Disputationes metaphysicae

1. In this doubt there can be almost the same ways of speaking which were reported in the preceding section; yet, because the same doctrine which was given of substantial forms is to be applied proportionally to accidental ones, this matter can therefore be dispatched very briefly by adding a few things which are proper to accidents. We suppose, then, from what was said in sect. 2, that in accidental forms there are necessarily individual differences, which individual forms add to the specific notions, from which they are distinguished at least by reason; for the doctrine given there is general, and the reasons made proceed of all species and individuals. Whence it comes about that, speaking of the metaphysical principles constituting and distinguishing things, no question remains about the principle of individuation of the accident; for there is in them an individual difference, which in each is proper and contracts the species to the being of such an individual. It remains, then, only to inquire what the physical foundation and principle of this difference is, and in this sense we here investigate the principle of individuation of accidents, as we said of substances. And therefore we have no controversy in this place with Scotus, who thought this question was to be terminated by his haecceities (which are nothing other than individual differences); for we too admit those differences; yet we inquire further into the physical root of those differences.

2. Two opinions, then, can only be reported here. The former is that accidents are individuated through the subject. So St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 29, a. 1, and q. 39, a. 3, and Opusc. 29, at the end. But in Quodlibet VII, a. 19, he limits this opinion and says that it is true in the other accidents besides quantity, which he says is individuated not from the subject but from site, but the other accidents from the subject, at least from quantity. Whence he infers that, although an individual quantity can be preserved by God without a subject, whiteness or the other accidents cannot, which necessarily require a subject, at least quantity itself, in order to become individual. And hence St. Thomas often teaches that there cannot be two separated whitenesses distinct only in number, because they would not have that by which they would be distinguished, I, q. 50, a. 4, and q. 75, a. 7. And Capreolus teaches and defends the same, In I, dist. 44, a. 1, concl. 2. The foundations of this opinion are the same as those which were brought forward above to prove that the substantial form is individuated by signate matter. And it is confirmed, first, for the accident has its whole being in order to the subject; therefore it must have its individuation from the subject, for each thing must be individuated from the same principles from which it has being. Secondly, because, if accidents were not individuated by the subject, several accidents diverse only in number could be received in the same subject, because, notwithstanding the identity of the subject, they could have distinction among themselves; whence no reason for this repugnance could be assigned; but we see that the same subject cannot receive two whitenesses or two heats; the whole reason of this, therefore, is because they are individuated by the subject; and therefore, by the very fact that they are received in the same subject, they are one, and not two.

3. The opinion of others.—The second opinion is that each accidental form is physically individuated by itself, as it is such an entity in act or aptitude, and has no other intrinsic principle of individuation besides its entity. So it is taken from the opinion of Durandus treated above; and all the reasons which we adduced of the substantial form prove the same of the accidental form. And the sum is that each thing is one in number formally and intrinsically (as regards the foundation of the unity or negation which one expresses) through the very same thing through which it is actual being in the nature of things, or apt to be such; because every such being is singular, as was shown above; but every thing through its entity is intrinsically and formally such actual being; therefore through the same it is something singular and individual; therefore accidents too have this. And it is confirmed, because the subject cannot be the principle individuating accidents; therefore such a principle can only be the intrinsic entity of the accidents themselves. The antecedent is evident, because first of all the subject cannot be called the intrinsic principle of the individuation of the accident as intrinsically and per se composing the accident, because we are not now dealing with the composite of subject and accident, but with the accidental form itself, which it is evident is not intrinsically composed of the subject itself, nor is the subject in this way its intrinsic principle. Again, neither can the subject be called the principle individuating the accident as the term of the relationship or aptitude of such an accident to inform such a subject; first, because with respect to the same subject in number two accidents distinct only in number can have an aptitude for informing it; therefore those aptitudes cannot be distinguished in number from the subject; therefore from themselves. Secondly, this most of all presses of certain accidents which according to their relationship do not stop at the subject, but refer it, or in some way lead it to another, such as relations, acts, habits and the like; for, if the accident is said to be individuated by the subject because it naturally regards it, why will these accidents not rather be said to be individuated by the ultimate terms which they naturally regard, especially since from them according to their common notions they take their essential or specific notions? Thirdly, because it is said without foundation that this accident in number has a natural adaptation and relationship only to this subject; for, although perhaps through natural causes it can be made in that alone, nevertheless of itself it is apt to inform any subject capable of such an accident; just as conversely it can happen that this subject cannot naturally have anything but this whiteness or this quantity, and yet its capacity is not on that account to be understood as of itself so limited and determined to this accident that it is not of itself sufficient for receiving similar accidents. Finally this very thing can be persuaded by all the reasons which we made about the substantial form.

Resolution of the question

4. This controversy is to be settled and defined by the distinction indicated above. For we said that we can speak of the principle of individuation in two ways: first, in order to being and to the proper constitution of the thing according to itself. Secondly, in order to production, in so far as the agent is determined to producing a distinct individual, or to effecting one rather than another, and consequently in order to our knowledge, in so far as we can distinguish sensibly (so to speak) one from another. In the former consideration, then (which is most of all a priori, and most proper to this science), the latter opinion is true, teaching that accidents have their individuation and numerical distinction not from the subject but from their proper entities, as the reasons made both here and in the preceding section sufficiently prove, and as will be more fully evident from what is to be said in the solutions of the arguments. But in the latter consideration (which is more physical and a posteriori) accidents can be said to receive their individuation from the subject as from a root, or rather an occasion, of their multiplication and distinction. This, however, is to be understood not of the subject barely taken, but with other circumstances or conditions necessary for the action applied, as will be more conveniently explained in the solutions of the arguments.

5. The foundations, then, of the former opinion, in so far as they are the same as the reasons by which it is wont to be proved that matter signed by quantity is the principle of individuation, and can be repugnant to the former part of the opinion posited by us, have been sufficiently treated and dispatched in the preceding section. But the first confirmation only proves that the accident has its individuation in order to the subject and depends naturally on it, not that the individuation of the subject is the intrinsic principle of the individuation of the accident. But in the second confirmation and in the foundations of the latter opinion a common doubt is touched upon, which cannot be passed over in this place, yet demands its own proper question.