Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Explanation of the question.—This question can seem common to all superior grades or concepts with respect to their inferiors, of which we must treat in Disp. V, sect. 1, and Disp. VI, sect. 2. But here it has a special difficulty on account of the transcendence of being, and therefore it must be briefly dispatched here, supposing that, besides the perfect real distinction which intervenes between entities mutually separable, another lesser one can be found in things before the intellect, such as is wont to be between a thing and a mode of the thing, as we shall say more fully below. Here, then, we suppose as certain that the notion of being is not really distinguished in the former way from the inferiors in which it exists, which is self-evident in every common predicate, and will be evident a fortiori from what is to be said.¹ We inquire, however, whether to be such or such being adds some mode distinct from the nature of the thing and before the intellect from being itself, so that being, and such being, for example substance, are distinguished from the nature of the thing in their formal notion, in so far as substance adds some mode which being does not express.

Arguments for the affirmative part

2. The first.—It seems from what has been said to follow that this should be affirmed. First, because the notion of being is the same in the thing as is conceived in the mind; but as conceived in the mind it does not include the mode of substance or accident; therefore neither in the thing itself; but the notions of substance or accident include their modes; therefore the notion of being in the thing is distinct from them. The major (for all the rest are known) is proved, because we do not say that the notion of being is in the thing in the same way in which it is conceived, as regards, namely, the mode which it has from the prescission of the one conceiving; but we say that that notion conceived is the same as is in the thing; and this seems self-evident, because the intellect in this concept does not feign the thing or the notion conceived; therefore it conceives the same one which is in the thing.

3. The second.—Secondly, things which are separable in reality are in some way distinct in reality, because these two include negations of the same notion, or equivalent ones, especially in finite things; but the notion of being is separable in reality from the notion of substance, for it is preserved in accident, and conversely it is separable from the notion of accident, because it is preserved in substance alone; therefore it is in some way distinct in reality from them. You will say that the notion of being which is in substance is not separable from it, nor that which is in accident from it, and therefore a distinction from the nature of the thing between them is not necessary. But on the contrary, for the aforesaid mode of separation suffices for a distinction from the nature of the thing, namely, that somewhere one notion can be found without another; because, if in the thing they are altogether the same, it does not seem intelligible, especially in finite things, that they should not always accompany each other, because things which are altogether the same in reality are the same everywhere; but in accident, for example, the notion of being and the notion of substance are not the same; therefore neither are they the same according to themselves and absolutely.

4. The third.—Which is declared thirdly in this way, because substance in reality is not substance by the same thing by which it is being (and the same holds of accident); therefore there is some distinction from the nature of the thing between the objective concept of being and of substance, even as they are in the thing in substance itself. The antecedent is evident, because substance is being by the same thing by which accident is, for in the notion of being they are one; therefore substance is not substance by that by which it is being, otherwise whatever was constituted in the notion of being by that reason would also be constituted in the notion of substance. But the first consequence is proved, because a distinction from the nature of the thing is excellently gathered from distinct formal or constitutive effects; since, therefore, something other is constituted by the notion of substance than by the notion of being as such, it is necessary that in the thing they have some distinction.

5. The fourth.—Fourthly, it is wont to be judged a difficult argument that it seems impossible that the same thing according to the same should agree with another and differ from it; but substance in reality and before any intellect agrees with, or is similar to, accident in the notion of being, but differs from it, or is dissimilar, in the notion of substance; therefore these two are distinguished from the nature of the thing in some way in substance itself; otherwise according to altogether the same it would be similar and dissimilar to accident. That this is impossible is proved because these two include a contradiction, for agreement and likeness express some notion of unity; for likeness is founded in unity, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics V; but dissimilitude rather expresses a notion of multitude. And the contradiction is confirmed and explained; because, if in substance the notion of substance and of being is altogether the same, then whatever is of the essence of substance is of the essence of being, and conversely; otherwise they would differ essentially, for when anything whatever is added or taken away the essence is changed; but if they differ essentially, then in the thing itself they have some distinction, for the essential notion consists in the thing itself. But if whatever is of the essence of substance is of the essence of being, it follows both that the notion of substance is found in accident, with which it agrees in the notion of being, and that it is not found, because in truth accident is not substance, but dissimilar to it. It follows also that substance is similar to accident in the notion of being, because this is supposed, and not similar, because the notion of being in substance is not of the same mode as the notion of being in accident. And consequently it also follows that the notion of being is affirmed of accident on account of its agreement with substance, and can be denied on account of the disagreement which it is said to have in the same notion. Finally, agreement and disagreement express essentially diverse relations; therefore they require in the thing essentially diverse foundations and reasons of founding or terminating.

6. On account of these and similar arguments some think that being expresses an objective concept distinct from the nature of the thing and prescinded from all its inferiors and from the concepts, however simple, contained under it, such as substance, accident and the like; and this is commonly judged to be the opinion of Scotus, In I, dist. 3, qq. 1 and 3, and dist. 8, q. 2, and In II, dist. 3, q. 1; and the Scotists follow it, who a fortiori think the same of all universal predicates, of which more fully below.

The true opinion

7. Nevertheless it must be said that the objective concept of being, as it exists in the thing itself, is not something distinct from the nature of the thing and prescinded from the inferiors in which it exists. This is the common opinion of the whole School of St. Thomas, which first of all all those necessarily teach who deny that the objective concept of being is prescinded in reason, as Soncinas, Cajetan, Ferrariensis; and Cajetan specially declared it in the said opusc. De ente et essentia, c. 1, q. 2; and Fonseca holds the same, in the place cited, although he seems to think otherwise about the distinction between superior and inferior essential predicates, Metaphysics II, c. 2, text 11, and elsewhere, of which below in its place. The same also a fortiori all hold who deny that the genus is distinguished from the nature of the thing from its species, or the species from its individuals, as Gregory, In I, dist. 8, qq. 2 and 3; Capreolus, q. 4, a. 3, in the answer to the arguments against the second conclusion; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 36; Soto, on the Logic, q. 3, a. 26.² Capreolus specially holds the same opinion, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, in the answer to Scotus’s arguments against the last conclusion. And it is the open opinion of St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, c. 26, fourth argument; indeed Scotus too, Metaphysics X, text 3, seems to hold this opinion; for he constitutes a difference between being and one; for being (he says) predicates the same nature really and formally of the genera of which it is predicated quidditatively; but one, although it predicates the same nature really, does not predicate it formally, because one expresses an attribute, not an essence. Although perhaps Scotus spoke there in another sense, namely that being expresses the essence of all the genera, yet not the whole, whereas one is altogether outside the essence. And this opinion is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, last chapter, text 16, where he says that being itself is determined by itself, without anything added, to substance, quantity, quality, and therefore is not placed in definitions, because it does not express a determinate nature contractible through some difference. And so the Commentator, St. Thomas, and Alexander of Hales explained it there; but Scotus explains that Aristotle excludes differences really distinct, but not formally distinct. But this is both openly against the mind of Aristotle and is not said consistently even by Scotus himself, because the inferior genera too are not really distinguished from their differences, but at most formally, according to the doctrine of the same Scotus; therefore Aristotle excludes this distinction and composition too in the determination of being to its inferiors.

8. The first reason.—It is proved by reason, first. If being and substance are distinguished from the nature of the thing, they are related either as whole and part, or as including and included, or as altogether co-distinct. This latter no one says, nor can it be apprehended; otherwise substance, taken precisely and formally as co-distinct from being, would not include being, which is impossible, since it is of the essential concept of substance to be being simply. But that the first too cannot be said is proved, for if being and substance are distinguished in that way, substance can be resolved into two concepts distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore in any singular substance there is that distinction from the nature of the thing which precedes the intellect, and must be in the singular things themselves; those two concepts, therefore, will be distinguished not only as they are apprehended by us, but also in the thing itself. But that this is impossible can be shown on the side of each concept; first on the side of the concept of being itself, for if in the thing itself it prescinds and is distinguished from the mode contracting it to the being of substance, I ask what kind of being is that which is understood to remain when that mode is prescinded. For either it is common being, abstracted from all singularity, or being determined to singular being. The first is evidently false, both because otherwise there would be in the thing itself a universal thing, universally, which is repugnant, because that being is existing and produced in reality; therefore it is intrinsically determined and singular; and also because it is incommunicable to another besides this substance, if we speak in the individual. The second, therefore, must necessarily be said, and then I ask whether in being so prescinded from the mode of substance there is some distinction from the nature of the thing between the common notion of being and such being, or not; for if there is a distinction, the same argument returns; for it will be necessary to resolve that concept into two, and so proceed to infinity; but if there is no distinction, then, in order that the common notion of being be determined to such being, it is not necessary to feign a distinction from the nature of the thing between them; therefore neither in order that being be determined to substance; for the reason is the same, and all the arguments made at the beginning can be applied to that concept of being which is said to be prescinded from substance as it really exists in it, and must necessarily be solved in it, and so no foundation will remain for feigning such a distinction. Besides, a real and singular entity can scarcely be conceived by the mind which nevertheless, in its intrinsic and essential notion, most formally does not include the notion of substance or accident.

9. Next, the same can be shown on the side of the other concept, or mode contracting being; for I inquire whether being is intrinsically included in it or not; if it is not included, it is nothing; substance, therefore, adds nothing over being, nor can that effect a distinction between being and substance; indeed, neither can it determine or contract being or constitute substance; for how will that which is nothing accomplish all these things? But if it is included, then that mode too includes the whole concept of substance, and of it the question returns whether it is distinguished from the nature of the thing from being or not; for if it is not distinguished, the same can be said of substance; but if it is distinguished, it will be necessary to resolve it into two other concepts distinct from the nature of the thing, and so proceed to infinity. It could be answered to this argument by denying the two-membered partition posited at the beginning, namely, that being is distinguished from substance as part from part, or as part from whole, but rather as a simple common concept from a simple particular concept, so that the common is included in the particular, although not conversely. But although this answer perhaps takes something true, as we shall expound more fully below, nevertheless it manifestly follows from it that there cannot be a distinction from the nature of the thing between the concept of being, as it really exists in its inferiors, and those inferiors. For if the inferior concept, for example of substance, is simple, so that it cannot be resolved into two concepts distinct among themselves from the nature of the thing, how can it be understood that there is in it a distinction from the nature of the thing between it and something included in it? This very thing, therefore, sufficiently declares that this mode of distinction is not actually in the things themselves, but only as in its foundation, and is completed through the prescission of reason.

10. The second reason.—Secondly, the concept of being is prescinded not only from creatures, but also from God; but in God the concept of being as such is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the concept of such being, namely uncreated or infinite; therefore neither in the other beings. The major is evident from what has been said, and the minor too is certain, both from the supreme simplicity of God, for if there were in him any distinction from the nature of the thing, he would not be supremely simple; and also because otherwise there would be in things some real notion distinct from the nature of the thing from all others, of itself and by its nature prior to God as he is God, namely that notion of being which in God would be distinct from the notion of God; but this is impossible, because God as God is essentially the first being in duration, in perfection and in nature. Finally, because that very notion of being which is in God essentially has the divine properties, such as to be independent and uncreated; whence also according to that notion of being as it is in the thing God is infinitely distant from creatures. By which arguments Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, q. 2, contends to prove that being does not express a prescinded objective concept; but they prove it of prescission according to the thing, not of prescission according to reason. But the first consequence of the argument is proved, because, although the concepts inferior to being in creatures are not as simple as the concept of God, and therefore their reason can seem unlike, nevertheless in the present matter it is the same; both because, if the reasons made at the beginning showed a distinction from the nature of the thing between being and its inferiors, they would show altogether the same in God, for they can be applied in the same way, as will be evident in the solutions; and also because with respect to being as such the inferior concepts of creatures too are simple, and in them no reality can be understood prior in nature to the proper entity of each according to its determinate notion. For how can it be conceived that in substance there is really or from the nature of the thing some entity prior under the notion of being than under the notion of substance?

11. The third reason.—Finally I argue: because the mere distinction of our concepts, by which we conceive something after the manner of common and particular, does not sufficiently indicate a distinction from the nature of the thing in the thing conceived; therefore neither does it indicate it in the concept of being with respect to its inferiors; therefore there is no such distinction. This second consequence is evident, because no other indication or vestige of such a distinction can be thought out, which is not to be asserted not only without a sufficient, but also without a compelling reason, because, speaking universally, distinctions are not to be multiplied without cause, and especially and specially this one, which can scarcely be conceived by the mind. But the first consequence is evident, because there is no greater reason concerning the common and particular concept in being than in the others; indeed in being, on account of its transcendence, there is less reason for distinction. But the first antecedent is evident first of all in divine things alone, for the concept of divine person is common to the three divine persons, which agree in that common notion and are distinguished in their proper ones, and yet in each of them the notion of person and the notion of such a person are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, but by reason only. Next it is evident also in notions common to God and creatures, as has almost already been explained in the notion of being as it exists in God. And it can also be declared in the notion of wisdom, for example, in which created and uncreated wisdom agree in some way, and yet neither in uncreated wisdom are the common notion of wisdom and the proper notion of such wisdom distinguished from the nature of the thing, on account of its supreme simplicity and perfection; nor can those two notions be distinguished from the nature of the thing in created wisdom, because, however much you prescind the notion of wisdom, if you consider it existing in the thing in created wisdom, you will understand it as intrinsically created, and consequently in the thing itself undistinguished, and in no way prescinded from the nature of the thing from that mode by which it is determined to the being of created wisdom; otherwise it would be necessary to understand in created wisdom some real notion of wisdom which not only according to reason but also according to the thing would abstract from the notion of created and uncreated, which is both most absurd and cannot be conceived by the mind, because whatever there is of entity in created wisdom is made and dependent. Finally, the same can be shown in notions common to created things alone, which we shall do at length below in disputing about universals; now it is briefly declared, because from the subtlety and mode of conceiving of the human intellect these superior and inferior concepts can be varied and multiplied in infinite ways; it is therefore a sign that this is not always founded in a distinction which is in the things, but in our mode of conceiving, some foundation of likeness, agreement or eminence of the things themselves being supposed; otherwise it would be necessary to feign in each thing infinite modes distinct from the nature of the thing, by which it would be fully constituted in itself and fully distinguished from others. Which is declared by one or another example, for the common sense, for example, has the power of perceiving the objects of all the external senses; therefore there can be abstracted a concept common to sight and the interior sense, namely of a sense perceptive of colour, and another common to hearing and the common sense, namely of a sense perceptive of sound, and so of the others. But who would say that in the common sense the power of perceiving colour or sound is distinguished from the nature of the thing between themselves, or that the power of sensing in common is distinguished in that sense from the proper power and mode by which it attains its objects, and not rather that there is there one simple power which attains all those objects, which the intellect, conceiving inadequately, compares with other things, and so abstracts common concepts, distinct not in the thing but in reason? The same holds in the light of the sun, in so far as it has both the power of illuminating, in which it agrees with the brightness of fire, and of heating, in which it agrees with heat, and of drying, in which it agrees with dryness; and from all these the intellect can abstract various concepts, all of which it is frivolous and without foundation to think distinct from the nature of the thing in the light.

Solutions of the arguments

12. The first is answered.—To the arguments posited at the beginning, then, the answer is, first in general, that in all of them there is a great equivocation, arguing from the objective notion as prescinded by the intellect to it as it is in the thing, and attributing to the things themselves what belongs only by extrinsic denomination to the notions conceived and prescinded, as they are under such a consideration and prescission of the intellect. And this is most of all to be considered in all these argumentations, which are founded only on the mode of speaking and conceiving. For as we conceive, so we speak; whence, just as our concepts, even if they are true and not false, are nevertheless not always adequate to the things themselves, so also words are commensurate with our concepts; and therefore we must beware lest we transfer our mode of conceiving to the things themselves, and on account of a diverse mode of speaking think that there is a distinction in the things where there truly is none.

13. To the first, then, the answer is by denying the first consequence; for the notion of being is said to be the same in the thing as is in the mind because in truth all beings have in the thing that likeness and agreement under which the intellect conceives them when it conceives being; and because this mode of conceiving being is inadequate with respect to beings as they are in the thing, therefore the notion of being so conceived is said not to include the determinate modes of beings; in which expression the discussion is no longer of the notion of being absolutely and as it is in itself, but as it is under the denomination of the intellect; whence it is the same as if it were said that through that concept being is not considered under the express notions of the inferior beings, but only by a common and inadequate concept; and therefore it is not rightly inferred that in the thing itself too the notion of being as it is in individual beings does not include their proper notions or modes. The major proposition assumed could also be distinguished, namely that the notion of being is the same in the thing as is conceived in the mind; for it is the same really, yet not in reason; and this is enough for it to be able in the thing to include the proper notions of the inferior beings, although as precisely conceived it does not include them; just as divine wisdom is the same in the thing as is conceived in the mind, although as conceived in the mind it is not understood to include justice, which in the thing itself it essentially includes; because that it does not include it as conceived means only that it is not expressly and distinctly considered as including it, by that prescissive concept, not a negative one.

14. To the second.—To the second it was rightly answered there that the notion of being in substance is not separable from substance, and similarly in accident; and hence rather identity and indistinction from the nature of the thing is gathered, because things which are so related in the thing that they neither are really distinguished nor can one be separated from the other, nor conversely, there is no reason why they should be distinguished in the thing itself, unless from elsewhere there is some sufficient principle of distinction, of which none is found in the present case. Whence to the rejoinder the answer is that the notion of being which is found in substance is not found the same according to the thing in accident, nor conversely, but only the same according to reason, that is, according to a certain agreement and likeness which reason can precisely conceive after the manner of one; and for this it is enough that such a notion, which is conceived in this way as common, be distinct according to reason from the proper notions of substance and accident. For what is proper to an infinite thing is only that the same thing in number be communicable to many really distinct things, through perfect identity with each and all of them, although each of them is incommunicable. But that the same thing, which is really simple in itself, that is, not composed of grades distinct from the nature of the thing, should be really incommunicable to another with which it has some likeness and agreement, by reason of which some notion common to both is conceived in them, this does not exceed the perfection of a finite thing; indeed in any thing whatever, however imperfect, something of this kind can be found.

15. To the third.—To the third the answer is, first, that substance in the thing itself is being by the same thing by which it is substance, and conversely, namely through its intrinsic nature and entity which it has in the thing; and the same holds, proportion being kept, in accident. Wherefore in the same sense substance is not being by the same thing by which accident is, nor conversely; for accident is being through accidental entity and in order to substance; but substance is being through substantial entity, absolute in itself from order or relationship to a subject; nor in this way (speaking in the same sense) are accident and substance one in the notion of being, as they are constituted in the thing itself. Secondly it is said that, if we speak not according to the thing, but according to prescinding reason, then substance is not substance by the same thing by which it is being—by the same thing (I say) according to reason; but from this sense it can only be concluded that the notion of being and of substance are distinguished by reason in substance itself, and similarly the notion of being and of accident in accident. And in the same way substance and accident can only be said to be constituted by the same thing in the notion of being in the way in which they are one in that concept, namely according to reason. Whence it can only be concluded that that notion common to both is distinguished from their proper ones through the prescission of the intellect.

16. How the same entity can agree and differ through the same most simple notion.—To the fourth: it seems impossible to some that the same thing according to the thing, without any distinction from the nature of the thing which it has in itself, should be the principle or foundation of agreement and distinction from another, on account of the argument given. Others, however, think that this is indeed repugnant in univocal agreement, but not in analogous, which would be enough for us. I, however, think that even in univocal agreement it is not repugnant, as is evident from examples, both in divine and in created things. For the Father and the Son agree univocally in the notion of person; for who will deny that there is some unity and agreement there, or affirm that it is analogous, since in the notion of person one is as perfect as the other? And yet in the individual persons no distinction from the nature of the thing can be feigned between the foundation of distinction and of agreement. For the same paternity, most simple in itself in its relative entity, is really distinguished from filiation and agrees with it in the common notion of relation or personality; and it is similar as it were generically and dissimilar as it were specifically, although in it these grades or concepts are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. In creatures, quantity and quality (as is probable) agree univocally in the notion of accident, and yet in each of them the notion of accident is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the proper one, as will be said more fully below; and I think the same is the case with all species with respect to their individuals, as will be said in its place. The reason, however, is that if distinction and agreement are of diverse orders, it is not repugnant that they be founded in the same thing; for thus one does not involve the negation of the other, indeed in a certain way it requires it. And so it is in the present case; for the distinction is real, but the agreement according to reason only, and therefore it is not repugnant that two simple things which are really primarily diverse according to the thing should according to reason have a unity founded in the real likeness or agreement which they have among themselves. For things which are diverse in the thing can be similar in that very thing in which they are distinguished; indeed likeness intrinsically demands distinction according to the thing with some unity of reason, or formal, or fundamental unity, for the same thing is not properly similar to itself. But if this agreement or likeness is imperfect, such as it is in the analogy of being and the like, it is more easily understood how things, however primarily diverse among themselves, can nevertheless have some imperfect agreement; for they are not called primarily diverse because they are in no way similar among themselves—for this it is not necessary to find in any real things or notions—but because they are primarily distinguished by themselves; with which distinction the aforesaid imperfect agreement stands. An example of this matter is in God, in whom no distinction of grades from the nature of the thing can be thought out; whence that most simple nature by itself is altogether distinct from created nature, and yet at the same time is the principle of some analogous agreement in a certain respect with the same; these two, therefore, are not repugnant.

17. To the last confirmation the answer is evident from what has been said. For it has already been said that the notion of substance and of being in substance is altogether the same according to the thing, yet differs by reason, and by the prior consideration has in substance the same essential notion, yet diverse by reason; and the same holds of the notion of being and of accident as they are found in accident; but conversely accident and substance compared among themselves are said to have in the notion of being the same essential notion according to reason only, not according to the thing; and in all the inferences made in that confirmation an equivocation is committed, by not distinguishing the diverse notions and modes of agreement and distinction.