Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Scotus, In I, dist. 8, q. 3, and in the Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 1, denies that this is the first division of being, but another by which being is divided into finite and infinite, because these two members formally contract being in so far as it is being; but the others contract being in so far as it is one; therefore that division is prior to this. The consequence is evident, because, just as the notion of being is prior to the notion of one, so also that division is prior which belongs to being as being than that which belongs to being as it is one; for that division belongs to being as it were per se in the first mode, this one per se in the second mode; just as, if in man there could be various modes of rationality and risibility, the division of man through the modes of rationality would be prior to that through the modes of risibility. The antecedent as regards the first part is declared, because essence is what constitutes being in so far as it is being; therefore the first diversity of essences as such is also the first division of being in so far as it is being; but one essence, as essence, differs from another in so far as the one is of so much essential perfection, the other of greater or lesser; and this is the first reason which being posited, and all others prescinded, the diversity of essences remains, and when it is taken away it does not remain; but this kind of diversity is found primarily and per se between the infinitely perfect essence and all the other finite ones; therefore the first division of being is that into finite and infinite. But the other part of the antecedent is evident from what has been said above, because those two members, namely one and many, in order to be able to divide being, must be equivalent to the division of being into one simply and one only in a certain respect, or into one per se and one per accidens; but this division formally taken is the division of being as it is one; therefore. But if anyone contends that being as being too can be divided through these two modes of unity, the same argument can return; for so this division will be as it were denominative (so to speak), for it will be a division through a property of being, whereas the former is essential, or through modes contracting being per se primarily and essentially.

2. But the Thomists contend that the first division of being is into one and many, or into being per se and per accidens. So Soncinas holds, Metaphysics X, q. 1, who attributes this to St. Thomas, I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 4, and In I, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, since he says that first there falls into the intellect being, second division, third one, fourth multitude. The foundation is that one is the first adequate attribute of being as being, belonging to it also as it abstracts from finite or infinite; therefore it belongs to being prior to finite or infinite. But first of all nothing can be gathered from that place of St. Thomas, because there he is not treating of the comparison of the division of being into one and many to other divisions of being, but of the mode and order in which one and many are conceived by us. That reason too is of no moment, because, in order that the comparison be made rightly, it is not to be made between one as it is an adequate attribute of being and the modes contracting being; for so Scotus would not deny that one belongs to being prior to finite and infinite or other similar modes, just as a property adequate to a genus and convertible with it is understood in reason to belong to it prior to the inferior contracting differences, because such a property belongs to it according to itself and precisely, but the contracting difference belongs by reason of the inferior. Rather, even if the opposed modes contracting being are taken disjunctively and attributed to being after the manner of one complex property, namely finite or infinite, etc., still one, as it is an adequate and incomplex property, will have to be judged prior in reason, either by the very fact that it is simpler, and according to itself more adequate and less dependent on the conception of another. All the more because, as I said above, these complex or disjunct predicates are in truth not properties of being in so far as it is being, because they essentially divide being itself. In order, then, that the comparison be made properly, it is necessary to speak of one according to the determinate modes of one, and in this way the reason given does not proceed, as is self-evident.

3. Otherwise, then, Javellus, treatise I De transcendentibus, c. 1, proposing various divisions of being, says that the first is into real being and being of reason; the second, of real being into one per se and per accidens; the third, into absolute and respective; the fourth (which is the third of real being) into one and many; the fifth, into the five transcendentals; the last, into finite and infinite; which order of divisions he confirms by no reasons. But what pertains to the present dispute, namely that, comparing those two divisions, namely into one and many, and finite and infinite, the former is prior to the latter, he proves by this apparent reason, because being is not divided into finite and infinite except in so far as it is good; but the other division, as has been said, is given of being in so far as it is one. Therefore this is prior to that, as the attribute of one is prior to the attribute of good. The major is evident, because finite and infinite divide being according to various grades of perfection; therefore they divide it as perfect; therefore as good; for perfect and good are the same. Whence also Scotus, because he thinks that there can be some real being which does not formally express perfection, premises another division, saying that being is first divided into quantified and non-quantified, namely by quantity of perfection, and afterwards divides quantified being into finite and infinite; therefore according to his opinion being is here divided as quantified or perfect. In which too Scotus seems to indicate that that division into absolute and relative is prior, because only relative being is called by him non-quantified, because relation as such does not express perfection. Whence it consequently comes about that only absolute being is divided into finite and infinite, which Javellus too teaches.

4. In this question it is necessary to suppose that the discussion is of real being, for being of reason, as was said above, does not have a common concept nor real agreement with real being, and therefore the division of being into real being and being of reason is not rightly numbered among the divisions of being, because it is rather a division of the name than of the thing; but here we are not treating of the various significations of the same word, but of the diverse modes in which the concept of the thing signified by the word can in reality be determined or contracted. Finally, here we are dealing only with the division of being which we said above is the proper object of metaphysics; but this is not being as it abstracts from real being and being of reason, but real being only.

5. Again, by the same reason it must be asserted that divisions of this kind are not to be understood with respect to being as it is divided into being per se and per accidens, taking being per accidens strictly for being altogether by aggregation; for, as was also shown above, such a division is not of some common concept, but of the word only according to an imperfect analogy of some proportionality. On account of which we said that being taken in that breadth is not the adequate object of this doctrine, but only real being per se, in the way in which it can have some unity of reason or concept founded in things, by reason of which it is capable both of real properties and divisions. And hence it comes about that, if that division of being into one and many is taken in the sense in which it coincides with the aforesaid division of being into per se and per accidens, then indeed it can be called prior to the division of being into finite and infinite, in the way in which the division or equivocation of the word is prior in every doctrine to be explained to the thing being divided in reality; in which sense that division into being of reason and of the thing too can be called first. Properly speaking, however, of real divisions contracting or dividing the adequate object of this science, that one cannot be counted in this order any more than the division of being into real and of reason, because in it too the word only is common, but not the concept, as has been shown.

6. It remains, then, that we compare these divisions in so far as in them real and per se being most commonly taken can be divided. These divisions, however, can be compared either in universality, for so one division can be called prior to another because it is more universal, and the other is in some way contained under it; or in the greater diversity and distance between the dividing members, for so that division can be called prior in which the dividing members are primarily and more distant among themselves; or finally they can be compared in the relationship of the dividing members to the thing divided itself, for so that division seems to have to be called prior in which the dividing members more per se and formally contract the thing divided according to its proper formal notion, as was declared in arguing for each opinion cited; nor does it appear by what other reason one division can be called prior to another.

7. From these things, then, three things seem to be able probably to be said in this dispute: the first is that, as regards universality, neither of these divisions is prior to the other; for each is adequate to being and embraces its whole breadth, nor is one in any way contained under the other or a subdivision of it; this is self-evident, because the thing divided of each is one and the same, as we suppose, and in each the dividing members include an immediate contradiction, by which they exhaust the thing divided. And this indeed is manifest in the division of being into one and many. But of the division into finite and infinite being, according to the opinion of Scotus, the matter is not so clear; for he, with many others, finds a medium between those two members of certain real beings which express no perfection; and therefore Scotus himself, as I was saying above, thought another division of being into quantified and non-quantified should be premised, so that only quantified being could adequately be divided into finite and infinite; whence it consequently comes about that this division so explained is less universal than the other into one and many; for that being which is called non-quantified, as it is being, so also it exists as one. I, however, suppose that the contrary doctrine is truer, and that there is no real being which from its proper and formal concept is not quantified, and consequently either finite or infinite, either simply or in its proper genus, of which we shall speak below, showing that every being expresses some perfection.

8. I say, secondly, that in the division of being just mentioned the dividing members are more distant among themselves and primarily differ than in the other division of being into one and many, and that in this way the aforesaid division is prior. For I suppose that infinite in that division is taken for infinite in entitative and essential perfection, especially because, as is evident elsewhere, only such an infinite is in the nature of things; for in created things there can be no infinite, absolutely speaking, which is not rather simply finite. But within God, whatever is in him is simply and essentially infinite, although according to our prescinded inadequate concepts something, especially relative, can be conceived as infinite only in some genus, infinity simply not being distinctly conceived in it, which is nothing to the present point. Hence, then, the assertion posited is evident, because the first division is given through the first diversity, which is between God and creatures; but the second not so, for under one member of it are contained God and several creatures which are simply and in all rigour one per se; but under the other only other creatures which are not beings per se in that way; but God and the creature are more distant among themselves than any notion of created being can be distant from another notion also created or at least common to God and creatures; for those are infinitely distant simply; but these not at all. This reason is explained in this way, because those two members of being, one and many, differ only according to the greater or lesser unity of being itself, and as far as depends on the force of that division those two members are no more distant among themselves than the unity of an army, for example, is distant from the unity of a man; for, although other beings can per se be more distant in unity, nevertheless by virtue of that division that greater diversity is not explained, but the aforesaid suffices; but finite and infinite being are much more distant among themselves than unity per se and per accidens as such; therefore in this sense that division is prior, as declaring the supreme and primary diversity or distance of being.

9. From which I infer that the same judgement is to be passed on the division of being into uncreated and created, and into being by essence and by participation, or into pure act and being in some way potential; for all these divisions coincide in the thing and under diverse negative or connotative concepts declare the same partition and diversity of being. And by the same reason I think that this division is prior to the division of being into substance and accident, even if they are equal in universality; because uncreated being is more distant, and primarily diverse, from created than accident is distant from substance as such or from created substance, which is the same. And by the same or greater reason that division is prior to the other into absolute and relative, because similarly the former two members are more distant and diverse; for the whole diversity between absolute and relative in creatures is preserved without infinite distance; indeed those two formal notions conceived are not so diverse among themselves that they cannot coincide in the same most simple thing, at least in God; whence also those two notions not only are not distant as created and uncreated being, but also of themselves neither postulates that it be created or uncreated, as the theologians teach in the matter of the Trinity.

10. Thirdly it must be said that, if those divisions are compared formally to the thing divided, then the division of being into infinite and finite is also prior with respect to being as such, although the other is prior with respect to one as one. This assertion the foundation adduced in favour of Scotus sufficiently proves, because the modes signified by finite and infinite are per se and formally determining the notion of being or of essence as such; for every real essence, by the very fact that it essentially includes reality, intrinsically and essentially postulates both some essential perfection and a mode or grade of such perfection. Whence also Cajetan, I p., q. 11, at the beginning, doubting why St. Thomas treated of the perfection and infinity of God before unity, answers that those two are contained within the breadth of the quidditative predicaments, but unity pertains to the attributes of being. Just as in God it is prior according to reason that he be perfect and infinite in essence than that he be one, because those two in our mode of understanding signify the most formal constitution of such an essence, so in created being such and so great an essential perfection of each is prior to its unity; therefore in common with respect to being the division of it through modes of essence primarily and supremely diverse, such as are signified by these words, finite and infinite, is more formal and prior than the division through modes of unity.

11. Nor does the reason of Javellus stand in the way of this; for it is denied that finite or infinite divide being in so far as it is good, speaking formally of good as it is an attribute of being, because, as we shall see below, to have some perfection as such is not an attribute of real being, but its essence; for by the name of essential perfection nothing else is signified than the very essence of the thing, which, in order that it be not feigned but real, must formally be something of perfection; for if it is an essence simply infinite, it is by itself supreme perfection; but if it is finite, it is some participation of that perfection. But what the notion of good, as it is an attribute of being, adds over the perfection of being, we shall say afterwards. But that that division into one and many, in the way in which it has been explained, is more formally a division of one as one than of being as being, is easily evident from what has been said, because those two members, in order to be able to divide being per se, must be so taken that they signify diverse modes of unity: whether by one there be signified that which is so one per se that it is in no way one per accidens, but by many that which is simply one per accidens, although by some reason it is one per se; or by one there be signified that which is so one that in it there is no multitude, even in potency, but by many every being which, although it is one per se, is in some way many, at least in potency; for by all these reasons only diverse modes of unity are described; but it is evident that the various modes of unity contract one more formally than being.

12. In these ways, then, the aforesaid divisions can be compared, nor does any other reason or cause now occur on account of which one division of being can be called prior to another. Whence also it is evident in passing that that order of divisions which Javellus posits rests or is founded on no reason; and especially most improper is that division by which he divides being into the six transcendentals (for of the others enough has already been said); for, since all the transcendentals are equal among themselves and convertible with being, that cannot properly be called a division of being, but is a certain enumeration both of being and of those things which are per se and adequately in being itself. 13. Finally it could be inquired here whether multitude or number as such expresses one real formality, and whether in this there is some difference between transcendental multitude and number which is posited as a species of quantity; but of this matter we shall speak more conveniently below in disputing about quantity.