Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The first reason for doubting.—The reason for doubting is twofold. The first was touched upon in the preceding section, and is founded on the analogy of being; because, if its objective concept is one, it is either by the unity of univocation, and so analogy is taken away, or by an analogous unity only, and so either it is not in truth one, or there is a contradiction in terms, because analogy intrinsically includes either several notions having only a proportion among themselves, or several relationships to one form, by reason of which the objective concept of an analogous name cannot be one. Which is declared and confirmed, because in order that being have one objective concept, it is necessary that all beings agree in one formal notion of being, which is immediately signified by the name being, because the unity of an objective concept requires the unity of a thing, or at least of a formal notion; but if all beings agree in one formal notion, then as such they have one and the same definition, as well as one objective concept; because, if the objective concept is one, its definition too can be one; therefore nothing is lacking to being for perfect univocation.

2. The second.—The second reason for doubting is that, if the objective concept of being is one, then according to itself it is prescinded and abstracted from all its inferiors, or the determinate notions of beings; the consequent is impossible; therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is evident, because, if the concept of being is one, then formally and actually it does not include in itself the determinate modes of beings; for these are intrinsically opposed and effect distinction; whence it is impossible that they should be actually included in one objective concept; therefore, in order that the concept of being be one, it is necessary that it prescind from all these; but that this is impossible I show thus: because, if being as such prescinds from the determinate notions of beings, then, in order that it be contracted or determined to them, it is necessary that something be added to it; therefore what is added is either being or nothing; if nothing, how can it really determine being and constitute some proper notion of being? But if it is being, then being as such cannot be prescinded from it, for what is prescinded from another is not included in it. For it cannot be understood that being is prescinded from the modes by which it is contracted, and that it is nevertheless intrinsically included in them; nor, conversely, that the mode contracting being includes nothing but being, and yet determines it to a special notion of being. For contraction and determination are not understood without addition; but addition cannot be understood unless what is added is such that it does not include that to which it is added, either according to the thing or according to reason, according to the mode in which it is understood to be added. And it is confirmed, for on this account Aristotle said, Metaphysics III, text 10, that the genus is outside the notion of the differences, namely because it abstracts and prescinds from them; therefore, if the objective concept of being is prescinded and one, it is necessary that it not be included in the contracting ones.

3. The reason of the difficulty on the contrary side.—But on the contrary is the fact that to one formal concept one objective concept necessarily corresponds; but it has been shown that there is one formal concept of being; therefore one objective concept must necessarily be granted. The major is evident, because the formal concept has its whole notion and unity from the object; therefore, in order to be one, it is necessary that it tend to an object in some way one; but the objective concept is nothing other than the object itself as known or apprehended through such a formal concept; therefore, if the formal concept is one, it is necessary that the objective concept also be one.

Various opinions are reported

4. The first opinion.—In this question, those who deny that there is one formal concept of being consequently also deny that there is an objective one.¹ And so thinks Cajetan, in the places cited in the preceding section, in the first opinion; and Ferrariensis, in the place cited. But of those who admit one formal concept of being, Soncinas denies one objective concept, Metaphysics IV, qq. 2 and 3; and Hispalensis, In I, dist. 3, q. 1; Hervaeus and Flandria, in the places cited in the preceding section. It is also attributed to Capreolus, but in truth he does not teach it, as I shall say below. St. Thomas too is cited for this opinion, I, q. 13, a. 5; De potentia, q. 7, a. 7; De veritate, q. 2, a. 11; in which places he indicates that to words which are common to God and creatures there corresponds not one notion conceived or signified, but several. The foundations of this opinion were touched upon at the beginning; for although many arguments are brought forward by these authors, the force of all of them is placed in the two difficulties touched upon. The aforesaid authors do not agree, however, in explaining the concept, or rather the objective concepts, which correspond to being. For some say that through the formal concept of being all the genera of beings are immediately represented, in so far as they have some proportion or relationship among themselves, as Ferrariensis; and Cajetan thinks the same. Others say that through the formal concept of being this disjunct is immediately represented, substance or accident, as Soncinas, Hervaeus and others. Again, others say that all the genera or notions, or simple concepts, are represented absolutely, not copulatively nor disjunctively, but² simply, as Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 2, sects. 4 and 7.

5. The second opinion.—The second opinion, altogether contrary, is that there is an objective concept of being simply one. Scotus holds this, In I, dist. 3, q. 1, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1, and In II, dist. 3, qq. 3 and 6; Javellus, Metaphysics IV, q. 1; Soto, on the Categories, c. 4, q. 1; and Capreolus is of the same opinion, In I, dist. 2, q. 1. There is, however, a diversity among these authors, for Scotus posits this concept as prescinded from the nature of the thing from the inferior natures and the modes contracting being. Others, however, posit this unity of the objective concept only from our mode of conceiving, without prescission and distinction which would be in the things; of which diversity of opinions we shall speak in the following section. But of the other difference, which also exists among these authors as regards univocation or analogy, we shall speak below.

6. The third opinion, intermediate between the aforesaid, uses a distinction, and is explained in various ways. For some say that the objective concept of being, taken in itself and absolutely without its inferiors, is one, and prescinded from them in reason; but that, compared to its inferiors and as included in them, it is not one; and so they reconcile the reasons for doubting adduced at the beginning; for, because through the formal concept of being being is conceived according to itself and without any comparison to its inferiors, it is necessary that at least under this consideration that objective concept have unity. But when this concept is considered as existing in the inferiors themselves, it cannot have unity; for the inferiors themselves, for example substance and accident, differ by that very thing by which they are beings; therefore they cannot have unity in it as such, because they cannot agree and differ according to the same thing; and the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning also confirm this latter part. Otherwise Fonseca, above, supposing that distinction of the confused, distinct and intermediate concept, or partly confused and partly distinct, says of this third concept that it can indeed be one, but not prescinded from its inferiors, but that it is the concept of, for example, substance; and of the distinct concept he similarly says that it is not one adequate to being, except perhaps in God, but in us includes the concept of substance, quality, etc. But, as I said, these are in truth not concepts of being as such. Finally, of the confused concept of being, which bears on the matter, he says that it is in a certain way one and prescinded, yet not simply but in a certain respect; that it is indeed in some way prescinded, because it does not expressly and determinately contain what is proper to the inferior members; but that it is not simply prescinded, even according to reason, lest it follow that it is univocal. He declares, however, that this prescission is in a certain respect and not simply, because this confused concept of being so excludes the things which are proper to substance and the other simple entities that its essence is nevertheless not other than the essence of such entities.

7. But these distinctions, as I touched upon in the preceding section, do not seem to me to serve for explaining the matter; but the more they are multiplied, the more the matter seems to be obscured and confused. Omitting, then, the distinct or particular concepts of substance and of the other genera or members dividing being in common, we deal here only with that objective concept which immediately and adequately corresponds to that formal concept which we said in the preceding section corresponds in the mind to this word being and to the thing immediately signified by it; for the other particular concepts, taken according to themselves, are not concepts of being in so far as it is being, but as they are such or such beings.

The former assertion

8. There is one objective notion of being.—I say, therefore, first, that to the formal concept of being there corresponds one adequate and immediate objective concept, which does not expressly signify substance, nor accident, nor God, nor creature, but all these after the manner of one, namely in so far as they are in some way similar among themselves and agree in being. In this conclusion the authors of the second opinion agree, and Fonseca does not dissent, and St. Thomas very much favours it, in the places cited above, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1, in so far as he says that the concept of being is most simple and the first of all, and is determined to substance, quantity, etc., through a certain determination and expression of such a mode of being, where it is necessary that the discussion be of the objective concept; for the formal is not determined nor contracted. Whence more openly, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1, St. Thomas says: Substance, quantity and quality contract being, by applying being to some quiddity or nature; but contraction cannot be understood without some unity and community of the objective concept. And in the same way Aristotle favours this opinion, Metaphysics IV, text 7, where he says that metaphysics considers being in so far as it is being, under which the other genera are contained; where St. Thomas says that first philosophy considers common being and the things which belong to it as such. By reason this opinion can be proved thus. It is necessary that the formal concept of being have some adequate object; but that is not an aggregate of various natures of beings according to some determinate notions of them, however simple; therefore it is necessary that that concept be one according to some agreement and likeness of beings among themselves. The consequence is evident from a sufficient enumeration, because we suppose (what is self-evident) that that objective concept is not one by real unity, that is, numerical or entitative; for it is evident that this concept is common to many things. The major assumed is likewise evident, because that formal concept is an act of the intellect; but every act of the intellect, as every act, in so far as it is one, must have some adequate object from which it has its unity. But the minor is proved, because, if that adequate object is from an aggregation of several natures of being, I ask what these natures are, and how they are aggregated in that concept; for this can in no way be conceived and understood. Which will also be evident by excluding all the modes in which this has been asserted, or can be thought out.

9. Being does not immediately signify substance and accident.—For, first, what Soncinas says, that that concept consists of substance and accident as such, is plainly false; for either those two are included in that concept copulatively, and this he does not say, nor can he say it; otherwise it would falsely be said that substance is being, or that quality is being, because neither is substance substance and accident, nor is quality, and so of the others. Or those two are included disjunctively, as Soncinas himself says; and this, besides being against experience, as I shall say immediately, implies the univocation of being, which he himself intends to avoid; for this disjunct, substance or accident, belongs as truly, simply and equally primarily to accident as to substance; because, just as for the truth of a disjunctive proposition the truth of one part suffices, so for a disjunct predicate to be predicated equally primarily and simply it suffices that one part of it belong equally primarily and simply to the subject; but accident is as truly and as properly accident as substance is substance; therefore that disjunct belongs as truly and properly to accident by reason of one part as to substance by reason of the other. Which can be seen in all similar predicates; for to be God or creature, for example, is said as truly and properly of man as of God, and so of others. Or finally those two are included simply, that is, without conjunction or disjunction, namely substance accident. And this is first of all against experience, because what is conceived is perceived by the mind, and in this way falls under experience; but we, on hearing the name of being, and conceiving precisely what we understand to be signified by this word, do not perceive with the mind substance as such nor accident as such, as anyone can experience in himself.

10. Next, that formal concept is simple and limited, and in reality prescinded from the proper formal concepts of substance and accident as they are such; therefore through it substance and accident are not represented properly and distinctly, as they are represented through the two concepts of substance and accident. For it cannot be said that that one concept of being contains in a more eminent mode that whole formal representation which is in those two concepts taken together; for this mode of universality in a formal concept is foreign to the human intellect, of which we are treating, and is scarcely found in the angelic; that concept, therefore, is not universal through the eminent representation of many as they are many, but through the confusion of many as they are in some way one. But if through that concept substance and accident are not represented as properly and distinctly as through the two proper concepts of substance and accident, no medium is understood as to how they could be represented according to what is proper to them, but only as they are in some way similar among themselves; therefore that concept does not consist of substance and accident represented even in the said mode absolutely and simply.

11. Add moreover that according to such a concept it is scarcely understood what is definitely predicated of something when it is said to be being; for what is predicated is the objective concept; if, therefore, that concept is this whole, substance accident, this predication, this is, is equivalent to this: this is substance accident; but a predication of this kind cannot be made determinately, or truly, or falsely, unless each part of the predicate is understood to be predicated copulatively or disjunctively, since those two parts are not joined after the manner of substantive and adjective so as to be predicated after the manner of one; although, even if it were done in this way, the sense would return copulative, and a false proposition would result. Again, against this whole opinion there is added that, if each of these, substance and accident, is found in that concept in any of the aforesaid modes, I inquire further what concept of substance is included there; for substance there is taken either for created substance, or for uncreated, or for some objective concept common to both. The first and second cannot be said, because being, of which we are now speaking, is common to created and uncreated being, as we said above that it is the object of this science; but if the third is said, an argument ad hominem arises thence against the aforesaid authors; both because substance is something analogous to uncreated and created substance; therefore if, notwithstanding the analogy, there is one objective concept common to created and uncreated substance, there will also be able to be a concept of being. And also because created substance is more distant from uncreated than accident from created substance; it would be necessary, therefore, speaking consistently, to add something to that concept, saying that it consists of the determinate notion of created substance and of accident, which is nevertheless incredible in itself, and can be attacked more efficaciously by the arguments given. And there still remains a similar argument on the side of the other member, namely accident; for this too, according to the aforesaid authors, is analogous, and at least with respect to some accidents it is perhaps true, as I shall say below; I shall inquire, then, similarly, whether accident enters the concept of being according to some common concept, or (so to speak) according to part of an objective concept common to all accidents; and against each the arguments given can be applied, and finally it can be concluded that this member too must be divided into several others.

12. The concept of being does not include all the first genera.—For this cause, then, perhaps, others have said that the adequate object of that formal concept of being is, or includes, all the first genera, or all the simple entities which proximately divide being. But against this opinion the former arguments proceed in the same way. First, because such natures can be included in such a concept neither copulatively, nor disjunctively, nor simply and without any copula, as is evident by applying the discourse given in the same way; for it has the same force, as will easily be evident to anyone considering. Second, from experience, because by virtue of the conception of being we do not perceive all these definite natures of being as they are such, and as they are distinguished among themselves; and it would be much more difficult to perceive so many natures than substance and accident only; and it is much more incredible that there should be one formal concept in us which distinctly represents all these natures than substance and accident alone; and if the formal concept of being does not so distinctly represent these natures as they are such, and as they are distinguished among themselves, it is concluded that it represents them only as they agree among themselves, and are in some way similar, which is what is intended. The consequence is evident because, as I declared a little before, between these two no medium can be found in the present case. Third, because by almost the same reason by which this objective concept of being is said to include all the first genera, or all simple entities, it would have to be said to include all entities, however composite, man, lion, etc., according to their proper notions, which no one has said hitherto. The consequence is evident, because, if being includes all the genera, or simple natures, in its concept, it is either because the notion of being as such does not prescind from them according to the thing, or because they add nothing to being which is not being, or because the notion of being is understood according to reason to be immediately determined, or contracted, to those natures. But the first and second of these reasons proceed in the same way in any entity whatever, even in the lowest species; for according to the thing the notion of being no more prescinds from the notion of man or horse, etc., than from the notion of substance and accident; nor does man add to being something which is not being, any more than substance or quantity, etc. But the third reason is not brought forward consistently, because, if being as such does not express one objective notion or concept, there is nothing in being as such, as regards the thing conceived, which can properly be divided, determined or contracted, either immediately or mediately; therefore that reason in no way prevents all entities, whatever they may be, from being included in the concept of being, if some are said to be determinately included; nor can a sufficient reason be assigned for some more than for others.

13. The concept of being does not include substance explicitly and the others implicitly.—Therefore, finally, it can be said otherwise that in the adequate object of the formal concept of being there are included not several determinate and distinct natures of being according to what is proper to them, nor all under some one common nature, but only one determinately and expressly, and the others implicitly and confusedly, for example, the nature of substance as such determinately and expressly, but the natures of accidents implicitly. But this mode too can be attacked no less efficaciously than the preceding ones. First, because I showed above that through the formal concept explicitly and determinately representing substance as substance, accidents are in no way represented, neither implicitly nor confusedly, if we speak properly, as I declared at length in the preceding section. Secondly, here too the argument taken from experience can be urged, from Soto, for we experience that we conceive of some thing that it is being, and doubt whether it is substance or accident; as, for example, of quantity we know evidently that it is a reality; but whether it is substance or accident we either doubt or are in opinion; therefore in that concept of being substance as substance is not included, that is, expressly and according to its proper notion. Thirdly, because otherwise the objective concept of being and the objective concept of substance would be the same; because the objective concept of substance is nothing other than the notion of substance determinately and according to its proper mode conceived by the intellect; but in the same way the notion of substance is said to be conceived through the concept of being. Again, if in the notion of substance so conceived the concepts of accidents are included confusedly or implicitly, whether it is signified by the name of being or by the name of substance, they will be included in the same way; because the notion conceived is the same, and the mode of conceiving it is the same, namely expressly and determinately; the objective concept of substance and of being, therefore, will be the same; but the consequent is plainly false and against the common mode of conceiving; for this predication, substance is substance, is identical, but this one not at all, substance is being; they differ, therefore, not only in names, but also in the objective notions which are predicated. Likewise, otherwise it would be the same to distribute every substance and every being. Likewise this proposition, accident is being, would be as false as this, accident is substance; all of which are plainly false.

14. An a priori proof of the conclusion.—Finally, from the thing itself and as it were a priori, our opinion is proved against all the aforesaid, because all real beings truly have some likeness and agreement in the notion of being; therefore they can be conceived and represented under that precise notion by which they agree among themselves; therefore they can constitute one objective concept under that notion; therefore that is the objective concept of being. The antecedent seems self-evident from the terms; for, just as being and non-being are primarily diverse and opposed, on account of which it is said to be the first principle of all, anything whatever either is or is not, so any being whatever has some agreement and likeness with any being whatever; for the intellect finds a greater agreement between substance and accident than between substance and non-being or nothing; the creature too participates in some way the being of God, and therefore is said at least to be his vestige on account of some agreement and likeness in being; by which reason we investigate the being of God from the being of the creature, and similarly the being of substance from the being of accident. Finally, by this reason we attribute to them some common properties or attributes, such as to have some goodness or perfection, to be able to act or communicate oneself, and the like; there is therefore in the thing itself some agreement and likeness between all real beings. The first consequence too is sufficiently clear of itself, both because all beings are knowable under that notion and agreement; and also because by this reason other things which have some agreement among themselves are conceived under it unitedly and conjointly, more or less in proportion to the greater or lesser agreement; and finally because in the thing there is a sufficient foundation for this mode of conceiving, and in the intellect there is not lacking the power and efficacy for such a mode of conception, for it is supremely abstractive and prescissive of all notions. And hence the second consequence too is easy, because, as we have said, the unity of an objective concept does not consist in real and numerical unity, but in formal or fundamental unity, which is nothing other than the aforesaid agreement and likeness. But the last consequence is evident, the others being presupposed, because, if such an objective concept is possible, it is transcendent, most simple, and in this way the first of all, which are the attributes of the concept of being. Likewise, that agreement is founded in the act of being, which is as it were the formal element in the concept of being; whence the argument is also taken that, just as the objective concept of being itself or existence is one, so also the concept of being. Finally, all things are founded on what we adduced above from St. Thomas, that the analogy of being is not in some form which is intrinsically in one analogate only and extrinsically in the others, but in being or entity, which is intrinsically participated by all; in that notion, therefore, all things have a real agreement, and consequently an objective unity in the notion of being.

The latter assertion

15. The objective concept of being is prescinded from every particular notion.—I say, secondly: this objective concept is prescinded according to reason from all the particulars or members dividing being, even if they are most simple entities. This conclusion seems to me to follow necessarily from the preceding one; because, since all determinate beings in some way dividing being are distinct among themselves and objectively many, they cannot be understood to agree in one objective concept unless at least according to reason a prescission and abstraction is made from the proper notions in which they are distinguished. But because the whole difficulty consists in this abstraction and prescission, it must first be declared, and afterwards the conclusion proved per se and from its proper principles.

16. It is to be noticed, therefore, that the abstraction or prescission of the intellect does not require a distinction of things, or the prescission of some notion or mode which, from the nature of the thing, precedes in the thing itself the prescission of the intellect; but that in a most simple thing a prescission of this kind can be made in various ways, namely, either after the manner of form from subject, or conversely after the manner of subject from form, or after the manner of form from form; as in God we prescind God as such from his act of will, and the act of will from God, and the act of will from the act of intellect; and similarly we prescind the subsistence of God from the nature of God as its mode, not that the intellect affirms it to be a mode, but that on its own side it conceives it after the manner of a mode. So, then, the intellect abstracts and prescinds something from something as the common from the particular, not on account of a distinction or prescission which precedes in the thing, but on account of its own imperfect, confused or inadequate mode of conceiving; by reason of which in the object which it considers it does not comprehend all that is in it as it exists in reality, but only according to some agreement or likeness which several things have among themselves, which are considered after the manner of one under that notion. From which it comes about that for an objective concept prescinded according to reason from other things or concepts a prescission of things according to themselves is not necessary, but a certain denomination from the formal concept representing that objective one suffices; namely, because through it that object is not represented according to all that is in the thing, but only according to such a notion of agreement; as is evident in the objective concept of man as such, which is said to be prescinded according to reason from Peter, Paul and the other singulars, from which it does not differ in the thing. But that prescission according to reason is a denomination from the formal concept; because, namely, man, as he is presented to such a concept, is not represented according to every mode in which he exists in the thing, but according to the agreement which several men have, who are conceived after the manner of one under that notion.

17. The reason for the conclusion.—This prescission of reason in the objective concept having thus been explained, then, it is not difficult to show that it is found in the objective concept of being; because through the formal concept of being neither God, nor created substance, nor accident is represented according to the mode in which they are in the thing, nor as they differ among themselves, but only as they in some way agree among themselves and are similar; therefore that which is immediately and adequately presented to this formal concept is prescinded according to reason from the proper objective concept of substance or accident. The antecedent has been proved in the preceding conclusion, adding also what was said in the preceding section; but the consequence is evident, because prescission according to reason consists in nothing else, as has been explained. And it is confirmed, first, for the objective concept of being is not according to reason the objective concept of substance, or of accident, or of any other determinate genus; nor is it an aggregate of all of them; therefore it is something one prescinded according to reason from them. The major and minor have been proved above; the consequence is evident, because this prescission according to reason consists only in a distinction of reason in order to the formal concepts. It is confirmed, secondly, for on account of this prescission this is not identical: substance is being, nor this: accident is being, and yet each is true, because in them something is understood to be predicated which is common to both and according to reason distinct from both. And by this reason too, as we argued above, it can happen that after conceiving something under the notion of being one doubts whether it is substance or accident, which cannot be understood without at least a distinction of reason. It is confirmed, thirdly, because for no other reason is there an objective concept of substance prescinded according to reason from all substances, and of accident from accidents, except on account of the agreement which they have, and according to which they can be precisely conceived; therefore the same must be said of the concept of being.

18. An evasion is refuted.—Perhaps someone will answer that there is not a real agreement between all beings in the notion of being, as there is between all substances in the notion of substance, or between accidents in the notion of accident. But either the sense is that between beings as such there is no real agreement, or that it is not as great as between the others. The first is plainly false, nor can it be understood except by those who think that accident, for example, is not called being except by extrinsic denomination, as medicine is called healthy, as Cajetan sometimes seems to indicate, opusc. De nominum analogia, c. 2; but it is not likely that he thought so, as will be said more fully below in treating of the analogy of being; and expressly the same Cajetan, I, q. 13, a. 5, teaches that being, although it is said analogically of God and creatures, is said of them intrinsically; and it indeed seems self-evident that something cannot be a real being by extrinsic denomination; for this is the proper notion or foundation of beings of reason, as will be said afterwards; it is necessary, therefore, that what is a real being be such really and formally through its intrinsic entity, which is the same as itself, and inseparable from it, even if all other things are understood to be prescinded or separated from it; and so accidents too, although the entity of substance is separated from them, are understood to retain intrinsically their entity, by which they are real beings; and therefore above we said with St. Thomas that the analogy of being does not exclude that the formal notion signified by being is found intrinsically in all the analogates. Hence, however, it necessarily follows that they have among themselves some real agreement according to their intrinsic notion of being, as has also been proved above. But that this agreement is perhaps not as great as that between substances or accidents among themselves in their proper notions matters nothing for the present point, for at most it concludes that the unity of the concept of being is not as great, but not that it is none, or not sufficient for the prescission of the objective concept according to reason. Just as the agreement between substances as such is not as great as that between men, and nevertheless each suffices for the unity and prescission of the objective concept.

19. It can be answered otherwise, and a difference assigned, because the notion of being is intimate to all, and therefore does not seem able to be prescinded even according to reason from any, whereas the other notions are not so intimate to things. But this difference too is none, if taken with proportion; for the notions of substance and accident too, taken most commonly, are intimately in all substances and accidents, under whatever notion they are prescinded and considered. This, therefore, in no way impedes the prescission of the objective concept, especially since it has been shown that this prescission is not always founded in some distinction of the thing, but only in such a mode of conceiving, by which the thing is considered under one aspect and not under another.

20. Another evasion is refuted.—Many things can be objected against this doctrine, which partly touch the analogy of being, partly its distinction or inclusion in all the things or modes determining it, of which we must speak in what follows. For now this alone is objected: that it follows from what has been said that the predicaments are not primarily diverse, because they agree in some common notion. The answer is that the predicaments are not called primarily diverse because they agree in nothing, since it is evident that several agreements or likenesses intervene between various predicaments; for the predicaments of accidents, besides the notion of being, agree in the notion of accident; some also agree in the notion of absolute accident and are distinguished from the respective, etc. They are called primarily diverse, therefore, because they agree in no genus, as Porphyry indicated in the chapter on species. Likewise, because they do not differ by proper differences, but by themselves, as will be evident from what is to be said in sect. V.

Corollaries from the preceding doctrine

21. The intrinsic mode of substance or accident is not included in the concept of being.—From these things I infer, first, that in this objective concept of being, so prescinded, the intrinsic modes of substance or of the other members dividing being are not actually included. It is evident, because they would be included either as constituting that concept of being, or as dividing it. Not the first, because it is impossible that one, as one, be constituted by opposite modes or differences. Nor the second, because that concept would then already be actually divided into two, and so that concept would not be one, the opposite of which has been proved. And I confirm it, for I ask what it is to include those modes actually; for either it is that in the thing itself that common concept of being actually includes those modes in the things in which it exists; or it is that in the mind, or in that objective concept, as precisely terminating such a formal concept, those opposite modes are actually included. The first of these is true, but not to the point, because this objective concept is considered as prescinded and adequate to the formal concept of being as such, and not according to the whole reality which it has in the thing in all its inferiors; for in this way the concept of being can neither be prescinded nor one, since it actually includes all that is necessary for the distinction of all the genera and concepts; nor can it properly and truly be called the concept of being as such, but they are rather several concepts of all beings according to their whole realities, from which the prescinded concept of being is not distinguished in reality. It is confirmed, for in this way the concept of man too can be said actually to include all individuals, because the objective concept of man, as it exists in the thing itself, really includes the individuals themselves and their proper modes, nor is man distinguished in the thing from his individuals any more than being is divided from substance, accident and the other genera, as will be evident below; but it will very improperly be said for this reason that the objective concept of man actually includes all individuals or their individuating principles. But speaking of the prescinded concept of being in the other sense, which is more to the point, it is false that it actually includes the opposite modes of the inferior genera, because as such it includes only what is represented through its formal concept; but through that formal concept these modes are not represented expressly and distinctly according to their proper notions, because the intellect, conceiving as such, perceives none of these, as is known from what has been said and from experience itself, and from other similar cases; for for no other reason is man said not to include the individuals actually, but only potentially, except because, as he is represented through the prescinded concept of man, no individual notion is considered in him, but only the notion of man.

22. Being does not immediately signify substance or accident.—Secondly it is inferred that this word being does not immediately signify substance or accident, or the other genera or simple entities according to their proper notions, but the objective concept of being as such, and by reason of it the genera or entities in which it exists in the thing itself. So think all the authors cited, both here and in the conclusion of the preceding section, especially Scotus, In I, dist. 3, qq. 1 and 3; Avicenna, Metaphysics I, c. 4, is also cited; Algazel, c. 6; and it is taken from St. Thomas in the places cited, and De ente et essentia, c. 1, where Cajetan in reality thinks the same, although he differs from Scotus and constitutes in this a difference between being and other names signifying determinate genera or species; but in truth there intervenes none which pertains much to the present matter, except that which is to be treated in the following section. Whence this is rather declared and proved: first, by the example of man (and the same holds of similar cases); for it immediately signifies man, and mediately Peter, in whom in reality the notion of man is found; therefore similarly being, etc. The consequent is proved from parity of reason, because in both cases the name is common, and in both the objective concept is prescinded according to reason from the inferiors, and the name does not signify them except on account of some agreement which they have among themselves.

23. Secondly it is declared a priori, because, just as words express the formal concepts of the mind, so also they immediately signify the objects which are immediately represented through concepts of this kind; for they serve to express concepts in so far as what the concepts naturally represent, words signify by imposition; and therefore a word is sometimes imposed in common, because the concept which it expresses is also common; therefore that very thing which is the immediate object of the formal concept is the immediate significate of the word adequate to that concept; but such is this word being with respect to the formal concept of being.

24. Thirdly this is declared more fully, because this word being so signifies many things that it comprehends them all from a single and first imposition; it is therefore a sign that it does not signify them immediately, but by means of some objective concept common to all of them. The antecedent is declared from the difference between the analogy of this word and of others which are analogous only through proportionality or an extrinsic relationship to one; for in the others the word always from its original imposition signifies only one thing, but afterwards through some metaphor it has been transferred to signify another; whence it comes about that it immediately signifies both as it were by a double imposition and signification. In which they agree with equivocals, and differ only in that in equivocals each imposition is equally first and does not emanate from the other, as in the aforesaid analogues. Examples are: laughter from its first imposition signifies only a certain action of man; but afterwards this word was transferred to signify the pleasantness of a field; similarly healthy from its first imposition signifies only the health existing in an animal; but afterwards it was transferred to signify other things which have a relationship to the health of the animal. And the reason is both that this manifold signification and imposition did not arise from one concept but from many, and also that it is not founded in a real agreement of the things signified, but only in an extrinsic relationship or proportion. But the name being, from its proper and original imposition, has a signification common to all beings, as is evident both from the common use and apprehension of such a word, and from its formal or quasi-formal significate, which is to be, which of itself is common and intrinsic to all real beings; and finally because that imposition arose from a single formal concept of being as such. And hence the first consequence too remains proved, because one word cannot by virtue of one imposition signify many things as many, but as they are in some way one; and therefore it is of the notion of a common word that, at least according to reason and in order to the concepts which words express, it does not immediately signify many things as they are such. Which can be shown in the present case, for being does not immediately signify substance alone, otherwise accident would not be intrinsically being; nor does it signify at once substance as substance nor accident as accident, as can easily be declared by running through those three members posited above, namely that it can immediately signify them neither disjunctively, nor copulatively, nor simply, as will easily be evident by applying the arguments given above. For these three, the formal concept, the objective concept, and the word, keep a proportion among themselves, and therefore we often argue from one to another, not indeed committing a vicious circle, but taking of each what is better known to us, or seems more easily conceded by others.

25. Fourthly I argue: because on account of this immediate signification of the common concept or notion of being, being can most properly be distributed, by saying, every being is good, and divided, for example, into substance and accident; for not only the word is divided there, but what is signified by the word. On this account too a comparison is excellently made by saying that this is a more perfect being than that, which Aristotle also makes, Metaphysics VI, c. 1. And finally we excellently use this word as an extreme or middle term of a syllogism, for the unity of the word would not serve for reasoning except by reason of one proximate and immediate significate. And in this way that common reason is excellent, that being in so far as it is being is the object of the intellect, or of the science of metaphysics; whence it is necessary that there be something one immediately signified by that word; for this reason can be efficacious in so far as that is not only an object in some way, but is also a subject about which demonstrations are made and a middle term for demonstrating something of the inferiors. Finally the experience often touched upon is added, because on hearing the name of being we conceive something, and not substance nor accident. For it cannot be said (as some indicate) that we then stop at the concept of the word, because this is against experience; for he who knows the signification of the word being forms another concept than he who is ignorant of it; for the latter conceives the word and stops there, or doubts what is signified by that word; but the former besides the word conceives the thing signified and in no way doubts about the signification, and yet does not conceive substance nor accident; this word, therefore, has another more immediate significate.

26. But Soncinas objects some reasons which we shall bring forward in the following section; for they prove only that being does not signify some medium distinct from the nature of the thing from substance and accidents, not that it cannot be distinguished by reason through a confused concept of the mind. He objects next Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 8, saying that being signifies the ten predicaments, which Averroes explains of the first signification and without a medium, whom Alexander of Hales follows there. He objects, secondly, Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 4, saying that if there are no beings abstracted from matter, natural philosophy is first philosophy, that is, the science of metaphysics can in no way be distinguished from it; which consequence would not be good if being as being signified something common to substance and accident, for that could be the object of metaphysics even if there were no immaterial beings. Thirdly we can object Aristotle, Physics I, text 25, where he indicates that being does not signify something one which can be the middle term of a syllogism; for on this account he rejects that reasoning of Parmenides: Whatever is besides being, is non-being; but non-being is nothing; therefore whatever is besides being, is nothing.

27. Fourthly Aristotle can be objected, Metaphysics VII, c. 4, text 15, saying that being itself is said of all the genera or predicaments, yet not similarly, that is, not according to the same notion and concept. Fifthly the same Aristotle is cited, Metaphysics VIII, c. 6, text 16, saying that being itself this indeed, that is, per se and as it is such, is at once substance, quality, quantity, etc., and therefore is not placed in the definition, as if he said that being descends immediately to the first genera; in which places Averroes, Alexander and St. Thomas so explain and think. Sixthly Aristotle is brought forward, Prior Analytics I, c. 28, where he indicates that the first genera are such that nothing is said of them, as Alexander and Philoponus seem to explain.

28. Solution.—To the first testimony the answer is that Aristotle says nothing there about immediate signification, but only about the general and equal predication of being and one; for they are found equally in all the predicaments, and thence he concludes that they are the same among themselves. For the efficacy of which reason it is not necessary that every medium of reason be taken away in this signification. Whence St. Thomas says there that being signifies the natures of the ten genera according as they are in act or in potency, in which he sufficiently indicates that it does not signify them immediately according to their proper notions, but according to some common one. The exposition of Averroes, therefore, is not necessary to us, although he himself sufficiently declares that he excludes only a medium which is a genus, and which signifies a definite and properly contractible nature, of which we shall speak afterwards. To the second some answer that the argument of Aristotle is good, yet not founded on this, that being cannot signify a concept common to substance and accident, but on this, that if there were no thing abstracting from matter according to being, the notion of being as such would not abstract from matter any more than the notion of body or of natural being, and therefore the consideration of being as such would not transcend the limits of natural philosophy, because then material substance would be the first being; but the science of the first being and of common being is the same, as he had said at the beginning of Book IV, and St. Thomas and Scotus notice in the said place of Book VI.

29. This common answer, however, needs greater examination. For it can first of all be doubted whether, even if there were no immaterial substances, a science of metaphysics distinct from physics and mathematics would have to be granted. For it seems it should be so asserted, for then there would be a notion of being abstracting from material substance and from quantity and the other accidents. There would also be common properties, such as true, one, same, diverse, whole, part, etc., of which neither physics nor mathematics now treats, nor would they then treat, since they are more common and exceed their proper objects. Therefore a third science superior to both would be necessary, which would accordingly be metaphysics. Whence it can secondly be doubted whether that science would then be prior to natural philosophy; for it seems it should be so said, because it would be about a more abstract and prior object.

30. It is indeed probable to me that, even with that hypothesis granted, there would still remain room for the science of metaphysics; for now only one part of it is that which disputes about spiritual substances; as regards the other parts, therefore, it could then remain, and dispute about being and the other transcendentals, and about the ten predicaments, and about the universal principles and causes. This being posited, however, nevertheless according to the mind of Aristotle, in the place cited, natural philosophy would be the first science or philosophy, at least in dignity and excellence, since it would treat of the most noble object, namely of substance as such, and of every substance; and consequently it would also treat of the first causes and principles of things, not indeed according to the abstraction of the mind, but according to the thing.

31. Whence finally it is said that it seems more probable that in that case a special science of metaphysics distinct from natural philosophy would not be necessary. The reason is that then philosophy would treat of every substance, and consequently of all accidents, even of quantity as it is a property of substance, and as regards its entity and essence, and in so far as it is distinguished both from substance itself and from all its other properties, because this whole consideration of quantity would not abstract from sensible matter nor exceed the breadth of the object of philosophy. And by the same reason the division and consideration of all the predicaments would pertain to the same philosophy, because there would be nothing in them not founded in reality in sensible substance; for the predicaments of accidents would not extend more widely than the predicament of substance. Again, the consideration of all essences and of all real causes would pertain to philosophy, for the same cause. And finally by parity of reason it would treat of the predicates common to substance and accidents, nor would it be necessary on account of these alone to constitute a special science, because they would not abstract from sensible matter, and the concept of being would not be other than the concept of material being. Nor would it stand in the way that the notion of being and similar common notions would be common to mathematical and physical things, because that community would only be according to real agreement, not according to some peculiar abstraction pertaining to the constitution of the object of a science. Just as now too continuous and discrete quantity agree in the common notion of quantity, and yet there is not one common mathematics, because physics sufficiently treats of that agreement and common notion, in which no special abstraction constituting a peculiar knowable object is found; so, then, it would be in that case.

32. To the third testimony, omitting the exposition of Soto and others, who say that that proposition is false, whatever is besides being, is non-being, because being said simply is taken for substance—for this is rigorously false, as I shall show below, and moreover, the proportion of predicate and subject being kept, it would still be true to say that whatever is besides being is non-being—omitting (I say) this exposition, the answer is that Aristotle does not deny that being can be the middle term of a syllogism, nor does he reject the reasoning of Parmenides on this account, but both because he took being to be one properly and rigorously, although it is only analogous, and also because he used the word one equivocally; for thus from the premisses posited above he concluded that that which is, or being, is one; therefore whatever is besides one is nothing; so as to conclude that all things are one, which is a manifest equivocation, for he intended that all things are one in the thing itself; but being, if it is taken precisely, and as it were immovably, is not one in this way, but only in reason; but if it is taken distributively and for individual beings, then indeed each being is one, but all things are not one.

33. To the fourth that exposition is denied; for when Aristotle says that being exists in all, but not similarly, it is not rightly explained as not by one concept, but as not in the same mode, because it is said of substance simply, but of the others in a certain respect, as St. Thomas explains. The fifth proves only that being is not such a medium as is properly contracted to its inferiors by something which is not being, but by simple determination, by which each genus is of itself being, and such being, which is most true, as we shall see more fully, sects. 5 and 6; it does not, however, exclude a medium concept from our confused mode of conceiving. To the sixth I answer first of all that Aristotle makes no mention there of the ten first genera; but he says absolutely that there are some things which are predicated of others, but nothing of them; which we can explain of the transcendentals, of which nothing is predicated as superior, for so that proposition seems to have to be restricted; for as an equal, there is nothing of which something cannot be predicated, since the transcendentals themselves are predicated properly of one another, and not altogether identically. Whence if anyone wishes to explain that member of the ten genera, he must restrict it otherwise to superior predicates which are genera or species; for absolutely how can it be true, since it is evidently established that many things are predicated of the first genera? Indeed Aristotle himself, Posterior Analytics II, c. 14, indicates that some superior or more universal predicates are contained within a genus, but others are said of others even outside a genus, which all the expositors understand to have been said on account of being and the like.

34. The concept of being, even as it is compared to its inferiors, is prescinded from them.—Finally it follows from what has been said that being expresses a concept one and prescinded not only as it is considered absolutely abstracted, but also as it is compared to its inferiors in order to be predicated of them, or is considered as existing in them. It is proved, because after any abstractive knowledge of a common concept from particulars the intellect can make a comparative one; therefore that very thing which is abstracted in being it can compare to its inferiors; for there is no greater repugnance in the concept of being than in other common ones, but rather the same reason, namely because that whole concept is in the inferiors themselves, whether it is distinguished from them in reality or in reason only, for this matters nothing; indeed, the less the distinction between them in reality, the more truly will one be attributed to the other; for thus, although we prescind the wisdom of God, and distinguish it from God by reason, comparing it to God we truly and properly say that wisdom is in God. In this manner, then, the notion of being precisely conceived is rightly compared to substance and accident and is said to be in them, and in this way these predications are made, substance is being, and accident is being. Whence it is confirmed, because every such comparison or composition is made from simple concepts; therefore, after the intellect has conceived being precisely, it can at the same time conceive substance or accident according to their proper concepts, because these simple concepts have no repugnance among themselves, as is self-evident; therefore similarly the intellect can then compare being to substance as existing in it, and similarly to accident; therefore the concept of being, even as compared to the concept of substance and accident, is prescinded from them according to reason.

35. You will say: therefore the concept of being, even as included in its inferiors, is prescinded from them, which is repugnant to what has been said above, because as included in its inferiors it is nothing other than they themselves, since there is nothing in them which is not being. The consequence is evident, because being cannot be compared to its inferiors or predicated of them except as it is in them; therefore, if as expressing a prescinded concept it is compared to its inferiors, then also as it is in them it will be prescinded. The answer is that there is an equivocation from our mode of conceiving to the thing itself, and conversely. Rigorously, therefore, the consequence is denied, because, although the concept of being, which is prescinded by us according to reason, is in its inferiors, nevertheless as it is prescinded, formally speaking, it is not in its inferiors; that is, it does not have in them that state or mode of being which it has by extrinsic denomination from the prescission of the intellect. But when it is said that this concept, even as prescinded, is compared to its inferiors and attributed to them, the sense is not that according to that prescission or denomination it is attributed to its inferiors, but only that that notion so conceived, compared to its inferiors, is found included in all of them. Wherefore, if that reduplication is not made of the notion of being as prescinded, but the discussion is simply of the notion of being precisely conceived, it is true that that notion is in the inferiors and is altogether and intimately included in them, and nevertheless is prescinded by reason, although in the thing it is not prescinded.

36. But at once a difficulty presses, because according to these things nothing seems to be lacking to the concept of being for the notion of a proper universal, for it will be one in many and of many. But this difficulty depends on the two reasons for doubting posited at the beginning of the section. One is about the univocation of being, because if being is not univocal, that reason suffices for it not to be properly universal; but how it does not follow from what has been said that it is univocal, and what it lacks for univocation, is to be treated below in its proper place, in dealing with the divisions of being; for now I only assert that all the things we have said about the unity of the concept of being seem far clearer and more certain than that being is analogous, and therefore that the unity of the concept is not rightly denied in order to defend analogy; but if one of the two had to be denied, it would rather be analogy, which is uncertain, than the unity of the concept, which seems to be demonstrated by certain reasons, that would have to be denied. In reality, however, it is not necessary that either be denied, because for univocation it is not enough that the concept be in itself in some way one, but it is necessary that it regard many with an equal relationship and order, which the concept of being does not have, as we shall expound more fully in the place cited. The other difficulty was about the mode in which being descends, or is drawn, to its inferiors according to reason, concerning which matter we shall make a proper section a little below, because it both has an obscure difficulty and depends on other things to be said first.