because the specific nature, for example, as it exists in the thing, is so identified with each individual in which it is that, in so far as it is in it, it cannot lose identity with it, and consequently as such cannot have real identity with others; it is therefore repugnant to such a nature that in the thing it should have an aptitude to being in many through identity; therefore, since the act of being in many of the universal nature is through identity, a real aptitude for such an act is repugnant to be found in the nature existing in reality.

5. A third reason can be adjoined, because, if this aptitude is in the existing nature, then the aptitude itself also exists in the thing; therefore the aptitude itself too is singular and individual, for whatever exists in the thing is singular and individual; therefore such an aptitude will be in some individual nature; for it cannot be separated by itself, but in the nature, since it is its property and aptitude; but since it is really existing and individual, it is necessary that it be in a nature really existing and individual; and consequently, since there is no greater reason concerning one individual nature than concerning others, such an aptitude will be in all and each individual natures. But hence many absurdities follow. The first, that there are as many universal human natures as there are natures contracted in individuals, because each of them is one in itself, having its proper and real aptitude of being in many distinct from the aptitude of another. For it cannot be feigned that the same aptitude in number of being in many is in all individual natures. Otherwise it would also have to be said that the same nature in number is contracted to each individual, than which nothing can be more absurd. The consequence is evident because the aptitude is only in the nature; indeed it cannot even be feigned as a thing distinct from the nature; therefore, if the aptitude is one in number in all, the nature too will be one in number in all. Likewise, either that aptitude is called one in number as it were collectively, so that it is not whole in each nature, but in each there is something of that aptitude and from all results one aptitude to several individuals; and this is beside the point, because according to that explanation in each individual nature there is only an aptitude of being in itself, and none has an aptitude of being in many. But if the discussion is of a collection, just as the whole collection of aptitudes is considered after the manner of one, so also the whole collection of natures can be considered; but that, as such, that is, as one collectively, is not in many, because the whole collection is not in each individual nature but in the aggregate of all; this unity of collection, therefore, is irrelevant to the notion of the universal, which must be in many in such a way that the whole is in each of them. Or that aptitude is simply one in itself and is whole in each and in all individuals; and then the same will have to be said of the nature itself, for the same reason, and because it is not a greater inconvenience to admit this in the nature itself than in that aptitude. But that each is most absurd is evident; both because this is much more than to posit one accident in number at the same time in diverse subjects; and also because a repugnance is involved in the terms when it is said that the same nature in number is contracted to several individuals; because, if it is the same in number, then it is one in number and individual; therefore incommunicable to many individuals. Again, it follows that in each individual there is some intrinsic real aptitude to the individual difference of another individual; but this is impossible, because to what is altogether repugnant there cannot be a real aptitude; but it is altogether repugnant that something which is essentially and really in me should be contracted and individuated through the individual difference of another man; therefore there cannot be in me a real aptitude to this.

6. The aptitude to existing in many does not belong to the common nature according to itself before the intellect.—I say, secondly: the aptitude to existing in many is not some real property belonging to the common nature according to itself before the operation of the intellect. This assertion can be proved by almost the same reasons by which we showed a little before that the nature according to itself does not have unity of prescission except through the intellect; for these two follow each other. For if the nature as actually existing is not really apt to be in many, it is because it does not exist except contracted and determined to this or that individual; therefore such an aptitude to being in several cannot belong except to the nature as prescinded from every contraction; therefore, if the nature does not have this prescission of itself, but through the intellect, neither will it be able to have this aptitude according to itself before every intellect. Secondly, because, if this aptitude belongs to the nature according to itself before every intellect, it belongs either to the existing nature or to the non-existing one; not indeed to the existing nature, as has been shown, because it does not exist except made individual through identity; nor can it belong to the non-existing nature, because, in order that a non-existing nature can be conceived as having this aptitude, it must at least be conceived as possible, because to be able to be in many intrinsically includes and supposes to be able to be; but it has been shown that the nature as possible is as individual as the nature as existing; it cannot, therefore, be more in the nature as possible than as existing.

7. Thirdly: for I inquire what this aptitude is. They answer that it is a certain positive mode belonging to the nature according to itself, in which the non-repugnance of the nature to being in many is founded; yet that that mode is not actual but potential, that is, such that it cannot belong to the actually existing nature, but only to the nature existing in potency or objectively. From which it also comes about that such a mode is not altogether inseparable from the nature, but rather separable, because the actually existing nature does not have such an aptitude nor such a mode of being. Just as (they say) the mode of being which a thing has in its causes is a real mode, belonging to things as long as they do not exist, which ceases to belong to them as soon as they are produced, because they are now said to be not in their causes but outside their causes. But these things do not meet with my approval: for I do not sufficiently conceive a real and positive mode which it is impossible should exist in the nature of things. For, in the way in which something is called positive and real, it is enclosed under the breadth of real being; but real being is not except in order to the act of being; therefore that to which the act of being is altogether repugnant cannot be comprehended under the breadth of real being; therefore it can be neither a thing nor a real positive mode. But if it is not a real mode, it will be a mode of reason, and consequently will not belong to the nature before the intellect. Moreover here too the argument made above urges, that contingent predicates do not belong to the nature according to itself, but by reason of something added, or of the state which it has in the thing or the intellect; if, therefore, this aptitude belongs to it of itself, and not by reason of some state, it will also belong to it per se and not contingently; therefore it will belong to it inseparably, which they deservedly deny, because in the individuals it does not belong to it.

8. Next, of that aptitude which is said to be conceived as a certain real potential mode, I shall also inquire whether it is to be conceived as one in number, or as one only in species and multipliable in number. This latter cannot be said, because it would be necessary to conceive it as multipliable in individuals, which is repugnant. The first too can scarcely be conceived by the mind; for how can one real aptitude in number be conceived in order to several distinct individual differences, when in truth there is none which, the same in number, can at the same time or successively be contracted in all of them? But if it is said that that is not one in number simply, but in a certain respect, namely by common numerical unity, it has already been shown that no such unity can be understood except through reason. Finally, either that aptitude intrinsically follows upon the formal unity of the specific nature, or it comes to it from without. If the first is said, it follows that it can no more be one in number than formal unity itself is, which we showed is not one in number, since it is multipliable in number. It follows also that that aptitude is found wherever formal unity is found, which is false; otherwise it would be found in the individuals. But if the second is said, it will have to be assigned whence, or from what principle or cause, this aptitude comes to the nature having such a formal notion; it will then have to be declared in what state or under what condition, which holds itself on the side of the nature itself and not on the side of the intellect, that nature is to be feigned or conceived which is as it were the adequate subject of that aptitude; and it will plainly be understood that neither of these can be declared except in order to the abstraction and separation which is made in the mind, because, this being excluded, there is no common nature distinct from the nature of the thing from the individuals, either in the state of actual existence or in the potential state, or in the being of essence or possible being, as has often been declared.

9. Whether the mode of being in the cause is something real in the effect.—But that example of the potential mode which a thing is said to have in its cause before it exists in no way helps the aforesaid opinion. First, because that mode, in so far as it is said or thought to be real, is sometime in the nature of things, namely as long as the thing is said to be in its cause. Next, because that mode too either does not cease to be when the thing is produced outside its causes, or, in so far as it ceases to be, it is not a positive mode but rather a privative one; for when a thing is said to have being only in its causes before it exists, two things are said: the first is that in the cause there is a power for giving being to such a thing, which power as it were by extrinsic denomination denominates the effect to be, not simply but in its cause; and as regards this such being in the cause is not lost even if the thing is produced in itself and outside the cause, because the power of the cause remains integral. The other thing which is indicated when a thing is said to have being in its cause is that it does not yet exist in itself; and this is what is lost when it is produced in itself; but this is not positive but privative, as is evident. You will say that beyond these there is on the side of the effect a certain potential mode by which it is called possible, which mode is lost from the moment it begins to exist. The answer is that this is not a positive mode on the side of the effect distinct from the aforesaid, because, as will be said below in treating of essence and existence, the objective aptitude of possible things to exist is on their side nothing but a certain non-repugnance, and on the side of the cause denotes the power to produce them. Although, as regards the present point, even if we granted that that aptitude is a positive mode, it would consequently have to be said that, when the thing is produced, it does not lose that aptitude as regards the positive, but only as regards the lack of its act; for the thing, when it exists, is not less apt to exist than before; but it only has the act of existing which it did not have before; nor is it likely that it loses a real positive mode precisely through this, that it actually begins to exist.

10. I say, thirdly: the aptitude of the common nature to be in many is only a certain indifference or non-repugnance, which has a foundation in the nature itself according to itself, but actually belongs to it only as it underlies the abstraction of the intellect. This assertion is common, and the authors cited seem to agree in it, especially Cajetan and the other Thomists. But it is first to be declared, then proved. For in two ways it can be understood that this indifference belongs to the nature according to itself. First, that the non-repugnance itself belongs per se to the nature by virtue of its formal unity. And this sense is false; otherwise the non-repugnance or indifference (which is the same) would be inseparable from the nature, and consequently the nature, as existing in the thing, would have that non-repugnance, which is openly false; for as it is in the thing it is so intrinsically and through identity made individual that to be in many is repugnant to it. In another way it can be understood merely negatively, namely that the nature by virtue of its formal unity precisely taken does not have repugnance to being in many. And this sense is true. From which the conclusion is easily evident as regards each part; for first of all such a non-repugnance so explained is founded in the formal unity itself, which of itself is not individual; and in this way the nature, even existing in the thing, can be said to have this non-repugnance, because even in the thing itself it is not incommunicable by virtue of its formal unity but by virtue of individual unity; for although the whole nature and the formal unity which is in the individual is incommunicable, and it is repugnant to it to be in many, nevertheless it does not have this by virtue of the formal unity of the nature, but from individuation.

11. And hence the other part is confirmed, namely that this aptitude to being in many, even explained through non-repugnance, does not belong to the common nature as existing in reality in so far as it is necessary for the notion of the universal. Because, in order that the nature be universal, it is not enough that of itself it not have determination to one, if from elsewhere, at least from the adjoined individual difference, it has it; but it is required that it be absolutely and simply indifferent. But as it exists in reality it is not so indifferent, but rather is simply determined to one wherever it exists; therefore the nature, as it exists in the thing, does not have indifference or non-repugnance. It is confirmed and declared, because the repugnance of being in many belongs to the existing nature by reason of the individual difference; therefore for the nature to be apt to exist in many through non-repugnance is nothing other than to be apt to exist in many through abstraction or prescission from every individual difference; but this prescission and abstraction does not belong to the nature as existing in reality, nor does it belong to it in some state which precedes every consideration of the intellect, because there is no such state in which the nature according to itself abstracts from individuals, either existing or possible, as was declared above; therefore. Finally it is confirmed from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, because this aptitude or repugnance does not belong to the existing nature according to itself before every act of the intellect; therefore it can only belong to it as it underlies the conception of the intellect. Especially because it has already been declared that this non-repugnance or indifference consists in, or arises from, the separation of all inferior or individual differences; but this separation in no way precedes in the nature itself, neither in the existing thing nor taken in some state of possibility, but only as it is objectively in the intellect; therefore.

12. Objection. Answer. Why several individuals can be under one species and not under another.—But someone will press: that several individuals can be multiplied under the same species does not come from the intellect, but is founded in the very nature of the thing; therefore also the aptitude of being in many belongs to the nature of itself and not from the intellect. The consequence is evident, because these two are either the same or in the thing itself follow each other mutually, namely that individuals can be multiplied under the same species and that the specific nature can be communicated to them. But the antecedent is evident, both because that individuals are multipliable under the same species is not something feigned through reason but found in things themselves; and also from the contrary, because, if the angelic nature (as many wish) is not multipliable in number, this comes from some real and intrinsic property of it, which is most certain in the divine nature; therefore conversely that human nature is multipliable in number is a real property of it and not something thought out by reason. The answer is that this argument confirms the conclusion, and concludes that the aptitude of being in many is fundamentally and remotely in things themselves, but not proximately as it expresses the indifference and indetermination of the common nature to one. But this remote and proximate aptitude is not used by us in the sense in which some (as I was saying above) assert that an aptitude or potency under one act is remote to others, and that the nature existing in the thing has this aptitude; for this has been sufficiently disproved by us. But I call the remote foundation of this aptitude the natural condition or property of such a nature, by reason of which the multiplication of individuals within the same species is not repugnant to it; but this property is not some aptitude of the common nature as such, which would be understood as a certain potency actuable through several differences, but is only such a perfection and limitation of a nature of this kind. Whence this property which founds this indifference or non-repugnance can be understood not only in the common and prescinded nature, but also in the particulars or individuals themselves, as they are such. As, for example, in the human species each individual is of such a condition that it is not repugnant to it to have another similar in species; and it is common to both or all the individuals of that species that it is not repugnant to them to have others similar only according to some genus and not in species, which comes to them either from the fact that they are material or from the fact that they are finite substances, to which it is not repugnant to have among themselves univocal likeness or agreement. So, then, it is rightly understood both that this aptitude of being in many has a foundation in things themselves, and that such a foundation is not to be feigned as some positive aptitude in the thing itself, common and indifferent, but as the limitation or condition of such things which include nothing in their entity by reason of which it is repugnant to them to have other things similar to themselves in perfection, or equal. And finally it is understood that this foundation of indifference or non-repugnance is not to be feigned only in the common nature according to itself, but in the individuals and singular things themselves; because, although in each individual the nature is determined to it only, nevertheless it is so in it that by virtue of it it is not repugnant that it be in another similar one, or rather that a similar nature be in another individual; and this alone is the sufficient foundation of its indifference and aptitude of being in many, which is in the common nature as abstracted by the intellect, and is not some indetermination which the nature itself has of itself or in the individuals.

13. Answer.—To the objection in form, then, I concede the antecedent, namely that it is founded in things themselves, and not in the operation of the intellect, that some individual things similar in species can be multiplied; but I distinguish the consequent, namely that the aptitude of being in many belongs to the nature of itself. For it can be understood of the proximate aptitude, that is, that which is conceived by us after the manner of a certain capacity prescinded from all contracting differences and actuable by them; and in this sense the consequence is denied, because, in order that individuals can be multiplied in the thing in the same species, such a capacity which precedes in the thing in the nature is not necessary, but it suffices that in the individuals there be no property by reason of which it is repugnant to them to have other similar ones. But if that consequent is understood of the remote foundation in the aforesaid sense, then the consequence is conceded; yet it is not against what we have said, as is evident. Whence what is said in the proof of the consequence, namely that these two are the same, that individuals can be multiplied in the same species and that the specific nature can be communicated to them, is also equivocal. For in the multiplication of individuals of the same species there is in the thing no other communication of the nature than a certain assimilation and agreement among the individuals themselves; whence neither is there in the common nature according to itself another aptitude to be communicated to many than there is in the individuals themselves the non-repugnance of having other similar ones. If, therefore, by the communication of the specific nature nothing else is understood, the whole is conceded and nothing is inferred against what has been said. But if (as the words rather sound) it is understood that the nature can be multiplied in many after the manner of a certain aptitude of a superior common nature, which, since it is one, is conceived as diffusing and communicating itself to many, this is a work of reason and our mode of understanding; for in the thing nothing of this kind precedes, nor is it necessary for the multiplication of individuals similar among themselves.

1. Universality is through the intellect with a foundation in the thing.—From all that has been said the true resolution concerning universal unity, and the answer to the arguments which were proposed in sect. 2, is easily gathered. It must be said, then, that universal unity arises through the function of the intellect, a foundation or occasion being taken from the singular things themselves. And so it is a certain unity of reason, belonging to natures as they are presented to the mind, and arising by denomination thence. I think this is the opinion of Aristotle in the places cited, who for this reason said, De Anima I, text 8, that the universal is either nothing or posterior, that is, after the operation of the intellect, as St. Thomas, Albert the Great and all the others understand there; and on this account the Commentator said there that the intellect makes universality in things. And in Metaphysics XII, comm. 4, he says that universals in Aristotle are collected from particulars in the intellect, which grasps the likeness among them and makes them one intention; and in comm. 27 he says that universals do not have being outside the soul; and in comm. 28 he says that there is no demonstration of the particular, although it alone is a thing in truth. The same is the opinion of St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 4, and in the other places cited above, who cites Avicenna, Metaphysics V, c. 1. All the Thomists also agree in this: Capreolus, Cajetan, Soncinas and the others cited above. Durandus holds the same, In I, dist. 3, q. 5, and In II, dist. 3, q. 7; Giles, In I, q. 2 of the Prologue, and dist. 19, p. 1; and Scotus could be drawn into the same opinion, for his words are not repugnant, since he says that only the universal in potency is in things, not in act; and so his disciples seem to expound him, as Fonseca reports and treats at length, in the said c. 28, q. 5, sect. 2; but there is no reason why we should linger on him; for it matters little to us what Scotus thought, especially since his words are very equivocal. And Damascene is cited for this opinion, De fide III, c. 11, where he says that the nature is contemplated either by thought alone, or in all the hypostases of the same species, which it joins together, or in one individual only. Where by the nature contemplated by thought alone he understands the nature as universal; in which way he says that it does not exist, but is only thought; but in individuals he said that it exists, either in all according to its whole specific breadth as really existing, or in one only.

2. It is proved by reason, because the unity and the aptitude of being in many, in so far as they are necessary for the notion of the universal, do not belong to the nature itself really, but through the intellect; therefore universality too belongs to it in the same way. It is confirmed and declared, because, if the nature has universality before the intellect, then either in the individuals or in itself; not in the individuals, because neither as in one only, since in it it is individual and determined to one; nor in many or all at once, both because the nature can be universal even if it is found in one individual only; and also because no real property belongs to the nature as existing in many individuals which does not belong to it in each or in some of them, besides the very multitude of individuations or singularities, in which universality does not consist, as is self-evident. Nor can universality belong to the nature in itself, prescinding from the individuals, except through the intellect; because, if such a nature is taken as existing in the thing itself, it does not prescind from the nature of the thing from the individuals, since it is not distinguished from them from the nature of the thing, as has been shown; but if the nature is not existing in itself, it cannot be conceived what or of what kind that state of it is unless it has it objectively in the intellect, because it does not have it really nor can have it, nor is it distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individuals according to the being of essence or possible being either, considered in the same state, as has often been said. Finally, if to be universal belongs to the nature really, it belongs either per se or by accident; neither can be said; therefore it does not belong really; therefore only through reason. The minor as regards the first part is evident, because, if to be universal belonged per se to man, it would also belong to all individuals; for whatever belongs per se in the first or second mode to the superior belongs also to the inferior; and because no property can be adjoined to a superior nature by reason of the inferior which is repugnant to the essence or the properties belonging per se to it, since neither can these be separated from it nor remain together with repugnant properties. But as regards the latter part the minor is proved, because, if universality belongs really and contingently or accidentally, it will be some accident of the nature; therefore, if it is a real accident, it will belong to it by reason of some singular, as we argued above of unity and of the aptitude of being in many. Likewise this accident will belong to it through some action of an extrinsic agent, or through the lack of action, if it is feigned to be a privative accident; but every action of this kind regards individuals per se. Finally, it can neither be feigned nor explained what kind of real accident this is; it is, therefore, of reason and through reason.

3. The opposing reasons are solved.—To the contrary foundations posited in the second section, it has already been declared how the nature in the thing is communicable to many, not through some aptitude or indifference which belongs to the nature itself according to itself, but only through the non-repugnance of the singular things themselves to be able to have others similar to themselves; which non-repugnance is not enough for the notion of the universal, as has been declared. Whence to the first that consequence is denied: human nature is not of itself incommunicable; therefore it is of itself communicable; for rigorously it is from a negative to an affirmative on the side of that mode or term of itself; and it can happen that neither of them belongs to it of itself, although in the thing one of them is always in it. But if that particle of itself is not taken in that rigour, namely as the same as per se and from within, but only so that the nature of itself signifies the same as the nature from its formal notion and prescinded from every inferior difference, then the consequence can be conceded, rather by reason of the matter than by reason of the form. For the nature can be called communicable of itself in the sense explained above, because it is not repugnant to it to have several individuals similar among themselves in essence and nature, nor is it repugnant to one individual to have another similar to itself; which non-repugnance, however, does not suffice for the notion of the universal, as has been said. And the same answer is to be accommodated to the second argument; for in the real nature itself there is no positive and real aptitude to several individual differences, but there is only a non-repugnance, even in the individuals themselves, to be able to have others similar to themselves. And thence it comes both that the nature is called communicable, or apt to be in many, and that such a nature cannot be adequately contracted through one individual difference, as has been sufficiently expounded. To the third the answer is that all those attributes express in some way order to the intellect; but they are founded in things themselves, not in so far as in them the nature has some universality, but in so far as in the individuals themselves there is agreement and likeness in essence and its properties, and in the intrinsic connection which essence and properties have among themselves, by reason of which common objective concepts are abstracted, from which universal predications are made, of necessary and perpetual truth, as they are abstracted from time. And in this way science is said to be of universals and not of singulars, not because it is of common names,¹ but because it is of common objective concepts, which, although in the thing itself they are not distinguished from singulars, are nevertheless distinguished by reason; and this is enough for all the aforesaid expressions. Which the nominalists did not sufficiently notice, and therefore they spoke otherwise, although in the thing they do not differ much from us, as we have said. Through which the last confirmation has been answered. To the other foundations nothing remains to be answered, for satisfaction has been made to all from what has been said.

1. This question is wont to be treated in other words at the beginning of dialectic, namely, whether the universal comes about through abstraction or through the comparison of the intellect. It is also wont to be treated, and more properly, in De Anima III, in explaining the object of the intellect, which is said to be the universal. But since it has been said by us that universal unity results through the work of the intellect, we cannot omit declaring what and of what kind this work of the intellect is. It is necessary, however, briefly to distinguish a twofold intellect, agent and possible; the function of the former is to effect intelligible species; of the latter to operate and understand through them; and the latter has a twofold operation (others being passed over which do not pertain to the present purpose): one is called direct, by which it tends directly into the thing which the intelligible species represents and to which it leads the intellect per se and simply. The other is called reflex, by which the intellect turns back upon the prior knowledge, or upon its object according to those conditions or denominations which it receives from the knowledge.

Three opinions are proposed

2. There can, then, be three opinions in this matter: the first is that the universal comes about through an operation of the agent intellect which precedes every operation of the possible intellect, and consists in the production of an intelligible species representing the nature prescinded and abstracted from all individuals; which is therefore wont to be called the abstraction of the common nature made by virtue of the agent intellect. So St. Thomas indicates, I, q. 85, a. 1, in the body and ad 4, and a. 3, ad 4; In Metaph. VII, lect. 13; De ente et essentia, c. 4; and the Commentator, De Anima II, comm. 10, saying that the intellect is moved to its ultimate perfection by universal things, namely as represented in intelligible species. And therefore, De Anima III, text 8, he says that, if universals were outside the soul, the agent intellect would be in vain. Flandria, Metaphysics III, q. 2, a. 2, and Metaphysics VII, q. 16, a. 1; Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 28, qq. 5 and 6; Soto, on the Logic, q. 3 on universals. Which opinion supposes first of all that the possible intellect directly, and by virtue of the species which it receives from the agent intellect, does not know material singulars but only common natures. From which it infers that the species produced by the agent intellect directly represents only the common nature prescinded from all individuals, and consequently is universal in representing. From which it finally comes about that the nature so represented becomes universal objectively and by extrinsic denomination through this kind of abstraction; for, if by contraction it becomes singular and individual, by abstraction it will become universal and common. And it is confirmed, because the universal is the object of the agent and the possible intellect, of the former as an active power, of the latter as a passive or receptive one; therefore it comes about through the action of the agent intellect, but precedes the operation of the possible intellect; for it is of the notion of an active power that it makes its object, but a passive power supposes it; for it is wont to undergo from it.

3. The second opinion is that the universal is not made by the agent intellect, but by the possible intellect, through the direct operation by which it knows the common nature according to its precise formal notion and essence, considering nothing of the inferior notions or of the individuals, nor considering formally and as it were in signified act the community of the nature itself, but only the essence, which is common. This opinion, as regards the former negative part in which it differs from the preceding, those must necessarily teach who hold that the possible intellect knows singulars directly, even material ones. For according to that opinion it must consequently be said that the agent intellect, speaking per se, effects a singular species, not only in being but also in representing an individual and singular thing; because the intellect could not know it first and directly unless it received a species properly and in particular representing it. From which it comes about that according to this opinion the agent intellect does not abstract the universal from singulars, and is only said to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm because it separates it from the conditions of matter as regards its real being, but not as regards the object which it represents; for it produces a species spiritual and immaterial in its entity, representing the same individual thing in number which the phantasm represents; for it is not repugnant that a material individual be intentionally represented by an immaterial form or quality. And in the universality of the genus this can be confirmed in every opinion, because, although we grant that the agent intellect abstracts the specific nature from individuals in that way, it is nevertheless not necessary that it abstract the generic nature from the species; because it is certain that the possible intellect can be borne directly and immediately to knowing the specific nature, and that the agent intellect can effect an intelligible species which in its representation does not abstract from the specific difference, whatever may be the case with the individual; therefore the universal which is the genus will not then come about through the abstraction of the agent intellect.

4. But the other, affirmative, part of the opinion, namely that this universal is sufficiently made through the abstraction of the possible intellect, can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 2, and Opusc. 42, c. 5, at the end, where he adduces that saying of the Commentator, De Anima I, text 8: The intellect makes universality in things; which, although it could be thought to have been said of the agent intellect, will nevertheless be true a fortiori of the possible intellect, of which Averroes speaks; for he is treating of the intellect defining and demonstrating. Finally, the authors cited in the preceding opinion, although they teach that the first universality is made by the agent intellect, nevertheless cannot consistently deny that this operation of the possible intellect suffices for a similar or more perfect universality. And so St. Thomas in other places cited speaks indifferently of the abstracting intellect, whether agent or possible. But more expressly Durandus teaches this of the possible intellect alone, In I, dist. 3, q. 5, n. 27, and In II, dist. 3, q. 7, n. 12. And it can be proved a fortiori by the reasons of the first opinion, because the concept or expressed species of the possible intellect represents more formally than the impressed species; therefore, if the intellect contemplates man precisely and abstractly, man, as represented in that concept, will be universal objectively, much better than if he were represented in the impressed species, because he has a more actual and more proper objective being, and according to that being he is universal. And it is confirmed, first, for man becomes singular through individuating differences; therefore, by the very fact that he prescinds from all of them through an actual abstract concept, he will become universal. It is confirmed, secondly, because, if man existed in the thing as he is presented to that concept, he would be universal in being, such as is attributed to Plato; therefore also now he is universal by denomination from the intellect. It is confirmed, thirdly, for if the intellect reflects upon man so conceived, considering his condition or as it were state, it knows that he is not some singular but something common to all singulars; in which conception the intellect is not deceived, as is evident, nor does it attribute to man so conceived something new, but conceives what was already in him; therefore before this reflection man was already universal through the prior direct conception. And to this can also serve the reason adduced for the preceding opinion, that the operation of the intellect supposes its object; for this is true of the object which is known through the operation, but not of the condition which results in the object in so far as it is known, when that condition is not known through such an act; because, since such a condition results from the act, it is compared to the power rather as active than as passive; and so it is in the present case; for the universality which is in a certain way said to be in, or belong to, the nature abstractly known is a certain condition or denomination resulting from such an act and mode of knowing, which nevertheless is not known through that act, but only the nature itself which is denominated universal; and therefore it is not necessary that the universality of that object be supposed before that action. But when afterwards the intellect reflects and contemplates that very condition or state of the abstract nature, it is then the object known through such an act; it is therefore supposed to that act; and yet that condition is nothing other than the universality of the nature; therefore universality is supposed before this reflexive, or (what is the same) comparative, knowledge; but it comes about through abstractive, or (what is the same) through direct and precise, knowledge of the universal nature.

5. The third opinion is that the universal comes about through comparative knowledge, by which the possible intellect, after it has apprehended the nature precisely and abstractly, compares it, so conceived, with the things in which it exists, and understands it as something one apt to be in many inferiors and to be predicated of them. And so according to this opinion the nature existing in singulars has universality only in remote potency, because it is not common either positively, as something truly one existing in many, or even negatively, as something proper to no singular thing. But there is only in it a certain likeness and agreement of several things among themselves which affords the occasion and remote foundation for universality. But the nature abstractly known can be called universal in proximate potency, because it is already common negatively, because it is conceived according to itself and not as proper to some individual; yet it is not yet judged to be actually universal, because it is not yet conceived as having an aptitude and relation to the many in which it is, which relation it receives through comparative knowledge; and therefore through that it is said ultimately to be constituted the universal in act. Which is further proved, because universality is not some thing having true existence, but is only a being or relation of reason; therefore it has being only objectively in the intellect; therefore it only is when it is actually made by the intellect, for then alone is it objectively in the intellect; therefore it only is through comparative knowledge, because through that alone is it made or thought out by the intellect. It is confirmed, for the universal as universal is relative, as is evident both from its definition, for it is defined through its correlative, namely: It is one in many and of many; and from its species, such as genus, species, difference, etc.; for these are said relatively, as is evident from the definitions given by Porphyry in the predicables; but relatives are simultaneous in nature and in knowledge; therefore the universal in act is not in the way in which it can be, namely objectively in the intellect, until its correlative is in the same way; but it cannot be in that way until one is compared to the other, which comes about only through the said comparative knowledge; therefore. And St. Thomas favours this opinion, who everywhere teaches that relations of reason are only in the apprehension of reason comparing one to another, as I, q. 28, a. 1, in the body and ad 4, and De potentia, q. 7, a. 1; and he indicates it in In Metaph. IV, lect. 4, and In Peri Hermeneias I, lect. 10. Cajetan too indicates it, treating in common of the relation of reason in the said q. 28 of the First Part, and in particular of the relation of universality, De ente et essentia, c. 4, q. 7, and a little before it. Scotus too is cited, Metaphysics VII, q. 11; Antonius Andreae, q. 17; and Antonius Trombeta, Metaphysics, q. 2, a. 1; for in the way in which they posit the universal in act through the intellect, they seem to place it in comparative knowledge rather than in prescissive. There is a difference, however, among these authors, in that some of them by comparative knowledge understand direct knowledge, by which the universal is compared with its inferiors as existing in them or predicable of them. So St. Thomas seems to think, and more clearly Scotus above, and In IV, dist. 2, q. 2; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, q. 18. But others understand reflex knowledge, by which, after the aforesaid comparison, the intellect conceives the comparison itself as a certain relation, and the nature compared as genus or species, etc., with respect to its inferiors.

Judgement is passed on the first opinion

6. Among these opinions the first is indeed probable on the supposition of that opinion that the agent intellect does not produce species representing individuals; and even that being supposed, it does not proceed generally of every universal, but at most of the specific one, and of that alone formally speaking, as a certain reason made above proves. And it can be declared more fully, because first of all it is certain that the agent intellect never impresses a species representing the difference alone, as it is a difference, but the whole specific nature. Because, just as the phantasm does not represent in the individual something after the manner of a form but after the manner of the whole individual, so the agent intellect produces a species representing the whole specific nature of the individual after the manner of a whole, nor can it prescind or change that action so as then to produce one species representing the difference after the manner of a form, and afterwards produce another representing the whole specific nature after the manner of a whole; because it is neither free in acting, but naturally impresses the species as much as it can, such a phantasm being supposed; nor is it cognitive so that it could now conceive the nature in one way, afterwards in another. Whence also in property and accident, although we grant that it effects species representing them in common, abstracting from individuals, nevertheless each of them by virtue of such an intelligible species is only represented as something common to many individuals similar in that notion. And the same holds in its own way in the generic grade, if perhaps sometimes on account of the weakness of the phantasm an intelligible species is produced representing precisely that grade; for, as the phantasm then represents only this animal, for example, so the intelligible species taken from it will represent the grade of animal only as abstracted and prescinded from similar individuals. And by this reason we say that, even that opinion being supposed, through this abstraction of the agent intellect nothing is per se abstracted except the specific nature. You will object that this discourse can be made of the abstraction made through the conception of the possible intellect, especially as regards the universal of property and accident. I answer that the reason is not equal, as will be evident from what we shall say in the following section.

7. I add, then, further that, if the notion and nature of the intelligible species is properly and truly understood, it is said quite improperly that the nature becomes universal through this abstraction; because, according to the true opinion, the impressed species is neither a formal image nor does it in any way represent formally, but effectively, in so far as it is as it were a seed or instrument of the object for effecting the formal intentional representation, which comes about through the concept of the mind. Whence the nature is not properly said to be objectively represented in the impressed species except very remotely and mediately, in so far as that species is effective of the act to which that nature is presented. And finally, even if we grant that the universal comes about in some way through the abstraction of the agent intellect, it will only be in habit or in first act; from which it comes about that it comes about much more and more perfectly through the second act proportioned to that first act, as I argued above. I omit that that first opinion proceeds from a false hypothesis; for it is simply truer that the species impressed by the agent intellect does not abstract from the representation of the same individual represented in the phantasm, but only from the real and entitative materiality of the phantasm itself, without which there can be a representation of the same individual, however material; for it is not repugnant that this be or come about through a spiritual form or quality or entity, as is evident in the angels and in God himself. And if it is not repugnant, no physical reason can be brought forward why such a form or species could not be made by the agent intellect; and without reason this is not to be denied, since it is more consonant both with various experiences and with the natural order of knowing, and with the end and natural activity of the agent intellect itself, which is given for this, that by means of a spiritual action it may render the possible intellect similar to the representation of the phantasm as far as it can; which it would be foreign to the present purpose to pursue and prove more fully here. But according to this opinion it is evident that the abstraction of the universal in no way comes about of necessity from the agent intellect, indeed perhaps cannot come about in any way; for, if the agent intellect is once posited as productive of species of singular things, it is probable that it can never produce species representing natures abstracted from singulars; but of this more fully in its place.

The other two opinions are examined and the question is resolved

8. The first opinion, then, being omitted, in order that we may judge of the other two, it is to be noticed that the universal can be conceived or denominated by us in two ways. First, as something absolute according to being, which can found some relation. Secondly, as relative according to being, expressing order to its inferiors. In the first way universal substance would be understood if man in reality were subsisting separated from every contraction, according to the Platonic opinion; nor would he be universal on account of a real relation according to being to his inferiors, but on account of his unity with an intrinsic and substantial aptitude to existing in many. In almost which way the Doctors cited in the preceding section said that the nature in the potential state, which it is feigned to have before existence in individuals, has a certain universality which does not consist in relation according to being, but in a certain absolute property of the nature having such unity and community; this is wont to be called by some the universal before the thing; which, if it were, would be absolute; yet in truth it is none. Indeed, even those who posit the universal actually really existing in the individuals themselves, which they call the universal in the thing, do not place its universality in relation. For they think that universality is real, but relation not at all, because either between the nature and the individuals there is not a sufficient distinction in the thing for a real relation, or the nature, as it prescinds from the individuals, does not have sufficient entity to found a real relation, since as such it does not have a singular entity in which such a relation could be founded. They place this universality, therefore, in an absolute property, which is a certain unity and community of such a nature. These examples, then, although they are not true, nevertheless declare that the concept of the universal as such is not the concept of a thing relative according to being, but of an absolute thing having such a mode of being, in which it has indifference and aptitude of being in many. Nor does it matter that this aptitude seems to be explained after the manner of a respect. For, just as in a real potency we understand a transcendental respect, and according to expression, prior to the predicamental respect according to being and included in the absolute thing, so in the present case we can conceive this aptitude of the universal thing as absolute indeed in itself, although it is explained after the manner of a transcendental respect. And hence it further comes about that this aptitude, because it is conceived after the manner of a potency having at least a transcendental order to those things to which it can communicate itself, can also be understood as a sufficient foundation for a relation or relationship to those to which it can communicate itself; which relationship is conceived as a certain relation according to being, and can also be called a certain universality, since it is a relationship of one to many in which it can be, or of which it can be predicated.

9. The universal, then, conceived in the former way, comes about through the direct operation of the intellect, which precisely and abstractly conceives the common nature without the contracting differences; which the reasons made in the second opinion sufficiently prove. And it can be confirmed by overthrowing the foundation of the third opinion; because no relation according to being is of the notion of the universal; therefore, although in the nature so abstracted no relation according to being to its inferiors is understood, it can be understood as actually universal. The consequence is evident, because, if that relation is not necessary, nothing else can be lacking, because there there is a common nature and after the manner of something subsisting abstractly from the individuals. Whence in that state through the intellect it is so related as it would be related really if in reality it subsisted outside the individuals; but then it would be really universal; therefore now too it is intellectually universal, so to speak. Finally, in the nature so conceived there is a new unity of reason, because it has one objective concept indivisible into several similar ones; it has also community, or aptitude to be in many and to be predicated of them; therefore nothing is lacking to it for the notion of the universal.

10. But speaking of the relation of universality as it is conceived by us after the manner of a relation according to being, this cannot result through abstraction alone, but, in the way in which it is, it comes about through comparison, because, as I suppose, this relation is not real but of reason; therefore it is not in the nature itself while it is thought absolutely and abstractly, because by virtue of that action it is not referred through the intellect, because the intellect does not yet compare it to its inferiors, nor is it referred really; therefore there is not yet such a relation. And the reasons adduced in the third opinion also sufficiently prove this. Wherefore, if those two opinions affirm one thing and do not exclude another, they are not contrary among themselves, nor do the reasons of one proceed against the other. Because nothing prevents that a twofold notion of universality can belong to the same nature through the intellect, namely absolute and respective, and that these are fashioned through diverse operations of the intellect, and that one, namely that which is absolute, is the proximate foundation of the other, namely the relative. Nor is it repugnant either that something belong to the nature through the intellect and be after the manner of something absolute, when it is such that it belongs only by extrinsic denomination; for in this way for the nature to be abstract, or universally conceived, adds to the nature only a certain being belonging to it by extrinsic denomination, which is called objective being. Just as to be seen or to be known is not some real being added to things, nor does it formally consist in a relation of reason, but in a denomination coming from the act of seeing or knowing, upon which the intellect can fashion a relation of reason if it compares one with the other; so, then, it is in the present case.

11. But it still remains to explain, concerning these opinions, of what kind is this prescissive or comparative knowledge through which the universal, said in each way, comes about. For in various ways the universal nature can be prescinded or compared. For, first, the common nature can be abstracted through pure prescission of the nature from one inferior, without any comparison either of the superior concept to some inferior or of the inferiors among themselves; as when from Peter alone I simply prescind the individuating properties and stop at the consideration of human nature. And through this purely prescissive knowledge some think that no universal comes about. It is truer, however, that through it too the absolute universal comes about, according to what we said of the second opinion. For the reasons made also prove this; although this knowledge does not suffice for knowing in the nature so conceived the universality or superiority which it has, as I shall say now.

12. Secondly, the common nature can be abstracted through the comparison of singulars or inferiors among themselves, as when, comparing Peter with Paul, I know that they are similar among themselves in human nature. Which comparison supposes the prior prescission, for it supposes that of each singular it is known that it is of such a nature; whence it supposes the concept of such a nature as it is prescinded from each individual. Whence through this comparison there is only added the knowledge of the agreement and likeness of several inferiors in such an abstract and prescinded nature. This comparison, however, can be further subdivided, in so far as through it can be considered either only the relationship of the particulars among themselves, as they have among themselves the relationship of similar things; and this comparison as such does not pertain to the constitution of the universal, but to the consideration of a certain mutual relation among the particulars themselves. Or in so far as through it is considered the relationship of the common nature to the particulars in which it exists. For after the intellect has apprehended that Peter and Paul are similar in being man, it again considers that this predicate man is related to Peter and Paul as something common to particulars; and in this comparison the notion of the universal, even respective, seems to be completed; for through it there arises in the mind, or rather in the thing presented to the mind, a relationship of reason of one common thing to several. But beyond this can be understood another more reflex knowledge, which the intellect makes by knowing, as it were in signified act, that the nature so abstracted and compared with its inferiors thence has the denominations of genus, species and the like, and that these denominations are of reason, not of the thing. But this knowledge is no longer the fashioning of universality, but is a certain more formal and express contemplation of it.

1. From what has been said, various questions which are wont to be treated about universals can easily be dispatched.

The first doubt is dispatched

2. It is asked, then, first, whether universals are beings or not. Which can be asked either of the nature which is denominated universal, or of the intention or denomination of universality itself. Of the nature we have already said that it is in things themselves; whence it comes about that, as regards the thing denominated, universals are real beings; but this is to be understood either permissively, or of those universals which fall per se into the direct operation of the intellect, so that either per se primarily, or at least through their own singulars directly known, they can also be directly conceived. Which is said for this reason, that in the very beings of reason which are feigned through reflection and the manifold operation of the intellect, the intellect can proceed so far as to abstract universal and common notions from these too, and make up a universal even in feigned things, which are not true beings; in which way the dialecticians say that genus taken in second intention is a certain specific universal, common to many genera, which in the intention or notion of genus differ only in number; and so of the others. But the reason is that the universal in act has being only objectively in the intellect; but to be objectively in the intellect can belong not only to true beings but also to feigned ones; and therefore to them too can be attributed those relations or denominations which require only this being, such as are the notion of subject and of predicate; and the same holds of the notion of universal. And therefore we say permissively or indefinitely that universals are real beings, yet not necessarily and altogether universally. But because the knowledge of the intellect necessarily begins from real beings, both because reflex operation supposes direct, and also because feigned beings are not conceived except through some relationship or proportion to true beings, therefore it is also rightly said that those universals are real beings which can be abstracted through the direct operation of the intellect. But if the discussion is of universality itself, or of the intention of universality, then it is commonly wont to be said that it is not a real being but of reason; which is true in this sense, namely that it is not some property nor something intrinsically and really inhering in the nature which is denominated universal, according to what we have said. Yet in another sense some distinction and declaration is needed. For we said that the nature can be denominated universal in two ways: first, by an absolute denomination, as if it subsisted universally; secondly, by a respective denomination. In the former way universality is not a being of reason as something properly feigned by reason, but only as an extrinsic denomination coming from an act of reason, as to be abstract, known, and other things of this kind, which do not express something existing really in the nature denominated, nor properly express some being of reason fashioned by the intellect as something objectively feigned by it, because such beings are only feigned while they are thought; but then the intellect thinks or knows nothing of the kind. It is therefore an extrinsic denomination from the concept of the intellect; for, because it is represented abstractly and universally through the concept, it is therefore denominated universal in the aforesaid way. Wherefore, in order that this universality be said to be, it is not necessary that it itself be formally and as it were reflexly known, as it were in signified act, but it is enough that the nature itself be known in such a way, namely prescinded and abstract, so that as it were in exercised act the nature is constituted universal. And in this manner Soto explains this universality through extrinsic denomination, on the Logic, q. 3 on universals, a. 1, dub. 2; and he adduces Scotus and St. Thomas for this opinion.

3. But speaking in the latter way of the universal relatively, or of the relation of universality, it is sufficiently evident from what has been said that the universal is not a real being, because that relation is not real but of reason. Which is briefly declared in this way. For a manifold relation can be feigned or thought out in the universal nature: one in order to the act of being, another in order to the act of predicating; but each can be apprehended either according to aptitude or according to act; for the common nature is conceived as apt to exist in many, and as such it can be conceived as having a relation of aptitude to communicating its being to them; it can likewise be conceived as actually existing in them, and as such having an actual relation, or that of a thing actually communicating itself to many. For just as in an accident we understand a relation of aptitudinal or actual inherence, so we can feign or think it out in the universal nature as communicable or as communicated to many. And the universal is wont to be defined in each way; yet the aptitudinal relation suffices for the nature to be judged completely universal. For that it is actually in many which exist is contingent, and does not change the nature of the thing; but the aptitude is simply necessary, for in it the universal is distinguished from the singular. Whence those involve a repugnance who say that angelic natures are universal and are incommunicable to many.

4. Similarly in order to the act of predicating the nature can be conceived either as apt to be predicated of many or as actually predicated of many; but the former consideration properly denominates the nature predicable. All these relations, however, are only of reason; for the universal nature is not in many except through identity, and therefore under that notion it cannot be really referred to those many. Likewise because, as we have said, in the thing there is no nature which is in many or which is apt to be in many; therefore the proximate foundation of those relations is not in the thing but in the mode of conceiving of the intellect; therefore a relation founded in it cannot be real; and this reason plainly proves the same of the relation of the predicable or the predicated, for all these too are founded in extrinsic denominations of the intellect, and therefore cannot be real.

The second doubt is dispatched

5. Whether universals are corporeal or not.—And according to these things another question is to be defined, which Porphyry proposes in the predicables, namely whether universals are corporeal. For it must be said in the same way that some universals can indeed be corporeal, namely those which belong to things composed of matter and form, as is evident of the concept of man, horse, animal, body; indeed these universals are most of all accommodated to the human intellect conjoined to a body; for it receives its knowledge from sensible things, and therefore these universals, speaking per se, it conceives and abstracts first. Absolutely, however, the notion of the universal is not limited to corporeal natures; for it is found in spiritual natures; for in them too there are singulars having among themselves some agreement and difference or distinction, by reason of which common and universal natures can be conceived in them. But because not only spiritual things among themselves and corporeal among themselves, but also corporeal with spiritual, have some agreement and likeness, therefore not only are there some corporeal universals and others incorporeal, but also some common to both, such as substance, quality, etc. For these abstract from corporeal and incorporeal things.

The third doubt

6. Whether universals are substances or accidents.—Whence a similar question is also easily dispatched, whether universals are substances or accidents. For this question, as also the preceding, is not properly about the intention of universality; for that, since it is not something real but only a denomination or relation of reason, is not truly either substance or accident, nor body nor spirit, although it is to be conceived after the manner of an incorporeal accident. The aforesaid question, then, is about the nature which is denominated universal; and this can be not only substantial but also accidental, as is self-evident. Aristotle, however, is sometimes wont to say that universals are not substances, as Metaphysics III, text 20, and Book VI, text 45; but he understands that they are not things subsisting per se and in themselves outside singulars. And therefore in the Categories, chapter on Substance, he calls substantial universals second substances; but the individuals of substances, or supposits, he calls first substances, which he says are more substances than the second, because these subsist first, but the others in them.

The fourth doubt

7. In what sense universals are called eternal.—An objection is resisted.—Another question about universals is defined from what has been said, namely whether they are eternal. For they are commonly thought to be such, because, since they are the proper objects of the sciences, they must be necessary and immutable and consequently eternal. But how this is to be understood is not explained in the same way by all. For Plato for this reason posited the ideas, which are eternal and immutable forms, as Aristotle reports. But Aristotle himself would perhaps say that in these corruptible things universals are eternal because some of their singulars in which they subsist are never lacking. We, however, suppose that these singulars do not always exist, and that outside them universals do not exist; whence we conclude that these cannot be called eternal according to the real existence which they have outside their causes. These universals, then, are called perpetual according to the being of essence or potential being. You will say: in this way individuals too are eternal, because they too are possible from eternity and have their essences immutable according to the being of essence. Whence of them too propositions can be made which have perpetual truth, as they are abstracted from time. The answer is that as regards the thing indeed it is so; yet in the mode of conceiving and speaking there is a difference; for universals as such, by the very fact that they are abstracted from singulars, are consequently also separated from time and place and from every change, beginning and ceasing; and therefore St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 2, that universals are wont to be said to be everywhere and always, not positively but negatively, that is, not because they are in every place and time, but because as such they do not determine for themselves place and time, in so far as they are abstracted from here and now. But this does not properly belong to individuals; for actions and changes, beginnings and ceasings, are concerned with them. Whence, although some universals are generable and corruptible, as man, animal and similar things, which from their formal notion bring with them such a potency or postulate such a mode of beginning and ceasing, nevertheless they do not have this very property except in order to individuals; for man as such can neither be generated nor corrupted, yet he is called generable and corruptible because he is of such a nature that he cannot be connaturally communicated to individuals except through generation, and the individual itself which participates such a nature is of itself subject to corruption. Some also add that universals are called eternal because the unity of prescission and the aptitude of existing in many belong to them perpetually, even when they do not exist, in the way in which other properties are said to belong to them perpetually, the copula being absolved from the existence of time. So Fonseca, Book V, c. 28, q. 8, sect. 3. But I do not see how this can be true unless we confess that some universality belongs per se and necessarily to the nature; for a proposition which is said to be of perpetual truth must be necessary from the connection of the terms; but it cannot be so necessary unless in some way it is per se; and therefore I think that universals cannot be called eternal in that way, except in order to some intellect which is eternal, as St. Thomas expressly said in the said solution ad 2.

The fifth doubt

8. Whether there are causes of universals or not.—Finally it is understood from what has been said whether and how universals have causes; for either the discussion is of universal natures or of their universality. In the former way, just as universal natures do not come about except in individuals, so they do not have causes except in them, nor other than those which they have; for they are both made by the same efficient cause and (if they are composite) consist of the same principles, or the same matter and form, and are ordered by their nature to the same end. But if we speak of universality itself, since it is not a real being, it is not necessary that it have proper and real causes; yet, in the way in which it is being, or rather imitates being, it has in its own way a material and an efficient cause; for the nature itself which is denominated universal imitates the material cause in so far as it is as it were the subject which is laid under the intention of universality and is denominated universal by it; but because that form is not real and intrinsic, therefore that subject is not of inherence but of denomination, and is rather the matter about which than in which or from which. But the efficient cause is the intellect itself, which makes the concept representing the nature itself abstractly, or the comparison of the same nature so abstracted to its inferiors; for it does not properly effect the relation of reason, but considers or feigns it not so much in signified act as in exercised act, as I said, namely by so conceiving the relationship as if it were a true relation. But a formal or final cause need not be sought here, for of the universal in act so considered universality itself is as it were the form, which is nothing other than either a denomination coming from an act of the intellect, or the relation of reason founded and conceived in it. But of this universality either there is no end, properly speaking, because it is only something resulting from the conception of the intellect intending the knowledge of things; or, if some end must be assigned, it is only the knowledge itself of the intellect, because, by considering the essences of things, it abstracts their grades and formal notions; and because it has the power of perceiving and discerning all things and of reflecting upon itself and its actions, it intends to know not only the natures of things but also the denominations or relationships which they seem to have as they are presented to the intellect itself; and for this end it fashions universals and feigns their relations.

1. We have explained what universal unity is and how it belongs to things; it remains that we declare the various modes of this unity or universality, so that it may also be evident hence what difference there is in this between the metaphysician and the dialectician, and by what reason universals are to be distinguished or multiplied by each.

The first division

2. What the universal in causing is.—What in representing.—First, then, the universal is wont to be divided into the universal in causing, in representing, in being and in predicating. But this division does not matter to the present purpose as regards the first two members. For the cause which is called universal because it can produce various effects is a certain singular thing, as God, the heaven, etc.; whence it has no other unity except real, singular or numerical unity; but it is called as it were universal in object, because its power extends to several effects; just as the intellect and the will are wont to be called universal powers objectively, because they are concerned with all beings; and the common sense too, with respect to the external senses, can be called universal in the same way, although in itself it is one and singular. And the same must be said of the universal in signifying or representing, whether it is taken in names which are called by the dialecticians common terms, or in intelligible species, or in formal concepts, or finally in any image whatever, by whatever reason it is feigned to represent many uniformly; for whatever is a representing thing of this kind is in itself one singular individual, and is called universal only on the side of the object, because it signifies or represents many. But the third universal, which is called in being, either is none, or in the thing coincides with the fourth and differs only in name and in a relationship of reason. For if the universal in being is called that which in the thing itself is universal, such a universal is none, as we have declared; but if it is that which has some foundation in the thing, yet is conceived through the intellect as something one existing in many, and so is made a universal in being, this very thing is the universal in predicating; for it can therefore be predicated of many because it is in them through some identity, as we have declared. But by reason of the former relationship in order to being it is properly called universal; but by reason of the latter relationship in order to predication it is called predicable. Whence it is wont to be said by the dialecticians that to be predicable is as it were an attribute or property of the universal.

The second division

3. What the metaphysical universal is.—What the physical universal is.—Hence, secondly, the universal is wont to be divided into the metaphysical, physical and logical universal, which by other names can be called the universal before the thing, in the thing, and after the thing. The metaphysical universal would most properly be so called if there were some universal separated in reality from the individuals; for in reality it would most of all abstract from every change and contraction; but of things so abstracted the metaphysician chiefly considers. And therefore Aristotle in these books of the Metaphysics, especially VII, inquires accurately about this universal and shows that in truth there is none; but that this metaphysical universal is to be distinguished from them not in the thing but by reason only. Again, the physical universal can be called the universal nature itself as it exists in things; and in this way the universal is not taken formally as it is universal, but only materially for the nature, which can be abstracted and denominated universal. But this universal is called physical because, since it is contracted in the singular things themselves, it is subject to change and to sensible accidents, from which physical consideration begins. Although this universal is not outside metaphysical consideration, both because it can also be found in immaterial things and in those abstracting from matter according to being; and also because this universal requires some formal unity, the consideration of which pertains to the metaphysician. Indeed even the dialectician considers this universal in some way, not per se on account of the natures themselves so universal, but only in so far as it is the remote foundation and as it were the subject of the intention of universality.

4. What the logical universal is.—But the universal in act itself, which arises through the operation of the intellect, is called the logical universal; for, because it is the function of the dialectician to direct the operations of the intellect in order to making definitions, divisions and argumentations or demonstrations rightly and orderly, which are chiefly handed down of things universally conceived and compared and coordinated among themselves, it is therefore necessary that he consider the intentions of reason or the denominations arising thence; although this is not so proper to the dialectician that it cannot more properly and per se pertain to the metaphysician, and in some way also to the physicist. For the latter, disputing about the soul, consequently treats of the intellect and of its acts and object; whence it is necessary that he consider the universal in so far as it is universal, both because it is in some way the proper object of the intellect, and also because it arises through abstraction or comparison, which are proper operations of the intellect. But it pertains most of all to the metaphysician; for, as we saw above, it pertains to him to distinguish beings of reason from real ones, and to declare what essence or entity they have; which is very foreign and extrinsic to the dialectical purpose, but he only touches upon these in passing, so that he may be able to order the works of the intellect themselves and reduce them to a certain method and art. But if we wish to attribute to each what is proper to him, the metaphysician considers the proper notion of the universal, in so far as it is one in many, and whatever follows upon it by reason of which it imitates the nature of being and of essence and its properties. But the dialectician per se considers only the notion of the predicable, not indeed considering its quiddity or entity, but only what it is necessary to know for making definitions or predications. As regards the present point, then, and the fitting use of words, let us call every universal in act, under the notion of universal, metaphysical; but under the notion of predicable let it be called dialectical.

The third division into five universals

5. Thirdly, and what pertains most to the matter, the universal is wont to be divided into those five members which Porphyry distinguished in the predicables, namely genus, species, difference, property and accident. Of the quality and sufficiency of this division it is not now in my mind to dispute; for this cannot fittingly be done without an exact knowledge of the individual predicables; but to discourse of the individual predicables would be foreign to our purpose; we hope, however, God helping, to treat of each matter in its proper place. Only, then, is to be recalled that distinction given above of the universal conceived after the manner of something absolute, such as arises through the simple abstractive or prescissive conception of the intellect, and the universal related or compared to its inferiors. It can be asked, then, how this division is to be understood, or of what universal, or conceived under what notion, absolute, namely, or respective, metaphysical or logical. And there can be two modes of answering. The former is that the logical universal, as respective of reason, is divided there, and not the metaphysical universal, or as precisely abstracted. Because in it as such those five members do not seem always and universally to be able to be fittingly distinguished. For, although sometimes in diverse natures or concepts they are easily distinguished, as in man, animal, etc., nevertheless in others they cannot be distinguished, stopping at the absolute concept, until a relation or comparison is made to diverse things. So white, for example, abstractly conceived, is a certain universal; yet, stopping at that abstraction, it cannot be denominated a predicable accident rather than a species, because with respect to diverse things it is capable of each relationship; whence, until comparison is made to diverse things, that twofold notion cannot be distinguished in that universal. Something similar can be considered in property, which with respect to diverse things can have the notion of property and of species; indeed even a generic nature, even substantial, although with respect to species it is denominated genus, nevertheless with respect to its proper individuals (according to the probable opinion of many) has the notion of species. Indeed even of the difference itself it is probable that, although with respect to the species or its individuals it constitutes a proper universal, nevertheless with respect to inferior differences formally taken it constitutes another notion of predication or is reduced to the predicable of species; for rational is predicated of this rational, for example, formally taken, not in quale but in quid, which I do not care to discuss and examine further here. Only, then, the lowest species of a substantial or accidental nature taken in the abstract is altogether incapable of another universal relationship, and does not have other inferiors to which it could be compared besides the individuals, whose integral quiddity it contains. That division, therefore, does not seem to have place in the universal in so far as it arises precisely through abstraction.

6. But if you ask of what kind that universal is to be called, it can be answered that the notion of the universal under that consideration consists only in prescissive separation from singulars, from which arises a certain unity of reason with aptitude to many, which under this precise consideration is of the same notion in any universal whatever; and therefore the universal as such is not divided further, but retains only the notion of universal until it is compared with its inferiors and receives various denominations in order to diverse things. And so under this notion the universal is not compared to the aforesaid members as a genus to differences, but rather as a subject to accidents, or as a proximate foundation to the various relations by which it can be denominated. Whence, when it is wont to be said by the dialecticians that the universal or predicable is a genus to the five universals or predicables, it is to be taken formally and with due proportion, as relative conceived in common.

7. The sufficiency of the five predicables.—But considering the universal as it is compared to its inferiors, it is rightly divided by those five members, the reason of which division can be briefly assigned thus. For what is one in many, or predicable of many, can express something essential to them or something outside the essence; again, if it is essential, it either expresses the whole essence, and so is the specific universal, which can only be common to individuals differing in number, because only individuals of this kind can agree in the whole essence; or it expresses only part of the essence; and this can happen in two ways. First, that it be as it were something material and potential, and so the universal of genus is constituted, which, as such, necessarily regards diverse species, because that agreement in generic nature which is the foundation of this universality is neither in the whole essence of the thing nor in its ultimate formal constitutive and determinative, but in a certain potential grade determinable through several differences. Secondly, it can happen that the universal expresses part of the essence after the manner of a form constituting its formal unity, and so the universal of difference is constituted, and it is said to be predicated in quale quid, because it is related after the manner of a form constituting the quiddity. Which mode of universality and predication can sometimes be common to things differing in species, but sometimes to things differing only in number, as is evident in ultimate and subaltern differences. And the reason is that such a mode of constitution through essential difference neither per se excludes further differences also essentially constituting and distinguishing specific essences, nor per se requires them; whence, because this is accidental to such a universal, it also happens to it that the inferiors in which it is found differ in species or in number. But how these are to be accommodated to what Porphyry taught in the chapter on Difference, and what he himself thought about this, is to be remitted to dialectical commentaries. Finally, if the universal or predicable is outside the essence, it can either be per se connected with the essence and flowing from it, and this is called property; or, if it is in no way per se connected with the essence, but contingent and altogether accidentally belonging, it is called accident, the fifth predicable.

8. But although both property and accident are forms of those things of which they are predicated, they are nevertheless to be taken not in the abstract but in the concrete, in order that they may be able to assume the notion of such universals, because otherwise they are not apt to be said of their inferiors in such a way. Rather, if such forms are conceived in the abstract, they do not regard their subjects with that relationship with which the universal regards its inferiors, but in the way in which an act regards the potency which it can inform; in order, then, that these can be compared to such inferiors under such a notion and relationship of universals, they must be conceived in the concrete after the manner of a common whole which is in the inferiors subject to it and can truly be predicated of them in recto. Which can be observed in all universals too, for in all it is true that concretes can be predicated only of concretes, and consequently only with respect to them can have the notion of universals. For this cause it is wont to be said that the universal does not regard nor is predicated of its inferiors except after the manner of a whole; for, although we have said that genus and difference formally do not express the whole essence but a metaphysical part, nevertheless, in order that they may have the notion of universals, it is necessary that they be conceived after the manner of a whole, and therefore they must be taken in the concrete, so that they express the whole thing at least implicitly, and in so far as they at least in potency include several inferiors; in which way Porphyry said that the genus is a whole (namely potential) with respect to the species; and Aristotle, Physics I, c. 1, said that the universal is a certain whole. But how substantial abstracts participate the notion of universals, and how universal predication has place in them, we shall touch upon in sect. 10 of this disputation.

9. Some objections are met.—Various objections occurred in this place, which are wont to be made against the sufficiency of this division so expounded, which are proper to the dialecticians; and therefore I only notice that this division can be thought not aptly handed down on a twofold title. First, because in it not all the ultimate notions of universals are enumerated, for difference could be divided into several, and similarly property, etc. Or, if all these are said to be comprehended under the general notions of difference or property, from another side the division will seem inept or superfluous, because it could be reduced to fewer general members; for genus and species seem to agree among themselves no less than general and special difference.

10. Why difference is contained in one predicable.—But this difficulty is of no moment, because, whether those members are ultimate and specific or general, nevertheless the division will be sufficient at least on this head, because no other member is brought forward which is not contained under those enumerated. And although we grant that some members are general and some specific, the division will not on that account be inept; for it is not necessary that the members of a division be equal, or equally abstract and common; for it is enough that they be contained under the thing divided and be in some way opposed and exhaust it; but that some are enumerated under a more common and others under a less common notion is accidental, and for peculiar causes can sometimes be expedient, as perhaps was done in the present case, because the distinction of those five members was necessary and sufficed for coordinating the predicaments and making definitions and the other functions of the dialecticians for which that division was invented. It can finally be added that it is not necessary to admit that not all those members in the notion of universal and predicable are specific and ultimate. Because for the proper relation of the universal and its essential difference it matters nothing that the inferiors differ more or less among themselves, provided that the relationship of the superior to them is of the same mode and notion; but this so happens in ultimate or subaltern differences. And the reason is the same of property and accident, but not of genus and species compared among themselves, as can be sufficiently evident from the reason adduced to explain the sufficiency of the division; for to explain and discuss these more fully is not of our purpose.

11. On the second head the aforesaid division can seem insufficient, because there seem to be certain other universals which are in no way comprehended under these; but these are of a twofold kind: some are transcendentals, which are superior to species and genera, which, since they have one objective concept, as was said above, and can be in many and predicated of them, seem to lack nothing to be called universals. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 10, says that being and one are most universal.

12. Why transcendentals are not universals.—But it can be answered that transcendentals of this kind are not properly and simply universals, although sometimes they are so called broadly and in a certain respect, by the reason by which everything which is in some way one and common to many can be called universal. Nevertheless, because these are analogous, they either do not have unity simply, or do not regard many equally; and therefore on this side they are excluded from the proper notion and division of the universal, which is to be understood to be divided in that partition. Whence Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6, expressly requires for the notion of universal that it be univocal; and in Metaphysics IV, c. 2, he in this way denies that being and one are universals. But if you press that it is not repugnant that there be some common objective concepts, essential to several predicaments, and univocal, and consequently universal, and not generic, because to many predicaments no genus is common, such as many think is the concept of accident, or the concept of successive being and the like, which they consequently say are not genera but after the manner of transcendentals, the answer is briefly that either there are no such univocal predicates (as many hold), or certainly, if there are any, they are reduced to genus, because in the notion of universal and in the mode of essential predication in quid incompletely, and not predicating the whole essence of the thing, they agree with it; yet they differ from proper genus, because they do not have proper differences by which they are contracted; and therefore they serve neither for definitions nor for coordinating the predicaments; of which matter a more fitting place for speaking will occur below, when we speak of the division of accident into nine predicaments.

13. Whether the vague individual is a universal.—But on the other side, from the other extreme, there seem to be certain common predicates as it were inferior to the lowest species and intermediate between it and the individual determinate singulars, such as Cajetan thought, in the chapter on Species, is the vague individual; and a more probable example can be adduced of the common notion of person or supposit, or of the very notion of individual. To which difficulty some deny that these predicates are univocal. But this is incredible, for in truth to be a person is said univocally of any man whatever, and to be first substance is said univocally of any first substance whatever; for what reason of analogy or equivocation can be thought out in these predicates? Others say that they are contained under the universal of species, for the notion of person is compared as specific to this and that person, and the notion of individual to this or that individual as such. But, although perhaps this can be defended formally, by comparing, for example, the notion of person to this person as such, it does not seem true if the comparison is made to this man as such, because as such it is not a quidditative predicate of him. Which can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 30, a. 4, ad 3. And this is enough to constitute a distinct universal according to relation, as it is now considered by us. Just as risible too is a species with respect to this and that risible thing as such, and nevertheless with respect to this or that man as such constitutes a new predicable, because under that notion it is not predicated essentially.

14. It seems it must be said, then, that individual as such, with respect to several individuals, does not constitute a new universal, because formally it expresses nothing other than the transcendental unity of each entity as it exists in the thing; and so it is excluded, as are the other transcendental predicates. Especially because, if it is taken according to the positive thing which it expresses, it adds nothing over being; but if it is taken according to what it formally adds, that is only a certain negation. Whence between individuals of the same species, for example two men, considering precisely their individual essences, besides the specific agreement there is no other in the notion of individual, except in so far as they agree in the notion of undivided being, which is only a transcendental agreement. But the notion of person or supposit I think can be reduced to the predicable of property, in so far as that mode by which it is constituted, namely personality or subsistence, is not essential, but per se accompanying the essence, as actually to inhere can be called a certain property of accident. Nor does it matter that that mode of personality or subsistence is not in its entity an accidental property but a substantial mode; because this does not vary the mode of universality or predication; just as to have a head, to be actually two-footed, is called an accident of the fifth predicable, although the thing from which it is taken is not an accident but substance, because the mode of predication is accidental and contingent; but of these let this be enough.

15. Finally we can add another mode of explaining that division of the absolute universal, or in so far as it arises through the abstractive consideration of the intellect, in which, although the aforesaid members cannot be altogether distinguished according to various relations to inferiors, as the discourse made above shows, they can nevertheless be distinguished in some way in order to metaphysical composition. So that genus is called that which after the manner of potency is apt to constitute the species; difference, that which after the manner of form or act contracts and divides the genus and constitutes the species; but species will be that which is composed of these; property, that which happens per se to the species; accident, that which is contingently in the individuals, or in the species by reason of the individuals. And in this way the universal is not so much divided according to diverse notions of universality as according to the diverse relationships of the universals themselves among themselves. Yet so that the universal of species is as it were chief, total and absolute; but the others express some as it were partial or formal relationship to the species itself, as has been declared. Whence it is also probable that the universal under this notion is not said equally primarily and univocally of these universals, but first of those which are essential, then of the others which are outside the essence, and that among the former the universal of species is chief; on account of which also Plato, as Aristotle sometimes indicates, posited ideas of species only. It is not, however, necessary to understand analogy among species, genus and difference in the notion of universal, because all express essential agreement and unity, and have the same mode of identity with respect to those from which they are abstracted, which happens otherwise in property and accident. And this consideration of universals according to their proper notions, and according as they are distinguished or compared among themselves, contributes most of all to knowing and defining the essences of things, and therefore is most necessary for the metaphysical purpose. But since property and accident are outside the essences of things, nothing occurs to be considered of them in so far as they are universals, besides the intentions and relations of reason which are declared by the dialecticians in order to predications; and what we shall say below in its place of the proper and real essence of accident and its distinction from substance, and of the various relationships which it has to substance, among which one can be intrinsic emanation, from which it has that it is named property; it remains, then, to speak of the other three universals, genus, species, difference, how they are distinguished in things and what principle and foundation they have in them.

1. That genus and difference are distinguished in the thing can seem to be persuaded by these arguments: first, because the species is composed of genus and difference, which composition is called metaphysical and is not thought to be altogether feigned through reason, but in some way found in things themselves; and therefore the more approved theologians teach that it is not found in God, because it is repugnant to his supreme simplicity; it is therefore a sign that genus and difference are in some way distinguished in the thing itself, and not only by reason or our concepts, because otherwise they would not make a composition in the thing; for a distinction of reason alone, even founded in a virtual distinction or eminence of the thing, does not suffice for a true composition of the thing; there is therefore in the thing some distinction between genus and difference. And it is confirmed, for by this reason Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, c. 10, text 33, having said that the definition must consist of parts, namely genus and difference, subjoins: as the definition is related to the whole thing, so the parts of the definition to the parts of the thing; there is therefore between them some true distinction, as between the parts of the thing.

2. Secondly the same is proved, because things which in the thing itself have integral or partial essences in some way diverse are in some way distinguished in the thing itself; but genus and difference are so related; therefore. The minor is proved from the things which are commonly attributed to genus and difference. For first of all Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 10, says that the difference is outside the notion of the genus; the difference, therefore, is not of the essence of the genus, nor conversely. Whence, Topics VI, c. 3, Aristotle says that neither does the genus participate the differences nor the differences the genus; and Metaphysics VII, c. 12, text 42, he says that the differences are not placed in the notion of the genus, but that the genus is compared to the differences as potency to essential act, and that therefore one per se comes about from them. And it is evident by reason, for the differences dividing the genus are opposed among themselves; therefore both cannot be of the essence of the genus; therefore neither the one nor the other can be of its essence. The consequence is evident, both because there is no greater reason for one than for the other, and also because, if one were of the essence, it would be inseparable, whence the other could never belong to it, since opposites cannot be at the same time in the same thing; the genus, therefore, has an essence of itself distinct from the differences, or not including them. But that conversely the difference too expresses an essence not including the genus is evident, both because otherwise the genus would be transcendent, and also because otherwise the difference would include all that the species includes, whence a certain nugation would be committed when the difference is adjoined to the genus.

3. A third argument can be that things which are separated in the thing must necessarily be in some way distinguished also in the thing; but the inferior and superior grade are separated in the thing, for somewhere there is the notion of animal where rational is not found, and so of the others. A similar argument is that in the thing itself two species are similar in the generic notion, but not in the specific; whence it seems necessary that these notions be distinct in the thing itself. Likewise, that the difference contracts the genus and actuates it; therefore they are not altogether the same, because the same thing does not contract itself. Fourthly I argue: because these expressions, precisely and abstractly, are false: Animality is rationality and similar ones; and only on account of a formal distinction; for, if subject and predicate were altogether the same, the affirmative proposition would be true; but by those words the generic and differential grades are precisely signified; these grades, therefore, are distinguished from the nature of the thing.

4. And hence it is further concluded that genus and difference, taken singly, are distinguished from the nature of the thing from the whole species, because they are compared to it as parts to a whole truly and in reality composed of them; but the whole is distinguished from the nature of the thing from each component, granted that it is not distinguished from all taken together and united; for it is distinguished at least as including something which the other does not include. Whence for this reason it is also commonly said that genus and difference, precisely taken in the notion of parts, cannot truly be predicated of the species, because a part is not predicated of the whole. And it is confirmed, first, for if in the thing man and animal were in no way distinguished, neither would horse and animal be; therefore neither could man and horse be distinguished, for things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other; and whatever is of the essence of one will be of the essence of the other, and conversely; for, if man and animal are the same in the thing, whatever is of the essence of man will be of the essence of animal; and it will be similar in the horse; therefore the same will hold comparing man and horse among themselves; or certainly it will have to be confessed that something is of the essence of animal in man which is not in the horse, and conversely; from which it follows that animal is not said univocally nor according to the same notion of man and horse, but equivocally, or at most according to a certain analogy of proportionality. Finally it is confirmed by that reason often made, because diverse things cannot be similar and different according to altogether the same; but two species differ simply and essentially, and yet are similar in genus; therefore it cannot happen that genus and species are not in some way distinguished in the thing itself.

Various opinions are reported

5. In this matter there can be various ways of speaking. The first is that these grades are distinguished not in any way whatever from the nature of the thing, but altogether really, at least through the inclusion of some really distinct thing which is in one and not in the other. Jandun indicates this opinion, Metaphysics II, q. 9, and all those must hold the same who think that these generic and specific grades are taken from really distinct forms; for thence it follows that body signifies only the composite of matter and the form of corporeity, living the composite of body and vegetative soul, animal adds a really distinct sensitive soul, man the rational. But of the differences, rational and the like, this opinion would perhaps say that they express only the ultimate form as informing; whence also it comes about that it expresses something really distinct from the genus. And hence perhaps Durandus thought, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, that in simple things, such as angels and accidents or forms themselves, there cannot be proper differences, and consequently not a composition of genus and difference.

6. The second opinion is that these predicates are distinguished from the nature of the thing among themselves and from the composite itself, at least by the distinction which they call formal or modal. So Scotus holds, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and Metaphysics VII, q. 16, and there Antonius Andreae, q. 7; for, although Scotus sometimes posits a real distinction between common and proper physical forms, as between the form of corporeity and the soul, for example, and then must necessarily say that between the grades taken from these forms there is a greater distinction than formal, according to the preceding opinion, nevertheless he does not think that that real distinction is formally necessary for distinguishing these grades, for in the same physically simple thing he admits true genus and difference and their composition; and therefore, speaking generally, he says that a formal distinction from the nature of the thing suffices and is at least necessary. But whether this formal distinction in Scotus is actual in the thing or only virtual or fundamental, and so coincides with the other which is called a distinction of reasoned reason, is not sufficiently evident, for he speaks variously, as we shall touch upon in the following disputation; now this opinion is to be treated by us in that sense in which it posits an actual distinction in the thing; and in that sense Ferrariensis seems to follow it, Contra Gentiles I, cc. 24 and 42; and Fonseca, Metaphysics II, c. 2, text 11, where he gathers it from the text of Aristotle, who denies that there can be a process to infinity in essential predicates, because, if they were distinguished only in thought, there would be no inconvenience in there being a process to infinity in them. Fonseca repeats the same, Book IV, c. 2, q. 4, sect. 3, and Book V, c. 7, q. 3, sect. 3, ad 2.

7. The third opinion, extremely contrary, can be this, that they are distinguished neither in the thing nor even by reason, but are altogether the same, although they are signified by diverse words. Which opinion can be attributed to the nominalists, in so far as they altogether deny that these universals are found in things; but it is scarcely credible that this opinion came into the mind of any philosopher, as the arguments made at the beginning at least conclude.

8. The true opinion, then, is that all these are distinguished by reason, some foundation being taken from the things themselves, yet that there is not some true and actual distinction, either real or from the nature of the thing, between all grades of this kind as they exist conjoined in reality. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, as is evident from I, q. 50, a. 4, ad 1; q. 76, a. 3, ad 4; and De ente et essentia, c. 4 and following; In Metaph. VII, lect. 4; and often elsewhere; and the Thomists commonly hold it: Hervaeus, Quodlibet I, q. 9; Capreolus, In I, dist. 8, q. 2, a. 3; Cajetan, Soncinas and Soto in the places cited in the preceding section; Gregory, In I, dist. 38; Gabriel and other nominalists. And since the affirmative part about the distinction of reason has been evidently proved by the arguments made and has no difficulty, nothing need be added about it; but the foundation of such a distinction will be declared in the solutions of the arguments, and more in the following section.

The true opinion is declared

9. In order that we may prove the other, negative part, it is to be noticed that, when we treat of the distinction of these grades, of genus, difference and species, they can be compared in four ways: first, as they are found in reality in diverse things or species; as if the animal which is in man is compared with the species of lion or horse, or if animal as it is in the lion is compared to the difference rational, for example, or another similar one; and this comparison is outside the matter and irrelevant, for in this way it is evident that the generic notion existing in the thing can be really distinguished from some difference or species of it; because in diverse species the formal unity of the genus itself is multiplied according to the thing; just as we said above that specific formal unity, as it exists in the thing, is multiplied in number in the individuals. But whether the genus, as it is in reality in one species, is distinguished from another species or its difference not only really but also essentially and quidditatively, perhaps pertains to the mode of speaking and depends on the proofs of this opinion, and is explained in the solutions of the arguments.

10. Secondly, they can be compared according to themselves, abstracting from existence both in things and in the intellect, in the way in which above we cited some saying that the nature according to itself, that is, barely and solitarily taken, is universal, as it precedes even every work of the intellect; for in the same sense they seem to think that quidditative predicates are distinguished among themselves from the nature of the thing. Because, if animal, for example, of itself and before every intellect has a positive aptitude to various differences and a unity of prescission of itself common to many species, it necessarily follows that it has from its nature some distinction from all the differences by which it can be divided and from the species to which it can be contracted. But, the things being posited which we have said of the notion of the universal, this comparison has no place; for we have shown that there is no state in which the common nature, whatever it may be, can have some unity of prescission, the intellect being excluded, if as existing in things themselves it cannot have it. Because the nature outside the intellect can have only a twofold state, namely of actual existence and of possibility, nor can another intermediate state be feigned or thought out; but the nature as possible is not otherwise prescinded or distinguished from possible differences or species than the existing nature from existing differences or species; nor is there some possible nature distinct from its inferior individuals or species, if existing in the thing it can never be distinct; because the existing and the possible nature are not one thing and another, but the same considered in diverse states; this comparison, therefore, can in truth be none which has a foundation in the thing.

11. Thirdly, genus and difference can be compared both among themselves and with the species which they compose, as they are in the intellect precisely and abstractly conceiving each of them; and in this way it is evident that they are distinguished by reason, as we have said; but whether they are distinguished by more than reason cannot (which is very much to be noted for solving the arguments made at the beginning) be sufficiently gathered from this comparison alone, unless in the things themselves some other sign of greater distinction is found. It is proved, because this is the power of the intellect, that it prescinds and abstracts things which in the thing are not actually distinct or prescinded; therefore, from the fact that some things as presented to the mind are distinguished by reason, no distinction between them in the thing can be gathered; because to be so distinguished by reason is nothing other than to be presented to distinct concepts of the intellect and to be conceived in a diverse way or under a diverse relationship, all of which can stand without distinction in the thing. And this can be confirmed from what we said above of the objective concept of being, how it is prescinded through the intellect and according to the thing undistinguished from all inferior beings; for the reasons made there proceed in the same way here, and we shall immediately touch upon them briefly.

12. In the fourth way, then, these can be compared as they exist in the thing in one and the same species and in one and the same individual of such a species; and in this sense this comparison is truly intended in the present question; and in the same sense we say that in Peter, for example, being sensitive is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from being rational, nor the grade of animal from the grade of man, and so of the rest.

13. The second note.—Where it is to be considered, secondly, that in the thing itself and in the same individual the generic grade can be understood to be distinguished from the specific in two ways: in one way, as the universal from the particular; in another way, as individual from individual at least formally distinct from the nature of the thing. The former mode of distinction would have place if it were true that universals existing in reality are actually and from the nature of the thing distinguished from the individuals in which they exist; and in this way Scotus seems to have proceeded and consequently spoken, because animal, for example, does not descend to individuals except by means of the species; and therefore, if we once admit that the specific nature as such is distinct from the nature of the thing from the difference by which it is contracted to individuals, by equal reason, and consistently enough, it will be said that the generic nature is in the same way distinguished from the differential grade prior in nature to its being contracted to individuals. But this mode of distinction has no place, the things being supposed which we said against Scotus of the universality of the nature, that it is in no way actually in things nor in the nature existing in individuals, but only as abstracted through the intellect. For if the nature in the thing does not have universality, then neither does it have the universality of genus, nor of difference, nor of species; therefore these cannot be distinguished in the thing as one universal from another or from its inferior. And it is confirmed, because the reasons by which it was shown above that the universal is not distinguished in the thing from the singular prove equally of any universal whatever, whether generic or specific, with respect to that singular in which it exists; therefore in the thing there can be no distinction between one inferior and superior grade universally taken, since in reality they are not distinguished from singulars.

14. There remains, then, only the other mode of distinction to be examined, which being excluded, it will be sufficiently shown that there is no distinction from the nature of the thing between these grades. And in this there is some difference and somewhat greater difficulty in the present question than in that treated above about the distinction of the universal from the individual difference; for, the individual difference being excluded, the singular and individual thing does not remain, and therefore neither can there remain an existing thing which would be distinguished in the thing from such a difference; but in the present case, the specific difference being excluded, the generic grade can be understood not only in the universal but also in the individual and really existing; for Peter, for example, is not only this man, but also this animal and this rational; and therefore, the specific difference being excluded through the intellect, the generic grade can still be understood as existing in the individual and singular, and accordingly the question still has place how in the individual this animal and this man, or this rational, are distinguished; that, then, they are not distinguished in the thing must be proved otherwise than from universality.

The first proof of the true opinion

15. It can be proved, then, first from individuation, because in one individual the individual difference is altogether one and the same and most simple, contracting proximately and immediately the lowest species and, with it and through it, consequently determining all the superior grades; therefore those grades cannot be distinguished among themselves more than each is distinguished from its individual difference; but none of them is distinguished from the nature of the thing from its individual difference, as has been proved; therefore neither are they distinguished among themselves from the nature of the thing in the same individual. The first antecedent is common among the dialecticians and metaphysicians, as Fonseca reports and declares at length, Book V, c. 28, q. 14, sect. 3, where he shows that the genus does not regard individuals except by means of the species. And the reason is, first, because the generic notion precisely taken is indifferent and as it were in essential potency to be determined by the specific difference, and therefore, until it is understood to be determined in this way, it is not proximately capable of individuation. Secondly, because the order between the generic, specific and individual difference is no less essential than between the superior essential differences, more and less universal, down to the specific; but body, for example, is not apt to be contracted by the difference of animal except by means of the difference of living, nor vegetative by the difference of rational except by means of the difference of sentient; therefore neither is animal determinable by the individual difference of this animal, for example Peter, except by means of the difference of man or rational; there is, therefore, one altogether indivisible individual difference, which, by contracting man to this man, at the same time contracts animal to this animal, and so of the other superior predicates. Whence I argue, thirdly, because such an individual difference, single and indivisible, suffices to determine in the singular the whole and integral essence of the thing, as it includes all the specific, generic or superior predicates which can be abstracted or thought out in it; therefore it would be superfluous to feign several metaphysical differences of this kind in the same individual. And it is confirmed from a sign; for this animal, for example, which is Peter, is altogether intrinsically and as it were essentially determined to be Peter; and therefore it is altogether repugnant to understand this individual of animal outside this individual of man; and the same holds of the other superior predicates; it is therefore a sign that animal is not determined immediately and according to itself to this individual of animal, but in so far as it is determined to the being of man; therefore the same individual difference is determined to the being of this man and of this animal.

16. Finally it is confirmed, for the individual thing as such is understood to be proximately capable of existence; for the universal as such, that is, in its universality, cannot exist; and therefore, the more universal a predicate is understood to be, the more as such it is conceived to be removed from existence; as, for example, substance in common is not understood to be apt to exist unless it is determined to material or immaterial; and the reason is the same of the whole series of general predicates down to the lowest species, which, contracted to its individual, is proximately capable of existence; therefore, just as no individual can exist unless it is in some lowest species, as is most certain (especially the false opinion of the real distinction of several substantial forms, essentially subordinated in the same composite, being excluded), so no generic notion is understood to be determined to its proper individual except as contracted and determined to some species. Which indeed in things, especially simple ones, both integral and partial, seems most evident of itself; for who would feign or conceive in the mind that Michael, for example, is through one thing this substance, this spirit and this angel? or that the rational soul of Peter is through one thing this soul and this rational soul, and so of others? Indeed in some cases this individual cannot even sufficiently be conceived by the abstraction of the mind as existing under the generic notion and not under some specific one; as, for example, this existing substance, this body or this spirit not being understood; let it be established, then, that all the essential attributes in one and the same individual are individuated by a single singular difference in the ultimate specific notion. But from this it is openly concluded (what we inferred in the first consequence) that the essential attributes in the same individual cannot be distinguished among themselves more than from the individual difference, because that is one and indivisible; therefore the things which are individuated by it cannot be distinguished as two individuals distinct from the nature of the thing, because in distinct individuals, in the way in which they are distinct, distinct individual differences must also be found; again, things which are altogether the same from the nature of the thing with the same individual and indivisible difference cannot be distinguished individually among themselves; therefore they are in no way distinguished from the nature of the thing, because, as has been proved, a distinction from the nature of the thing cannot intervene except between individual and singular things as such.

The second proof

17. Secondly the assertion posited is proved, because in one individual, for example Peter, to be this animal and to be this man come from the same physical principle, namely from this soul, as is self-evident and will be declared in the following section; but in this soul, for example of Peter, to be rational, sensitive and vegetative (whether formally or eminently) are not grades distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore neither are the grades of man and animal in any way distinguished in Peter. The consequence is evident, because we rightly conclude that this animal is not really distinguished from the man himself because this soul which gives the being of animal is not really distinct from that which gives the being of this man; therefore in the same way it is concluded that it is not distinguished from the nature of the thing. You will say that this argument proceeds from things equally unknown; for whoever posits this distinction in the composite posits it also in the form and in any other thing whatever, even if it is physically simple. The answer is that, granted that it must be spoken so consistently in that opinion, nevertheless the argument and the difficulty are deservedly referred back to the roots of these grades and to simple physical entities, because in them it can appear more clearly how superfluously and without cause this distinction is feigned, since there is no sufficient indication of it in the foundation and root of such grades. Which is evident thus: for the rational soul, for example, is in the thing one simple form; which, if it is considered as the efficient principle of all the operations which are in man, is understood to be one eminent and as it were universal principle of them; nor is it necessary to feign in it various entities or real modes distinct from the nature of the thing through which it would be the principal and radical principle of such operations; otherwise also in the form or light of the sun, in so far as it can be the universal principle of several actions, various grades or modes of being distinct from the nature of the thing would have to be feigned. And similarly one would have to philosophize in every general principle of several actions or effects, which is foreign to all reason and right conception, because things which are distinct in inferiors are united in a superior principle. The rational soul, therefore, through its entity, in the thing altogether the same and simple, is the radical principle of all human operations without any actual distinction which is in it as it has the notion of such a principle, although through inadequate concepts it can be conceived by us in many ways, and so be distinguished by reason in order to various operations. Therefore in the same way the same soul in the genus of formal cause confers on man all the grades of living, animal and man according to altogether the same reality, without any actual distinction which is found in it from the nature of the thing. The consequence is evident, both because the reason is the same of the soul considered in one and in another genus of cause; and also because by the same thing by which the soul is the radical principle of operations it is the principle formally constituting the operating thing. Indeed these grades are distinguished by us in the soul in no other way than in order to operations. Whence, if in order to them a distinction from the nature of the thing is not necessary in their principle, neither will it be necessary in the notion of informing.

18. But if in these grades which are taken in order to diverse operations a distinction from the nature of the thing is not necessary, much less will it be necessary in other superior or inferior genera or differences, such as, for example, the notion of body or of substance; or, if we speak of forms, the notion of substantial form or of form of body; for, by the very fact that something is a form of matter actuating its substantial potentiality, it is a substantial form and is also a form of body; but this is inseparable and indistinguishable from the nature of the thing from any form whatever actuating matter and composing with it one substantial composite. Similarly the inferior genera, such as the notion of brute under animal and others of this kind, can be distinguished less than the aforesaid grades in man; for if in the soul of man as it is the principle of various operations a distinction from the nature of the thing is not found, much less will it be able to be found in the soul of the brute, for example, in order to sensitive operations effected in such a way in that grade and order.

The third proof

19. Thirdly there is an excellent a priori reason, because this abstraction of genera and species, in order to be made by the intellect, has a sufficient foundation both in it and in things without any actual distinction which precedes in the things themselves; therefore such a distinction is not to be asserted. The consequence is proved, because the whole reason for introducing this distinction was taken from our mode of conceiving, and consequently from the mode of speaking founded in the mode of conceiving; therefore, if on this account that distinction is not necessary, neither is it to be believed, because real distinctions, or those from the nature of the thing, are not to be multiplied without foundation. But the first antecedent, although it has been proved in treating of the concept of being and of the identity between the common and the individual nature, is here briefly declared and proved. Because, in order that the intellect form and prescind those concepts, on the side of things the agreement and likeness of them among themselves, more or less perfect, with some dissimilitude and disagreement, suffices; but on the side of the intellect it suffices that it can conceive that in which things agree after the manner of one, by conceiving it precisely; but all this can come about without an actual distinction of grades which is in the thing itself; therefore. The minor is proved by the examples adduced above; for two men agree among themselves in the notion of man and are distinguished as they are individuals, without a distinction in the thing between the common notion and the individual difference. Likewise God and the creature agree in the notion of real being and differ in the notion of such being, without a distinction between the common and the proper notion, neither on the side of God, as is certain, nor on the side of the creature, because no grade can be prescinded in the creature, if it is positive and real, which does not have that agreement with God in the notion of being. These examples, therefore, declare that altogether the same thing can be the principle and foundation of agreement and difference with another on account of greater or lesser likeness with it, without any actual distinction which precedes in the things themselves.

20. Which holds true not only in analogous agreement, as some indicate, but also in univocal, as the example of specific agreement and individual difference sufficiently declares; and other examples can be adduced of more universal or generic agreements; for the common sense, for example, agrees with sight in the perception of colour, and thence a common concept can easily be abstracted; but with hearing it agrees in the perception of sound, and thence another concept can be abstracted; but no one will say that the power of perceiving sound and colour is distinguished from the nature of the thing in the common sense itself. It is similar with the light of the sun, in so far as it agrees with heat in effecting heat and with dryness in drying. Likewise qualities intermediate between contrary extremes, as the colour green or red between white and black, and liberality between avarice and prodigality, have a certain agreement and dissimilitude with the extremes; for liberality, compared to avarice, differs from it and agrees with prodigality in the power and propensity of pouring itself out and communicating; but compared to prodigality, it differs from it in moderation and agrees with avarice in retaining; but it would be vain to feign in liberality various grades or real modes distinct from the nature of the thing on account of these comparisons and conceptions of our intellect, which (if the matter is attentively considered) can almost be multiplied to infinity; and scarcely can differences so simple be thought out that the intellect could not divide them, finding in them agreement and difference with other things; as in man, in so far as he is rational, it finds agreement with the angel in understanding and difference in the mode of understanding; and so of others. From these things, then, it is sufficiently evident that concepts of the intellect of this kind are not sufficient signs of the actual distinction of things.

Solution of the arguments

21. The composition of genus and difference is a composition of reason.—To the first argument posited at the beginning the answer is that the composition of genus and difference is not a real composition, but only of reason; because, as the argument well proves, without a distinction from the nature of the thing neither can a true composition, and one which is in the thing, be understood; because composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things; where, therefore, there is no distinction in the thing, neither can there be composition; this, therefore, is a composition of reason. But this composition is said not to be altogether feigned through reason, not because it actually precedes in the thing, but because in the thing there is a foundation for the intellect to be able to conceive one notion as potential and prescinded from the other, and the other as actual and determining the former; and so properly the composition is only in concepts, but in the thing only by extrinsic denomination from the concepts of the mind; and in this way it is said to be a composition of reason. Wherefore such a composition is not repugnant to God on account of simplicity alone, as I shall say below, but also by reason of the divine illimitation and eminence. For first of all on this account he cannot have univocal agreement with the creature, and consequently not generic either. Next, in God no common notion can be so abstracted and prescinded that it is not included in every proper and particular notion, on account of the supreme illimitation and simplicity of God, which is also repugnant to the composition of genus and difference.

22. How far the definition and its parts are commensurate with the thing and its parts.—To the confirmation the answer is that the parts of the definition are not properly said to signify the parts of the thing, but to have a certain proportion with the parts of the thing, as St. Thomas expounds, In Metaph. VII, lect. 9, because genus and difference are related after the manner of matter and form, which are the parts of the thing from which on this account genus and difference are said to be taken, as we shall explain more fully in the following section. Next it is said that the definition is a work of the intellect and necessarily requires some true and proper composition of distinct concepts, as the definition uttered in speech must consist of distinct partial words; for it explains distinctly the nature of the thing, which cannot be done by us by one word or by one simple concept; and by this reason it is said to consist of parts; it is not, however, necessary that the individual parts of the definition explain individual parts of the thing defined distinct in the thing, but each can express the whole nature or entity of the thing defined; yet one expresses it confusedly and under some common and potential notion, but another under a more determinate and proper notion; and such diverse notions can be called parts of the thing defined not according to the thing but according to reason only; for the thing defined as defined expresses a denomination of reason.

23. To the second the answer is that genus and difference express essences or essential notions diverse according to reason, not according to the thing; and in this way the genus is said to be outside the notion of the difference and the difference also outside the notion of the genus; for the notion of each is so conceived and prescinded in the mind that according to that prescission and abstraction neither is formally included in the other; for which it is not necessary that they be distinguished in the thing itself in one and the same thing, but on the side of the genus it is enough that its notion, as it corresponds to such a conception, is not intrinsically constituted by its dividing difference, and consequently that it can be found in the thing without such a difference; but on the side of the difference, in order that the genus be said to be outside its notion, it is enough that in its precise objective concept the objective concept of the genus is not included, but the difference is conceived as the act of the genus altogether distinct by reason. And this too is enough for genus and difference to be said to be compared as potency and essential act, not according to the thing but according to reason only; for as the composition is, such must the act and potency be; but this composition is of reason, as we have said; in the same way, therefore, one per se is said to be composed of genus and difference according to reason and not according to the thing; and therefore such a composite is most of all one per se, because the components are one in the thing, and according to reason they are per se compared and subordinated. And in this sense St. Thomas said, In Metaph. VII, lect. 12, that the difference is not added to the genus as an essence diverse from it, but as contained in it implicitly, as the determinate is contained in the indeterminate; and for this cause one per se is composed of them.

24. To the reason the answer is that we can speak of genus and difference in two ways. First, as they exist in reality; secondly, as they are prescinded through the intellect. In the former way, since genus and difference are not distinguished in the thing in each species, genus and difference have the same essence as the species, although it is signified diversely through the concepts or words signifying genus and difference, as St. Thomas, just cited, said. And in this way the genus, as it is in the thing, actually includes the opposite differences, as it is in diverse species; in which way equivocations are said to lie hidden in the genus. And so also Aristotle said, Metaphysics X, c. 11, text 24, that the genus, as existing in one species, is diverse from itself as it is in another. Nor does it stand in the way that those differences are opposed, because the genus so considered does not have real unity, but its formal unity is multiplied in diverse species, and therefore in them it can be actuated by opposite differences, or rather be identified with them. But in the second way, and more properly and usually, we speak of genus and difference as they underlie our abstract and prescinded concepts; and so only that is said to be of the essence of each which is per se necessary for the formal notion and constitution of the thing so conceived; and in this way (as has been said) neither are the dividing differences of the essence of the genus, nor the genus of the essence of the differences; yet this whole distinction and prescission is through the operation of the intellect, to which the essence expresses a relationship, or which it involves, when it is signified by the names of genus and difference.

25. The third argument, and all the things which are indicated in it, have often been solved above, for the same arguments are made in the species with respect to individuals and in being with respect to its inferiors. I say, then, that the genus, as it is in reality conjoined with its difference, is altogether inseparable from it; and from such a difference we say that it is not distinguished in the thing itself; but that the genus, as it is in one species, is separable in the thing from the difference of another species is no argument that in one and the same species genus and difference are distinguished, because the genus, as it is in the thing in one species and in another, is not really one and the same, but by reason and abstraction only; therefore only a distinction of reason is included, of which there is in the thing itself some foundation, namely some incomplete and imperfect likeness of diverse natures, which can be in the thing without actual distinction, as has been declared. That expression, therefore, that the difference contracts the genus or actuates it, expresses order to our concepts, and therefore a distinction of reason suffices for its truth and propriety.

26. The fourth argument touches a difficulty which demands the following section; but the other arguments which were brought forward to show a distinction from the nature of the thing between genus and species among themselves, and difference and species among themselves, have an easy solution from what has been said. Whence to the first the answer is that genus and difference are not compared to the species as parts distinct from the nature of the thing, but only by reason. And this is enough that genus or difference, taken with prescission, cannot be predicated of the species, as has been declared. To the first confirmation too the solution is evident from what has been said; for, although in man animal is the same as man and in the horse is the same as the horse, it does not follow that man and horse are the same among themselves, because they are not really one animal, but only have likeness in being animal, by reason of which they agree in one concept of animal; and this is enough that animal be univocal and be said of each according to the same conceived notion, although according to the thing animal has another real essence in man than in the horse, and conversely. To the last confirmation the assumption is denied; for nothing is repugnant, as has also often been shown, that a thing altogether the same and without any distinction which is in it from the nature of the thing should found likeness and difference with another; because they can be assimilated imperfectly and only in a certain respect, yet simply differ.

1. I call metaphysical abstracts those which are abstracted from metaphysical concepts, as animality, rationality and the like; and I call them metaphysical abstracts in order to distinguish them from physical ones, such as whiteness, colour, etc., between which there is no doubt that true and proper predications can be made, as whiteness is colour and the like. Of the former terms, then, and of the propositions which are made up of them, as animality is rationality and the like, Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 7, and dist. 5, q. 1, and on the predicables, q. 16, thinks that they are false on account of the formal distinction, from the nature of the thing, of the extremes. But Soto, q. 3 on universals, a. 2, says that Scotus differs in this from all the realists; whence he himself thinks the contrary from the opposite foundation, namely because a mere distinction of reason does not suffice for the falsity of the proposition.

2. But not only Scotus, but also other authors think that those expressions are to be denied, not on account of a distinction from the nature of the thing, but on account of the mode of signifying, which, a distinction of reason being adjoined, suffices to make a proposition false when one formal notion precisely conceived is predicated of another distinct notion similarly precisely conceived, which is done in those expressions. Because abstract terms signify precise formal notions; whence, when one is predicated of the other, it is signified that one is the other not only according to the thing, but also according to the prescission of the mind and according to reason, which is false; and in this way Niphus holds this opinion, Metaphysics III, disp. II; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 4; and St. Thomas indicates it in the same work, cc. 3 and 4; and it can be confirmed, because these abstracts signify the nature after the manner of a part; but one part cannot truly be predicated of another nor of the whole; whence it is commonly wont to be said that even the genus itself, for example animal, if it were taken precisely after the manner of a part, could not truly be predicated of the species, and is only truly predicated in so far as it at least confusedly signifies all that is in the species, or because it adequately signifies that which has such a nature, which is the whole itself; much less, therefore, can those propositions taken in the abstract be verified.

3. But if you object: if predications of this kind can be made in the abstracts of accidents, why not in the abstracts of substances? The answer from Scotus is that these abstracts are of ultimate abstraction, that is, of such abstraction that they cannot be further abstracted or resolved into others more abstract; but the accidents which are signified in the abstract according to common usage, and in which we say that those predications can be made, are not abstracts of ultimate abstraction; for they could be further resolved or abstracted, as if from whiteness whiteness-ness were abstracted, from colour colour-ness; for then in these abstracts too the aforesaid predications cannot be made; for the same cause militates. But it will be said more properly and more formally that the reason of substances and accidents is the same if the abstraction is of the same notion, namely either physical or metaphysical; but that between these the reason is diverse. For through physical abstraction, namely of whiteness from the subject, the essence is not abstracted from the very thing (so to speak) which it constitutes, but the form is abstracted from the subject; and therefore by virtue of such abstraction only universal predication after the manner of property or accident is taken away, because as such such a form cannot be predicated of its subject nor of the composite, because to the former it is compared as a part, to the latter as a thing distinct from it, and it is not signified as existing in it, but as standing per se. Finally, as such it in no way signifies that which has the form, nor does it stand for it, but only for the form itself which it signifies. And similar to this in substances will be if we abstract the form from the composite and signify it abstractly, as the soul from the animate, etc.; for so the abstract will not be able to be predicated of the concrete; but between abstracts predications of superiors of inferiors can be made; for soul is rightly predicated of such a soul. But through another, metaphysical abstraction the essence is abstracted from the entity which it constitutes, and is formally conceived and signified, as when whiteness-ness is said; and therefore in these abstracts true predications cannot be made when the notions conceived are distinct at least according to reason.

4. Among these opinions the last has attained the truth more; yet, in order that we may explain the matter more fully, we can distinguish here four kinds of predications: for, first, the superior and as it were generic abstract can be predicated of the inferior and as it were specific and integral abstract, as when we say: humanity is animality. Secondly, the same generic abstract can be predicated of the abstract not of the species but of the difference alone, which is compared to it as formal to material, as if we say: rationality is animality. Thirdly, conversely, this formal or differential abstract can be predicated of the specific abstract, as in this: humanity is rationality. Fourthly, the same abstract of the difference can be said of the generic or material abstract, as in this: animality is rationality.

5. Beginning, then, from this last predication, it seems to me rigorously false on account of the reasons given; and because those two extremes, as they are precisely and abstractly signified, are in no way so compared that one is formally included in the other; and consequently neither can one express all that the other expresses, neither in act nor in potency, neither explicitly nor confusedly. And although identically animality and rationality are sometimes the same essence, nevertheless this is not signified by that mode of enunciating, but rather it is signified as if the predicate were of the formal and quidditative concept of the subject. Whence an excellent confirmation is taken, because rationality cannot truly be predicated of animality except as its dividing and contracting difference, and so as existing outside its notion; but in that expression it is not predicated as a dividing difference; because the dividing difference, since it is outside the genus, lies beside it and is related after the manner of an accident, and therefore cannot be predicated of it in the abstract, but only in the concrete. On account of which Avicenna rightly said, tract. V of his Metaphysics, c. 6, that rationality, as it is signified in the abstract, is not the difference, but the principle of the difference. And for the same cause I think the third expression is rigorously false, because in it too rationality is not predicated as a difference, because it is not predicated in quale; it is therefore predicated as the whole and integral notion of humanity, and so it makes a false sense. Similarly I think enunciations of the second kind are rigorously false, although in the identical sense they are less indirect than the first; for every essence which is really rationality is also animality, but not conversely.

6. But expressions of the first kind seem able to admit some true sense in all rigour and propriety, although they seem equivocal, and therefore are not to be admitted without distinction. For humanity, since it expresses the integral essence and nature of man, includes in its concept animality and rationality, because all this is of the essence of man. Likewise, because humanity does not express rationality alone, for it includes more in its concept, as is self-evident; for it does not express only the ultimate difference of man, nor only the abstract of the difference, but expresses the form of the whole, which physically includes the whole nature composed of matter and form, and metaphysically all the grades of such a nature. Humanity, therefore, is in truth a certain sensitive nature, and in this it has some agreement and likeness with the nature of the horse and the lion taken in the abstract, for all are an integral principle of sensing; therefore one common concept can be abstracted from all of them, which is generic to them and can be predicated of them and in confusion and in potency expresses all that is found in the individual members; and indeed this concept seems to be signified by that expression, integral or total principle of sensing, which without doubt is truly predicated of all those natures. If, therefore, by the name of animality the same concept is signified and in the same way, that expression will be true. But this signification does not seem foreign to the propriety of that word; because, although that abstract is signified as a part with respect to the concrete, and therefore cannot truly be predicated of it (according to the truer opinion to be treated below in the disputation on the supposit), nevertheless with respect to the total form itself, although it does not formally express its whole notion, it seems able confusedly to signify it whole, or its common concept, as including in potency all its determinations; in this sense, then, that proposition will be true; as this too is true: this humanity of Christ is humanity, and it pertains to the predication of the species of the individual.

7. Nevertheless, on account of the formal signification and prescission of the abstract word, there can be an equivocation in that word animality, so that by it the constitutive notion of animal is signified as prescinded from every inferior; and in this sense the expression would be false, as the arguments made before convince; and therefore that expression is not to be admitted without distinction; and as regards this the reason is not the same of the common physical abstracts of forms or accidents; for, since these by their nature are real and physical forms, when they are signified or conceived in the abstract, they are plainly understood to be abstracted from subjects, but not prescinded from all inferior differences; but the substantial nature is only a metaphysical form and is not properly in a subject, and therefore, when it is conceived and signified in the abstract, it seems to be signified with every prescission even from every contracting difference, according to that saying of Avicenna: horseness is only horseness; although it is not repugnant that it also be signified after the manner of a potential whole with respect to its inferiors, as we have said. But you will ask: if animality can in this sense be conceived as the genus of humanity and of other natures taken in the abstract, why will rationality not have the notion of difference, or what will its difference be? The answer is that, if anyone wishes to define humanity metaphysically, he will easily understand this; for he will not say that humanity is animality rationality; for it would be an incongruous expression, nor would it be a definition, because those two parts are in no way joined among themselves to compose one expression. He will say, then, that humanity is rational animality; rational, therefore, is the difference also of that abstract; because, as I was saying above, the abstract as such cannot be predicated after the manner of a difference, but of genus or species; for it is always predicated in quid; for predication in quale comes about only through connotative or objective terms, which signify the form as informing or lying beside another. And therefore also in accidents, although the genus is predicated in the abstract of the species, the difference will never be said after the manner of an abstract, but of a concrete; for we shall not say that whiteness is colour and the scattering of sight, but colour scattering, or scattering of, sight. But if finally you object that the same difference cannot be of the genus taken in the abstract and in the concrete, the answer is that rational, joined to animal in the concrete and to animality in the abstract, is not attributed to each in the same sense; for in one it signifies to be a nature only rational, but in the other to be a rational supposit.

1. Although universal unity in some way differs from formal unity, as we have said, nevertheless, because it is not a unity according to the thing but according to reason, the principle of each unity is not diverse in the thing; and therefore it is not necessary to raise diverse questions about them; but, the principle of formal unity being explained, that of the universal will have been explained, because the latter is not founded in things except by means of formal unity. And therefore Ferrariensis rightly said, Contra Gentiles II, c. 95, that when it is asked from what genus and difference are taken, it is not asked about genus and difference in second intention, that is, as through reason they have unity or a relation of reason, but in first intention, that is, according to the formal unity or agreement which they can have in the thing. But the discussion here is of the physical principle; for just as above, individual unity having been explained, we inquired into and explained its principle, that is, the physical foundation which it can have in the thing, so here we investigate a similar principle with respect to formal unity, which is either the unity of the genus or of the difference, or of the species composed of both; for I now omit transcendental formal unity, because either it is analogous, and so is not unity simply, or, if it is univocal, it is to be reduced to the generic, as I said above, and it has the same proportional foundation, as I shall explain.

2. The question so declared, then, coincides with that common one, whence genus and difference are taken. And the reason for doubting is that it is commonly wont to be said that the genus is taken from matter and the difference from form; which nevertheless does not appear true. First, because also in the angels the formal unity of genus and species is found; and yet in them neither matter nor form is found. Secondly, because if the genus were taken from matter, then things which did not have common matter could not have a common genus either; the consequent is openly false, because both material substances agree with immaterial ones in some genus, and terrestrial bodies with celestial ones, although they do not agree in matter. Thirdly, because even in substances having similar matter the genera are not taken from matter, as is evident of the genus of living thing, animal and the like; for the living thing does not have life from matter but from form; and so of the others. On the contrary is the fact that that manner of speaking is that of almost all the ancients, but especially of St. Thomas, De ente et essentia, cc. 4, 5 and 6; Contra Gentiles II, c. 95; and the question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1; and Averroes indicates it, Metaphysics X, at the end, comm. 26, on account of Aristotle saying there that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus, because they also differ in matter. In which he indicates that the genus either is matter or is altogether to be taken from matter.

The former opinion is rejected

3. In this matter there can be a twofold mode of speaking. The former is that matter and form, properly and rigorously taken, are the proper and necessary principles of generic or specific formal unity; and in this sense that the genus is taken from physical matter as from its proper principle, but the difference or species (for these two are reckoned the same, since the difference constitutes the species) from the form. And in this manner those seem to have thought who deny that immaterial things are composed of genus and difference, but only things composed of matter and form; among whom is Durandus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1; and Albert indicates it, on the Categories, chapter on Substance; and Giles in the same place, and Quodlibet I, q. 8; for, moved (as it seems) by this reason, they deny that corporeal substances are univocally substances with incorporeal ones. Which Averroes too denied, in the place cited above, of terrestrial and celestial bodies, because he thought that the heavens do not consist of matter, of which elsewhere. It is true that it does not necessarily follow from this principle that these authors denied genera and differences in the angels or the heavens, because they could have thought that they have a generic agreement among themselves, even if they denied that they have it with inferior substances. Nevertheless, if they think so, they will be able to bring forward no probable reason on account of which they deny common genera to these substances composed of matter and form and to those immaterial ones which admit in themselves the composition of genus and difference; because, just as in this they are similar to inferior substances, so they can have with them some union and generic agreement; nor will this be repugnant to their simplicity or perfection; they will speak more consistently, therefore, by saying that, by the very fact that they do not have matter and form, they cannot have genus and difference either, because these are founded in them. But of this assertion so expounded I do not see what foundation can be brought forward, except that, just as matter is in potency to several forms and with them composes diverse essences, so the genus is related to several differences. But this opinion so expounded is openly false, as the arguments made at the beginning and those which we shall bring forward convince; and that foundation is very light, because that agreement is not through true likeness and propriety, but only according to a certain proportion.

Resolution of the question

4. How the genus is said to be taken from matter, the difference from form.—The second opinion, then, is that matter and form, not according to physical propriety but according to a certain proportion and analogy, are the principles from which genus and difference are taken. For matter is the first and as it were essential or substantial potency of the substantial nature, of itself indifferent to several natures or acts; but form is the first substantial act determining or constituting the nature. Because, then, the genus is something potential and indifferent, and is actuated and determined by the difference to a certain grade or species of nature, therefore the genus is said to be taken from matter and the difference from form, that is, through a certain proportion to matter and form. And this is the opinion of Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 6; of St. Thomas, in the said opusculum De ente et essentia, and Contra Gentiles II, c. 95, and In Metaph. VII, lects. 11 and 12, and in other places to be cited below. And this sense is true and easy. It must be said, then, speaking universally, that the principle of formal unity is the whole essence and nature of the thing, yet in a diverse way; for the principle of generic unity is the nature itself, as it is further perfectible or determinable, or as it has agreement and likeness with others in some potential grade, or one further determinable. But of specific unity, or of the difference, it is the same nature according to its ultimate essential perfection. It is proved, first, by the reasons given, because no other mode can be assigned which is common to all substances and accidents and forms. Secondly, because in material substances themselves neither the form nor the matter is a sufficient principle of genus and difference; because, as was said above, both genus and difference in some way express the whole nature of the thing, and therefore can be predicated of the species. Whence, if per impossibile we understood a composite of the rational soul and another matter of another notion from that of which man now consists, from such matter and form the genus and difference by which man now essentially consists would not be taken; because rational, although it is taken chiefly from the soul, nevertheless essentially includes such matter. And conversely, although this matter is feigned without composition with any form, no proper genus of substance could be taken from it, except perhaps the genus of matter, with respect to which matter itself is related as the whole nature, from which, as it has agreement with the matter of the heaven in some further determinable grade, such an incomplete genus can be taken; and consequently from the same, as it has completion in its essence, will be taken the ultimate difference constituting the species of such matter; and the same holds in its own way in the form; therefore in each thing every unity of this kind is taken from the whole nature, compared or conceived in one way and another. But this is to be understood with due proportion, for in complete and integral substances it is true simply and with all propriety, because they are those which have proper and integral natures; but because in partial substances too, such as are matter and form, generic and specific unity is found in its own way, in them it must be understood with proportion that genus and difference of this kind are taken from the whole nature, namely partial, that is, from the whole entity of the form or the matter, according to diverse notions; which is to be accommodated in the same way to accidental forms too, as can be seen at length in St. Thomas, opusc. De ente et essentia, c. 7.

Answers to the arguments

5. In the angels genera and differences are truly found.—To the first, then, we confess that in the angels there are genera and species, as St. Thomas declares at length in the said opusculum De ente et essentia, cc. 5 and 6, and I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 1, and others, as we shall treat below in disputing about the intelligences. Nor is it necessary that there be matter and form in them, because, as we have said, these are not always the principles of genus and difference, but any nature, even simple, provided it is such that it can have with others a univocal agreement in some grade abstractable by the intellect as determinable or determining; but it is not repugnant that this be found in angelic natures, since they are of finite and limited perfection. You will say: therefore there is no difference in this between material and immaterial substances; because in both genus and difference are taken from the whole nature according to a more perfect or more imperfect grade; whence matter and form are related as it were per accidens, because they concur only in so far as they are parts composing such a nature; but the consequent seems to be against St. Thomas in the places cited, especially I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 1, where he says that there is a difference between material and immaterial substances, that in the former the genus is taken from one thing and the difference from another, but in the latter each is taken from one and the same thing according to diverse reason. Ferrariensis, above, answers that, if we speak of the proximate principle, there is no difference, because that is the whole nature in all substances, as we have said; but if the discussion is of the radical principle, in this there is some difference; for in immaterial substances, since they are not composed of physical parts, the radical principle of every formal unity is the same as the proximate; but in material substances, because they are composed of physical parts, although the whole nature is the proximate principle, matter is nevertheless judged to be the radical principle of the genus, because it is the root of all potentiality, and because the genus is considered as determinable through differences through proportion to it; but form is judged to be the first root of the difference, because it gives the ultimate perfection and brings the complete nature into act. In which some difference can also be considered between matter and form, because matter per se is not properly the radical cause of any grade, even generic, until it is actuated by the form, on which primarily and essentially every grade of substantial nature depends. Whence St. Thomas, question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, ad 24, says that when the genus is said to be taken from matter, it is not to be understood of prime matter, but according as through the form it receives a certain imperfect and material being with respect to the specific, as the being of animal is imperfect with respect to man, and both are from the soul. Whence it comes about that, properly speaking, matter is not the principle of the genus except through analogy and proportion, as we have said. But the form seems to have something more with respect to any difference whatever, because it is its proper root, which is true not only of the ultimate but also of subaltern differences. Although matter is not altogether to be excluded in its genus, because every natural form is its act, and from it as such the difference is taken, and therefore matter is always in some way included in such a difference.

6. Material substances agree univocally with immaterial ones.—To the second there are not lacking those who concede the consequence, namely that there is no common genus to things not having common matter, or of the same notion, as was cited above. But they rest on no probable foundation, because, as we have shown, the composition of genus and difference is not repugnant to finite things, even if they either consist of no physical matter or of matter of another notion from the matter of these inferior things. Likewise it is not repugnant to them to have univocal agreement or likeness with these inferior things, as is evident of the concept of substance, which, considered according to its precise notion, belongs equally to integral material and immaterial substances, and to terrestrial as to celestial ones. The answer, then, to the argument is by denying the consequence; for first of all, as regards celestial and terrestrial bodies, although we grant that their matters are different in species, since those very matters agree in genus among themselves, it will be no inconvenience that from them in their own way one common genus be taken for these bodies, not only in so far as they are substances but also in so far as they are bodies. But as regards immaterial substances, they agree univocally with inferior ones in the notion of being per se or subsisting in a substantial nature; whence they can have a common genus, not taken from proper matter, but from the whole nature according to its indeterminate notion, as has been said. Nor is that Aristotelian saying repugnant to this truth, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus, because, as St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales and others expound, both there and in Metaphysics V, text 33, that is not to be understood of the logical or metaphysical genus, which is considered through agreement in some formal unity, but of the physical genus, which is matter itself; of which interpretation more below, Disp. XXXIX, sect. 3. The third reason has been dissolved by what has been said.