Disputationes metaphysicae

1. What the formal and the objective concept are, and in what they differ.—First of all the common distinction of the formal and the objective concept is to be supposed. That is called the formal concept which is the very act, or (what is the same) the word, by which the intellect conceives some thing or common notion; which is called a concept because it is as it were the offspring of the mind; and it is called formal either because it is the last form of the mind, or because it formally represents to the mind the thing known, or because in truth it is the intrinsic and formal term of the mental conception, in which it differs from the objective concept, so to speak. That thing or notion is called the objective concept which is properly and immediately known or represented through the formal concept; as, for example, when we conceive man, that act which we effect in the mind in order to conceive man is called the formal concept; but man, known and represented by that act, is called the objective concept—a concept indeed by extrinsic denomination from the formal concept, through which its object is said to be conceived; and therefore it is rightly called objective, because it is not a concept as a form intrinsically terminating the conception, but as the object and matter about which the formal conception is concerned, and to which the eye of the mind directly tends; on account of which it is called by some, following Averroes, the understood intention; and by others it is called the objective notion. Hence is gathered the difference between the formal and the objective concept, that the formal is always a true and positive thing, and in creatures a quality inhering in the mind, whereas the objective is not always a true positive thing; for we sometimes conceive privations and other things which are called beings of reason, because they have being only objectively in the intellect. Likewise the formal concept is always a singular and individual thing, because it is a thing produced by the intellect and inhering in it; but the objective concept can indeed sometimes be a singular and individual thing, in so far as it can be presented to the mind and conceived through the formal act, but often it is a universal or confused and common thing, such as man, substance and the like. In this disputation, then, we chiefly intend to explain the objective concept of being as such, according to its whole abstraction, according to which we said it is the object of metaphysics; but because it is very difficult, and depends much on our conception, we take our beginning from the formal concept, which, as it seems to us, can be better known.

Various opinions are reported

2. The first opinion absolutely denies that there is one formal concept of being which is in truth one in itself, and prescinded and distinct from the other concepts of particular beings. So thinks Cajetan, opusc. De nominum analogia, cc. 4 and 6. For although he speaks obscurely, and distinguishes concerning a perfect or imperfect concept, that distinction nevertheless coincides with another of Fonseca to be treated immediately; whence, if he is read attentively, he in truth thinks this; and Fonseca said that he had attained the truth, or come nearer to it, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 2, sect. 3. The foundation is that otherwise being would be univocal, and not analogous, which we shall see below to be false. The consequence is proved, because those things are univocal whose name is common, and the notion of substance accommodated to the name is the same, on the testimony of Aristotle at the beginning of the Categories; but the name of being is common to all beings; therefore either the notion of the name is one and the same, and so being will be univocal, or it is not one, and so neither will the formal concept of being be able to be one, because the formal concept has its unity from some one thing or notion conceived, which it adequately regards. Whence, if that concept is also adequate to the word or name of being, it cannot be more one than the notion of being signified by that name is one.

3. The second opinion, which is rather an explanation of the preceding, is that of Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 34, who distinguishes a twofold concept: one he calls what the name means, the other what the thing is; the former, he says, can be one in the concept of being, but the latter not at all; and he founds both on the analogy of being. And it is explained in this way from the common notion of analogues; for they can be conceived in two ways: in one way, by the proper real concept signified by the name, and in this way, in so far as they are analogous, they do not have one real concept but several, as is evident both in analogues of proportionality and of proportion or attribution; for if, on hearing this name, laughing, the proper concept of the thing signified is formed, not one but a twofold concept is formed: one of man, who is properly and formally laughing; the other of the meadow, which is so called only through a certain proportionality. But if not both of these concepts but only one is formed, that word is not conceived according to its whole analogy or common signification with respect to those things, but either only as it is univocal with respect to men, or only as it is transferred and metaphorically signifies the meadow. And it is similar in analogues of attribution, for example, healthy; for if the proper concept of the thing signified is formed, it is not one but manifold: one of the animal, which is formally and properly healthy; others of the other things which are called healthy extrinsically through various relationships or denominations from the health of the animal. But in each of these analogues one very confused concept can be formed, which pertains rather to the signification of the word than to some thing, as if, on hearing the name healthy, you conceive that which has order to health. So, then, in the present case, on hearing the name of being, a confused concept can be formed, comprehending whatever has being or a relationship to being; but this is only a concept of what the name means; yet, if the things signified by that name are truly conceived, not one concept is formed but several.

4. The opinion of Fonseca, closely akin to this.—Nor does Fonseca, above, differ much from this opinion, distinguishing a threefold concept of being, namely distinct, confused and intermediate, that is, partly confused and partly distinct. The distinct is that which determinately and expressly represents all the simple entities which being immediately signifies, and this is not one but several. The confused is that which represents all things confusedly and indeterminately, and this is one. But the intermediate, which is partly confused and partly distinct, is that which determinately represents one nature, for example substance, but the others, namely quantity, quality, etc., implicitly and indeterminately, in so far as all agree with substance by a certain proportion; and this too is said to be one.

5. That so great a diversity of distinctions hinders clarity rather than helps it.—But distinctions of this kind seem to me to be multiplied without cause, and rather to confuse the matter than to explain it. For we ought to speak of the formal concept of being not according to what can be known and comprehended about all the things comprehended under this word, as they are in themselves, but as they are signified by this word; otherwise the discussion will not be about the concept of being in so far as it is being, but about the concept of all things both existing and also possible, in so far as they are such and are distinguished among themselves, in which way they can be distinctly conceived by one formal concept by no one except God alone, as the same author rightly noted. But in this sense even the concept of substance or of living thing, if it is explicit and distinct in that way, will only be that by which all substances or all living things, in so far as they are, are distinctly conceived, in which way God alone too will be able to have a distinct formal concept of them—of substance, of living thing, etc.

6. You will say that substance, living thing and similar names do not immediately signify these or those substantial or living natures, but the notion of substance, of living thing, etc., and therefore, for forming a distinct concept corresponding to the significate of such a word, it is not necessary to descend to the particular natures; but that it is otherwise with being, because it immediately signifies entities, at least simple ones, that is, those not composed of a common nature and a contracting difference. But this is in truth false, as will be more fully evident from the following section, and is now briefly evident from the common mode of conceiving. For who would say that being immediately signifies God as he is God, even though God is most simple and not composed of a common nature and a contracting difference? Finally the same can be asked of substance, accident, and the other genera or simple concepts. Likewise, why will being be said to signify immediately simple entities rather than those composed of a common nature and a contracting difference, such as animal, habit, etc.? For being as such comprehends all things generally under itself, and just as in the concept of substance or of quality nothing is included which is not being, so neither in the concept of animal or of habit. But that a composite concept can be resolved into several, of which neither includes the other, but not a simple concept, matters little for mediate or immediate signification. For who would believe that being immediately signifies rational, and not man, because rational expresses a simple concept and man a composite one? And so, stopping properly and precisely at the formal concept of being as such, it does not pertain to it that through it particular beings should be distinctly conceived according to their proper and determinate notions; and therefore the concept of being as such, if one stops at it, is always confused with respect to particular beings as they are such. And therefore St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 6, says that if God knew other things than himself only in so far as they are beings, he would know them only in common, confusedly and imperfectly; whence he concludes that he knows them not only according as they communicate in the notion of being, but also according as one is distinguished from another; he thinks, therefore, that the concept of being as such, stopping precisely at it, is always confused with respect to any determinate notion of being, as it is such in itself and is distinguished from the others, whether it be composite or simple.

7. The manner of speaking of the others is not approved.—Wherefore that member about the concept partly confused and partly distinct is also superfluous for explaining the present matter. First indeed, because the concept of substance is improperly said to be implicitly or confusedly the concept of accident, and universally the proper concept of the first analogate is most improperly said to be a confused concept of the other analogates, which are secondary, although many speak thus, saying that, just as the same name, although it immediately signifies the first analogate, secondarily signifies the others, so the formal concept of the first analogate confusedly represents the others, in so far as they are similar or proportional to that first one; for what distinctly represents something seems consequently to represent, at least confusedly, other things similar to it. But although this is of small moment, and perhaps about the manner of speaking, it does not meet with my approval, because such a proper and distinct concept of the first analogate is only one, and formally represents only the first analogate itself; in which it is not rightly compared with the name, because a name signifies only by imposition, and therefore the same name which primarily and properly signifies one thing can by transference be imposed to signify other things secondarily; but the concept of a thing only naturally represents the thing itself, and therefore, if it is the proper and adequate concept of the first analogate according to its proper notion, it cannot represent the rest; whence neither does it of itself make them known, but at most can be as it were the origin or occasion for the others to be conceived and denominated according to some proportion or relationship to the first analogate; which is not enough for the special and proper concept of the first analogate to be called implicit or confused with respect to the others. Next, I ask whether that concept of the first analogate is altogether the same as the concept which corresponds to the proper name of the same thing or nature, for example substance, or whether it is diverse. This latter cannot be said, because, if each is the proper concept of substance, it cannot be understood in what the diversity consists, such that one is said to represent accidents and not the other. But if the former is said, then that concept can no more be said to represent accidents than the proper concept of man represents other animals; indeed it can be said less, since there is less likeness. Likewise, because otherwise it would have to be said that substance has one formal concept in some way common to substance and accident, which is in truth most improper and rigorously false; because, although accident expresses a relationship to substance, the concept of substance nevertheless in no way represents that relationship, but only its term, and that not formally under the notion of term, but according to its absolute notion; therefore this is not enough for that concept to be called an implicit or confused concept of accident. And the same can easily be considered in the other analogates or their concepts; for the formal concept of a laughing man as such is in no way a confused concept of the meadow, nor is the proper concept of a healthy animal the concept of medicine, and so of the others. And the reason is that what founds an analogy of this kind is either some real agreement or likeness between the analogates, as we shall say below of being, and that is not represented through the proper concept of any analogate; or it is not a proper likeness, but only a certain proportion or attribution, and this too is not enough for the proper concept of one analogate, as such, to represent in some way the others, but only that form through order to which the others are denominated such; which form is represented through such a concept absolutely and as it is such in itself, and not with a relationship to the others.

8. I add further: whatever may be the case with this manner of speaking, that the determinate concept of substance is called confused with respect to the other genera of beings, or accidents, it nevertheless still cannot be called the formal concept of being as such; both because it is the proper formal concept of substance as substance, whereas the proper concept of being must be diverse from the concept of substance, since being is rightly divided into substance and accident; and also because being does not immediately signify substance, as I shall show below; therefore neither does it immediately express the proper formal concept of substance. It remains, therefore, that the formal concept of being as such, compared to determinate beings as they are such, is always a confused and indistinct concept in representing this or that being. I say, however, with respect to particular beings as they are such, because with respect to that object which it immediately and properly represents (whatever that may be), it can be said to be, and truly is, a proper and distinct concept; just as the same concept of animal, which is confused with respect to man, is proper and distinct with respect to animal as such, although under this same comparison the same simple concept is wont to be called confused with respect to that composite concept by which animal is conceived through its definition. And in a similar way, either in diverse men or in one at diverse times, one concept of being can be more distinct than another, and conversely one can be called confused with respect to another more distinct one, in so far as it happens that the very notion or quiddity of being as such is known more or less perfectly; which distinction of formal concepts is nothing to the purpose, because it is rather on the side of the one conceiving, and from a perfect or imperfect light or mode of conceiving, than from the relationship to the object, which we chiefly consider here.

The true opinion

9. These distinctions, then, being passed over, it must be said that the proper and adequate formal concept of being as such is one, prescinded in reality and in reason from the other formal concepts of other things and objects. This is the common opinion, as Fonseca, above, confesses; Scotus and all his disciples hold it, as we shall see in the following section; Capreolus, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, concl. 1 and 9, and in the answers to the arguments against them; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 1, q. 2, who cites St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 7, aa. 5 and 6; Soncinas, In IV Metaph., q. 1; Javellus, q. 1; Flandria, q. 2, a. 6; Hervaeus, Quodlibet II, q. 7; Soto, on the Categories, c. 4, q. 1; and it is plainly gathered from St. Thomas, in the places to be cited in the following section. And it is proved, first, by experience; for on hearing the name of being, we experience that our mind is not drawn apart or divided into several concepts, but rather gathered into one, just as when it conceives man, animal and the like. Secondly, because, as Aristotle said, De Interpretatione I, we express our formal concepts by words; but the word being is not only materially one, but also has one signification from its original imposition, by virtue of which it does not immediately signify some nature under a determinate and proper notion under which it is distinguished from others. Hence neither does it signify many things as they are many, because it does not signify them according as they differ among themselves, but rather as they agree among themselves, or are similar; it is therefore a sign that to this word there also corresponds in the mind one formal concept, by which what is signified by this word is immediately and adequately conceived. Or rather, conversely, by this sign we gather that the imposition of such a name proceeded from such a mode of conceiving things by one concept. Thirdly, we can argue from the concept of existence; for it seems self-evident that there is one formal concept of existence as such, because whenever we speak and dispute about existence in this way as about one act, we in truth form not several concepts but one; therefore also the formal concept of the existent as such is one, because, just as the abstract is conceived after the manner of one, so also the concrete as precisely so constituted; therefore similarly one formal concept corresponds to being as such; for being either is the same as existent, or, if it is taken as existent in aptitude, its concept has the same notion of unity. Hence also the concept of being is wont to be called not only one but also most simple, so that the ultimate resolution of the other concepts is made to it; for through the other concepts we conceive this or that kind of being, but through this one we prescind all composition and determination; whence this concept is also wont to be called of itself the first which is formed by man, because, other things being equal, it can more easily be conceived of any thing whatever; all of which St. Thomas hands down, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1; and Avicenna, Metaphysics II. Wherefore concerning the unity of this most common and confused concept there is almost no one who doubts; but we have shown that no other concept can truly and properly be called the concept of being as such which is not confused with respect to particular beings as they are such. Finally, if the formal concept of being is not one, there will therefore be several; how many, then, will there be? There is no greater reason for two than for three, or for any other number; because, if these concepts are multiplied, it is necessary that they be multiplied according to some diversity of the things or entities comprehended under the breadth of being; but these entities can be multiplied to infinity, and be distinguished according to their proper notions; and if once it is posited that the concept or concepts of being as such represent determinate natures of being, even as distinct, there is no reason why one should stop at two rather than at three or four, etc., as will be more evident from what we shall say in the following section about the objective concept; for although the formal concept, in so far as it is made by us and in us, can seem better known by experience, the exact knowledge of its unity nevertheless depends much on the unity of the object, from which acts are wont to take their unity and distinction.

10. From which it is understood, first, in what sense and for what reason this formal concept is said to be prescinded according to the thing itself from other concepts, namely because in reality it is really distinct from the concept of substance as such, of accident, of quality, and the other similar ones; for we are speaking of the human intellect, which, while it divides in the mind even those things which are not distinct in reality, divides concepts within itself, forming really distinct concepts of the same thing according to the diverse prescission or abstraction of the thing conceived; in which way the formal concepts of divine justice and mercy are in us really prescinded or distinct, although mercy and justice are not distinguished in themselves. So, then, the concept of being as such, since in representing it prescinds from the proper notion of substance as such, of accident, and of all the others, must necessarily be really prescinded and distinct in itself from the proper concepts of such notions or natures as they are such; and this too all easily confess.

11. Secondly it is gathered from what has been said that this formal concept of being, just as it is one in itself according to the thing, so also according to its formal notion, and according to that too is prescinded in reason from the formal concepts of particular notions. It is evident, first, because this concept is in itself most simple, as objectively, so also formally; therefore it has in itself one simple adequate formal notion; therefore according to it it is prescinded from the other formal concepts. Secondly, because, just as our mind, by prescinding things which are not distinguished in reality, really distinguishes its formal concepts within itself, so conversely, by confusing and joining things which are distinguished in reality, in so far as they are similar in themselves, it unites its concept, forming it one in reality and in formal notion; but in this way beings are conceived by this formal concept of being; for the mind takes all those things only as they are similar among themselves in the notion of being, and as such forms one image, representing by a single formal representation that which is; which image is the formal concept itself; that concept, therefore, is simply one in reality and in formal notion, and according to it prescinded from those concepts which more distinctly represent particular beings or their notions.

12. The formal concept of being as such is not multiplied according to the multitude of particular objects.—Thirdly it follows that this formal concept of being is not only one, but also cannot be several according to its relationship to more determinate objects, or objects more distinctly conceived on the side of the objects. These formal concepts can indeed be multiplied, either according to number in diverse subjects, or in the same subject at diverse times, perhaps also according to species on the side of the one conceiving, in a higher mode or with greater clarity and more distinct apprehension of the very formal notion of being as such (although perhaps this whole distinction is only according to more and less within the same species, especially stopping at the concepts which can naturally be formed by man); but from the greater or lesser determination of the object the concept of being as such cannot be multiplied; because, as has been shown, by the very fact that one does not stop at the common conception of being as such, but descends to this and that being as they are such, although formal concepts are multiplied, the concept of being as such is not, but the concept of substance, or of accident, etc., is adjoined.

13. This concept is not of the name only, but also of the thing.—Fourthly it is gathered from what has been said that this concept is falsely called a concept of the name only, and not of the thing signified by the name of being, and according to that notion by which it is signified by it. First, because, as I said, this concept is prior to the word and to its imposition for signifying things in such a way. For although as regards us concepts are often formed by means of words, nevertheless in itself and simply the concept is prior, which of itself brings forth the word by which it is expressed, and is the origin of its imposition; such a concept, therefore, is simply and absolutely a concept of the thing according to itself, and not only in order to the signification of the word, such that for this reason it would be called a concept of the name, or of what the name means. Secondly, because this concept is after the manner of a certain simple image naturally representing that which is signified by the word at pleasure; but in this alone consists its being a concept of the thing; although, because that concept is most simple, and therefore its object cannot be declared by a proper definition, we are wont to use descriptions to explain it, which seem only to declare the signification of the name more distinctly; and in this way it can be said in a good sense that that concept is of what the name means, provided it is not excluded that it is the proper and adequate concept of the thing immediately signified by that word.

14. Of which analogues there is one common notion.—The foundation of the first opinion (for enough has already been said about the second) touches upon the matter of the analogy of being, to be treated below, and depends also on what is to be said about the objective concept; for many think that the unity of the formal concept is not repugnant to analogy, but the unity of the objective concept is, of which afterwards. For now it is briefly said, from St. Thomas, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, that among analogues of attribution there are some which signify a form which is intrinsically only in the principal analogate, but in the others only through relationship or extrinsic denomination, such as healthy and the like; and to these the unity of a formal concept is repugnant, because the analogates do not have proper likeness and agreement among themselves. But there are others which signify a form or nature intrinsically found in all the analogates; and of this kind is being, as we shall see below, for accidents are not beings by extrinsic¹ denomination, but by the intrinsic nature or notion of being which they participate; and in analogues of this kind it is not unfitting that there should be one formal concept, simply and absolutely one in itself in reality and in adequate formal notion; but in what its analogy consists will be explained below.