Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting is that, in order that something be a true and real property of another, it requires at least four conditions. The first is that the property itself be some thing, for if it is nothing, how can it be a real property? The second, that it be distinguished in some way from the nature of the thing from that of which it is the property, for if it is altogether the same as it, it will rather be its essence, or of its essence, than a property. The third, that it belong to it adequately, or be convertible with it; for we are dealing with the property which belongs to something per se in the second mode; for this alone is what falls under science and can be demonstrated. The fourth, finally, is that the subject, or that of which it is the property, be not of the intrinsic notion and essence of such a property; because, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics VII, c. 5, text 18, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 18, text 35, the subject does not fall intrinsically and essentially, but only as something added, in the definition of the attribute; otherwise they would be mutually so related that the attribute would belong to the subject per se in the second mode, but the subject to the attribute per se in the first mode; which seems an open repugnance. But it cannot happen that with respect to being there is some property which has all these conditions; for if the property is real, it is intrinsically and essentially real being; because, namely, it cannot be altogether non-being, nor only a being of reason; because (as I was saying) what is nothing, or is only feigned by reason, cannot be a real attribute of real being; it must therefore be something real; therefore it is real being quidditatively and essentially, for, as was proved above against Scotus, nothing can be real which is not intrinsically and essentially real being. It is repugnant, therefore, that there be a real property of real being as such; because, if it is a real property, then being is of its essence; but if it is a property of being, being cannot be of its essence, because, as we were saying, the subject cannot be of the essence of the attribute. Again, that which is essentially being cannot be distinguished from the nature of the thing from being, as was proved above generally; therefore neither can it be an attribute of being. Likewise, what is essentially being, and is not being itself in common, is inferior to being; therefore it is not convertible with being; therefore it cannot be a property of being. Finally, what is essentially being must have all the properties of being, if there are any; therefore that very thing cannot be a property of being; otherwise it would be a property of itself, which is plainly repugnant; or certainly it would include another property similar to itself and distinct from itself; and the same could be said again of that, and so one would proceed to infinity.

Various opinions are reported

2. The first opinion, of Scotus.—In this matter I find three ways of speaking. The first is that being has real and positive properties distinct from it from the nature of the thing, which nevertheless are not in themselves intrinsically and essentially beings. It is taken from Scotus in the places cited above, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, and dist. 8, q. 2, and in dist. 2, qq. 3 and 6. His foundations as regards the last two parts were touched upon in the reason for doubting. The first part, however, can briefly be proved, first, from the general opinion of all who attribute to being these attributes, one, true, good, which are not feigned by the intellect, but truly and really belong to being, and are outside the nature of being itself, because to be one, etc., is not predicated of things as essentially as to be being. Likewise, because a science demonstrates of its real object only real properties; but metaphysics is a true science demonstrating these attributes of its object; these, therefore, are true and real attributes. And Aristotle indicated this, Metaphysics IV, c. 1, saying that this science contemplates being in so far as it is being, and the things which belong to it per se; for things which are not real cannot belong per se to what is real; being, therefore, has real properties.

3. The second opinion.—The second opinion, which some Thomists defend, agrees with Scotus first of all in this, that it is necessary that being have real attributes, because it cannot have none at all, otherwise it could not be the object of a science; but if they are not real, they are none, because what is not real cannot always, per se, and necessarily belong to being; which is nevertheless of the notion of a proper attribute. Hence they consequently concede that these attributes are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing from being, because this too is of the notion of a real property. Likewise, because attributes of this kind do not formally predicate the essence of the thing, but a mode outside the essence. Whence this proposition, man is being, is in the first mode of speaking per se, but not this one, man is one; on account of which Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 2, says that being and one are the same, yet not simply and as synonyms, but as principle and cause. But this opinion adds against Scotus that these attributes, even formally taken, essentially include being, on account of the same reasons by which this was proved above of real differences or modes; for the same reasons proceed of attributes of this kind, supposing that they are positive and real. Hence they consequently assert that in these transcendentals it is not unfitting that the subject be intrinsically included in the attribute, because it is not included as subject, but as determined to such a mode, which mode is an attribute of being itself taken according to itself; and it can be adequate to it and convertible with it, because it does not determine it to a special genus of being, but affects it in a certain mode common and universal to all beings. For, as St. Thomas says, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, a mode is expressed or added over being in two ways, namely, either as a special mode of being, or as a mode generally consequent upon every being. And from these things the authors of this opinion think that the whole reason for doubting posited at the beginning can be dispatched.

4. The third opinion.—The third opinion is that being does not have real positive attributes, but that all those things which are attributed to being as its attributes add to being itself only some negation or a relation of reason. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the said De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1, which he also indicates in I, qq. 5, 11 and 16, and wherever he disputes about these properties of being in particular. Soncinas holds the same, Metaphysics IV, q. 1, ad 1, qq. 17 and 19, ad 9, and Book V, q. 14; Javellus, Metaphysics IV, q. 2; Soto, on the Categories, chapter on Property, q. 2, ad 2; Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 2; Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 3. The foundation of this opinion has been explained in the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, and rigorously it is true; it needs, however, explanation.

The true opinion is declared

5. Which property is distinct in the thing from its subject, and which is not.—Examples.—It is first of all to be noticed, then, that it is one thing for some predicate to be a true and real attribute of a subject, another for it to be conceived, explained and predicated by us after the manner of an attribute or property, which would more properly be called after the manner of an attribute in the sense in which the theologians speak of the divine perfections. Of the notion of a true and real attribute, then, are those conditions posited at the beginning; but for the latter mode of attribute or property they are not necessary, especially that one about the distinction from the nature of the thing; but a distinction of reason suffices, by which one thing is conceived as a subject having some essence or formal notion, at least confusedly conceived, and another after the manner of a perfection or property. Examples of which, besides that adduced of the divine attributes, can be taken from Aristotle in the Categories, where he attributes to them various properties which cannot be distinguished or explained otherwise; as, for example, he teaches that it is a property of quantity to be the foundation of equality and inequality, which property expresses nothing in the thing distinct from quantity, but is only an aptitude, which is nothing other than quantity itself; it is conceived by us, however, as distinct in reason in order to explain more distinctly the functions of quantity itself. And in the same way it could be attributed to quantity, as its property, to be the proximate subject of corporeal accidents, which nevertheless in the thing expresses nothing distinct from the nature of the thing from quantity itself.

6. Secondly it is to be observed that in attributes of this kind formally taken it is one thing that they themselves be real beings or beings of reason; another that they be distinguished in reality or in reason; for it can very well happen that they are real, although they are distinguished not in reality but in reason, as is easily evident in the examples posited; and the reason is clear, because the distinction of reason which arises from the prescission of the intellect is not through the conception of some feigned entity which is not in the thing, but only through an inadequate mode of conceiving a true thing; the attribute, therefore, can be real, although the mode of attribution and distinction is only through reason. Rather, if we speak properly, in order that an attribute be distinguished by reason alone from a real subject, it is necessary that it be a real attribute and not only of reason or privative; otherwise, formally speaking, it would be distinguished by more than reason, namely as non-being from being, or as feigned being from true being. Wherefore it is also necessary to observe that in attributes of this kind what is formally signified by them is often one thing, but what is intended to be explained by us through them another; for often what is formally signified is negative, but through it a positive and real perfection of the thing is explained by us; as simplicity, which is assigned by us as an attribute of God, or of certain other beings in their grade, formally consists in a negation; but through it we explain such a mode or entity of a simple thing.

7. The twofold significate of being.—Finally it is to be observed, from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 14, and St. Thomas, I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2, and In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1, that being properly and rigorously signifies the entity of a thing, in which way we have hitherto spoken of it; but sometimes whatever can simply be affirmed of something is called being; for, because affirmation is made through the verb of being, whatever is simply attributed to things, although it posits no entity in them, is wont to be called being or to be; but predicates or attributes of this kind seem to be able to be reduced to two heads. One is of those which consist in negation or privation, for so we say that a thing is indivisible, that a moral act is evil, that a man is blind, and the like. The other is of those which consist in extrinsic denominations taken from things themselves, in which way God is called Creator from time, or a wall seen, etc.; but this denomination is sometimes taken as actual and requires the coexistence of each extreme, as in the examples posited; but sometimes as aptitudinal, as a wall is called visible, etc.

8. Being does not have positive attributes distinct from it in the thing.—These things posited, I say, first, that being as being cannot have true and altogether real positive attributes distinct from it from the nature of the thing. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the places cited, who rightly noticed that the discussion is of being in so far as it is being; for in so far as it is such being it can well have real attributes distinct from the nature of the thing, because such being as such can be outside the essence of another being, and consequently also outside the essence of its attribute; but being in so far as it is being cannot be outside the essence of any being; and therefore no property or attribute can be real without being essentially included in it, and therefore it cannot be distinct from the nature of the thing from being; for, as was shown above, being in so far as it is being is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from every being in which it is essentially included; and this is the chief foundation of the conclusion, which can be confirmed and explained in various ways. First, because whether the notion of being is considered solitarily and precisely, or as it is in things, no attribute distinct from the nature of the thing will be found to emanate from it, or from any thing, from the mere fact that it is conceived to be being, but only from the fact that it is such being. Which is evident by induction, for the attributes of being hitherto found are only those which are called transcendentals; but these either are not positive, or are not real intrinsic ones, or, if in some sense they are such, they are not distinct from the nature of the thing from being; which will be better evident in treating of each of these attributes. Now it is briefly declared, because these attributes are common to God and are found most properly in him without distinction from the nature of the thing. But if you say that it is otherwise in creatures, first of all this is said without foundation; for it would be necessary to assign some special indication or necessity of its distinction; but nothing of the kind can be brought forward. And next there is an excellent reason, because we are now dealing with being in so far as it is being as it abstracts from God and creatures; therefore the things which are attributed to it are attributed either as distinct from the nature of the thing or not; if this latter is said, it is what we intend, for if these are distinguished in some being, that will be from a peculiar reason, of which we shall see afterwards; but if the former is said, it follows that in every being, even in God, they are distinguished from the nature of the thing, because whatever is attributed per se to the superior must belong to every inferior.

9. And this can be urged more fully, because being itself in so far as it is being, from the mere fact that it is such, without another real mode superadded to it and distinct from the nature of the thing, has whatever is positively necessary for it to be one, true, good, etc.; whence in the very mode of explaining we say that being is because it has a true essence and some real perfection, etc. Nor does it matter that the mind can conceive and consider the notion of being without expressly considering the other notions, because this at most indicates a distinction of reason, or something negative or extrinsic included or connoted in those attributes, as we shall declare afterwards. Finally, distinctions of this kind from the nature of the thing are understood with the greatest difficulty, and therefore are not to be multiplied without sufficient indication and reason; but here there is no apparent indication of this distinction, as will easily be evident from what is to be said and from the solutions of the arguments. And moreover, on account of the transcendence of being, this distinction is much more difficult in it, as the reasons made at the beginning also show, especially that one, that the subject would be of the essence of the attribute, although the attribute is as it were an accident of the subject. In which too a special repugnance is involved, that being in so far as it is being, which abstracts from substantial and accidental essence, simple or composite, actual or potential, perfect or imperfect, perfecting or perfectible, should postulate or require distinct attributes, which would be as it were certain intrinsic accidents by which it would be perfected.

10. Being has true attributes.—The attributes of being do not formally express beings of reason, and how the contrary expression is to be explained.—I say, secondly, that being in so far as it is being has some properties or attributes which are not feigned by reason, but are truly and in the thing itself predicated of it. This whole is excellently proved by the reasons touched upon in the first and second opinions. For it is simply true that each being is one and good, etc.; but in order that these be true it is not necessary that the mind feign some beings of reason; for although the mind thinks nothing about things, gold is true gold and is one determinate thing distinct from others; and similarly God is one and good, etc. Moreover this is rightly proved by that reason, that metaphysics, which is a real and true science, demonstrates these of being; but it does not demonstrate something feigned by the intellect. Wherefore, if we speak with this rigour of the being of reason, it is not rightly said that these attributes formally signify beings of reason, because beings of this kind are properly said only to be objectively in the intellect; whence they only are when they are known or feigned by the intellect; but these attributes in truth do not depend on the feigning of the intellect, but belong to being itself absolutely and before any consideration of the intellect, as has been said. Such expressions, therefore, in order to be true, are to be expounded by a certain broader reason, in so far as everything which does not posit in the thing to which it is attributed something real, positive and intrinsic can be called a being of reason, either as it is distinguished against proper real being, having a true and intrinsic entity, or fundamentally, namely because the intellect, in order distinctly to conceive and predicate attributes of this kind, takes from them a foundation for feigning some beings of reason.

11. What the attributes of being add formally.—I say, thirdly: these attributes of being formally add either a negation or a denomination taken through a relationship to something extrinsic; through them, however, a real positive perfection of being is explained, not according to something real superadded to being itself, but according to the very formal or essential notion of being. Aristotle seems to me to have indicated this conclusion, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, saying at the same time that being and one express the same nature, and nevertheless do not formally signify the same thing; because, namely, one formally adds a negation which being does not express; but through it nothing else is explained than the very nature of being, which is to be declared more fully below. And similarly the same must be said of true and good, and of any other such attributes there may be; for these formally, and in order to our conception, do not express the same as being, nor do they express a negation, as is evident of itself; they signify, therefore, being under a certain relationship to another, namely in so far as it has in itself whence it is loved, or truly known, or something similar, as we shall declare in their places. And so St. Thomas seems plainly to expound this matter in the places cited. The reason for this conclusion, however, is that these attributes are not synonymous with being itself; otherwise they could in no way be called properties or attributes, and it would be nugatory to say that being is one or good; it is necessary, therefore, that they formally signify something besides being; but they cannot formally signify some entity superadded to being and distinct from it from the nature of the thing, as has been shown; nor can they signify beings of reason rigorously taken, as I said; therefore they can express nothing else than either a negation, or a privation, or some relationship or extrinsic denomination. Again, this whole notion of attributes tends to this, that the nature of being may be more perfectly known and explained by us; otherwise it would be vain and irrelevant to the science of being; but it is not so, but very accommodated, for, because we do not perfectly know simple things as they are in themselves, we use partly negations, partly comparisons to other things, in order to explain them distinctly. So, then, although these attributes formally add negations or other relationships, nevertheless through all of them the nature of being is explained, either as regards perfection, or as regards integrity or something similar. I have said that these attributes add over being only a negation or something similar, because it is placed under controversy whether formally or in the abstract these attributes express only a negation or relation, or include entity itself, which will be better explained in each of the attributes.

The arguments are solved

12. To the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, together with the things adjoined in the first and second opinions, the solution is easy from what has been said; for it has already been conceded that these attributes are not proper real attributes with that rigour and propriety which make it necessary that all the conditions enumerated there belong to them. It has also been declared in what sense these attributes can be called real, namely because they formally express something which in its own way is in things and can truly and simply be attributed to being, after the manner of a privation or of a real denomination or real aptitude with a relationship to something extrinsic. And this is enough for these attributes, according to the whole of what they include, not to be properly essential, and therefore to be said to be after the manner of attributes or properties. This also suffices for these attributes to be able to fall under science, since they both are in things, and in the mode in which they are, follow being itself and contribute to explaining its nature. All the more because for the notion of science and for making demonstrations a distinction of reason between attributes suffices, because, as we conceive, so also we reason; and so we truly demonstrate of God that he is immortal because he is immaterial; and so it could also be done in the attributes of being, even if they were distinguished only by reason from being itself. Finally, from what has been said it is also evident how being is not said essentially of these its properties or attributes; for according to the thing indeed it is said essentially of them, because they explain nothing other than the very nature of being; yet it is not of their essence as regards what they add over being, because the negation, for example, which one formally adds, is not essentially true and real being, such as is that which is said to be as it were the subject of these properties; and so the process to infinity and the other inconveniences which were touched upon in the arguments are avoided.

13. How the attributes of being differ among themselves.—Finally, from what has been said it is gathered how these properties or attributes can be distinguished among themselves; for as regards the intrinsic thing which they signify in being they are not distinguished in the thing, since they express nothing distinct from being from the nature of the thing, as has been shown; and in this way it is wont to be said that in the thing the entity of a thing is its goodness and truth, and conversely. But if we consider what they formally add, they can be said to differ formally, not indeed by an intrinsic and positive formal notion, but either by a negative or an extrinsic one, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said in particular of each.

1. Reasons render the question doubtful.—Six transcendentals are commonly wont to be enumerated: being, thing, something, one, true, good; from which it seems to be gathered that there are five attributes of being, because there are so many predicates which are convertible with it, and no more. On the contrary, however, is the fact that neither can all of these have the notion of an attribute, and besides these others can be thought out by us. The first can be proved from what has been said, because thing formally expresses only the quiddity of a thing, and the ratified or real essence of being; [but this is not a property of being];¹ whence many think that thing is a more essential predicate than being itself. Similarly something, since it is immediately distinguished against nothing, seems to signify most formally nothing other than being itself; for something seems to be said as the same as having some quiddity; but this formal signification coincides with the signification of thing and of being.

2. The second is proved, because besides these predicates others seem common to every being, as, for example, to endure and to be somewhere; for these necessarily accompany all beings. But if you say that these do not belong to being except as existing, whereas here the discussion is of being according to itself, abstracting from actual existence, against this is the fact that those properties of duration or local presence too can be considered according to themselves abstracting from actual existence, and as such will be understood to have a per se connection with being; whence, just as this predication, being is one, is of perpetual truth, the copula being absolved from time, so also this one, being has duration or local presence. There is, however, a special difficulty about the very being of actual existence, for it seems to be a certain property of being itself taken according to itself, because it does not belong to it essentially nor altogether accidentally. Again, besides these simple attributes there seem to be others complex or disjunct; for just as it can be said to be a property of number that it is even or odd, and of quantity that it is finite or infinite, so it can be said to be an attribute of being that it is finite or infinite, in act or in potency, or similar things. Finally, if negations or relationships of reason suffice for the attributes of being, as has been said, these could be multiplied to infinity, such as to be the same, not to be impossible, to be lovable, to be intelligible, etc.

Resolution of the question

3. The attributes of being are only three.—This question is proposed only in order that we may reduce this treatment of the attributes of being to certain heads; and therefore it must briefly be said that, if we speak properly and do not feign distinctions not at all necessary, there are only three proper attributes of being, namely one, true and good. For that these three are distinct among themselves at least in formal notion, whether that be negative or positive, real or of reason, anyone will easily persuade himself. First, from the common opinion of all who write on this matter. Secondly, from the common mode of conceiving and the signification and interpretation of the words themselves; for one as such signifies only that the thing is integral and undivided in itself; whence it formally adds a negation, in which it is distinguished from true and good. But these are distinguished among themselves because true expresses an adequation or relationship to the intellect, but good to the will or appetite as fitting to it, whether it expresses this formally or fundamentally; but these are very diverse notions or relationships. Which can also easily be declared from their contraries; for unity is opposed to multitude, goodness to malice, truth to falsity; but these are very distinct. Finally, from what we shall say in particular about these attributes this will be more evidently established, and at the same time we shall show that each of these attributes belongs to every being and so is convertible with being; these three, therefore, are attributes of being.

4. Thing and being are not related as essence and attribute.—But that besides these there are no others can be gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas; for although he often enumerates those six transcendentals and declares their notion and sufficiency, as De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, q. 21, a. 1, and often elsewhere, yet when he treats in particular of these properties he never treats except of those three, as is evident from I, qq. 5, 11 and 16, and in the said disputed questions. And it can be declared in this way from what has been said; for thing and being, according to common use, are used as synonyms; and sometimes they are said of actually existing being, but sometimes they prescind from actual existence; wherefore neither is an attribute of the other. A sign of which too is that one is never predicated of the other, and if it is so predicated, it is judged to be a nugation or an identical predication. But the others are predicated of being, and are adjoined to it as an adjective to a substantive; for so we say one being, true being, etc.; but being and thing are substantives, and cannot be joined in that way; it is therefore a sign that one is not an attribute of the other. But if we wish to distinguish these two with that rigour with which St. Thomas above, following Avicenna, distinguished them, that thing prescinds from actual existence and signifies mere quiddity, whereas being is taken from to be and expresses only actually existing being, then it is evident that thing does not signify an attribute of being, but is a most quidditative predicate. And rather being will signify something outside the essence, at least in creatures. Yet neither can being be called an attribute of thing; for existence is not an attribute of the existing creature, either because it does not flow from its intrinsic principles, but comes to it from without, or because it does not belong to it necessarily and per se; whence neither does the actual existence of a creature properly fall under science, in so far as it actually depends on the free will of the Creator; but what this existence is, and how it is distinguished from the essence of the creature, is an obscure matter, which we shall dispute below in treating of created being in particular. But if, according to a certain opinion treated above, being, not only as it expresses what actually exists, but also as it expresses what is apt to exist, were distinguished from thing, as the latter absolutely expresses that which has a real quiddity, then being would be the first attribute of thing; but this was disproved above, because aptitude for existing enters into the first notion of real quiddity, and in this the real quiddity is first distinguished from the non-real or feigned. In these two, therefore, no attribute of being is contained. I know that Averroes, in his paraphrase, chapter on Thing, says that thing signifies not only a true thing but a feigned one; but this is common to being, and is only according to an equivocal signification. Of which and of the other equivocal significations of these words I shall speak in what follows.

5. Something, according to the various etymologies of the word, is a synonym either of being or of one.—Again, something can have a twofold etymology or interpretation. One is that something is the same as having some quiddity; for whether this was the first derivation of the word or not, it seems now in common use to be taken in this sense; for something and nothing are judged to be opposed contradictorily or privatively; but nothing signifies the same as non-being or not having any entity; something, therefore, is the same as having some entity or quiddity. In this signification, then, it is evident that something is not an attribute, but a synonym of being; and it is judged the same, even according to formal notion and concept, to say of something that it is something and to say that it is being; and so Fonseca thinks of this attribute, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 5, sect. 2.

6. But the other etymology of this attribute is that which St. Thomas touches upon in the places cited, namely that aliquid is said as it were aliud quid, “another what”, which seems more conformed to the first imposition of this word, as is evident from the Latin authors; according to which this word formally signifies something distinct from being, namely distinction from another, or the negation of identity with another. In this sense, however, this attribute either is not diverse from one, or is included in it as consequent upon it. For that is called one which is undivided in itself and divided from every other, as we shall see below; therefore in the notion of one is included that negation which is imported in the word something, or it is reduced to it; and therefore this attribute does not so increase the number of these attributes that it is necessary to treat specially of it; but once the notion of one has been explained, and consequently of multitude, which is opposed to it, and of identity or distinction, which are in some way founded in its notion, this predicate something will remain explained. For although the negation enclosed in it can be distinguished by reason from the negation included in one, in that one expresses the negation of multitude, but something only the negation of identity with another—in which way one and something are distinguished by St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1—nevertheless, because the latter negation is founded in the former, and has no special difficulty in the doctrine to be handed down about these attributes, it is not necessary to distinguish them. Some, however, as Javellus, in the treatise De transcendentibus, c. 3, say that something expresses actual division from another being, so that before the creation of the world God would be one, but not something. But this is said most improperly; for who would say that a being is not something because other things do not exist? Indeed in that sense something cannot be an attribute of being, since it does not belong to every being; therefore, as it is an attribute, it expresses only that negation in aptitude and with respect to another existing or possible being; and in this way, as I said, it is founded in unity and is explained together with it.

7. From the said six transcendentals, then, there remain only the three enumerated above which can be attributes of being, whose sufficiency St. Thomas hands down in the place cited from De veritate, and q. 21, a. 1; because the attributes of being must add something over being, and cannot add something positive and real; therefore either something negative, or something positive of reason, or through denomination or fittingness to something extrinsic. In the former way the attribute of one is constituted, because that negation of indivision in itself and of division from every other follows upon every being considered according to itself and absolutely, and there is no other which necessarily belongs to every being as such. In the latter way the two other attributes are constituted, one through relation or fittingness to the intellect, the other through relationship and fittingness to the appetite and will; for these two faculties and no others are universal, and regard every being under a diverse notion.

8. What order is kept among the attributes of being.—And hence authors gather that of these three attributes unity is the first, because it is absolute; for it belongs to every being of itself, and not through denomination from another extrinsic thing, nor properly through relation to another, which true and good in some way signify, in so far as they express fittingness with another; but absolute things are prior to respective ones in their genus. You will say that one too, as it expresses division from another, imports a relationship to another. The answer is, first, that that negation is not of the notion of one, that there be another from which it is distinguished, but only follows upon one that it is apt to be distinguished; for God will be one even if there is nothing from which he is divided. Next, that negation is not a relation, but rather the negation of a relation, for identity rather is a relation, and that is the negation of identity, or certainly its foundation, and consequently it cannot be the foundation of any relation of reason. Finally, even if we feign it after the manner of a relationship to another, it is of itself prior to the other relations of true or good, because it is in a certain way more abstract, because it regards another only under the notion of being; for so one is said to be divided from every other, of whatever other notion that may be. And so Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, c. 1, joins one with being as its first attribute; and St. Thomas, I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 4, thinks that after being, one is what is known first of each being; which things Soncinas treats more fully, Metaphysics IV, q. 24, and Javellus, treatise De transcendentibus, c. 1.

9. A comparison between the attributes of being in perfection.—Of the other two transcendentals or attributes of being, however, true is prior to good, as St. Thomas taught, I, q. 16, a. 4. And it is evident, because goodness is in a certain way founded in truth; for in order that health be good, it is supposed to be true health; for if it is feigned, it will not be good, and so of the others. Whence true expresses order to the intellect, good to the will; but the intellect is a prior power to the will. But if anyone wishes to compare these attributes in perfection too, and asks which of them is more perfect, it can first of all easily be answered that formally, and according to what they add over being, they express no perfection, because they express or add nothing real to being itself; whence under this notion there is nothing to be compared, because comparison supposes something positive; but in so far as they signify in some way being itself and declare its nature, they express altogether the same perfection of being, and so from this side too they cannot be compared, because comparison requires distinction.

The arguments are satisfied

10. Why six transcendentals are enumerated.—To the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, the answer is that six transcendentals are not enumerated for this reason, that all signify distinct attributes of being, but that some are distinguished by this reason, while others only from the diverse etymology or imposition of the word. And so thing and being are distinguished, because the latter was taken from to be, the former from real quiddity. And similarly something and one are distinguished from their first imposition, in that one was said from the negation of division in itself, something from the negation of identity with another; but in the thing they signify the same attribute, because those two are required for perfect unity.

11. To the other part, however, by which it is proved that these attributes are more, the answer is, first, that duration is perhaps not something diverse from actual existence; and so the reason will be the same concerning both. But if perhaps in creatures it is distinct from the nature of the thing, it is deservedly not enumerated among the attributes of being, because it is a certain special being, as we shall see below in its place. And the same must be said of local presence; for as it is a mode of certain beings, it constitutes a special predicament, as we shall also say below. But of those disjuncts, finite or infinite, etc., it must be said either that they are properly not attributes of being in common, but rather its divisions, because either they essentially contract being itself in so far as it is being, or certainly neither dividing member belongs to it except as contracted or determined to some special notion of being, as we shall see below of finite and infinite; or certainly they signify diverse states of the same being, as to be in act or in potency, as we shall also say below; where we shall also declare how the existence of a creature is not its attribute. Or certainly these disjunct properties are reduced to simple ones, as same or diverse to unity.

12. Why some relationships of reason common to all beings are not attributes of being.—To the last the answer is that indeed several negations or relationships of reason can be thought out by us in being which are not formally explained by those attributes which have been enumerated by us; in which way some say that thing is an attribute which formally adds over being the negation of feigned or chimerical being. Others add same and diverse, for every being has a relation of reason of identity to itself and a relation of diversity from another, at least from non-being or from being of reason. Likewise a relation of likeness to another can be feigned, at least fundamentally, so that, just as equal is posited as an attribute of quantity, so assimilable (so to speak) would be an attribute of being; for there is no being which cannot have something in some way similar to itself, at least analogically; and infinite other denominations of this kind can be multiplied, as was touched upon in the argument. It must nevertheless be said that those attributes are sufficiently enumerated, either because they alone contribute to explaining the nature of being and have, both in things and in the usage of men, a sufficient cause and usefulness on account of which they have been thought out and distinguished; or, if any others of this kind can be thought out, they are contained virtually in these, or are reduced to them.

13. Thing does not formally express the negation of feigned being.—That thing, then, formally expresses some negation of feigned being is indeed feigned, and beyond every Latin signification of the word and the common conception of men; for thing is not a negative or privative term, but altogether positive. That negation is also irrelevant, both because it is more obscure to explain what feigned being is than what a thing is; and also because, if that negation is necessary for the attributes of being, it is rather to be founded in true; for that is called true being which is not feigned; or, if it is taken formally, it is included in one or something; because in the negation which something expresses it is included that it be divided from every other, and consequently also from feigned being. All the more because the notion of feigned being as such consists in a negation; for that is properly feigned being which can be so apprehended by the mind that it involves in itself repugnance and impossibility, which is a certain negation; and therefore real being is not properly divided from it by a negation, but formally by its own reality, as we shall say more fully in the following disputation in a similar case. And by the same reason are excluded similar negations which can be made by the mere reflection of the intellect, such as not to be diverse from itself, to be diverse from being of reason, not to be unequal to itself, and similar ones, which both are useless and can be multiplied to infinity, and are mere works of reason, which do not suffice for attributes of being, as we have said.

14. And hence it is also evident that it is not necessary to add identity or diversity among the attributes of being; because, as these can formally express relations of reason, they do not pertain to the attributes of being, as was said generally above; because such relations do not belong per se to being, but only extrinsically through the thinking, reflection or comparison of the mind; but if they are taken in so far as they have in the thing some positive or privative foundation, then they are sufficiently contained under unity, as we shall say below. And in the same way likeness (if this is common to every being) is reduced to unity; for if it is taken for a true relation, it is without doubt not an attribute, because it neither always belongs to every being, and to that to which it belongs, it belongs not per se, but by accident. And if perhaps it is said always to belong to an existing creature, still with respect to it it will be a certain accident, as the relation of the creature is. But if it is taken fundamentally, then it is to be reduced to unity; for so Aristotle said that likeness is founded in unity. Finally, in this manner the denomination intelligible, significable is reduced to truth; the notion of integral and perfect, and the denomination lovable, appetible, and the like, are reduced to good; it is not necessary, therefore, to feign more attributes.

1. The reason for doubt on each side.—This question is proposed chiefly on account of Aristotle, who, Metaphysics IV, c. 3, text 8, taught that that principle, it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be, is the first and almost the only one, to which all the demonstrations of this science, indeed also of the other sciences, must be resolved, at least virtually. But on the contrary there seems to be, first, that the proper and intrinsic principles of a science must be taken from the cause or reason on account of which the predicate belongs to the subject; whence the same Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, teaches that the posterior attribute is demonstrated through the prior, but the first of all either is not demonstrated, but belongs immediately to the subject, or is demonstrated as regards us only through the definition of the subject; but the definition itself is in no way demonstrated, but is known immediately of the subject. So, then, in every science the first principle will be that in which either the first attribute is predicated of the subject or the definition of the thing defined; therefore in the present science too the proper and intrinsic principles will have to be taken from the connection of the first attribute with the notion of being, or of the notion of being with being itself; this, therefore, will be the first principle, everything which is, is one, because one is the first attribute of being, as we have said; or certainly this: every being is that which has an essence. It is not, therefore, that one: it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be, because that is very extrinsic, and cannot serve for proper a priori demonstrations, but at most for reduction to the impossible. Add that that principle is reduced a priori to this one: every being is one; for a thing cannot at the same time be and not be for this reason, that it can only be determinately one. In which way many say that it belongs first to being, in so far as it is being, to be divided from non-being, which property they think is included in unity, of which we shall see afterwards. Finally the difficulty is increased, because even among the principles in some way intrinsic and most universal that one does not seem to be the first, because it is negative; but every negation is founded on some prior affirmation; therefore there is another principle prior to it, in which it is founded, such as will be either this one, it is necessary that the same thing be or not be, or this one, one contradictory necessarily destroys the other.

Some more certain pronouncements for declaring the sense of the question

2. Metaphysics needs principles into which it ultimately resolves its conclusions.—In this matter all agree that in metaphysics (as in the other sciences) some first self-evident principles are necessary, by which attributes are demonstrated, whether the discussion is of the transcendental attributes of being as being, or of the more special properties of certain beings as they are within the breadth of the formal object of metaphysics, according to what was said in the prooemial disputation; although, because being as being, in order to this science, is prior to the rest, the attributes adequate to it are also prior, and consequently also the most universal principles, which in some way consist of the transcendentals themselves, are prior to the rest; and therefore we are now dealing especially with them. That such principles are necessary, then, the reason is the same in this science as in the others, because it too proceeds through demonstration, resolving conclusions into principles; in which resolution it cannot proceed to infinity, as is evident from the general doctrine about causes; for in no genus of causes can one proceed to infinity; therefore it is necessary that it stop at principles or self-evident propositions.

3. A single principle does not suffice for this function.—Secondly, from this reason it seems to be concluded that these principles must be not only one, but several, and at least two, at least in so far as they are immediate propositions and indemonstrable a priori. The reason is that nothing can be concluded from one principle alone, as is evident from dialectic; because formal inference requires three terms, which cannot be in one principle; therefore the ultimate resolution is necessarily made to two immediate principles. Because, if one is immediate and the other demonstrable, that which is demonstrable will have to be further resolved and demonstrated; but it cannot be demonstrated through the other immediate principle alone; therefore another must be adjoined; and if that too is demonstrable, another will have to be sought through which it may be demonstrated; lest, then, one proceed to infinity, one must stop at something also indemonstrable; several first principles, therefore, are necessary in this science too. And hence it follows that, if we speak of the first principle in this sense, namely as it expresses only an immediate or self-evident proposition, in this sense a single first principle is not to be sought in this science; nor could Aristotle have spoken in this sense in the place cited, because in truth there is none which is in this way single and only first. In another sense, then, a principle prior to the rest can be inquired into, namely either because it is better known to us, or because in use or causality it is prior and more universal, or because it is in every way more indemonstrable; and in this sense there is a controversy among authors which is the first metaphysical principle.

Various views

4. The first opinion is that that which we reported from Aristotle is not the first, but this one, every being is being. So Antonius Andreae holds, Metaphysics IV, q. 5. And to Aristotle he answers that he called that other one the first principle among those which are circulated as general, such as every whole is greater than its part, etc. But this author does not speak rightly even in his own principles, because that proposition is identical and nugatory; and therefore in no science is it taken as a principle of demonstration, but is outside every art. Otherwise in every science the first principle would be that in which the subject of the science was predicated of itself. And the first principle of one science would be as self-evident as that of another; for every identical proposition is equally known, as mobile being is mobile being, just as being is being. And in this science there would be several principles equally known, although not equally universal, as Substance is substance, Accident is accident. He would therefore speak more plausibly if in place of being he took some definition or description explaining the notion of being, and predicated it of being; for although the definition and the thing defined are the same in the thing, the proposition in which the definition is predicated of the thing defined is nevertheless not identical, but doctrinal, because in it a distinct concept is predicated of a confused one. And in this way the reason for doubting posited at the beginning favours this opinion. It seems, however, to be repugnant to Aristotle, in the said c. 3 of Metaphysics IV, when he absolutely concludes that that principle, it is impossible, etc., is simply the first of all, and that all demonstrations are resolved into it.

5. Others say that not that one posited by Aristotle, but this one, it is necessary that anything whatever either be or not be, is the first principle of all, on account of the reason touched upon above, because this is affirmative, while that other is negative. For it is not true, as Javellus, Metaphysics IV, q. 6, thought, that those two principles signify the same thing in diverse words, and so are not to be reckoned two, but one; for, if the matter is considered more attentively, the things which are signified by those principles are diverse. For just as in contraries, or privative opposites, it is one thing that they cannot belong at the same time to the same thing, another that one of them must necessarily belong, as is self-evident, so also in contradictory opposites these two are formally and rigorously diverse. But these are signified by those two principles; for by that one, it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be, the repugnance of contradictory opposites is signified; but by that one, anything whatever either is or is not, their immediacy is signified, namely that no medium can fall between them. And so they are posited as distinct by Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, c. 7, texts 27 and 28, and Book III, c. 2, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 8, texts 26 and 27, where he posits the same principles in dialectical terms: It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be affirmed and denied of the same thing; It is necessary that the same thing be affirmed or denied of the same thing; which in other words are wont to be said by the dialecticians: It is impossible that two contradictories be at the same time true, and, it is impossible that they be at the same time false; which two it is evident are very diverse, and that the first is founded on that principle, it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be; but the second on the other, it is necessary to be or not to be. From these reasons, however, it is at the same time evident, comparing these principles among themselves, that that one about the impossible posited by Aristotle is prior to the other about the necessary. First indeed, because it is more self-evident that contradictories have repugnance among themselves than that they have immediacy. For the former at once shines forth in the terms themselves, but the latter needs some discourse and declaration. Whence the former is common to all opposites, for in so far as they are opposites they fight among themselves; but the latter does not belong to all, as is evident from the chapter on Opposites. Secondly, because it is prior according to reason that two contradictories cannot be at the same time true than that they cannot be at the same time false, just as truth is of itself prior to falsity.

Resolution of the question

6. Two kinds of demonstration and their properties.—In order, then, to answer the question, it is necessary to distinguish a twofold kind of demonstration: one is called ostensive, the other reducing to the impossible. The first is per se and directly required for science; and in it one proceeds from causes to effects and from the essence of the thing to demonstrating attributes; for we are speaking of a priori science and of the reasoned fact; for that which is a posteriori is not resolved into the principles of which we are now dealing, but rather into experience. The second kind of demonstrating is not per se necessary, but is sometimes adjoined on account of the defect, ignorance or obstinacy of man; and it is useful not only for persuading and proving conclusions, but also first principles; which cannot be done in the former mode, because, since they are immediate, they do not have an a priori middle term through which they may be proved; yet by reducing to the impossible their truth can be shown, and the intellect convinced to assent to them. Indeed in every kind of demonstration, although the principles demonstrate the conclusion a priori and are self-evident, the force of the inference is virtually founded on reduction to the impossible, namely because it cannot happen that the same thing at the same time is and is not, or that two contradictories are at the same time true. On account of which Averroes said, Metaphysics II, c. 1, that without that principle posited by Aristotle no one can philosophize, dispute or reason.

7. What the mode of demonstrating a priori in this science is.—It must be said, then, first of all, that for demonstrating a priori the attributes of being of being, the first principles must be taken either from the notion of being itself, or from its first attribute for demonstrating the posterior ones; and the discourse made at the beginning convinces of this. And it is confirmed, for as regards this the reason is the same concerning this science as concerning the others; for since the properties of being are in their own way its attributes, it is necessary that they arise from its intrinsic notion and essence, because this is of the intrinsic notion of a proper attribute; they will therefore be able to be demonstrated through the very essential notion of being, whether this be through the distinction of the things themselves among themselves or in order to our concepts and discourses, so that one is truly the reason of another, which suffices for human science and demonstration. Whence, if the attributes of being are so connected among themselves that one arises from another, that which is first will constitute one principle for demonstrating the others; but if (as can sometimes happen) several attributes are immediately connected with the notion of being, they can be demonstrated of being only through the notion of being itself; but how this is done will be evident afterwards in the course of the science. In this order, then, the first principle will be that in which the notion or essence of being distinctly conceived is predicated of being itself.

8. What the first principle of reduction to the impossible is.—Secondly it must be said that in the other kind or mode of demonstrating through reduction to the impossible, the first principle on which that whole mode of demonstrating rests is: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. This is self-evident, because every reduction to the impossible finally stops at this, that it follows that the same thing at the same time is and is not; and as long as it is not reduced to this, the impossibility has not been sufficiently demonstrated; but after it has been reduced to this, one stops there, as at the last term of resolution and the best-known principle. And although sometimes the impossible can be reduced to another inconvenience, that two contradictories are at the same time false, or that the same thing neither is nor is not, nevertheless this very thing is impossible in so far as it virtually includes the other, namely that at the same time something is denied and not denied of something, which is to affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing.

9. What the absolutely first principle of human science is.—Thirdly it must be said that hence it comes about that that principle, it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be, is simply the first in human science, and especially in metaphysics. The reason is that that principle is rightly called first from which the whole of human science takes its firmness; but such is the aforesaid principle, because from it not only conclusions but also first principles are demonstrated. Indeed Fonseca adds, Metaphysics IV, c. 3, q. 1, sect. 3, that through that principle first principles are confirmed a priori. But I do not see why he calls reduction to the impossible a priori, since it is not from a cause, but through an extrinsic middle term. Unless perhaps he understands that through a principle of this kind there is demonstrated a priori not indeed the truth of the other principles, which cannot be done, but the impossibility and repugnance which follows from the opposite; for the ultimate resolution of every repugnance is made to contradiction, to which reduction is made through that principle. This, however, is enough for that principle to be called simply first; for, since human talent does not at once comprehend the other first principles as they are in themselves, it is much helped and confirmed in its assent to them by reducing to the impossible, which in the others can be done through that first one; but that one itself can in no way be shown, even by reduction to the impossible, because nothing more impossible can be inferred than that which is pronounced in it, which is a sign that it is most known and first. I said, however, that the use of this principle is most necessary in this science, because, since being is most simple, it can scarcely be defined, and its notion more distinctly explained and applied to making true demonstrations, so that the propositions assumed are not judged identical.

The opposing reasons are solved

10. To the reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, as regards the former part, it has already been explained that Aristotle does not call that principle first because metaphysics uses it for its proper and direct demonstrations; for rather the same Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 8, text 26, says that that principle is not wont to enter formally into demonstration. It is called the first principle, then, for the other reasons already explained; for it is as it were the universal foundation by virtue of which all demonstrations rest, and the other principles can, at least as regards us, be declared and confirmed, although this is always done with some other principle adjoined, either conceded or self-evident. To the first confirmation the answer is that the truth of that principle is not properly founded on unity, but on the opposition and repugnance of contradictories; whence it will not rightly be proved that what is cannot at the same time not be because what is one is only one; both because, as I shall say below, being in so far as it is one is not properly divided from non-being, but from another being, because it is rather divided from non-being in so far as it is being; and also because this very division of being from non-being is founded on this, that the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be, on account of the formal repugnance of these terms. To the last confirmation it is said, first, that it can indeed happen that some affirmative proposition, in so far as it is simpler than a negative, is prior to it in the order of generation or composition, and yet that in the notion of self-evident truth it is not so manifest, nor equally first; and so it can be said of that principle; for although its whole truth is founded on the nature of being itself, which of itself excludes not-being, nevertheless this very thing is explained through that principle, although negative, most evidently and most aptly for founding demonstrations reducing to the impossible.

11. What the first principle is in the genus of morals, and a comparison with the first in the genus of nature.—And hence many arguments are easily solved which are wont to be made against the opinion of Aristotle about this first principle, such as that it consists of many words, neither most universal nor very known, such as simul, idem, which signify relations, which are posterior to absolute things. Likewise, that it is a modal proposition, which supposes a prior one de inesse. For to these and similar arguments it is said that at most they prove that this is not the first proposition or combination which the intellect forms, but not that it is not the first principle, because for this it is not necessary that it be the first proposition, but only that the science of all other truths depend in a certain way on it, while it itself is so true, known and indemonstrable that it does not depend on another; but these belong to that principle, as has been shown. That principle, however, could be reduced to simpler terms by saying: No being is and is not; for so it is made up of simple terms, and of the most universal and first ones, which is necessary in the first principle, so that it can be common to all sciences, as St. Thomas noted, I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Where he notices that this principle is first in speculative matters; for in practical or moral matters there is another first, namely, every good is to be done and evil avoided; for, because all moral actions are concerned with good and evil, therefore the first moral principle had to consist of those terms; yet, because practical things are founded on speculative, therefore what is the first principle in speculative matters is simply and absolutely first. But whether this principle is so known that it can be denied in the mind by no one, although he seem to contend with the voice; likewise by what modes it is to be persuaded against one who obstinately denies it, either by refuting him from what he has conceded, or by reducing him to inconveniences repugnant to the senses, Aristotle treats at length, Metaphysics IV, cc. 3, 4 and 5, in which places the expositors can be seen, because there is no reason why we should linger further on this matter.