Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting is that, in order that something be a true and real property of another, it requires at least four conditions. The first is that the property itself be some thing, for if it is nothing, how can it be a real property? The second, that it be distinguished in some way from the nature of the thing from that of which it is the property, for if it is altogether the same as it, it will rather be its essence, or of its essence, than a property. The third, that it belong to it adequately, or be convertible with it; for we are dealing with the property which belongs to something per se in the second mode; for this alone is what falls under science and can be demonstrated. The fourth, finally, is that the subject, or that of which it is the property, be not of the intrinsic notion and essence of such a property; because, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics VII, c. 5, text 18, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 18, text 35, the subject does not fall intrinsically and essentially, but only as something added, in the definition of the attribute; otherwise they would be mutually so related that the attribute would belong to the subject per se in the second mode, but the subject to the attribute per se in the first mode; which seems an open repugnance. But it cannot happen that with respect to being there is some property which has all these conditions; for if the property is real, it is intrinsically and essentially real being; because, namely, it cannot be altogether non-being, nor only a being of reason; because (as I was saying) what is nothing, or is only feigned by reason, cannot be a real attribute of real being; it must therefore be something real; therefore it is real being quidditatively and essentially, for, as was proved above against Scotus, nothing can be real which is not intrinsically and essentially real being. It is repugnant, therefore, that there be a real property of real being as such; because, if it is a real property, then being is of its essence; but if it is a property of being, being cannot be of its essence, because, as we were saying, the subject cannot be of the essence of the attribute. Again, that which is essentially being cannot be distinguished from the nature of the thing from being, as was proved above generally; therefore neither can it be an attribute of being. Likewise, what is essentially being, and is not being itself in common, is inferior to being; therefore it is not convertible with being; therefore it cannot be a property of being. Finally, what is essentially being must have all the properties of being, if there are any; therefore that very thing cannot be a property of being; otherwise it would be a property of itself, which is plainly repugnant; or certainly it would include another property similar to itself and distinct from itself; and the same could be said again of that, and so one would proceed to infinity.

Various opinions are reported

2. The first opinion, of Scotus.—In this matter I find three ways of speaking. The first is that being has real and positive properties distinct from it from the nature of the thing, which nevertheless are not in themselves intrinsically and essentially beings. It is taken from Scotus in the places cited above, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, and dist. 8, q. 2, and in dist. 2, qq. 3 and 6. His foundations as regards the last two parts were touched upon in the reason for doubting. The first part, however, can briefly be proved, first, from the general opinion of all who attribute to being these attributes, one, true, good, which are not feigned by the intellect, but truly and really belong to being, and are outside the nature of being itself, because to be one, etc., is not predicated of things as essentially as to be being. Likewise, because a science demonstrates of its real object only real properties; but metaphysics is a true science demonstrating these attributes of its object; these, therefore, are true and real attributes. And Aristotle indicated this, Metaphysics IV, c. 1, saying that this science contemplates being in so far as it is being, and the things which belong to it per se; for things which are not real cannot belong per se to what is real; being, therefore, has real properties.

3. The second opinion.—The second opinion, which some Thomists defend, agrees with Scotus first of all in this, that it is necessary that being have real attributes, because it cannot have none at all, otherwise it could not be the object of a science; but if they are not real, they are none, because what is not real cannot always, per se, and necessarily belong to being; which is nevertheless of the notion of a proper attribute. Hence they consequently concede that these attributes are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing from being, because this too is of the notion of a real property. Likewise, because attributes of this kind do not formally predicate the essence of the thing, but a mode outside the essence. Whence this proposition, man is being, is in the first mode of speaking per se, but not this one, man is one; on account of which Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 2, says that being and one are the same, yet not simply and as synonyms, but as principle and cause. But this opinion adds against Scotus that these attributes, even formally taken, essentially include being, on account of the same reasons by which this was proved above of real differences or modes; for the same reasons proceed of attributes of this kind, supposing that they are positive and real. Hence they consequently assert that in these transcendentals it is not unfitting that the subject be intrinsically included in the attribute, because it is not included as subject, but as determined to such a mode, which mode is an attribute of being itself taken according to itself; and it can be adequate to it and convertible with it, because it does not determine it to a special genus of being, but affects it in a certain mode common and universal to all beings. For, as St. Thomas says, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, a mode is expressed or added over being in two ways, namely, either as a special mode of being, or as a mode generally consequent upon every being. And from these things the authors of this opinion think that the whole reason for doubting posited at the beginning can be dispatched.

4. The third opinion.—The third opinion is that being does not have real positive attributes, but that all those things which are attributed to being as its attributes add to being itself only some negation or a relation of reason. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the said De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1, which he also indicates in I, qq. 5, 11 and 16, and wherever he disputes about these properties of being in particular. Soncinas holds the same, Metaphysics IV, q. 1, ad 1, qq. 17 and 19, ad 9, and Book V, q. 14; Javellus, Metaphysics IV, q. 2; Soto, on the Categories, chapter on Property, q. 2, ad 2; Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 2; Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 3. The foundation of this opinion has been explained in the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, and rigorously it is true; it needs, however, explanation.

The true opinion is declared

5. Which property is distinct in the thing from its subject, and which is not.—Examples.—It is first of all to be noticed, then, that it is one thing for some predicate to be a true and real attribute of a subject, another for it to be conceived, explained and predicated by us after the manner of an attribute or property, which would more properly be called after the manner of an attribute in the sense in which the theologians speak of the divine perfections. Of the notion of a true and real attribute, then, are those conditions posited at the beginning; but for the latter mode of attribute or property they are not necessary, especially that one about the distinction from the nature of the thing; but a distinction of reason suffices, by which one thing is conceived as a subject having some essence or formal notion, at least confusedly conceived, and another after the manner of a perfection or property. Examples of which, besides that adduced of the divine attributes, can be taken from Aristotle in the Categories, where he attributes to them various properties which cannot be distinguished or explained otherwise; as, for example, he teaches that it is a property of quantity to be the foundation of equality and inequality, which property expresses nothing in the thing distinct from quantity, but is only an aptitude, which is nothing other than quantity itself; it is conceived by us, however, as distinct in reason in order to explain more distinctly the functions of quantity itself. And in the same way it could be attributed to quantity, as its property, to be the proximate subject of corporeal accidents, which nevertheless in the thing expresses nothing distinct from the nature of the thing from quantity itself.

6. Secondly it is to be observed that in attributes of this kind formally taken it is one thing that they themselves be real beings or beings of reason; another that they be distinguished in reality or in reason; for it can very well happen that they are real, although they are distinguished not in reality but in reason, as is easily evident in the examples posited; and the reason is clear, because the distinction of reason which arises from the prescission of the intellect is not through the conception of some feigned entity which is not in the thing, but only through an inadequate mode of conceiving a true thing; the attribute, therefore, can be real, although the mode of attribution and distinction is only through reason. Rather, if we speak properly, in order that an attribute be distinguished by reason alone from a real subject, it is necessary that it be a real attribute and not only of reason or privative; otherwise, formally speaking, it would be distinguished by more than reason, namely as non-being from being, or as feigned being from true being. Wherefore it is also necessary to observe that in attributes of this kind what is formally signified by them is often one thing, but what is intended to be explained by us through them another; for often what is formally signified is negative, but through it a positive and real perfection of the thing is explained by us; as simplicity, which is assigned by us as an attribute of God, or of certain other beings in their grade, formally consists in a negation; but through it we explain such a mode or entity of a simple thing.

7. The twofold significate of being.—Finally it is to be observed, from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 14, and St. Thomas, I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2, and In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1, that being properly and rigorously signifies the entity of a thing, in which way we have hitherto spoken of it; but sometimes whatever can simply be affirmed of something is called being; for, because affirmation is made through the verb of being, whatever is simply attributed to things, although it posits no entity in them, is wont to be called being or to be; but predicates or attributes of this kind seem to be able to be reduced to two heads. One is of those which consist in negation or privation, for so we say that a thing is indivisible, that a moral act is evil, that a man is blind, and the like. The other is of those which consist in extrinsic denominations taken from things themselves, in which way God is called Creator from time, or a wall seen, etc.; but this denomination is sometimes taken as actual and requires the coexistence of each extreme, as in the examples posited; but sometimes as aptitudinal, as a wall is called visible, etc.

8. Being does not have positive attributes distinct from it in the thing.—These things posited, I say, first, that being as being cannot have true and altogether real positive attributes distinct from it from the nature of the thing. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the places cited, who rightly noticed that the discussion is of being in so far as it is being; for in so far as it is such being it can well have real attributes distinct from the nature of the thing, because such being as such can be outside the essence of another being, and consequently also outside the essence of its attribute; but being in so far as it is being cannot be outside the essence of any being; and therefore no property or attribute can be real without being essentially included in it, and therefore it cannot be distinct from the nature of the thing from being; for, as was shown above, being in so far as it is being is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from every being in which it is essentially included; and this is the chief foundation of the conclusion, which can be confirmed and explained in various ways. First, because whether the notion of being is considered solitarily and precisely, or as it is in things, no attribute distinct from the nature of the thing will be found to emanate from it, or from any thing, from the mere fact that it is conceived to be being, but only from the fact that it is such being. Which is evident by induction, for the attributes of being hitherto found are only those which are called transcendentals; but these either are not positive, or are not real intrinsic ones, or, if in some sense they are such, they are not distinct from the nature of the thing from being; which will be better evident in treating of each of these attributes. Now it is briefly declared, because these attributes are common to God and are found most properly in him without distinction from the nature of the thing. But if you say that it is otherwise in creatures, first of all this is said without foundation; for it would be necessary to assign some special indication or necessity of its distinction; but nothing of the kind can be brought forward. And next there is an excellent reason, because we are now dealing with being in so far as it is being as it abstracts from God and creatures; therefore the things which are attributed to it are attributed either as distinct from the nature of the thing or not; if this latter is said, it is what we intend, for if these are distinguished in some being, that will be from a peculiar reason, of which we shall see afterwards; but if the former is said, it follows that in every being, even in God, they are distinguished from the nature of the thing, because whatever is attributed per se to the superior must belong to every inferior.

9. And this can be urged more fully, because being itself in so far as it is being, from the mere fact that it is such, without another real mode superadded to it and distinct from the nature of the thing, has whatever is positively necessary for it to be one, true, good, etc.; whence in the very mode of explaining we say that being is because it has a true essence and some real perfection, etc. Nor does it matter that the mind can conceive and consider the notion of being without expressly considering the other notions, because this at most indicates a distinction of reason, or something negative or extrinsic included or connoted in those attributes, as we shall declare afterwards. Finally, distinctions of this kind from the nature of the thing are understood with the greatest difficulty, and therefore are not to be multiplied without sufficient indication and reason; but here there is no apparent indication of this distinction, as will easily be evident from what is to be said and from the solutions of the arguments. And moreover, on account of the transcendence of being, this distinction is much more difficult in it, as the reasons made at the beginning also show, especially that one, that the subject would be of the essence of the attribute, although the attribute is as it were an accident of the subject. In which too a special repugnance is involved, that being in so far as it is being, which abstracts from substantial and accidental essence, simple or composite, actual or potential, perfect or imperfect, perfecting or perfectible, should postulate or require distinct attributes, which would be as it were certain intrinsic accidents by which it would be perfected.

10. Being has true attributes.—The attributes of being do not formally express beings of reason, and how the contrary expression is to be explained.—I say, secondly, that being in so far as it is being has some properties or attributes which are not feigned by reason, but are truly and in the thing itself predicated of it. This whole is excellently proved by the reasons touched upon in the first and second opinions. For it is simply true that each being is one and good, etc.; but in order that these be true it is not necessary that the mind feign some beings of reason; for although the mind thinks nothing about things, gold is true gold and is one determinate thing distinct from others; and similarly God is one and good, etc. Moreover this is rightly proved by that reason, that metaphysics, which is a real and true science, demonstrates these of being; but it does not demonstrate something feigned by the intellect. Wherefore, if we speak with this rigour of the being of reason, it is not rightly said that these attributes formally signify beings of reason, because beings of this kind are properly said only to be objectively in the intellect; whence they only are when they are known or feigned by the intellect; but these attributes in truth do not depend on the feigning of the intellect, but belong to being itself absolutely and before any consideration of the intellect, as has been said. Such expressions, therefore, in order to be true, are to be expounded by a certain broader reason, in so far as everything which does not posit in the thing to which it is attributed something real, positive and intrinsic can be called a being of reason, either as it is distinguished against proper real being, having a true and intrinsic entity, or fundamentally, namely because the intellect, in order distinctly to conceive and predicate attributes of this kind, takes from them a foundation for feigning some beings of reason.

11. What the attributes of being add formally.—I say, thirdly: these attributes of being formally add either a negation or a denomination taken through a relationship to something extrinsic; through them, however, a real positive perfection of being is explained, not according to something real superadded to being itself, but according to the very formal or essential notion of being. Aristotle seems to me to have indicated this conclusion, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, saying at the same time that being and one express the same nature, and nevertheless do not formally signify the same thing; because, namely, one formally adds a negation which being does not express; but through it nothing else is explained than the very nature of being, which is to be declared more fully below. And similarly the same must be said of true and good, and of any other such attributes there may be; for these formally, and in order to our conception, do not express the same as being, nor do they express a negation, as is evident of itself; they signify, therefore, being under a certain relationship to another, namely in so far as it has in itself whence it is loved, or truly known, or something similar, as we shall declare in their places. And so St. Thomas seems plainly to expound this matter in the places cited. The reason for this conclusion, however, is that these attributes are not synonymous with being itself; otherwise they could in no way be called properties or attributes, and it would be nugatory to say that being is one or good; it is necessary, therefore, that they formally signify something besides being; but they cannot formally signify some entity superadded to being and distinct from it from the nature of the thing, as has been shown; nor can they signify beings of reason rigorously taken, as I said; therefore they can express nothing else than either a negation, or a privation, or some relationship or extrinsic denomination. Again, this whole notion of attributes tends to this, that the nature of being may be more perfectly known and explained by us; otherwise it would be vain and irrelevant to the science of being; but it is not so, but very accommodated, for, because we do not perfectly know simple things as they are in themselves, we use partly negations, partly comparisons to other things, in order to explain them distinctly. So, then, although these attributes formally add negations or other relationships, nevertheless through all of them the nature of being is explained, either as regards perfection, or as regards integrity or something similar. I have said that these attributes add over being only a negation or something similar, because it is placed under controversy whether formally or in the abstract these attributes express only a negation or relation, or include entity itself, which will be better explained in each of the attributes.

The arguments are solved

12. To the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, together with the things adjoined in the first and second opinions, the solution is easy from what has been said; for it has already been conceded that these attributes are not proper real attributes with that rigour and propriety which make it necessary that all the conditions enumerated there belong to them. It has also been declared in what sense these attributes can be called real, namely because they formally express something which in its own way is in things and can truly and simply be attributed to being, after the manner of a privation or of a real denomination or real aptitude with a relationship to something extrinsic. And this is enough for these attributes, according to the whole of what they include, not to be properly essential, and therefore to be said to be after the manner of attributes or properties. This also suffices for these attributes to be able to fall under science, since they both are in things, and in the mode in which they are, follow being itself and contribute to explaining its nature. All the more because for the notion of science and for making demonstrations a distinction of reason between attributes suffices, because, as we conceive, so also we reason; and so we truly demonstrate of God that he is immortal because he is immaterial; and so it could also be done in the attributes of being, even if they were distinguished only by reason from being itself. Finally, from what has been said it is also evident how being is not said essentially of these its properties or attributes; for according to the thing indeed it is said essentially of them, because they explain nothing other than the very nature of being; yet it is not of their essence as regards what they add over being, because the negation, for example, which one formally adds, is not essentially true and real being, such as is that which is said to be as it were the subject of these properties; and so the process to infinity and the other inconveniences which were touched upon in the arguments are avoided.

13. How the attributes of being differ among themselves.—Finally, from what has been said it is gathered how these properties or attributes can be distinguished among themselves; for as regards the intrinsic thing which they signify in being they are not distinguished in the thing, since they express nothing distinct from being from the nature of the thing, as has been shown; and in this way it is wont to be said that in the thing the entity of a thing is its goodness and truth, and conversely. But if we consider what they formally add, they can be said to differ formally, not indeed by an intrinsic and positive formal notion, but either by a negative or an extrinsic one, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said in particular of each.