Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Complete beings, and indeed incomplete ones resolvable into several concepts, participate the notion of being.—This question has no difficulty in complete beings, or those which are conceived by the intellect after the manner of complete beings, such as are all individuals, species and genera which are directly constituted in some predicament up to the supreme genera; for being is divided into these, and is predicated essentially of them, and consequently of all the other inferiors which are contained under them. Next, not only of complete beings and concepts, but of any partial or incomplete beings whatever which are resolvable into several real concepts, it is also undoubted that being is intimately and essentially included in them, because, if they are resolvable into several real concepts, then at the least they must be resolved into the concept of being, which is the most universal of all. Likewise this will be evident a fortiori from what is to be said.

2. These things being supposed, it is the opinion of Scotus, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, and dist. 8, q. 2, and In II, dist. 3, q. 6, that being is not included in the ultimate differences, nor in the intrinsic modes by which it is determined to the first ten genera, nor in its proper attributes, which are convertible with it, such as one, true, good, of which elsewhere he thinks that they are positive and real properties, as is evident In II, dist. 3, q. 1, in the answer to the arguments. But what Scotus understands by the ultimate difference is explained by him obscurely enough; for he does not call ultimate that difference which constitutes the lowest species, for there he expressly says that rational or rationality is not an ultimate difference if the rational soul is in the thing itself diverse from the sensitive. He calls ultimate, then, the difference which is taken from the ultimate reality of the form, but non-ultimate that which is taken from the whole form; as, if there is (he says) in man one soul, which is really vegetative, sensitive and rational, in it diverse grades or formal realities are distinguished, and the difference which is taken from the ultimate reality is called ultimate, not only because it constitutes the lowest species, but because it differs from the others by itself, and is not resolvable into several concepts; but if we feign that the rational soul as such is an integral and per se distinct form from the sensitive and all the superior ones, then, just as such a form is intrinsically and quidditatively being, so the difference taken from it is also intrinsically and quidditatively being, and therefore its concept is not simply simple, but can be resolved into the concept of being and some other mode by which the concept of being is determined to the being of such a difference; and therefore such a difference is not ultimate, since it differs from others through something distinct from itself.

3. The foundation of Scotus.—And hence is taken the first and principal foundation of Scotus, for one difference is not another, as is self-evident; therefore either it agrees with the others in the quidditative concept of being, or not; if it does not agree, then it does not include such a concept in its quiddity and essence, which is what we intend; but if it agrees with the others in that concept, it is necessary that it differ through something else; therefore one difference will differ from the others through another difference; therefore that difference was not ultimate, since it is resolved into another further one; and then of that other difference it will further have to be inquired in the same way whether it includes the quidditative concept of being, in which it agrees with the others; and so either we shall proceed to infinity, or we must stop at some ultimate difference which so differs by itself from all other things or concepts that it does not agree with them even in the concept of being, and consequently does not intrinsically and quidditatively include the notion of being; for, if it included it, it would agree in it with the others; and if it agreed, it would need another difference by which to differ, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 9, and Book X, c. 5, that things which agree among themselves differ by differences. And this reason can be applied in the same way to the intrinsic modes by which being is contracted to the first ten genera; for, since each of those genera is conceived after the manner of a complete being, it is certain that it quidditatively includes the notion of being, in which all those genera agree; therefore it is necessary that they differ by some modes or differences; of those modes, then, it is further asked whether they include being; for if they do not include it, this is what we intend; but if they include it, it must be asked through what they differ from the others and how being is contracted to those modes; and so either one will proceed to infinity, or one must stop at some difference or mode which does not include being; therefore, since there is no greater reason for one than for another, one must stop at that first mode by which being is contracted to substance, quantity, etc.

4. The second reason of Scotus.—And this the second reason of Scotus most of all confirms, taken from the proportion between metaphysical and physical composition; for each is made from potency and act, or (as Scotus speaks) from the determinable and the determining; but in physical composition the ultimate resolution is made to an ultimate determinable potency, which in its entity includes nothing of the determining form or act, and to an ultimate determining form or act, which includes nothing of the determinable potency; therefore similarly in the metaphysical composition of all beings the resolution must be made into ultimate determinable and determining concepts, of which one does not include the other, nor conversely; but every such resolution on the side of the determinable concepts is ultimately made into the concept of being, in which as such no determining mode or difference is actually included; therefore also on the side of the determining concept there must correspond some mode or difference which in no way includes the determinable concept of being. Finally, about the attributes of being Scotus multiplies several reasons, which I now omit, because of those attributes we must speak professedly in the following disputation.

The opinion of Scotus is refuted

5. The Scotist explanation of the ultimate and non-ultimate difference is attacked.—This opinion of Scotus the Thomists deservedly attack, although some of them sometimes favour it, as I shall note below. And first indeed that distinction of the ultimate and non-ultimate difference, as it is proposed and explained by Scotus, both supposes a false foundation and is insufficient. The first is evident, because in truth there is no difference which is taken from the whole physical form. First indeed, because according to the truer opinion there is in the substantial composite only one form, and yet every substantial composite has some agreement with other composites and with all created substances, and consequently from its form, as it has agreement with them, some non-ultimate difference is taken; therefore no difference is taken from the whole form, but the ultimate is taken from the ultimate grade or reality of it, as Scotus himself speaks. Which reason proceeds of composite substances, but is more evident in simple or immaterial created ones, which consist of genus and difference, because in them there is only one simple nature, physically speaking, from which non-ultimate and ultimate differences are taken according to its diverse grades or concepts. And the reason proceeds in the same way in accidental forms, for from one and the same form according to the thing, for example whiteness, the non-ultimate difference of colour and the ultimate one of whiteness are taken. Next, even if we granted that there are several forms in the substantial composite, there would be no difference taken from any whole form. For feign that the rational soul in man is distinct from the sensitive, etc.; still rational would not be a difference taken from the whole form. It is proved, because according to that form man would have agreement with the angels in intellectuality; therefore from that form another prior difference would be taken; therefore the difference of rationality, as it is proper to man, would still in that case not be taken from the whole form, but from its ultimate grade; indeed between that form and the others there would necessarily be an agreement, either in the common notion of substantial form, or in the notion of soul and principle of life with respect to other really distinct souls; therefore according to all these notions non-ultimate differences could be taken from it; therefore there would be no difference which would be taken from the whole form; for on account of similar reasons in accidental forms there can be none from which one whole single difference is taken, as Scotus admits.

6. Also of the lowest differences.—Whence it can further be shown that the division of Scotus is insufficient. For, omitting the difference which is said to be taken from the whole form, which in truth is none, as I have shown, Scotus himself admits that there is an ultimate difference which is taken from the ultimate reality of the form; therefore it is necessary that he admit another genus of differences, which is taken neither from the whole form, nor from its ultimate reality, but from the form according to some common or superior reality, as will be the difference of sensitive in man, if in him the sensitive soul is not really distinct from the rational, or as the difference of colour in whiteness. Such a difference, therefore, is neither ultimate, as is self-evident, nor non-ultimate according to the declaration of Scotus, because it is not taken from the whole form, but only from a certain grade of its reality; therefore differences of this kind are insufficiently enumerated by Scotus. And it remains to be asked whether according to his opinion these differences, which are neither taken from the whole form nor are ultimate, intrinsically and quidditatively include being or not. For if they do not include being, it follows that there are no real differences at all which include being, which he himself denies, and is quite absurd in itself; because, if no difference is being, there are no real differences in things, and consequently neither are real essences constituted through them, nor are they essentially distinguished. But if those differences include being, then the same must be said of the ultimate differences, even if they are not taken from the whole form, but from its ultimate grade. This consequence is proved, first, because these subaltern differences, for example sensible, are not taken from the whole form, but from a certain real grade of it, and this is enough for them to include being; therefore much more will this suffice for the ultimate differences to include being. The consequence is evident, because such a difference is taken from a more perfect grade of that form; as, for example, sensible and rational, the true opinion about the unity of the soul in man being supposed, are differences of which neither is taken from the whole form, and sensible is taken from it according to a superior and less perfect grade; yet, because the form, even considered according to that precise grade, is real and a true being, therefore that difference intrinsically and essentially includes being; but rational is taken from the same form according to an inferior real grade, and a more perfect one, and the form from which it is taken, even according to that consideration, is real and a true being; therefore with much greater reason the real difference intimately and essentially includes being. Moreover there is no greater reason for one than for the other, for the concept of the difference sensible is as simple as the concept of the difference rational; for neither formally includes the other, nor conversely. Which I declare thus: for, as Scotus himself indicates, this difference, rational, does not properly differ from others through another difference, but through itself, because, while it is that by which another differs, it is at the same time also differing by itself, lest we proceed to infinity and make the difference itself a species, as consisting of a genus and another difference; but all this proceeds in the same way in the superior difference, namely sensible, because that too does not consist of another difference, nor is it a species, but differs by itself from the other opposed to it, in so far as it divides and contracts the superior genus and constitutes its own proper subaltern species; the reason, therefore, of each difference is the same, and the same holds of all the superior ones. But if you say that differences of this kind are subaltern and determinable through the ultimate differences, this first of all matters nothing for these rather than those to include being; indeed, according to the discourse of Scotus given above, it rather follows that these differences, as they are determinable by the inferior ones, do not include them, and in so far as they determine the superior ones, also cannot include the superior ones themselves, and consequently are as simple as the ultimate differences can be. And moreover the ultimate differences too, especially according to the opinion of Scotus, are determinable through individual differences; therefore in this too the reason is the same concerning them.

7. Likewise the individual differences.—Whence it seems finally to follow, speaking consistently according to the opinion of Scotus, that the individual differences alone ought to be called ultimate, for they alone are taken from the ultimate reality of the form, and in no way differ through others, neither as through constituting differences (which is common to all differences, as has been said), nor as through differences contracting to inferiors, because they do not have them, which is proper to these individual differences. But neither did Scotus speak of ultimate differences in this sense, as is evident from the places cited and from the things we have adduced, nor can it be said of them that they do not include being, on account of the other reasons touched upon above, namely because these too are taken from the matter or form according to their true reality. Likewise, because the concept of the individual difference is not in itself simpler than the concept of the specific or generic difference, even if it is not so common or contractible; for this matters nothing for the simplicity of the concept, for rather the superior and more universal are wont to be simpler. And moreover the reasons which we shall make about the intrinsic modes will prove it also of these individual differences, for, as I shall show, their reason is the same or proportional.

8. The intrinsic modes of being imbibe the notion of being.—Now, therefore, the opinion of Scotus is also shown to be false concerning the intrinsic modes. First, because either those modes are positive and real, or not. This second neither is said by Scotus, nor is true, as I shall show against some in the following section; for how could they constitute various essences of things, and the essential distinction between them, if they were not real and positive modes? But if they are of this kind, how can it be conceived by the mind that they do not intrinsically and essentially include being? For, as we showed in the preceding section, being intrinsically is that which has a true and real essence; either, therefore, these modes have some real essence, and so are intrinsically and essentially being; or they have none, and so can neither constitute a real essence, nor add anything real for contracting the superior concept and constituting a determinate essence and distinguishing it from others. And it is confirmed, for if these modes are not being, then they are nothing; therefore they can contribute nothing to constituting real essences. Some answer that these modes are not being ut quod, yet are being ut quo, or something of being, and hence are neither simply and univocally being, as Scotus speaks, nor altogether nothing. But this answer seems to consist only in words, since to be being ut quo is nothing other than to be a real form or act in metaphysical constitution or composition; but there can be no real form or act of anything unless it is in itself something real, which is to be in itself real being; therefore it is repugnant to say that something is a real quo, and not being ut quod, for that quo must necessarily be founded in a quod of this kind. Which can be shown by induction in every physical composition. But the reason is the same in metaphysical composition, because in it too potency and act are conceived as constituting an integral reality or essence; whence, considered in themselves too, they must necessarily be conceived as having something of reality or essence, at least partial; otherwise they could not be conceived as apt to constitute and complete a real essence; and this reason can be applied to all differences, both ultimate and non-ultimate, generic, specific and individual.

9. Secondly, the reasons made about the differences can conversely be applied here, especially that one, that the non-ultimate, that is, the subaltern, difference includes being because it is taken from the form according to some grade of its reality; but these intrinsic modes too are taken from the form or nature according to some grade of its reality; therefore they too include being. The minor is declared, for in substance the mode per se is taken from the reality of any substantial nature whatever, in so far as it agrees with others in aptitude for subsisting, and so in immaterial substances that mode is taken from the whole simple form according to that precise notion; but in material ones from the whole metaphysical form or integral nature, and consequently from the matter, in so far as on its part it contributes to subsisting, and from the form, in so far as it absolutely constitutes the substantial nature. The first consequence, therefore, holds from parity of reason, and because, just as this intrinsic mode immediately determining being is conceived as something simple, differing from the others by itself and not through another mode, so also is the difference, both subaltern and ultimate, as has been declared.

10. That being is a genus, and the mode of being a true difference, is inferred from the opinion of Scotus.—The answer of Scotus to the inconvenience inferred is refuted.—Thirdly, because, if the concept of substance is resolved into the concept of being and the concept of a mode altogether co-distinct from being, and contracting it, and not including it, nothing can be lacking to this mode for it to be a true difference, nor to being for it to be a genus, especially since Scotus supposes that being is univocal. The consequence as to the former part is proved, because nothing else is of the notion of a difference except that it essentially contract a superior univocal and quidditative predicate, not including it, and with it constitute some essential grade after the manner of its form, from which it has that it is predicated (as they say) in quale quid, and consequently that it makes something differ from others; but all these belong to the modes contracting being according to the doctrine of Scotus. But as to the other part the consequence is proved, because it is only of the notion of a genus that it be a univocal and quidditative predicate, or in quid, not expressing the whole quiddity down to the last grade (on account of which it is wont to be said to be predicated in quid incompletely), and that it be apt to be contracted and determined through essentially distinct differences, from which it has that it is predicated of many things differing essentially; but all this belongs to being according to the principles of Scotus. Whence conversely Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 10, proves from this that being cannot be a genus, because it is essentially included in all the differences and modes by which it is contracted, which is repugnant to a genus, as the same Aristotle proves, Topics VI, c. 3. Scotus answers that being is not a genus because, although not in all, it is at least included in some differences, namely in the non-ultimate differences, which are taken from the whole form. But this first of all has been shown to suppose something false, because there are no differences which are taken from the whole form in the sense intended by Scotus, that is, which are taken from the whole form totally (so to speak) and not according to some precise grade or concept. And next it does not satisfy; for what does it matter that being is included in some ultimate and remote differences, for it not to be a genus with respect to substance and accident, into which it is proximately and univocally divided through proper differences outside its notion? Indeed, conversely, according to the opinion of Scotus it would have to be inferred that those non-ultimate differences, as they are feigned by him, are not proper differences, but certain species of being; for they are resolvable into the concept of being, quidditative and univocal to them, and into some ultimate difference which does not include being; nothing, therefore, will be lacking there for the constitution and composition of a species.

11. Fourthly, these intrinsic modes are unequal in entitative perfection; therefore they are beings. The antecedent is evident, because substance is more perfect than accident, and not by reason of that in which they agree; therefore by reason of that in which they differ; therefore by reason of its own proper intrinsic mode. Which is also self-evident; for substance is more perfect for this reason, that it is per se, whereas accident is in another; therefore the very mode of being per se is more perfect than the mode of existing in another; therefore each has some perfection; therefore entity, for perfection cannot be conceived without real entity; for either they are the same, or perfection supposes entity and is its property. Whence a new argument or confirmation can be made; for in these modes (and the same holds of all differences) the attributes of being are found; for they are something, for they are not nothing; and one, for each mode is undivided in itself and distinct from every other; and good, because they have their definite perfection and appetibility; and true, because they are not feigned and are intelligible per se. Finally, the mode by which substance is constituted must be in some way substance; for, as Aristotle said, Physics I, c. 6, substance is not constituted from non-substances; and the same holds proportionally of the mode of accident; but what is substance is also being; therefore.

12. An explanation of the opinion of Scotus which could be feigned.—Hence, however, someone can take occasion to explain the opinion of Scotus, or certainly to introduce another new one. For the difference or mode constituting substance is not complete substance, but incomplete; for by this reason substance, which is the most general of the predicament of substance, can have differences in which it is not included, because that genus is only complete substance, whereas the difference is only incomplete substance; in this manner, then, it can be said that the being which is determined to the being of substance, quantity and the others which are placed in the straight lines of the predicaments is only complete being, and therefore is not included in the intrinsic modes by which it is determined, nor even in the differences, which are also incomplete beings; and in this sense all the reasons given do not proceed against this opinion, because it is not denied that differences and modes are in some way beings, but only that they are complete beings, which has no absurdity.

13. It is shown to be foreign to the mind of Scotus and false.—But this exposition neither is according to the mind of Scotus, nor is true in itself. The first is evident, because Scotus specially denies that being is included in the ultimate differences, but concedes that it is included in the non-ultimate ones; he is not speaking, therefore, of complete being, because in this way no difference is complete being. Next, Scotus speaks of the most universal concept of real being which our mind can abstract, as is manifestly evident from the places cited; but complete being explained in the aforesaid way is not the most universal concept of being, for, since incomplete beings have something of entity, they have some real agreement with complete beings; therefore a more universal notion of being can be conceived, which according to reason prescinds from these. But that that opinion is false in itself is shown by three reasons. The first is only ad hominem, supposing the opinion of Scotus that being is univocal; for then it follows more evidently, according to the aforesaid interpretation, that complete being is one genus common to the ten predicaments, because it has real differences outside its notion, and all the other things required for the notion of a genus, as is evident by applying the reason given above.

14. The second reason is that being most commonly taken, as it is transcendent, and the object of metaphysics or of the intellect, abstracts from complete and incomplete; for all these, as is evident from the mode of signifying, are related by way of addition to being in so far as it is being, in order to the prescission or expression of our concepts. And at least there is no doubt that being can be signified and conceived in this generality, as I was saying a little before; but in this way we are now speaking of being, because as such it is the object of metaphysics; therefore being of this kind is intrinsically included in the differences and intrinsic modes. But if perhaps the authors of the aforesaid opinion say that they are not speaking of being of this kind, but of complete being, first of all they are not speaking to the matter with which we are now dealing. Next they do not escape the difficulty which is chiefly intended to be declared in this whole opinion, namely, how being descends to its inferiors; for, although they say that complete being is contracted to substance through a certain mode which is neither complete being nor altogether nothing, but incomplete being, it remains for them to explain how and through what most common being is determined to the being of complete or incomplete being. For of that which complete being adds over being I shall inquire whether it includes being most commonly taken; for if it does not include it, it will be nothing, and all the arguments given will proceed; but if it includes it, then the difference or mode contracting or dividing includes the very thing divided. Whence of that mode it will remain to be inquired through what it is distinguished from being in common itself, which it includes in itself, and through what it differs from other beings, and so this explanation will fall into the difficulties which Scotus intends to avoid.

15. The third reason, and the most proper, is that that concept of complete being common to the ten predicaments, as they are constituted in straight lines, and not to other things, is impossible, because incomplete substances, which are not placed directly in the predicament of substance, are more perfect beings than accidents, which are placed directly in the predicament of accident. Which is evident, whether we consider incomplete substances physically or metaphysically, for prime matter is more perfect, and has more of entity, than quantity, and substantial form more than quality. Similarly rationality, as it is a substantial difference, is something more perfect than any accident whatever; therefore being, as it is common to substance and accidents, is much more common to incomplete substances, and consequently to everything which under any notion whatever includes entity, for this agreement alone can be considered between substance and accident. Whence that concept of complete being, if it is the concept of being which is per se one, can only be the concept of substance.

Resolution of the question

16. It must be said, therefore, that being in so far as it is being is intrinsically included in every being, and in every concept of a positive difference or mode of real being. So St. Thomas teaches, Contra Gentiles I, c. 25, and De veritate, q. 21,¹ a. 1, and indicates it in Quodlibet II, a. 3, and I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 3, ad 1; q. 5, a. 1; and the Thomists teach it, Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 1; Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 14; Soto, on the Antepraedicamenta, c. 4. Fonseca holds the same, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 3, and it is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 10, whom I cited above. And, the things which have been said against Scotus being supposed, it is sufficiently proved by induction; because, if we speak physically of things, the notion of being is included in all substances and all their parts, and in all accidents and all real positive modes; for all these have in some way a true essence, that is, not feigned nor imaginary, but real, apt to exist outside nothing. But if things are considered metaphysically, being is included in all genera and species and individuals without controversy, and it has been shown by us that it is included also in the differences and in the positive intrinsic modes; but besides these there is nothing in things.

17. An objection is answered.—You will say that the attributes of being are besides all these, of which nothing has been said. The answer is: concerning these attributes it is placed in controversy whether they formally express something positive distinct from the nature of the thing from being, or only something negative or a being of reason. If, therefore, this latter is true, it must consequently be said that those attributes do not formally include being, and that this is not against the conclusion, because those attributes do not formally express differences or modes really determining or affecting being. But if the former opinion is true, it must consequently be asserted that these attributes in their formal concept include being, on account of the same reasons adduced above, and that these attributes are contained under the enumeration made, because they express real modes of being adequate to it or convertible with it; but which of these opinions is truer will be treated in the following disputation. But the a priori² reason of the conclusion has also already been touched upon, and is taken from the notion of being explained above, which is to have a real essence, in which it is not included that that essence be perfect or imperfect, integral or partial, but only that it be real; but this must necessarily be included in all things and real modes or differences. A posteriori, however, the general reason is also that in all these there is always found some real effect or quasi-effect, which cannot be understood without the inclusion of some entity; for they constitute, complete or integrate and distinguish real being, so that even that mode by which, in our manner of understanding, being in common is determined to God or uncreated being is conceived as constituting such a being; whence it cannot be conceived except under the notion of some entity. Likewise differences or modes of this kind are wont to be the roots of real properties or actions; therefore.

18. To the first foundation of Scotus the answer is that one difference, however ultimate, can be diverse from another even if it agrees with it in the common notion of being, as all teach of the first most general genera, which on this account are said not properly to differ, but to be primarily diverse, because otherwise they would not be supreme genera, but contained under another superior one, especially if the univocation of being is posited, which Scotus posits; but how this is to be understood will be declared in the following section. To the second the answer is, first of all, that that proportion between physical and metaphysical composition is not necessary; otherwise, just as of every form it is true that it includes nothing of matter, and of matter that it includes no form, so of every genus or determinable concept it would have to be verified that it includes no difference, and conversely of every difference that it does not include being, which is the first determinable. Secondly it is said that that proportion can be kept between metaphysical and physical composition as long as one stops at them, and it holds in this, that neither does the genus include the difference, nor the difference the genus, as neither matter includes form, nor form matter; but if, by resolving metaphysical composition, one arrives at simple concepts not composed of genus and difference, then in them, with respect to the superior transcendental predicates, the aforesaid proportion need not be kept, because in them that mode of determination is no longer found, but another, now to be explained.