Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting can be, first, that the divine nature is really existing, and yet is not singular and individual, since according to faith it is communicable to many. Secondly, each angel is an existing thing, and yet does not have this numerical and individual unity, but precisely essential unity, such as is understood by us to be in man as such; therefore. The minor is proved, because this individual unity is understood to add something over formal or essential unity, by reason of which the essential notion can be contracted and consequently divided into several individuals; but in the angel there is not this addition, but in it there is the whole essence as it were prescinded and abstracted, for which reason it cannot be multiplied according to number; just as, if man as he is abstractly conceived existed in that way, he could not be multiplied. Thirdly, man in the thing itself exists in Peter and in Paul, and as such is not something individual and singular; therefore not whatever exists in the nature of things has this unity. On the contrary is what Aristotle very often teaches against Plato, that whatever is in things is individual and singular.

2. It is to be supposed that individual or singular being is opposed to common or universal being not only relatively, in so far as according to the comparison of the mind or dialectical consideration the individual is subjected to the species; for this neither belongs to every individual nature, as is evident in the divine, nor pertains to the present consideration; it is opposed, therefore, as it were privatively, almost in the way in which unity is opposed to multitude. For that is called common or universal which according to some one notion is communicated to many or is found in many; but that is called one in number, or singular and individual, which is so one being that, according to that notion of being by which it is called one, it is not communicable to many, as to inferiors and subjects of it, or to things which in that notion are many; for these fall into the same, and were signified by Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 3, text 14, saying: We expound the singular as that which is one in number, but the universal as that which is in these. And they are explained by an example; for humanity as such in its objective concept does not express something singular and individual, because that concept of itself is common to many humanities, which are really many and in which the very notion of humanity is multiplied. Whence it comes about that according to reason the notion of humanity is superior and common to many as to inferiors; but this humanity, for example that of Christ, is individual and singular, because that whole notion or objective concept of this humanity cannot be common to many which under that notion are many, that is, to many humanities; but that this humanity is communicable to the divine Word, for example, or also to several supposits, is not against its singular and individual unity, because it is not communicated to them as a superior to inferiors, but as a form to a supposit or supposits, in which according to its proper notion it is neither multiplied nor divided. Through this negation of communicability or division, then, this singular and individual unity is completed.

3. Which is further confirmed and explained thus; for just as the notion of one in common is completed through the negation of division, as was explained with Aristotle, so the notion of such a one, namely singular and individual, is also to be completed by a negation; both because there is no greater reason in one than in the other, and also because more and less common notions must keep a proportion, so that, just as the difference per se and in the same order contracts the genus, so universally the determination is related to the determinable, so that they are per se subordinated, as happens in the present case. But no other negation of division or divisibility can be thought out which completes the notion of individual and singular entity except that which has been explained by us, namely, that the entity be such that its whole notion is not communicable to many similar entities, or (what is the same) that it be not divisible into several entities such as it itself is. For by this reason man as such is not a singular entity, because he is divisible into several in which the whole notion of man is found; but conversely this two-foot quantity is individual, because, although it is divisible, it is nevertheless not divisible into several of which each is such as the whole divided was; and so that is a division of a whole into parts, not of a common thing into particulars. You will say: this notion of individual is common to multitude and to being per accidens, because even a heap of stones is such that it is not communicable to many nor divisible into several such as it itself is, and any number taken in particular has the same; indeed even some species or genus, for example man or animal, is not divisible into several which are such as the divided thing itself is. The answer is by conceding that all those things which participate that negation are, as regards that, individual and singular, as this heap of stones in that notion is singular and individual, and similarly this two or three is a certain individual of such a species of number, and this genus or this species under the notion of genus or species is one individual; yet these only according to reason, but those only in the notion of being per accidens or of number or multitude participate that unity. Wherefore, in order that the aforesaid negation or indivision be accommodated to being and one per se (of which we are treating), it is to be taken as adjoined to entity per se; for the notion of unity, as we said above, does not consist in indivision alone, but in undivided entity. The notion of individual and singular unity per se, therefore, will consist in an entity by its nature per se one and in the aforesaid way undivided or incommunicable. You will say: at least this water will not be singular, because it is divisible into several in which the whole notion of water is found. The answer is that it is not divisible into several which are this water which is divided, but which are water; and therefore this water is singular, but water common.

Resolution of the question

4. The notion of the individual or singular being thus explained, then, it must be said that all things which are actual beings, or which exist or can exist immediately, are singular and individual. I say immediately, in order to exclude the common notions of beings, which as such cannot immediately exist nor have actual entity except in singular and individual entities, which being taken away it is impossible for anything real to remain, as Aristotle said of first substances in the Categories, chapter on Substance. And the assertion so explained is self-evident, which Aristotle proves against Plato, Metaphysics I, c. 6, and Book VII, texts 26 and 27, and often elsewhere. Although many think that Aristotle interpreted Plato’s opinion about the ideas perversely, because he either posited them in the divine mind, or certainly separated from individuals not in reality but only by formal reason; but this matters little to us, and we shall touch on it again in the following disputation. Now the assertion is proved, because whatever exists has a certain and determinate entity; but every such entity necessarily has a negation adjoined; therefore also singularity and individual unity. The minor is evident, because every entity, by the very fact that it is a determinate entity, cannot be divided from itself; therefore neither can it be divided into several which are such as it itself is; otherwise that whole entity would be in each, and consequently, as it is in one, it would be divided from itself as it is in another, which involves a manifest repugnance. Every entity, therefore, by the very fact that it is one entity in the nature of things, is necessarily one in the aforesaid way, and therefore singular and individual.

5. Which reason concludes also that even by absolute power it cannot be understood that a real entity, as it exists in the thing itself, is not singular and individual, because it implies a contradiction to be an entity and to be divisible into several entities which are such as it itself is. Otherwise it could at the same time be one and several entitatively, or according to the same real entity, which involves a contradiction. And this reason also convinces that universals cannot be separated from singulars, because, if universal man existed outside Peter and Paul, etc., either he would also be in Peter and Paul, or he would remain altogether separated outside them; if this latter is said, then man as such would be a certain singular thing co-divided from Peter and Paul; he was therefore falsely called universal. And moreover it follows that neither Peter nor Paul are men, because, in order that an essential predicate belong to something, it is necessary that it be not separated from it. For how will it truly be able to be said of him if it is not in him? Or how can it be understood to constitute essentially one in whom it is not? But if it is in Peter and Paul, either it is altogether the same really and entitatively in both, and so Peter and Paul will not be two men, but one; or it is distinct according to the thing and entity in each of them, and so that universal and separated man would either be a certain third co-distinct from Peter and Paul, and so he would falsely be said to be in them and to be universal, because he would be only a certain singular distinct from the others; or certainly, if the very same were in one and in the other, it would be necessary that he be both distinct from himself and one and several really according to the same essence as existing in the thing, which are openly repugnant. By this reason, then, it is necessary that every thing, as it exists in reality, be singular and individual.

Answers to the arguments

6. To the first: there are not lacking theologians¹ who say that the divine essence is neither singular nor universal. But this is false, for those two include an immediate contradiction; whence it is impossible that one of them not belong to any being whatever. Moreover the divine nature is so one in itself that it cannot be multiplied or divided into several similar ones; it is therefore one individual and singular nature, by reason of which God is so one in number that he can in no way be multiplied. The divine nature, therefore, has individual and singular unity, to which it is not repugnant that that nature be communicable to three persons, because it is communicated to them not as a universal to particulars, nor as a superior to inferiors, but as a form or nature to supposits, in which it itself is divided neither by them nor from itself, because it is whole in each and in all together, altogether undistinguished from them; but of this elsewhere.

7. To the second: some Thomists (as I touched upon on the Third Part of St. Thomas, q. 4, a. 4) think that spiritual natures exist abstracted in the specific essence and perfection alone, as it were, without their own individual contraction. But of this opinion, and of the sense which it can have so as not to say something altogether absurd and unintelligible, we shall speak more conveniently in the following section, n. 21; for as regards the present point it cannot be denied that every angelic nature, as it exists in the nature of things, is singular and individual. For if the divine nature itself, which is supremely immaterial, is singular and individual, much more will any angelic nature be; for it is incommunicable not only to many natures but also to many supposits, at least by its nature. Next, the reason of the conclusion proceeds equally of any spiritual nature or entity whatever, because it is impossible that there not be adjoined to such an entity the negation of communicability or of the division of such an entity into several similar to itself, because it cannot itself be divided from itself and be one and several. Finally, for this it matters nothing whether a spiritual substance and nature can be multiplied according to number within the same species or not. For if it can, it is necessary that each individual of that species have individual and singular unity, nor will the species itself be able to exist except in some individual, as has been said of other universals. But if that multiplication of individuals is repugnant to such a nature, by this very fact such a nature existing in the thing is more singular and individual, because it is more incommunicable, namely as it were essentially, after the manner of the divine nature. For the notion of individual unity, then, of which we are now treating, the addition of the aforesaid negation suffices. But whether for this negation some positive addition over the specific nature is required will be said in the following section.

8. To the third the answer is that man, as he exists in the nature of things, is singular, because he is not other than Peter and Paul; but whether in them he has some distinction from the nature of the thing from them will be said in the following section and also in the following disputation.