Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting can be, first, that the divine nature is really existing, and yet is not singular and individual, since according to faith it is communicable to many. Secondly, each angel is an existing thing, and yet does not have this numerical and individual unity, but precisely essential unity, such as is understood by us to be in man as such; therefore. The minor is proved, because this individual unity is understood to add something over formal or essential unity, by reason of which the essential notion can be contracted and consequently divided into several individuals; but in the angel there is not this addition, but in it there is the whole essence as it were prescinded and abstracted, for which reason it cannot be multiplied according to number; just as, if man as he is abstractly conceived existed in that way, he could not be multiplied. Thirdly, man in the thing itself exists in Peter and in Paul, and as such is not something individual and singular; therefore not whatever exists in the nature of things has this unity. On the contrary is what Aristotle very often teaches against Plato, that whatever is in things is individual and singular.

2. It is to be supposed that individual or singular being is opposed to common or universal being not only relatively, in so far as according to the comparison of the mind or dialectical consideration the individual is subjected to the species; for this neither belongs to every individual nature, as is evident in the divine, nor pertains to the present consideration; it is opposed, therefore, as it were privatively, almost in the way in which unity is opposed to multitude. For that is called common or universal which according to some one notion is communicated to many or is found in many; but that is called one in number, or singular and individual, which is so one being that, according to that notion of being by which it is called one, it is not communicable to many, as to inferiors and subjects of it, or to things which in that notion are many; for these fall into the same, and were signified by Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 3, text 14, saying: We expound the singular as that which is one in number, but the universal as that which is in these. And they are explained by an example; for humanity as such in its objective concept does not express something singular and individual, because that concept of itself is common to many humanities, which are really many and in which the very notion of humanity is multiplied. Whence it comes about that according to reason the notion of humanity is superior and common to many as to inferiors; but this humanity, for example that of Christ, is individual and singular, because that whole notion or objective concept of this humanity cannot be common to many which under that notion are many, that is, to many humanities; but that this humanity is communicable to the divine Word, for example, or also to several supposits, is not against its singular and individual unity, because it is not communicated to them as a superior to inferiors, but as a form to a supposit or supposits, in which according to its proper notion it is neither multiplied nor divided. Through this negation of communicability or division, then, this singular and individual unity is completed.

3. Which is further confirmed and explained thus; for just as the notion of one in common is completed through the negation of division, as was explained with Aristotle, so the notion of such a one, namely singular and individual, is also to be completed by a negation; both because there is no greater reason in one than in the other, and also because more and less common notions must keep a proportion, so that, just as the difference per se and in the same order contracts the genus, so universally the determination is related to the determinable, so that they are per se subordinated, as happens in the present case. But no other negation of division or divisibility can be thought out which completes the notion of individual and singular entity except that which has been explained by us, namely, that the entity be such that its whole notion is not communicable to many similar entities, or (what is the same) that it be not divisible into several entities such as it itself is. For by this reason man as such is not a singular entity, because he is divisible into several in which the whole notion of man is found; but conversely this two-foot quantity is individual, because, although it is divisible, it is nevertheless not divisible into several of which each is such as the whole divided was; and so that is a division of a whole into parts, not of a common thing into particulars. You will say: this notion of individual is common to multitude and to being per accidens, because even a heap of stones is such that it is not communicable to many nor divisible into several such as it itself is, and any number taken in particular has the same; indeed even some species or genus, for example man or animal, is not divisible into several which are such as the divided thing itself is. The answer is by conceding that all those things which participate that negation are, as regards that, individual and singular, as this heap of stones in that notion is singular and individual, and similarly this two or three is a certain individual of such a species of number, and this genus or this species under the notion of genus or species is one individual; yet these only according to reason, but those only in the notion of being per accidens or of number or multitude participate that unity. Wherefore, in order that the aforesaid negation or indivision be accommodated to being and one per se (of which we are treating), it is to be taken as adjoined to entity per se; for the notion of unity, as we said above, does not consist in indivision alone, but in undivided entity. The notion of individual and singular unity per se, therefore, will consist in an entity by its nature per se one and in the aforesaid way undivided or incommunicable. You will say: at least this water will not be singular, because it is divisible into several in which the whole notion of water is found. The answer is that it is not divisible into several which are this water which is divided, but which are water; and therefore this water is singular, but water common.

Resolution of the question

4. The notion of the individual or singular being thus explained, then, it must be said that all things which are actual beings, or which exist or can exist immediately, are singular and individual. I say immediately, in order to exclude the common notions of beings, which as such cannot immediately exist nor have actual entity except in singular and individual entities, which being taken away it is impossible for anything real to remain, as Aristotle said of first substances in the Categories, chapter on Substance. And the assertion so explained is self-evident, which Aristotle proves against Plato, Metaphysics I, c. 6, and Book VII, texts 26 and 27, and often elsewhere. Although many think that Aristotle interpreted Plato’s opinion about the ideas perversely, because he either posited them in the divine mind, or certainly separated from individuals not in reality but only by formal reason; but this matters little to us, and we shall touch on it again in the following disputation. Now the assertion is proved, because whatever exists has a certain and determinate entity; but every such entity necessarily has a negation adjoined; therefore also singularity and individual unity. The minor is evident, because every entity, by the very fact that it is a determinate entity, cannot be divided from itself; therefore neither can it be divided into several which are such as it itself is; otherwise that whole entity would be in each, and consequently, as it is in one, it would be divided from itself as it is in another, which involves a manifest repugnance. Every entity, therefore, by the very fact that it is one entity in the nature of things, is necessarily one in the aforesaid way, and therefore singular and individual.

5. Which reason concludes also that even by absolute power it cannot be understood that a real entity, as it exists in the thing itself, is not singular and individual, because it implies a contradiction to be an entity and to be divisible into several entities which are such as it itself is. Otherwise it could at the same time be one and several entitatively, or according to the same real entity, which involves a contradiction. And this reason also convinces that universals cannot be separated from singulars, because, if universal man existed outside Peter and Paul, etc., either he would also be in Peter and Paul, or he would remain altogether separated outside them; if this latter is said, then man as such would be a certain singular thing co-divided from Peter and Paul; he was therefore falsely called universal. And moreover it follows that neither Peter nor Paul are men, because, in order that an essential predicate belong to something, it is necessary that it be not separated from it. For how will it truly be able to be said of him if it is not in him? Or how can it be understood to constitute essentially one in whom it is not? But if it is in Peter and Paul, either it is altogether the same really and entitatively in both, and so Peter and Paul will not be two men, but one; or it is distinct according to the thing and entity in each of them, and so that universal and separated man would either be a certain third co-distinct from Peter and Paul, and so he would falsely be said to be in them and to be universal, because he would be only a certain singular distinct from the others; or certainly, if the very same were in one and in the other, it would be necessary that he be both distinct from himself and one and several really according to the same essence as existing in the thing, which are openly repugnant. By this reason, then, it is necessary that every thing, as it exists in reality, be singular and individual.

Answers to the arguments

6. To the first: there are not lacking theologians¹ who say that the divine essence is neither singular nor universal. But this is false, for those two include an immediate contradiction; whence it is impossible that one of them not belong to any being whatever. Moreover the divine nature is so one in itself that it cannot be multiplied or divided into several similar ones; it is therefore one individual and singular nature, by reason of which God is so one in number that he can in no way be multiplied. The divine nature, therefore, has individual and singular unity, to which it is not repugnant that that nature be communicable to three persons, because it is communicated to them not as a universal to particulars, nor as a superior to inferiors, but as a form or nature to supposits, in which it itself is divided neither by them nor from itself, because it is whole in each and in all together, altogether undistinguished from them; but of this elsewhere.

7. To the second: some Thomists (as I touched upon on the Third Part of St. Thomas, q. 4, a. 4) think that spiritual natures exist abstracted in the specific essence and perfection alone, as it were, without their own individual contraction. But of this opinion, and of the sense which it can have so as not to say something altogether absurd and unintelligible, we shall speak more conveniently in the following section, n. 21; for as regards the present point it cannot be denied that every angelic nature, as it exists in the nature of things, is singular and individual. For if the divine nature itself, which is supremely immaterial, is singular and individual, much more will any angelic nature be; for it is incommunicable not only to many natures but also to many supposits, at least by its nature. Next, the reason of the conclusion proceeds equally of any spiritual nature or entity whatever, because it is impossible that there not be adjoined to such an entity the negation of communicability or of the division of such an entity into several similar to itself, because it cannot itself be divided from itself and be one and several. Finally, for this it matters nothing whether a spiritual substance and nature can be multiplied according to number within the same species or not. For if it can, it is necessary that each individual of that species have individual and singular unity, nor will the species itself be able to exist except in some individual, as has been said of other universals. But if that multiplication of individuals is repugnant to such a nature, by this very fact such a nature existing in the thing is more singular and individual, because it is more incommunicable, namely as it were essentially, after the manner of the divine nature. For the notion of individual unity, then, of which we are now treating, the addition of the aforesaid negation suffices. But whether for this negation some positive addition over the specific nature is required will be said in the following section.

8. To the third the answer is that man, as he exists in the nature of things, is singular, because he is not other than Peter and Paul; but whether in them he has some distinction from the nature of the thing from them will be said in the following section and also in the following disputation.

1. We have shown that there is individual and singular unity in things; now we begin to declare what it is, which cannot better be done otherwise than by declaring what it adds over the common nature, or that which is abstractly and universally conceived by us.

Various opinions are reported

2. The first opinion generally affirms that, at least in created things, the individual adds to the common nature some real mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the nature itself and composing with it the individual itself. This seems to be the opinion of Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and in the Quodlibet, q. 2, and Metaphysics VII, q. 16; and in the same place Antonius Andreae, q. 17; which opinion Fonseca seems to defend, Book V, q. 3, sect. 2, and q. 5, throughout. And John Baptist Monlorius fights most keenly for it in his special work on universals, c. 6. The foundation of this opinion can be almost that which (on Aristotle’s testimony) moved Plato to posit ideas of universals abstracted from singulars, namely, because sciences and demonstrations are of universals and not of singulars. Likewise, because essential and proper definitions are given of universals and not of singulars. Likewise, because the properties which are per se in things belong to them by means of the universal natures, so that it is true to say that Peter is risible because man is risible; just as conversely contingent predicates belong to common natures by reason of individuals; for man runs because Peter runs; therefore all these indicate some distinction from the nature of the thing between the individual and the common nature; but this distinction cannot be except in so far as the individual adds something over the common nature, because it includes that whole; therefore it cannot be distinguished from it except as something adding to it.

3. Secondly I argue: because man, for example, is not essentially something individual; therefore, when he becomes individual, something is added to him outside the essence of man; therefore it is necessary that that be distinct from the nature of the thing from man as such. The antecedent is evident, because if man were essentially this individual, he could not be multiplied into several; indeed neither could he be conceived without some individuation and singularity, because a thing cannot be conceived without that which is of its essence; but man can be conceived distinctly, indeed also defined essentially, without any individuation. Just as God, because he is essentially this singular individual, therefore can neither be multiplied nor truly and properly conceived unless he is conceived under this individual and singular notion. But the first consequence seems self-evident, because to be individual is something in the nature of things, and that is not essential to the common nature, indeed not even to the individual itself (as is commonly said), because all individuals are of the same essence; therefore it is necessary that it add something besides the common essence. And hence the second consequence is easily proved, because what is of the essence and what is outside the essence seem to be distinguished from the nature of the thing; indeed those things are most of all so distinguished of which one is not of the essence of the other; but what the individual adds to the species is outside its essence, as has been shown; therefore.

4. Thirdly, Peter is not formally constituted as Peter and as man by the same thing; both because that by which man is constituted is common to Peter himself and to other men, but that by which he is constituted in the being of Peter is proper to him; and also because otherwise man could not be conceived under a common concept any more than Peter. And here can be added all the arguments by which it is wont to be proved that universals are distinguished from the nature of the thing from their inferiors, which we partly touched upon above in dealing with the concept of being, and shall partly touch upon in the following disputation.

5. The second opinion, extremely contrary, is that the individual adds nothing at all to the common nature which is positive and real, or distinct from it either in reality or in reason, but that each thing or nature is per se individual primarily and immediately. So think the nominalists, In I, dist. 2, where Ockham, qq. 4 and 6; and Gabriel, qq. 6, 7 and 8; this opinion can also be attributed to Henry, Quodlibet V, q. 8, where he thinks that the individual adds to the species only a negation, of which opinion we shall say more in the following section, opinion 3. The foundation is that nothing real can be understood which is not singular, as was proved in the preceding section; therefore it is repugnant that a thing become singular through the addition of something real over the common nature. Secondly, because no thing can become one through the real addition of something positive, as was shown above; therefore neither singular and individual. The consequence is evident, both because singularity is a certain unity, and also because there is no true and real unity besides singular and individual unity. Thirdly, because what is added is either essential or accidental; if essential, it follows that the species can be divided through essential differences, against Porphyry, chapter on Species; whence it further follows that individuals differ essentially, and that the species does not express the whole essence or quiddity of individuals, which is against Porphyry and all dialecticians. Finally, it follows that individuals can and must be defined by a proper and adequate essential definition, against Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 53. But if what is added is accidental, it follows that the individual is being per accidens; it follows also that accident does not come to an individual subject but constitutes it, which is impossible, because if one is individuated from the other, rather the accident receives individuation from the subject than conversely.

6. The third opinion can use a distinction between spiritual and material things; for in immaterial things the singular thing adds nothing over the common nature, but in material things something. Which distinction seems founded on Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, c. 11, text 4, where he says that in immaterial things the quod quid est is not distinguished from that whose it is, but in material things it is distinguished; where by quod quid est he understands the essence or essential definition, which can be compared both to the thing defined itself and to the individuals in which such a thing defined and definition exists. In the former way Aristotle compared them, Metaphysics VII, c. 6, texts 20 and 21, and generally taught that in beings per se the quod quid est is the same as that whose it is, or the definition as the thing defined, because they express the same essence and differ only in the confused or distinct mode in which they are conceived. Which is common both to simple and composite substances and to accidents, if they are defined in so far as they are one per se. For beings per accidens either cannot be defined by one definition, or, if they are in some way defined after the manner of one by reason of the accidental form, that definition is in some way distinct from that subject to which it is attributed. In the latter way, however, which pertains to the present point, they are compared by Aristotle in the other place cited, and in this way he says that in immaterial things the quod quid est, that is, the specific essence, which is explained by the definition, is the same as that whose it is, that is, as the individual or singular thing; which he says is otherwise in things composed of matter and form. He thinks, therefore, that the immaterial thing is individual by itself without any addition, but the material not so, but becomes this individual through some addition; and so St. Thomas and others expound this place. And in De Anima III, text 9, Aristotle says that in certain things the thing, supply individual, is other than the specific quiddity of the thing, which he himself says in those words: Magnitude is one thing, the being of magnitude another; but he adds that this distinction is not found in all things, which all expositors understand to have been said on account of immaterial things, in which individuals are nothing but the specific natures themselves subsisting. So Averroes, Philoponus, and at length St. Thomas. Whence the same St. Thomas seems to teach this opinion, I, q. 3, a. 3, and De ente et essentia, c. 5, in which places Cajetan, and III, q. 4, a. 4, thinks the same, and it seems to be the received opinion in the School of St. Thomas, as will be more evident from what we shall report in sect. 4. For from what is to be treated there the foundation of this opinion is to be taken, namely, because immaterial substances, since they neither have matter nor express a relationship to it, nothing too can be thought out in them which they would add over the essence, and therefore they are individual by themselves; but in composite things signate matter is added, from which something can be taken which the individual adds over the species.

The point of the difficulty is laid open

7. First, it is undoubted among all authors that the individual adds over the common nature some negation formally completing or constituting the unity of the individual. This is self-evident from the notion of unity explained above, adding the things which we noted in the preceding section about the notion or meaning of the name of individual. Rather, if we speak formally of the individual in so far as it is one in such a way, it adds a negation in its formal concept not only over the common nature abstractly and universally conceived, but also over the whole singular entity precisely conceived under a positive notion, because this whole entity is not conceived as one singularly and individually until it is conceived as incapable of division into several of the same notion. The present difficulty, then, is not about this negation, whether it formally pertains to the notion of this unity or not; for about this too there are opinions, of which we have already said in the preceding disputation what we think truer; but the difficulty is about the foundation of that negation; for, since it does not seem able to be founded in the common nature alone—for that of itself is indifferent and does not postulate such an indivision into several similar ones, but is rather divided in them—we therefore inquire what there is in the singular and individual by reason of which such a negation belongs to it.

Resolution of the question

8. I say, first: the individual adds something real besides the common nature, by reason of which it is such an individual and that negation of divisibility into several similar ones belongs to it. In this conclusion we agree with Scotus, and it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 40, a. 2, saying that wherever there is something common to many there must be something distinctive. And Contra Gentiles I, c. 42, seventh reason, he says that that distinctive must be something added to the common intention. And the Thomists do not dissent from this conclusion, as is evident from Cajetan, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4, De ente et essentia, c. 4; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 31; Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 9; Soto, on the Logic, q. 2 on universals. And it is proved from what we have just said; for the common nature of itself does not postulate such a negation, and yet to that nature, as it exists in the thing and has been made this, such a negation belongs per se and intrinsically; therefore something has been added to it by reason of which it has been adjoined to it, because every negation belonging intrinsically and necessarily to some thing is founded on something positive, which cannot be of reason, but real, since that unity and negation truly and of itself belong to the thing itself. Or this reason can be proposed otherwise, because the specific nature according to itself, and in so far as it is the proximate object of the common concept of man, lion, etc., has nothing repugnant to communicability, and therefore is said to be negatively indifferent, as we shall see below; but through this individuation this indifference of it is taken away and it becomes incapable of such division, in so far as it has been made singular; therefore it is necessary that something positive be understood to have been added to it, by reason of which this is repugnant to it. Finally, Peter and Paul agree in the common nature and differ among themselves in their proper notions; therefore they add these to the common nature; but these are positive; for they are not constituted by negations in the notion of such a substance; therefore. The arguments which were adduced to confirm the opinion of Scotus also conclude the same.

9. I say, secondly: the individual as such does not add something distinct from the nature of the thing from the specific nature, so that in the individual Peter himself, for example, humanity as such and this humanity, or rather that which is added to humanity in order that it become this (which is wont to be called haecceity or individual difference), are distinguished from the nature of the thing and consequently make a true composition in the thing itself. In this assertion all who attack the opinion of Scotus must agree, such as Cajetan, De ente et essentia, q. 5, and I, q. 5, a. 6; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 3; Nifo, Metaphysics IV, disp. 5, and others. Who nevertheless do not sufficiently distinguish whether they attack Scotus as regards his whole opinion, even as regards the addition of the individual difference over the specific, or only as regards the distinction from the nature of the thing, and their arguments seem to be common to both parts, and therefore are not very efficacious. In the same assertion those must necessarily agree who deny that the nature is universal in reality, as are the weightier philosophers and theologians, and the whole school of St. Thomas, as we shall see in the following disputation. But that one follows from the other is evident, because, if in the individuals themselves that which the individual adds over the common nature is distinct from the nature of the thing from it, then conversely the nature itself in the thing itself prescinds from such an addition or individual difference; and so in reality nature and haecceity are two, if not as two things, at least as a thing and a mode; therefore each of them has per se its own unity, because it cannot be understood that some things are two unless they are one and one; for number supposes unities; therefore that nature, as prescinded from the individual difference, has unity in the thing itself; therefore either individual unity or universal. The first cannot be said according to the aforesaid opinion; otherwise the nature would be individual before the individual difference, and so such a difference would be superfluously adjoined; therefore according to this opinion it must necessarily be said that that nature, as it prescinds in the thing itself and is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individual difference, has universal unity; which it can be understood from what was said in the preceding section is impossible, and we shall show it more fully below.

10. It can be answered, according to the doctrine of Scotus, that the nature as prescinded in the thing from individuation has neither individual nor universal unity, but formal unity, which is as it were intermediate between the aforesaid unities, and is nothing other than the unity of the essence which is explained through the definition. But against this, first, because, although in such a nature this formal unity can be distinguished by reason from individual unity, it nevertheless cannot be conceived that in reality it is according to its entity prescinded and distinct from the nature of the thing from individual unity, and that as such it also lacks universal unity. It is proved, because either that as such is common or incommunicable; for these two are immediately opposed; if incommunicable, it is individual; if common, it is universal. Likewise, either that nature which in Peter is distinct from the haecceity of Peter is by itself really distinct from the nature which is in John, as it too is distinguished in him from the nature of the thing from his haecceity, or as such it is not distinct; if this second is said, that nature will be common; but if the first is said, it is necessary that those natures as such be individual and singular, because they differ only as distinct in number and really within the same species.

11. And hence I argue, secondly, directly showing that there cannot be such a distinction in things which would be a true and actual distinction from the nature of the thing preceding every operation of the intellect; for every such distinction must be between real entities, or between a real entity and its mode. And indeed, if it is in the former way, it will be a real distinction, which will necessarily suppose each entity as singular and individual in itself, which is self-evident and so is denied by no one, because the distinction of entities supposes each entity constituted in itself and thus one and singular. But if the distinction is between an entity and its mode, as it is here said to be, in order that it be a true distinction from the nature of the thing it is necessary that such an entity, the mode being prescinded, be understood to have in the thing itself a true real entity; otherwise a distinction from the nature of the thing between such a mode and entity could not be understood. Because either that mode intrinsically and formally constitutes that entity or not; if it constitutes it, then it is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from it, because it will be intrinsically and essentially included in it, so that nothing can be conceived in that entity which does not include that mode; but if that mode is not understood so intrinsically and formally to constitute such an entity, it is necessary that it be understood to suppose it constituted in its entity and really to come to it and modify it, since it is posited as distinct from it in the thing itself. But it is impossible to understand this mode of distinction between the individual difference and the common nature; therefore. The minor is proved, because, if, that mode being prescinded, the nature is understood to have its entity, then that entity by itself, and as it is prior to that mode, must necessarily be singular and individual; therefore it does not need a superadded individuation, nor can it be distinguished from the nature of the thing from it; just as, if a line could not be understood constituted in the notion of line without straightness, straightness could not be conceived as a mode co-distinct from the nature of the thing from the line and coming to it; but if now it is conceived as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing, it is because the line can be conceived existing in the thing itself and constituted in the notion of line without such a mode.

12. But the first consequence is proved, because every entity existing in things must necessarily be singular and individual by itself: first, because as such it is understood to be outside its causes and to have real actuality and existence; therefore as such it is understood as singular, because nothing can terminate the action of causes or be capable of existence unless it is singular. Secondly, because such an entity, as so conceived prior to a mode distinct from itself, is incommunicable to many inferiors or to things of the same notion, because it can neither be divided from itself nor become several; therefore already as such it is individual. Thirdly, because that mode of haecceity which constitutes Peter is singular and proper to him and is said to constitute and compose Peter by modifying the nature; therefore, if that modification is through a true distinction and composition which is in the thing, it is necessary that to that mode, which is as it were a certain particular act, there correspond also a particular entity after the manner of an actuable potency; therefore that entity which is supposed to such an act must be individual and particular. Which is explained, fourthly, for in Peter and Paul, for example, there is a double composition from common nature and individual difference; therefore in both there is really distinct not only the individual difference of one from the individual difference of the other, but also the entity of the nature which is in one from the entity of the nature which is in the other; therefore those two natures are distinguished intrinsically and entitatively as two singular things, even when the individual differences are prescinded by the intellect, because a real distinction between actual entities cannot be understood except in so far as they are individual and singular.

13. You will say that they are indeed distinguished through the individual differences, as two matters are said to be distinguished through forms or quantities. But of this example we shall speak afterwards; for universally I think it cannot happen that one thing is really distinguished from another through something else distinct from itself, but through its own entity, through which it is constituted in such being, because, proportion being kept, a thing is distinguished by that by which it is constituted. But in the present case this is manifest, because in Peter and Paul there are two individual differences really distinct among themselves, and each of them actuates a real nature, from which it is distinguished from the nature of the thing and with which it composes its individual altogether really distinct from the other, not only as regards the difference, but also as regards the whole entity of the nature; therefore it is necessary that, even when the differences themselves are prescinded by the intellect, that which remains in reality in Peter and Paul be really distinct and therefore singular; otherwise it would have to be said that some thing altogether really the same is contracted by individual differences in Peter and Paul. For it is not enough to say that not the same nature really, but the same formally, is contracted; for this formal identity, as it can be in the thing, is only a certain likeness, which supposes real distinction, and consequently the individuation of those things which are called similar; but as it is conceived after the manner of unity, it is not real unity, but only of reason, by denomination from the concept of the mind, as we shall say afterwards.

14. Fifthly, this can be declared, because the individual differences themselves of Peter and Paul are really distinguished among themselves as two incomplete things, yet singular and individual in the way in which they are, and nevertheless have among themselves likeness and agreement, because in truth they are more similar among themselves than to the individual difference of a horse or lion; and in them it would not be necessary to distinguish from the nature of the thing something in which they are similar and something in which they are distinguished; otherwise one would proceed to infinity, which in things or modes distinct from the nature of the thing is an inconvenience, as was said above in a similar case; therefore the same could be said of the individuals Peter and Paul themselves, that, although they are distinguished among themselves and are similar, it is not necessary to distinguish in them from the nature of the thing that by which they are similar and that by which they are distinguished; therefore there is no reason why the individual difference should be distinguished from the nature of the thing either from the common nature, as from an extreme composing the individual, or from the whole individual, as from an integral composite. Nor does it matter if someone answers that those individual differences are simpler and are that by which individuals are constituted and distinguished, and therefore can more be distinguished by themselves; because, although perhaps as regards distinction of the concepts of the mind this contributes something, as I shall say immediately, nevertheless, if this distinction were in things, the argument would urge, because those differences are to be considered as two real modes existing in reality and distinct from the nature of the thing from any other entity whatever; because, just as they have quasi-formal effects distinct in number, namely to constitute this or that individual, so also they are distinct in number. And although they are by which with respect to the individuals, nevertheless, in so far as they are in themselves something and real beings, although incomplete, they are also which, at least incompletely, as we noted above in a similar case in treating of the concept of being, as Cajetan also noted, I, q. 11, a. 1, around ad 1. And yet with this distinction and simplicity they have among themselves a real agreement in the common notion of such modes, as the same Cajetan says, De ente et essentia, q. 5; therefore either in these too the common notion is to be distinguished from the proper ones, or certainly such a mode of arguing is fallacious in any individual whatever. Some answer that between these individual differences there is no real agreement from which a common concept could be abstracted; but this is difficult to believe, of which it will be said generally in the following disputation.

15. And hence a sixth reason is taken, because that whole distinction which is feigned to be from the nature of the thing between the nature and the individual has been taken from the mode of conceiving and speaking, from the agreement and distinction which is found between the individuals themselves; but this is no sign for indicating a distinction from the nature of the thing, and on the other side there are many things which more urgently indicate that there is no such distinction in the thing; therefore. The major is evident from the arguments made in favour of Scotus. The minor as regards the first part is evident, both from the example adduced of the individuating differences themselves, and from what was treated above about the concept of being, about which almost the same arguments are made; and also because otherwise it would be necessary to distinguish from the nature of the thing all common concepts from particular ones, which I shall show below to be false. Finally this part will be more fully evident from the solutions of the arguments. But the other part of the minor has been sufficiently proved by the arguments made. Which is finally confirmed from the sign of inseparability; for those things which, although they are conceived by us in a diverse way, are so related in the thing that neither is separated or can be separated from the other even by absolute power, are without cause feigned to be distinct from the nature of the thing, as I shall say more fully below in the disputation on distinctions; but the notion of man and the proper individuation of Peter are so related in Peter that they can in no way be separated, neither such a mode from the nature, nor the nature as it is in Peter from such a mode; therefore. Nor does it help at all to say that the notion of man is separable from Peter because it can be in Paul, because this is not to consider the notion of man as it really exists, but only as it is conceived in the mind, and therefore it is not enough for a distinction from the nature of the thing, which must be between those things which are in reality, if it is a distinction between positive things, or between a thing and a real positive mode. Whence that distinction which is understood between the common notion abstractly understood and the individual is only of reason, because that nature as such is nowhere except objectively in the mind. But if anyone calls that a formal distinction, because the mind conceives one definition of man as such and another of Peter, he will raise a question about a word; because, as regards the thing, that distinction is not so in the thing that in Peter or Paul those things are understood to be distinct from the nature of the thing, or to make a composition in the thing, as has been shown.

16. I say, thirdly, that the individual adds over the common nature something distinct from it by reason, pertaining to the same predicament, and composing the individual metaphysically, as an individual difference contracting the species and constituting the individual. The first part of this assertion follows from the two preceding ones; for it was said in the first that the individual adds something to the common nature, and in the second it was denied that that is distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore it is necessary that it be distinguished at least by reason, because, if it were in no way distinguished, it would in no way be added. Nor does it follow from this that what is added is something of reason; for, just as it is one thing to be distinguished by reason, another to be only of reason—for it can happen that things which are real are distinguished by reason alone—so also what is added can be real, as it truly is, although it is distinguished by reason alone. You will say: that addition is only through reason. I answer: as regards the thing added I deny it; as regards the mode of addition, or of contraction or composition, I concede it; for, just as the separation of the common nature from the individual differences is only through reason, so conversely that the individual difference is understood as added to the common nature is only through reason; for in the thing there is not that proper addition, but in each individual there is one entity really having by itself each notion.

17. The second part of the conclusion also follows openly from what has been said, and it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, where he says that substance is individuated by itself; and De potentia, q. 10, a. 3, he denies that substance can be constituted by an accident; this addition, therefore, is not outside the genus of the thing itself, but in substances it is substance, at least incomplete, because in the thing there is nothing but individual substance. The third part, finally, is easily evident, because this addition is not some physical part of the substance, because it is predicated of the individual as expressing its whole essence, which a physical part does not express, and therefore it is not predicated of the whole. Nor is it something after the manner of a whole directly placed in the predicament of substance; it is therefore something incomplete after the manner of a difference. Likewise it contracts the common nature and divides it into individuals, and constitutes the individual itself metaphysically, as per se one in its genus.

18. But against this conclusion a certain reason made in the preceding can be objected; for, if the individual adds something at least distinct by reason, there follows a process to infinity in objective concepts distinct by reason, which also above in a similar case we reckoned an inconvenience; the consequence is evident, because the individual is said to add over the species something distinct by reason because it agrees with another individual in the specific notion and differs in the individual one; but the individual difference itself too agrees with another similar difference in a common notion, and differs in number from it; therefore it too adds according to reason something distinct by reason over the common notion of such a difference; and again of that addition the same argument will be made, and so to infinity. It can be answered, first, that in these our concepts it is not a great inconvenience to admit a process of this kind, because the intellect divides things which in reality are altogether indivisible, and therefore it would not be wonderful if the intellect could proceed to infinity in these divisions or concepts. Secondly, someone could so philosophize about the concept of species and individual as we reasoned above about the concept of being and its inferiors; for we said that the inferiors add over being something distinct by reason, yet in such a way that the inferior concept immediately conceived under the concept of being is not properly resolvable into two concepts, but is only a simple concept more express and determinate than the concept of being; so, then, in the present case it can be said that the concept of the individual is not properly composite and resolvable into the concept of another mode, or of an individual difference, but is only a more express concept of the specific nature itself as it exists in the thing in such an entity, in which neither can such an entity nor anything of that entity be conceived without including such a specific notion, nor can the specific notion itself, as it exists in the thing, be distinctly conceived except as contracted in such or such an entity. And by this reason the process to infinity is easily avoided, as is evident from what was said in a similar case of being.

19. But this mode of answering can seem little consonant with the common mode of conceiving and speaking of the philosophers, who explain this contraction of the species to individuals after the manner of metaphysical composition. And not without reason does this seem to be commonly affirmed, because genus and difference too are not distinguished in the thing in which they are conjoined, as we shall show below, and nevertheless, on account of the various agreements and disagreements which are found between several things, the intellect forms diverse concepts of genus and difference, of which one is not included in the other; so, then, it can also do between species and individuals; for their proportion among themselves is almost the same, and the same the difference from the concept of being. For that is transcendent, and therefore cannot properly be contracted after the manner of composition, nor can anything be added to it according to reason in which it is not included; but the concept of the species (as also the concept of the genus) is of itself limited and not transcendent, and therefore it is not necessary that it be included in every concept determining it; it can therefore be contracted after the manner of composition, and consequently the individual can also be resolved into the concept of the species and of the individual difference; for that is not man, nor Peter, for example, but a difference contracting man and constituting Peter. You will say that there is also a difference between genus and species, because the generic notion, not only as abstracted and made universal in the mind, but also as existing in the thing itself, can be prescinded in the mind and distinguished by reason from the specific difference, as we shall see below; but the specific notion cannot be distinguished even by reason from the individual difference except as abstracted and made universal in the mind, because as existing in the thing it cannot be conceived except as including individuation; and because every composition, even according to reason, must be understood in the thing as it actually exists, therefore such a composition is more easily understood between the generic and specific notion than between the specific and individual. But notwithstanding this, that metaphysical composition of the individual is not to be denied, because for it it is enough that the specific notion can be prescinded in the mind as not included in this individual difference.

20. And therefore, that kind of composition and resolution of the individual being admitted, the answer, thirdly, is that it is not necessary to proceed to infinity; for the same mind which conceives the individual as composed of the objective concept of the species and the individual difference conceives the individual difference as altogether simple and irresolvable, because it does not conceive it under the concept of species, but only of difference, of whose notion it is to be simple and not composed of a common notion and another contracting difference. As can be seen also in the specific or subaltern differences themselves; for sensible or rational are not formally composed of other differences, but by the very fact that they are notions of differing, they differ from others by themselves; so, then, the individual differences too are to be conceived, in which as regards this that mode of determining being to themselves through simple determination of the concept without composition can be admitted. And that notion of the individual difference, in so far as it can be conceived as a real and common notion, will also be as it were transcendent to the individual differences, because nothing can be conceived in them in which such a notion is not included; and therefore that common notion too will be determined to the individual differences not through a new composition but through the simple determination of a more express and determinate concept, and so further resolution and process ceases.

21. I say, fourthly: the individual, not only in material things and accidents, but also in created and finite immaterial substances, adds something distinct by reason over the species. We exclude from this conclusion the divine nature, because, since it is essentially so determined to this nature in number that it is altogether repugnant to it to be multiplied according to it, the common notion of deity cannot even according to reason (if it be true) be abstracted from such a deity; for, by the very fact that it is so abstracted, true deity is not conceived, because it is of the true concept of deity that it be this in number and not another; because its infinity requires this. And hence it consequently comes about that this individual deity adds nothing even according to reason over the concept of true deity. Whence Cajetan is deservedly reproved because in I, q. 3, a. 3, and in other places, he said that God can in one way be taken as it signifies a concrete, as it were specific, of the divine nature. For such a truly common concept is repugnant to true divinity, of whose essence it is that it be this singular nature, and therefore the true God can no more be conceived by a common concept and abstracted from this God than Peter.

22. From this exception, however, which is singular and belongs specially to God on account of his infinity, the conclusion posited and the contrary general rule in all creatures, even if they are immaterial, is confirmed. It is proved, because in any immaterial, individual and finite substance, for example Gabriel the Archangel, the mind conceives both this individual, in so far as it conceives this entity in number, and its essential and specific notion, which does not essentially include this entity in number nor a positive repugnance to being communicated to another individual; therefore the mind there conceives something common and something which according to reason is added to it in order that it be determined to this individual; therefore as regards this precisely there is no difference between immaterial substances and other things. It will perhaps be said that any angelic essence or species whatever is essentially and intrinsically determined to this individual, and consequently that this individual adds nothing positive and real, even distinct by reason, over the species itself, but only the negation of communicability to several similar ones, which belongs immediately to such a species by reason of itself without any addition.

23. This indeed seems to have been the sense of the authors whom I cited in the third opinion, and the same think those who deny that angels differing only in number can be created within the same species, even by absolute power; for this cannot be denied to the divine power for any other reason except because it is judged to be against the intrinsic and essential notion of such a nature. That opinion, however, has a foundation in St. Thomas, I, q. 50, a. 4, and the question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 8, and Contra Gentiles II, c. 95, De ente et essentia, c. 5, where Cajetan holds it, q. 9; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, concl. 5; and Abulensis, Paradoxa IV, c. 34. And Aristotle seems to favour it much, Metaphysics XII, text 40; and Avicenna, Metaphysics V, c. 5.

24. But this opinion first of all supposes that signate matter is the adequate principle of that individuation in which the individual adds something positive to the specific notion, which can be called positive individuation; but this supposition in the aforesaid sense is false. The major is openly evident from the aforesaid authors. And its reason is clear, because they deny such individuation in the aforesaid substances for no other cause than because they lack matter; therefore they suppose that matter, either according to itself or as signed by quantity, is the adequate root of such individuation, so that from that principle, If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, they infer from the lack of matter the lack of the aforesaid addition or individuation. But the minor proposition will be proved at length in the following section, even in material substances. But even if we granted that in material substances an individual difference of this kind is taken from matter, it could not efficaciously be inferred that matter is the adequate principle of that difference in the whole breadth of created being; for diverse substances have diverse principles accommodated to their natures, nor can a sufficient argument be taken from the mode of composition or individuation found in exterior things to things of a superior notion; otherwise by the same reason someone could deny that there is in the angels a metaphysical composition of genus and difference, because in material things the genus is taken from matter and the difference from form, which many wish to be understood with propriety. Likewise with the same facility someone could say that in the heavenly bodies the individual does not add over the species something positive, even distinct by reason, either because they do not have matter, as Averroes thought, or certainly because they have matter of another notion. For if it is true that in these inferior things matter is the only root of the individual difference, we can only attribute it to this inferior matter; for of the superior we can gather by no sufficient reason whether this also belongs to it, since it is of a diverse notion. They will perhaps say that that matter underlies quantity of the same notion, and that this is enough for it to be the principle of the same mode of individuation. But this does not satisfy; for, as I shall show below, quantity, since it is an accident, can in no way enter into the principle of the individuation of substances. Substances of a superior order, therefore, can agree in metaphysical composition with substances of an inferior order, and have the principle of it in a simpler and more perfect way. And so from the negation of matter no efficacious argument can be made.

25. Next I return to the reason begun; for that the divine nature essentially includes its positive individuation and incommunicability with respect to inferiors comes precisely from this, that such multiplication is repugnant to its infinity; but every created immaterial substance is finite; therefore there is no reason why it should be repugnant to it to have another altogether similar essence, yet really distinct in entity. It can be answered that, although spiritual substance is simply finite in the genus of being, it is nevertheless infinite in its species and has the whole perfection possible in its species, because, since it is abstracted and separated from matter, it has nothing whence it is limited, and therefore cannot be multiplied within that species. But infinity of this kind is both asserted without sufficient foundation and can scarcely be declared in what it consists, except by begging the question.

26. I ask, then, whether this infinity is intensive or extensive. The first cannot be said, both because the whole intensive perfection of such an angel is contained within a certain grade and limit of such a species, in which there is no formal intensive infinity; unless perhaps it be said infinite in a certain respect, because it can contain under itself syncategorematically infinite species of an inferior order, which nevertheless does not indicate infinity, but a certain perfection of a superior notion; whence this can be common to the species of material things, as is evident in the human species, under which species of brutes can be multiplied to infinity. This genus of perfection or infinity, therefore, is nothing to the question with which we are dealing, nor can it be the reason on account of which some species is individual by itself and cannot be multiplied in individuals. Indeed, even if we admitted that intensive infinity, true and formal, in some intrinsically limited grade, it does not follow that such a perfection cannot be found in many similar individuals, because this has no necessary connection with that. As, although there were given an infinitely intense grace in the soul of Christ the Lord, for example, it does not therefore follow that there cannot be given other qualities of grace distinct in number, whether finite or infinite. Which argument also declares that that proper and formal intensive infinity can no more be given in substances than in accidents.

27. But if the discussion is of extensive infinity, first the question is begged, because this extension is nothing other than the multiplication of individuals in that species. Next, what is said involves a repugnance; for that individual formally and in itself is only one; how, then, can it contain in itself an extensive infinity, which consists in the mere multiplication of individuals? You will say that it contains it virtually, not formally. But it cannot be explained in what this virtual infinity or containment consists or in what it is founded, since it does not consist in the intensive infinity of such a nature, nor can it be founded in it, as has been proved; no reason, therefore, is assigned on account of which it is repugnant to the perfection of such a nature to be communicated to many individuals similar in essential perfection. Substances of this kind, therefore, although abstracted from matter, are simply finite. For it is not necessary that they have limitation from matter properly so called (whatever may be the case as regards this with material forms), but from their proper difference, or from themselves and from their proper entity, or because they have such a received being, or finally because by their nature they exist in such a supposit; from infinity, therefore, no reason can be taken on account of which immaterial natures of this kind are essentially individual and incommunicable.

28. It can be said otherwise that from immateriality alone a sufficient reason is taken. Because things which lack matter cannot be multiplied materially, as is self-evident; therefore only formally and essentially or specifically; therefore not individually or according to numerical multiplication, because this is material multiplication. But this reason too, if the words materially and formally are taken properly in the first antecedent, is insufficient and begs the question; for it takes the conclusion itself in the reason, namely either that numerical distinction is taken from matter, or that to differ in number is the same as to differ materially. For granted that in material things these have some truth, which we shall examine afterwards, nevertheless no sufficient argument can be taken thence to immaterial things. Individual distinction, therefore, extends more widely than material difference taken in the said way; for to differ in number is only to be distinguished in proper entities with agreement and likeness in the whole essential notion, which can be common both to spiritual and to corporeal things. Whence, if material and formal are taken more broadly, as formal expresses the precise essential notion, but material whatever contracts it and determines it to such an entity, then two angels of the same species, although they are distinguished as two integral forms, can be said to be distinguished not formally but materially or entitatively, as two rational souls are distinguished among themselves.

29. And by this example this opinion can first be confirmed; for the rational soul, physically considered, is also a simple and spiritual entity, and yet is not individual from its essential notion, but adds something according to reason. But they say that the rational soul has a transcendental relationship to the body, and is individuated thence. But this first of all is uncertain, for perhaps it is as true that this soul expresses such a relationship to the body because it itself is such, as conversely. And next, whatever may be the case with this, it matters nothing to the present point, for the same proportional argument can be taken; for the rational soul, which has its specific notion with a transcendental relationship to the body, does not have individuation by virtue of that precisely, but from some addition according to reason, through which that relationship is determined to such a body, or rather to such a relationship to the body; therefore in the same proportion the substance of an angel, which has an absolute essential notion without transcendental relationship, will not be individual by virtue of that, but from something added according to reason proportioned to it. And a similar argument can be taken from spiritual accidents, in which the individual adds something over the species not only in order to diverse subjects, but also with respect to the same; for these accidents can be distinguished in number and multiplied with respect to the same subject, at least successively, as is evident of diverse acts of the same notion in the same angelic intellect; if, therefore, in those acts the same spiritual specific notion is found contractible to diverse individuals, not from diverse subjects, but from diverse individual differences in order to the same subject, why could not the same substantial and spiritual specific notion be similarly contracted through individual differences proportioned to it? Certainly no sufficient reason can be given. And similar arguments can be taken from other simple entities which can be distinguished in number by themselves, such as two matters or two quantities, as we shall see more fully in the following section.

30. Finally, the divine power is limited without cause so that it could not create several angels similar in essence and species, or, if it had willed to annihilate the evil angels, could not have created others similar, which is certainly incredible in itself; and therefore almost all the other theologians, In II, dist. 3, teach that this can be done by God: Scotus, q. 7; Durandus, q. 3; Gabriel, q. 1, and others; and Marsilius, In II, q. 3, a. 3; Alexander of Hales, II p., q. 20, last member, a. 2, and Metaphysics VII, text 41; and among the Thomists Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles II, 93, says that such numerical distinction of spiritual substances is not repugnant by absolute power, although he denies that it is according to the natural order of things; and St. Thomas favours it, Opusc. 16, last chapter, where he teaches at length that immaterial substance is one in number, singular and individual, because of itself it is not born to be participated by many; but he adds that it is of a rude intellect to gather thence that it cannot be multiplied by God. But whatever may be the case with this manner of speaking, whether this is to be called possible by absolute power or by natural or ordinary power, which is perhaps a question about a name, nevertheless, by whatever reason it is possible, it is sufficiently concluded that immaterial substance is not individual by virtue of its essential and specific notion; for, if it had this, it would imply a contradiction that such a substance be multiplied individually, just as it implies that the same individual be multiplied numerically. Whence it is also evident in passing that those are ignorant of the proper meaning of the word who say that in angelic natures there is a truly specific objective concept and logically (as they say) universal, and yet that that nature is of itself so incommunicable that it implies a contradiction for it to be in several individuals distinct only in number; for this is an open repugnance; for, if that nature can in no way be in many individuals, it is because of itself and from its proper essential concept it is so incommunicable; therefore, if it is such, it is repugnant to abstract it from this individual and render it communicable or indifferent, because this very abstraction is against its nature and essence, as is openly evident in the divine nature. It is therefore more truly and more consistently said that, just as in immaterial substances there are true and proper species, so also there is an individual which adds something according to reason over the species, and consequently that there can also be several similar individuals. But whether in fact there are, and what in this is more consonant with the Scriptures and the Fathers, pertains to theological disputations.

Satisfaction is made to the foundations of the other opinions

31. To the foundation of the first opinion the answer is that all those things which are enumerated in the first argument only indicate that the specific nature expresses an objective concept prescinded according to reason from individuals, and conversely that the individual adds something distinct by reason over the specific nature. For human science is of things universally conceived, of which definitions and demonstrations are immediately made; and for this it is enough that they can be abstracted according to reason, although in the thing itself they are not separated. Which is evident from what was said of the concept of being, of which there is science and demonstrations are made, although it is evident that in reality it is not prescinded from the proper notions of beings, but only abstracted according to reason. Whence this distinction too is enough for those causal expressions: because man is risible, Peter is risible; because in them no real and physical cause is given which intervenes between Peter and risible, but the adequate reason and origin of that property is explained.

32. To the second the answer is that in arguments of this kind (which I noted above in treating of the concept of being) an equivocation is easily committed by arguing from our mode of conceiving and from the use of the words by which we signify things as conceived by us to the things themselves as they are in themselves, gathering a distinction of things from a distinction according to reason, which is a fallacious argument. The answer, then, is that man as such, signified and conceived, does not express nor include in his essential notion any individual difference, as the argument rightly proves. And it is evident, because according to reason he is prescinded from all of them and can be contracted and determined according to reason through several differences of this kind. Whence it is rightly concluded that something must be added, which is outside the essence of man so conceived, in order that he become singular; I deny, however, that there follows thence a distinction in the thing between the common nature of man and his individual difference, because the nature of man is not found in the thing so common and abstract as it is conceived through the intellect. But when it is said that what is of the essence and what is outside the essence are distinguished from the nature of the thing, and not only by reason, the answer is that something can be understood to be outside the essence in two ways. In one way according to the thing, or considering things as they are in reality; in another way according to reason prescinding one from another, although in the thing it is not prescinded. In the former way it is true (especially in finite things) that whatever in reality is outside the essence must be distinguished from the nature of the thing from it, because it cannot be said to be outside the essence for any other reason; I deny, however, that in this way the individual difference, for example of Peter or Paul, is outside the essence of man as existing in the thing itself; for man does not exist in the thing except in Peter, Paul, etc., and in each his proper difference is of the essence of man as existing in him. You will say that it follows thence that man in Peter and Paul differs essentially, or that Peter and Paul do not have the same essence. The answer is that they do not have the same really, yet have the same by reason, which in the thing is nothing other than to have a similar one; and because to differ essentially, under these words, does not signify only the real distinction of essences, but also denies essential likeness and agreement, and so unity of essence according to reason, therefore it is simply not conceded that things which differ only in number differ essentially. Nevertheless, if those words were taken only in the former sense, it would be true that Peter and Paul differ essentially; according to which signification we deny that in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit differ essentially, because they have neither essential difference nor distinction of essences. But in the latter way, namely according to the prescission of reason, everything without which such a conceived notion can be preserved is said to be outside the essence of the objective concept; and in this way it is not necessary that what is said to be outside the essence be distinct from the nature of the thing from the other; but it suffices that it be distinguished by reason, because that very word outside does not signify absolutely to be outside the thing, but to be outside the concept, or outside the thing as conceived.

33. Whence to the confirmation the answer is to be given by almost the same distinction; for in reality man is not constituted as man precisely, nor separated in himself, but is constituted as Peter, Paul, Francis; whence in each man is constituted by the same thing as Peter; nor is there in the thing something truly one constitutive of man which is in reality common, but there are several constitutives of individual men, in which the common notion is said to be fundamentally on account of the agreement and likeness which they have among themselves, as we shall say more fully in the following disputation. But according to reason, just as common man is abstracted, so he is understood to have an adequate and common constitutive; yet thence it can only be concluded that that is distinct by reason from the singular differences which specially constitute individuals. To the third the answer is that from what was said of the concept of being it is evident that those arguments do not prove a distinction from the nature of the thing; and we shall show the same of universal and inferior natures in the following disputation.

34. To the first argument of the second opinion the answer is that it rightly proves that a thing does not become singular through the addition of a reality or mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the nature which is said to become singular, because every such distinction supposes entity and consequently singularity in each extreme. But that argument does not prove that a thing cannot become singular through the addition of something distinct by reason, because this distinction does not suppose actual entity, and consequently neither singularity, in each extreme, because, since this distinction is through concepts, it can easily be understood between a thing universally conceived and its mode.

35. And according to this doctrine some things are easily solved which Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 2, q. 4, objects against the doctrine of Scotus, in so far as they can be applied against the first and third conclusions posited by us, such as that one: a singular act supposes a singular potency, Physics II, c. 3, text 36; but what the individual is said to add over the species is a singular act of the nature; therefore it supposes a singular nature, because it regards it as a potency. For the answer is that the major is true of real act and potency, distinct from the nature of the thing, of which Aristotle speaks in the place cited; not of act and potency distinct by reason, for the cause explained. Just as a specific act too does not suppose a specific potency, but a generic one. Another argument of his is: what belongs to one individual and is repugnant to another supposes their distinction; but the individual difference is of this kind; therefore it does not make the distinction, but supposes it. But this argument by virtue of its form is weaker. For the major can easily be denied, as is evident in a similar form: what belongs to one species and is repugnant to another supposes their distinction; for there would have to be added, or makes it; the same, therefore, would have to be added in the present case. Nevertheless, if the argument were made not of the individuals themselves, but of the nature which is contracted through this individual difference, it can have force against a distinction from the nature of the thing between that difference and the nature, but not against our opinion. For in distinct individuals there are also really distinct natures; whence, if the individuating differences are distinct from them from the nature of the thing, it is necessary that the difference which belongs to one and is repugnant to the other supposes their distinction and does not make it; because it supposes, as has been said, a singular potency proportioned to itself, and consequently distinct from another which is not proportioned to it; and so it will no longer be an individual difference, as we also argued above. But the distinction from the nature of the thing being taken away, the argument does not proceed with respect to the nature to be contracted, because in this way there is not one and another nature, so that the difference could belong to one and be repugnant to the other, but it is one according to reason. But if the discussion is of the nature not as contractible, but as contracted, then it is already the individual thing itself, which is constituted through the difference itself and distinguished from another.

36. To the second the answer is that it proceeds only of the ultimate formal notion of one, or of individual unity, which consists in negation, of which we confess that it adds nothing over the individual entity besides the negation; but we are treating of the foundation of this negation, and of that which the singular entity adds over the common nature, by reason of which it is capable of such a negation.

37. To the third some say that what the individual adds over the species is accidental. But that this is false is convinced both by the arguments made there, and by others which we shall make in the following section, and also from what has been said; for, if this addition is distinct only by reason from the substance or essence of the thing, and is per se conjoined to it as per se determining the common nature to the particular, how can it be accidental? Others, then, simply call this essential to the individual, not to the species, which in truth is so, if we consider the thing itself, for what altogether intrinsically constitutes and composes this individual is its proper difference together with the common nature; nor can this individual not only be, but not even be conceived, without such a difference. Nevertheless, according to reason, and according to the manner of speaking of the dialecticians and metaphysicians accommodated to our mode of conceiving, this individual difference is not called essential, but intrinsic, entitative and as it were material, in order that it may be distinguished from the specific difference, which is most formal; for it is taken from that grade in which individuals formally agree or are assimilated. And so this seems to have to be declared thus: that individuals of the same species, with real distinction, have an integral and perfect likeness in nature, in which they differ from individuals differing in species under the same genus, which do not have among themselves so great and so perfect a likeness. Hence, then, it comes about that our mind conceives that in which those individuals agree among themselves as one something and as that which is formal in them and which per se contributes to science; for distinction in entity alone is judged to be as it were per accidens, and therefore it is called material. And for the same cause the scientific definition is not given except of the common and specific concept, and in this sense the lowest species is said to be the whole essence of the individuals, namely formally and precisely taken and conceived, and as its knowledge serves human science, which does not descend to particulars according to their proper and individual notions, both because it can neither perceive them as they are in themselves, nor does it treat of the proper accidents of individuals, because either they belong to them contingently and per accidens, or, if perhaps there are some altogether proper, they lie as hidden as the individual differences themselves. Finally, because it would be very laborious and almost infinite to descend to individual particulars. Nevertheless there is no doubt that individuals, even if they differ only in number, have distinct essences in the thing, which, if they are conceived and explained as they are in themselves, will have to be declared by diverse concepts and definitions; and they will also have distinct properties, at least according to the thing or according to some proper mode, under which notion they fall under angelic or divine science.

38. To the foundations of the third opinion the answer is as follows. To Aristotle in Metaphysics VII it can first be answered, with Alexander of Hales there, that when Aristotle says in things separated from matter the quod quid est is not distinguished from that whose it is, he does not take matter with all propriety for prime matter or for the proper subject of some form, but for any supposit whatever which in reality is in some way distinct from its nature; in which way no created substance can be said to abstract from matter, because in all the nature is in a supposit in some way distinct from it. This doctrine is true, but I do not think that Aristotle spoke in that place in that sense. Alexander of Aphrodisias expounds it otherwise, who thinks, and in truth very probably, that Aristotle in each place cited above spoke of the same substances and compares in the same way the quod quid est with that whose it is. Which can be confirmed from the words of the same Philosopher; for he says in that text 41: It has been said moreover that the quiddity and each thing are the same in some things, as in first substances; for so Alexander himself reads. And although in the text commonly in that place that particle, it has been said, is not repeated, nevertheless that which had preceded a little before also comprehends this clause, as is sufficiently evident from the context. Hence, then, by first substance Alexander does not understand immaterial substances, as St. Thomas does, because Aristotle in the latter place refers himself to what he had said in the former; but there he had said nothing of immaterial substance in special, nor in the other does he bring forward a special reason on account of which he constitutes a difference in this between material and immaterial substances; nor is there any indication on account of which we should say that he uses that term, with that whose it is, equivocally, so that in the former place it is taken for the thing defined, but here for the supposit, so that the comparison made in each place would be diverse. And finally Aristotle never used the name of first substance to signify specially immaterial substances; for, although in Book IV, c. 3, text 7, he seems to use that word in that signification, nevertheless the Commentator there understands God by first substance, and whatever may be the case with that place, no argument is taken thence to the other in which we are now engaged; and so according to this exposition the opinion of Aristotle in each place is the same. By first substances, then, Alexander understands any substantial supposits whatever, from which the quod quid est, that is, the common nature, is not separated. But what Aristotle adds, I call first substance that which is not said by reason of one thing being in another, as in a subject or matter, is explained by Alexander of substance which is not signified as one thing in another, but as one thing consisting per se, in which it differs from the accidental composite, as is white, for example, or snub, in which something is signified as existing in a subject as in matter; for of a composite of this kind, from such a subject as matter and an accident as existing in it, Aristotle adds that in it, since it is one per accidens, the quod quid est is distinguished from the subject in which it is. And so according to this exposition nothing can be gathered from the aforesaid text against our opinion. Besides this probable exposition, however, that place has another perhaps more probable; yet, because it touches the question of the distinction of nature from supposit in immaterial things, it will be handed down more conveniently below in the disputation on the distinction of nature and supposit in created things.

39. To the other testimony from De Anima III, if the common exposition is to be retained, nothing can be answered except that Aristotle was of that opinion, which Scotus finally concedes, In II, dist. 3, q. 7, ad 1, where he says that Aristotle thought that the angels are beings necessary per se, and therefore could not consistently think that there could be several angels in one species; for, if there could be, there would be in fact, because in things per se necessary and eternal to be and to be able are the same. And similarly, if there could be several, they could also be multiplied to infinity, and finally would actually be infinite. But the foundation of this discourse is uncertain, namely that Aristotle thought the angels to be beings necessary per se. And perhaps Aristotle, when he posits this difference between material and immaterial individuals, does not speak precisely and metaphysically of the individual as it expresses singular substance alone, but speaks physically of the individual as it is in the thing itself affected by its accidents; in which way he seems to speak in the said place of De Anima III; for he says that the material individual is such that sense is concerned with it, which is not true of the individual taken with rigorous and metaphysical prescission, but only in the latter and physical way. And so a difference between the material and spiritual individual can easily be found.

40. To the reason of the aforesaid opinion (whatever may be the case with that opinion that in material things signate matter is the principle of individuation, which we shall dispute immediately) the answer is that, although in immaterial things this principle of individuation is not given, some proportional one must nevertheless be given, because those substances too are individual not by virtue of their specific notion, but of their singular one. Whence, when it is said that spiritual substance is individual by itself, if by itself is understood as by virtue of its specific notion, the question is begged and something false is assumed, as has been proved; but if by itself is understood as through its own entity, this is indeed true, but nothing prevents that in that very entity the specific notion and the individual difference are distinguished by reason, and that the same entity according to diverse respects can be the principle and foundation of each. For as regards this the reason is almost the same concerning material substances; for, whether signate matter is said to be the principle of their individuation or anything else whatever, nothing can be which is not the very essential entity of the thing, either whole or partial; whence in the same it is necessary to distinguish both the specific notion, on account of which it is said to be essence or part of essence, and another notion, distinct not in reality but by reason, on account of which it is said to be the principle of individuation.

1. We omit the divine substance, since, as we have said, it is per se and essentially individual; whence there is no more reason to seek a principle of individuation in it than a principle of its essence or existence.

The sense of the question

2. In order that the sense of the question may be understood, it is to be taken from what was said in the preceding section that in substances of this kind a metaphysical composition can be considered, which according to reason is from the specific nature and the individual difference; for just as that which the species adds over the genus is, according to metaphysical consideration, a difference dividing or contracting the genus and constituting the species, so that which the individual adds over the species is rightly called a difference contracting the species and constituting and distinguishing the individuals, which are truly and properly said to differ in number; for on this account the species is said to be predicated of many differing in number. Likewise we have shown that this which the individual adds over the species, although it is distinct only by reason, is nevertheless real and positive, founding the negation or indivision proper to the individual, because of itself it is incommunicable and distinct from others, or incommunicable to other individuals; and therefore, adjoined to the species, it constitutes with it the individual per se one under such a species; nothing, therefore, is lacking to it for it to have the true notion of a difference. Whence some think that this is the principle of individuation to be assigned, and that no other is to be sought, as may be seen in Scotus, In II, dist. 2, q. 6; and Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, sect. 1. But the question is not disputed in this sense, nor is there truly a diversity of opinions about it among those who dispute about the principle of individuation. The sense of the question, then, is: what foundation or principle does that individual difference have in the thing itself? For these metaphysical predicates are wont to be taken from the real principles constituting the thing, in the way in which the genus is wont to be said to be taken from matter and the difference from form; and substantial denominations are sometimes taken from matter, as when man is called material, sometimes from form, as when he is called rational, sometimes from the whole composite nature, as when he is called man; in this manner, then, it is inquired in the present case what the principle of this individual difference is. From which declaration it is evident that extrinsic principles or causes of individuation, or rather of individuals, are not inquired into here, such as are the efficient and final cause; for these cause individuation in no other way than by causing the individual entity, or by giving the intrinsic principle of individuation itself; this, therefore, is what we inquire into. And although the question is general about all created substances, yet because material ones are better known to us, we shall speak of them first, and afterwards it will easily be evident what we can conjecture about spiritual ones. And since the opinions on this matter are various and demand a prolix examination, we shall treat them one by one.

3. There is, then, the celebrated opinion affirming that the principle of individuation is signate matter. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 50, a. 4; III, q. 77, a. 2; and In IV, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; and Opusc. 29; and De ente et essentia, c. 2, where Cajetan disputes and defends it at length; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, qq. 33 and 34; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 21, and others to be cited below. And this opinion is thought to be Aristotle’s; for in various places he judges that numerical distinction and identity are to be attributed to prime matter. Whence in Metaphysics V, c. 6, text 42, he says: and those things are one in number whose matter is one; and in Book VII, c. 8, text 28, he says: that the form in these fleshes and bones is Socrates and Callias; and c. 10, text 25: the singular (he says) from the ultimate matter is now Socrates; and from this principle, in Metaphysics XII, c. 8, text 49, he concludes that the first mover cannot be other than one in number, because it is without matter, thinking it necessary that things which agree in species and differ in number have matter and differ through matter. And similarly, in De Caelo I, c. 9, he proves that there cannot be another world, because this world embraces the whole matter of natural things. From these testimonies, then, it appears that this was Aristotle’s opinion, according to which it must consequently be said (as the aforesaid authors say) that in immaterial substances there is no positive principle of individuation nor a proper individual difference, but only a nature of itself incommunicable.

4. For the foundation of this opinion, if we look to reason, I find almost none which is not reduced to the authority of Aristotle, namely: because matter is the principle of the multiplication and distinction of individuals within the same species, as Aristotle testifies in the places cited; but that is the principle of individuation which is the principle of numerical distinction; therefore. Secondly, because that is individual which is incommunicable to similar inferiors; but matter is the first foundation of this incommunicability; for form, since it is act, is of itself communicable, but matter, since it is prime potency, is of itself incommunicable, and form is then limited and determined when it is restricted to this matter. Thirdly, because the individual is the first subject in the metaphysical coordination; for all superior things are predicated of it, and it itself of no others; therefore the first principle and foundation of the individual as such must be that which is the first subject among physical principles; but such is matter; therefore.

The reasons of the said opinion are weighed

5. But before we proceed further, these reasons, authority being set aside, are not of great moment. For to the first it can easily be answered by denying the major; for rather that is the principle of multiplication which is the principle of distinction; but the principle of distinction is not matter, but rather form, for, as is in the common proverb, it is act which distinguishes. Whence St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 40, proves professedly that matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things; and although he intends to speak chiefly of essential distinction, his reasons nevertheless seem to urge also of numerical distinction, especially what he says in the second reason, that form does not follow the disposition of matter as its first cause, but rather matter is so disposed that such a form follows. Likewise what he says in the same place, that those things which are reduced to matter as to their first cause are beyond the intention of the agent and happen by chance. If, therefore, matter were the first cause on account of which there is such an individual, the individual as such would happen by chance and beyond the intention of the agent. Likewise what he says in the same place in the fourth reason, that one matter needs something else distinct from itself in order to be distinguished from another matter; it is not, therefore, the first cause of distinction, as was assumed in the reason given. Wherefore, convinced by these and other reasons, many of the authors who follow the aforesaid opinion confess that, since two things are of the notion of the individual, namely to be incommunicable to inferiors and to be distinct from other individuals, matter is the principle of individuation as regards the first, but that as regards the second it is quantity, for it is quantity which distinguishes matters themselves; how truly and consistently this is said we shall examine afterwards; for now we shall only weigh the force of the said reasons. The first reason, however, proceeded only of individuation as regards the distinction of one from another, of which the aforesaid authors already confess that it does not arise from matter. I notice, however, that the arguments made do not convince of every distinction, for, as I shall say below, matter in its own way has that by which it distinguishes one from another, in so far as it itself has some entitative act; yet they prove that there is no reason why the first reason of the whole numerical distinction should be attributed to it rather than to some form.

6. The second reason proceeds of the first root of incommunicability, in which the notion of the individual first consists, as was declared above; for distinction from another is related rather consequently, according to what was said above of unity in common; whence, if that reason were efficacious, it would sufficiently prove that matter is the principle of individuation. But if anyone considers rightly, an open equivocation is committed in that discourse; for when matter is said to be the principle of the incommunicability of the individual because it is the first subject, of itself most incommunicable, either the word incommunicable is taken equivocally or something false is assumed in the proof. For matter can be understood to be incommunicable in many ways: first, that it is incommunicable to something as to a physical subject which it would inform or in which it would inhere; and this sense is most true, and it is rightly proved from this that matter is the first subject; this, however, is irrelevant to the matter with which we are dealing, both because it is not of the notion of the individual as such that it be incommunicable to another as to a subject, for accidents are individual, although they are communicated in this way, and substantial forms too; and also because that incommunicability does not suffice for the notion of the individual; for matter by virtue of its species is incommunicable in that way, and yet it is not individual by virtue of its species, but common to many matters differing in number; that incommunicability, therefore, is not the first root of individuation, even in matter itself; much less, therefore, will matter be able to be the first principle of the individuation of substance by reason of this incommunicability. In another way, then, matter can be called incommunicable, either after the manner of a cause, or after the manner of a part, or after the manner of a nature to a supposit, or after the manner of a superior to inferiors; and all these modes are false; for matter is communicated to form in the way in which it is its cause and sustains it. Likewise matter is communicated to the composite as a part to the whole and as a cause to its effect, which it causes in no other way than by intrinsically communicating its entity to it. Likewise matter as a part of the nature is communicated only to its proper supposit, if we speak naturally, but supernaturally also to another's, as may be seen in the humanity of Christ; but all these modes are nothing to the present point, as is self-evident. But the last mode (in which alone the terms assumed in the aforesaid reason would be taken univocally) is openly false, as is convinced by the reason given above, because matter as such, by virtue of its species, is communicable to many inferiors which can be subjected to it in order to predication, although they cannot be subjects of inherence. But if you say that matter as such is common, but signate matter, of which that opinion speaks, is incommunicable, against this is the fact that signate matter, whatever it may be, does not have its incommunicability from the notion of first subject, on which the said argument was founded; if, therefore, signate matter is incommunicable, it will be for another cause, which can be common to forms or other things, as we shall see in what follows. Wherefore for that incommunicability which is of the notion of the individual that notion of first subject is irrelevant; for both the angelic forms and God himself are incommunicable in that way, although they are altogether act and not potency. Whence, when it is said in the same place that form is of itself communicable, it is also beside the point; for form as form is communicable to matter as to a subject, not as to an inferior; and according to its specific notion it is communicable to distinct forms, and therefore according to that notion it is not individual; yet this form is as incommunicable as this matter; therefore as regards this there is no greater reason for one than for the other.

7. And from these things it is evident that the third conjecture has no efficacy, because the reason of the subject of inherence and of the subject of predication is far diverse; for although a certain proportion can be thought out between these two subjects, for the superior is compared to the inferior subject to it as a form giving being, nevertheless they are simply not of the same notion, nor is one founded in the other; whence in simple substances there is subjection or subordination of inferiors to superiors without a subject of inherence or information. Add that that which is the subject of predication is not of itself more imperfect than its superior predicate, as matter, which is the first subject, is inferior to form; and therefore it is not necessary that that which is the first subject in the order of generation and imperfection be the first principle and foundation of the individual, which is the first subject in the order of predication, containing in itself every perfection of the superiors and adding something proper by which it as it were completes and perfects it.

Many things are objected against the said opinion

8. But it must be seen, although this opinion cannot be convinced by reason, whether it can be fittingly defended and sustained; for this will be enough for us, that we defend it at least on account of the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas. And the first reason of difficulty about it can be that matter of itself is common, not only in so far as the same according to specific notion is common to many individuals of matter, but also because the same matter in number can underlie many forms, either distinct in species or diverse only in number, at least successively; how, then, can matter be the principle of individuation? For the principle of individuation must be most proper, and in no way common to many individuals, neither simultaneously nor successively. On account of this difficulty it has been added in that opinion that matter not in any way whatever, but signed by quantity, is the principle of individuation. But what is signified by that word is so obscure that in explaining this matter the defenders of this opinion disagree among themselves in a wonderful way. Whose various expositions it is necessary to report and examine, in order that it may more clearly appear how great the probability of this opinion is.

The first way of explaining signate matter is rejected

9. The first exposition is that matter signed by quantity is nothing other than matter with quantity, or affected by quantity; for they think that from these two this principle of individuation is as it were integrated, so that matter gives incommunicability, quantity distinction, as we were saying above. So Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 5, and a. 3, in the answers to the arguments against it. The same Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 21, and Soncinas, Book VII, q. 34. St. Thomas favours it, De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, where he explains that natural signate matter is matter with the determination of these or those dimensions; and De malo, q. 16, a. 1, ad 18, he says that matter subject to dimensions is the principle of numerical distinction in those things in which many individuals of one species are found; and on Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, he says that quantity distinguishes material things. And it seems founded on Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 3, text 11, where he thinks that specific distinction comes about through form, but numerical through quantity; and Book X, c. 3, text 4, he posits only these modes of division, namely according to form or according to quantity; and Metaphysics V, c. 13, he attributes to quantity that it is the principle of division; whence he says that that is quantified which can be divided into things of which each is apt by nature to be a this something; and Physics III, c. 7, text 78, he says that number arises from the division of the quantified continuum. But the reason can be that, in order that matter be the principle of individuation, something is necessary which distinguishes this matter from that; but this is not matter itself, because distinction must come about through act; nor is it the form, for rather this form is distinct from that because it is made and received in distinct matter.

10. But this opinion is false and can be attacked by weighty reasons. We can proceed, however, in two ways: first, supposing the other opinion which the aforesaid authors hold, that quantity is not in prime matter, but in the whole composite, and is destroyed when the substance is corrupted, and a new one is acquired at the generation of the substance. From which it comes about that, simply speaking, this form in number is first introduced into this matter and quantity follows. Whence the argument is made, because this form, when it is first understood to be received in this matter, is also understood to be received in matter distinct from others; therefore it is not formally and intrinsically made distinct through quantity. Likewise from matter and form precisely conceived and as preceding quantity this substantial individual results; therefore it as such is one, not by unity of reason, but by real, singular and transcendental unity; therefore, just as by virtue of its substantial entity it is undivided in itself, so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from all others; therefore it does not have distinction through quantity. Nor does it matter if you say that in the genus of material cause quantity is prior in matter. Both because in that opinion this cannot fittingly be said consistently, as is to be treated below; and also because at least it cannot be understood according to the true inherence of quantity in matter, because according to that principle quantity never inheres in matter in real duration, but in the composite; therefore neither can it belong to it in some prior sign, because what does not belong in reality and in real duration can belong neither prior nor posterior; but quantity does not make a thing divided or distinct from others except by inhering and informing; therefore in no sign does quantity have this effect first in matter, but in the whole composite; therefore it supposes it already individual, and consequently distinct by another prior division. And finally because for the force of the reason it is enough that in some genus of cause, which is simply prior, matter, as it precedes quantity, has distinction of itself. Finally the reason can be concluded thus: the form is received in matter bare of quantity; therefore this form in this matter, because generation comes about in the singular; therefore from them this individual results before the coming of quantity; indeed quantity comes to an individual already constituted, which God could preserve without quantity distinct from all others; therefore quantity does not intrinsically and formally enter the principle of individuation, either of the whole composite substance, or of its individual parts, namely form and matter.

11. Secondly, we can proceed in the other opinion, that quantity is in prime matter and remains the same in what is generated and what is corrupted; and then a no less efficacious argument is taken from elsewhere, because not only this matter according to itself, but also as affected by this quantity, can be under diverse forms, and consequently in individuals distinct in number; therefore it can no more be the principle of individuation than matter alone. It will perhaps be said that matter with indeterminate dimensions can be under diverse forms, and as such is not the principle of individuation, but that matter with these determinate dimensions is proper to this individual, and as such is the principle of individuation. But I inquire what these determinate dimensions add over quantity. For dimensions can be called indeterminate only because they do not express a certain term of length or breadth, etc., and in this way terminate quantity will only add certain terms of the dimensions; and this is not enough for the present point, because the same matter existing in this way under the same certain and determinate quantity can underlie distinct forms, as is evident in the same rod first green, afterwards dry, and similar cases. Otherwise that quantity can be called indeterminate which is not affected by certain dispositions, such as such rarity or density, or other qualities, by which matter is determined to this form rather than another. And in this sense it can be admitted that matter affected by quantity or dimensions so determined, that is, so proximately disposed, is so proper to this individual that it cannot be in another. Nevertheless the said authors neither can speak in this sense, nor would their opinion in it be true. The first is evident, because they themselves say that quantity from its proper notion and formal effect distinguishes one individual from another; therefore this does not belong to it by reason of other qualities or dispositions; otherwise not matter signed by quantity, but quantified matter signed by qualities, would have to be called the principle of individuation. The second is evident, because otherwise it follows that the accidents by which matter is disposed to the form are intrinsically included in the principle of the individuation of the substance; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is evident, because signate matter, according to this opinion, intrinsically and formally includes these accidents as inhering in it and determining it to such a form. But the minor is proved, first, because the individual of substance is per se one, directly placed under the species in the predicament of substance; it does not, therefore, intrinsically include accidents, although it intrinsically includes the principle of individuation. Secondly, because it has been shown above that the individual difference is not in reality distinct from the nature of the thing from the substantial nature, and so is the individual substance itself; therefore its intrinsic principle cannot be an accident, but substance.

12. And these reasons can proceed also in the other opinion, that quantity is not in prime matter but in the whole composite; because quantity is an accident; therefore, in whatever subject it is, it cannot intrinsically enter the constitution of the substantial individual; therefore it cannot effect its distinction. Whence, abstracting from those opinions, we can argue, thirdly: because, although a thing is prior in nature one in itself than distinct from others, nevertheless this latter follows intrinsically from the first without any positive addition which would be made to the thing itself which is one, but only through negation, by which, the other extreme being posited, it is true to say that this is not that. And so that same positive thing which founds unity as regards the first negation or indivision in itself founds consequently the later negation of distinction from another; in which sense it is wont to be said, and is most true, that a thing is distinguished from others through that through which it is constituted in itself, because it is distinguished through that by which it is. In almost which sense St. Thomas said, I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2, that each thing has unity in the same way in which it has being. And it is evident in specific unity, for the same difference which constitutes the species one in itself makes it distinct from the other species; whence what is the principle of such a difference is also the principle not only of unity but also of specific distinction; therefore similarly in individual unity that which is the principle of the individual as regards its constitution and its incommunicability or indivisibility in itself is also the principle of its distinction from others; and conversely, what is the principle of distinction must also be the principle of constitution. If, therefore, matter per se, and quantity being set aside, constitutes the individual incommunicable and one in itself, it also distinguishes it from others; or, if it cannot give distinction, neither can it give the incommunicability of individuation. And it is confirmed. For that is called incommunicable in this way which is so one in itself that it cannot be divided into many similar ones; but what is of this kind has precisely from this that, if others exist, it is distinguished from them. And the same argument can conversely be made of quantity, that, if it is what distinguishes the individuals of substance, it must also constitute them; or conversely, if it cannot constitute them, as is truer, because, since it is an accident, it is outside the whole breadth of substance, and rather supposes an individual subject, neither can it distinguish them.

13. Some answer that this reason rightly proves that quantity does not effect the first distinction between the individuals of substance, but does not prove that it does not effect some distinction, namely numerical and quantitative, which is enough for quantity as regards this part to be able to pertain intrinsically to the principle of individuation. But this answer labours in equivocation; for, if quantity does not cause the first distinction, but another, I ask which is that which it supposes, and which that which it causes; the former certainly can be no other than the entitative distinction by which this matter is not that, or this substance is not that. Both because no other prior distinction can be thought out; and also because this is most intrinsic to any entity whatever; for just as nothing can be conceived more intrinsic to each being than its entity, so no distinction or separation from another being is prior to that which is explained by this negation: This being is not that; on account of which it cannot be understood that one entity is distinguished from another entitatively, and primarily, through something other than itself.

14. Whence it also comes about (which is a new and sufficient argument against this whole opinion) that it does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity to distinguish entitatively one matter from another, or a part of matter from a part of matter, because, just as quantity supposes matter as its subject, so it supposes its individual entity, which by itself is entitatively distinct from another similar entity; therefore distinct quantities suppose distinct subjects in which they are received, and distinct parts of quantity suppose parts of the subject also entitatively distinct. For here too that argument of Cajetan has place, that a singular act supposes a singular potency, which is most true in act and potency really distinct. All the more because, since quantity is really distinct from the matter in which it is, it cannot make it really distinct from itself; therefore it supposes in it an entity which by itself can be distinguished from its quantity; therefore by the same it will be able to be distinguished from all others which are not itself; this, therefore, does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity. Which finally can be confirmed a posteriori; for, if God, quantity being separated, preserved the substance of the body of Peter, for example, the partial entities of matter which are in the hands, feet, head, etc., would always remain entitatively distinct, whether they remained united or not, because, although one entity can be conjoined to or separated from another, nevertheless that one should become another, or that both should coalesce into one indivisible, preserving their entity, is an open repugnance, because they would both be distinct and not be distinct.

15. The distinction, then, which quantity supposes in substance is entitative and substantial distinction; but this is what pertains per se to individual unity, of which we are treating; for through this the individual is understood to be distinct from all others, either under the same species, if it is compared with similar ones, or also under the genus, or under any common predicate whatever, if it is compared with all others; therefore, if quantity confers some distinction, that will be per accidens to the notion of the individual and supervening on it; quantity, therefore, will not by that reason pertain to the principle of individuation of which we are treating. Which is explained from the thing itself; for quantity, just as it gives substance quantitative unity, so it can only give either quantitative or situational distinction; of which the former consists only in this, that one substance is under diverse terms of quantity from another, and so is not continuous with it by the continuation proper to quantity; but the latter consists in this, that one substance is outside the site or place of another. Whence it is also preserved that quantity distinguishes as it constitutes; for first it makes substance extended in itself, united and quantitatively determined and having this corporeal bulk, but consequently it makes it fill local space; and similarly it primarily distinguishes quantitatively, and then situationally; but this whole distinction is outside the notion of the individual substance, and accidental to it, as quantity itself is.

16. Which indeed is self-evident in situational distinction, because it is very extrinsic and mutable, and however much the quantified thing changes its site, it remains the same in number; indeed by the power of God the same corporeal substance in number can be preserved either without quantity or with it without site, in the way in which the body of Christ is in the Eucharist. And similarly the same quantified thing can be constituted by the power of God with a double site, as I showed at length in treating of the mystery of the Eucharist;¹ and two distinct bodies can be placed in the same site, and it has often been done by God, as has been demonstrated in the matter of the resurrection.² This situational distinction, therefore, matters nothing to numerical unity and distinction. But of quantitative distinction the judgement is the same as of quantity itself and of the unity coming from it, which we showed above is accidental to the intrinsic and entitative unity of material substance; whence, although it naturally accompanies it after the manner of a property, nevertheless in the order of nature it supposes it, and is rather caused by it than causes it. And finally by absolute power the same material substance in number could be preserved without its quantity, and consequently retain its whole individual unity with substantial incommunicability and distinction without quantitative unity and distinction.

17. Wherefore Soncinas and Ferrariensis too finally confess that material substance does not have transcendental unity from quantity, but that it is nevertheless one in number through quantity. But it is wonderful that they so easily turn aside from the true sense of the question and use terms equivocally. For, as we have often admonished and all suppose, and they themselves (as I think) are not ignorant, when we treat here of numerical unity, we do not take number as it is a species of quantity, but as it can be found in any beings whatever, as St. Thomas notes, Opusc. 16, last chapter, where he says in this way that even immaterial substance is one in number; in which way also Aristotle, in Metaphysics V, distinguished one in number, in species, in genus and in proportion. This numerical unity, then, is transcendental in each thing, just as specific or formal unity is in its own way transcendental with respect to the common nature; therefore, if material substance has transcendental individual unity, and not through quantity, quantity does not intrinsically pertain to the principle of the individuation of substance. Add that, in the way in which substance is one in predicamental number through quantity, it is not only distinguished but also constituted and made undivided and incommunicable in itself quantitatively through the same quantity; for quantity could not make something one in its genus unless it also made it undivided, since the notion of one consists in this; if, therefore, they speak constantly and univocally of incommunicability and distinction of the same genus, they wrongly distribute these functions, attributing one to matter and another to quantity; but if they speak now of substantial incommunicability and afterwards of quantitative distinction, they do not persist in the true sense of the question and admit equivocation in the use of words.

The second way of expounding signate matter is rejected

18. The second exposition is that matter signed by quantity does not include quantity itself intrinsically, but as the term of the relationship of matter to it. For matter by its nature is capable of quantity, but as such it cannot be the complete principle of individuation, because it is indifferent to any quantity whatever, as to any form whatever; but through the action of the agent prior to generation it is determined so as to be capable of this quantity and not another, and as such it is said to be the principle of individuation. But by quantity we understand in this place not only mathematical quantity (so to speak), but physical, that is, affected by physical qualities and dispositions. So Cajetan explained this matter, De ente et essentia, c. 2, q. 5. Javellus follows, Metaphysics V, q. 15, and before them Giles, Quodlibet I, q. 5, a. 1. But this opinion displeased the same Cajetan, I, q. 29, a. 1, on account of the argument which I shall report below, and therefore he found another manner of speaking (if indeed it is another); for he says that not matter as it is in potency to this quantity, but as virtually pre-having this quantity, or as it is the root and foundation of this quantity, is the principle of individuation. Nevertheless I do not sufficiently understand what is signified by these words distinct from the former, because matter (especially in the opinion of Cajetan and the other Thomists) does not pre-have quantity in the genus of effective cause, but it is made by an extrinsic agent or results from the form; it can therefore pre-have it only in the genus of material cause; but this is nothing other than to have it in receptive potency, or (what is the same) to have potency to it; just as matter as pre-having form can be nothing other than matter as it is in potency to form, or rather as it is in receptive potency of form, because it pre-has it in no other way than in the genus of material cause; the same, therefore, holds in the present case for the same reason. All those words, then, matter as foundation, as root, as cause, come back to the same, because matter is not the foundation of quantity except materially and passively, nor is it the root except as first subject, nor the cause except material, which consists in the notion of receptive potency, from which the form is educed; therefore under all those words nothing else can underlie but the potency of matter itself. Wherefore both Cajetan’s own argument and those which we shall make proceed equally against this opinion, and therefore it is not necessary to treat it as diverse.

19. With these is also to be joined another, which says that signate matter is nothing other than matter ultimately disposed to this form, because it is not disposed except by quantity affected by such qualities. But this opinion can be affirmed in two ways: first, understanding that quantity and the other dispositions inhere and remain in matter, and simply precede in the order of nature the introduction of the form, and in this way disposed and signate matter can rightly be understood in relation to the form; yet in this way to posit signate matter as the principle of individuation is to fall into the former opinion of Capreolus, because this signate matter intrinsically includes quantity and accidents, which it is impossible to include in the principle of individuation, as we have shown. But if it is said that these dispositions, although they inhere in matter, are nevertheless not included in the individual intrinsically and formally, but are as it were required conditions, against this is the fact that thence the principle of individuation intrinsically and formally becomes only something common to many individuals, namely matter itself according to itself; but this is impossible, as we argued above. Whence this would not be to assign that which in itself and in truth is the principle of individuation, but at most that which can be a sign of individuation as regards us, or the occasion of the production of such an individual with respect to the agent, of which modes we shall speak afterwards. In another way, then, this opinion can be taught, supposing that quantity and the other dispositions are not in matter but in the composite, and that, as they make up the ultimate disposition, they follow the form; and in this sense it is the same for matter to be disposed as to have an order or determinate potency to this quantity with these dispositions; and in this way this manner of speaking coincides with the second exposition adduced.

20. This whole exposition, then, I judge to be false. And first of all it supposes in it that matter does not have quantity and other dispositions inhering in it, which, although it is probable, is perhaps not as probable as the contrary. Next, that opinion being supposed, Cajetan argues, in I, that the potency of matter for receiving quantity is in the genus of quantity, since potency and act are in the same genus, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics X; therefore neither can that potency to quantity intrinsically pertain to the principle of the individuation of substance; otherwise the individual of substance would not be per se one, for it would consist of things of diverse predicaments. This reason, however, taken by itself is not efficacious; for Javellus rightly answers that potency pertains to the genus of its primary act, to which it is per se primarily ordered, and from which it in its own way takes its species; but matter is not so a potency to quantity that it is per se primarily ordered to it, but to substantial form; and therefore it is not necessary that it pertain to the predicament of quantity. But what Fonseca urges in favour of Cajetan, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 4, that, although the potency of matter simply does not pertain to quantity, nevertheless as receptive of quantity it pertains to that predicament—this (I say) does not press, because that reduplication of matter as receptive of quantity does not add a real potency to matter itself, but only according to our mode of conceiving and speaking explains that potency through a relationship to a secondary term, which is quantity; and therefore it is not necessary that by that reason it pertain to the predicament of quantity. As regards, then, the force of the argument founded on that maxim, act and potency are in the same genus, the answer of Javellus is good, as we shall say more fully below in treating of the material cause of accidents.

21. Nevertheless from the same answer an efficacious argument is taken against this very opinion; for if the potency of matter regards substantial form prior to quantity, then also its potency is determined to this substantial form prior to this quantity; therefore it is not signed or determined to this form through potency to this quantity. The first consequence is evident, both because potency is determined to act in a mode proportioned to itself; if, therefore, the potency itself is substantial and does not regard accidental act except by means of substantial act, it is not determined except with the same relationship and proportion; and also because, according to the opinion of these authors, in the thing itself matter does not receive this quantity except by means of this form, and because it receives this form, therefore it receives this quantity; therefore similarly in potency its capacity is not determined to this quantity except in so far as it is determined to this form. And the same argument proceeds according to Cajetan’s other form of speaking of matter as pre-having quantity, because matter does not pre-have quantity except in so far as it pre-has the form upon which quantity follows; therefore neither does it pre-have this quantity with these dispositions except in so far as it pre-has this form, upon which this quantity and these dispositions follow; therefore it cannot be sealed to this form in this, that it pre-has this quantity. Finally the same form of arguing proceeds against the other expression about matter disposed with the ultimate disposition, because matter is not determined to such an ultimate disposition except by means of the form; for we suppose that it is not received in it, but in the composite; therefore matter cannot be sealed either through a relationship to such a disposition, or through the disposition itself as actually received, because in either way the determination of this matter to this form simply precedes, both according to relationship and according to actual reception. This reason, however, proceeds of the ultimate disposition, which is in the instant of generation and follows the form. But if anyone contends that matter is sealed through the dispositions immediately preceding, one must proceed by another way.

22. Whence I argue, secondly and principally, against this whole exposition,³ because matter of itself is indifferent to this quantity and these dispositions, and to others; but in the instant of generation (according to this opinion), prior in nature to receiving the substantial form, it is left bare of every accident, and without any entity superadded to it; therefore it remains as indifferent as it exists of itself; therefore its potency is not determined to this quantity, because it cannot be understood that a potency of itself indifferent is determined without any addition or change made in it; therefore through such a potency so undetermined it is not sealed. The major is self-evident from the nature of matter. The minor too is self-evident in the principles of this opinion which we are attacking, because before the substantial form nothing else substantial can be pre-understood as added to matter; for what would it be, or by what would it be made, or on what foundation, or for what would it be posited? Nor anything accidental, because no accident precedes in matter before the substantial form, and in every opinion no accident precedes in matter before quantity itself. Some say that in that instant there is added to matter a certain real mode, distinct from the nature of the thing from matter, prior to the introduction of the substantial form with its quantity and other dispositions, and that through this mode matter is sealed; and some call that mode substantial, others accidental. But both speak gratuitously, nor can they explain or give a reason for what they say, which is foreign to the true method of philosophizing. For, first, I inquire for what this mode exists. They will say: in order that matter be determined to this form. On the contrary, matter itself is indifferent to this mode and to infinite others; through what, then, is matter determined to receive this mode in that instant rather than another? For if you say it is determined through another mode, we shall proceed to infinity; but if you say it is determined through the immediately preceding dispositions, it will better be said that matter is immediately determined to the form, and so this mode is superfluous. Besides, the arguments by which we shall immediately show that matter cannot be determined to the form through preceding dispositions prove in the same way that it cannot be determined through them to receiving such a mode. But if finally it is said that matter, without any prior determination, receives this mode by virtue of the agent, why will the same not be said of the form? This mode, therefore, is interposed without reason or foundation.

23. Secondly I shall inquire when and by what this mode is made; for either it is made little by little while matter is disposed, or it is made in one instant, either prior to generation or in the very instant of generation. But none of these can fittingly be understood or explained; for if it is said to be made successively and little by little with the dispositions, it will be intensible as they are; it will therefore be some accident, and therefore it will be corrupted in the instant of generation. Likewise on this side the principle of individuation will be intensible and remissible; matter will also be sealed in itself and modified to the form prior in time to receiving it. And consequently, since this mode is immediately repugnant to another mode of determination which matter has with respect to the form under which it exists, it follows that matter also loses it little by little; and by the same reason it could be inferred that it loses little by little and successively its union with such a form; all of which are absurd and improbable. And the same things follow more openly if this mode is posited to be made all at once in some instant before the instant of generation; for then matter would be at the same time under one form and ultimately sealed to another; besides that no reason can be given why it should be made in one instant rather than in another, speaking of those in which matter is not apt to receive the form. But if it is said to be made at the same time in the instant of generation, it follows that matter is left bare prior in nature to receiving such a mode, and consequently that nothing resists the agent so that it may not act on it as much as it can; therefore, just as it is said to act immediately such a mode, much better will it be said to act immediately its form.

24. Thirdly, I shall inquire what this mode is. For it is not substantial, first, because, since it is neither nature nor part of nature, neither subsistence nor existence, it cannot be conceived what it is. Next, either it is altogether absolute, even according to transcendental relation, and this will not be said consistently, both because through it matter is said to be determined to this form or quantity, and also because through it matter is said to be sealed; if, therefore, it is altogether absolute, signate matter will be something altogether absolute from quantity and from order to quantity, which is against the aforesaid opinion. And almost the same argument will be made if that mode is posited with some transcendental relationship; for, in order that the mode be substantial, it is necessary that the primary term of that relationship be the substantial form, and not quantity; and so also order to quantity will in no way pertain to the principle of individuation. But if that mode is posited as accidental, it cannot be explained what it is, or to what predicament it is to be reduced; it is also repugnant to that opinion that accidents are not in prime matter; it also follows that the principle of individuation is a being per accidens compounded of substance and accident, and that the individual adds over the species an accidental mode distinct from the nature of the thing from substance, which is altogether false.

25. Wherefore others answer that the potency of matter in that instant is determined to this quantity by the agent itself without any thing or intrinsic mode superadded to it. But this involves an open repugnance; for either the discussion is of the agent as pre-understood in first act before its action, and in this way it is impossible that through it the intrinsic potency and capacity of matter be determined, since they are altogether distinct things, and one as such does not actually change the other. Whence, if in that instant that agent were annihilated before it acted on the matter, and another were applied, it would induce into the same a distinct form proportioned to itself. But if the discussion is of the agent in second act, or of its action, it implies a contradiction to understand that the agent through its action determines matter and posits nothing intrinsic in it to determine it, because such an action of the agent is in the patient, in which it necessarily has some term.

26. It can be answered that the agent determines matter through its action, not that which it has in the instant of generation, but that which it had immediately before that instant. Which answer coincides with that opinion which says that the dispositions which immediately preceded leave the potency of matter determined, even if they leave nothing real in it. Which indeed cannot be understood of intrinsic and positive determination, on account of the argument given, that the capacity of matter is of itself universal and indifferent; therefore it cannot be intrinsically limited unless something is added to it, or it is in some way changed in itself; but nothing of this kind happens in it; but that relationship to the preceding dispositions is only a certain relation of reason, or an extrinsic determination. And it is confirmed; for if the preceding dispositions determine matter, it is either effectively or formally; for those accidents can have no other genus of causality in matter; for, although in comparison with the form they are said to concur materially, nevertheless with respect to matter not at all, because they are compared to it not as potency but as act; therefore they can only determine it formally or effectively. But not formally, because a form which is not has no real formal effect; whence, just as matter in that instant lost those accidental forms, it lost all their formal effects. Nor effectively, both for the same reason, because what is not does not effect, and also because matter receives nothing before the form, as has been shown; in no way, then, can the potency of matter be understood as intrinsically determined to this quantity, so that in this way it could be the principle of individuation. And this whole discourse can be applied against Cajetan’s later manner of speaking, because matter of itself no more pre-has this quantity than another, nor is it more the root of this than of another; I inquire, then, through what it is determined so that in that instant of generation it pre-has this quantity more than another, or is the root of this rather than another, and the whole argument made returns. Which also proceeds in the same way against the other mode of explaining signate matter, that it is matter disposed through preceding dispositions (for of subsequent ones enough has already been said in the first reason and in the arguments made against the opinion of Capreolus); for those dispositions leave nothing in matter, since they themselves are altogether corrupted, as is supposed; therefore they cannot leave it intrinsically and positively disposed, as is convinced by the arguments made; for whether you say disposed or determined, it is the same; for the same thing underlies these words.

27. But I always say intrinsically and positively, because negatively, by virtue of the preceding dispositions, matter is left not repugnant to the introduction of this form, which is rather to remain indifferent than determined. Again, extrinsically it can be said to be here and now naturally determined to receiving this form, because perhaps by a certain natural consecution this agent here and now about this subject, immediately after this alteration, is determined in natural order to introducing this form. But this in truth is rather a determination of the agent than of matter, and therefore this determination cannot make matter the intrinsic principle of individuation, but pertains to the extrinsic principle, which is on the side of the agent. All the more because, even according to this mode of determination, the agent is understood to be determined to introducing this form prior to this quantity and the other dispositions; for it induces this form per se, but this quantity and dispositions in so far as they result from this form, according to the opinion which we are pursuing. Whence finally a general argument can be made, because matter is not disposed nor determined per se primarily except to this form and on account of this form, and by reason of it receives these accidents; and therefore, according to itself and in the order of nature, the form cannot be this on account of these accidents, nor on account of order to them, and consequently not through matter signed through order to some accidents; therefore signate matter explained in that way cannot be the principle of individuation.

The third exposition of the same opinion about signate matter

28. The third explanation is that we can speak of the principle of individuation in two ways: first according to itself, that is, in so far as it is truly the principle constituting the individual as such, and is the root or foundation from which the individual difference is taken. Secondly we can speak of the principle of individuation in order to the production or multiplication of individuals, which is to inquire what is the principle and root on account of which substantial individuals are multiplied, or why this individual rather than another is produced, or why it is produced distinct from the rest. Again, in each consideration can be inquired that which is the principle of individuation per se and in itself, or only that which in order to us is the principle of distinguishing one individual from another, or which is only the occasion of such a distinction. First, then, speaking of the principle constituting the individual in the thing, and from which the individual difference contracting the species and constituting the individual is truly taken, this opinion denies that matter signed by quantity is the principle of individuation, because the discourses made seem to conclude this.

29. Secondly this opinion says that matter is the principle and root of the multiplication of individuals in material substances. It is proved, because it is the origin of generations and corruptions, through which the multiplication of individuals comes about. Likewise, because the composite from such matter is corruptible by reason of it, and thence has that it cannot be perpetually preserved; and therefore, in order that the species be preserved, the multiplication of individuals is required; the root of this multiplication, therefore, is matter. And it can also be added that this root is matter affected by quantity, because matter without quantity would not be capable of physical alteration and change through various and contrary dispositions, from which this variety and multiplication of individuals arises. But this function does not belong to matter as signed and determined to a certain form or quantity, but absolutely according to itself, because hitherto we have not dealt with the root of this individual in particular, but absolutely with the root of the multiplication of individuals in the same species; but matter is not the root of this multiplication absolutely in so far as it is determined to one form or quantity, but rather in so far as it is determinable to several. You will say: in this way matter will also be called the root of the multiplication of species in generable and corruptible substances; for they can be multiplied from the same matter because it is capable of all forms and according to itself indifferent to them and to their various dispositions. The answer is that the reason is not similar; for, although that property of matter is necessary for the aforesaid multiplication, it is nevertheless not properly the first root of that variety, both because, since the whole matter itself is of one species and its parts or portions according to themselves are distinguished only in number, as far as depends on itself it is content with forms distinct in number; and also because specific distinction is per se in things, and therefore radically comes from the form, which per se gives the species; and therefore this distinction without controversy is found in material and immaterial, corruptible and incorruptible things, which is not evident of numerical distinction, nor does it appear so necessary.

30. Thirdly this opinion says that matter signed by quantity is the principle and root, or at least the occasion, of the production of this individual distinct from the rest. It is declared, for this individual can be compared either to the other existing individuals, or to other possible ones, which can be produced from the same matter, even by the same agent. In the former way the sufficient and first reason why this individual is produced distinct from the rest is because it is produced from matter diverse in number, because, since the same form in number cannot be in total matters diverse in number, by the very fact that the matter is diverse in number, it is necessary that the form at least be diverse in number; whence for this distinction it is not necessary to adjoin other dispositions or another signation of matter, because the numerical distinction of matter according to itself, or with its quantity, suffices; which nevertheless does not suffice for this matter to be the root of the distinction of this individual from the rest which do not exist, or which have been made or can be made from the same matter. Whence some have said that Aristotle did not assign a principle of individuation by which the individual is distinguished from all the things which do not exist, because these are sufficiently distinguished by contradiction alone; but that he assigned only a principle distinguishing in the aforesaid way one individual from other existing ones; which Fonseca taught, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 4, sect. 4; and he reports it from Hervaeus, Quodlibet V, q. 9; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 2, q. 5. But it is to be added that through matter considered in the aforesaid way the individual is distinguished not only from other existing ones, but also from any other possible ones, even non-existing, which can be generated from other matters distinct in number, especially in those whose forms are educed from matter, because it is very probable that the same form in number cannot be educed, not only simultaneously but not even successively, from matters diverse in number. But in individuals which can be generated from the same matter in number, the distinction of one existing individual from another existing one has no place, because several individuals consisting of the same matter in number cannot exist at the same time; and therefore such distinction is always of an existing thing from a non-existing one.

31. But although this contradictory opposition is a sufficient argument of the distinction of such individuals, the principle and root can still be investigated why they are so distinguished that, one existing, the other does not exist; or why in this matter this form in number rather than another which could be made is introduced. For the cause of this cannot be given from prime matter alone, since the same is successively in each individual, which is perhaps true also of the quantity coeval with matter itself. Other dispositions and circumstances of the action, therefore, must be adjoined, namely that from this subject so prepared and disposed at this time by this agent this action is done; for thus it comes about that, although the prime or remote matter is the same, nevertheless from it this individual is made distinct from all others which have been made or can be made from it, because the production takes place with diverse dispositions and circumstances. And this is confirmed and declared; for fire, for example, is of itself able to produce several forms similar to itself in species and distinct in number, and yet here and now in this matter it introduces this form in number rather than others, which determination cannot come from the fire itself, since it is a natural agent and of itself equally able to introduce any form whatever; nor can it come from the form to be educed, because it does not yet exist, nor has it whence it would determine the power of the agent; nor does it come from remote matter, because that too is of itself equally indifferent; therefore it comes either from the dispositions, if they remain in matter, or from the natural order of acting here and now with these circumstances; for another natural cause cannot easily be thought out. For what some think, that this is to be reduced to the divine will, although it holds true in those effects which are made immediately by God himself, nevertheless to attribute this to all natural causes does not seem philosophical, and in theology it has a special difficulty on account of the determination of free acts, and especially evil ones, which we shall touch on below in treating of the concurrence of God with secondary causes. In this way, then, matter signed and affected by these circumstances is the principle or occasion of such individuation, because neither does matter suffice without the circumstances, as has been said, nor the circumstances without the matter; for if this is diverse, the effect too will be diverse.

32. You will say: therefore the same matter will be the intrinsic principle constituting the individual in its being; for as a thing is related to becoming, so also to being. The answer is by denying the consequence, both because it is one thing for this thing to be such an individual, another for this individual rather than another to be now produced, and therefore these can come from diverse roots; and also because, according to this explanation, signate matter is not so much the principle of individuation as the occasion of inducing this form in the subject rather than another; but that form is not this because it is made in this subject, at this time and by this agent, because these are accidental to it according to itself, and the same in number could be made by God without these circumstances; and, speaking of the dispositions, rather they are ordered to such a form than conversely; signate matter, therefore, can only in the said way be the occasion why this form is produced by a natural agent from the natural order by which the power of a natural agent is determined to effecting such an effect rather than another in such a subject applied and affected by such circumstances.

33. Fourthly this opinion adds that matter signed by sensible quantity is called the principle of individuation as regards us, because through it we know the distinction of material individuals among themselves. So St. Thomas, Opusc. 32, De natura materiae et dimensionibus indeterminatis, c. 3, says that from this prime matter and this form the individual of substance comes about, yet that it is not demonstrable here and now without determinate dimensions; and therefore (he says) matter under certain dimensions is called the cause of individuation, not because the dimensions cause the individual, since an accident does not cause its subject, but because through certain dimensions the individual is shown here and now, as through a proper and inseparable sign of the individual; and he indicates the same in Opusc. 29, De principio individuationis. Whence, when in other places St. Thomas indicates that the individual adds accidents over the specific nature, as I, q. 3, and Quodlibet II, a. 4, and De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, and in other places cited above, he seems to have to be expounded in order to our knowledge. For that is the sign by which we a posteriori distinguish one individual from another, not that by which it is distinguished in itself, as St. Thomas himself seems to have explained in the other places or opuscula cited, and to have proved by an excellent reason, namely, because an accident does not cause its subject; especially since the same St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, and De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, ad 8, says that substance is individuated by itself and by its proper principles, but accidents are individuated by substance; therefore, when in other places he places accidents, or order to accidents, among those things which individuate substance, he must necessarily be expounded either as regards our knowledge, or as regards the occasion which they afford to the production of such an individual of substance, as has been declared. This, however, is attributed to matter by reason of quantity rather than by reason of qualities, because the numerical distinction of qualities themselves too is most of all known to us from quantity; for if two images are very similar among themselves, we distinguish them in no other way than by numbering them in diverse quantified subjects. And in the same sense it seems it must be understood that quantities themselves are distinguished in number from sites; for this is true as regards us; for we sensibly distinguish and number them because we see them in diverse sites; yet it is not true according to itself; for rather quantities occupy diverse sites because they are distinct in themselves; it is only, then, because quantity by its nature has this, that it constitutes part outside part and body outside body in order to site, and a more apt principle for distinguishing material individuals in order to us is lacking.

Resolution of the question

34. This whole opinion is indeed probable in itself, and at one time it pleased me; I fear, however, whether according to it the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas is sufficiently explained; both because otherwise they would have handed down to us the principle of individuation very deficiently and with great equivocation, if, omitting that which truly and in itself is the principle constituting the individual, they had handed down to us only either signs a posteriori or occasions of distinguishing or producing individuals; and most of all because from this principle they seem to have inferred that in things separated from matter there are not several individuals, because there is not a principle of individuation of this kind. That too which in that opinion was said about the determination of agents to particular effects and forms from matter with the circumstances of the action seems to many learned men difficult to believe, because, if the matter is attentively considered, all things are reduced to the circumstance of time, which seems very extrinsic for this determination to be able to come from it. But of this last point I shall speak more conveniently in the following section. Of the other point truly pertaining to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas: as regards St. Thomas, it is evident that that exposition is founded on other places and words of his which cannot be reconciled otherwise. But as regards Aristotle, he does not seem ever to have professedly and metaphysically investigated and declared this principle, but only to have taught in a physical manner from sensible things how to distinguish one material individual from another. But what the said authors inferred thence, that in immaterial substances there is no multiplication of individuals in the same species, can at most have this probable sense, namely that we do not have reasons and principles for distinguishing spiritual substances distinct in number, which we have in material ones; indeed many extend this also to incorruptible material substances, in which too we do not have as many principles for knowing or positing numerical distinction in them as we have in corruptible substances, of which most of all all the things which have been said proceed. Finally, what Aristotle said in De Caelo I, that there cannot be another world besides this because in this is the whole matter, he certainly seems to have understood either that God created the world from matter and could not create matter itself; or that God acts from necessity of nature, and therefore could not create more matter than he created; or certainly that God is so determined in his mode of acting that he can make no integral and material substance from nothing in time, as we shall see in the course of this work. And so from that opinion it is only gathered for the present, from the mind of Aristotle, that material substances are not multiplied except from matter. But whatever may be the case with the mind of these authors, it is evident from this opinion so declared that the proper and internal principle of the individual difference, even in material things, has not been handed down to us. For the arguments made against this opinion expounded in other ways plainly conclude that signate matter cannot be a principle of this kind.

1. There is another principal opinion on this matter, that the internal principle of individuation is the substantial form. This is wont to be attributed to Durandus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, who does not altogether affirm it, as I shall say afterwards; but Averroes seems to have taught it, De Anima I, c. 7, and Book II, at the beginning, and comms. 7, 8, 9 and 60, and Physics III, comm. 60, and Book IV, comm. 38; Avicenna too is cited, Naturalia VI, part I, saying that the form gives numerical unity to the subject; Zimara holds it, Theorem 97; and Sebastian, bishop of Osma, De Anima II, c. 1. And Aristotle favours it in the same place, when he says that the form is what constitutes a this something. And from this word of Aristotle the chief foundation of this opinion is to be taken; for the principle of individuation must be that which intrinsically constitutes this substance and is most proper to it; therefore by reason of the first property it must be something substantial; for accidents, as has often been said, neither constitute substance nor this substance; for this substance, even as it is this, is being per se and substantial. But by reason of the other property this principle cannot be matter, but form, because this matter is not most proper to this individual, since it can be under other forms; therefore form is the principle of individuation.

2. Whence I argue, secondly, that the principle of unity and of entity is the same; on account of which St. Thomas said, sole question De Anima, a. 1, ad 2, that each thing has being and individuation according to the same. But each thing properly has being from its form; therefore also individual unity. The major is evident, because unity is an attribute following upon entity and adds to it only a negation; therefore it cannot have another positive and real principle except that which is the principle of the entity itself.

3. But someone will object against this opinion and reason that, although it rightly proves that form contributes to unity, it does not prove that it alone is the principle of individuation; for matter too is an intrinsic principle constituting the entity of the thing, and therefore it too will be a principle of individuation, if not alone, at least with form. It could be answered according to the opinion of Durandus, In IV, dist. 44, q. 1, that form has the power of individuating not only the composite but also matter itself, because form gives being not only to the composite but also to matter; whence it comes about (he says) that by the very fact that matter is joined to the same form in number, it itself is the same in number. But this opinion of Durandus is false, and is deservedly rejected by the other theologians, as I showed in tom. 2 of the Third Part, disp. XLIV, sect. 2. For one and the same matter in number which was in what was corrupted remains in what is generated; otherwise the subject from which generation comes about would not be the same in number. Likewise, because it is impossible either that a thing which before was distinct in number from another should afterwards become that other, or the same in number with it indivisibly, or that a thing which was one in number should afterwards according to its whole self become another distinct in number; therefore the matter which under the form of food is one in number cannot become another in number through beginning to be under the form of the soul; and the matters of Peter and Paul, which are distinct in number, will not become one in number, even if they are successively under the form of Peter and of Paul. Finally, otherwise the same matter in number once annihilated would be restored through the mere union of another matter to the same form; and we are speaking of true unity according to real and physical entity, and not only according to appearance or the vulgar manner of speaking, in which way a thing which is in continual flux and is changed only little by little is wont to be called one; for in this way, even if the change takes place in the form, such a unity can be preserved, as is evident in a river, or in a tree or a brute.

4. The answer, then, is otherwise: that it is indeed true that the adequate intrinsic cause of the individual unity of material substance is form and matter, as the argument concludes; yet, if these two are compared among themselves, the chief cause of this unity is the form, and in this sense it is specially attributed to it that it is the principle of individuation. Just as matter too is necessary for the specific notion or unity; for the notion of man or of humanity as such cannot be constituted without matter, and the same holds of the generic notion of animal, living thing, etc.; and nevertheless the specific notion is absolutely said to be taken from the form, because it gives the ultimate completion and only presupposes matter as something potential and indifferent; by the same reason, then, it will be called the principle of individuation, because it gives the ultimate substantial completion to the individual, although it presupposes matter as of itself potential and indifferent; on account of which Aristotle said, above, and Physics I, c. 7, text 69, that the form constitutes a this something. And since, as we were saying above, a thing is distinguished through the same thing through which it is constituted, the same form which constitutes this something distinguishes it from others, since it is act which distinguishes, Metaphysics VII, c. 13, text 49; therefore it is the form which completes the notion of the individual. And the common mode of conceiving and speaking confirms this; for if to the soul of Peter, for example, there is united a body consisting of matter distinct from the body which it had before, although that composite is not in every respect the same as it was before, nevertheless, simply speaking, that individual is called the same by reason of the same soul; but conversely, if to a body consisting of the same matter a soul distinct in number is united, it is simply not judged the same individual, but a distinct one; it is therefore a sign that individuation is taken chiefly from the form.

5. But it is further objected against this opinion and the reason given that, although form as such gives specific being, it does not give individual and numerical being except as it is this; therefore not form as such, but that whence the form itself has it that it is this, is the principle of individuation; but it is this by reason of matter; therefore matter rather is the first root of individuation. The minor is proved, first, because form is not this by itself; otherwise the same could be said of any entity whatever, nor would it be necessary to seek another principle of individuation; therefore it is this through matter, for no other root can be thought out. Secondly, because form has its whole being in order to matter; therefore also its individuation; therefore matter is the principle of the individuation of form, and consequently of the whole composite. Thirdly, because forms are multiplied in number in so far as they are received in diverse matters, and therefore separated forms are not multiplied in number, because they are not received in matter; therefore they are individuated also through order to matter; the ultimate resolution of this individuation, therefore, is made to matter; for this form is this because it is received in such matter; therefore the first root of individuation is matter.

6. These objections are the foundations of the opinion treated in the preceding section, which rather declare and confirm this opinion which we are now treating. For almost all of them can be retorted and made of matter itself. I concede, then, that form is not the principle of the individuation of the composite according to its specific notion, as is self-evident, but in so far as it is this; but this very thing must be said of matter, because matter too has a specific and common notion, according to which it is not sufficient to constitute the individual; therefore, if it constitutes it, it does so in so far as it is this. I shall ask again, then, whence it has it that it is this. Some answer, because God willed to create this rather than another; but this is beside the point, for we are not here inquiring into the extrinsic principle of individuation, but the intrinsic one; otherwise someone could also say that this soul is this because God willed to infuse it rather than another; or that this form is this because God determined his concurrence to it, as is very probable, as we shall say in the following section. Others answer that this matter is this by reason of this quantity. But this both is false and does not remove the difficulty. The first is evident from what has been said above, because, since this matter is simply supposed to this quantity, it cannot be individuated through it. Likewise, because the reasons made above prove universally that nothing substantial can be individuated through a superadded accident; for this matter too is something per se one constituted under the specific notion of matter, per se contracting it. Indeed matter and this matter are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, as was shown above of any individual with respect to the common notion; therefore this matter cannot be intrinsically individuated through quantity, which is a thing distinct from it, nor through order to it, since rather this quantity expresses order to this matter than conversely. The second, about quantity, is evident, because of it too I shall inquire whence it is this, since it does not have this from its specific notion; and since one must not proceed to infinity, nor commit a vicious and useless circle, one will have to stop at some thing which is this by itself; therefore this is to be attributed to substance rather than to accident, since it is a prior and more absolute entity; or, if it is to be admitted that two incomplete beings are individuated through a mutual relationship to each other according to diverse genera of causes, this will rather have to be said of matter and substantial form among themselves than with some accident, because they are more per se connected and regard each other. Therefore all the arguments made can conclude the same of matter as they intend of form, for there is between them, as regards this, a certain equality. And on the other side matter surpasses form only in this, that it is a certain occasion of producing various and individual forms, as has been declared above; but form surpasses matter in this, that it chiefly constitutes the individual, and that it is more proper to it, and that matter is rather for the sake of form than conversely, as is said in Physics II, c. 9, text 91; therefore, all things weighed, the chief principle of individuation is the form.

Resolution of the question

7. This opinion, then, as it has been expounded by us, is sufficiently probable and comes very near to the truth. But simply it must be said that form alone is not the full and adequate principle of the individuation of material things, if we speak of their whole entity, although it is the chief one, and therefore according to a formal manner of speaking it is sometimes judged sufficient for the denomination of the same individual. All of which are to be declared and proved at length in sect. 6.

1. There have not been lacking those who have so affirmed, whose opinion Scotus reports, In II, dist. 3, q. 3; and Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 32; and Henry indicates it, Quodlibet II, q. 8; and Carthusianus attributes it to him and inclines to it, In II, dist. 3. But Fonseca, Book V, c. 6, q. 2, sect. 2, reports Henry, Quodlibet V, q. 8, as denying that individuation comes about through existence, or through anything intrinsic, but through the agent alone. But this, as it is improbable in itself, so it is asserted by no one, as far as I have seen; for, although the agent is the extrinsic cause of the individual, nevertheless what it effects is distinct from the agent itself; but it effects the individual and confers on it an individual nature; therefore that by which the nature is individual is something intrinsic to the individual itself. And so Henry, in the same place, expressly concedes that that through which the individual has it to be this is something besides matter and besides the agent, which he explains to be the notion or disposition of the supposit. Whence he seems to think that subsistence is the principle of individuation in all created substances; and so in the former place he had spoken with a distinction of existence or subsistence; and therefore it will be necessary to say something of each.

2. The opinion, then, about existence is rejected by all as altogether false and improbable; but one can proceed in it in two ways: first, supposing that existence is distinct from the nature of the thing from the essence of the individual; secondly, according to the opinion asserting that existence is nothing other than the actual entity of each thing. In this latter way this opinion in reality coincides with the opinion asserting that each thing is individuated by itself and needs no other principle of individuation besides its entity; whence in reality this opinion is not worthy of greater reproof than that of which we shall speak afterwards. It can only be reproved because it uses obscure and ambiguous terms, and because it attributes this notion of individuation to existence rather than to essence, since this cannot belong to existence except in so far as it is the same as essence. But if one proceeds in the former opinion, it will indeed be formally true that each thing in the notion of existent has some individual notion from existence itself, just as this white thing, as regards the formal notion of white, is constituted by whiteness, although simply this white thing, because it is taken for the subject, is not constituted by whiteness. Whence also in the matter proposed, speaking materially (so to speak) of the existing thing, or of this essence in number, it is improbable to say that it is individuated through the existence by which it exists, if this is a thing distinct from it or a mode diverse from the nature of the thing.

3. First indeed, because the essence, remaining within the breadth of essence, becomes individual, and in it the specific essence is contracted and determined; but the specific essence is not contracted through something distinct from itself from the nature of the thing, as was proved above; therefore it is not contracted to the individual essence through existence. The major is self-evident, both because man, for example, is of himself common to many individuals, whether they exist or do not exist; and also because Peter and Paul, as they abstract from actual existence, or as possible, intrinsically include their individual notions, by which they are distinguished; and finally because, just as specific or essential differences belong to species by a necessary connection, according to which propositions in which essential predicates are predicated are said to be of perpetual truth, so to the individual belongs its individual difference. Whence Peter is as necessarily this man as he is man, and Peter is as necessarily placed under man as man under animal; this contraction and subordination, therefore, does not come about through actual existence, which contingently comes to an essence fully constituted and individuated.

4. Secondly, here there has place the argument reported above from Cajetan, that a singular act supposes a singular potency, which principle we said is true in act and potency distinct from the nature of the thing, because then the potency is really supposed to the act in the order of nature, and is something one distinct from its act, and one not in thought but in reality, and therefore it cannot happen that it has unity formally and intrinsically from its act. But essence and existence are so compared according to the aforesaid opinion; therefore the essence, in the way in which it has per se an entity of essence distinct from existence and apt to be actuated by it, so also has its unity and individuation. Otherwise it would be necessary to understand that existence is the act of the specific and universal nature, which is quite absurd.

5. Thirdly, because in existence itself can be considered the common notion of human existence, for example, and the notion of this existence of Peter or Paul; therefore of existence itself it remains to be inquired through what it becomes this; for not from the essence, since according to this opinion it does not suppose it individual, but common; nor from some accident, as is self-evident and sufficiently proved above; from what, then? If you say that it becomes this by itself, why will you not say this with greater reason of the essence, since it is prior both in the order of nature and in perfection, and since it is in a certain way more absolute? For existence is the act of this essence; whence this existence will rather be this because it actuates this essence; just as in common too the existences of man and lion differ because they either follow upon or regard diverse essences, the aforesaid distinction being supposed. From which a new confirmation can be taken, because, just as human existence in common is outside the essence of man in common, so this existence of Peter is outside this individual essence of Peter; and just as in Peter and Paul there are two existences in number, so there are two humanities in number, having distinct individual entities of essence. Finally there is an argument a posteriori, because (that opinion being supposed) the same individual entity is preserved without its existence, or changes various existences, as the humanity of Christ in that opinion lacks its proper existence, and yet is individual and has an intrinsic principle of individuation; similarly the same entity in number of prime matter, as it changes forms, is said to change existences, and yet always remains the same in number.

6. From these things, however, it is easily understood what is to be thought of that opinion if it speaks not of proper existence but of subsistence. For either we speak formally of the supposit, or of the nature in the abstract, or in the concrete and formally of the individual as contained under such a species of substance, namely of this man. In the first way it is true that the supposit is individuated through this subsistence, because it is formally constituted through it; and by this reason in the Trinity there are three supposits, although there is one nature, because there are three subsistences; but the person of Christ is one in number, and one supposit in number, although it has a double nature, because it has only one subsistence in number; the supposit, therefore, as such is individuated through subsistence. Although of subsistence itself the question remains, through what it becomes this; for the notion of subsistence too, for example human, is common and specific; but in Peter it is this subsistence in number, or that; of which question the same must be said as of other substances or substantial modes, which we shall see below.

7. In the second way, that is, speaking of the integral substantial nature in the abstract, for example humanity, it is false and improbable that it is individuated through subsistence, as is evident a fortiori from all the arguments made about existence. For it is certain that subsistence is something distinct from the nature of the thing from the substantial nature, even taken individually. It is certain also that a nature of this kind can be preserved individual without its connatural subsistence, as it was preserved in Christ the Lord; therefore it cannot be intrinsically individuated through it. But if perhaps someone says that it is individuated at least through order to it, he will say this gratuitously and without foundation, because, if one is to be individuated through order to another, rather the subsistence is this through order to this nature than conversely, because the nature is prior and more perfect, but subsistence is only a certain mode and term of the nature. Likewise in the divine nature we find a single individual nature with a threefold subsistence; it is therefore a sign that the individuation of the nature is absolute from subsistence.

8. Wherefore in this Henry plainly seems to have erred, for he thinks of the nature itself that it becomes this and individual by reason of the supposit. About which he also teaches another thing altogether false and improbable, namely that the supposit adds over the specific nature only a double negation, of indivisibility in itself and of division from every other, and that through this double negation the nature becomes formally individual without any other positive thing superadded to the specific nature; in which three false things are contained. The first is that the supposit adds over the nature only a negation, of which we shall see afterwards in its place; for, speaking with respect to the individual nature, this is less improbable, although not true; yet with respect to the specific nature it is altogether improbable. Secondly, it is false that the individual nature adds over the specific only a negation, as is evidently evident from what was said in section 2, because otherwise the substantial individual nature as such would not be real being, but would be only the specific nature with negations, which cannot even be conceived by the mind. Likewise because that negation requires a positive foundation, which cannot be the specific nature alone, as was sufficiently shown there. But the third is more false, that through the very negations by which (according to Henry) the supposit is constituted, the nature becomes individual; for thence it follows either that the humanity of Christ is not individual, or that it is a supposit; but each is an error. The consequence is declared; for, since in that double negation it is said to be undivided in itself and divided from every other, either this being divided from every other signifies not being united to another, or not being in another, and this either is not of the notion of the individual substantial nature, or the humanity of Christ the Lord is not individual; or being divided from another (which Henry openly thinks) removes only identity and signifies distinction from every other entity or similar nature, and in this way that double negation does not suffice for the notion of supposit, or the humanity of Christ the Lord is a supposit; in no way, therefore, does subsistence, by whatever way its notion is explained, pertain to the individuation of the nature.

9. Rather, speaking also in the third way, in the concrete and formally of the individual of the specific nature, it must be said that it, speaking per se, does not take its individuation from subsistence, but from nature. For so the theologians say that, if three persons assumed one humanity, there would be one man in number, just as now they are one God in number on account of one divine nature; that man, therefore, would have numerical unity from the individual nature. And Christ the Lord now, in so far as he is this man, is the same man in number as he would be if he subsisted in his proper nature, although the person and subsistence are very diverse from that proper and connatural to such a humanity; therefore the individuation of this man is to be taken not from subsistence but from nature. But the reason is that the individual is formally constituted under the species by reason of the nature and not by reason of the subsistence; whence it comes about that, although it happens that the subsistence is diverse in species or genus, nevertheless, if the nature is of the same species, the individual is univocally and most properly contained under such a species; for which cause Christ is univocally man with other men; and by a similar reason, if the nature is the same in number, he is the same man in number even if the subsistence is diverse.

10. Conclusion of the whole question.—But I said speaking per se, because here the question insinuated itself whether with a double nature there can be the same individual in number on account of the unity of subsistence; for so it is disputed by the theologians whether, if the divine Word assumed two humanities, he would be one man or several. For from what has been said it seems to follow that there would be several men in number on account of several humanities in number, because it has been said that the individuation of the concrete is taken from the individual nature. Nevertheless, as I said in tom. 1 of the Third Part with St. Thomas, he would simply and in the common manner of speaking be called one man, not indeed per se and formally, but as it were materially by reason of the supposit, in the way in which he is called one craftsman who has several arts, distinct not only in number but also in species. But this unity is diverse from the preceding, which is taken from the unity of the nature, nor is it the unity of an individual formally contained under a species, as the argument proves; just as the unity of a craftsman having several arts distinct in species is not the unity of a species contained under a genus, but is a material or suppositional unity, which is judged to suffice for that manner of speaking, on account of the real or substantial union of several natures in one supposit, because the substantive noun signifies the nature after the manner of something standing per se, as was explained more fully in the said place. From all these things, then, it is sufficiently evident that the principle of individuation of the substantial nature, or of the individual constituted through it, is not rightly placed in subsistence or existence.

1. From what has been said hitherto against the preceding opinions, it seems to remain, as it were from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, that every singular substance is singular by itself, or through its own entity,¹ and needs no other principle of individuation besides its entity, or besides the intrinsic principles of which its entity consists. For if such a substance, physically considered, is simple, it is individual of itself and by its simple entity; but if it is composite, for example of matter and form united, then, just as the principles of its entity are matter, form and their union, so the same taken in the individual are the principles of its individuation; and these, since they are simple, will be individual by themselves. This opinion Aureolus held, in Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2; and Durandus holds it in substance, In II, dist. 3, q. 2. But Fonseca, reporting it, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 3, says in sect. 2 that it is the most involved of all, and that, if it is reduced to its true sense, it leaves the question unsolved. To me, however, it seems the clearest of all, and I think that both he and almost all the others finally fall into it, because in truth the foundation of unity cannot be distinguished from the entity itself. Whence, just as individual unity formally cannot add anything positive and real over the individual entity, because as regards this the reason is the same of it and of every unity, so the positive foundation of this unity, as regards the negation which it expresses, can add nothing positive, physically speaking, to that entity which is denominated one and individual; therefore that entity by itself is the foundation of this negation, and in this sense it is said by that opinion to be by itself the principle of individuation. For this opinion does not deny that in that individual entity the common nature can be distinguished by reason from the singular entity, and in this way² that the individual adds over the species something distinct by reason, which, according to metaphysical consideration, has the notion of an individual difference, as was said in the preceding section and as Durandus does not deny, but rather seems to suppose. But this opinion nevertheless adds (what properly pertains to the present question) that that individual difference does not have in the individual substance some special principle or foundation which is distinct in the thing from its entity; and therefore in this sense it says that each entity by itself is the principle of its individuation. This opinion, then, rightly explained, is true; but in order that it may become clearer we shall declare it one by one in all substantial things.

Through what prime matter is individuated

2. First, then, beginning from prime matter, it must be said that it is individual in the thing, and that the foundation of such unity is its entity by itself, as it is in the thing without anything extrinsic superadded. It is proved, because the matter which is under this form of wood is diverse in number from that which is under the form of water or of man; it is therefore individual and singular in itself. But the foundation of such unity in it is not the substantial form, nor order to this or that form, as was proved above against Durandus, because, whatever substantial form is varied, the same matter in number always remains, which, although it is actually united to this or that form, nevertheless of itself expresses a common and indifferent relationship to any form whatever which it can receive. Again, neither can quantity be the foundation of this individual unity of matter, as the same argument proves, if it is true that matter loses and acquires various quantities as the substantial forms are varied. Likewise, because according to the same opinion matter, prior in nature to receiving quantity, underlies the action of the agent inducing the form or quantity; but it does not underlie it except as individual and singular, because actions are about singulars. But if we hold that the same quantity is coeval with matter, the same argument can be accommodated, at least in order to the power of God; for God can take away this quantity from this matter and give another, or preserve it altogether without quantity; the same matter in number, therefore, would be without the same quantity in number; therefore quantity is not the foundation of such unity for matter itself; otherwise it could in no way retain its unity without it. And moreover there are all the common arguments made above: that substance is not individuated through an accident, nor through order to an accident; for matter is substance, although partial. Likewise that the individual substance is being per se. Likewise that the accident supposes its subject as it is in the thing, and consequently singular. Likewise that the individual difference is not distinct in the thing from the entity which it constitutes; whence neither can it be founded in a distinct entity.

3. Corollary.—And these reasons proceed a fortiori of any accidents or dispositions whatever of matter. Wherefore, when it is wont to be said by some that matter is individuated by the agent, in so far as its indifference to this form is individuated and restricted through dispositions, in order that it may be true in some way, it must be understood in a sound manner; because the agent, in order to act on matter, supposes it individual, and by its action cannot take away or change its individuation; otherwise it would destroy it and introduce another in its place; nor can it happen that what in the thing is already individual should receive another individuation in itself through the addition of some entity. Matter, therefore, is said to be limited or determined by the agent through dispositions to this form, not in order to being, but in order to the action of the agent itself and the reception of the form; and this either only per accidens and as it were negatively, because through the dispositions impediments to this action and to the introduction of this form are removed, or also in some way per se and positively, if these dispositions are naturally necessary for the eduction or union of this form with this matter; for this is controverted among philosophers and does not matter to the present difficulty, because this adaptation through dispositions is as it were extrinsic to matter itself, which, even taken in the individual, is of itself capable of any form whatever; and if dispositions are required, it is rather by reason of the form than by reason of matter itself; this, therefore, matters nothing to its intrinsic individuation.

4. Some objections are satisfied.—You will say: this matter is not distinguished from another except through quantity, because, since it is pure potency, it cannot be distinguished except through act. Likewise matter essentially regards form according to its species; therefore this individual matter must be individuated through form, or through a relationship to this form. To the first the answer is that one matter is distinguished from another in order to site through quantity, but entitatively and really it is distinguished through its own entity, as was said above; because, just as matter of itself has something of entity, whether of existence or of essence, so by reason of that it has something of entitative actuality, through which it can be transcendentally distinguished from another. To the second the answer is: in the way in which matter essentially has a transcendental relationship to form, so this matter has this transcendental relationship to form, because it has this capacity and potency in number, and it is individuated through a relationship to form; but this very thing is to be individuated physically by itself, because its entity essentially includes this relationship. But it is not necessary that this individuation come about through the determination of the form (in which sense the argument would have to proceed in order to have any difficulty), because not only matter in the species, but also this matter in number, regards form in common as the adequate object of its capacity, even taken in the individual; and therefore it is not rightly said that matter is individuated through this form, but that it is individuated by an individuated relationship to form. Just as the visual power in the species expresses a relationship to colour in common, and in the individual similarly expresses a relationship not to this or that colour, but to colour in common; and therefore it is not properly individuated through this colour, although it is individuated with, or through, such a transcendental and entitative relationship to colour.

What the principle of individuation of the substantial form is

5. Secondly it must be said that the substantial form is this intrinsically through its own entity, from which, according to its ultimate grade or reality, its individual difference is taken. This conclusion can be proved by the same proportional reasons as the preceding, and can easily be confirmed from what was said above, especially from what was said in the first and second opinions. For first of all no accidents can be intrinsic principles individuating the substantial form, because such a form too, as it is this, is being per se, although incomplete, and pertains to the predicament of substance, and is placed under the specific notion of such a form, although reductively. Likewise this form either is simply and in every respect prior to accidents and their origin, or, if it supposes some in the genus of material cause, it does not express per se a relationship to them, but at most requires them as conditions or dispositions necessary for preparing the subject; therefore it can in no way be individuated by accidents. Next, matter by itself cannot be the intrinsic principle of individuating any form, because it is not the intrinsic principle of its entity; but the principle of unity is the same as the principle of entity, as has often been said, because unity adds no thing to entity, but a negation intrinsically accompanying it. The antecedent is evident, because matter is an intrinsic principle of the composite, because through its entity it composes it; but it does not so compose the entity of the form; it is not, therefore, its intrinsic principle. But with respect to those forms which depend on matter in becoming and in being, matter is a per se cause of the form in its genus, not as intrinsically composing it, but as sustaining it, which is a certain genus of causality as it were extrinsic; and in this way matter can be called the cause and principle of the individuation of such forms in its genus, from the principle posited, that the cause of entity is the cause of unity, and because matter does not cause a form except a singular and individual one; therefore by causing its entity it causes its individuation. Nevertheless, because the individual difference is predicated intrinsically of the individual thing, it is therefore not taken from causes in any way extrinsic to the individual thing itself, but from its intrinsic principle or entity; and therefore in this way matter cannot be the intrinsic principle of the individuation of forms. Which is declared a posteriori in order to the divine power: for this substantial form can be preserved without matter, and then, just as it retains its individual difference, so also its intrinsic principle of individuation; therefore matter is not an intrinsic principle of this kind. This is more manifest in the rational soul, in which, just as being is not caused per se by matter, so neither is unity or individuation, as St. Thomas noted, Contra Gentiles II, c. 75, in the solution of the first reason, and c. 81, at the beginning; therefore matter not only is not the intrinsic principle of the individuation of the soul, but not even its per se cause, although it is as it were a certain occasion that, such a body having been organized, God creates such a soul in it.

6. A small doubt.—But the difficulty is whether the form is individuated at least through matter as through the term to which it expresses a relationship. For in this there seems to be a difference between matter and form, that matter, because the same in number underlies several forms, cannot have an individual termination from the form which it regards; but form does not have that indifference, but is determined to actuating this matter, and therefore it can be individuated from this matter as from the term to which it expresses a relationship, as it is such a form. And so the Thomists commonly think, and so they understand St. Thomas in the places cited above and in others, where he says that form is individuated through matter. And in the same sense can be expounded what he says, sole question De Anima, a. 3, ad 13, that the principles of individuation of forms are not of their essence, but that this is true only in composites. But first of all the reason given has no place in the rational soul, which, remaining the same in number, can actuate diverse matters. For first it at the same time so actuates diverse parts of matter composing the same body that it is whole in each part; therefore it cannot be individuated through adaptation to the whole body and to its individual parts. But it presses more that it can successively inform diverse integral matters, as when through continual nutrition the whole matter into which the form was first introduced is little by little lost, and another new one is acquired and informed by the same form. Likewise it is accidental to nutrition itself that it be made from these or those foods, and yet thence it comes about that the soul afterwards informs this or that matter; therefore this too is contingent and accidental to it; it is not, therefore, individuated thence, nor is it of itself adapted to this matter in number.

7. Someone will perhaps say that this soul of itself postulates that at least in the beginning it be introduced into such matter, although afterwards it can leave it and inform another; and by this reason that it is individuated by that matter into which it is first introduced. But this first of all is said gratuitously; for, if the same soul can at diverse times naturally inform various matters, it is a sign that its informative power or aptitude for informing does not regard this matter in number as its adequate term. On what foundation, then, can it be said that of itself it postulates one matter in the beginning more than another, or regards one more intrinsically than another? Otherwise in the same way it could be said that matter by its nature postulated that it be created under those forms in number under which it was created, and that it was individuated by them, although afterwards it could be preserved under other forms; just as, therefore, this would there be said gratuitously, so also it is said without foundation of the soul. For suppose that that matter in number which the offspring acquires and informs through its own nutrition was previously under the form of the maternal blood from which in the beginning the body of the same offspring was formed; certainly, just as into that matter afterwards disposed through nutrition this form in number could be introduced, so also, if in the first formation it had been disposed by the power of the seed from the maternal blood, the same form could similarly have been naturally introduced into it; for no philosophical reason can be given why it could not; therefore this soul, even as this, is indifferent to informing several matters, whether in the beginning in production or afterwards in conservation.

8. A theological note.—Nor does it matter if someone says that these matters are judged one and the same because the change takes place little by little under dispositions and organization of the same notion; because this unity of matter or of body is rather according to external species and appearance than according to the true and physical entity of the body or matter. Add that, although it happened that the whole matter came about through the integral separation of one body and the conjunction of other matter, nevertheless the soul would naturally inform both; as it is probable will sometimes happen in the resurrection. As, if it happens that in this life two souls have informed altogether the same matters, a body from other matter can be given to one of them, which it will inform no less connaturally than if it consisted of the former matter. It is therefore a sign that this soul, as apt to inform, in no way regards determinately this matter, and consequently is not individuated by this matter, as it is this, even as by the term of its transcendental relationship, because it is not its adequate term. This soul, therefore, is individuated by itself and by virtue of its entity; and consequently because it intrinsically has such an individual aptitude for informing the human body, in the way in which we said a little before of the relationship of matter. And so Toletus teaches in particular of the rational soul, De Anima III, q. 18, concls. 2 and 3, who confirms this by the argument made above by us, that in assigning the principle of individuation one must stop at something which is individuated per se; therefore, if matter or quantity are said to be individuated per se, much more must this be said of the rational soul, which is per se subsisting and gives being to the others rather than receives it from them. The variety of bodies, therefore, is an excellent sign a posteriori of the distinction of souls, because it is as it were the occasion of producing diverse souls; it is not, however, the proper and intrinsic principle of their individuation.

9. But whether the reason is the same of all other substantial forms which depend on matter in being does not seem able to be judged by the argument just made, because these forms so inform this matter in number that they are altogether determined to informing it, nor can they naturally inform another matter distinct in number, since they cannot be separated from this, either all at once or little by little; which also proceeds of the souls of perfect brutes, if they are extended and divisible, as the common and perhaps more probable opinion holds (for if they are supposed to be indivisible, the argument made about rational souls will proceed in them); it can rightly be said, then, that the material substantial form is this intrinsically indeed through adaptation to this matter in number, but through the matter itself as through the term of this relationship. But nevertheless even in these material forms this cannot properly be said; because either in this matter in number are included the dispositions by which this matter is prepared by the agent for this form, or this prime matter alone according to its bare entity is understood; but in neither way can this be sufficiently understood or explained.

10. The first is evident, because matter with accidents cannot be the reason of the individuation of the form, even as the term of its relationship, because, since this relationship is transcendental and substantial, it does not include accidents in its primary and per se term. Likewise, because, if we suppose that the same dispositions are not in what is generated which preceded in what was corrupted, the arguments made above proceed, that the form prior³ in nature absolutely and simply informs matter bare of accidents; but it informs it as it is individual and singular; therefore in the same way it regards it according to its aptitude and individual adaptation. But if we suppose that the dispositions which were in what was corrupted remain in matter, then too the form does not inform matter as affected by accidents, although these are presupposed as necessary conditions, or perhaps only because they are left from the preceding alteration; therefore neither does this form as this regard accidents, but matter only. All the more because, although these accidents in number are varied, either little by little naturally or all at once supernaturally, and other similar ones are given, the same form in number will be preserved in the same matter; therefore this form as this in no way regards such accidents in number, so as to be individuated by them. Rather, even if we granted that this form requires these accidents in number, the form itself would not on that account be such in the individual on account of the accidents, but rather conversely the accidents would be required to be such on account of such a form, speaking a priori and simply, although as regards us, or in order to production or generation, such dispositions are the principle or occasion of distinguishing forms.

11. But the second, namely that neither can this prime matter purely taken be in this way the principle individuating the form, is proved, first, because this matter can be common to many forms, diverse either in species or in number; therefore as such it is not a sufficient principle individuating the form, because what is of itself common cannot as such be the principle of individuation. Secondly, on the side of the form itself, because, although this form once made in and from this matter cannot be in another on account of the dependence which it has on it—which dependence is such that neither can that form be naturally preserved without that genus of material causality, nor is there any natural way or mode by which this form could be transferred into another matter so as to be preserved by it—nevertheless, if the entity of such a form is considered according to itself, its intrinsic aptitude does not seem to be determined to informing this matter in number, so that it would intrinsically be unapt to inform naturally any other matter whatever distinct in number; therefore it does not receive its intrinsic individuation from this matter in number, even as from the term of its informative relationship or aptitude. The consequence is proved, because this matter is not the adequate term of that relationship, since the aptitude of this form according to itself could be exercised equally connaturally in another and another matter, if it were placed in any whatever. For that it is placed by natural causes only in this matter and not in another does not take away its intrinsic aptitude, nor does it make this matter its adequate term. As perhaps there is in the universe some portion of matter which has always been under the same form in number and always will be, and perhaps there is no natural way of varying it, and not on that account is the aptitude of matter of itself determined to such a form.

12. But the antecedent can be persuaded by many conjectures, which are common also to rational souls. The first, because by absolute power this form can be transferred into another matter and inform it; it is therefore a sign that there is in such a form an intrinsic natural aptitude for informing it, as far as depends on itself. The consequence is proved, because, although that action or transmigration of this form from matter to matter would be supernatural as regards its mode, nevertheless the term produced would be natural, for that composite of such form and matter would subsist naturally. The second: any other matter distinct in number is capable, as far as depends on itself, of any individual form whatever, even if it happens to be in another matter distinct in number; for one would think without foundation that the capacity of this matter in number is of itself limited to these forms rather than to those, because perhaps natural agents according to the natural order cannot effect in it those individual forms which they effect in other matters. Because, since matter of itself is pure potency and indifferent, such a determination cannot fittingly be attributed to it; that matter in number, therefore, which in fact is under this form of this horse would, as far as depends on itself, be capable of the soul of another horse distinct in number, which in fact informs another matter; therefore conversely that soul too is apt, as far as depends on itself, to inform this or that matter. The consequence is evident, because natural potency and act mutually correspond to each other; whence potency does not naturally regard any act except that which has a natural aptitude for informing it.

13. Thirdly, because, if this horse’s soul, for example, were apt of itself only to inform this matter in number, all the horses’ souls which could inform that matter in number at diverse times would have among themselves some real agreement which they would not have with the horses’ souls informing other matters, because all of them would have an aptitude for informing this matter in number, which other horses’ souls could not inform. And the same argument can be made in all the forms of water, fire and the like, namely that under the same species of the form of fire, for example, there would be a certain breadth of individuals regarding only this matter in number, and another breadth of others regarding that matter in number, and so of the others; and so under the specific concept there could be given an objective substantial concept common to many individuals of that species and not to others; which seems absurd, for that agreement, since it is real and substantial, will also be essential to such forms, and consequently the lowest species will be divisible through several essential differences, which involves an open repugnance. But this reason is more apparent than efficacious, because it can have some evasions and difficulties, which we shall touch on more conveniently in the following disputations; yet the other reasons are efficacious, which we shall confirm and declare more fully in the following section. The conclusion posited, then, remains sufficiently proved, that the intrinsic principle from which the individual difference of the substantial form is taken is the very entity of the form, in so far as of itself it has such an aptitude for informing matter; for all things extrinsic or distinct from the form itself have been excluded, so that it cannot be individuated by them; whence it comes about that the form is this not because it regards this matter, but only in so far as it has such an aptitude for informing matter.

By what principle substantial modes are individuated

14. I say, thirdly: a substantial mode, which is simple and in its own way indivisible, also has its individuation from itself, and not from some principle distinct from itself from the nature of the thing. It is declared by examples in the union, for example, of form to matter, or of matter to form, which I suppose from what is to be said below is a substantial mode. Likewise in simple subsistence; and the same would hold of existence, if it were a real mode of essence distinct from it from the nature of the thing. And so it is evident that the union which my soul now has to my body is one in number and individual, both because it is something real and existing in reality, and distinct from the nature of the thing from the soul; and also because it differs in number and not in species from the mode of union of another soul to its body; it therefore has its individual difference; therefore also some intrinsic principle or foundation of it; this principle, then, we say can be nothing other than the entity of the mode itself, whatever that entity may be. This can be proved, first, by the general reasons made, that each thing is one as it is, and that the negation which unity adds is immediately founded in the entity of the thing according as it is in itself; and finally because each simple entity is intrinsically such by itself, or is constituted in its being in our mode of understanding, and consequently is also distinguished from others by itself. Secondly it is proved by excluding other principles of this individuation; for, if there were any, it would most of all be this soul or this matter with respect to this union (to pursue the example begun; I omit accidents, because they have already been sufficiently excluded by the reasons made about matter and form); but this mode is not properly individuated from this matter and from this form; because, although this mode of union in the individual cannot be in another form on account of the special real identity which it has with this form, nor can it be made or preserved in another matter distinct in number, because it regards this not according to aptitude, but according to a certain actual notion which is adequately terminated at this matter, nevertheless this soul and this matter could be united by another union distinct in number. For it is not necessary that, if the union of this soul and matter is now dissolved and perishes, and again this matter and this form are united by God, they receive the same union in number which they had before. For although we grant that this can be done, of which some also doubt, there is no reason why it should be necessary, because in other modes of figure, of sitting, or similar ones, it is not necessary that the same in number be reproduced; indeed this is not natural. Those unions, therefore, can be distinguished in number in the same form with respect to the same matter; therefore the principle of its individuation is not sufficiently taken from this form or this matter; therefore it is necessary that such a mode have of itself the intrinsic foundation of its individuation, although according to it it regards this form and this matter by a transcendental relationship; because this is the nature of such a mode.

What is the principle of individuation of the substantial composite

15. Fourthly it must be said that in composite substance, as such a composite, the adequate principle of individuation is this matter and this form united among themselves, among which the chief principle is the form, which alone suffices for this composite, in so far as it is an individual of such a species, to be judged the same in number. This conclusion follows from the preceding and from what was said in sect. 4, and is consonant with the opinion of Durandus and Toletus treated above; and in substance Scotus and Henry do not dissent, nor all the nominalists; Fonseca too does not dissent, Metaphysics V, q. 5, although he says that it is an improper expression when we say that this matter and this form are physical principles of individuation, because neither this form, nor this matter, nor both together could be added to the specific nature of man so as to constitute this man with it, and because also this matter and this form are individual, constituted from their specific natures and proper principles of individuation. But in these reasons he turns aside from the physical notion to metaphysical composition; for when this matter and this form are said to be physical principles of the individuation of this composite, they are not compared to the common specific nature, but to the physical composite which they compose; and therefore it is not necessary that they be added to the common specific nature, but that they compose it by composing the individual in which it is included. Whence according to the same physical constitution such principles are simple, nor do they have others by which they are physically individuated, but they are individuated by themselves, as has been declared. It is not, therefore, an improper expression, but true and proper, because the intrinsic principles of individuation are the same as the intrinsic principles of entity, as has often been said, because individuation follows entity as it is a certain negation; but as it includes the positive it is the entity itself and adds nothing to it; but this matter and this form united among themselves are the intrinsic principles of the whole entity of the composite substance of which we are treating; therefore they are also the intrinsic physical principles of individuation. And it is confirmed, for matter and form taken absolutely are the physical principles of the species of composite substance and of its specification; therefore this matter and this form will be the physical principles of the individual and of its individuation. And in the same way it can be concluded that neither by itself, but both together, are this adequate principle. Because this composite, in order to be altogether and completely the same in number, requires not only this form or this matter, but both together, and, whichever is varied, the composite does not remain simply and in every respect the same in number as it was before, because in some respect its entity has been varied; therefore matter and form are the adequate principle of the numerical unity of the whole composite as such. And it is confirmed by the reason given, because the principles of unity are the same as those of entity; but this matter and this form are the adequate intrinsic principle of this composite entity; therefore also of unity and individuation.

16. Inference.—An objection is solved.—And hence it is also evident that this same union in number is required for the perfect unity of such a composite, because in its own way it concurs intrinsically to its constitution; for the entity of the composite intrinsically includes not only the entity of matter and form, but also their union among themselves; therefore, when the union is varied, the entity is in some respect varied, and consequently the unity of the composite itself; it is therefore required for perfect unity and individuation; by this reason, then, this union too could be numbered among those things which complete the perfect principle of individuation of the composite itself. It is not, however, as necessary as matter and form, because these are simply the essential principles of such a composite; but the union is as it were a required condition, or the causality of matter and form, as I said in tom. 2 of the Third Part, disp. XXXIV, sect. 2. Comparing also matter and form among themselves, the chief principle is the form, not only with respect to the specific nature, form being taken in the species, but also with respect to this individual, form being taken as individual; because this form is most proper to this individual, and because it is that which completes this integral substance in number; for this matter only begins it, and as far as depends on itself does not begin this more than another. Likewise because this form is the chief principle of being, and consequently is also the chief principle of distinguishing this substance from others; but the principle of unity is the same as the principle of being and of its distinction from others; therefore. You will say that form is the principle of specific distinction, because it makes things differ formally; therefore it cannot be the principle of numerical distinction; otherwise numerical distinction would be formal and essential. The answer is that form according to its specific and essential notion makes specific and essential difference, but individual form according to its entity makes entitative and numerical distinction. For Peter and Paul differ among themselves in number more because they have souls distinct in number than because they have distinct bodies. And from these things the last part of the conclusion is evident, which is also sufficiently proved from the common manner of speaking which we noted above; for he is simply judged the same man, not only according to appearance but also according to truth, who has the same soul in number, even if the body is changed. But the reason is that form is simply judged to constitute the species, and similarly this form this individual under such a species.

17. A question.—Answer.—But you will ask whether the individual difference is rigorously taken from the complete principle, namely matter and form, or from one only; for authors seem more frequently to think that it is taken from one only; for, since this difference is simple, it does not seem to be taken from the whole composite, nor from a double partial principle, but from one only which is simple. They differ, however; for some say that that principle is matter, as Cajetan and others; others say that it is form, as Scotus; and Durandus inclines to the same. And this latter is truer, the former foundation being supposed, namely that the individual difference is to be taken from one only of these principles. We speak, however, of the thing itself according to itself; for as regards us, who take our knowledge from material things, the distinction of individuals is often taken from matter, or from the accidents which follow upon matter, such as are quantity and other properties; but according to itself, just as the difference is to be taken from a substantial principle and not from an accidental one, so among the substantial principles themselves it is to be taken from that which is chief and more proper and the ultimate constitutive of the thing itself; but such is the form, as has been shown. Likewise this is true speaking of the individual of such a nature or species, as it is formally constituted in it. For which reason we said above that the supposit is one in number if it has one subsistence in number, even if the nature is not one, because the formal constitutive of the supposit is incommunicable subsistence, from which alone the individual notion of the supposit as such is to be taken; but conversely we said that the unity and individual difference of the singular thing, as constituted under such a species or substantial essence, is to be taken from the substantial nature, which formally constitutes such an individual. In this manner, then, we say in the present case that the individual difference of this man formally taken, as he is an individual of the human species, is taken from this soul. But if we speak of this composite as it is perfectly and in every respect one, it will more truly be said that its individual difference is taken from its whole entity, and so from the adequate physical principle, which includes matter and form, so that in this way it is verified also of that whole composite that it is individuated by itself, or through its own entity; for through it it has identity simply in itself and diversity from every other. Nor is it unfitting that a difference which according to the metaphysical concept is simple, that is, not composed of genus and difference, should be taken from a physically composite entity or nature, in so far as it is one and is conceived after the manner of one individual nature.

18. By what complete spiritual substances are individuated.—Finally, from what has been said it is sufficiently evident what is to be said of immaterial substances, in which too individual differences are found, as we have shown; whence, since in them there is only a simple complete substantial entity, it is evident that in them there can be no other principle of individuation besides the very entity of each thing, which is such of itself and is distinguished per se from others. And in this all agree who confess that these substances are individual, by whatever reason they declare their individuation. But those who say that it belongs of itself to such a specific spiritual nature teach much more and a fortiori that they are individuated through their entities, as is evident from Capreolus, In II, dist. 3; Cajetan and others, I, q. 3, a. 3, and q. 50, a. 4; Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, q. 49; Javellus, q. 25; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 21. But those who think that also in immaterial things individuation comes about through the addition of a difference necessarily also teach that it is to be taken from the substantial entity of the angel itself according to itself; because it is neither to be taken from accidents, nor is there anything else from which it could be taken; all of which have been sufficiently proved from what has been said. But the common argument, that if these substances differ through their entities they necessarily differ formally and essentially, has already been solved in a similar case of other forms. For those entities, however formal, can be altogether similar in essential notion; and then, although they are distinguished by themselves, the distinction is nevertheless numerical, because it is in entity, not in formal notion. But they are said to be distinguished by themselves not because they are not similar, but because one has of itself that it is not the other; for likeness does not exclude distinction, as will be said below.

1. In this doubt there can be almost the same ways of speaking which were reported in the preceding section; yet, because the same doctrine which was given of substantial forms is to be applied proportionally to accidental ones, this matter can therefore be dispatched very briefly by adding a few things which are proper to accidents. We suppose, then, from what was said in sect. 2, that in accidental forms there are necessarily individual differences, which individual forms add to the specific notions, from which they are distinguished at least by reason; for the doctrine given there is general, and the reasons made proceed of all species and individuals. Whence it comes about that, speaking of the metaphysical principles constituting and distinguishing things, no question remains about the principle of individuation of the accident; for there is in them an individual difference, which in each is proper and contracts the species to the being of such an individual. It remains, then, only to inquire what the physical foundation and principle of this difference is, and in this sense we here investigate the principle of individuation of accidents, as we said of substances. And therefore we have no controversy in this place with Scotus, who thought this question was to be terminated by his haecceities (which are nothing other than individual differences); for we too admit those differences; yet we inquire further into the physical root of those differences.

2. Two opinions, then, can only be reported here. The former is that accidents are individuated through the subject. So St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 29, a. 1, and q. 39, a. 3, and Opusc. 29, at the end. But in Quodlibet VII, a. 19, he limits this opinion and says that it is true in the other accidents besides quantity, which he says is individuated not from the subject but from site, but the other accidents from the subject, at least from quantity. Whence he infers that, although an individual quantity can be preserved by God without a subject, whiteness or the other accidents cannot, which necessarily require a subject, at least quantity itself, in order to become individual. And hence St. Thomas often teaches that there cannot be two separated whitenesses distinct only in number, because they would not have that by which they would be distinguished, I, q. 50, a. 4, and q. 75, a. 7. And Capreolus teaches and defends the same, In I, dist. 44, a. 1, concl. 2. The foundations of this opinion are the same as those which were brought forward above to prove that the substantial form is individuated by signate matter. And it is confirmed, first, for the accident has its whole being in order to the subject; therefore it must have its individuation from the subject, for each thing must be individuated from the same principles from which it has being. Secondly, because, if accidents were not individuated by the subject, several accidents diverse only in number could be received in the same subject, because, notwithstanding the identity of the subject, they could have distinction among themselves; whence no reason for this repugnance could be assigned; but we see that the same subject cannot receive two whitenesses or two heats; the whole reason of this, therefore, is because they are individuated by the subject; and therefore, by the very fact that they are received in the same subject, they are one, and not two.

3. The opinion of others.—The second opinion is that each accidental form is physically individuated by itself, as it is such an entity in act or aptitude, and has no other intrinsic principle of individuation besides its entity. So it is taken from the opinion of Durandus treated above; and all the reasons which we adduced of the substantial form prove the same of the accidental form. And the sum is that each thing is one in number formally and intrinsically (as regards the foundation of the unity or negation which one expresses) through the very same thing through which it is actual being in the nature of things, or apt to be such; because every such being is singular, as was shown above; but every thing through its entity is intrinsically and formally such actual being; therefore through the same it is something singular and individual; therefore accidents too have this. And it is confirmed, because the subject cannot be the principle individuating accidents; therefore such a principle can only be the intrinsic entity of the accidents themselves. The antecedent is evident, because first of all the subject cannot be called the intrinsic principle of the individuation of the accident as intrinsically and per se composing the accident, because we are not now dealing with the composite of subject and accident, but with the accidental form itself, which it is evident is not intrinsically composed of the subject itself, nor is the subject in this way its intrinsic principle. Again, neither can the subject be called the principle individuating the accident as the term of the relationship or aptitude of such an accident to inform such a subject; first, because with respect to the same subject in number two accidents distinct only in number can have an aptitude for informing it; therefore those aptitudes cannot be distinguished in number from the subject; therefore from themselves. Secondly, this most of all presses of certain accidents which according to their relationship do not stop at the subject, but refer it, or in some way lead it to another, such as relations, acts, habits and the like; for, if the accident is said to be individuated by the subject because it naturally regards it, why will these accidents not rather be said to be individuated by the ultimate terms which they naturally regard, especially since from them according to their common notions they take their essential or specific notions? Thirdly, because it is said without foundation that this accident in number has a natural adaptation and relationship only to this subject; for, although perhaps through natural causes it can be made in that alone, nevertheless of itself it is apt to inform any subject capable of such an accident; just as conversely it can happen that this subject cannot naturally have anything but this whiteness or this quantity, and yet its capacity is not on that account to be understood as of itself so limited and determined to this accident that it is not of itself sufficient for receiving similar accidents. Finally this very thing can be persuaded by all the reasons which we made about the substantial form.

Resolution of the question

4. This controversy is to be settled and defined by the distinction indicated above. For we said that we can speak of the principle of individuation in two ways: first, in order to being and to the proper constitution of the thing according to itself. Secondly, in order to production, in so far as the agent is determined to producing a distinct individual, or to effecting one rather than another, and consequently in order to our knowledge, in so far as we can distinguish sensibly (so to speak) one from another. In the former consideration, then (which is most of all a priori, and most proper to this science), the latter opinion is true, teaching that accidents have their individuation and numerical distinction not from the subject but from their proper entities, as the reasons made both here and in the preceding section sufficiently prove, and as will be more fully evident from what is to be said in the solutions of the arguments. But in the latter consideration (which is more physical and a posteriori) accidents can be said to receive their individuation from the subject as from a root, or rather an occasion, of their multiplication and distinction. This, however, is to be understood not of the subject barely taken, but with other circumstances or conditions necessary for the action applied, as will be more conveniently explained in the solutions of the arguments.

5. The foundations, then, of the former opinion, in so far as they are the same as the reasons by which it is wont to be proved that matter signed by quantity is the principle of individuation, and can be repugnant to the former part of the opinion posited by us, have been sufficiently treated and dispatched in the preceding section. But the first confirmation only proves that the accident has its individuation in order to the subject and depends naturally on it, not that the individuation of the subject is the intrinsic principle of the individuation of the accident. But in the second confirmation and in the foundations of the latter opinion a common doubt is touched upon, which cannot be passed over in this place, yet demands its own proper question.

1. That accidents differing only in number are in the same subject can happen in two ways, namely at the same time or only successively; and each has been placed in controversy, and in the present section we treat only the former.

The first opinion is treated

2. In which there is the first opinion, which denies that not only accidents of the same species, but also of diverse species, if they are contained under the same proximate genus, can be at the same time in the same subject. See St. Thomas, I, q. 85, a. 1, where: It is impossible (he says) that the same subject be perfected at the same time by several forms of one genus and of diverse species, as it is impossible that the same body according to the same part be at the same time coloured with diverse colours or figured with diverse figures. But in De veritate, q. 8, a. 14, he declares this of forms existing in perfect act. Which exposition the Thomists commonly embrace, and so they solve the arguments about several intelligible or sensible species contained under the same proximate genus (such as are the species of man and horse) existing at the same time in the same power, and about two sciences, for example, or two moral or theological virtues, which, since they differ in species and are contained under the same proximate genus, can be at the same time in the same power, even with perfect intension; for these and similar things they say are at the same time only in incomplete act, because they are at the same time only in first act or in habit, not in second act.

3. But in truth it is difficult to sustain this opinion in that generality simply and absolutely. First, because no sufficient reason for it can be given; for, as Scotus well objects, In I, dist. 3, q. 6, § Ad quaestionem igitur, in the examples which St. Thomas brought forward above, those accidents differing in species cannot be at the same time for this reason, that they include some opposition in order to the subject; for two colours are always opposed, either as extreme contraries, or as extreme and intermediate, or as approaching more to one of the extremes; figures too include repugnance in site, or in straightness and obliquity, or in some similar thing; but it is not necessary that all accidents differing in species have an opposition of this kind with respect to the subject. Next, Durandus, In II, dist. 3, q. 8, urges not badly the argument about intelligible species (although he himself uses it badly to deny intelligible species); he argues, then, that, although the intellect does not actually understand, several species are perfect and complete as regards the act of informing; for actual operation matters nothing to the complete being of a form. Cajetan answers, I, q. 85, a. 4, that this is true of species in real being, but not in intelligible being. But, to omit that this is a certain begging of the question in the question which he disputes there, namely whether the intellect can have several acts of understanding at the same time, because, as he himself expounds, that intelligible being is nothing other than that it actually moves the power to actual consideration; to omit this (I say), for the question with which we are here dealing it is enough that two accidents according to their real being have at the same time a complete act of informing in the same subject. And the same argument can be made of the habits of the moral virtues or of the sciences, in which that distinction of real or intelligible being has no place. And from these the argument can be extended also to acts; for it will not be repugnant that they be at the same time, as far as depends on themselves or on the receptive power, if there is not lacking an active power which can effect them at the same time, because in the rest there is no greater repugnance between acts than between habits of the same genus, if otherwise they are not contrary.

4. And so too is solved the reason which St. Thomas indicates in the said De veritate, q. 8, namely, that acts of the same genus regard the same power and terminate it; but the same power cannot at the same time be terminated by several acts. For the answer is that this is true in acts adequate to the same power, but not in inadequate ones; as in the present case one species or one habit is not the adequate first act of the intellect, because it does not perfect it in order to its adequate object; and therefore several can be in it at the same time, even if they are of the same genus, until they integrally and adequately perfect it. And the same will have to be said of any accidental forms whatever. As, for example, heat and dryness, although perhaps they agree in proximate genus, can be at the same time in the same fire, because neither of those qualities per se fills the natural capacity of fire, neither the passive, which it has by reason of matter, nor in a certain way the active, which it has by reason of form through natural emanation. That proposition of St. Thomas, then, in order to be true in some sense, is to be understood of forms which completely and adequately actuate the potency of the subject in such a genus or notion, as will be more evident from what is to be said. For this opinion which has hitherto been treated is not founded on the individuation of accidents, and so did not pertain to the present question; yet it had necessarily to be set out first, both for the completion of the doctrine and also because it throws light on what we shall say.

The second opinion

5. The second opinion, then, is also extreme, that no accidents at all of the same species can be at the same time in the same subject. Which is thought to be Aristotle’s, Metaphysics V, c. 10, text 15, saying that those accidents differ in species which, being in the same substance, have a difference. Where St. Thomas, lect. 12, gives the general reason of that assertion, because it is impossible that several accidents of the same species be in the same subject. He teaches the same, III, q. 35, a. 5, where also he does not admit several relations diverse only in number in the same father with respect to several sons, nor in the same son with respect to father and mother. And so Capreolus generally defends this opinion, In I, dist. 7, q. 2; Cajetan, III, q. 35, a. 5; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 9, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1; there Paludanus, q. 2; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 4, where he adduces several reasons. But the chief is taken from individuation; for distinction in forms is only either formal, which is specific, or material from the subject, which is numerical, from Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 3; Book V, c. 6; therefore, where neither of these intervenes, there cannot be distinction; therefore, where there is the specific unity of an accident in the same subject, there cannot be numerical plurality. It is confirmed, because otherwise, by the reason by which two accidents diverse only in number could be at the same time in the same subject, they could also be multiplied to infinity, because there is no greater reason for one multitude than for another; whence it is inferred that there are infinite relations in the same subject, and other similar inconveniences.

6. But it is also difficult to sustain this opinion in this whole generality without any exception, on account of various examples in which it plainly seems to fail, which we shall bring forward immediately. And therefore, although none of the authors simply teaches the extremely contrary opinion, namely that any accidents whatever differing only in number, of whatever species they are, can be at the same time in the same subject—for this is openly repugnant not only to Aristotle and all philosophers, but also to experience itself, as was touched upon above and will be more fully evident from what is to be said—nevertheless several apply exceptions and limitations to the aforesaid opinion; but because it is difficult to choose a middle way and give its reason, therefore in making this exception they do not agree among themselves.

The third opinion

7. The third opinion, then, is that of the Thomists, who distinguish accidents in complete or incomplete act; for in the former way they deny that accidents differing only in number can be at the same time in one subject, on account of the reasons given and the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas, whom they so expound. But in the latter way they admit it. So Cajetan, I, q. 95, a. 4. More clearly Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2, on the arguments against the ninth conclusion; Javellus, Metaphysics V, q. 16. Who seem to have taken this from St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 8, a. 14, and seem to have been led chiefly by the argument of intentional species; because they cannot deny that several differing only in number can be in the same subject, namely in the same intellect, or in the same phantasy, or in the same medium according to the same part.

8. But first of all this distinction is not sufficient, for we shall show below that not only these intentional accidents but also several others according to their whole complete being can be at the same time in the same subject. Next, about these intentional accidents the argument made above returns, namely for what reason they are said to be incompletely in the subject: whether because they do not effect, or because they do not fully inform; this latter is false, because they are in it according to their whole being; therefore they inform; but the former seems irrelevant, because the complete being of an accident does not consist in effecting but in informing. Finally there is added that, if these accidents cannot be in the same subject on account of individuation, then the same will hold whether they are in actual operation or not; because before they operate they have their individuation from the subject; therefore either that reason is not fitting, or it equally proves that these accidents cannot be distinguished in number in the same subject even while they do not operate.

The fourth opinion

9. The fourth opinion is that proper accidents, or those which flow intrinsically from the subject, cannot be several differing only in number in the same subject; but those which are common accidents can be at the same time. So Jandun, Metaphysics V, q. 36. The reason of the former part is that nature abhors superfluity; whence, since the proper accident is intrinsic to the nature, and one suffices for the function and end of the nature, it is not multiplied. And hence is taken the reason of the other part; for, since the common accident often comes from without and per accidens, it is not repugnant that it be multiplied in the same subject; and so it happens that several heatings are made at the same time in the same wood by diverse fires.

10. But this opinion, although it is true as regards the former part¹, is not universally true as regards the latter, because neither several whitenesses nor several heats can be at the same time in the same subject, although these are common accidents. Nor is what is said of several heatings true, for when two fires heat the same wood according to the same part, as they effect one heat, so also one heating, which is from each partially and from both together as from the total cause. Moreover, if that rule were generally true, it would follow that two sciences of the same species and in order to the same object, and similarly two temperances diverse only in number, could be at the same time in the same subject, which is not probable. Finally there stands in the way a general reason, because even in extraneous and accidental changes the extrinsic agent intends to assimilate the patient to itself; whence, if it finds it similar, it does not act on it again; otherwise, after it had once assimilated it to itself, it would act on it again and again, and so the action would proceed to infinity, at least as regards the multiplication of accidental forms. And by the same reason things altogether similar in the same accident would change each other mutually, and would multiply similar accidents in themselves. Indeed by the same or greater reason the same thing would act on itself, by producing in itself through one accident another similar one, or, if it already had two, it would effect a third, and so to infinity; all of which are plainly false and absurd. Whence it is gathered that also in these accidental changes the principle of them on the side of the subject is the privation of a similar form; and therefore a change of this kind does not tend to multiplying an accident of the same species in the same subject.

The fifth opinion

11. The fifth opinion distinguishes accidents which are made through proper motion or which are made without motion; and of the former it denies that they can be at the same time in the same subject, on account of the reason adduced, that motion comes about from contrary to contrary; but of the latter it affirms that accidents diverse only in number can be at the same time in the same subject. Fonseca reports this opinion, Book V, c. 10, q. 1, sect. 1, and it is wont to be attributed to Scotus, Gabriel, Durandus and others, In III, dist. 8; yet Durandus there, q. 3, says nothing of this, but rather in the solution ad 1, in absolute accidents, admits only that those which are of the same species can be in the same supposit according to one part and another; but in relative ones according to one foundation and another. But Gabriel there, a. 3, dub. 1, applies no distinction, but simply denies that it is repugnant that two accidents differing only in number be in the same subject. And Scotus speaks almost in the same way there, sole question. He indicates, however, that through the operation of a natural agent the multiplication of qualities of the same notion in the same subject does not come about; because the natural agent intends to perfect an imperfect pre-existing form; and therefore it does not induce an altogether other form, but some degree or as it were part which it unites to the pre-existing one in order to perfect it. In which he indicates that distinction of accidents which are made through motion or without it. Which Antonius Andreae also indicates, Metaphysics V, q. 8. For he says that relative accidents differing only in number can be in the same subject; but of absolute ones he subdistinguishes, for some are educed from the potency of the subject, and these are not multiplied in number in the same subject; but others are not educed, and these can be multiplied. And of this kind he thinks is light, about which the students of perspective contend that from two luminous bodies two lights are produced in the same part of the subject, because they make two shadows, and because, one luminous body being taken away, some light in the air is corrupted and some remains.

12. All accidents inhering in a subject are educed from its potency.—But these things are partly false, partly do not satisfy. And, to begin from this last, it is false that there are some accidents in a subject which, in the way in which they are made in it, are not educed from its potency,² because all depend on the subject in becoming and in being; and specially of light it is evident that it is educed from the potency of the subject; for it is not created, nor made only in the subject, but from the subject, the air, for example, concurring in the genus of material cause to its effecting. It is also false that lights are multiplied in number in the same subject; nor is there any experience by which this could be proved; for experience only teaches that, other things being equal, two luminous bodies act more in the same part than one only; but this is not on account of the multiplication of lights, but on account of the greater intension of the same light; from which it comes about that, one agent being taken away, or in that part to which the action of one reaches and not of the other, the effect appears less, not because one light is corrupted and the other remains, but because the same becomes and is preserved more remiss. And hence it is also that sometimes two shadows result, because a shadow is nothing other than the lack or diminution of light; and it often happens that, one body being interposed between two luminous bodies distant from each other, in one place it impedes the action of one, and in another distant place the action of the other, but in the intermediate place the action of neither is impeded; and thence it comes about that several shadows appear. And hence the first distinction about accidents which are made through motion or without it is easily refuted; for, if motion is taken rigorously for successive motion which comes about from a contrary, it is evident from the example of light that the latter part is false; for light is not made through motion, but through instantaneous change, nor is it made from a contrary positive term, but from a privative one, and yet it cannot be multiplied in the same subject. Likewise that distinction seems very per accidens; for what does it matter to this numerical distinction or identity of accidents that they are made through motion or through change? Because the distinction of accidents is not taken thence, but either from themselves or from the subject. But if the subject is in potency only to one heat which comes about successively, why will it not also be said to be in potency only to one light, although it comes about all at once? Or conversely, if it is in potency to several lights, why will it not be in potency to several heats? But if it is said that in those things which come about successively the agent does not intend to induce a new accident but to perfect the pre-existing one, the same will be said of light and of any other similar quality, which, as it comes about in an instant from the opposite privation, so also can be intensified in an instant from the privation of so much intension. Whence here too there has place the reason touched upon above from Scotus, that not only successive motion but every natural action of an agent is in order to render the patient similar to itself; and therefore it does not act on what is similar, but requires in the patient privation as the principle of its action; when, therefore, light is in the air as four, and a new luminous body is applied, it will not act on the air in so far as it is similar to itself in four degrees, but rather in so far as it is dissimilar in further degrees; the reason, therefore, of accidents which come about through change or through motion is the same.

13. But if motion in that distinction is not taken in that rigour, but as it comprehends change, so that the sense is that those accidents which come about per se through proper action are not multiplied in the subject according to number, but others are multiplied, then too the distinction can be attacked: first, because it is given through things which are very extrinsic and per accidens to the numerical distinction of accidents. Secondly, because neither part seems to be constant; for sensible species come about through proper action, and yet are multiplied in number in the same part of the medium; sound too seems to come about per se by proper action, and yet is multiplied in number in the same subject, as experience seems to prove; for we hear a harmony of several voices at the same time and through the same medium, which could not come about unless the sounds were diverse. But conversely figure does not come about per se primarily through motion, and yet cannot be multiplied in number in the same subject; and the same is true in all similar absolute ones, because they cannot be multiplied through the change of something extrinsic, as relative ones can; and therefore, as they do not come about per se, so neither can they be multiplied per se in the same subject; nor even concomitantly, since that form which comes about per se and upon which they follow is not multiplied in number in the same subject.

14. Relative accidents can be multiplied under the same species in the same subject, yet not all.—Moreover, the distinction of absolute and relative does not satisfy in every respect; for, if relatives are taken rigorously for relatives according to being and predicamental ones, it is indeed true that these can sometimes be multiplied in number in the same subject, as we shall say in treating of relations; but this is not universally true; for the relation of the creature cannot be multiplied in the same subject. But the other part, about absolute ones, is less universal, as is evident from the examples adduced of species and of sounds and similar things. Fonseca uses another distinction, in the place cited above, sect. 3, which in great part coincides with the aforesaid. And in sum he says that of accidents naturally acquired through motion, or through change conjoined to motion, there cannot be several of the same species in the same subject, and of these he explains in the fourth place the saying of Aristotle, which in this sense he understands to be universally and without exception true. But he adds subsequently that of accidents which are not intensified and remitted, whether they are acquired through motion or change conjoined to motion or in another way, it is necessary that there be very many of the same species in the same subject. Whence he seems to limit the former opinion to those accidents which are intensified and remitted; and so the former opinion is not altogether general, as he indicates in the fourth conclusion. But not even with that limitation does this opinion seem universally true, because intentional species can be intensified and remitted, and nevertheless are multiplied in the same subject; it is also probable that sound is remitted and intensified, which nevertheless he himself says is multiplied in the same subject. What he also adds in the same place, that in order to the absolute power of God there cannot be in the same subject several accidents distinct in number when they are such that by their nature they coalesce into one more intense in number, is difficult to believe, as I shall immediately declare more fully.

Resolution of the question as regards the mode in which several similar accidents can be at the same time in the same subject

15. In so great a variety of opinions, then, it is difficult to prescribe some certain rule in this matter and to assign its true reason. Two things, however, seem to me certain in this matter. One is that this universal negative proposition, that several accidents of the same species cannot be in the same subject, cannot be verified absolutely and simply, or without some limitation. Which the examples of intentional species and of relations prove to me most of all, supposing that they are something real distinct from the nature of the thing from absolute things. But the example adduced of sound is not so convincing, both because it is not certain that sound comes about per se primarily through that motion or action; and most of all because it is not sufficiently established that the several sounds which are heard are in the same part of the subject; for they always come about in the beginning in distinct places and there are properly perceived; but when they reach the hearing, or the part of the medium near the hearing, perhaps they no longer reach it according to real being but only according to intentional being. Other examples are wont to be adduced of the continuities and durations of two motions which can come about at the same time in the same thing; as, for example, the same wood can at the same time be heated and dried, which two motions, although they are diverse in species, nevertheless their continuities and durations seem to differ only in number. But these examples do not greatly compel, both because it is very probable that neither is duration an accident or mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the existence of the enduring thing, nor intrinsic or entitative continuity from the continuous thing itself; and also because, even if we admit such accidents, they are not in the mobile immediately, but by means of the motion which they affect; and therefore they are not properly in the same subject according to the same. Nevertheless the former examples suffice, to which can be added that the same power can have at the same time several acts distinct in number, although perhaps not altogether similar or supremely perfect, as if the will or appetite at the same time loves two men by diverse acts; or if the blessed (as many wish) at the same time love God necessarily and freely from charity.

16. Of which accidents it is to be judged that they can coexist in one subject, of which not.—Secondly, it is certain that it cannot naturally happen in every species of accidents that several which differ only in number be at the same time in the same subject. This is evident of all the properties which belong from within, such as are quantity, which belongs from within by reason of matter, the connatural powers or faculties which in each thing flow from the form, and in the same part of the subject are never multiplied within the same species, as is sufficiently evident by induction. Likewise of real and absolute qualities, either the first, by which matter is disposed, or the second, which result from these, as can also be proved by experience; for the instance which is wont to be adduced of the degrees of intension is not to the point; for these do not properly differ in number, of which elsewhere. The same, finally, is more probable of light and similar things. But what general rule is to be handed down, or what reason of the difference to be assigned, I find nothing which satisfies me in every respect. We can, however, explain it in this way. Some accidents so differ only in number that, besides the distinction of entities, in all the rest they have a certain likeness and agreement, namely in the function or offices to which they are destined, and in whatever relationship they express, such as are two heats, two whitenesses and the like. But there are others which, although they agree in the specific notion and under it differ only in number, nevertheless do not have so great a likeness among themselves, but differ either in function or in relationship. As, for example, two visible species of Peter differ in number in the former way. But two visible species of Peter and of Paul differ in number in this latter way; for they are not as similar among themselves as those two; for they have diverse transcendental relationships to objects and are ordered to diverse functions.

17. I say, then, thirdly, that accidents of the former kind cannot be multiplied in number in the same subject, but those which are of the latter kind can be multiplied. And each can be proved by induction and by the examples adduced. For altogether absolute accidents are never multiplied in number in the same subject for this reason, that they are similar in the former way; but respective accidents, whether by predicamental or transcendental respect, can be multiplied, because with specific unity they can have some dissimilitude, as it were material, on whose occasion they can be multiplied; whence it comes about that with respect to the same thing they can never be multiplied; and therefore the relation of the creature cannot be multiplied, because its term can only be one, and with respect to the same term relations cannot be multiplied. Therefore too, although we grant that the relations to father and mother are several and diverse only in number, nevertheless the relation to the father cannot be multiplied in the same son. But the reason of the difference between the two kinds of accidents can be assigned sufficiently probably from what has been said. First, from the final cause, because when accidents are altogether similar, their multiplication in the same subject would be superfluous and idle, which nature abhors; but when they are in some way diverse, or are ordered to diverse ends, as is evident in intentional species, or result from things ordered to diverse ends and thence participate diverse relationships, as happens in relations, then the numerical multiplication is not superfluous nor beyond an end consonant with nature.

18. Secondly, on the side of the agent, because, when accidents are altogether similar, no agent per se intends either their plurality or to induce another into a subject already having another altogether similar, because the agent only intends to render the patient similar to itself, which it sufficiently attains through only one form of this kind. But when the accidents are not similar in the aforesaid way, this reason ceases and the subject needs a greater assimilation; and therefore the agent also procures it. As, for example, although the medium, having received the species of Peter, is intentionally similar to him, it is not sufficiently similar to Paul, and therefore there remains in Paul the power of inducing a species by which he may render it similar to himself, and so of the others.

19. Whence, thirdly, a reason is given from the capacity of the subject; for just as prime matter, although it is indifferent to all substantial forms, nevertheless does not have the capacity to have all at the same time, nor several, because it is sufficiently actuated by one form, so also the subject of accidents, although per se primarily it is capable of some species of accident, and consequently is indifferent to any individual of it, is nevertheless not capable of receiving at the same time all or several individuals of such a species, in so far as in them the specific notion is found in the same way, because such a capacity is sufficiently actuated by one form of such a species; and this happens when the individual forms are altogether similar and of the same notion and relationship; but when the accidents are dissimilar and have various relationships, then one does not suffice to fill the capacity of the subject, and therefore it can happen that they are multiplied in the same subject until they altogether fill its capacity. As the intellective power, in so far as it is capable of natural science of God or of man, is sufficiently disposed in first act by one science in number of metaphysics or of philosophy, and therefore no longer remains capable of another similar science; yet the same intellective faculty, as it is capable of actual knowledge of men, is not fully actuated by one act by which it knows Peter or Paul, nor by one intelligible species; and therefore it is capable of several, until its faculty is sufficiently completed, because those several do not actuate it altogether in the same way, but in order to diverse things. Whence it finally comes about that, of the distinctions brought forward above, that one which distinguishes between absolute and respective comes nearest to the truth; for absolute ones are not multiplied, because they are always altogether similar; but respective ones, either according to being or according to expression, or by predicamental relation or transcendental relationship, can be multiplied when they regard diverse terms or are ordered to diverse functions, on account of the dissimilitude which they have in themselves, because none of them fully actuates the subject, as has been declared. And according to these things is to be explained the place of Aristotle in Metaphysics V. For it is not necessary that that indication of specific diversity be altogether universal of all accidents, but of those which in the individual are perfectly similar.

A formal answer to the question as it pertains to individuation

20. From these things is gathered the formal answer to the present question, on account of which all these things have been said, namely, that it does not come per se from individuation that some accidents diverse only in number cannot be at the same time in the same subject. For, although they were in it at the same time, they could very well be understood as distinct in number by reason of their entities, as those things are distinguished which can be at the same time, as has been said, or as those are distinguished which are successively in the same subject, as will be said immediately. But that some cannot be in it comes from the natural incapacity of the subject and the adequation which is found between its receptive potency and such an act, and consequently from the defect of a natural agent which could effect that multiplication.

21. Whence I further infer that by absolute power it is not repugnant that several accidents differing only in number, even if they are altogether similar, be placed at the same time in the same subject; because it is not repugnant from their individuation and distinction, and God can operate in the subject beyond its natural capacity; and if God willed to do this for the showing of his power, it would not be altogether superfluous. This, however, some limit to those accidents which are not intensified nor remitted; for of those which receive intension they think it impossible even by absolute power that several differing only in number be placed in the same subject without their composing one intense quality, if each of them inheres in the subject, because by this very fact they are necessarily united among themselves into one more intense; because two degrees of heat require no other union in order to compose one intense heat except that they be in the same subject. Whence, if one of them inheres in the subject and the other does not inhere but is sustained by the same subject in another way without inherence, then it will not be repugnant that they be at the same time, or rather be sustained at the same time by the same subject, because then they do not have among themselves the union necessary to compose one more intense quality; and in this opinion Giles is cited, In I, dist. 17, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 1; but there he says nothing.

22. This opinion, however, seems to suppose false principles about the intension of qualities. The first, that intension comes about through the addition or aggregation of several degrees of the same quality altogether similar among themselves. The second, that those degrees have no union among themselves, either in some common and real positive term, or by another genus of union after the manner of act and potency, but are only united in the subject and in the same part of the subject, if it has parts. The third, that those degrees do not regard the subject in any order, but all equally immediately, so that there is no order among them of first, second and third degree, except perhaps in the order of generation and production; but if they come about at the same time, all are equally first. From which doctrine it excellently follows that God cannot multiply degrees of heat inhering in the same subject without their making one more intense; because such intension is nothing other than the aggregation of several similar degrees in the same subject; but without these principles I do not see on what foundation that limitation can rest, as I shall immediately show; indeed that opinion so explained does not properly limit that God can³ place any intensible qualities whatever diverse only in number in the same subject, but adds that, by the very fact that he places them, they will necessarily effect one more intense.

23. That doctrine of intension, however, involves some repugnance, which, since it is foreign to this place, cannot be professedly declared, but is nevertheless briefly indicated. For either those degrees of which an intense quality is said to be composed, for example eight degrees of heat, are indivisible in themselves, or each has its own breadth of intension and remission: the first cannot be said, first, because otherwise intension could not be a continuous motion; for each of those degrees would necessarily have to be acquired whole at once, otherwise it would not be indivisible; therefore the whole intension would have to come about through momentary and indivisible changes; therefore not by continuous succession, which is both against sense and experience and against reason, because as long as the natural agent overcomes the patient there is no reason why it should interrupt the action; otherwise it would not be in its power afterwards to repeat it, nor could a philosophical reason be given why it should effect it now rather than before or afterwards. Secondly, because otherwise the degrees of heat would in no way make one heat per se, but would be united merely per accidens in the same subject, as whiteness and sweetness; but this is not enough for them to effect one individual of heat, any more than if God placed two intellects in the same soul. Indeed, if this sufficed for intension, no reason could be given why, if God placed two intellects in the same soul, they would not effect one more intense; for if you say that intellects are not qualities which are apt to coalesce into one more intense, against this is the fact that according to that opinion, in order that qualities can coalesce into one more intense, nothing else is required except that, since they are altogether of the same notion, they can be united in the same subject; but intellects will have this at least in order to the divine power. Thirdly, many absurdities follow from that opinion, namely that a remiss quality could intensify another equal or even more intense one by effecting as many degrees as it has in itself; or, if likeness stands in the way, it follows that a more intense quality cannot intensify a more remiss one, because they are altogether similar in form. It follows also that no natural reason can be given why, when a form is remitted, one degree rather than another is cast off, and other similar things which it would be long to pursue. It must necessarily be said, then, that in those degrees of intension of heat, for example, which we divide in the mind, there is a breadth according to which there can be continuous intension or remission in them, which breadth must necessarily be divisible to infinity; otherwise by reason of them continuous alteration could not come about, because continuous motion must necessarily be divisible to infinity; whence consequently it is also necessary that these degrees be joined among themselves by some common term, because otherwise neither continuity nor true real union can be conceived between them, without which that breadth cannot be understood; because if two degrees are not united among themselves in this way, then neither in one degree will its two parts or halves (so to speak) be united among themselves; because the whole quality is composed of several degrees just as each degree is composed of two or three equal parts; but these cannot be understood without the said union, any more than a continuum divided into its every part can be understood.

24. From these contrary principles about intension, however, it plainly follows that God can place in the same subject several intensible qualities differing only in number which do not effect one more intense, as, for example, two heats as eight, because he can place them inhering in the subject and not having among themselves any union per se, but only per accidens by reason of the subject, which is not enough for intension. Nor can any new implication of contradiction be brought forward in this; and so the doctors more frequently think, In I Sent., dist. 17, where Gregory, q. 5; Ockham, q. 7; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 1, where he adduces a not contemptible conjecture: because God can intimately place two quantities differing only in number in the same site, their distinction being preserved and without any real union between them by reason of which they would effect one greater quantity; why, then, could he not place two whitenesses in the same subject, their distinction being preserved and without a union by reason of which they would compose one more intense?

1. Several accidents are said to be successively in the same subject when the subject first had one accident, and then lost it, and afterwards acquires an accident of the same species; and then it is asked whether the later accident necessarily is, or can be, distinct in number from the former. For some so tenaciously defend the individuation of the accident from the subject that they think it impossible that even in this way there be several accidents differing only in number in the same subject. Whence it is inferred that the same accident in number which had perished before is always reproduced in the same subject, namely the same heat, the same light, and consequently the same where, the same local motion, especially if it is through the same space; for the reason of all these is the same. And Scotus in part defends this opinion, at least when the agent is the same and the subject the same; who is not founded on individuation, but on this, that the same agent about the same subject is always apt by nature to make the same thing, nor can a sufficient reason be assigned why it should make something distinct in number. Indeed Aristotle too, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, indicates that, if the agent and the matter are one in number, the effect too is one in number. And it is explained in this way: for if with open eyes I continuously gaze at this wall for an hour, I effect and preserve the same act in number; therefore, if I close my eyes for a little and open them again, I shall again effect the same act in number, for that interruption in no way prevents that power from being able, in that whole hour and in any part of it taken by itself, to effect and receive the same act in number. But if you object that it follows also that the substantial form is reproduced the same in number in the same part of matter whenever a form similar in species is induced, and consequently that the same individual which was before is naturally reproduced, which is to say that resurrection can come about naturally, there are not lacking those who concede this, as may be seen in Paul of Venice, De generatione II, at the end. But others deny that the reason is the same, because the substantial form requires disposed matter, and never concurs with the same dispositions.

2. But another opinion is extremely contrary, namely that not only can several accidents differing only in number be successively in the same subject, but that it is necessarily so whenever an accident similar in species is reproduced in the same subject; which Durandus, Marsilius and others held to be necessary even in order to the absolute power of God; whose opinion, and that of Scotus, I treated at length in tom. 2 of the Third Part, disp. XLIV, sect. 9. The foundation of Durandus is that, whenever that production takes place, an action distinct from that which was before is repeated, for an action cannot be reproduced, any more than successive beings can; therefore the term of the action too must be distinct. Whence it is confirmed, because, if such permanent accidents, which come about successively in the same subject, were not distinct, successive accidents too could be not distinct, and so the same time in number could be reproduced, which all reckon impossible.

Resolution of the question

3. But a middle way is to be held, and it must be said that it can happen that several accidents diverse only in number are successively in the same subject. Which indeed, if it is understood of the power of God, is self-evident, because it involves no repugnance, and it follows a fortiori from what has been said that they can even be at the same time; much more, then, successively. And this is enough to show that accidents of the same species do not have their intrinsic numerical and entitative distinction through the subject, or through a relationship to this subject in number; otherwise they could in no way be distinguished, even if the production or reproduction took place at diverse times; because, as I shall immediately declare, diversity of time alone is not per se sufficient for this distinction if otherwise there is not in the forms produced themselves a sufficient foundation of distinction and individual difference. But if the assertion is understood of the power and order of natural agents, then too it is true, as will be evident a fortiori from what is to be said.

4. I say, secondly, that it is not only possible, but also comes about according to the order of nature, that accidents distinct only in number come about successively in the same subject. This is the more common opinion of the philosophers, Physics V, c. 4, and De generatione II, last chapter; and of the theologians, In IV, dists. 43 and 44. On which I said some things in tom. 2 of the Third Part, disp. XLIV, sect. 7, where I showed that according to the order of nature the same accident in number which had been corrupted is not reproduced in the same subject; for from this principle it is inferred that it must be distinct, which is what we intend here. It is not easy, however, to assign the first cause and root of this natural necessity. For Durandus, above, gives it from the diversity of the action or change; in which Henry thinks the same, Quodlibet VII, q. 16, although he differs from Durandus in that he does not posit this necessity in order to the power of God, as Durandus does, who in this erred gravely, as I showed in the aforesaid place, because God in acting does not depend on time nor on the other circumstances on which natural agents can depend, because they act through motion and transmutation. On account of which Aristotle said, Physics V, c. 4, that for the unity of motion the unity of time is required; which reason Toletus embraces, De generatione II, q. 13.

5. But the reason is difficult and does not seem to satisfy. First, because the numerical unity of the change is rather to be sought from the numerical unity of the term or form produced than conversely, as Aristotle taught in Physics V, in the same place; therefore, when the accidents produced are said to be diverse in number because the actions are diverse, a vicious circle is committed. Secondly, because, even if we grant that the actions are diverse, it does not follow that the forms will be diverse, because for the unity of action more things are required than the unity of the form produced, from the same Aristotle in the place cited; and otherwise the form does not have its unity and distinction from the action, but from elsewhere. Whence it happens that the same light in number produced by one lamp is preserved by another, which must necessarily come about through a diverse action. Thirdly, because of the actions themselves the question remains why it is necessary that according to the order of nature they be distinct in number; for what is said of the diversity of time does not satisfy; for either the discussion is of extrinsic time, which is considered in the motion of the heaven, and this seems to matter nothing to the intrinsic individuation or numerical distinction of actions; because from this time is taken only a certain extrinsic denomination of the things which are said to be in such a time; but numerical unity or distinction does not consist in an extrinsic denomination. Likewise, because the same action in number, even an indivisible one, can permanently endure and coexist with a prior and a posterior extrinsic time, as is evident of the action of illuminating, of seeing and the like. Or the discussion is of the time or duration intrinsic to the action itself and to the change by which it is produced; and then, since such duration in the thing is nothing other than the existence of the action itself, to say that these actions are distinct because they come about at diverse times is the same as if it were said that they are distinct because they have diverse durations and existences, which is the same thing or equally obscure; for this is what we are inquiring, why it is necessary that those durations, existences or entities of those actions be distinct, and not rather the same repeated again and again. Just as, when God reproduces the same form in number, it is certain that he can reproduce it by the same action in number by which he had first produced it; for this involves no repugnance, as was said more fully in the aforesaid place; therefore, in order that the action be distinct, or that it have a distinct intrinsic duration, it is not enough that it come about twice, or with a prior and posterior extrinsic time; therefore, in order that it may be shown that with respect to a natural agent these actions will necessarily be distinct, the reason must be sought from elsewhere.

6. Nor does the reason of those authors convince, namely, that, if the same action in number could be reproduced, successive things too could be reproduced, which seems plainly repugnant. For if this reason were valid, it would proceed also in order to the absolute power of God. Whence it seems necessarily to be said that in successive things there can be considered that which is real and positive, and that which is included in succession after the manner of negation or privation; for succession intrinsically expresses that something has been and now is not, and that something is to be but is not yet. As regards this negation or privation, then, the successive being cannot be restored, because in this way there is no power over the past. But as regards the positive, there seems to be no repugnance that, just as the same heat is reproduced by God, the same heating too be reproduced; and just as the same sitting and the same where, so consequently the same local motion. For all these express real positive modes, which have their individuation from themselves and do not depend on extrinsic time any more than other things, but on intrinsic duration; the reason, therefore, as regards this is the same of them as of the other things; therefore on the side of the action no sufficient reason can be given on account of which this is repugnant to natural agents.

7. Others, then, say that the cause and reason of this matter depends on another question, namely, whence the secondary cause is determined to effecting this effect in number here and now rather than another; for that same thing which is the cause of this determination must also be the cause why, whenever the secondary cause acts anew, it is determined to effecting a new effect distinct from all preceding ones; for from the mere power of the efficient cause, or from the mere capacity of the subject, no sufficient cause of this matter can be given, since both the power of the agent and the capacity of the subject itself are always the same and remain integral, and are of themselves equally indifferent to acting or receiving any individual whatever. Some, then, say in the aforesaid question that the whole cause and root of this determination is to be reduced to the divine will and predefinition. For God, seeing that this agent here and now is disposed to change this subject to such a form in species, and that of itself it is indifferent to this or that form in the individual, and cannot of itself choose or determine its action to this rather than that, by his will decreed to give his concurrence for producing such an individual in particular in this instant and in this subject; and because the secondary cause cannot act without the concurrence of God, it is consequently determined to acting here and now such an individual and not another. This manner of speaking I touched upon in passing in the place cited, and indicated that it did not please me, because the reason does not seem sufficiently philosophical, and because in free acts it has some difficulties; but now, the matter having been considered more attentively, I think it is very probable; both because I see that it pleases not only Gregory, In I, dist. 17, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7, and dist. 35, q. 1, a. 1, and other Nominalists, but also many most learned modern writers. For Toletus, Physics VIII, q. 3, concl. 2, third reason, gathers from this the freedom of the first cause, that by its will alone it determines secondary causes to individual effects. Fonseca too, Metaphysics I, c. 2, q. 3, sect. 8, says that in certain effects it is necessary to have recourse to the divine determination and predefinition, which he repeats in Book V, c. 2, q. 9, sect. 2, ninth reason, by which he proves the essential dependence of secondary causes on the first in acting; and the Copulata Conimbricensia teach the same, Physics II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 2. And also because it is not arbitrary nor beyond physical and natural reason that the first cause should help secondary causes and supply their defects in those things in which they themselves seem to fail; but in the present case there seems to be lacking to them a mode by which they could be determined to certain singular effects rather than to others. Of which matter again below, in disputing about causes. Now, then, according to that opinion it must consequently be said that God has determined his concurrence with secondary causes always to producing new and distinct effects, but not to producing again an effect which was before and has now ceased to be.

8. But it will deservedly be asked of the authors of this opinion whence it is evident that the first cause has determined its concurrence in this way; for either this was in some way due to the secondary causes themselves, or founded in their connatural mode of acting, or it is from the will of God alone, as is the determination of production to this individual rather than another. If this second is said, since such a will of God is not had by revelation, the matter will be altogether uncertain, since it can neither be shown by reason nor deduced from any natural principles. But if the first is said, then the primary and as it were ultimate reason of this determination is not from the divine will but from the nature of the proximate causes; and this is what we are inquiring, how this can be founded in the nature of the proximate cause; especially if the determination to producing this effect in number rather than another is not founded in it.

9. On account of this someone could say that secondary and finite causes contain in their power any singular effect only once (so to speak), and therefore that, after such a cause has once produced some effect, there does not remain in it the power to produce that effect again, nor to repeat the action by which it produced it, because by the first production its power is as it were exhausted, in so far as it can be terminated at such an effect in number. But this is said gratuitously and without proof, and cannot even be understood; for active power per se and as such does not operate through some diminution or change of itself, but through the change or production of another. Whence its efficacy remains as integral and perfect as if it had produced nothing; therefore by virtue of a production once made it does not remain powerless to make the same again and again, if from elsewhere there is no repugnance on the side of the effect itself. For by this reason any active power, however finite, can act successively to infinity, if it perseveres integral in its being; because it remains integral also in its efficacy, and on the side of the effect that succession or multiplication to infinity is not repugnant; therefore the same will hold as regards the reproduction of the same effect, if on its side there is no repugnance. Which I say for this reason, that after a thing has once been produced and remains in being, it cannot again be produced by the agent, although its active power remains integral, because on the side of the effect it is repugnant, at least from the nature of the thing. But that what is not should come to be cannot be repugnant on its side, even if it was before. For what can prevent it from coming to be again, if it now is not? Since it is now as distant from being as if it had never been. Therefore, if otherwise the active power remains integral, the reason of this necessity cannot be taken from its inefficacy.

10. It can finally be added, then, that natural agents, although of themselves they have a power as it were general and indifferent to several individuals of the same species, nevertheless of themselves postulate a certain mode and order in the use and exercise of such power, so that nature is determined to acting here and now in such a subject such an individual, and after that another, and after this another, and so of the rest; for nature itself seems to postulate this determination and order, lest it involve in itself a certain perplexity and confusion. Hence, then, it comes about that in acting it never returns to the same effect, but always produces a new one. Which manner of speaking I chose in the aforesaid place, because in an obscure and difficult matter nothing occurred which altogether satisfied, nor does anything now offer itself; indeed this very thing which is attributed to the nature of such agents does not seem able to be sufficiently founded or explained; for, since the natural power of acting is of itself simple and altogether the same, it does not appear how this natural determination can be founded in it, or whence it could be established. Nor can extrinsic circumstances as such help to this, as was shown above of time; and the reason is altogether the same of place, in so far as it expresses an extrinsic surface or a relationship to extrinsic bodies. It must be confessed, therefore, either that this depends on the divine will alone, or, if it has some natural cause, that it is hidden from us, and that at most it can be said that, since these natural powers are ordered to the multiplication of individuals and naturally intend it, it is more consonant with their natures that they always receive concurrence for new effects. For by this cause, not only in the will of God but in the very natures of things, it is founded that in the generations of men new souls are always produced, and that souls which have once been created and exist separated are not united again to bodies.