Disputationes metaphysicae

1. We omit the divine substance, since, as we have said, it is per se and essentially individual; whence there is no more reason to seek a principle of individuation in it than a principle of its essence or existence.

The sense of the question

2. In order that the sense of the question may be understood, it is to be taken from what was said in the preceding section that in substances of this kind a metaphysical composition can be considered, which according to reason is from the specific nature and the individual difference; for just as that which the species adds over the genus is, according to metaphysical consideration, a difference dividing or contracting the genus and constituting the species, so that which the individual adds over the species is rightly called a difference contracting the species and constituting and distinguishing the individuals, which are truly and properly said to differ in number; for on this account the species is said to be predicated of many differing in number. Likewise we have shown that this which the individual adds over the species, although it is distinct only by reason, is nevertheless real and positive, founding the negation or indivision proper to the individual, because of itself it is incommunicable and distinct from others, or incommunicable to other individuals; and therefore, adjoined to the species, it constitutes with it the individual per se one under such a species; nothing, therefore, is lacking to it for it to have the true notion of a difference. Whence some think that this is the principle of individuation to be assigned, and that no other is to be sought, as may be seen in Scotus, In II, dist. 2, q. 6; and Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, sect. 1. But the question is not disputed in this sense, nor is there truly a diversity of opinions about it among those who dispute about the principle of individuation. The sense of the question, then, is: what foundation or principle does that individual difference have in the thing itself? For these metaphysical predicates are wont to be taken from the real principles constituting the thing, in the way in which the genus is wont to be said to be taken from matter and the difference from form; and substantial denominations are sometimes taken from matter, as when man is called material, sometimes from form, as when he is called rational, sometimes from the whole composite nature, as when he is called man; in this manner, then, it is inquired in the present case what the principle of this individual difference is. From which declaration it is evident that extrinsic principles or causes of individuation, or rather of individuals, are not inquired into here, such as are the efficient and final cause; for these cause individuation in no other way than by causing the individual entity, or by giving the intrinsic principle of individuation itself; this, therefore, is what we inquire into. And although the question is general about all created substances, yet because material ones are better known to us, we shall speak of them first, and afterwards it will easily be evident what we can conjecture about spiritual ones. And since the opinions on this matter are various and demand a prolix examination, we shall treat them one by one.

3. There is, then, the celebrated opinion affirming that the principle of individuation is signate matter. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 50, a. 4; III, q. 77, a. 2; and In IV, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; and Opusc. 29; and De ente et essentia, c. 2, where Cajetan disputes and defends it at length; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, qq. 33 and 34; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 21, and others to be cited below. And this opinion is thought to be Aristotle’s; for in various places he judges that numerical distinction and identity are to be attributed to prime matter. Whence in Metaphysics V, c. 6, text 42, he says: and those things are one in number whose matter is one; and in Book VII, c. 8, text 28, he says: that the form in these fleshes and bones is Socrates and Callias; and c. 10, text 25: the singular (he says) from the ultimate matter is now Socrates; and from this principle, in Metaphysics XII, c. 8, text 49, he concludes that the first mover cannot be other than one in number, because it is without matter, thinking it necessary that things which agree in species and differ in number have matter and differ through matter. And similarly, in De Caelo I, c. 9, he proves that there cannot be another world, because this world embraces the whole matter of natural things. From these testimonies, then, it appears that this was Aristotle’s opinion, according to which it must consequently be said (as the aforesaid authors say) that in immaterial substances there is no positive principle of individuation nor a proper individual difference, but only a nature of itself incommunicable.

4. For the foundation of this opinion, if we look to reason, I find almost none which is not reduced to the authority of Aristotle, namely: because matter is the principle of the multiplication and distinction of individuals within the same species, as Aristotle testifies in the places cited; but that is the principle of individuation which is the principle of numerical distinction; therefore. Secondly, because that is individual which is incommunicable to similar inferiors; but matter is the first foundation of this incommunicability; for form, since it is act, is of itself communicable, but matter, since it is prime potency, is of itself incommunicable, and form is then limited and determined when it is restricted to this matter. Thirdly, because the individual is the first subject in the metaphysical coordination; for all superior things are predicated of it, and it itself of no others; therefore the first principle and foundation of the individual as such must be that which is the first subject among physical principles; but such is matter; therefore.

The reasons of the said opinion are weighed

5. But before we proceed further, these reasons, authority being set aside, are not of great moment. For to the first it can easily be answered by denying the major; for rather that is the principle of multiplication which is the principle of distinction; but the principle of distinction is not matter, but rather form, for, as is in the common proverb, it is act which distinguishes. Whence St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 40, proves professedly that matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things; and although he intends to speak chiefly of essential distinction, his reasons nevertheless seem to urge also of numerical distinction, especially what he says in the second reason, that form does not follow the disposition of matter as its first cause, but rather matter is so disposed that such a form follows. Likewise what he says in the same place, that those things which are reduced to matter as to their first cause are beyond the intention of the agent and happen by chance. If, therefore, matter were the first cause on account of which there is such an individual, the individual as such would happen by chance and beyond the intention of the agent. Likewise what he says in the same place in the fourth reason, that one matter needs something else distinct from itself in order to be distinguished from another matter; it is not, therefore, the first cause of distinction, as was assumed in the reason given. Wherefore, convinced by these and other reasons, many of the authors who follow the aforesaid opinion confess that, since two things are of the notion of the individual, namely to be incommunicable to inferiors and to be distinct from other individuals, matter is the principle of individuation as regards the first, but that as regards the second it is quantity, for it is quantity which distinguishes matters themselves; how truly and consistently this is said we shall examine afterwards; for now we shall only weigh the force of the said reasons. The first reason, however, proceeded only of individuation as regards the distinction of one from another, of which the aforesaid authors already confess that it does not arise from matter. I notice, however, that the arguments made do not convince of every distinction, for, as I shall say below, matter in its own way has that by which it distinguishes one from another, in so far as it itself has some entitative act; yet they prove that there is no reason why the first reason of the whole numerical distinction should be attributed to it rather than to some form.

6. The second reason proceeds of the first root of incommunicability, in which the notion of the individual first consists, as was declared above; for distinction from another is related rather consequently, according to what was said above of unity in common; whence, if that reason were efficacious, it would sufficiently prove that matter is the principle of individuation. But if anyone considers rightly, an open equivocation is committed in that discourse; for when matter is said to be the principle of the incommunicability of the individual because it is the first subject, of itself most incommunicable, either the word incommunicable is taken equivocally or something false is assumed in the proof. For matter can be understood to be incommunicable in many ways: first, that it is incommunicable to something as to a physical subject which it would inform or in which it would inhere; and this sense is most true, and it is rightly proved from this that matter is the first subject; this, however, is irrelevant to the matter with which we are dealing, both because it is not of the notion of the individual as such that it be incommunicable to another as to a subject, for accidents are individual, although they are communicated in this way, and substantial forms too; and also because that incommunicability does not suffice for the notion of the individual; for matter by virtue of its species is incommunicable in that way, and yet it is not individual by virtue of its species, but common to many matters differing in number; that incommunicability, therefore, is not the first root of individuation, even in matter itself; much less, therefore, will matter be able to be the first principle of the individuation of substance by reason of this incommunicability. In another way, then, matter can be called incommunicable, either after the manner of a cause, or after the manner of a part, or after the manner of a nature to a supposit, or after the manner of a superior to inferiors; and all these modes are false; for matter is communicated to form in the way in which it is its cause and sustains it. Likewise matter is communicated to the composite as a part to the whole and as a cause to its effect, which it causes in no other way than by intrinsically communicating its entity to it. Likewise matter as a part of the nature is communicated only to its proper supposit, if we speak naturally, but supernaturally also to another's, as may be seen in the humanity of Christ; but all these modes are nothing to the present point, as is self-evident. But the last mode (in which alone the terms assumed in the aforesaid reason would be taken univocally) is openly false, as is convinced by the reason given above, because matter as such, by virtue of its species, is communicable to many inferiors which can be subjected to it in order to predication, although they cannot be subjects of inherence. But if you say that matter as such is common, but signate matter, of which that opinion speaks, is incommunicable, against this is the fact that signate matter, whatever it may be, does not have its incommunicability from the notion of first subject, on which the said argument was founded; if, therefore, signate matter is incommunicable, it will be for another cause, which can be common to forms or other things, as we shall see in what follows. Wherefore for that incommunicability which is of the notion of the individual that notion of first subject is irrelevant; for both the angelic forms and God himself are incommunicable in that way, although they are altogether act and not potency. Whence, when it is said in the same place that form is of itself communicable, it is also beside the point; for form as form is communicable to matter as to a subject, not as to an inferior; and according to its specific notion it is communicable to distinct forms, and therefore according to that notion it is not individual; yet this form is as incommunicable as this matter; therefore as regards this there is no greater reason for one than for the other.

7. And from these things it is evident that the third conjecture has no efficacy, because the reason of the subject of inherence and of the subject of predication is far diverse; for although a certain proportion can be thought out between these two subjects, for the superior is compared to the inferior subject to it as a form giving being, nevertheless they are simply not of the same notion, nor is one founded in the other; whence in simple substances there is subjection or subordination of inferiors to superiors without a subject of inherence or information. Add that that which is the subject of predication is not of itself more imperfect than its superior predicate, as matter, which is the first subject, is inferior to form; and therefore it is not necessary that that which is the first subject in the order of generation and imperfection be the first principle and foundation of the individual, which is the first subject in the order of predication, containing in itself every perfection of the superiors and adding something proper by which it as it were completes and perfects it.

Many things are objected against the said opinion

8. But it must be seen, although this opinion cannot be convinced by reason, whether it can be fittingly defended and sustained; for this will be enough for us, that we defend it at least on account of the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas. And the first reason of difficulty about it can be that matter of itself is common, not only in so far as the same according to specific notion is common to many individuals of matter, but also because the same matter in number can underlie many forms, either distinct in species or diverse only in number, at least successively; how, then, can matter be the principle of individuation? For the principle of individuation must be most proper, and in no way common to many individuals, neither simultaneously nor successively. On account of this difficulty it has been added in that opinion that matter not in any way whatever, but signed by quantity, is the principle of individuation. But what is signified by that word is so obscure that in explaining this matter the defenders of this opinion disagree among themselves in a wonderful way. Whose various expositions it is necessary to report and examine, in order that it may more clearly appear how great the probability of this opinion is.

The first way of explaining signate matter is rejected

9. The first exposition is that matter signed by quantity is nothing other than matter with quantity, or affected by quantity; for they think that from these two this principle of individuation is as it were integrated, so that matter gives incommunicability, quantity distinction, as we were saying above. So Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 5, and a. 3, in the answers to the arguments against it. The same Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 21, and Soncinas, Book VII, q. 34. St. Thomas favours it, De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, where he explains that natural signate matter is matter with the determination of these or those dimensions; and De malo, q. 16, a. 1, ad 18, he says that matter subject to dimensions is the principle of numerical distinction in those things in which many individuals of one species are found; and on Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, he says that quantity distinguishes material things. And it seems founded on Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 3, text 11, where he thinks that specific distinction comes about through form, but numerical through quantity; and Book X, c. 3, text 4, he posits only these modes of division, namely according to form or according to quantity; and Metaphysics V, c. 13, he attributes to quantity that it is the principle of division; whence he says that that is quantified which can be divided into things of which each is apt by nature to be a this something; and Physics III, c. 7, text 78, he says that number arises from the division of the quantified continuum. But the reason can be that, in order that matter be the principle of individuation, something is necessary which distinguishes this matter from that; but this is not matter itself, because distinction must come about through act; nor is it the form, for rather this form is distinct from that because it is made and received in distinct matter.

10. But this opinion is false and can be attacked by weighty reasons. We can proceed, however, in two ways: first, supposing the other opinion which the aforesaid authors hold, that quantity is not in prime matter, but in the whole composite, and is destroyed when the substance is corrupted, and a new one is acquired at the generation of the substance. From which it comes about that, simply speaking, this form in number is first introduced into this matter and quantity follows. Whence the argument is made, because this form, when it is first understood to be received in this matter, is also understood to be received in matter distinct from others; therefore it is not formally and intrinsically made distinct through quantity. Likewise from matter and form precisely conceived and as preceding quantity this substantial individual results; therefore it as such is one, not by unity of reason, but by real, singular and transcendental unity; therefore, just as by virtue of its substantial entity it is undivided in itself, so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from all others; therefore it does not have distinction through quantity. Nor does it matter if you say that in the genus of material cause quantity is prior in matter. Both because in that opinion this cannot fittingly be said consistently, as is to be treated below; and also because at least it cannot be understood according to the true inherence of quantity in matter, because according to that principle quantity never inheres in matter in real duration, but in the composite; therefore neither can it belong to it in some prior sign, because what does not belong in reality and in real duration can belong neither prior nor posterior; but quantity does not make a thing divided or distinct from others except by inhering and informing; therefore in no sign does quantity have this effect first in matter, but in the whole composite; therefore it supposes it already individual, and consequently distinct by another prior division. And finally because for the force of the reason it is enough that in some genus of cause, which is simply prior, matter, as it precedes quantity, has distinction of itself. Finally the reason can be concluded thus: the form is received in matter bare of quantity; therefore this form in this matter, because generation comes about in the singular; therefore from them this individual results before the coming of quantity; indeed quantity comes to an individual already constituted, which God could preserve without quantity distinct from all others; therefore quantity does not intrinsically and formally enter the principle of individuation, either of the whole composite substance, or of its individual parts, namely form and matter.

11. Secondly, we can proceed in the other opinion, that quantity is in prime matter and remains the same in what is generated and what is corrupted; and then a no less efficacious argument is taken from elsewhere, because not only this matter according to itself, but also as affected by this quantity, can be under diverse forms, and consequently in individuals distinct in number; therefore it can no more be the principle of individuation than matter alone. It will perhaps be said that matter with indeterminate dimensions can be under diverse forms, and as such is not the principle of individuation, but that matter with these determinate dimensions is proper to this individual, and as such is the principle of individuation. But I inquire what these determinate dimensions add over quantity. For dimensions can be called indeterminate only because they do not express a certain term of length or breadth, etc., and in this way terminate quantity will only add certain terms of the dimensions; and this is not enough for the present point, because the same matter existing in this way under the same certain and determinate quantity can underlie distinct forms, as is evident in the same rod first green, afterwards dry, and similar cases. Otherwise that quantity can be called indeterminate which is not affected by certain dispositions, such as such rarity or density, or other qualities, by which matter is determined to this form rather than another. And in this sense it can be admitted that matter affected by quantity or dimensions so determined, that is, so proximately disposed, is so proper to this individual that it cannot be in another. Nevertheless the said authors neither can speak in this sense, nor would their opinion in it be true. The first is evident, because they themselves say that quantity from its proper notion and formal effect distinguishes one individual from another; therefore this does not belong to it by reason of other qualities or dispositions; otherwise not matter signed by quantity, but quantified matter signed by qualities, would have to be called the principle of individuation. The second is evident, because otherwise it follows that the accidents by which matter is disposed to the form are intrinsically included in the principle of the individuation of the substance; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is evident, because signate matter, according to this opinion, intrinsically and formally includes these accidents as inhering in it and determining it to such a form. But the minor is proved, first, because the individual of substance is per se one, directly placed under the species in the predicament of substance; it does not, therefore, intrinsically include accidents, although it intrinsically includes the principle of individuation. Secondly, because it has been shown above that the individual difference is not in reality distinct from the nature of the thing from the substantial nature, and so is the individual substance itself; therefore its intrinsic principle cannot be an accident, but substance.

12. And these reasons can proceed also in the other opinion, that quantity is not in prime matter but in the whole composite; because quantity is an accident; therefore, in whatever subject it is, it cannot intrinsically enter the constitution of the substantial individual; therefore it cannot effect its distinction. Whence, abstracting from those opinions, we can argue, thirdly: because, although a thing is prior in nature one in itself than distinct from others, nevertheless this latter follows intrinsically from the first without any positive addition which would be made to the thing itself which is one, but only through negation, by which, the other extreme being posited, it is true to say that this is not that. And so that same positive thing which founds unity as regards the first negation or indivision in itself founds consequently the later negation of distinction from another; in which sense it is wont to be said, and is most true, that a thing is distinguished from others through that through which it is constituted in itself, because it is distinguished through that by which it is. In almost which sense St. Thomas said, I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2, that each thing has unity in the same way in which it has being. And it is evident in specific unity, for the same difference which constitutes the species one in itself makes it distinct from the other species; whence what is the principle of such a difference is also the principle not only of unity but also of specific distinction; therefore similarly in individual unity that which is the principle of the individual as regards its constitution and its incommunicability or indivisibility in itself is also the principle of its distinction from others; and conversely, what is the principle of distinction must also be the principle of constitution. If, therefore, matter per se, and quantity being set aside, constitutes the individual incommunicable and one in itself, it also distinguishes it from others; or, if it cannot give distinction, neither can it give the incommunicability of individuation. And it is confirmed. For that is called incommunicable in this way which is so one in itself that it cannot be divided into many similar ones; but what is of this kind has precisely from this that, if others exist, it is distinguished from them. And the same argument can conversely be made of quantity, that, if it is what distinguishes the individuals of substance, it must also constitute them; or conversely, if it cannot constitute them, as is truer, because, since it is an accident, it is outside the whole breadth of substance, and rather supposes an individual subject, neither can it distinguish them.

13. Some answer that this reason rightly proves that quantity does not effect the first distinction between the individuals of substance, but does not prove that it does not effect some distinction, namely numerical and quantitative, which is enough for quantity as regards this part to be able to pertain intrinsically to the principle of individuation. But this answer labours in equivocation; for, if quantity does not cause the first distinction, but another, I ask which is that which it supposes, and which that which it causes; the former certainly can be no other than the entitative distinction by which this matter is not that, or this substance is not that. Both because no other prior distinction can be thought out; and also because this is most intrinsic to any entity whatever; for just as nothing can be conceived more intrinsic to each being than its entity, so no distinction or separation from another being is prior to that which is explained by this negation: This being is not that; on account of which it cannot be understood that one entity is distinguished from another entitatively, and primarily, through something other than itself.

14. Whence it also comes about (which is a new and sufficient argument against this whole opinion) that it does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity to distinguish entitatively one matter from another, or a part of matter from a part of matter, because, just as quantity supposes matter as its subject, so it supposes its individual entity, which by itself is entitatively distinct from another similar entity; therefore distinct quantities suppose distinct subjects in which they are received, and distinct parts of quantity suppose parts of the subject also entitatively distinct. For here too that argument of Cajetan has place, that a singular act supposes a singular potency, which is most true in act and potency really distinct. All the more because, since quantity is really distinct from the matter in which it is, it cannot make it really distinct from itself; therefore it supposes in it an entity which by itself can be distinguished from its quantity; therefore by the same it will be able to be distinguished from all others which are not itself; this, therefore, does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity. Which finally can be confirmed a posteriori; for, if God, quantity being separated, preserved the substance of the body of Peter, for example, the partial entities of matter which are in the hands, feet, head, etc., would always remain entitatively distinct, whether they remained united or not, because, although one entity can be conjoined to or separated from another, nevertheless that one should become another, or that both should coalesce into one indivisible, preserving their entity, is an open repugnance, because they would both be distinct and not be distinct.

15. The distinction, then, which quantity supposes in substance is entitative and substantial distinction; but this is what pertains per se to individual unity, of which we are treating; for through this the individual is understood to be distinct from all others, either under the same species, if it is compared with similar ones, or also under the genus, or under any common predicate whatever, if it is compared with all others; therefore, if quantity confers some distinction, that will be per accidens to the notion of the individual and supervening on it; quantity, therefore, will not by that reason pertain to the principle of individuation of which we are treating. Which is explained from the thing itself; for quantity, just as it gives substance quantitative unity, so it can only give either quantitative or situational distinction; of which the former consists only in this, that one substance is under diverse terms of quantity from another, and so is not continuous with it by the continuation proper to quantity; but the latter consists in this, that one substance is outside the site or place of another. Whence it is also preserved that quantity distinguishes as it constitutes; for first it makes substance extended in itself, united and quantitatively determined and having this corporeal bulk, but consequently it makes it fill local space; and similarly it primarily distinguishes quantitatively, and then situationally; but this whole distinction is outside the notion of the individual substance, and accidental to it, as quantity itself is.

16. Which indeed is self-evident in situational distinction, because it is very extrinsic and mutable, and however much the quantified thing changes its site, it remains the same in number; indeed by the power of God the same corporeal substance in number can be preserved either without quantity or with it without site, in the way in which the body of Christ is in the Eucharist. And similarly the same quantified thing can be constituted by the power of God with a double site, as I showed at length in treating of the mystery of the Eucharist;¹ and two distinct bodies can be placed in the same site, and it has often been done by God, as has been demonstrated in the matter of the resurrection.² This situational distinction, therefore, matters nothing to numerical unity and distinction. But of quantitative distinction the judgement is the same as of quantity itself and of the unity coming from it, which we showed above is accidental to the intrinsic and entitative unity of material substance; whence, although it naturally accompanies it after the manner of a property, nevertheless in the order of nature it supposes it, and is rather caused by it than causes it. And finally by absolute power the same material substance in number could be preserved without its quantity, and consequently retain its whole individual unity with substantial incommunicability and distinction without quantitative unity and distinction.

17. Wherefore Soncinas and Ferrariensis too finally confess that material substance does not have transcendental unity from quantity, but that it is nevertheless one in number through quantity. But it is wonderful that they so easily turn aside from the true sense of the question and use terms equivocally. For, as we have often admonished and all suppose, and they themselves (as I think) are not ignorant, when we treat here of numerical unity, we do not take number as it is a species of quantity, but as it can be found in any beings whatever, as St. Thomas notes, Opusc. 16, last chapter, where he says in this way that even immaterial substance is one in number; in which way also Aristotle, in Metaphysics V, distinguished one in number, in species, in genus and in proportion. This numerical unity, then, is transcendental in each thing, just as specific or formal unity is in its own way transcendental with respect to the common nature; therefore, if material substance has transcendental individual unity, and not through quantity, quantity does not intrinsically pertain to the principle of the individuation of substance. Add that, in the way in which substance is one in predicamental number through quantity, it is not only distinguished but also constituted and made undivided and incommunicable in itself quantitatively through the same quantity; for quantity could not make something one in its genus unless it also made it undivided, since the notion of one consists in this; if, therefore, they speak constantly and univocally of incommunicability and distinction of the same genus, they wrongly distribute these functions, attributing one to matter and another to quantity; but if they speak now of substantial incommunicability and afterwards of quantitative distinction, they do not persist in the true sense of the question and admit equivocation in the use of words.

The second way of expounding signate matter is rejected

18. The second exposition is that matter signed by quantity does not include quantity itself intrinsically, but as the term of the relationship of matter to it. For matter by its nature is capable of quantity, but as such it cannot be the complete principle of individuation, because it is indifferent to any quantity whatever, as to any form whatever; but through the action of the agent prior to generation it is determined so as to be capable of this quantity and not another, and as such it is said to be the principle of individuation. But by quantity we understand in this place not only mathematical quantity (so to speak), but physical, that is, affected by physical qualities and dispositions. So Cajetan explained this matter, De ente et essentia, c. 2, q. 5. Javellus follows, Metaphysics V, q. 15, and before them Giles, Quodlibet I, q. 5, a. 1. But this opinion displeased the same Cajetan, I, q. 29, a. 1, on account of the argument which I shall report below, and therefore he found another manner of speaking (if indeed it is another); for he says that not matter as it is in potency to this quantity, but as virtually pre-having this quantity, or as it is the root and foundation of this quantity, is the principle of individuation. Nevertheless I do not sufficiently understand what is signified by these words distinct from the former, because matter (especially in the opinion of Cajetan and the other Thomists) does not pre-have quantity in the genus of effective cause, but it is made by an extrinsic agent or results from the form; it can therefore pre-have it only in the genus of material cause; but this is nothing other than to have it in receptive potency, or (what is the same) to have potency to it; just as matter as pre-having form can be nothing other than matter as it is in potency to form, or rather as it is in receptive potency of form, because it pre-has it in no other way than in the genus of material cause; the same, therefore, holds in the present case for the same reason. All those words, then, matter as foundation, as root, as cause, come back to the same, because matter is not the foundation of quantity except materially and passively, nor is it the root except as first subject, nor the cause except material, which consists in the notion of receptive potency, from which the form is educed; therefore under all those words nothing else can underlie but the potency of matter itself. Wherefore both Cajetan’s own argument and those which we shall make proceed equally against this opinion, and therefore it is not necessary to treat it as diverse.

19. With these is also to be joined another, which says that signate matter is nothing other than matter ultimately disposed to this form, because it is not disposed except by quantity affected by such qualities. But this opinion can be affirmed in two ways: first, understanding that quantity and the other dispositions inhere and remain in matter, and simply precede in the order of nature the introduction of the form, and in this way disposed and signate matter can rightly be understood in relation to the form; yet in this way to posit signate matter as the principle of individuation is to fall into the former opinion of Capreolus, because this signate matter intrinsically includes quantity and accidents, which it is impossible to include in the principle of individuation, as we have shown. But if it is said that these dispositions, although they inhere in matter, are nevertheless not included in the individual intrinsically and formally, but are as it were required conditions, against this is the fact that thence the principle of individuation intrinsically and formally becomes only something common to many individuals, namely matter itself according to itself; but this is impossible, as we argued above. Whence this would not be to assign that which in itself and in truth is the principle of individuation, but at most that which can be a sign of individuation as regards us, or the occasion of the production of such an individual with respect to the agent, of which modes we shall speak afterwards. In another way, then, this opinion can be taught, supposing that quantity and the other dispositions are not in matter but in the composite, and that, as they make up the ultimate disposition, they follow the form; and in this sense it is the same for matter to be disposed as to have an order or determinate potency to this quantity with these dispositions; and in this way this manner of speaking coincides with the second exposition adduced.

20. This whole exposition, then, I judge to be false. And first of all it supposes in it that matter does not have quantity and other dispositions inhering in it, which, although it is probable, is perhaps not as probable as the contrary. Next, that opinion being supposed, Cajetan argues, in I, that the potency of matter for receiving quantity is in the genus of quantity, since potency and act are in the same genus, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics X; therefore neither can that potency to quantity intrinsically pertain to the principle of the individuation of substance; otherwise the individual of substance would not be per se one, for it would consist of things of diverse predicaments. This reason, however, taken by itself is not efficacious; for Javellus rightly answers that potency pertains to the genus of its primary act, to which it is per se primarily ordered, and from which it in its own way takes its species; but matter is not so a potency to quantity that it is per se primarily ordered to it, but to substantial form; and therefore it is not necessary that it pertain to the predicament of quantity. But what Fonseca urges in favour of Cajetan, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 4, that, although the potency of matter simply does not pertain to quantity, nevertheless as receptive of quantity it pertains to that predicament—this (I say) does not press, because that reduplication of matter as receptive of quantity does not add a real potency to matter itself, but only according to our mode of conceiving and speaking explains that potency through a relationship to a secondary term, which is quantity; and therefore it is not necessary that by that reason it pertain to the predicament of quantity. As regards, then, the force of the argument founded on that maxim, act and potency are in the same genus, the answer of Javellus is good, as we shall say more fully below in treating of the material cause of accidents.

21. Nevertheless from the same answer an efficacious argument is taken against this very opinion; for if the potency of matter regards substantial form prior to quantity, then also its potency is determined to this substantial form prior to this quantity; therefore it is not signed or determined to this form through potency to this quantity. The first consequence is evident, both because potency is determined to act in a mode proportioned to itself; if, therefore, the potency itself is substantial and does not regard accidental act except by means of substantial act, it is not determined except with the same relationship and proportion; and also because, according to the opinion of these authors, in the thing itself matter does not receive this quantity except by means of this form, and because it receives this form, therefore it receives this quantity; therefore similarly in potency its capacity is not determined to this quantity except in so far as it is determined to this form. And the same argument proceeds according to Cajetan’s other form of speaking of matter as pre-having quantity, because matter does not pre-have quantity except in so far as it pre-has the form upon which quantity follows; therefore neither does it pre-have this quantity with these dispositions except in so far as it pre-has this form, upon which this quantity and these dispositions follow; therefore it cannot be sealed to this form in this, that it pre-has this quantity. Finally the same form of arguing proceeds against the other expression about matter disposed with the ultimate disposition, because matter is not determined to such an ultimate disposition except by means of the form; for we suppose that it is not received in it, but in the composite; therefore matter cannot be sealed either through a relationship to such a disposition, or through the disposition itself as actually received, because in either way the determination of this matter to this form simply precedes, both according to relationship and according to actual reception. This reason, however, proceeds of the ultimate disposition, which is in the instant of generation and follows the form. But if anyone contends that matter is sealed through the dispositions immediately preceding, one must proceed by another way.

22. Whence I argue, secondly and principally, against this whole exposition,³ because matter of itself is indifferent to this quantity and these dispositions, and to others; but in the instant of generation (according to this opinion), prior in nature to receiving the substantial form, it is left bare of every accident, and without any entity superadded to it; therefore it remains as indifferent as it exists of itself; therefore its potency is not determined to this quantity, because it cannot be understood that a potency of itself indifferent is determined without any addition or change made in it; therefore through such a potency so undetermined it is not sealed. The major is self-evident from the nature of matter. The minor too is self-evident in the principles of this opinion which we are attacking, because before the substantial form nothing else substantial can be pre-understood as added to matter; for what would it be, or by what would it be made, or on what foundation, or for what would it be posited? Nor anything accidental, because no accident precedes in matter before the substantial form, and in every opinion no accident precedes in matter before quantity itself. Some say that in that instant there is added to matter a certain real mode, distinct from the nature of the thing from matter, prior to the introduction of the substantial form with its quantity and other dispositions, and that through this mode matter is sealed; and some call that mode substantial, others accidental. But both speak gratuitously, nor can they explain or give a reason for what they say, which is foreign to the true method of philosophizing. For, first, I inquire for what this mode exists. They will say: in order that matter be determined to this form. On the contrary, matter itself is indifferent to this mode and to infinite others; through what, then, is matter determined to receive this mode in that instant rather than another? For if you say it is determined through another mode, we shall proceed to infinity; but if you say it is determined through the immediately preceding dispositions, it will better be said that matter is immediately determined to the form, and so this mode is superfluous. Besides, the arguments by which we shall immediately show that matter cannot be determined to the form through preceding dispositions prove in the same way that it cannot be determined through them to receiving such a mode. But if finally it is said that matter, without any prior determination, receives this mode by virtue of the agent, why will the same not be said of the form? This mode, therefore, is interposed without reason or foundation.

23. Secondly I shall inquire when and by what this mode is made; for either it is made little by little while matter is disposed, or it is made in one instant, either prior to generation or in the very instant of generation. But none of these can fittingly be understood or explained; for if it is said to be made successively and little by little with the dispositions, it will be intensible as they are; it will therefore be some accident, and therefore it will be corrupted in the instant of generation. Likewise on this side the principle of individuation will be intensible and remissible; matter will also be sealed in itself and modified to the form prior in time to receiving it. And consequently, since this mode is immediately repugnant to another mode of determination which matter has with respect to the form under which it exists, it follows that matter also loses it little by little; and by the same reason it could be inferred that it loses little by little and successively its union with such a form; all of which are absurd and improbable. And the same things follow more openly if this mode is posited to be made all at once in some instant before the instant of generation; for then matter would be at the same time under one form and ultimately sealed to another; besides that no reason can be given why it should be made in one instant rather than in another, speaking of those in which matter is not apt to receive the form. But if it is said to be made at the same time in the instant of generation, it follows that matter is left bare prior in nature to receiving such a mode, and consequently that nothing resists the agent so that it may not act on it as much as it can; therefore, just as it is said to act immediately such a mode, much better will it be said to act immediately its form.

24. Thirdly, I shall inquire what this mode is. For it is not substantial, first, because, since it is neither nature nor part of nature, neither subsistence nor existence, it cannot be conceived what it is. Next, either it is altogether absolute, even according to transcendental relation, and this will not be said consistently, both because through it matter is said to be determined to this form or quantity, and also because through it matter is said to be sealed; if, therefore, it is altogether absolute, signate matter will be something altogether absolute from quantity and from order to quantity, which is against the aforesaid opinion. And almost the same argument will be made if that mode is posited with some transcendental relationship; for, in order that the mode be substantial, it is necessary that the primary term of that relationship be the substantial form, and not quantity; and so also order to quantity will in no way pertain to the principle of individuation. But if that mode is posited as accidental, it cannot be explained what it is, or to what predicament it is to be reduced; it is also repugnant to that opinion that accidents are not in prime matter; it also follows that the principle of individuation is a being per accidens compounded of substance and accident, and that the individual adds over the species an accidental mode distinct from the nature of the thing from substance, which is altogether false.

25. Wherefore others answer that the potency of matter in that instant is determined to this quantity by the agent itself without any thing or intrinsic mode superadded to it. But this involves an open repugnance; for either the discussion is of the agent as pre-understood in first act before its action, and in this way it is impossible that through it the intrinsic potency and capacity of matter be determined, since they are altogether distinct things, and one as such does not actually change the other. Whence, if in that instant that agent were annihilated before it acted on the matter, and another were applied, it would induce into the same a distinct form proportioned to itself. But if the discussion is of the agent in second act, or of its action, it implies a contradiction to understand that the agent through its action determines matter and posits nothing intrinsic in it to determine it, because such an action of the agent is in the patient, in which it necessarily has some term.

26. It can be answered that the agent determines matter through its action, not that which it has in the instant of generation, but that which it had immediately before that instant. Which answer coincides with that opinion which says that the dispositions which immediately preceded leave the potency of matter determined, even if they leave nothing real in it. Which indeed cannot be understood of intrinsic and positive determination, on account of the argument given, that the capacity of matter is of itself universal and indifferent; therefore it cannot be intrinsically limited unless something is added to it, or it is in some way changed in itself; but nothing of this kind happens in it; but that relationship to the preceding dispositions is only a certain relation of reason, or an extrinsic determination. And it is confirmed; for if the preceding dispositions determine matter, it is either effectively or formally; for those accidents can have no other genus of causality in matter; for, although in comparison with the form they are said to concur materially, nevertheless with respect to matter not at all, because they are compared to it not as potency but as act; therefore they can only determine it formally or effectively. But not formally, because a form which is not has no real formal effect; whence, just as matter in that instant lost those accidental forms, it lost all their formal effects. Nor effectively, both for the same reason, because what is not does not effect, and also because matter receives nothing before the form, as has been shown; in no way, then, can the potency of matter be understood as intrinsically determined to this quantity, so that in this way it could be the principle of individuation. And this whole discourse can be applied against Cajetan’s later manner of speaking, because matter of itself no more pre-has this quantity than another, nor is it more the root of this than of another; I inquire, then, through what it is determined so that in that instant of generation it pre-has this quantity more than another, or is the root of this rather than another, and the whole argument made returns. Which also proceeds in the same way against the other mode of explaining signate matter, that it is matter disposed through preceding dispositions (for of subsequent ones enough has already been said in the first reason and in the arguments made against the opinion of Capreolus); for those dispositions leave nothing in matter, since they themselves are altogether corrupted, as is supposed; therefore they cannot leave it intrinsically and positively disposed, as is convinced by the arguments made; for whether you say disposed or determined, it is the same; for the same thing underlies these words.

27. But I always say intrinsically and positively, because negatively, by virtue of the preceding dispositions, matter is left not repugnant to the introduction of this form, which is rather to remain indifferent than determined. Again, extrinsically it can be said to be here and now naturally determined to receiving this form, because perhaps by a certain natural consecution this agent here and now about this subject, immediately after this alteration, is determined in natural order to introducing this form. But this in truth is rather a determination of the agent than of matter, and therefore this determination cannot make matter the intrinsic principle of individuation, but pertains to the extrinsic principle, which is on the side of the agent. All the more because, even according to this mode of determination, the agent is understood to be determined to introducing this form prior to this quantity and the other dispositions; for it induces this form per se, but this quantity and dispositions in so far as they result from this form, according to the opinion which we are pursuing. Whence finally a general argument can be made, because matter is not disposed nor determined per se primarily except to this form and on account of this form, and by reason of it receives these accidents; and therefore, according to itself and in the order of nature, the form cannot be this on account of these accidents, nor on account of order to them, and consequently not through matter signed through order to some accidents; therefore signate matter explained in that way cannot be the principle of individuation.

The third exposition of the same opinion about signate matter

28. The third explanation is that we can speak of the principle of individuation in two ways: first according to itself, that is, in so far as it is truly the principle constituting the individual as such, and is the root or foundation from which the individual difference is taken. Secondly we can speak of the principle of individuation in order to the production or multiplication of individuals, which is to inquire what is the principle and root on account of which substantial individuals are multiplied, or why this individual rather than another is produced, or why it is produced distinct from the rest. Again, in each consideration can be inquired that which is the principle of individuation per se and in itself, or only that which in order to us is the principle of distinguishing one individual from another, or which is only the occasion of such a distinction. First, then, speaking of the principle constituting the individual in the thing, and from which the individual difference contracting the species and constituting the individual is truly taken, this opinion denies that matter signed by quantity is the principle of individuation, because the discourses made seem to conclude this.

29. Secondly this opinion says that matter is the principle and root of the multiplication of individuals in material substances. It is proved, because it is the origin of generations and corruptions, through which the multiplication of individuals comes about. Likewise, because the composite from such matter is corruptible by reason of it, and thence has that it cannot be perpetually preserved; and therefore, in order that the species be preserved, the multiplication of individuals is required; the root of this multiplication, therefore, is matter. And it can also be added that this root is matter affected by quantity, because matter without quantity would not be capable of physical alteration and change through various and contrary dispositions, from which this variety and multiplication of individuals arises. But this function does not belong to matter as signed and determined to a certain form or quantity, but absolutely according to itself, because hitherto we have not dealt with the root of this individual in particular, but absolutely with the root of the multiplication of individuals in the same species; but matter is not the root of this multiplication absolutely in so far as it is determined to one form or quantity, but rather in so far as it is determinable to several. You will say: in this way matter will also be called the root of the multiplication of species in generable and corruptible substances; for they can be multiplied from the same matter because it is capable of all forms and according to itself indifferent to them and to their various dispositions. The answer is that the reason is not similar; for, although that property of matter is necessary for the aforesaid multiplication, it is nevertheless not properly the first root of that variety, both because, since the whole matter itself is of one species and its parts or portions according to themselves are distinguished only in number, as far as depends on itself it is content with forms distinct in number; and also because specific distinction is per se in things, and therefore radically comes from the form, which per se gives the species; and therefore this distinction without controversy is found in material and immaterial, corruptible and incorruptible things, which is not evident of numerical distinction, nor does it appear so necessary.

30. Thirdly this opinion says that matter signed by quantity is the principle and root, or at least the occasion, of the production of this individual distinct from the rest. It is declared, for this individual can be compared either to the other existing individuals, or to other possible ones, which can be produced from the same matter, even by the same agent. In the former way the sufficient and first reason why this individual is produced distinct from the rest is because it is produced from matter diverse in number, because, since the same form in number cannot be in total matters diverse in number, by the very fact that the matter is diverse in number, it is necessary that the form at least be diverse in number; whence for this distinction it is not necessary to adjoin other dispositions or another signation of matter, because the numerical distinction of matter according to itself, or with its quantity, suffices; which nevertheless does not suffice for this matter to be the root of the distinction of this individual from the rest which do not exist, or which have been made or can be made from the same matter. Whence some have said that Aristotle did not assign a principle of individuation by which the individual is distinguished from all the things which do not exist, because these are sufficiently distinguished by contradiction alone; but that he assigned only a principle distinguishing in the aforesaid way one individual from other existing ones; which Fonseca taught, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 4, sect. 4; and he reports it from Hervaeus, Quodlibet V, q. 9; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 2, q. 5. But it is to be added that through matter considered in the aforesaid way the individual is distinguished not only from other existing ones, but also from any other possible ones, even non-existing, which can be generated from other matters distinct in number, especially in those whose forms are educed from matter, because it is very probable that the same form in number cannot be educed, not only simultaneously but not even successively, from matters diverse in number. But in individuals which can be generated from the same matter in number, the distinction of one existing individual from another existing one has no place, because several individuals consisting of the same matter in number cannot exist at the same time; and therefore such distinction is always of an existing thing from a non-existing one.

31. But although this contradictory opposition is a sufficient argument of the distinction of such individuals, the principle and root can still be investigated why they are so distinguished that, one existing, the other does not exist; or why in this matter this form in number rather than another which could be made is introduced. For the cause of this cannot be given from prime matter alone, since the same is successively in each individual, which is perhaps true also of the quantity coeval with matter itself. Other dispositions and circumstances of the action, therefore, must be adjoined, namely that from this subject so prepared and disposed at this time by this agent this action is done; for thus it comes about that, although the prime or remote matter is the same, nevertheless from it this individual is made distinct from all others which have been made or can be made from it, because the production takes place with diverse dispositions and circumstances. And this is confirmed and declared; for fire, for example, is of itself able to produce several forms similar to itself in species and distinct in number, and yet here and now in this matter it introduces this form in number rather than others, which determination cannot come from the fire itself, since it is a natural agent and of itself equally able to introduce any form whatever; nor can it come from the form to be educed, because it does not yet exist, nor has it whence it would determine the power of the agent; nor does it come from remote matter, because that too is of itself equally indifferent; therefore it comes either from the dispositions, if they remain in matter, or from the natural order of acting here and now with these circumstances; for another natural cause cannot easily be thought out. For what some think, that this is to be reduced to the divine will, although it holds true in those effects which are made immediately by God himself, nevertheless to attribute this to all natural causes does not seem philosophical, and in theology it has a special difficulty on account of the determination of free acts, and especially evil ones, which we shall touch on below in treating of the concurrence of God with secondary causes. In this way, then, matter signed and affected by these circumstances is the principle or occasion of such individuation, because neither does matter suffice without the circumstances, as has been said, nor the circumstances without the matter; for if this is diverse, the effect too will be diverse.

32. You will say: therefore the same matter will be the intrinsic principle constituting the individual in its being; for as a thing is related to becoming, so also to being. The answer is by denying the consequence, both because it is one thing for this thing to be such an individual, another for this individual rather than another to be now produced, and therefore these can come from diverse roots; and also because, according to this explanation, signate matter is not so much the principle of individuation as the occasion of inducing this form in the subject rather than another; but that form is not this because it is made in this subject, at this time and by this agent, because these are accidental to it according to itself, and the same in number could be made by God without these circumstances; and, speaking of the dispositions, rather they are ordered to such a form than conversely; signate matter, therefore, can only in the said way be the occasion why this form is produced by a natural agent from the natural order by which the power of a natural agent is determined to effecting such an effect rather than another in such a subject applied and affected by such circumstances.

33. Fourthly this opinion adds that matter signed by sensible quantity is called the principle of individuation as regards us, because through it we know the distinction of material individuals among themselves. So St. Thomas, Opusc. 32, De natura materiae et dimensionibus indeterminatis, c. 3, says that from this prime matter and this form the individual of substance comes about, yet that it is not demonstrable here and now without determinate dimensions; and therefore (he says) matter under certain dimensions is called the cause of individuation, not because the dimensions cause the individual, since an accident does not cause its subject, but because through certain dimensions the individual is shown here and now, as through a proper and inseparable sign of the individual; and he indicates the same in Opusc. 29, De principio individuationis. Whence, when in other places St. Thomas indicates that the individual adds accidents over the specific nature, as I, q. 3, and Quodlibet II, a. 4, and De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, and in other places cited above, he seems to have to be expounded in order to our knowledge. For that is the sign by which we a posteriori distinguish one individual from another, not that by which it is distinguished in itself, as St. Thomas himself seems to have explained in the other places or opuscula cited, and to have proved by an excellent reason, namely, because an accident does not cause its subject; especially since the same St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, and De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, ad 8, says that substance is individuated by itself and by its proper principles, but accidents are individuated by substance; therefore, when in other places he places accidents, or order to accidents, among those things which individuate substance, he must necessarily be expounded either as regards our knowledge, or as regards the occasion which they afford to the production of such an individual of substance, as has been declared. This, however, is attributed to matter by reason of quantity rather than by reason of qualities, because the numerical distinction of qualities themselves too is most of all known to us from quantity; for if two images are very similar among themselves, we distinguish them in no other way than by numbering them in diverse quantified subjects. And in the same sense it seems it must be understood that quantities themselves are distinguished in number from sites; for this is true as regards us; for we sensibly distinguish and number them because we see them in diverse sites; yet it is not true according to itself; for rather quantities occupy diverse sites because they are distinct in themselves; it is only, then, because quantity by its nature has this, that it constitutes part outside part and body outside body in order to site, and a more apt principle for distinguishing material individuals in order to us is lacking.

Resolution of the question

34. This whole opinion is indeed probable in itself, and at one time it pleased me; I fear, however, whether according to it the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas is sufficiently explained; both because otherwise they would have handed down to us the principle of individuation very deficiently and with great equivocation, if, omitting that which truly and in itself is the principle constituting the individual, they had handed down to us only either signs a posteriori or occasions of distinguishing or producing individuals; and most of all because from this principle they seem to have inferred that in things separated from matter there are not several individuals, because there is not a principle of individuation of this kind. That too which in that opinion was said about the determination of agents to particular effects and forms from matter with the circumstances of the action seems to many learned men difficult to believe, because, if the matter is attentively considered, all things are reduced to the circumstance of time, which seems very extrinsic for this determination to be able to come from it. But of this last point I shall speak more conveniently in the following section. Of the other point truly pertaining to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas: as regards St. Thomas, it is evident that that exposition is founded on other places and words of his which cannot be reconciled otherwise. But as regards Aristotle, he does not seem ever to have professedly and metaphysically investigated and declared this principle, but only to have taught in a physical manner from sensible things how to distinguish one material individual from another. But what the said authors inferred thence, that in immaterial substances there is no multiplication of individuals in the same species, can at most have this probable sense, namely that we do not have reasons and principles for distinguishing spiritual substances distinct in number, which we have in material ones; indeed many extend this also to incorruptible material substances, in which too we do not have as many principles for knowing or positing numerical distinction in them as we have in corruptible substances, of which most of all all the things which have been said proceed. Finally, what Aristotle said in De Caelo I, that there cannot be another world besides this because in this is the whole matter, he certainly seems to have understood either that God created the world from matter and could not create matter itself; or that God acts from necessity of nature, and therefore could not create more matter than he created; or certainly that God is so determined in his mode of acting that he can make no integral and material substance from nothing in time, as we shall see in the course of this work. And so from that opinion it is only gathered for the present, from the mind of Aristotle, that material substances are not multiplied except from matter. But whatever may be the case with the mind of these authors, it is evident from this opinion so declared that the proper and internal principle of the individual difference, even in material things, has not been handed down to us. For the arguments made against this opinion expounded in other ways plainly conclude that signate matter cannot be a principle of this kind.