Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reason for doubting on either side.—From what was said in the preceding section, it seems to follow that it pertains to this science to discourse about every being and according to every notion of being, because a science which treats of some genus as of its adequate object also treats of all the species contained under it, as is evident of philosophy. And the reason is that otherwise there will not be an adequation between such an object and such a science; for more things will be contained under the one extreme than under the other; therefore by parity of reason a science which speculates about being as its adequate object considers all things contained under it. On the contrary, however, is the fact that, if this were so, all the other sciences would be superfluous, especially those which inquire into the proper natures of things, since metaphysics alone would sufficiently accomplish all this.

2. The first opinion.—In order to declare this difficulty and the matter with which metaphysics is concerned, and to lay open more clearly and distinctly its bounds and limits, the present question has been proposed by us. In which Giles, Metaphysics I, q. 22, and at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, affirms that metaphysics considers all things and their properties down to their last species or differences. Which opinion Antonio Mirandulano defends, in Book XIII De eversione singularis certaminis, sects. 6 and 7. He consequently affirms that the other sciences are not totally diverse from metaphysics, but are its parts, or rather that all are parts of one science; but that by common usage they are distinguished and counted as several for the sake of convenience and their use in learning, because they are taught and learned as if they were distinct, and this on account of the variety of things.

3. This opinion can be further founded, first, on the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2, who says that metaphysics is a universal science because it disputes about all things. And in Book IV, at the beginning, he says that this science disputes universally about being; and at the end of text 2 he adds that, just as there is one sense of one object and of the things contained under it, so this one science speculates about being in so far as it is being, and its species, and the species of the species; and in Posterior Analytics I, c. 23, he says that it belongs to the same science to consider the whole and the parts, that is, the genus and the species, or universal and special predicates; and in Metaphysics VI, c. 1, he says that metaphysics considers the quod quid est of all things.

4. Foundation.—Secondly, I argue in this way, because it is not repugnant that there be one science which considers all things in this way; therefore such a science is to be posited, both because sciences are not to be distinguished and multiplied without cause, and also because the intellect acquires sciences in the more perfect way in which it can; but it is more perfect to acquire the science of all things united rather than divided; therefore. But a science of this kind can be none other than metaphysics, which is the most worthy and most universal of all those which can be had naturally. The first antecedent is proved, because there is one faculty of understanding which is concerned in this way with being in so far as it is being, descending to all the proper and specific notions of beings; therefore it can acquire one habit of science, by which it is rendered ready and prompt for knowing the whole of being in the same way; for this habit must be as universal as the power itself is, otherwise that power cannot be perfectly well disposed to all its acts necessary for perfect science. As, for example, for perfect science it is not enough to know what each thing is, but it is necessary to distinguish it from the others, as, for example, man from the lion and from the angel, and so of the rest; which, however, no science can accomplish except one which considers all things universally according to their proper notions, by which they are distinguished, because the distinction between extremes cannot be known unless both are known according to the proper notions in which they are distinguished, as is self-evident and as Aristotle teaches, De Anima III, c. 2.

5. Hence I argue, thirdly, because, if anything stood in the way of this universality of metaphysics, it would be most of all that not all notions of beings abstract from matter according to being; but this does not stand in the way, because it must necessarily be said that metaphysics descends to consider several notions or quiddities of beings which cannot exist without matter. For metaphysics distinguishes finite being into the ten first genera of the predicaments; and again it distinguishes substance into material and immaterial; for it could not descend to the immaterial unless it discerned it from the material, nor could it do this unless it first handed down the proper notion and quiddity of material substance as such; this, therefore, belongs to the function of metaphysics; indeed, since we know immaterial things only after the manner of privations, we must first know what material substance or matter is, so that through its lack we may apprehend immaterial substance. And so Aristotle, in Metaphysics VII and VIII, disputes professedly about material substance and its intrinsic principles, which are matter and form.

6. And again the same argument can be made in accidents, as in qualities, relations and the like. But a peculiar difficulty is raised by certain first genera which altogether concern matter, such as quantity, habit and position, whose proper notions metaphysics hands down in order to make up the adequate division of being, which can pertain to no other science. Fourthly, either we suppose that metaphysics is one simple habit, or a collection of several quasi-partial ones. If the first is said, it is necessary consequently to say that metaphysics considers precisely the notion of being as such, and descends to no particular or less universal notion of being, which is plainly false, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section and will be more evident from what is to be said. The consequence is proved, because the same simple habit cannot attain the common notion according to itself and prescinded, and descend to particular ones, as we shall declare in the following section. But if we say the latter, namely, that it is only one habit by a collection of several partial ones, there will be no greater reason for making up one science which is concerned with being as such and with certain beings, than with all in particular; because each can be done equally conveniently by a collection of several.

7. The preceding opinion is refuted, first of all by the testimony of Aristotle.—This opinion, however, is rejected by almost all writers as foreign to the mind of Aristotle and to the truth; for Aristotle himself expressly, in Book I, c. 2, having said that the wise man knows all things, adds, as it is possible to know them without having the science of them singly; and below, declaring this, he says that he who has universal science in a certain way knows all things which are subject to the universals. He says, however, in a certain way, because he does not know them simply and according to what is proper to them by virtue of such science, but in so far as they are contained under the universal. More clearly, in Book IV, at the beginning, he distinguishes this science from the others, because it speculates about being as being and the things which belong to it per se; but none of the others considers universally about being as it is being, but, cutting off some part of it, they speculate about what befalls it (that is, belongs to it), as the mathematical sciences do. He distinguishes this science, therefore, from the others, which are concerned with particular beings; this, therefore, does not consider that part of being which the others cut off. He repeats the same in Book VI, from the beginning, where he distinguishes three speculative sciences, philosophy, mathematics and natural theology, which he distinguishes both from the abstraction of their objects, and also consequently from the things of which they treat, and finally from the mode in which they proceed and demonstrate, as we shall declare below. And this division of the speculative sciences all the interpreters of Aristotle have followed, and almost all philosophers, as is handed down more fully in Posterior Analytics I.¹

8. Metaphysics is not the only science.—The other sciences have complete evidence from their proper principles apart from metaphysics.—It is proved of mathematics.—There is, therefore, a second opinion received by all these, that metaphysics does not consider all beings according to all their special grades or notions, as they are considered by the philosopher or the mathematician. Hence Averroes, Physics II, comm. 22, says that metaphysics considers matter only as it is a certain being; but physics considers it as it is the subject of form; and he repeats almost the same in Metaphysics IV, comm. 9, and on the other places of Aristotle cited. And St. Thomas in the same places, and on Boethius, De Trinitate, in the question on the division of the sciences, a. 4, ad 6. The argument against the former opinion can also be explained thus: because it can be understood in three ways that this science contemplates all things according to their proper notions. First, that not it alone, but other sciences distinct from metaphysics speculate about them, yet in such a way that the knowledge of them which is had through the other sciences is not truly and properly scientific, but of some lower order, and is only called science in a common way, because it has some certitude, either from sense, or from some human faith, in the way in which a subalternated science, when it is without the subalternating one, is called science. And this way of declaring this opinion is false; for first it supposes a false opinion about the subalternation of the other sciences to metaphysics, concerning which we shall speak a little later. Secondly, it supposes that the other sciences, metaphysics being set aside, do not have their own evidence from their proper principles, which is plainly false. The consequence is evident, because if they have this evidence, nothing is lacking to them for the true and proper notion of science; it is falsely denied, therefore, that their knowledge is truly and properly scientific. The minor is evident, because it is against experience, for mathematics has its own evident and self-evident principles, from which it proceeds by evident demonstrations, nor does it rest on any testimony or human faith, as is self-evident, but on evidence compelling the intellect. Nor does it rest on sense, for, speaking per se, it abstracts from sensible matter, and consequently from sensible effects. And if sometimes it uses visible figures, it is only so that the mind may perfectly apprehend the terms of the principles, in order that it may perceive their intrinsic connection.

9. Of philosophy.—Philosophy, however, although it does not have as much evidence as mathematics, nevertheless has an evidence proper and accommodated to itself, because it too is not founded per se on human authority; and if in some part it proceeds thus, as regards that part it is not science, but mere faith and opinion; nor will it change its notion, or become more evident, on account of its connection with metaphysics; it is founded, therefore, per se on the evidence of its principles, which it also does not have primarily from metaphysics, but from the habit of principles. But if anyone says that this evidence in philosophy is only a posteriori, and from effects known through sense, the answer is by granting that in us indeed it happens so for the most part on account of our imperfection; yet this makes no difference to the matter at hand; for those physical things which are known so imperfectly by us through philosophy are not known more perfectly or more evidently through metaphysics. But if some natural things can be known in a more perfect way by the human intellect conjoined to a body, as in truth they can, in these no greater evidence is expected² from metaphysics, but it can be had per se in philosophy itself; for although it begins through sense, it is not always founded on it; but it uses it as a servant for perceiving the natures of things through the intellect, and when these are known it composes an a priori demonstration through principles evident to the intellect per se and from their terms; nor can another mode be feigned by which a more perfect or more evident science of natural things of this kind would be had through metaphysics; this way of speaking, therefore, is gratuitously invented.

10. Otherwise, therefore, it can be understood that metaphysics treats of all beings according to all their notions, namely, because metaphysics, as the most universal science, embraces all these by its power and efficacy (so to speak), even if other particular sciences can attain some part of this object in a proper and particular way, although scientific and perfect in its genus. Therefore, just as the particular and the universal cause, the particular and the universal sense, are distinct, and the universal attains whatever the particular does, although not conversely, so it might be judged of this science and of the others. Nevertheless, this way too has no probability, first, because, as can be taken from the discourse just given, there is no possible natural mode of demonstrating the proper physical or mathematical things higher or more perfect than that which the particular sciences themselves observe; therefore distinct particular sciences are posited superfluously and without cause, if there is one universal science which descends to all those things. Next, because these sciences are not to be thought out as distinct faculties or powers, but as habits of the same faculty, to be acquired by its proper acts, in order that they may render it ready for eliciting similar acts; therefore, if metaphysics speculated about, for example, natural things according to their proper notions as such, it would not be acquired through acts more noble than those which philosophy could exercise about the same things, because neither as regards that part would they have greater evidence nor higher principles; therefore there could be no reason for multiplying these habits about the same things; nor would the power need a habit facilitating it for those acts about which it would already have philosophical science.

11. In a third way, therefore, that opinion can be understood by confounding all the sciences into one metaphysics, so that we understand these denominations or concepts of mathematics, philosophy and metaphysics to be only inadequate denominations or concepts of the same science. And this sense pertains rather to the question about the distinction of the sciences, as they are certain habits or qualities, than to the question about the object, which we are now treating. For it is certain from what has been said that metaphysics, according to that objective concept which corresponds to this word, is not concerned with all things in particular, because, by the very fact that the mind is understood to be concerned with natural or mathematical things as such, it is already understood to leap over the bounds of metaphysics, and to use philosophy or mathematics. Just as, although memory is not distinguished from the intellect in reality, but by a formal objective notion, it will not properly and formally be said to be concerned with things as present, but only with past things as such. I add next (whatever may be the case with those three sciences, philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics, in what way each of them is one per se, which we shall touch on briefly a little later) that it is of itself incredible that they all should truly and properly be one single human science. First indeed, because this has seemed self-evident to almost all philosophers. Secondly, because they deal with altogether diverse things, and have almost no connection among themselves, as regards the things which are proper to each. Thirdly, because they differ much in their mode of proceeding; for the philosopher scarcely withdraws from sense; the metaphysician proceeds through the most universal and most abstract principles; the mathematician proceeds in a certain intermediate way; which modes of proceeding arise from that commonly known threefold abstraction from matter. And if these sciences are distinct, metaphysics is no less distinguished from the other two than those two among themselves, because the things separated from matter of which it treats are no less, indeed more, distant from the rest than all the rest among themselves, both in the perfection of being, and in abstraction, and also in the mode of reasoning and the difficulty and subtlety of the science itself; since, therefore, mathematics is distinct from philosophy by the consent of all, on account of its diverse abstraction and altogether diverse mode of proceeding, the same is to be judged with greater reason of metaphysics with respect to them; therefore it is not concerned with all the things which the other sciences consider, according to the proper notions by which they are considered by them.

The opinion to be held, and the first conclusion for it

12. Being can be conceived both as an actual whole and as a potential whole.—This latter opinion is true and to be held; in order that we may propose and confirm it more distinctly, and that it may be more clearly evident about which things we must treat in the course of this doctrine, some propositions are to be subjoined. I say, therefore, first: although this science considers being in so far as it is being, and the properties which belong per se to it as such, it does not, however, stop at the prescinded and as it were actual notion of being as such, but descends to consider some inferiors according to their proper notions. This whole assertion is evident from what was said in the preceding section; and as regards the former part, about being in so far as it is being, it can be confirmed from the things adduced in reporting the second opinion. As regards the other part, however, it can be confirmed from what was said about the first opinion; and it will immediately be declared more fully. It is only to be noticed that what the dialecticians say, that a genus can be considered either as an actual whole or as a potential one, or (what is the same) can be considered either as abstracted by prescissive abstraction, that is, according only to what it includes in act in its formal notion in its objective concept thus prescinded, or by total abstraction, as it is abstracted as a potential whole including its inferiors in potency—this (I say) which is said of genus can in its own way be applied to being in so far as it is being; for it both has its formal notion, as it were actual, which can be considered prescinded according to reason, and has inferiors, which in its own way it includes in potency according to reason. When, therefore, some common notion is assigned as the adequate object of some power or habit, it is not always assigned as it is something actual and altogether prescinded by formal abstraction, but as it includes its inferiors in some way; just as natural being, or material substance, is said to be the adequate subject of philosophy, not only according to the prescinded notion of material substance as such, but also according to the proper notions of the inferior material substances, corruptible or incorruptible, etc. Thus, therefore, when metaphysics is said to be concerned with being in so far as it is being, it is not to be thought that being is taken altogether and formally prescinded, so that inferiors are altogether excluded according to their proper notions, because this science does not stop at the consideration of that formal actual notion alone; that notion, therefore, is to be taken as it includes the inferiors in some way.

13. Which notions metaphysics speculates about in particular, and which not.—I say secondly: this science does not consider all the proper notions or quiddities of beings in particular, or as they are such, but only those which are contained under its proper abstraction, or in so far as they are necessarily conjoined with it. This is the mind of Aristotle, and of the authors whom I cited in the second opinion, and of others who have written about this science. All of whom distinguish a threefold abstraction in the speculative and real sciences, such as are the three enumerated above, physics, mathematics and metaphysics; for concerning the other sciences, whether moral or practical, there is another reason and mode of considering the unity of the object, either from the end of the science or from the mode of proceeding, concerning which elsewhere. Those three sciences, therefore, agree in some abstraction, for all consider things in the universal; they differ, however, in abstraction as it were formal and prescissive from matter, for philosophy, although it abstracts from singulars, does not abstract from sensible matter, that is, matter subject to sensible accidents, but rather uses it in its mode of reasoning. Mathematics, however, abstracts according to reason from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter, because quantity, however much it is abstracted, cannot be conceived except as a corporeal and material thing. But metaphysics is said to abstract from sensible and intelligible matter, and not only according to reason, but also according to being, because the notions of being which it considers are found in reality itself without matter; and therefore in its proper and objective concept it does not include matter per se. Concerning this threefold abstraction and the partition of these three sciences through these abstractions it is discussed professedly in the books of the Posterior Analytics. For now let it suffice us that up to now no more apt reason for distinguishing these sciences has been found, and that on other grounds this seems sufficiently fitting; for, since these sciences are about things themselves, and are most of all speculative, and therefore use abstraction in order to constitute a knowable object about which demonstrations can be made, it is rightly understood that the knowable object as such varies from the diverse mode of abstraction; and therefore this abstraction, in so far as it has a foundation in the object itself, is wont to be called the formal notion under which of such an object in the notion of the knowable. Likewise, because things are the more perfectly intelligible the more they abstract from matter; and similarly knowledge, the more it is of an object more immaterial and consequently more abstract, the more certain it is; and therefore the variety of knowable objects and of sciences is rightly considered from the diverse grade of abstraction or immateriality. From this received doctrine, however, the assertion posited is easily understood and proved, because a science does not transgress the limits of its formal object, or of the formal notion under which of its subject; but it considers whatever is contained under it; therefore this science considers all beings or notions of beings which are contained under the aforesaid abstraction; and it does not proceed further, for the rest pertain to physics or mathematics.

14. Metaphysics considers the notion of substance as such, and of accident as such.—What it is to abstract from matter according to being.—In order, however, that this may be more clearly understood, I say thirdly: this science considers, under the notion of being, the notion of substance as such, and also the notion of accident. Concerning this assertion no one doubts; and it is easily evident from the principle posited, because those two notions abstract from matter according to being; for, as we said above, and as St. Thomas rightly noted in the prologue to the Metaphysics, not only are those notions of beings said to abstract from matter according to being which are never in matter, but also those which can be in things without matter, because this is enough for them not to include matter in their formal notion, nor to require it per se. Add also that these notions are knowable, and can have attributes as it were adequate and proper, and do not pertain to another science; they pertain, therefore, to this one; for the human intellect, if it is perfectly disposed, cannot lack a science of this kind. Hence, just as philosophy, in considering the various species of material substances, consequently considers the common notion of material substance, and its adequate principles and properties; and again, dealing with the various species of living things, considers the common notion of living thing as such, and its proper principles and properties; so human science (so to speak), in considering the various grades and notions of beings, must necessarily consider the common notion of being. Likewise, since it speculates about various substances and various accidents, it must necessarily consider the common notions of substance and accident; but it does not accomplish this except through this universal and princely science.

15. Which other notions under being pertain to metaphysical consideration.—And hence it is evident (not to repeat the same things) that the same is to be said of all the common notions which under being, substance and accident can be so abstracted as to be in things without matter; of this kind are the notion of created or uncreated being, of finite or infinite substance, and similarly of absolute or respective accident, of quality, of action, of operation or dependence, and the like. Concerning which it is to be observed that many common notions can be abstracted from material and immaterial things, whose consideration, according to the principle posited, ought strictly to pertain to this science, such as the common notion of living thing, which can be abstracted from material and immaterial things; likewise the common notion of knower and understander, just as the common notion of necessary or incorruptible being is also considered by this science; yet, because many of the aforesaid notions, as they are known by us, could only be known from the diverse grades of souls, therefore nothing can conveniently be said about them here besides what is said in the science of the soul; and therefore we relegate to that place those predicates which are taken from the operations of life and are common.

16. Predicates common only to immaterial things belong to this consideration.—Secondly, it is further inferred a fortiori that it pertains to this science to treat in particular of all beings, or notions of beings, which can be found only in immaterial things, such as the common notion of immaterial substance, the notion of the first or uncreated substance, and also of the created spirit, and of all the species or intelligences which are contained under it. It is only to be attended to that these substances, especially the created ones, can be known naturally very imperfectly, at most according to certain common notions and negative concepts, but not according to their proper and specific differences; yet, in the way in which they can be known, their contemplation pertains most of all to this science, as was said above. For it does not pertain properly and per se to physics, except perhaps according to a certain common extrinsic notion, and one not sufficiently certain, namely, in so far as the angels are movers of the heavenly orbs; per se, however, and as regards the knowledge of the essence and properties of the intelligences which can be had naturally, they exceed the physical faculty, because they are most remote from the senses, and therefore their knowledge is more difficult and higher. It pertains, therefore, to this science, which perfects man according to that which is most excellent in him, and in which his natural happiness in great part consists, that is, in the contemplation of the highest things, as Aristotle said, Ethics X, c. 7.

17. The common notion of cause, and the four genera of causes, and the chief causalities among them pertain to metaphysics.—Thirdly, it is gathered from what has been said that it pertains to this science to treat of the common notion of cause, and of the individual genera of causes as such, and of the first and chief causes or notions of causing of the whole universe. I declare each, because, first of all, the notion of cause and effect as such is of itself common to material and immaterial things, for in God, who is supremely immaterial, the notion of cause is found, and in the angels the notion of effect, and it is common and essential to all created beings, in so far as they are finite beings, that they emanate from some cause; and to created beings themselves also, whether material or immaterial, according to the common notion, some genus of operation or causality pertains. Again, this notion of cause, not only according to the common notion of cause, but also according to the special and distinct modes of causing, of itself abstracts from matter according to being, for the notion of efficient cause as such does not per se require matter, and much less the notion of end. Likewise this notion of a free agent, acting from purpose. Likewise the notion of exemplar cause, or the notion of a cause acting through its own exemplar or idea. Again, the material and the formal cause, although, as they are found in substances, they do not seem to abstract from matter, nevertheless, in so far as according to their common notions they abstract from substances and accidents, are also separated from matter; it pertains, therefore, to metaphysics to distinguish these genera of causes, and to explain the notions of each. And because it is wisdom itself, and the supreme natural science, it pertains to it to consider the first causes of things, or rather the first notions of causing in the first cause; and such are the notion of efficient and of final cause; for these, according to their supreme perfection, neither require matter, nor suppose it or another genus of cause, nor require imperfection, but are conjoined per se and primarily in the first cause, which is God; but it is otherwise with the notion of matter and form; for these necessarily suppose another prior cause, from which they arise at least efficiently and finally, and therefore they are not counted among the causes or notions of causing that are simply first; and therefore their exact knowledge does not pertain to the metaphysician except according to the common notions of such causes, not, however, according to those things in which such notions of causing are found, which are matter and substantial form. For although these are attained by metaphysics, nevertheless the integral science of them is handed down by the philosopher.

18. Finally, it is to be considered concerning this that this consideration of causes pertains to the metaphysician by various titles or reasons; for if the power of causing, or causality itself, or the relation resulting from it, is considered as they are certain beings, they pertain to this science as its object—not indeed as the adequate object (as some falsely said, which we touched on above), but as a part of the object, because these are only certain beings, or modes of beings, but do not in themselves enclose the whole breadth of being. But if the notion or power of the cause is considered in order to the cause itself, namely, in so far as it is a property or attribute of that thing which is called a cause, then it pertains to this science to consider the cause, not as its object or part of its object, but as a certain attribute of the object or of its part; and in this way, because this science considers God, it consequently considers in him the notion of first final, efficient and exemplar cause; and considering the angels, it inquires what power of causing they have with respect to the other beings; and treating of substance as such, it speculates about what causality it has with respect to accidents, and so of the others. Finally, if the notion of cause is considered in order to the effect, that is, in so far as its knowledge is necessary for the exact knowledge of the effect, then too the knowledge of causes pertains to this science, not as its object, nor as a property of the object, but as a principle or cause of the object or of its part.

19. Whether the consideration of the rational soul is the office of the metaphysician.—Two difficulties, however, remain concerning what has been said. One is about the rational soul, whether its consideration pertains to the metaphysician, whether it is considered in the notion of being or in the notion of cause. For this soul is a certain immaterial substance, and consequently abstracts from matter according to being, whence it also abstracts in its proper notions. For this reason, therefore, the proper and specific consideration of this soul can seem to pertain to this science. Which Aristotle seems to confirm, On the Parts of Animals I, c. 1, indicating that the physicist does not consider every soul. On the contrary, however, is the fact that the rational soul, even as rational, is a natural form having an essential order to matter, and as such is the principle of its operations, even of those which it exercises through the body, even according to that peculiar mode in which they are exercised by man. But this controversy is wont to be treated professedly at the beginning of the book On the Soul, where Cardinal Toletus can be seen, q. 2 of the prooemium.

20. For now it is briefly said that the consideration of this soul is to be referred to the last and most perfect part of natural philosophy. First, because the science of man as man is physical; but it belongs to the same craftsman to consider the whole and its essential parts. Next, because, although the soul has a subsisting being, separable from matter as regards actual conjunction, yet not as regards aptitude, nor as regards order to matter, and consequently neither as regards the perfect knowledge both of its essence and of its properties and operations; but all knowledge through matter is physical. There is no doubt, therefore, that the knowledge of the soul, as regards its substance, and the properties which belong to it per se, and the mode or state of existing or operating which it has in the body, pertains to the physicist. But to consider the state of the separated soul, and the mode of operating which it has in that state, some think pertains per se to the metaphysician; which is probable, because according to that notion there seems to be complete abstraction from matter, and nothing about the soul, as it is in that state, can be known except through a certain analogy and proportion to the other immaterial substances; nevertheless, because it pertains to the perfection of a science to consider its subject integrally and completely, all these things are more conveniently treated in philosophy, especially because this consideration of the soul and its states, divided as it were into parts and handed down in diverse sciences, produces prolixity and confusion; and therefore in the course of this work we shall abstain from the consideration of the rational soul, both conjoined and separated. Especially because about the angels too, for the same reason, we shall say very little, because their integral consideration and contemplation has already rightly been taken over by the theologians, and to transfer it all here would be foreign to natural science, and consequently to our purpose; but to touch on things in passing, or to treat them imperfectly, would be of either no usefulness or little. And almost the same reason holds for the knowledge of God, although, because more things can be known naturally about God than about the intelligences, and because the natural knowledge of him is more necessary for the perfection of this science, we shall say some things about him, in so far as they have either been touched on by the philosophers or can be found by natural reason.

21. The other difficulty was about the common notions of material substance, and others, which include matter or cannot be without matter; this, however, is touched upon in the arguments, and will be dispatched in their solutions.

22. The arguments of the opposite opinion are satisfied.—To the first reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, the solution is evident from what has been said. For it is not necessary that a science which considers a universal notion descend in particular to all the things which are contained under such a notion, but only to those which participate the same notion of the knowable, or the same abstraction. Wherefore, although, considering the real agreement in the common notion of being, there seems to be no greater reason concerning some particular beings than concerning others for them to fall under this science according to their proper notions, yet, considering the agreement in abstraction from matter according to being which exists between certain special notions of beings and the very common and most abstract notion of being, there is a sufficient reason on account of which this science descends to certain particular beings and not to others.

23. A difficult place of Aristotle is explained.—To the first foundation of the first opinion, taken from the testimonies of Aristotle, the answer is evident from what has been said; for this science is said to consider universally about being because it considers the most abstract notion of being in so far as it is being, and all the things which agree with it in the same abstraction and knowable notion. And in the same way it is said to treat of all things, namely, in so far as they are beings, and because it teaches general principles, common to all things. But those words of Book IV, text 2, seem to have a special difficulty, where it is said that it belongs to this science to consider being and its species, and the species of the species. Some answer that that distribution is to be understood accommodatedly, namely, of the proximate and remote species of being contained under the same abstraction of the knowable. But St. Thomas and other ancients, whom Fonseca follows, answer this better by construing the letter of Aristotle otherwise, which according to the ancient version runs thus: To speculate whatever species there are of being in so far as it is being belongs to one science in genus, and the species of the species. In which words those two, and the species of the species, are equivocal; for they can be joined so that the one determines the other, and they are referred to being and to the species of the species of being; and the version of Argyropoulos clearly indicates this sense, and the explanation given proceeds in it. Otherwise, however, those two words can be disjoined and referred to diverse things, namely, to the species of knowable things and to the species of sciences; and Fonseca rightly indicated this, translating thus: It belongs to one science in genus to contemplate as many species of being as there are, and the species of the species; and so the sense will be that it belongs to one science in genus to contemplate the species of being in common and in genus; but that it belongs to various species of sciences to contemplate the various species of being according to their proper and specific notions of the knowable. And from this sense our opinion is confirmed; for if by one science we understand strictly the common genus of science, from this place it is had that it does not pertain to any science in species to contemplate all beings according to all their specific notions, but that this pertains to the genus of speculative science in common; but that particular knowable objects according to their proper notions pertain to the specific sciences. But if by one science in genus we understand a science general by reason of its object, such as metaphysics is, then too it is had from this place that a science of this kind considers all the species of being only under the common notion of being or of substance; but that the special sciences consider the species of being under their proper and specific notions.

24. One acquired human science cannot embrace all knowable things according to their proper notions.—To the second the answer is that there cannot be one human science, acquired by the proper acts of human talent, which universally perfects it as regards all knowable things according to all their notions; otherwise not only those speculative sciences, philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics, but also the moral and rational ones, and finally all, would coalesce into one, which would be the adequate perfection of the human intellect, which is incredible, because, since the acts and discourses of human talent are so various and so particular and distinct, and independent among themselves, it is not probable that it could happen that all should concur to generate the same science. Nor is this necessary for the effect which is mentioned in the argument, namely, for judging about the diversity of distinct things, which are said to pertain to diverse sciences, because each science, in handing down the knowledge of its object, sufficiently renders the intellect ready to distinguish it from the rest, provided, however, that the rest are known; hence two sciences can help each other and concur for judgements of this kind, especially if one provides as it were the formal middle term, while the other as it were ministers the matter to which that middle term is applied. For this is almost what happens in the case at hand; for in order that the intellect may judge and demonstrate that one thing is diverse from another, for example, the horse from the lion, it takes the formal middle term from metaphysics, which is the notion of diversity, or what it is to be diverse, and applies or attributes it to the horse and the lion, whose concepts or notions it takes from philosophy; yet, because the middle term is as it were the formal element of the demonstration, such a demonstration is therefore judged metaphysical, and in this way it is said to be the function of metaphysics to show diversity in things; and in the same way it is said to demonstrate the quiddities of things, because the middle term for demonstrating a quiddity in the notion of quiddity is metaphysical, since to know the notion of quiddity as such is proper to metaphysics.

25. To the third some answer that a twofold notion is to be distinguished in metaphysics. One is that of a particular science, under which notion they deny that it attains material things as such. The other is in so far as it is a common art, and presides over the other sciences or arts; for Aristotle attributes this function to it in this prooemium, and in Posterior Analytics I, c. 17, text 23, where by the science that is mistress of all he understands metaphysics, as all explain; under this notion, therefore, they say, metaphysics knows material things as they are material, indeed also that matter, in so far as it is pure passive potency; and if you object that a science cannot transgress its object, they answer under the same distinction that this is true of science as it is a particular science, but not as it is a common art. Nevertheless, the distinction and the answer need greater declaration. For those two notions are not distinguished from the nature of the thing in the habit of metaphysics, as two parts of it distinct in reality itself, but only by consideration, and by our prescissive abstraction through inadequate concepts; for metaphysics is said to be a universal science, and to hand down universal principles, and therefore to be able to help the other sciences, only by reason of its most abstract and most universal object; therefore it cannot accomplish those two functions separately, so to speak, or through diverse parts of itself, but at the same time, while it treats its proper object perfectly, it attains whatever perfection it has over the other sciences, and confers all the usefulness which it can provide to them; that partition, therefore, is only according to our reason. Therefore it cannot happen that metaphysics transcends the formal notion of its object, either according to the one notion or according to the other. And it is confirmed, for if metaphysics, as it is said to be universal, transcends its abstraction, and is concerned with material things in so far as they are such, then in this it has no term or limit, but will descend to all the objects of the other sciences according to all their notions, and so one falls into all the inconveniences which we inferred against the other opinions. The consequence is evident, both because if such a term is not assigned from the formal notion of the object, there is nothing whence it may be assigned; and because if the metaphysician attains the proper object of philosophy, for example, in order to constitute it, he would also attain the objects of all the sciences, and in philosophy itself he would have to contemplate all the species of natural beings, in order that, if perhaps there are several philosophies, he may separate their objects; or, if there is one, he may declare how its one object is made up out of so many things.

26. I think, therefore, that metaphysics, considered under no notion, properly leaps over the formal notion of its object, nor attains material things except by in some way concerning its abstraction, nor, finally, is universal or serves the other sciences except under that notion under which it perfectly exhausts its object. In order to declare this, however, I say first of all that metaphysics does not attain the notion of material substance, and other similar notions which are not found without matter, except in so far as their proper knowledge is necessary for handing down the general divisions of being into the ten supreme genera, and other similar ones, down to prescribing the proper objects of the other sciences; for this is the proper function of this science, as is taken from Metaphysics VI, VII and VIII, and because this can pertain to no other science, as is easily evident of itself; likewise, because without these divisions metaphysics could not know its object exactly, neither according to the common notion of being, which, since it is analogous, is not sufficiently distinctly known without distinguishing the modes in which it can be contracted, nor according to those proper and special notions which are to be contemplated by metaphysics per se and exactly, because it cannot perfectly attain these notions unless it separates and distinguishes them from the others.

27. Secondly, it is said that, since the universal notions which metaphysics considers are transcendental, so that they are imbibed in the proper notions of beings, hence it comes about that, while the metaphysician attains some grades of beings which include matter, in order to separate from them the other grades which pertain to him directly and per se, he considers abstractly about them the notions and properties which are common to beings abstracting from matter, and belong specificatively also to the material beings themselves, even as they are such; as, for example, metaphysics distinguishes substance into material and immaterial, either in order to take up the proper notion and consideration of immaterial substance, or because it pertains to a science to consider in some way the proper parts of its object, as is said in Posterior Analytics I, c. 23. But once a division of this kind has been handed down, it considers immaterial substance per se and directly, treating universally all the things which can be known about it; material substance, however, it does not contemplate in this way, but only in so far as is necessary for distinguishing it from immaterial substance, and for knowing about it all the metaphysical predicates which belong to it as it is material, such as, for example, to be composed of act and potency, and the mode of this composition, and that it is a certain being one per se, and the like.

28. Thirdly, the answer in form to the argument is that metaphysics therefore does not consider all beings in particular because it does not transcend the proper abstraction of its object; but that it considers certain generic grades, which attain matter, without omitting its abstraction, both because it abstracts those very grades from matter in so far as it is subject to motion and sense, and considers them only according to the common notions of act or form and potency, and the like; and also because it attains their proper notions only indirectly, in order to its proper abstraction, namely, in order to declare how the common and transcendent predicates are found in them, and how from them are distinguished the other grades or genera which truly and in reality abstract from all matter. And this is what Aristotle indicated, Metaphysics IV, text 5, when he said: It belongs to the philosopher to be able to speculate about all things; for if not to the philosopher, who will it be that will consider whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same, or whether one thing is contrary to one? etc. For he calls metaphysics philosophy by antonomasia, to which he says it pertains to consider the diversity of things in common, because the same and the diverse are attributes of being; and he declares this by the aforesaid example, which he placed in a certain individual perhaps for the sake of affecting obscurity, since it is evident that science does not descend to individuals, from Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, and Metaphysics III, c. 13.

29. The fourth argument is truly difficult; for it touches upon the difficulty about the unity of science, of what kind it is, which cannot be treated exactly in this place; we shall, however, touch upon it briefly in the following section.