Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Metaphysics is truly and properly a science.—The definition of metaphysics.—The object of metaphysics having been explained, it will be easy to set out its essential notion; but since the essence and the unity of a thing are either the same or intrinsically conjoined, its unity is therefore to be explained at the same time, especially because the discussion is about specific unity; for about numerical unity there is no question, since it is evident that this science is multiplied according to number in diverse subjects, as are the other accidents also. In the same subject, however, it is certain that it is not multiplied in order to the same things; but whether with respect to diverse things it too is distinguished, and consequently can be multiplied in the same subject, depends on the prior question about its specific or essential unity. But since this unity is rightly declared through genus and difference, because the species consists of genus and difference, we therefore suppose what is certain and self-evident, that metaphysics is truly and properly a science, as Aristotle taught at the beginning of the Metaphysics and in innumerable other places; and it is evident from the definition of science, which is taken from Posterior Analytics I and Ethics VI, c. 3, namely, that it is a knowledge or habit affording certain and evident knowledge of necessary things through their proper principles and causes, if it is perfect and a priori science. All these things, however, are found in this doctrine, as far as depends on the force and notion of its object, and therefore there is no doubt that this is in itself a science, although perhaps in us it does not always, or not as regards all things, attain the state or perfection of science. It is evident, therefore, that this science is contained under the genus of science. Indeed, from what has been said it can easily be evident that it is contained under the genus of speculative science, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics I, c. 2, and Book II, c. 1, because it is concerned with things most speculative, and which are not ordered to operation, as we shall declare more conveniently below in explaining the attributes of this science. Next, it is evident from what has been said that this science is essentially distinct from the other speculative and real sciences, such as philosophy and mathematics; whence it also follows that it has, as such, some unity, by reason of the object explained by us. Under which notion it can be defined that metaphysics is the science which contemplates being in so far as it is being, or in so far as it abstracts from matter according to being.

2. Whether metaphysics is one in a subaltern species, or in a lowest one.—There remains, therefore, the difficulty to be treated at present, whether this unity is generic or specific, and consequently whether that difference which is taken from the relationship to the adequate object set out by us is subaltern, so that under it several specific ones can be designated, or rather is one indivisible and last difference. For many think of it in the former way; whose opinion can be urged, first, because in the object established by us various abstractions can be assigned; for first of all there is that twofold abstraction from matter according to being, either necessarily or only permissively, which seems sufficient to vary the knowable object as such according to species, and consequently the science. Again, among things which exist necessarily without matter, the abstraction of God, who is altogether pure act and abstracts even from all metaphysical composition, seems at the least very diverse from the abstraction of the other intelligences, which, although they lack matter, are nevertheless composite, and far diverse attributes belong to them. Under the general unity of metaphysics, therefore, at least three sciences distinct in species can be constituted. One which is concerned with being in so far as it is being, and descends at most to the common notions of substance and accident, and to the nine genera which are contained under the latter; a second, which contemplates the created intelligences; and a third, which contemplates God alone. For, just as natural beatitude consists in him alone, so there seems to be a natural science to be posited which according to its last and specific notion attains God alone. Nor perhaps will there be lacking one who would divide this science into more members, according to the diverse grades of abstraction in the very common notions of being in so far as it is being, or of substance in so far as it is substance, and so of the others.

3. Secondly, I argue principally in this way: because if this science is one, it is most of all as regards the judicative habit which is left in the mind from its acts. For it is certain that the intelligible species which this science uses are very many, and not one only; and similarly it is evident that its acts are various and manifold, differing not only in number but also in species. For who would doubt that the act by which we judge that every being is one, or that unity is an attribute of being, is diverse from that by which we judge that the intelligences are immortal, or something similar? If, therefore, specific unity can be thought out in metaphysics, it is only as regards the judicative habit. But it cannot be established in that either. Therefore it can be in nothing. The minor is proved, because if that habit is one in species, either it is altogether simple in its entity according to its order to the object (leaving aside for now the composition, if there is any, through intension alone, or through rooting in the subject), or it is a composite quality. But neither seems able to be said. The first is proved, because, since the habit of metaphysics inclines to various judgements, and about most distinct things, so as to be as it were commensurate with the acts themselves, it does not seem able to incline to all of them, or to produce all of them, through one and the same simple quality.

4. Which is declared secondly thus: because the habit of metaphysics is first acquired through one act about one object, for example, about this conclusion: Every being is true, or another similar one; then through other acts it is increased and extended to other very diverse conclusions, in which increase it is necessary that something of reality or entity be added to it, because it is impossible to understand a real increase without a real addition. But this addition cannot be sufficient by way of intension alone, because this increase is not only from the diverse participation of the subject according to greater and greater rooting of the form itself in it, but is on the side of the habit itself through greater extension to the object; therefore an addition is required on the side of the habit itself, in so far as something is added to it by which it regards a new object or a new conclusion, as St. Thomas openly taught in dealing with habits in common, I-II, q. 52, aa. 1 and 2. A habit of this kind, therefore, cannot be altogether simple, as it regards the whole breadth of its object. But that neither can it be composite and yet be truly one in species is proved, first, because that which is first acquired in the habit through acts of one species, and that which is added through an act distinct in species, are also distinct in species among themselves; therefore they do not compose one habit according to species. The antecedent is evident, both because the acts by which they are generated are distinct in species, and also because they incline to similar acts distinct in species; and moreover because there is no greater reason for distinction among the second acts themselves than among the inclinations which remain after the manner of first act, inclining to acts similar to those by which they were generated, and consequently commensurate and proportioned to them; and finally because, if there were no specific distinction between those two, neither would a numerical one be necessary, but an increase by way of intension would suffice. The former consequence, however, is proved, because from two qualities distinct in species one quality of one species cannot be composed.

5. It can be answered that those two are distinguished not by a total, but by a partial species, and that therefore an integral quality, simply one, can be composed of them as of heterogeneous parts. But against this: for I ask what this mode of composition is; for either it is through a true and real union of those qualities (which are called partial) not only in the same subject, but also among themselves, or it is only through their being brought together in the same subject. Neither can be said, for the first does not seem able to be sufficiently understood or explained; for I ask what that union is. For either it is through the immediate conjunction of one with the other, and this not, because such a union intervenes only between those things which are related as potency and act, or as form and matter, accident and subject, term and terminable thing; but those two are not compared to each other in any of these ways, as is self-evident, because each per se regards its own object, and does not require the other in order to be terminated or actuated by it. Or they are united after the manner of a certain continuation in some common term, as the degrees of intension are believed to be united; and this mode of union too is most difficult to understand. First indeed, because there is no sufficient reason for feigning it. Secondly,¹ because some indivisible term must be assigned in which those two are united. Which, however, does not seem able to be done, because that term too must regard some object; but there is none to which it could tend, because it neither tends at the same time to both objects of those partial habits, or of the acts by which they were generated, nor is there any reason why it should tend to one rather than to the other; nor can a new object be feigned to which it would tend, since no other has been known or judged through the acts. Thirdly, because in the acts such a union cannot be required, nor such an indivisible term in which they are united; otherwise all the acts of the science of metaphysics could coalesce into one and be really united, which is unintelligible; therefore neither is there such a union in the habit, because there cannot be anything in the habit which was not in the acts. But if the acts have no union among themselves, they have nothing whence or by which to effect it. And these arguments proceed even if those two particular habits are feigned to be of the same notion and species. But if they differ in species, a fourth argument can be added, namely, that things which differ in species cannot be continuous per se, nor have a proper common term.

6. Finally, if on account of these arguments it is said that those qualities compose one habit only by being brought together in the same subject, it follows, first, that there is no true unity in this science, but only a unity per accidens by reason of the subject, especially if (as seems more probable) those qualities are distinguished in species. It follows, secondly, by the same reason, that from all the habits of the sciences one science is composed by their being brought together in the same subject.

7. Two difficulties or questions are touched upon in the arguments proposed. The first is proper and special to this place, whether metaphysics is one science in species or not. The second is general, and of the same notion in all sciences and in almost all acquired habits: whether they are simple qualities, or composite according to extension to their objects.

8. Various opinions on this matter.—Concerning the former part, which is proper to this place, some think that metaphysics is not one science in species, but in genus, and contains under itself at least those three aforesaid species, namely, one about God, who abstracts altogether both from matter and from every vestige of matter, such as all composition can be judged to be, and likewise from all change and vicissitude; one about the created intelligences, which abstract neither from all composition nor from all change, both local and of intellect and will, yet abstract intrinsically and essentially from matter and physical motion; and one about being, which abstracts from matter according to being only permissively. Nor is this against the division of speculative science given by Aristotle into physics, mathematics and metaphysics, because that is not a division into lowest species, but into subaltern ones, as is evident of mathematics, which contains several sciences under itself.

9. Metaphysics is one science in species.—Nevertheless it is to be asserted, with the common opinion, that metaphysics is simply one science in species. For this seems to be the clear mind of Aristotle in the whole prooemium, or cc. 1 and 2 of Metaphysics I, where he always speaks of this science as of one species, and attributes to it as to one and the same the names and attributes which belong to it partly according as it is concerned with God and the intelligences—for thus it is called theology, or divine science, and first philosophy—and partly as it is concerned with being in so far as it is being, and its first attributes and principles, by which reason it is called universal science and metaphysics. But it is called wisdom in so far as it embraces all these things, and contemplates the first principles and the first causes of things. Likewise in Book IV, where he seems to treat professedly of the object of this science, he says that it is one, and considers all things which are separated from matter. Hence, in the course and mode of handing down this doctrine, he sufficiently indicates that it is one science in species, and often says indifferently that being in so far as it is being is the adequate object of this science, and that its chief part is substance, either simply, or immaterial and first, as is evident from Book IV, cc. 2 and 3, and Book VII, c. 1, and Book XII, in which he hands down the knowledge of God and of the intelligences, and says that it is the chief part of this doctrine, to which in a certain way the others are ordered. And finally, in Book VI, c. 1, and Book XI, c. 6, he establishes abstraction from matter according to being as the adequate formal notion under which of the object of this science. But if the science which dealt with being as being were distinct from that which treats of immaterial being, and being separated from matter in reality, the former would not properly and perfectly participate an abstraction of this kind, nor would it deal with the first causes of things, nor have the other things which Aristotle attributes to metaphysics; and by almost this argument St. Thomas concludes, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, that natural wisdom is only one, whereas the habits of the other sciences are several, where it is necessary to speak of specific unity; for according to genus the other sciences too have unity; but this wisdom is none other than metaphysics; nor can it be said that only that part, or last science, of metaphysics which deals with God is called wisdom, because that, taken prescissively, does not consider the first principles common to all the sciences, nor does it corroborate and confirm them, which pertains to wisdom; just as, conversely, that former part of metaphysics which deals with being as such does not by itself alone consider all the highest causes, and therefore that too, taken prescissively, does not have the proper notion of wisdom; it is necessary, therefore, that one and the same science embrace all these things. And the same St. Thomas taught this very thing on the cited places of Aristotle, and especially in the prologue to the Metaphysics, and the other expositors, ancient and modern, think the same.

10. The reason for this opinion, however, is that there is no sufficient foundation for this multiplication of sciences; and moreover all the things which are treated in this science are so connected among themselves that they cannot conveniently be attributed to diverse sciences. All the more because, by reason of the same abstraction, all agree in the same notion of the knowable. For although God and the intelligences, considered according to themselves, seem to be placed in a certain higher grade and order, nevertheless, as they fall under our consideration, they cannot be separated from the consideration of the transcendental attributes. Hence it is also confirmed, for a perfect science of God and of the other separated substances hands down the knowledge of all the predicates which are in them; therefore also of the common and transcendental predicates. Nor is the reason the same with the lower sciences, for example philosophy, which, although it considers material substance, does not on that account contemplate the common and transcendental predicates which are also in it, because, since it is a lower science, it cannot ascend to knowing more abstract and more difficult predicates, but supposes them known through a higher science. But the science of God and the intelligences is the supreme one of all natural sciences; and therefore it supposes nothing known through a higher science, but includes in itself whatever is necessary for the perfect knowledge of its object, as far as can be had by natural light; the same science, therefore, which treats of these special objects, considers at the same time all the predicates which are common to them with other things; and this is the whole metaphysical doctrine; it is, therefore, one science.

11. The first reason for doubting is answered.—And by these things the first reason for doubting posited at the beginning has been satisfied; for it has been declared how that abstraction from matter according to being, which is called permissive or necessary, does not vary the specific notion of the knowable object, both on account of the necessary connection of such things and predicates among themselves, especially in order to knowledge, and also on account of the same order of doctrine and certitude. Finally, because that diversity of abstraction is only according to diverse concepts of reason, which diversity alone does not of itself suffice to constitute a diverse science, unless another greater reason for distinction occurs. Otherwise as many sciences would have to be multiplied as there are common predicates abstractable from their inferiors, and as many sciences differing in species as there are species of things, which is not commonly admitted.

12. Whether metaphysics is one habit.—To the second reason for doubting we cannot give satisfaction professedly in this place, because, as I said, the question which is touched upon there is common to all sciences, and perhaps we shall examine it below in treating of quality. For now I say briefly that it seems to me most difficult to wish to defend that the habit of metaphysics is either one simple quality, or so composite that it arises from various partial entities united among themselves by a true and real union; which difficulty the things proposed in that argument sufficiently show. Wherefore it seems easier to say that a science of this kind includes partial qualities or habits, which are said to compose one science not by aggregation alone per accidens in the same subject in which they inhere, but by a certain subordination and dependence which they have among themselves through order to the same subject with which they are concerned; for it is not necessary that the same order of unity be found in all things. And if anyone inquires what this order of subordination and dependence is, it can be answered that it consists in the relationship to the same object, which, although it embraces various things and has diverse properties which are demonstrated of it, yet these are so connected among themselves that the knowledge of the latter depends on the former, and they mutually help one another in knowledge under the same notion and mode of science and doctrine. But this matter, as I said, demands a more accurate inquiry and disputation, to be handed down in its place.