Disputationes metaphysicae

1. In explaining the final cause and usefulness of this science we have at the same time declared its effect; for its whole usefulness is placed in its operation and effect; it remains, therefore, that we say a few things about its attributes, which can easily be gathered from its subject matter and from its end.

2. First conclusion.—I say, first, that the science of metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science of all. So Aristotle teaches, Book I, c. 2, and Book II, c. 1, and Book III, c. 2; and all the interpreters. And this assertion has been sufficiently proved from what has been said. For in the preceding section we showed that the end of this science is the knowledge of truth, and that of itself it rests in it; but a science is called speculative from this end, as Aristotle teaches in Book VI, and as will be treated below in its place. And in the first section it was shown that the object of this science is the most noble, both in the being of object, on account of its supreme abstraction, and in the being of thing, on account of the most noble beings which it comprehends. But every science has its nobility from its object; this science, therefore, is the most excellent speculative science of all.

3. A small question.—Someone will perhaps ask, however, whether this science is purely speculative, or also practical; for, as I now suppose, it is not repugnant that the same science or knowledge should at the same time by an eminent notion be speculative and practical; for the theologians attribute this to divine science, not only as it is in God himself, but also as it is participated by us, whether through clear vision, or through obscure theology and faith; therefore also among acquired and natural sciences there could be some which participates this eminence, and is at the same time speculative and practical. And if this is to belong to any, it ought most of all to belong to this doctrine: first, because it is the supreme science of all, and commands all, as Aristotle said in the prooemium. Next, because it perfects the natural knowledge of God, as far as can be done by the light of nature; but right judgement about things to be done depends on the knowledge of God; therefore this judgement too is directed by this science, and so on that side it is practical. And it is declared in this way: for this science demonstrates the divine attributes which can be demonstrated by the light of nature, among which are to be supremely good, to be the last end of all things, to be the first truth; therefore this science demonstrates all these things; therefore it will also demonstrate that God is to be loved above all things, because this is due to him in so far as he is supremely good and the last end. Again, this science demonstrates that God has providence over all things, and is most wise and most just; therefore it will consequently also teach that he is to be feared, and trusted, and similar things, all of which pertain to morals and practice. Finally, infused theology is rightly judged to be eminently practical and speculative for no other reason than because under a higher light it considers in God that notion of the last end to be attained through moral and practical means; therefore the same will hold of natural metaphysics, as it proceeds under a lower light, proportion being kept.

4. Answer.—Nevertheless, it must be said that this doctrine has nothing of practical science, but is only contemplative. So it is taken from Aristotle and the other expositors; for although they do not expressly touch upon this question, nevertheless, while they teach simply that this science is speculative, and either are silent about practical science or certainly deny it, they plainly think it is purely speculative. Add that Aristotle, in the books of the Ethics, disputed professedly about the happiness of man as the first rule of moral actions. But the happiness of man consists in God as he is the last end of all things, and in a singular way of the rational creature; that consideration, therefore, does not pertain to metaphysics; therefore no other consideration remains under which this doctrine could be practical. For if it is practical, it would most of all be moral; for it is self-evident that it is not factive or directive of the operations of art, nor even of intellectual actions, as was said in the preceding section; but it is not moral, because the consideration of the last end in order to morals is not its function, but that of moral philosophy, as has been said.

5. Why theology is speculative and practical, metaphysics only speculative.—The a priori reason, however, can be given from the difference between supernatural theology and this natural one; which is to be taken from the difference of the light under which each proceeds. For the former proceeds under the light of the divine revelation of faith, in so far as it is applied mediately and through discourse to the conclusions contained in the principles of faith; but faith not only reveals God as the last end of all things, but also teaches specially that the happiness of man consists in him; and consequently faith reveals not only speculative truths about God, but also practical ones; indeed it also reveals almost all the first principles of morals; and it is concerned with all these with the same certitude and of itself in the same way; from which theology discourses, considering in God not only speculatively the notion of last end, but also morally in order to the means by which it is to be attained. But metaphysics proceeds only under the natural light, which does not embrace all its objects in the same way nor with the same certitude; and therefore metaphysics is not a habit adequate to it, but under a certain special notion and abstraction it perfects the natural light with respect to those objects which abstract from matter according to being, as we have said. And therefore concerning God it considers only speculatively the notion of last end and supreme good, namely, in so far as he is such in himself, and can be known as such by the light of nature, rather as regards whether he is than as regards what he is. But it does not consider practically how this end is to be attained by man; indeed, it does not even attain or inquire in particular into the mode in which God is the last end of man, or in which man himself can attain God, as he is his last end; because this is already below the metaphysical abstraction and contemplation, and pertains to philosophy; indeed, it supposes the physical consideration of man, or natural philosophy, which is merely speculative; and it pertains to moral philosophy, which in a certain way, and (so to speak) inchoatively, is a practical science; concerning the distinction of which sciences this is not the place to speak. I admit, however, that if a natural metaphysical science could be had of the angels as they are in themselves, it would pertain to it not only to contemplate their nature, but also how they would be capable of their last end, and in what their happiness would consist, and by what means they could arrive at it; which science would be partly moral, and would join some practice with speculation; and it would be wholly metaphysics, because it would wholly abstract from matter according to being. Nevertheless, a science of this kind would be angelic rather than human; for we can investigate scarcely anything about the happiness of the angels except by analogy to our own; and therefore metaphysics, as it is in us, is merely speculative in every respect, and does not descend to moral or practical matters.

6. Second conclusion.—I say, secondly: metaphysics is not only a science, but also natural wisdom. Aristotle posits this assertion and proves it professedly, Book I, cc. 1 and 2, and Book III, c. 2. He first supposes that there is in us some intellectual virtue which is wisdom; which the same Aristotle also taught, Ethics VI, c. 2 and following. And it is the common consent of all the wise; for if no habit of man were wisdom, no man could be called wise, for the wise man is and is called so from wisdom; for man is not wise by nature, nor from the power or faculty alone, as is self-evident, otherwise all men would be wise; but man becomes wise by some use, and habit or virtue; wisdom, therefore, is a habit. Again, from the word itself and the sense of all it is evident that it signifies a habit pertaining to the intellect, not any whatever, but a perfect one, which is an intellectual virtue, and a very perfect one. Which Aristotle proves by an excellent discourse in the prooemium, c. 1, distinguishing experience from art, and art from science, which is sought for its own sake and is concerned with the knowledge of causes and principles; and concluding that wisdom must be some science of this kind.

7. The manifold acceptation of wisdom.—It is to be noticed in this place, however, that if we attend to common speech, sometimes by this name of wisdom there seems to be signified not one determinate habit of the intellect, but a certain intellectual rectitude for judging well about all things, arising from the perfect attainment of all the sciences, in the way in which justice in one acceptation does not signify one singular habit, but the harmony and rectitude of all the virtues of the will. And to this acceptation of wisdom those descriptions of Cicero seem to be excellently accommodated: Wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by which these things are held together.¹ And in the same sense the ancient philosophers seem to have spoken of wisdom, who said that it belonged to the notion of wisdom that it be a knowledge of all things, even down to the lowest species, and all their properties; for this is not done by one science, but by the collection of all. Indeed, if the discussion is of man, he does not attain so exact a knowledge of all things even through all the sciences taken together; and therefore they themselves said that there is in man not true wisdom, but a counterfeit one; we, however, say more truly that there is in man a true wisdom, even a natural one, but human, and consequently very limited. In another way, however, and one more used among the wise, wisdom is taken for some peculiar habit, and this in two ways; for there is one which is called wisdom simply, another which is so only in a certain respect; the former is in a certain way universal, not by predication, or by the collection of all, but by eminence and power, as we shall declare immediately; the latter is particular, not only in habit, but also in matter and power. Concerning this latter wisdom there is a long discourse of Socrates in Plato, Dialogue III, or On Wisdom, where he distinguishes the wisdom of craftsmen and of pilots, and the like. And in this same way Paul seems to have said, 1 Cor. 3: As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation. For one is called wise in some genus or matter who knows perfectly the science or art which is concerned with it, and through the supreme causes of that genus, as St. Thomas noted, II-II, q. 45, a. 1. Finally, in another way (as St. Thomas says in the same place) a certain particular science or intellectual virtue is called wisdom simply; and in this way Aristotle used this word, Ethics VI, in the place cited, and in the present one; and in this sense he attributes this dignity of wisdom to metaphysics.

8. Some properties of wisdom.—Secondly, to prove this Aristotle subjoins, c. 2, the conditions of wisdom, of which some are common to it with the other speculative sciences, while others are proper to it; and those which seem to be common are to be so taken that they belong to wisdom according to a certain eminence and singular perfection. The first condition, then, is that wisdom be concerned with all things, and be the science of all things, as far as is possible. This condition has been sufficiently set out by us in Sect. 2. Its reason, however, will be evident from what is to be said.

9. The second condition of wisdom posited by Aristotle is that it be concerned with more difficult things and things more remote from the senses; for to know those things which are obvious to all, or which are perceived by the senses, pertains not to the wise, but to any common men whatever. This condition, however, seems to be understood of the knowledge of more difficult things, as far as is possible for man; for it does not pertain to the wisdom of man to seek things higher than himself, and which cannot be known by natural light, such as are the outcomes of future contingents, and the like, which to wish to know through human science is not wisdom, but rashness. Human wisdom, therefore, is concerned with higher and more difficult things according to the capacity of human talent.

10. The third condition is that it be the most certain knowledge; under which condition evidence and clarity² too are comprehended, because the natural certitude about which the discussion is arises from evidence and is commensurate with it. The perspicuous reason for this condition, however, is that wisdom signifies perfect science and an exceptional knowledge; but the greatest perfection of human knowledge is placed in certitude and evidence.

11. The fourth condition is that it be more apt for teaching and for handing down the causes of things. Aristotle had indicated this very thing in c. 1, saying that the sign of the wise man is to be able to teach, and that it pertains to the wise man to know and hand down the causes of things. Likewise in each art or science we judge him wiser who comprehends the causes of things more intimately and more universally. Finally, human knowledge is more perfect when it attains the cause, otherwise it is always imperfect; a sign of which is that the mind of the inquirer does not rest until it finds the cause. That, therefore, will be wisdom simply which attains the higher and more universal causes of things; whence it will also come about that it is more apt for teaching.

12. The fifth is that such wisdom is most worthy to be desired for its own sake and for the sake of knowing; for this pertains to dignity, as is self-evident; since, therefore, wisdom holds a certain dignity and excellence among the sciences, there is no doubt that it is to be placed in that genus of sciences which are sought for the sake of knowing itself; and that in it it holds a certain supreme and excellent grade, and thus that it is most of all desirable for its own sake.

13. The sixth property of wisdom is to preside over the others rather than to minister to them; which is also consonant with its dignity; but in what sense this is to be taken I shall declare immediately. I only notice concerning these properties that Aristotle, in assigning them, speaks for the most part not of wisdom but of the wise man; he understands, however, that that science is wisdom by reason of which these conditions belong to the wise man. And if anyone says that these properties do not belong to the wise man by reason of one science, but by reason of all or several together, the answer is that it now remains to be shown, by proving that these conditions are found in the science of metaphysics, and at the same time it will be shown that there is some one science which excels the others in all those attributes, and is therefore wisdom, and that that is metaphysics.

14. It is demonstrated that the said properties of wisdom are found in metaphysics.³—In the third place, therefore, Aristotle proves, in the said c. 2, that all these conditions are found in metaphysics. The first indeed, because he in a certain way knows all subjects who is endowed with universal science; but metaphysics is the most universal science; therefore it is the science of all things in that way which wisdom requires, namely, as far as is possible. Concerning this condition enough was said above, Sect. 2, and from what was said there it may be gathered that metaphysics deals with all things in two or three ways. First, confusedly and in common, in so far as it deals with the notions of being common to all things, or to all substances or accidents, and consequently with the first and most universal principles, on which all the principles of the other sciences are founded in some way. Secondly, in particular about all things down to their proper differences and species; which is true in some way, yet not equally nor in the same way in all; for in things, or notions of things, which abstract from matter according to being, it is simply true on the side of the things themselves; it is limited, however, by the imperfection of our intellect. And so human metaphysics (of which we are treating) demonstrates and discourses about these as far as human talent can by natural light. But in things which concern sensible or intelligible matter or quantity, it is not simply true, even on the side of the science itself, but only in so far as transcendental predicates are found in them, or metaphysical notions and middle terms abstracting from matter are applied to them in some way, so that something may be demonstrated of them through these. Thirdly, we can add that this science deals with all things not in themselves, but in their causes, because it disputes about the most universal causes of all things, and especially about God.

15. It could, therefore, be inquired which of these modes suffices for the notion of wisdom, and consequently on which side metaphysics is wisdom, or whether it is wisdom only as it comprehends all these modes. To which it seems briefly to be said that metaphysics requires that whole breadth and knowledge in order to be absolutely and simply wisdom. For if someone knows from metaphysics the common notion of being in so far as it is being, and its attributes and principles, he has indeed an inchoate wisdom, since he holds universal principles by which he can confirm and judge other principles. Likewise, because he has a certain science, or part of science, very desirable of itself, and most worthy to be known, and most useful and in a certain way necessary for all the other sciences; it would, therefore, be some sort of wisdom. It could not, however, be called wisdom simply; for what is wisdom simply without the knowledge of God? Likewise, because being in so far as it is being, when one stops precisely at it, although in the notion of a knowable object it is sufficiently perfect on account of its abstraction, subtlety and transcendence, nevertheless in the being of thing it has the least perfection, for there is greater perfection in determinate beings; but for the notion of wisdom a knowable object is not enough without the dignity of the things which are known. Indeed, if we lay stress on the name, certainly metaphysics, if it stopped at the most abstract notion of being, would not be a sufficiently savoury science to be able to be called wisdom simply. Conversely, however, if a metaphysics were feigned which treated of God and not of being, it would indeed have something more of the notion of wisdom, both on account of the nobility of its object, which in reality is no less abstract than being, although not in predication or universality; and on account of the delight which such contemplation has most of all joined to it; and finally on account of its virtual containment and causality, from which it comes about that such knowledge of God easily brings forth the knowledge of other things. Nevertheless, an exact and demonstrative knowledge of God of this kind cannot be obtained through natural theology without the common notions of being, substance, cause and the like first being known, because we do not know God except from his effects, and under common notions, with negations added by which we exclude imperfections. And therefore it cannot happen that metaphysics be wisdom under the latter notion unless it also includes the first. But if a metaphysics were feigned which, from the first and second modes of knowing, had whatever is necessary for knowing God, and primarily attained and contemplated him, it could indeed be called wisdom absolutely, even if it knew little or nothing about other things in particular; it would, however, be a very imperfect and mutilated wisdom, which would necessarily be ignorant of many things even about God, or attain them imperfectly; because, since God is known from his effects, the chief effects being unknown, the knowledge of God himself too would necessarily be diminished. And for this reason Aristotle rightly called not a part of metaphysics, but the whole of it, wisdom simply, which he said is only one, Ethics VI, c. 7; and St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2.

16. Aristotle proves that the second condition of wisdom is found in metaphysics because it treats of the most universal things, and those most remote from sense; but these are most difficult for us to know; for since our knowledge arises from sense, what is farthest removed from sense falls with difficulty into our understanding. Taking occasion from this, however, the interpreters are wont to dispute whether our intellect in this state knows singulars directly, or universals only; and whether among universals themselves it more easily knows those which are less common, such as the lowest species, and whether therefore what Aristotle says in this place is true, that the most universal things are the most difficult to know. Nevertheless, the former of these questions is altogether foreign to the present purpose; for what does it matter for declaring the dignity of the science of metaphysics, or for understanding the aforesaid text of Aristotle, whether the singular is known directly by the intellect or not? This question, therefore, is altogether to be referred by us to its proper place, that is, to the science of the soul. For we hope that, God helping, we shall at some time hand down the disputations of that science too, worked out according to our powers. And if we cannot achieve this, what has been handed down hitherto on the aforesaid question by the weightiest authors will suffice; for I have determined to discourse about nothing outside its proper place, or altogether outside method, even if such a disputation must be omitted altogether; for I judge it a lesser inconvenience to be silent about something than, by importunely summoning foreign questions from elsewhere, to obscure and confound a lucid and distinct method.

17. Whether our intellect knows universals or singulars more easily.—And almost the same reason holds for the latter question, which I shall therefore also omit, touching only on what is necessary in order that the sense of Aristotle in the cited place may be understood, lest he seem to contradict himself. For in Physics I, immediately at the beginning, he says that in science one must proceed from more universal things to particular ones, because one must begin from things better known to us, and more universal things are better known to us; but here he says that this science is about the most difficult things, because it is about the most universal ones, which are most difficult for men to know. Which apparent contradiction St. Thomas, In Metaph. I, c. 2, lect. 2, reconciles thus: that we understand Aristotle in Physics I to have spoken only of simple apprehension and imperfect knowledge of universal things, but here of scientific and complex knowledge, by which we distinctly know the proper notions of universals and demonstrate their properties of them. For it is not always the case that things which come to mind more easily through simple apprehension are also more easily penetrated intimately and known; for what do we apprehend more easily than time, motion and the like? But what is inquired into with more difficulty as regards exact knowledge, both of the formal notion or entity, and of the properties of such things? Thus, therefore, more universal things are said to be better known to us as regards simple and imperfect apprehension, as regards whether it is (so to speak); for who would not more easily conceive that this is a tree than whether it is a pear tree or a fig tree? For these more universal, confused and imperfect concepts we need fewer things, and therefore we form them more easily. But when we inquire into their exact knowledge, we attain it with more difficulty, because they are more remote from the senses, as Aristotle said here.

18. I see only this standing in the way of this exposition: that Aristotle in Physics I does not seem to speak only of that rude and imperfect apprehension of universals, but of scientific knowledge; for from that facility of knowing more universal things he gathers the order to be observed in science; but science ought not to proceed from things better known as regards apprehension, but as regards that knowledge which can be had through science; for if scientific knowledge is more difficult, it will contribute almost nothing that simple apprehension is easier, for one to begin from things of this kind according to a fitting method. Add that it is evident from experience itself that even in scientific knowledge common notions are known more easily than proper ones, as mobile or natural being more easily than the heaven or man, and the notion of being more easily than the notion of substance or accident. And reason too urges this, for in science there is intended per se and directly the distinct knowledge both of the essence and of the properties of each thing or formal notion; and universals themselves are not treated or known, speaking per se, as they are total or potential universals, under which notion their distinct knowledge depends on the knowledge of inferior things; for this is as it were reflexive and dialectical knowledge, because that property or notion of a potential whole belongs to them through the intellect rather than in reality itself; for universals of this kind are known in the proper and real sciences according to their proper actual essences, and the properties consonant with and adequate to them; but in this way more universal things are known more easily, because the knowledge of less universal things depends altogether on them, and not conversely, because more universal things are of the notion of the inferior, and not conversely. And this objection seems to conclude not only that Aristotle in Physics I spoke of the scientific knowledge of more universal things, but also that it is false that these more universal things are more difficult to know.

19. Wherefore some would have it that Aristotle in this place spoke not of universal notions, but of universal causes, that is, not of the universals which they call universals in predicating, of which he had spoken in Physics I, and of which the discourse given proceeds, but of universals in causing, such as God and the intelligences. Of which the reason of Aristotle also seems rightly to be understood, namely, because universals are most remote from the senses; for this is true of universals in causing, but not at all of the others; for since these are also in material singulars, they do not seem remote from sense; for this being, or this substance, is presented to sense, just as this animal or this man; whence more universal predicates are more easily presented to the senses by reason of their proper singulars than less universal ones; and therefore animal falls more easily into our intellect, at least on our part, than man, and substance than animal, and so of the others; because, speaking regularly, and according to the ordinary mode in which sensible objects are applied to us, the singulars of these more easily impress species or phantasms on the senses.

20. Nevertheless, this exposition is commonly rejected by the interpreters of Aristotle; for although they admit that the saying of the Philosopher is true also of universal causes, they teach, however, that he spoke properly of the more universal predicates, both because these are properly and simply called universals, and also because in truth even on that side on which metaphysics treats of being and substance as such it is more difficult than the other sciences. And the reason of Aristotle applies also to these predicates, namely, that they are farther removed from the senses according to their abstraction and prescinded notion; for these common notions do not have proper singulars, but descend to singulars by means of less universal notions.

21. The mode of reconciling adduced from St. Thomas is explained and approved.—The expositors bring forward other answers, both on this place of the Metaphysics and on that of the Physics, and on Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, and Book II, cc. 15 and 18, where Aristotle also says that universals are better known by nature, singulars to us. Omitting these, I think one must persist in the former answer, if, however, it is explained a little. I think, therefore, it must be said that Aristotle in Physics I spoke of the order of doctrine, in which he says one must begin from more universal things, because they are better known to us as regards the simple and confused knowledge of them, in so far as they are certain potential and universal wholes. Nor does it matter that in the sciences confused knowledge is not intended, but distinct, because Aristotle does not say that more universal things are better known by that knowledge which is intended through science, but rather by that imperfect knowledge which is supposed in order to be perfected through science. But in this place of the Metaphysics Aristotle is not dealing with the order of doctrine to be observed by us, but with obtaining the perfect science of the objects themselves, and in this way he says that more universal things are more difficult to know. Which, however, he did not assert simply, but with this limitation, for the most part; because it sometimes happens that more universal things are better known to us even as regards perfect knowledge, because the difficulty which is in them on the side of abstraction can be compensated from elsewhere; in which way natural being as such is better known to us than the heaven, and being than the angel. Notwithstanding that limitation, however, Aristotle concludes that this science is about the most difficult things, because in it there is so great an abstraction that it altogether prescinds from matter, and from sensible actions and properties as they are such, and therefore there can be nothing in its object whereby the difficulty arising from so great an abstraction might be removed; and let these things suffice about that second condition.

22. Doubt.—Concerning the third condition of wisdom, it can rightly be doubted how it belongs to this doctrine, namely, to be the most certain. And the chief reason for the difficulty arises from the mathematical sciences, which seem much more certain, since they proceed from most evident principles, indeed from principles best known to sense. Whence the same Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 3, text 16, indicates that the mode of proceeding of mathematics is the most accurate and most certain, because it abstracts from matter and change, from which philosophy does not abstract; and although metaphysics seems to abstract, if the things of which it treats are considered, nevertheless, as it is in us, it does not seem to abstract, because it considers those things only from sensible effects, which are concerned with matter. Whence the same Aristotle, Book II, text 1, says that things most known by their nature are unknown to us, because our intellect is related to them as the sight of the bat to the light of the sun. And it is confirmed, for human knowledge begins from sense, whence it receives clarity and certitude through sense; the more remote from sense, therefore, knowledge is of things, the less certain it will be; just as, therefore, from this principle Aristotle gathered above that this science is the most difficult, so he could have gathered that it is the most uncertain. Indeed, these two seem always to be conjoined, namely difficulty and uncertainty, or lesser certitude; if, therefore, this science is most difficult, it will consequently be less certain.

23. Answer.—Two parts of this doctrine seem to need distinguishing: one is that which discourses about being as it is being, and its principles and properties. The other is that which treats of some peculiar notions of beings, especially of immaterial ones. As regards the former part, there is no doubt that this doctrine is the most certain of all, which is enough for this property to be attributed to it absolutely and simply; for whenever a comparison is made between habits, it ought to be made according to what is best and greatest in them, as is taken from Topics III, c. 2; thus, therefore, Aristotle in the said prooemium says absolutely that this doctrine is the most certain, and he seems to speak of it as it is in us. And his reason is excellent, and proceeds of this science as regards this part, namely, because that science is most certain which is concerned most of all with the first principles, and which makes up its matter from fewer things; but this science is so related, because such a science is more independent, and has better-known principles, from which other principles receive strength and certitude, as has been declared; for thus the things with which the mathematical sciences deal include the common and transcendent predicates about which metaphysics discourses; the mathematical principles also include metaphysical ones, and depend on them.

24. But concerning the other part of this science, which is concerned with determinate notions of being, a distinction must be made; for a science can be more certain either according to itself or as regards us. The science of these things of itself, then, is undoubtedly most certain, and surpasses the mathematical sciences. For the certitude of a science in this way is to be weighed from its object; but things of this kind and immaterial substances are of themselves apt to generate the most certain knowledge of themselves, because, just as they are more perfect beings and more necessary, simple and abstract, so there is in them greater truth and greater certitude of principles. But on the side of our intellect this science in us is, as regards this part, less certain, as experience teaches, and as the reasons for doubt posited at the beginning prove. Especially that one, that, since our knowledge arises from sense, we attain more obscurely, and from the nature of the case less certainly, those things which abstract from all sensible matter.

25. Some doubts are proposed and dissolved.—First.—You will say, first: therefore this science, as it is in us, is always less certain in this part than mathematics; therefore it is simply less certain, because the metaphysics of which we are treating is none other than human; but this is only in us; what does it matter, then, to the nobility of metaphysics that according to itself it is more certain? For that will be true of angelic metaphysics, not of ours. Whence, in treating of ours, a repugnance seems to be involved in that distinction, according to itself and as it is in us; for this distinction, accommodated to objects or things known, fits excellently, and so Aristotle often used it in Posterior Analytics I, and at the beginning of the Physics and the Metaphysics; but accommodated to our acts or habits it seems in no way able to have a place, for the reason given; here, however, we are speaking not of objects, but of the thing itself. Some answer that it is enough that metaphysics in the angels is more certain, because it is of the same notion as ours, because it discourses about these beings under the same notion or abstraction. But this is not rightly said, because that angelic science is of a higher notion: first, because it is either a priori and perfect, namely as it is concerned with created things, or, if it is a posteriori, as about God, it is through a perfect knowledge of more noble effects. Next, because sciences differ in genus from their mode of proceeding; but the mode of understanding of the angels is higher, simpler and essentially more perfect.

26. A comparison between metaphysics and the mathematical sciences in certitude.—The answer, therefore, is, first, that perhaps in some state human metaphysics can be more perfect and more certain than the mathematical sciences are; for although, acquiring this science by natural powers alone and in the ordinary human way, it cannot be obtained so perfectly, yet if our intellect were helped by some superior cause in the natural discourse itself, or if the science itself were produced in a supernatural way, although the thing itself is natural, it could perhaps be so clear and evident as to surpass the mathematical sciences. But since this answer is more theological than philosophical, I add further that, although metaphysics in us is always, as regards this part, inferior to mathematics in certitude, it is nevertheless simply and essentially more noble; to which it contributes much that according to itself, and on the side of its object, it is more certain; for the dignity of the object pertains most of all to the dignity of the science, and it is that which per se redounds to the science; but the imperfections which are mixed in on our side are rather per accidens; and to this the distinction given tends, in which sense it involves no repugnance.

27. Second doubt.—Someone will doubt, secondly: for hence it follows that this science of metaphysics, in so far as it deals with God, is less certain as regards us than as it treats of the intelligences, which, however, does not seem true. The consequence is deduced thus from the reason given: for if this science is less certain as regards us as it is concerned with things abstracted from matter, because our knowledge begins from material things, then the more a thing of which metaphysics treats is removed and remote from this matter, the less certain will metaphysics be as it is concerned with it; but God is supremely distant from material and sensible things; therefore. The answer is by denying the consequence, absolutely speaking. For one thing can be understood to be more distant from another in two ways, namely, in perfection or entity, and in causality or the connection of effect and cause. In the former way God is more distant from material things than the created spirits; but in the latter way the created spirits are more distant from all created things than God. For all things depend essentially on God, not on the other spirits, and, speaking per se, all things imitate God, and bear some likeness or vestige of him; but that some likeness or agreement with the angels should result from this is secondary and accidental. Since, therefore, we ascend to contemplating the separated substances from sensible things, not considered in any way whatever, but as effects, hence it comes about that we naturally attain the knowledge of God more certainly than that of the angels; which will be more evident from the very use and experience of what is to be said.

28. Third doubt.—Thirdly, it can be doubted, especially concerning the former part posited, whether this science surpasses the others only as regards the certitude of its principles, or also of its conclusions. For the reason given seems to proceed only about principles; but if this is said, it follows that not this science, but the habit of principles, which is distinct, is more certain than the other sciences. Hence it can also be doubted in passing whether this science is more certain than the habit of principles. For if this is said, the difficulty posited is easily dispatched, as is self-evident; but this very thing seems most difficult; for this science rests on the first principles themselves; how, then, can it be more certain than their habit, since here too that axiom is true: That on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so?

29. Beginning from this latter part, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2,⁴ indicates that wisdom is more noble and more certain even than the habit of principles itself; for thus he says: Science depends on understanding as on something more principal, and both depend on wisdom as on the most principal, which contains under itself both understanding and science; St. Thomas, therefore, thinks that wisdom is more principal and more perfect than understanding, or the habit of principles. And he indicates the reason: because wisdom has whatever there is of perfection in the habit of principles, and that very thing in a more noble way, and moreover something more; it is, therefore, more perfect. The antecedent is declared, because understanding is concerned with the first principles by bearing judgement on them; but wisdom has this very thing, as was shown above, and beyond this is concerned with many other things which are inferred from the principles, and with the most noble things and the first causes of things, as was shown above. Again, wisdom is concerned with the first principles themselves in a more noble way, because understanding is concerned with them only in a simple way, bearing judgement from the natural and immediate efficacy of the natural light of the intellect; but wisdom, making a reflection upon that very light, and contemplating its origin, from which it has its whole certitude, takes it as a middle term for demonstrating the truth and certitude of the principles; but this mode of judging seems higher and more comprehensive; wisdom, therefore, has more perfection than understanding, and whatever nobility there is in understanding it has in a more perfect way. Hence the difficulty indicated to the contrary also seems to be satisfied; for although wisdom, in its beginning and as it were in the way of generation, depends on understanding, because it must suppose some principles, nevertheless according to itself, if it is perfect, it does not depend on it essentially, but is per se sufficient for assenting to the principles through proper middle terms and reflection upon the intellectual light itself; and perhaps it can come to such perfection that it now gives assent to its principles without any formal discourse. And Albert holds the same opinion, in the book De Apprehensione, part 5; and it has a great foundation in Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, text 23, where he indicates that metaphysics is the prince of all because it demonstrates its own principles; and Ethics VI, c. 7, where he speaks thus: The wise man must not only know the things which are known from the principles, but must also speak truly about the principles. Wherefore wisdom is both understanding and science, and (being as it were the head) the science of those things which are held in the highest honour. He could not, however, have understood that wisdom is an aggregate of understanding and some science, since he distinguished these one by one as diverse virtues; he understands, therefore, that it is understanding and science according to a certain eminent perfection, as the expositors there also understand; and Buridan disputes it, q. 12, who indicates this opinion in the last question of the same Book VI of the Ethics.

30. Whether metaphysics is more certain than the habit of principles.—Nevertheless some probably think that this opinion is to be limited, so that wisdom is preferred to the understanding of principles as it is concerned with the principles of the other sciences, but not as it is concerned with the principles of metaphysics itself. Which limitation seems to be taken from the words which St. Thomas subjoins above, saying that wisdom is the most principal and contains under itself understanding and science: As judging (he says) of the conclusions of the sciences, and of the principles of the same; where the relative of the same is to be noted; for it refers to the other sciences distinct from wisdom; therefore wisdom is compared to understanding only as it is concerned with the principles of the other sciences, and because it judges of them, and therefore it is said to be more noble. But it seems to happen otherwise in the same wisdom compared to understanding as it is concerned with the principles of wisdom itself; for from it, as from its proximate source, it has its whole certitude. Likewise, that habit is concerned with the same things in a more noble way, because that habit does not stop at the most abstract first principles pertaining to being as such, and to other abstract terms, such as that: Anything whatever either is or is not, and the like, but is also concerned with the first principles of substance as such, and of God, and of the intelligences as such; whence it properly pertains to it to contemplate their quiddities; for the quiddity of a thing is understood by simple knowledge, or an immediate principle is constituted from it, if it is known by us through composition; but it will pertain to wisdom to demonstrate the properties of these things from their quiddity. And indeed it does not seem able to be denied that the knowledge of those principles on which this science rests is simply more certain than the science itself, since it depends on it as on its proper cause, of another and superior notion in the mode of assenting. Nor does it matter that metaphysics reflects upon its principles in order to demonstrate them; for it is always necessary that, according to its proper notion, it proceed through discourse and rest on prior principles, which it takes as better known and more certain; for it is not to be said that the same acquired habit assents through discourse and without discourse. Therefore, absolutely and universally comparing the principles of metaphysics to the science itself, their knowledge is more certain. And experience confirms this very thing; for nothing is demonstrated in metaphysics which under that notion is as certain as this principle, Anything whatever either is or is not, in so far as it is self-evident.

31. How wisdom is more excellent than all the other intellectual habits.—When, therefore, wisdom is preferred to all the other intellectual virtues, even to the understanding of principles, it can be understood, first, of wisdom as it includes its principles, and is compared to the other sciences as they too include their principles and conclusions; for that the sciences are wont to be considered thus is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2, text 5, where Fonseca notices it. But metaphysics is said to surpass the other sciences as regards the certitude both of its conclusions and of its principles, not only by comparing principles to principles and conclusions to conclusions; for thus it would not be a proper comparison of science to understanding, but of science to science and understanding to understanding; in which sense even a particular science can be said to be more certain than the understanding of principles, because it can have more certain principles. It must be understood, therefore, that even comparing the conclusions of metaphysics to the proper principles of the other sciences, metaphysics is said to surpass them in certitude, because its discourse rests on principles so known and certain that it can generate a more certain assent than is the simple assent to some principles in other matters; and on account of the other reasons given above.

32. A less evident habit can be more noble than a more evident one, and a less certain than a more certain.—Or, secondly, and perhaps more clearly, it can be said that wisdom is preferred to the understanding of principles in nobility and excellence simply, but not always in certitude or evidence, especially with respect to us, or as it is in us; for the nobility of a habit, or its dignity, or that of a science, is not always convertible with certitude or evidence; for Christian faith is simply, in its substance or species, more noble than natural metaphysics, although it is not so clear and evident; and natural philosophy is more noble than mathematics, although it is less certain, on account of the nobility of its object, which contributes more to the dignity of an intellectual virtue simply, as St. Thomas indicated, De Anima I, c. 1, and I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1, where he adduces that saying of Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I, c. 5: Although we can touch but lightly on higher things, yet on account of the excellence of that kind of knowing we are more delighted than when we hold all these things which are joined to us. And he has almost a similar opinion in De Caelo I, c. 12. Wisdom, therefore, or metaphysics, although it is not more certain in us than understanding, at least as regards its principles, is nevertheless simply more noble and higher, because it attains more noble beings and the supreme causes of beings, namely God and the intelligences, which the understanding of principles does not attain according to their proper notions, but only according to the common notion of being and substance; for although many principles about God and the intelligences are self-evident according to themselves, nevertheless with respect to us nothing is self-evident; for if it is not self-evident to us that God exists, as we shall show below, much less the rest, which are demonstrated about these things in metaphysics. And so it comes about that about these things we know nothing immediately through the understanding of principles, but only through wisdom; and therefore wisdom is more noble, even granted that it is not more certain than its principles, as it exists in us; because for greater nobility it is enough that it be about simpler things, and things more certain according to themselves, with that certitude and evidence which can be had through the natural light of human talent. Hence the natural happiness of man (which confirms this most of all) consists not in some act of the understanding of principles, but in the act and contemplation of wisdom, as Aristotle says, Ethics VI, c. 12, that just as health is a certain happiness of the body, so wisdom is the happiness of the soul; and therefore in the same place he prefers it to prudence; for prudence is referred to wisdom as to its end; for prudence (as he says excellently) is the procuress of wisdom; for it so rules the mind as to render it peaceful and free from perturbation, which is most of all necessary for the contemplation of wisdom; and he teaches the same in Ethics X, cc. 7 and 8.

33. And from these things the resolution of the third doubt is also evident as regards its former part; for it must be said that this doctrine is more certain than the other sciences, not only as regards its principles, but also as regards its conclusions. Which indeed, if it is understood proportionately, is undoubted, as I said, namely, that the principles of this science are more certain than the principles of the other sciences, and the conclusions of this one than the conclusions of the others; for this latter follows from the former; for those conclusions are more certain which follow from more certain principles by the same kind of inference. But that the principles are more certain is evident, because they are more abstract and more universal, and the first of all, as we shall see below; whence they can serve for demonstrating in some way the principles of the other sciences, as has been declared. But if that comparison is understood absolutely, and without the said proportion, that is, that this science according to its whole self, even according to its conclusions, surpasses the other sciences in certitude according to all that is in them, even as regards their principles, then the comparison is less certain, and not necessary for the nobility and perfection of wisdom. Nevertheless it is probable, if we speak of the proper and particular principles of the other sciences as they are known by us; for you will scarcely find one which becomes known to us from the mere knowledge of its terms with as much certitude as can be manifested from the principles of metaphysics.

How metaphysics is more apt for teaching

34. The fourth condition of wisdom, which is to be more apt for teaching, Aristotle demonstrates thus: because that science is more apt for teaching which is concerned more with the knowledge of causes; for those teach who bring forward the cause of each thing. Tacitly, however, he subsumes that this doctrine is concerned most of all with the knowledge of causes; and so he concludes that it is most apt for teaching, and therefore is wisdom. Aristotle declared this same condition through almost the whole of c. 1 of this prooemium, or first book. For in order to conclude that it pertains to wisdom to investigate the supreme causes of things, he begins from a principle taken from afar, and says that men naturally desire science; for it is chiefly for this reason that they love the senses; and that in the other animals there is only the knowledge of the senses, and some of them have also memory, and a certain innate prudence, or rather natural instinct and sagacity, and some also participate a certain mode of discipline, yet never attain perfect experience; but that man knows singulars through the senses, which he not only holds in memory but also compares among themselves, and so little by little acquires experience, which is concerned only with singulars. Through experience, however, he proceeds further, and inquires into art, by which he now knows universals and inquires into their notions and causes; and therefore he who has attained art is judged wiser than one who is only experienced, because he knows not only that the thing is, as the experienced man does, but also the reason why, and the cause of the thing. And therefore (he says) in any art whatever we judge the master-builders more noble and wiser, who are not only active (which in its own way is common to inanimate things), but also know the causes and reasons of things. And immediately he subjoins the property with which we are concerned, saying: And in general the sign of the wise man is to be able to teach; which he can accomplish who knows the causes of things, but not he who has experienced effects alone.

35. Doubt.—Concerning this condition, however, it can first of all be doubted why this science is judged more apt for teaching than the rest; for every proper and a priori science (for the comparison must be made among these) demonstrates the thing through its causes; therefore each science is as apt for teaching in its own matter as this one in its. Nor does it matter for this that this science treats of more noble things; for this will indeed contribute to its being more noble, but not to its being more apt for teaching; for to this the proportion of the effect to the cause contributes more than the nobility of each; for a lower effect is taught as fittingly through its own proper cause as a higher one through its own; this condition, therefore, either is not special in metaphysics, or is not distinct from the nobility of the object. And if this property can be attributed to any science, it should certainly rather be attributed to dialectic; for it teaches how to learn, and teaches how to teach; therefore it is more apt for teaching than any other. And so Plato accommodates this function to dialectic in the dialogue on Being, or the Sophist, and therefore in the same place, and in Book VII of the Republic, he prefers it to all the sciences.

36. Solution of the doubt.—To the former difficulty the answer is that, although the other sciences demonstrate their properties or effects through proper causes accommodated to them, nevertheless, because those causes are not first, nor independent, but subordinated to higher ones, the other disciplines are therefore not so apt for teaching as metaphysics, which considers the first causes and principles of things. And so metaphysics excels not only in the nobility of its object, but also in the independence and superiority of its causes and principles. From which it comes about that this science by itself alone, and without the aid of another, teaches fully and exactly all the things which fall under its object, while the other sciences in many things depend on this one in order to be able to hand down the exact knowledge of causes; and therefore this science is said to be more apt for teaching.

37. To the confirmation the answer is that there are two things which help toward teaching, namely, the method and mode of teaching, and the comprehension of things and causes. As regards the former, the function of teaching pertains to dialectic, and in that sense it can be said to be most apt for teaching, or rather for learning, since it hands down the form and method of teaching. But as regards the latter, metaphysics is most apt for teaching, since it teaches higher and more efficacious middle terms of demonstrating, and most of all a priori ones. Since, therefore, this is the chief and most difficult thing in science, and since dialectic itself, in so far as it is a science and demonstrates through causes, depends in this in some way on metaphysics, this is therefore simply the most apt for teaching. Nor did Plato think otherwise, who often understands metaphysics under the name of dialectic.

38. How metaphysics demonstrates a priori.—Secondly, concerning the same condition, or its proof, it can be doubted how this science can demonstrate through causes, since it has a most simple object, which cannot have proper causes. For being in so far as it is being, neither according to itself nor according to the most noble object contained under that common one, can have proper causes; therefore metaphysics cannot demonstrate through causes, at least in its supreme part, nor in that which considers the most universal notions of being. The antecedent is evident, because God has no causes, and consequently neither has being as being, which comprehends God. The answer is that causes are twofold: some proper, which in reality influence the effect; and others more broadly so called, which are rather causes of knowing the thing a priori than of its existing, and are properly called the reasons of the attributes or properties which are demonstrated of the subject. Speaking, therefore, of the subject of this science according to its most abstract notion—most abstract (I say) either according to our reason, as being in so far as it is being, or according to the thing itself, as the first being, or being itself by essence—in this way it is true that this science does not have proper causes of the thing, through which it demonstrates something of its object; it has, however, reasons and middle terms distinct from the extremes according to our mode of conceiving, by which it composes a priori demonstrations; for for demonstrations of this kind, since they are composed in a human way, the distinction of concepts with some foundation in the thing suffices, and that a property known through one concept be the reason of another attribute demonstrated; and in this way we demonstrate that God is a perfect being because he is a being necessary from within, and we demonstrate one property of being, or of substance, in the same way through another. And Aristotle comprehends this mode of demonstration when he says that this science teaches the causes of things, that is, the principles and roots and reasons of things, whether they are proper physical causes or metaphysical reasons, which are also wont to be called formal causes in a broad sense. And in this way St. Thomas explains, In Metaph. VI, text 1, what Aristotle says there, namely, that the principles and causes of beings in so far as they are beings are inquired into in this science. But as regards the other parts, or beings, which metaphysics comprehends under its object, such as created beings, the intelligences, etc., in this way it has proper real causes, or causes truly influencing in the thing itself, through which it can compose demonstrations, as is self-evident.

Through how many genera of causes metaphysics demonstrates

39. It demonstrates through the final cause.—Through the efficient.—A third question, however, immediately occurs: whether this science, as it is concerned with these beings, demonstrates through all the genera of causes, or only through some. And first of all it is certain that it demonstrates very often and most of all through the final cause, as is evident from its very use, and because this is the first and most noble of the causes, and the one which is wont to contribute most toward investigating the natures and properties of things, indeed the other causes of a thing. Again, it is also certain that this science demonstrates through the efficient cause, for it considers the first being, which is the chief efficient cause of all the others, on which all the others depend essentially. And under that cause it also considers the intelligences, which have some causality over these lower things, and finally the other causes of things, in so far as they can be comprehended under its object.

40. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: the causality of the efficient cause is concerned with the existence of things; but science abstracts from existence; therefore it cannot demonstrate anything through the efficient cause. The answer is, first, that although actual dependence on the efficient cause, as it is in exercised act (so to speak), does not fall per se under science, because it is not simply necessary, but contingent and free, the intrinsic relationship to the efficient cause, especially the first, is necessary, and is considered in science, and many properties of things are gathered from it. For from the fact that a creature has essential dependence on an efficient cause, it is gathered that it is not a being by essence but by participation, and that being is not of its essence, and that it is a finite being, and the like. Next it is said that, granted that science does not consider the existence of a thing in exercised act, it nevertheless considers it in signified act, that is, what existence itself is, and how it belongs, or can belong, to each thing; and to this the consideration of the efficient cause contributes most of all. Hence it also comes about that concerning those things which are in some way necessary beings, science contemplates actual and exercised existence itself; which is most of all true concerning God, who is simply a necessary and actually existing being, whose necessity of existing is considered not through an efficient cause, but through the negation of an efficient cause. Concerning other things, too, it is inquired in science whether they are eternal, and how they emanate from their efficient cause. Many things, therefore, are demonstrated in metaphysics through this cause.

41. Through the exemplar.—And hence it is also evident that this science can use the exemplar cause in its demonstrations, if, however, it can attain the truth and property of the exemplar itself in itself; which, however, is rare, and in the divine exemplars, which they call ideas, naturally impossible, because those divine exemplars cannot be beheld in themselves unless God is seen in himself. In whatever way, however, the exemplar cause is known, it is an excellent middle term for demonstrating, and most proper to metaphysics, for of itself it abstracts from matter, and is found more properly in spiritual and intellectual things, and is in a certain way the notion or form through which the agent operates; and so the reason concerning it is the same as that concerning the efficient cause.

42. How through the material.—Concerning the material cause, finally, Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, q. 15, absolutely denies that metaphysics demonstrates anything through this cause. His reason is that metaphysics abstracts from matter on the side of its object; therefore the principles of metaphysics also abstract from matter; therefore so do its demonstrations. But this opinion needs limitation, for the material cause as such, and taken in its whole breadth, extends more widely than sensible matter, or intelligible or quantitative matter, from which the object of metaphysics abstracts. The assumption is declared, for in spiritual things there is truly material causation (so to speak); for created spiritual substance is truly the material cause of its accidents, and many think that essence is the material cause of existence, and nature of personality, and the term of the action which tends to it. Although, therefore, we grant that metaphysics does not use matter most properly so called in its demonstrations, it cannot, however, be denied that it often uses the material cause, either for affirming or for denying something. In the former way it demonstrates, for example, that the accidents of an angel are immaterial, indivisible, and whole in the whole and whole in any part, because they are in a spiritual subject, etc. In the latter way, however, it demonstrates that those accidents are not created, because they depend on their subject in coming to be and in being conserved; and similarly from the proper definition of the material cause it demonstrates that essence cannot be compared to existence as a subject. Finally, the causality of passive potency as such is material; but it pertains to the metaphysician to consider passive potency and to demonstrate through it; therefore also through the material cause. I add further, from what was said above about the object of this doctrine, that, although it does not treat per se and by primary design of physical matter, it nevertheless treats of it in some way, namely, in so far as is necessary for completing the treatment and consideration of its object, and for distinguishing act from potency, and complete form from incomplete, and both from matter, and finally for placing matter in that grade of being in which it is truly to be placed; and in this treatment it can gather and demonstrate many things from the common notion of the material cause, as seems self-evident, and will be evident from use itself. Demonstration through the material cause, therefore, is not altogether foreign to this science, although the others occur more frequently and seem to be more proper to this doctrine.

43. Concerning the fifth property nothing occurs to be added to what was said in the former conclusion and in the preceding section. For it has been shown that this science is most of all speculative, and is concerned with things most of all to be desired and known for their own sake; whence it is most evident that this science is to be desired and sought for its own sake. Likewise it has been said that natural happiness is placed in some act of this science; but happiness is most of all desired for its own sake.

Metaphysics is easily the prince of the other sciences

44. And from this condition it is easily understood that the sixth condition of wisdom also belongs most perfectly to metaphysics; whence Aristotle demonstrates it in this way. That science is most of all the prince, and is set over the one which ministers, which considers the first causes of things, especially the final and last one, for whose sake things come to be; but this is the function of metaphysics; it is it, therefore, which will have dominion over the other disciplines; therefore by this title too it is wisdom. But some say that not this, but moral science, especially political science, has this principality, and as it were command over the other sciences, as Fonseca learnedly noted on this place of Aristotle. For to command and have dominion among the intellectual virtues is to be attributed to the practical rather than to the speculative ones; for to command is a practical act; and moral philosophy is practical, and in it the chief part is politics, which commands all things in order to the common good of the commonwealth; therefore. And it is confirmed, for according to the due order of reason, good morals are not to be referred to science, but science to good morals; that science, therefore, which procures good morals ought to command that which rests in the mere speculation of things. But these reasons, if they prove anything, proceed rather of prudence than of moral philosophy, for to command pertains to prudence, not to philosophy; but to intend good morals belongs properly neither to philosophy nor to prudence, but to the will and its virtues. Next, those reasons indeed prove that prudence is more perfect in the notion of a moral virtue, and under that notion commands practically; and consequently we can also grant freely that in order to good morals moral philosophy in some way goes before the other speculative sciences; but those reasons do not prove either that prudence is absolutely and simply more perfect than metaphysics, or that in the genus of intellectual virtue moral philosophy has the primacy.

45. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish two things in the sciences, namely, the contemplation or judgement of truth, and the infallible power or rectitude of attaining it; and the good use of such a science and of its acts, in so far as they are free, and can be done or not done well or badly, and for an honest end, and with due circumstances. The former notion is essential to science as such; indeed, universally it belongs per se primarily to every intellectual virtue, although a practical virtue further orders the very knowledge and judgement of truth to work, which does not pertain to the greater perfection of science as such, but is rather an indication of lesser perfection, as Aristotle taught here in the prooemium of the Metaphysics; and perhaps we shall touch on it below in treating of qualities and habits of the mind. The latter notion, namely the use of science—that it be honest, or useful to the commonwealth, or for other ends—is accidental to science as such, although it is most necessary for man. To command the use of science in this latter way, therefore, pertains proximately to certain virtues and to prudence, and the moral sciences contribute more to this same command than metaphysics; and this is properly called practical command, because it regards the work of science more as it is a work of the will than of the intellect; for use is actively in the will, although sometimes the execution is in the intellect. But to direct the sciences under the former notion, namely to the knowledge of the true, pertains per se primarily and most of all to metaphysics, from which they receive in some way their principles, and the knowledge of their terms, and their objects, or the quiddities of their objects, according to what has been declared above. And by reason of this direction and independence metaphysics can be said to command the others, by a command speculative rather than practical; by reason of which it itself is simply eminent in the notion of science and wisdom. I add, finally, that if metaphysics is considered in so far as the natural happiness of man consists in its most perfect act, then not only the other sciences but also the moral virtues and prudence are ordered to it as to their end; for all these are ordered to the happiness of man, and all actions are excellently referred to this end, namely, that they may dispose man and render him apt for divine contemplation, which formally or elicitively pertains to this science, although it must have joined to it the love which is wont to arise from such contemplation. And by this reason too Aristotle concludes that this science commands all, because it contemplates the supreme good and the last end simply; for just as among arts which are subordinated to some end, that one is architectonic and commands the others which considers the supreme end in that order, so metaphysics, which absolutely contemplates the last end of the sciences and of all arts and of the whole of human life, is said to command all, and to be the prince of all, not because it commands properly and practically, but as it were virtually and eminently. For metaphysics does not proceed by showing practically how that end is to be obtained, or how other things are to be directed to it; and therefore it does not command properly and formally; it shows, however, the end to which all things are to be directed, and shows that that end is the last end of all things; and therefore, on the side of the thing known, virtually and eminently, as far as depends on itself, it commands all things, and directs all things to that end and supreme good.

The doubt about the subalternation of the other sciences to metaphysics is dispatched

46. The opinion of some.—Here, however, a doubt occurs concerning this condition: whether this command or direction of metaphysics over the other sciences is such that all the sciences are to be said to be subalternated to metaphysics by reason of it. For there have not been lacking those who have so thought about this command of metaphysics that by reason of it they said that all the sciences are subalternated, but that metaphysics alone is simply, or only, subalternating. Which opinion some attribute to Aristotle, Physics I, c. 2, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 7; and to Plato, Republic VII, where he disputes about metaphysics under the name of dialectic. And St. Thomas indicates it, in the opuscule De natura generis, c. 14. Others, however, simply deny this subalternation; and this is the common and received opinion, as may be seen in Javellus, Metaphysics I, q. 2; Soncinas, Book IV, q. 9; Soto, Physics I, q. 11. Others, finally, use a distinction, and teach that under one notion or use of the word subalternation metaphysics can be called subalternating, at least in some way, but deny it simply. Read Fonseca, Book IV, c. 1, q. 1.

47. What a subalternated science is.—But lest we be involved in the ambiguity of names, let us suppose that that science is properly called subalternated to another which essentially, or necessarily from the nature of the thing, depends on it in the being of science, so that it cannot be a science unless it is joined to the subalternating science and takes from it the evidence of its principles. The reason for this, however, is that a subalternated science does not have self-evident and immediate principles, but conclusions demonstrable in a higher science; and therefore, just as every science depends essentially on the habit of principles, so the subalternated depends on the subalternating properly so called, because each takes the evidence of its principles from a higher virtue. You will say: whence is it evident that a subalternated science cannot have self-evident principles, but that conclusions demonstrable elsewhere are principles to it? The answer is that this can pertain only to the signification of the word; for in reality it is evident that there are some sciences which use principles of this kind, such as medicine, music, etc.; these, therefore, we say are signified by the name of subalternated sciences. For those which have immediate principles are subordinated proximately and per se to the habit of principles; and therefore there is no reason why they should be said to have subordination with respect to another science, since they do not depend on it per se; this dependence, therefore, of one science on another is signified by the name of subalternation.

48. What conditions are required for subalternation.—From which it comes about that true subalternation is only between diverse sciences; for even if within the same science there is a dependence of one conclusion on another down to the principles, the science cannot on that account be said to be subalternated either in whole or in part, since absolutely the whole science is subordinated not to another prior science, but immediately to the habit of principles; at most it can be said that one conclusion is subordinated or subalternated to the demonstration of another. It is necessary, therefore, that the sciences be distinct, and that they have the aforesaid dependence and subordination among themselves. It sometimes happens, however, that some science has the said dependence on a higher science not in all its principles, nor in the demonstrations of all its conclusions, but in some; and then it is said to be subalternated to it, not in whole, but in part, or by a partial, not a total, subordination; in which way geometry is said to be subalternated to natural philosophy, because, although it uses many indemonstrable principles, it nevertheless has some which are demonstrated in philosophy, such as that one: From any point to any point a line can be drawn, which is demonstrated in physics, because no indivisibles are immediate, since continuous quantity cannot be composed of indivisibles.⁵

49. Whence the subalternation of one science to another arises.—This dependence of one science on another, however, is wont to arise from the subordination of the objects; for, just as the being of a science consists in its order to its object, so also its principles are proportioned to it. Wherefore, if the objects of two sciences are not subordinated to each other, as when they are genera or species altogether co-divided, there cannot be subalternation between those sciences. It is necessary, therefore, that this subalternation be founded in the objects, namely, in this, that the object of one is the same as the object of the other with some accidental difference adjoined, which in the being of being is per accidens, but in the being of the knowable is in some way per se, and constitutes a special knowable object. For when two objects of science are subordinated per se even in the being of the thing, namely as genus and species, or as essentially superior and inferior, the sciences of those objects cannot be subalternated, at least totally; because either they pertain to the same science, if they are altogether in the same abstraction, or certainly, if the sciences are diverse, each will be subalternating, because each can have its own principles taken from the proper difference of the object which it considers, or from its first attribute, and through them it will be able to demonstrate the other conclusions which are composed about the posterior attributes. For the science of man does not consider the things which belong to man as he is an animal, but only as he is rational, and in these it is not subalternated to the science of animal, because to be rational belongs immediately to man, and from this principle arise the other attributes of man as man. But if there is some attribute which depends in some way on the sensitive grade as such, or on the special conjunction of the sensible with the rational, the science of man will be partially subalternated to the science of animal as regards that, but not altogether and totally.

50. For absolute and total subalternation, therefore, it is necessary that the subject of the subalternated science add an accidental difference to the subject of the subalternating science, as visual line adds to line, sonorous number to number, the curable human body to the human body; for from this conjunction it comes about both that the science which specially considers the properties flowing from that conjoined thing as such is diverse from the science which abstracts from that composition and considers the subject according to itself, and also that the principles of such a science are conclusions of the higher science, namely because the properties of such a composite arise from the components themselves and from the properties which they have according to themselves, and which are demonstrated in the higher science. Concerning all of which it is discoursed more fully in Posterior Analytics I, c. 11; here, however, they have only been indicated and as it were tasted, in order that we may explain briefly how metaphysics is disposed toward the other sciences, even as regards this property.

51. None of the properties of a subalternating science belong to metaphysics.—From what has been said, therefore, it is gathered not obscurely that no property of a properly subalternating science belongs to metaphysics with respect to the other sciences. For, first, the other sciences do not depend altogether on metaphysics in the being of science, because they do not depend on it for all the evidence and certitude of their principles. For they have their own immediate principles, indemonstrable ostensively and directly; which is enough for them to be able to have their evidence immediately from the habit of principles, which suffices for generating science. For although metaphysics can in some way demonstrate those principles, that demonstration is nevertheless not simply necessary for the evident judgement of such principles, since they can be known evidently from their terms, and that demonstration is not properly a priori, but by reduction to the impossible, or at most through some extrinsic cause. Metaphysics, therefore, is not simply necessary for the evidence of these principles; therefore neither in order that the habit generated from them be true science; therefore such a habit is not a science subalternated to metaphysics. Again, the objects of the lower sciences are not subordinated to being or to substance per accidens, but per se and essentially, as is evident in natural being, which is the object of philosophy, and in quantity, which is the object of mathematics. And the reason is that nothing is contained under being per accidens, but per se; and if there is some science which deals with some being of reason, it is in no way subordinated to metaphysics in so far as the latter deals with real being, because being of reason as such is not contained under real being, but is primarily diverse; but in so far as metaphysics deals with being of reason, then any being of reason whatever is contained not per accidens but per se under being of reason as such, which the metaphysician considers; there does not intervene, therefore, a proper and total subalternation. Which use itself also teaches; otherwise metaphysics would have to be acquired before all the sciences, since without it no science could exist; but use has the opposite, for the reasons touched on above, and nevertheless true demonstrations are made from self-evident principles without metaphysics, and especially in the mathematical sciences; there does not intervene, therefore, a true subalternation. But that it sometimes intervenes in one or another conclusion is not repugnant, as can easily be understood from the principles posited.

52. But if anyone, by extending the word, wishes to call subalternation that excellence and as it were command which metaphysics has over the other sciences, in so far as it can in some way establish and confirm their principles, and in so far as it brings great light to all, or in so far as it attains the last end or happiness of man, one should not contend with him, since the dispute is about a name; especially since weighty authors sometimes use that kind of expression, as may be seen in Simplicius, Physics I, text 8; and Themistius, in his Paraphrase of Posterior Analytics I, c. 2; Aristotle, however, never used that manner of speaking, nor did he require that property for the notion of wisdom, but only that it have dominion in a certain way over the other sciences, which is far different, as is evident from what has been said.

53. A question is answered.—Up to this point, then, the second assertion has been sufficiently proved, namely, that metaphysics is true wisdom. Someone will ask, however, how the former and the latter assertion cohere; for Aristotle in the Ethics places science and wisdom as co-distinct species under the genus of intellectual virtue; but we make this doctrine at the same time science and wisdom. This, however, is dispatched with easy effort if we say with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1, that wisdom is co-distinguished from science not because it is not science, but because in the breadth of science it has a special grade and dignity. Whence it comes about that science is taken in two ways: in one way generically, as it signifies a habit acquired through demonstration, as it is defined in Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, where for this reason no mention is made of wisdom in particular, because science is treated only under that general notion under which it embraces wisdom; and in this way the former assertion posited by us proceeds. In another way science is taken more strictly, as it signifies a habit which is concerned only with demonstrable conclusions, and not with the principles themselves, that is, for a habit which is only science and in no way understanding, in that sense, namely, in which Aristotle said that wisdom is understanding and science; and in this sense science is distinguished from wisdom; and so we say that metaphysics is not a science of this kind, but wisdom.