Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Several accidents are said to be successively in the same subject when the subject first had one accident, and then lost it, and afterwards acquires an accident of the same species; and then it is asked whether the later accident necessarily is, or can be, distinct in number from the former. For some so tenaciously defend the individuation of the accident from the subject that they think it impossible that even in this way there be several accidents differing only in number in the same subject. Whence it is inferred that the same accident in number which had perished before is always reproduced in the same subject, namely the same heat, the same light, and consequently the same where, the same local motion, especially if it is through the same space; for the reason of all these is the same. And Scotus in part defends this opinion, at least when the agent is the same and the subject the same; who is not founded on individuation, but on this, that the same agent about the same subject is always apt by nature to make the same thing, nor can a sufficient reason be assigned why it should make something distinct in number. Indeed Aristotle too, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, indicates that, if the agent and the matter are one in number, the effect too is one in number. And it is explained in this way: for if with open eyes I continuously gaze at this wall for an hour, I effect and preserve the same act in number; therefore, if I close my eyes for a little and open them again, I shall again effect the same act in number, for that interruption in no way prevents that power from being able, in that whole hour and in any part of it taken by itself, to effect and receive the same act in number. But if you object that it follows also that the substantial form is reproduced the same in number in the same part of matter whenever a form similar in species is induced, and consequently that the same individual which was before is naturally reproduced, which is to say that resurrection can come about naturally, there are not lacking those who concede this, as may be seen in Paul of Venice, De generatione II, at the end. But others deny that the reason is the same, because the substantial form requires disposed matter, and never concurs with the same dispositions.

2. But another opinion is extremely contrary, namely that not only can several accidents differing only in number be successively in the same subject, but that it is necessarily so whenever an accident similar in species is reproduced in the same subject; which Durandus, Marsilius and others held to be necessary even in order to the absolute power of God; whose opinion, and that of Scotus, I treated at length in tom. 2 of the Third Part, disp. XLIV, sect. 9. The foundation of Durandus is that, whenever that production takes place, an action distinct from that which was before is repeated, for an action cannot be reproduced, any more than successive beings can; therefore the term of the action too must be distinct. Whence it is confirmed, because, if such permanent accidents, which come about successively in the same subject, were not distinct, successive accidents too could be not distinct, and so the same time in number could be reproduced, which all reckon impossible.

Resolution of the question

3. But a middle way is to be held, and it must be said that it can happen that several accidents diverse only in number are successively in the same subject. Which indeed, if it is understood of the power of God, is self-evident, because it involves no repugnance, and it follows a fortiori from what has been said that they can even be at the same time; much more, then, successively. And this is enough to show that accidents of the same species do not have their intrinsic numerical and entitative distinction through the subject, or through a relationship to this subject in number; otherwise they could in no way be distinguished, even if the production or reproduction took place at diverse times; because, as I shall immediately declare, diversity of time alone is not per se sufficient for this distinction if otherwise there is not in the forms produced themselves a sufficient foundation of distinction and individual difference. But if the assertion is understood of the power and order of natural agents, then too it is true, as will be evident a fortiori from what is to be said.

4. I say, secondly, that it is not only possible, but also comes about according to the order of nature, that accidents distinct only in number come about successively in the same subject. This is the more common opinion of the philosophers, Physics V, c. 4, and De generatione II, last chapter; and of the theologians, In IV, dists. 43 and 44. On which I said some things in tom. 2 of the Third Part, disp. XLIV, sect. 7, where I showed that according to the order of nature the same accident in number which had been corrupted is not reproduced in the same subject; for from this principle it is inferred that it must be distinct, which is what we intend here. It is not easy, however, to assign the first cause and root of this natural necessity. For Durandus, above, gives it from the diversity of the action or change; in which Henry thinks the same, Quodlibet VII, q. 16, although he differs from Durandus in that he does not posit this necessity in order to the power of God, as Durandus does, who in this erred gravely, as I showed in the aforesaid place, because God in acting does not depend on time nor on the other circumstances on which natural agents can depend, because they act through motion and transmutation. On account of which Aristotle said, Physics V, c. 4, that for the unity of motion the unity of time is required; which reason Toletus embraces, De generatione II, q. 13.

5. But the reason is difficult and does not seem to satisfy. First, because the numerical unity of the change is rather to be sought from the numerical unity of the term or form produced than conversely, as Aristotle taught in Physics V, in the same place; therefore, when the accidents produced are said to be diverse in number because the actions are diverse, a vicious circle is committed. Secondly, because, even if we grant that the actions are diverse, it does not follow that the forms will be diverse, because for the unity of action more things are required than the unity of the form produced, from the same Aristotle in the place cited; and otherwise the form does not have its unity and distinction from the action, but from elsewhere. Whence it happens that the same light in number produced by one lamp is preserved by another, which must necessarily come about through a diverse action. Thirdly, because of the actions themselves the question remains why it is necessary that according to the order of nature they be distinct in number; for what is said of the diversity of time does not satisfy; for either the discussion is of extrinsic time, which is considered in the motion of the heaven, and this seems to matter nothing to the intrinsic individuation or numerical distinction of actions; because from this time is taken only a certain extrinsic denomination of the things which are said to be in such a time; but numerical unity or distinction does not consist in an extrinsic denomination. Likewise, because the same action in number, even an indivisible one, can permanently endure and coexist with a prior and a posterior extrinsic time, as is evident of the action of illuminating, of seeing and the like. Or the discussion is of the time or duration intrinsic to the action itself and to the change by which it is produced; and then, since such duration in the thing is nothing other than the existence of the action itself, to say that these actions are distinct because they come about at diverse times is the same as if it were said that they are distinct because they have diverse durations and existences, which is the same thing or equally obscure; for this is what we are inquiring, why it is necessary that those durations, existences or entities of those actions be distinct, and not rather the same repeated again and again. Just as, when God reproduces the same form in number, it is certain that he can reproduce it by the same action in number by which he had first produced it; for this involves no repugnance, as was said more fully in the aforesaid place; therefore, in order that the action be distinct, or that it have a distinct intrinsic duration, it is not enough that it come about twice, or with a prior and posterior extrinsic time; therefore, in order that it may be shown that with respect to a natural agent these actions will necessarily be distinct, the reason must be sought from elsewhere.

6. Nor does the reason of those authors convince, namely, that, if the same action in number could be reproduced, successive things too could be reproduced, which seems plainly repugnant. For if this reason were valid, it would proceed also in order to the absolute power of God. Whence it seems necessarily to be said that in successive things there can be considered that which is real and positive, and that which is included in succession after the manner of negation or privation; for succession intrinsically expresses that something has been and now is not, and that something is to be but is not yet. As regards this negation or privation, then, the successive being cannot be restored, because in this way there is no power over the past. But as regards the positive, there seems to be no repugnance that, just as the same heat is reproduced by God, the same heating too be reproduced; and just as the same sitting and the same where, so consequently the same local motion. For all these express real positive modes, which have their individuation from themselves and do not depend on extrinsic time any more than other things, but on intrinsic duration; the reason, therefore, as regards this is the same of them as of the other things; therefore on the side of the action no sufficient reason can be given on account of which this is repugnant to natural agents.

7. Others, then, say that the cause and reason of this matter depends on another question, namely, whence the secondary cause is determined to effecting this effect in number here and now rather than another; for that same thing which is the cause of this determination must also be the cause why, whenever the secondary cause acts anew, it is determined to effecting a new effect distinct from all preceding ones; for from the mere power of the efficient cause, or from the mere capacity of the subject, no sufficient cause of this matter can be given, since both the power of the agent and the capacity of the subject itself are always the same and remain integral, and are of themselves equally indifferent to acting or receiving any individual whatever. Some, then, say in the aforesaid question that the whole cause and root of this determination is to be reduced to the divine will and predefinition. For God, seeing that this agent here and now is disposed to change this subject to such a form in species, and that of itself it is indifferent to this or that form in the individual, and cannot of itself choose or determine its action to this rather than that, by his will decreed to give his concurrence for producing such an individual in particular in this instant and in this subject; and because the secondary cause cannot act without the concurrence of God, it is consequently determined to acting here and now such an individual and not another. This manner of speaking I touched upon in passing in the place cited, and indicated that it did not please me, because the reason does not seem sufficiently philosophical, and because in free acts it has some difficulties; but now, the matter having been considered more attentively, I think it is very probable; both because I see that it pleases not only Gregory, In I, dist. 17, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7, and dist. 35, q. 1, a. 1, and other Nominalists, but also many most learned modern writers. For Toletus, Physics VIII, q. 3, concl. 2, third reason, gathers from this the freedom of the first cause, that by its will alone it determines secondary causes to individual effects. Fonseca too, Metaphysics I, c. 2, q. 3, sect. 8, says that in certain effects it is necessary to have recourse to the divine determination and predefinition, which he repeats in Book V, c. 2, q. 9, sect. 2, ninth reason, by which he proves the essential dependence of secondary causes on the first in acting; and the Copulata Conimbricensia teach the same, Physics II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 2. And also because it is not arbitrary nor beyond physical and natural reason that the first cause should help secondary causes and supply their defects in those things in which they themselves seem to fail; but in the present case there seems to be lacking to them a mode by which they could be determined to certain singular effects rather than to others. Of which matter again below, in disputing about causes. Now, then, according to that opinion it must consequently be said that God has determined his concurrence with secondary causes always to producing new and distinct effects, but not to producing again an effect which was before and has now ceased to be.

8. But it will deservedly be asked of the authors of this opinion whence it is evident that the first cause has determined its concurrence in this way; for either this was in some way due to the secondary causes themselves, or founded in their connatural mode of acting, or it is from the will of God alone, as is the determination of production to this individual rather than another. If this second is said, since such a will of God is not had by revelation, the matter will be altogether uncertain, since it can neither be shown by reason nor deduced from any natural principles. But if the first is said, then the primary and as it were ultimate reason of this determination is not from the divine will but from the nature of the proximate causes; and this is what we are inquiring, how this can be founded in the nature of the proximate cause; especially if the determination to producing this effect in number rather than another is not founded in it.

9. On account of this someone could say that secondary and finite causes contain in their power any singular effect only once (so to speak), and therefore that, after such a cause has once produced some effect, there does not remain in it the power to produce that effect again, nor to repeat the action by which it produced it, because by the first production its power is as it were exhausted, in so far as it can be terminated at such an effect in number. But this is said gratuitously and without proof, and cannot even be understood; for active power per se and as such does not operate through some diminution or change of itself, but through the change or production of another. Whence its efficacy remains as integral and perfect as if it had produced nothing; therefore by virtue of a production once made it does not remain powerless to make the same again and again, if from elsewhere there is no repugnance on the side of the effect itself. For by this reason any active power, however finite, can act successively to infinity, if it perseveres integral in its being; because it remains integral also in its efficacy, and on the side of the effect that succession or multiplication to infinity is not repugnant; therefore the same will hold as regards the reproduction of the same effect, if on its side there is no repugnance. Which I say for this reason, that after a thing has once been produced and remains in being, it cannot again be produced by the agent, although its active power remains integral, because on the side of the effect it is repugnant, at least from the nature of the thing. But that what is not should come to be cannot be repugnant on its side, even if it was before. For what can prevent it from coming to be again, if it now is not? Since it is now as distant from being as if it had never been. Therefore, if otherwise the active power remains integral, the reason of this necessity cannot be taken from its inefficacy.

10. It can finally be added, then, that natural agents, although of themselves they have a power as it were general and indifferent to several individuals of the same species, nevertheless of themselves postulate a certain mode and order in the use and exercise of such power, so that nature is determined to acting here and now in such a subject such an individual, and after that another, and after this another, and so of the rest; for nature itself seems to postulate this determination and order, lest it involve in itself a certain perplexity and confusion. Hence, then, it comes about that in acting it never returns to the same effect, but always produces a new one. Which manner of speaking I chose in the aforesaid place, because in an obscure and difficult matter nothing occurred which altogether satisfied, nor does anything now offer itself; indeed this very thing which is attributed to the nature of such agents does not seem able to be sufficiently founded or explained; for, since the natural power of acting is of itself simple and altogether the same, it does not appear how this natural determination can be founded in it, or whence it could be established. Nor can extrinsic circumstances as such help to this, as was shown above of time; and the reason is altogether the same of place, in so far as it expresses an extrinsic surface or a relationship to extrinsic bodies. It must be confessed, therefore, either that this depends on the divine will alone, or, if it has some natural cause, that it is hidden from us, and that at most it can be said that, since these natural powers are ordered to the multiplication of individuals and naturally intend it, it is more consonant with their natures that they always receive concurrence for new effects. For by this cause, not only in the will of God but in the very natures of things, it is founded that in the generations of men new souls are always produced, and that souls which have once been created and exist separated are not united again to bodies.