Disputationes metaphysicae

1. From the things which have been said, some doubts which are wont to be treated by authors about this division can easily be defined. The first is whether this division is analogous or univocal.

2. The answer is that, if it is understood in the latter sense, it is analogous and almost equivocal, because the division of being into being per se and being per accidens, to which the aforesaid division is equivalent in that sense, as has been said, is analogous, by a certain analogy of proportionality, so that to being so taken one common concept does not correspond, because being per accidens as such is in truth not being but beings, and is only called being on account of a certain proportion or imitation of being per se. This opinion is proved first of all from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, at the end, where he openly teaches that analogy intervenes here. Next by reason, because things which are many simply are not one simply; for these two are altogether opposed; therefore neither are they being simply; for being and one, if they are taken in the same proportion, are convertible; therefore being is not divided univocally into one and many, but analogically. And St. Thomas indicated this, I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2, according to the exposition of Cajetan adduced and declared above. Next, that this analogy is as great as we have said is declared in this way: because to be undivided is of the notion of one; but this indivision is not found in one per accidens of this kind except very analogically and almost equivocally, because in it are found many things actually divided, and the indivision is only according to a certain apprehension or relationship; therefore the notion of one does not belong to such a multitude except through a certain proportionality or imitation; therefore the notion of being belongs to it in the same way, because, as has been said, being and one correspond to each other with proportion. Likewise, because being is said from essence or from existence; but in that multitude there is not an essence nor an existence, but rather essences and existences.

3. You will say that this at most proceeds of those things which are so many simply that they are in no way one except by aggregation, as in a heap of stones, etc., because there in truth there is not unity but a certain nearness, which cannot be called unity except through a certain proportionality, as has been rightly declared. But in other beings per accidens, which have some union or coordination of parts, by reason of which they can in some way be called one per se, as we said above, the reason given does not seem to proceed, nor so great an analogy to intervene; for these seem to be comprehended under one concept of one transcendentally taken; for they have some real unity and indivision which is founded in the things themselves.

4. The answer is that this is indeed probable, especially when a physical and real union intervenes, as between substance and an accident intrinsically inhering in it; for in such a composite, just as there is a true and physical union, so there is some real unity, which, although it is not as great as that in the substantial composite, nevertheless has a real agreement with it, such as there is also between those unions; that, therefore, will suffice at least for the unity of the concept, granted that it be with some analogy, which depends on what is to be said below about the analogy of being. But of other artificial beings the matter is more doubtful, because there does not intervene there a real and physical union, and consequently neither a real indivision; therefore neither a real agreement in unity which would suffice for the unity of the concept in the notion of being or of one. Nevertheless the opposite can easily be defended, because that very composition with some conjunction or coordination is some union, which suffices for these beings to be conceived as in some way one per se; on account of which we said above that it is probable that under that notion they are directly contained under the object of metaphysics, and that there can be science of them as such; this, therefore, will also be enough for them to be able to be conceived under one transcendental concept of one.

5. And hence it follows a fortiori that, if that division is understood in the former sense explained above, so that the thing divided is being per se rigorously so called into one which is in no way many, and one which is many in potency, then much more is one divided according to a certain common concept of one per se or simply, because to be many in that way, namely in potency, does not exclude unity simply, as has been said; yet all analogy does not seem to be excluded from that concept, because God, who is contained in it, as he is not univocally being, so neither does he seem to be univocally one with the other creatures.

6. It could, however, probably be said that, although one, as regards the positive thing which it includes or connotes, is not said univocally of God and creatures, nevertheless as regards the included negation it is not repugnant that it be said univocally, because other negative predicates can be said univocally of God and creatures. As, for example, to be immaterial, as it precisely expresses the negation and lack of prime matter, belongs equally to the angels and to God, although the positive foundation of that lack is not univocal in them; so, then, it seems it can be said of the negation of division which one expresses. You will say that this at most proceeds of things indivisible as such, for example of the angel. But against this, first, because, if it is once conceded that transcendental one is said univocally of the angel and God, an argument is taken thence that it is said univocally also of man, for example, because, although man is not as perfectly one as the angel, he is nevertheless univocally one; therefore, if the angel is univocally one with God, man too will be univocally one with both. Secondly it is evident by an a priori reason, because one precisely expresses the negation of actual division; but this negation is integrally and perfectly found in being most properly and per se one, even if it is composite. But that in an indivisible substance something more is found besides that negation pertains indeed to a certain greater perfection of entity or of unity, yet does not suffice for analogy in the notion of one. Whence, since otherwise with respect to this negation there is no proper dependence or causality except by reason of the foundation, there seems to be no sufficient reason of analogy in it. Thirdly the same is confirmed, because otherwise prime matter, for example, would be more perfectly one than composite substance; and the same argument can be made of the soul, indeed of any simple accident whatever with respect to composite substance, and of the point with respect to quantity; for with respect to all it follows that one is analogous and is said first of the simple, although most imperfect, being.

7. But although these things are said probably, nevertheless it must simply be said that transcendental one is said analogically of God and creatures and of all those things of which being is said analogically, because (whatever may be the case with the negation) one does not formally express negation alone, as was seen above, but undivided entity or essence; and therefore where the essence is not univocal, neither can real unity be univocal. Likewise, because, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics IV, text 2, as regards the thing it is the same to say one and one being; therefore what is not simply being cannot be simply one; therefore what is analogically being will also be analogically one. This, however, holds most of all in God, in whom not only is the essence as such of another order, but also, as it founds the negation of one, it has a certain perfection of another notion and order. But in those beings in which, although the essence is more imperfect, nevertheless as it founds the negation of division it has a certain excess of simplicity or indivisibility, it can in some way be said that the notion of one is more perfect as regards the negation, but not simply, on account of the reason given. And hence again what was said above is confirmed, that one does not formally express the negation alone, but entity under negation.