Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting is that from what was said in the preceding section it seems plainly to follow that one formally expresses only the negation, because it formally expresses that in which it is distinguished from being; but it is distinguished only in the negation which it adds; therefore it formally expresses that alone. Secondly, because each property or attribute formally expresses what it adds to its object; but one is an attribute of being; therefore it formally expresses only what it adds over being; but it adds only a negation; therefore. Thirdly, because, if besides the negation it expresses something, either that is being, or something else; this second cannot be thought; for if that is other than the negation, it must be positive; but it cannot be something positive of reason, as was shown above; it is necessary, therefore, that it be something positive and real, and consequently that it include being, according to what was said above against Scotus. But if the first is said, namely that what one formally expresses includes real being, all the inconveniences and arguments made above against the opinion asserting that one adds something positive over being follow, namely, that being is quidditatively included in its attribute, which is against the notion of subject and attribute. Likewise the process to infinity inferred above follows, because that which one formally signifies will also be one, etc. Finally it follows that the formal significate of one is altogether the same as its adequate significate, as it includes also the material. And finally it follows that the attribute of one formally includes the whole perfection of being, and consequently that the attribute is of equal perfection with its subject.

Various opinions

2. The former.—In this matter there are two opinions. The first affirms that one formally expresses only the negation explained above. Cajetan indicates this opinion, I, q. 11, a. 1, on the second argument of Scotus, when he says that one formally is no more outside nothing than other privative or negative things. Fonseca teaches it more fully and more clearly, in the said q. 5, sect. 5, and St. Thomas favours it, I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1, in so far as he says that one does not import the notion of perfection, but only of indivision. The foundations of this opinion are posited at the beginning, by which it seems to be concluded that one in its formal significate does not include being, but only connotes it, and consequently formally expresses only indivision or negation.

3. The latter opinion.—The second opinion is that one formally expresses not negation alone, but the entity itself under the negation, which is the more common opinion of those writing on this place of Metaphysics IV: Soncinas, q. 3, a. 8; Javellus, qq. 5 and 8; Flandria, q. 3, a. 8; Jandun, q. 4; Capreolus too holds it, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, where concerning the first conclusion he adduces Avicenna, Metaphysics III, c. 3, saying: Unity is being which is not divided; so that being is of the essence of unity, and not its subject; for unity substantially is being itself which is not divided. And Soto indicates it, on the Logic, chapter on Property, q. 2, ad 2. St. Thomas favours it, In I, dist. 19, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2, saying that the very essence of created being, according as it is undivided in itself and distinct from others, is its unity; and dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, where he says that one encloses in its understanding common being and adds the notion of privation; and De potentia, q. 9, a. 7, where he says that one signifies not indivision only, but being with it. But in these last two places St. Thomas openly speaks of the adequate significate of one, not of the formal, as Fonseca expounds; the first place, however, does not seem to admit this exposition.

4. This opinion is founded, first, because if one formally expressed only indivision, it would be a privative term; the consequent is false, because every privative term expresses some imperfection in the thing to which it is attributed, which cannot be said of one, otherwise it could not be attributed to God; therefore. But this reason is not of great moment; for it is not necessary that a privative term import imperfection, if the form which it denies does not pertain to perfection simply, as is evident in these terms, infinite, immaterial, which, although they are taken altogether privatively, express no imperfection; the same, therefore, can be the case with one, because the division which it denies does not express perfection simply. Indeed the same reason would proceed, if it were efficacious, even if one formally expressed being with indivision; for if privation purely taken expressed imperfection, even if something is adjoined to it, it will express the same imperfection adjoined to perfection.

5. This opinion is wont to be proved otherwise, because, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, being and one signify the same nature; but if one formally expressed a pure negation, it could not signify the same nature as being, because being does not express a negation, but a positive nature. But this reason too does not convince; for if one, by signifying only a negation formally, were of another nature from being, on account of the distinction which exists between privation and the positive, by the same reason, although it formally expressed being with indivision, it would have to be said to be of another nature from being, at least in the way in which the whole composite is distinguished from the matter or subject, or as blind and Peter are distinguished. Aristotle, therefore, says that one and being express the same nature as regards the whole positive thing which each expresses; and it is also rightly expounded negatively, namely, that one does not express another nature (positive, of course) from being. Just as the same Aristotle, Physics I, c. 1, said that matter and privation are the same, namely negatively, because privation does not express a thing distinct from matter; so, then, it can easily be said in the present case.

Resolution of the question

6. I certainly think that the diversity between these opinions is rather about the manner of speaking than about the thing. For in the thing all agree that one, in its whole and adequate significate, expresses nothing other than undivided being, and that indivision adds nothing to being except the negation of division; and consequently it is necessary that all confess that in one there is nothing outside the notion of being as such except the negation alone; because the whole which is being, besides that which is added to it, is of its essential notion; but the negation alone is what is added to it; therefore that alone is outside its notion; whence it further comes about that one can be called an attribute of being only by reason of the negation which it superadds to being, because it is an attribute only in so far as it expresses something outside the notion of being. These things being posited in the thing, the remaining question about the formal significate¹ seems to be only about the imposition of the name. In which each opinion cited is probable, and is founded on a probable mode of conceiving the significate of this word one. For some conceive that, real being being supposed, one is constituted by the mere negation of division superadded to it, and therefore they say that one formally expresses only the aforesaid negation. But others conceive that unity is not as it were a certain privation adjoined to being, but is the very nature or entity of the thing, which entity or essence constitutes being; but as it is undivided entity, it constitutes one being.

7. The latter opinion is chosen.—An example illustrating the whole matter.—And this mode of conceiving seems to me more like the truth, and therefore I judge that the latter opinion is simply to be approved. First, on account of the reason now touched upon and indicated by St. Thomas, In I, in the place cited above, because one formally expresses real unity; but real unity is not a negation alone; therefore it is the entity itself under the negation. The minor is evident by induction; for God is called one from the unity of God, which consists in the undivided essence; and similarly Peter is called one in number because he has a nature one in number; whence his unity does not consist in a negation alone. And finally from the terms themselves it seems evident that real unity expresses more than a negation. Secondly, because one is not said univocally of being of reason and real being, as is self-evident; and yet, if you consider the negation precisely, it can equally be attributed to and denominate being of reason as well as real being; it is therefore a sign that one does not formally express the negation alone; otherwise the denomination of one could fall equally on being of reason and on real being, because the signification of a word is to be attended to chiefly from its formal significate. Just as the names of artefacts are judged not to signify figure alone in their formal significate, because they are not said equally nor univocally of things having the same figure in diverse materials, as saw is not said univocally of an iron and a wax one; so, then, neither will one signify negation alone formally, since it is not said equally of all things to which such a negation can equally belong; it therefore formally expresses the undivided entity itself. And hence a third argument can be taken, because one as it is transcendent does not formally express something supposing being, and as it were lying beside it and coming to it, as white formally expresses whiteness; for a thing is not so understood to be one as it is white; for it is one intimately through its own entity, but white through a form supervening on another entity; it is therefore a sign that one does not formally express the negation alone as it were superadded to the entity, but the intrinsic undivided entity itself. Finally, from what is to be said below it will be evident that almost necessarily one must think in this manner of the other transcendentals, good and true, which cannot formally express mere relations of reason, but the entity itself with some relation or denomination of this kind; therefore the same must be thought of one, for if the arguments which are made to the contrary about it proved anything, the same would proceed of the other transcendentals.

The arguments are answered

8. To the first the answer is that one is distinguished from being radically indeed (so to speak) by reason of the negation which it superadds to being; but formally it is not distinguished through the negation as through the form of one, but through undivided entity; and so being formally expresses entity as such, but one formally expresses the same entity as undivided.

9. To the second the answer is that that assumption is true in real properties most properly taken and adding to their subjects something distinct from them from the nature of the thing; for in these it is true that the names signifying such properties are wont formally to signify precisely what the property adds to the subject; but in these transcendental attributes, which do not add something real, it is not necessary to observe this; for, in order that they be not negations only, or altogether beings of reason, but signify in some way a real property, it is necessary that in some way they include the entity itself in their formal significate.

10. To the third the answer is that one in the concrete expresses being itself as undivided, but unity in the abstract expresses entity also in the abstract as undivided, and that unity of this kind is formally signified by the attribute of one; nor does any inconvenience follow from this; for that being taken in the concrete is predicated quidditatively of its attributes also taken in the concrete is no inconvenience; for so good is being, and true similarly, nor in these is it necessary to observe all the things which belong to real and most proper properties; for there the subject altogether prescinds from the property, and conversely, because they are distinguished from the nature of the thing; but here there is no such distinction, but only the addition of some negation or denomination; and therefore being is indeed not included in that which one adds, as was said above; but in one itself it is necessary that it be intimately included; nor does a process to infinity follow from this, because being and one, as regards the positive thing which it includes, are altogether the same, both in the thing and also in reason, except on account of the adjoined negation. But if we speak in the abstract of unity, it will not so properly be said to include being quidditatively as entity or essence; for in these the proportion must be kept, and as regards this, at least as regards the mode of signifying, the formal significate of one and the adequate one of the same are not the same. I say, however, as regards the mode of signifying, because in these most simple things the thing signified by the abstract and the concrete is the same, and so entity and being, unity and one, are the same, and differ only in reason and in the mode of conceiving and signifying. Wherefore there is no process to infinity, because just as being is being by its entity, but entity is entity by itself, and that by which being is being, but as such is not conceived as that which is, although in the thing it is most formally being itself; so in the same proportion one must speak of one and unity; for as regards the positive thing they signify the same, and differ only in that one signifies being or entity under indivision. Finally, in this way it is no inconvenience that one in the thing expresses the whole perfection which being expresses, although it does not express it under altogether the same concept or formal notion, because it does not express it precisely as it is perfection or entity, but as it is under indivision.