Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There have not been lacking those who have so affirmed, whose opinion Scotus reports, In II, dist. 3, q. 3; and Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 32; and Henry indicates it, Quodlibet II, q. 8; and Carthusianus attributes it to him and inclines to it, In II, dist. 3. But Fonseca, Book V, c. 6, q. 2, sect. 2, reports Henry, Quodlibet V, q. 8, as denying that individuation comes about through existence, or through anything intrinsic, but through the agent alone. But this, as it is improbable in itself, so it is asserted by no one, as far as I have seen; for, although the agent is the extrinsic cause of the individual, nevertheless what it effects is distinct from the agent itself; but it effects the individual and confers on it an individual nature; therefore that by which the nature is individual is something intrinsic to the individual itself. And so Henry, in the same place, expressly concedes that that through which the individual has it to be this is something besides matter and besides the agent, which he explains to be the notion or disposition of the supposit. Whence he seems to think that subsistence is the principle of individuation in all created substances; and so in the former place he had spoken with a distinction of existence or subsistence; and therefore it will be necessary to say something of each.

2. The opinion, then, about existence is rejected by all as altogether false and improbable; but one can proceed in it in two ways: first, supposing that existence is distinct from the nature of the thing from the essence of the individual; secondly, according to the opinion asserting that existence is nothing other than the actual entity of each thing. In this latter way this opinion in reality coincides with the opinion asserting that each thing is individuated by itself and needs no other principle of individuation besides its entity; whence in reality this opinion is not worthy of greater reproof than that of which we shall speak afterwards. It can only be reproved because it uses obscure and ambiguous terms, and because it attributes this notion of individuation to existence rather than to essence, since this cannot belong to existence except in so far as it is the same as essence. But if one proceeds in the former opinion, it will indeed be formally true that each thing in the notion of existent has some individual notion from existence itself, just as this white thing, as regards the formal notion of white, is constituted by whiteness, although simply this white thing, because it is taken for the subject, is not constituted by whiteness. Whence also in the matter proposed, speaking materially (so to speak) of the existing thing, or of this essence in number, it is improbable to say that it is individuated through the existence by which it exists, if this is a thing distinct from it or a mode diverse from the nature of the thing.

3. First indeed, because the essence, remaining within the breadth of essence, becomes individual, and in it the specific essence is contracted and determined; but the specific essence is not contracted through something distinct from itself from the nature of the thing, as was proved above; therefore it is not contracted to the individual essence through existence. The major is self-evident, both because man, for example, is of himself common to many individuals, whether they exist or do not exist; and also because Peter and Paul, as they abstract from actual existence, or as possible, intrinsically include their individual notions, by which they are distinguished; and finally because, just as specific or essential differences belong to species by a necessary connection, according to which propositions in which essential predicates are predicated are said to be of perpetual truth, so to the individual belongs its individual difference. Whence Peter is as necessarily this man as he is man, and Peter is as necessarily placed under man as man under animal; this contraction and subordination, therefore, does not come about through actual existence, which contingently comes to an essence fully constituted and individuated.

4. Secondly, here there has place the argument reported above from Cajetan, that a singular act supposes a singular potency, which principle we said is true in act and potency distinct from the nature of the thing, because then the potency is really supposed to the act in the order of nature, and is something one distinct from its act, and one not in thought but in reality, and therefore it cannot happen that it has unity formally and intrinsically from its act. But essence and existence are so compared according to the aforesaid opinion; therefore the essence, in the way in which it has per se an entity of essence distinct from existence and apt to be actuated by it, so also has its unity and individuation. Otherwise it would be necessary to understand that existence is the act of the specific and universal nature, which is quite absurd.

5. Thirdly, because in existence itself can be considered the common notion of human existence, for example, and the notion of this existence of Peter or Paul; therefore of existence itself it remains to be inquired through what it becomes this; for not from the essence, since according to this opinion it does not suppose it individual, but common; nor from some accident, as is self-evident and sufficiently proved above; from what, then? If you say that it becomes this by itself, why will you not say this with greater reason of the essence, since it is prior both in the order of nature and in perfection, and since it is in a certain way more absolute? For existence is the act of this essence; whence this existence will rather be this because it actuates this essence; just as in common too the existences of man and lion differ because they either follow upon or regard diverse essences, the aforesaid distinction being supposed. From which a new confirmation can be taken, because, just as human existence in common is outside the essence of man in common, so this existence of Peter is outside this individual essence of Peter; and just as in Peter and Paul there are two existences in number, so there are two humanities in number, having distinct individual entities of essence. Finally there is an argument a posteriori, because (that opinion being supposed) the same individual entity is preserved without its existence, or changes various existences, as the humanity of Christ in that opinion lacks its proper existence, and yet is individual and has an intrinsic principle of individuation; similarly the same entity in number of prime matter, as it changes forms, is said to change existences, and yet always remains the same in number.

6. From these things, however, it is easily understood what is to be thought of that opinion if it speaks not of proper existence but of subsistence. For either we speak formally of the supposit, or of the nature in the abstract, or in the concrete and formally of the individual as contained under such a species of substance, namely of this man. In the first way it is true that the supposit is individuated through this subsistence, because it is formally constituted through it; and by this reason in the Trinity there are three supposits, although there is one nature, because there are three subsistences; but the person of Christ is one in number, and one supposit in number, although it has a double nature, because it has only one subsistence in number; the supposit, therefore, as such is individuated through subsistence. Although of subsistence itself the question remains, through what it becomes this; for the notion of subsistence too, for example human, is common and specific; but in Peter it is this subsistence in number, or that; of which question the same must be said as of other substances or substantial modes, which we shall see below.

7. In the second way, that is, speaking of the integral substantial nature in the abstract, for example humanity, it is false and improbable that it is individuated through subsistence, as is evident a fortiori from all the arguments made about existence. For it is certain that subsistence is something distinct from the nature of the thing from the substantial nature, even taken individually. It is certain also that a nature of this kind can be preserved individual without its connatural subsistence, as it was preserved in Christ the Lord; therefore it cannot be intrinsically individuated through it. But if perhaps someone says that it is individuated at least through order to it, he will say this gratuitously and without foundation, because, if one is to be individuated through order to another, rather the subsistence is this through order to this nature than conversely, because the nature is prior and more perfect, but subsistence is only a certain mode and term of the nature. Likewise in the divine nature we find a single individual nature with a threefold subsistence; it is therefore a sign that the individuation of the nature is absolute from subsistence.

8. Wherefore in this Henry plainly seems to have erred, for he thinks of the nature itself that it becomes this and individual by reason of the supposit. About which he also teaches another thing altogether false and improbable, namely that the supposit adds over the specific nature only a double negation, of indivisibility in itself and of division from every other, and that through this double negation the nature becomes formally individual without any other positive thing superadded to the specific nature; in which three false things are contained. The first is that the supposit adds over the nature only a negation, of which we shall see afterwards in its place; for, speaking with respect to the individual nature, this is less improbable, although not true; yet with respect to the specific nature it is altogether improbable. Secondly, it is false that the individual nature adds over the specific only a negation, as is evidently evident from what was said in section 2, because otherwise the substantial individual nature as such would not be real being, but would be only the specific nature with negations, which cannot even be conceived by the mind. Likewise because that negation requires a positive foundation, which cannot be the specific nature alone, as was sufficiently shown there. But the third is more false, that through the very negations by which (according to Henry) the supposit is constituted, the nature becomes individual; for thence it follows either that the humanity of Christ is not individual, or that it is a supposit; but each is an error. The consequence is declared; for, since in that double negation it is said to be undivided in itself and divided from every other, either this being divided from every other signifies not being united to another, or not being in another, and this either is not of the notion of the individual substantial nature, or the humanity of Christ the Lord is not individual; or being divided from another (which Henry openly thinks) removes only identity and signifies distinction from every other entity or similar nature, and in this way that double negation does not suffice for the notion of supposit, or the humanity of Christ the Lord is a supposit; in no way, therefore, does subsistence, by whatever way its notion is explained, pertain to the individuation of the nature.

9. Rather, speaking also in the third way, in the concrete and formally of the individual of the specific nature, it must be said that it, speaking per se, does not take its individuation from subsistence, but from nature. For so the theologians say that, if three persons assumed one humanity, there would be one man in number, just as now they are one God in number on account of one divine nature; that man, therefore, would have numerical unity from the individual nature. And Christ the Lord now, in so far as he is this man, is the same man in number as he would be if he subsisted in his proper nature, although the person and subsistence are very diverse from that proper and connatural to such a humanity; therefore the individuation of this man is to be taken not from subsistence but from nature. But the reason is that the individual is formally constituted under the species by reason of the nature and not by reason of the subsistence; whence it comes about that, although it happens that the subsistence is diverse in species or genus, nevertheless, if the nature is of the same species, the individual is univocally and most properly contained under such a species; for which cause Christ is univocally man with other men; and by a similar reason, if the nature is the same in number, he is the same man in number even if the subsistence is diverse.

10. Conclusion of the whole question.—But I said speaking per se, because here the question insinuated itself whether with a double nature there can be the same individual in number on account of the unity of subsistence; for so it is disputed by the theologians whether, if the divine Word assumed two humanities, he would be one man or several. For from what has been said it seems to follow that there would be several men in number on account of several humanities in number, because it has been said that the individuation of the concrete is taken from the individual nature. Nevertheless, as I said in tom. 1 of the Third Part with St. Thomas, he would simply and in the common manner of speaking be called one man, not indeed per se and formally, but as it were materially by reason of the supposit, in the way in which he is called one craftsman who has several arts, distinct not only in number but also in species. But this unity is diverse from the preceding, which is taken from the unity of the nature, nor is it the unity of an individual formally contained under a species, as the argument proves; just as the unity of a craftsman having several arts distinct in species is not the unity of a species contained under a genus, but is a material or suppositional unity, which is judged to suffice for that manner of speaking, on account of the real or substantial union of several natures in one supposit, because the substantive noun signifies the nature after the manner of something standing per se, as was explained more fully in the said place. From all these things, then, it is sufficiently evident that the principle of individuation of the substantial nature, or of the individual constituted through it, is not rightly placed in subsistence or existence.