Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There are various opinions on this matter, which are to be noted and examined one by one and briefly, so that we may understand exactly about what things we must discourse in the course of this doctrine, in such a way that we neither transgress its bounds nor leave untouched anything contained within them.

The first and second opinions are set out

2. The first opinion, then, is that being taken most abstractly, in so far as it embraces under itself not only all real beings, both per se and per accidens, but also beings of reason, is the adequate object of this science. This opinion is urged, first, because being so taken can be the adequate object of some science; therefore most of all of this one, which is the most abstract of all. The antecedent is evident, both because being in that whole breadth is presented to the intellect; therefore it can also be presented to one science, for the reason is the same; and also because, just as the intellect understands all those things, so this science discourses about all of them, namely, about beings of reason and real beings, and about beings per se and per accidens; therefore, if for that reason they are contained under the object of the intellect, for a similar reason they ought to be contained under the adequate object of this science; therefore being, as it is presented to this science, must be taken under that abstraction and breadth by which it directly comprehends all these things; and in the same way are to be taken the common attributes of which this science treats, such as unity, multitude, truth and the like. Hence I argue, secondly, because it pertains to the perfection and breadth of this science that it separate and distinguish all these things, and teach concerning all of them whatever can be known about them with certain knowledge, for this pertains most of all to the notion of wisdom; therefore all these beings, according to their common notions, are directly contained under the adequate object of this science. Thirdly, because, if anything prevented being so taken from being the object, it would be most of all that it is not univocal; but this does not matter, for it is enough that it be analogous; otherwise it could not be common to real accidents and to created and uncreated substances; but being, in so far as it is analogous, also embraces beings of reason, as can be taken from Metaphysics IV, text 2, where Aristotle subjects privations, negations or non-beings to the analogy of being, in so far as they are intelligible; therefore being so analogous can be the adequate object of this science, all the more because all those things are comprehended under the adequate abstraction of this science, which is from all sensible and intelligible matter; for all those notions of beings can be found without matter of this kind. Finally, in the very properties which are demonstrated of being in common in this science, beings of reason are so included that without them the properties cannot be understood, as we shall see later; therefore it is necessary that this science dispute about them.

3. Nor is it enough if someone says that this science does indeed discourse about these beings, yet not per se and by design as about its object, but incidentally and while doing something else, either in order better to explain its objects, or because the knowledge of these is easily obtained from the knowledge of the object; this (I say) is not enough, because the arguments given seem to prove more; otherwise the same could be said of accidents, indeed also of created substances. Especially because beings of reason of this kind and the like are knowable per se, and many things about them are naturally known and demonstrated; but there is no other science to which this belongs per se. For although some attribute this to dialectic, yet neither can this be said universally of all beings of reason, but at most of certain respects which follow upon the operations of the intellect; nor does the dialectician inquire per se about them how they participate the notion of being and its attributes, but only touches upon them incidentally, as far as is necessary for explaining the conceptions of the intellect and the denominations arising from them.

4. The second opinion can be that the object of this science is real being in its whole breadth, in such a way that it does not directly comprehend beings of reason, because they do not have entity and reality, but embraces not only beings per se, but also beings per accidens, because these too are real and truly participate the notion of being and its attributes; and of these the arguments given in confirmation of the preceding opinion proceed more urgently. And it can be confirmed because some particular sciences have beings per accidens for their objects; but the object of this science directly embraces all the objects of the particular sciences; therefore.

The first two opinions are refuted

5. These two opinions, however, are manifestly repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics VI. For in the first place, as regards beings per accidens, in so far as they are such they cannot fall under science, as Aristotle proves in the same place, text 4; for being per accidens is here so called not in the character of an effect, but in the character of being, that is, not that which is effected by accident or contingently and beyond the intention of the agent, but that which in itself is not truly one, but a certain aggregate of many; concerning which distinction we shall say more below in treating of unity. Since, therefore, this being per accidens is not one but an aggregation of many, it can neither have a proper definition, nor real attributes which are demonstrated of it, and therefore it does not fall under science. But if such a being is considered in so far as it is in some way one, and its unity is in some way in the thing, it is then no longer considered as altogether per accidens, but as in some way comprehended under the breadth of being per se, although perhaps it holds some imperfect grade in it; for there are various modes of being per se and per accidens, as we shall declare in its place when treating of unity. For this reason I said that the discussion is of being per accidens in so far as it is such, for that, as such, is not a being but beings, and therefore it is directly comprehended not under the object of one science, but of several, to which the beings per se of which such a being per accidens is composed can pertain, as St. Thomas noted in the said Book VI of the Metaphysics, lect. 4. But if that unity is not in the thing, but only in apprehension or conception, such a being as such will not truly be called real; hence the reason concerning it will be the same as concerning the other beings of reason. These, however, are excluded from the direct consideration of this science by the same Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, at the end, as all the interpreters noted in the same place. And the reason is that such things are neither truly beings, but almost in name only, nor do they agree with real beings in the same concept of being, but only through a certain imperfect analogy of proportionality, as we shall see below; but the adequate object of a science requires some objective unity.

6. Why beings of reason are excluded from the object of this science.—Hence it does not matter that Aristotle sometimes declared the analogy of being as it extends to these beings, because there he was not assigning the object of this science, but explaining the signification of the word in order to remove equivocation. Afterwards, however, in the proper place, he taught that being is not the object according to that whole analogy, which consists more in the unity of the word than of the object. And for this reason too there is not a similar reason concerning real accidents, for those are truly beings and are in some way comprehended under the unity of the objective concept of being, as we shall see later. Nor is it necessary that all the things which are in some way considered in a science be directly contained under its adequate object, for many things are considered incidentally through a certain analogy or reduction, either that by their knowledge the object itself may be more illuminated, or because, the object being known, the other things are known by analogy to it, and perhaps cannot be known otherwise. Likewise it is not necessary that the properties of the subject, which are demonstrated of it, be directly contained under the object itself, at least according to all that they include. Thus, therefore, although this science considers many things about beings of reason, nevertheless they are rightly excluded from the object per se and directly intended (unless someone wishes to contend about the name), for both of the reasons stated. For in the first place beings of reason are considered in some way in this science, yet not per se, but on account of a certain proportionality which they have with real beings, and in order that they may be distinguished from them, and that it may be better and more clearly conceived what in beings has entity and reality, and what has only its appearance. Hence (so to speak) these beings of reason are considered rather in order that they may be known not to be beings, than in order that science or knowledge of them may be acquired. Then they are considered in order to declare the properties of real being and of the object of this science, which are not sufficiently conceived and explained by us except through beings of reason of this kind; for thus this science deals in some way with genus and species in order to explain the unities of things, and so of the others, as is taken from Metaphysics IV, cc. 1 and 2, and from Books VI and VII, and it will be more evident from the course of the matter. Again, these beings are often treated by reason of some real foundation which they have in things, or certainly because the foundation itself cannot be sufficiently known, nor its reality declared by us, unless we first explain what denominations of reason are mixed in there.

7. The foundations of the preceding opinions are resolved.—The arguments of the preceding opinions, therefore, prove indeed that beings of this kind are considered in this science, but not that they are parts directly contained under its object. Indeed, as I judge, they pertain to no science per se and primarily, because, since they are not beings, but rather defects of beings, they are not knowable per se, but in so far as they fall short of the true notion of beings, which is considered per se, or in so far as they seem in some way to accompany it. In the former way the Philosopher deals with blindness, and with darkness and the void, in so far as they are defects and privations of sight, of light and of real place. In the latter way many treat of relations or denominations of reason. The dialectician does so in so far as it pertains to him to direct and order the real concepts of the mind, from which denominations of reason are taken, and in which these relations of reason are founded; but they are also considered, or can be considered, by the Philosopher, in so far as he himself per se properly speculates about the operations of the intellect, not only direct but also reflex, and about their objects. In this science, however, they are considered for the reasons already stated.

The third opinion is set out

8. Leaving aside, then, these opinions, which enlarged the object of this science too much, there are many others which restrict it too much. The third opinion, therefore, and the one opposed at the other extreme, makes the supreme real being alone (namely God) the adequate object of this science. Albert reports this opinion at the beginning of the Metaphysics from Alpharabius, in the book On the Division of the Sciences, and it can be attributed to Averroes, Physics I, last comm.; for he reproves Avicenna because he said that it pertains to the first philosopher to demonstrate that the first principle exists; but (Averroes objects) no science demonstrates that its object exists; but God, or the first principle, is the object of the whole of philosophy. Aristotle too, in Metaphysics I, at the beginning, says that this science contemplates the first cause of things, and therefore is most divine; wherefore, as we saw, he calls it theology; but theology is nothing other than the science of God; God, therefore, will be the object of this science, for a science receives its dignity and excellence from its object, and those attributes or names by which such dignity is indicated; but the most excellent object is God; therefore this ought to be the object of the most excellent and most worthy science.

9. An objection is met.—Nor will he satisfy who answers that God is the principal object of this science, and that this is enough for that dignity and appellation of the science, although he is not the adequate object. For against this the argument is pressed. First, because it is more noble and more excellent to have God for the adequate object than only for the principal one; but this science is the most noble of all which can be acquired by the natural light of the intellect; therefore God is its adequate object. The first antecedent is proved, because God according to his proper notion is something more noble than any notion common to God and creatures could be, as is self-evident, because God according to his proper notion is an infinitely perfect being; but every other more abstract notion of itself neither expresses nor requires infinite perfection; but that science which has God for its adequate object tends immediately and per se primarily to him according to his proper notion; whereas that science which regards God only as its principal object can at most be concerned per se primarily with some notion of being common to God and creatures; therefore the former science will be far more noble, because the nobility of a science is taken from that object to which it tends per se primarily. Which can also be declared and confirmed by examples, because the divine intellect is the most noble of all, and therefore has God alone for its adequate object, and attains nothing else except in so far as it is manifested in God himself or through him. Similarly the beatific vision is more noble having God for its adequate object than if it attained God immediately and something else under some common notion. And finally for this reason supernatural theology is judged to have for its adequate object God alone as supernaturally revealed; therefore by the same reason God, as knowable by the natural light of our intellect, will be the adequate object of this natural theology. Indeed, rather, we can argue that God cannot be the principal object of this science if he is not the adequate one, because God and creature cannot agree under some common notion of knowable object; therefore either God must be said to be the adequate object of this science, or he must be altogether excluded from its object. The antecedent is evident, first, because God is an intelligible object of a far different and more eminent notion than every created object is, and God is more distant from any created object, in abstraction and immateriality, than all created beings are distant according to their proper notions; but all created objects cannot agree according to their proper notions under one adequate object of this science; therefore much less can God and the other created beings agree. Next, because a common object is prior in nature to those things which are contained under it, because it is superior to them and is not convertible with them by consequence of subsisting; but nothing can be prior in nature to God; therefore he cannot be a principal object contained under something common; he will therefore be the adequate one.

10. The objection is resolved.—And if you object that this science discourses not about God alone, but about many other things, they answer that other things are not treated in this science per se or for their own sake, but in so far as they can contribute to the knowledge of God. And so Aristotle in Book XII of the Metaphysics concludes the science about God, while all the things which he hands down in the preceding books are referred to that last one as to the conclusion chiefly intended. Hence St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, and Cajetan there say that this science is concerned with that which is last with respect to the whole of knowledge, and judges about all principles by resolution to the first causes, which Cajetan interprets of the first or highest cause, which eminently contains the first notions of causing, which both are universal and pertain to perfection simply, such as are end, efficient cause and exemplar; for matter and form are not universal, and include imperfection.

The third opinion is rejected

11. Nevertheless, this opinion is not to be approved; for it is repugnant to Aristotle and to almost all the other philosophers and his interpreters, as we shall see; it is also repugnant (so to speak) to experience itself, and to the doctrine which is wont to be handed down in this science and is judged necessary for its perfection and completion; for in it many things are contained and taught which are per se necessary for knowing other things besides God, and for the perfection of the human intellect, in so far as it can be concerned with things of this kind, or with knowing common notions and principles; and they contribute either nothing or little to knowing God, nor are they referred to this by the mode or notion of such a science, whatever may be the case with the intention of the knower. The a priori reason, finally, is that this science, since it proceeds by natural discourse, does not attain God as he is in himself, but as far as he can be manifested from creatures by the natural light of the human intellect; and therefore there can be no natural science which attains him and regards him as its adequate object, because the notion under which he is attained is always common to other created things. Hence it is evident that it was rightly said, in treating the foundation of the preceding opinion, that God is contained under the object of this science as its first and chief object, but not as its adequate one.

12. To the instances or rejoinders, however, the answer is as follows. To the first indeed: we grant that it is a great excellence of a science to have God for its object, to which alone it tends per se and primarily, and through it to the rest; we say, however, that this perfection exceeds the natural powers of human talent and of the science which can be acquired through them; and therefore, although this science is most noble within its order, so great a perfection is not on that account to be attributed to it. Nor in this is it to be compared with the divine intellect and the beatific vision; nay, nor with supernatural theology, which proceeds under a higher light and from higher principles. Although it is not certain even of supernatural theology that God alone is its adequate object; for many judge that not God, but revealed being, is the adequate object of that doctrine; because divine revelation, which is the formal notion under which of that object, can fall equally upon God and upon other things, as regards the force and notion of knowing, although in the notion of end and in the excellence of the thing revealed God surpasses all things, and therefore he is wont to be called either the principal object, or simply the object, when things are considered practically and in order to morals. But of this elsewhere.

13. Whether God can agree with creatures in the notion of object.—To the last the answer is that it is not repugnant that God, as known through creatures, should agree with them in some common notion of object; for although in his being and according to himself he is more distant from any creature whatever than they are among themselves, nevertheless, according to those things which can be manifested of him by natural science, and according to the notion and mode in which they can be manifested from creatures, a greater proportion and agreement can be found between God and creatures than between some creatures among themselves. Nor, for constituting an adequate object of this kind, which comprehends God under itself, is it necessary that there be something, or some notion of being, which is prior in nature to God; but it is enough that there be such according to the abstraction or consideration of the intellect, which is not repugnant, as we shall show below in treating of the concept of being. For just as some agreement or imperfect likeness between God and creatures can be understood in the notion of being, of substance, or of spirit, so there can be some concepts prior to God according to reason in universality of predication; but this is not a priority of nature, nor by reason of causality, as is self-evident, nor by reason of independence or priority in subsisting, for every notion, however abstracted, common to God and creatures, is so compared to God that it cannot exist in the nature of things except in God himself or dependently on God, and therefore it cannot be prior in nature to God himself.

The fourth opinion is refuted

14. Two testimonies of Aristotle are brought forward for this opinion.—And from what has been said against the preceding opinion two others, certainly hardly probable, are easily excluded. Let the fourth opinion, then, be that substance or immaterial being, as it includes in itself God and the intelligences alone, is the adequate object of this science. This opinion is wont to be attributed to the Commentator, Physics I, last comm. But there he only says that the intelligences pertain per se to the object of this science, not that they are its adequate object. This opinion, however, can be urged from the course or partition of the sciences; for, leaving aside the rational sciences, which are rather certain arts and treat of words or concepts, and the mathematical sciences, which deal not with substance but with quantity alone, among the sciences which deal with substances, philosophy treats of all generable and corruptible substances, and of incorruptible corporeal substances also, and of substance composed of matter and an immaterial¹ form, such as man is, and of the immaterial form itself, namely the rational soul, and finally of the five grades or orders of material substances, namely of simple bodies, of inanimate mixed bodies, of those merely vegetative, of those merely sentient, and of rational ones, and of all their properties. Nothing, therefore, remains to be known in things except immaterial substances; these, therefore, complete the adequate object of this science. This whole discourse can be confirmed, first, by a twofold testimony of Aristotle. One is Metaphysics IV, text 4, where he says that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are substances. Hence, just as substance is twofold, namely material and immaterial, so the science which philosophizes about substances is twofold; whence he concludes that that is first philosophy which contemplates the first, that is, immaterial substance. The other testimony is Metaphysics VI, text 3, where Aristotle says that if there were no substances abstracting from matter according to being, natural philosophy would be first, nor would there be any other science necessary besides it; therefore the whole objective notion of this science, which constitutes it in its own way and distinguishes it from the others, is immaterial substance; this, therefore, is its adequate object. It is confirmed, secondly, because natural philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics are commonly distinguished from the abstraction of their objects; for physics considers things consisting of sensible matter; mathematics abstracts from that matter according to reason, but not according to being, and therefore it is said not to abstract from intelligible matter; but metaphysics abstracts from both sensible and intelligible matter, not only according to reason, but also according to being; but immaterial substance alone abstracts from matter according to being; therefore it is the adequate object of this science.

15. This opinion, however, as I said, has no greater probability than the preceding one; hence there is no weighty author who defends it, for in the whole discourse given it proceeds deficiently. That discourse proves rightly indeed that immaterial substances pertain most of all to the object of this science. It also proves that, of the things subsisting in the nature of things, no others fall per se and according to their proper notions under the object of this science besides immaterial substances, as we shall say a little below against Giles. It does not, however, prove, nor rightly conclude, that immaterial substance as such is the adequate object of this science, because in immaterial substance itself other more universal and more common notions or objective concepts can be considered, concerning which, according to their adequate notion, some science can be handed down, for to these notions proper principles and properties correspond; but no other science besides metaphysics contemplates these notions; therefore the adequate object of metaphysics is to be designated under some more universal notion. Although, therefore, we grant to the discourse and induction given that all material things, according to those notions in which they do not agree with immaterial things, are sufficiently known through other sciences distinct from metaphysics, it is not rightly concluded that immaterial substance as such is the adequate object of this science, because there still remain notions common to both things or substances, in which proper demonstrations can be made.

16. The testimonies of Aristotle brought forward for the preceding opinion are explained.—What it is to abstract from matter according to being.—And therefore from the testimonies of Aristotle too nothing to the contrary can be gathered; for he himself, as we shall see immediately, often assigns to this science a more universal object than immaterial substance. In the former place cited, however, he only says that material and immaterial substances according to their proper notions pertain to diverse sciences, and that the science which contemplates immaterial substances is prior in nature and dignity; and each of these is most true, even if immaterial substance as such is not the adequate object of such a science, but in some way its proper object, in so far as it is considered by this science alone, both according to its immediate notion, and according to every superior notion included in it, and also according to every inferior notion or subjective part which can be considered under such a notion. In the latter place, however, that conditional: If there were no other substance superior besides material ones, natural philosophy would be first, nor would any other science be necessary, is most true, not because immaterial substance is the adequate object of first philosophy, but because, if this substance were taken away, both the proper and the adequate object of first philosophy would be taken away, because not only would immaterial substance be taken away, but also all notions of being or of substance common to immaterial and material things; and, that hypothesis given, just as there would be no immaterial beings, so neither would there be any notions of beings abstracting from matter according to being, and therefore another distinct science would not be necessary. From which it is also evident that the second confirmation does not rightly conclude, because not only immaterial substance as such, but also every notion of being more abstract than it or superior to it abstracts from sensible and intelligible matter according to being; for to abstract from matter according to being is nothing other than to be able to exist in the nature of things truly and really without matter; and this is true not only of immaterial substance as such, but also of any superior notion whatever, which, since it can sufficiently exist in immaterial substance itself, can evidently also exist in things without matter.

17. You will say: granted that this is true, this kind of abstraction nevertheless belongs in a diverse way to immaterial substance as such and to the superior notions, for to immaterial substance or being it belongs per se, positively and necessarily, because neither the common notion of immaterial substance nor anything contained under it can exist in matter; but the more common notions, such as the notion of being, of substance, of accident and the like, participate that abstraction only permissively (so to speak) and as it were through another; for they can exist without matter by reason of one part subject to them, yet it is not repugnant to them to be in matter by reason of another part. The answer is that this in no way prevents those notions from being contained under the object of this science and from sufficiently participating its abstraction, because, by the very fact that those notions can exist without matter, they cannot pertain to a lower philosophy or science, as is self-evident. Nor do they require another science besides this one; for either it would be prior to metaphysics, which is not to be asserted, since metaphysics is first philosophy, as we saw from Aristotle, and since there is no more noble knowable object than immaterial substance, as it comprehends God; or it would be some posterior and inferior science, and this too cannot be said, both because the science which contemplates immaterial substances according to their proper notions can much more contemplate other notions which are in them, even if they are common to other inferior things; and also because human and natural science can scarcely attain immaterial substances except by beginning from notions which are common to those substances and to other things. Wherefore, for the object of this science it is enough that in its objective concept it does not include matter, neither sensible nor intelligible. But that it should also include something repugnant to matter may pertain to a certain greater excellence or property of the object, yet it does not constitute the adequate object. And to this and the preceding opinion can be reduced that which Avicenna touches upon at the beginning of his Metaphysics, namely, of those who said that the first cause or causes of things are the adequate object of this science. Which opinion, taken thus absolutely, is of itself improbable; but in what way the knowledge of causes pertains to this science will be said in the following section.

The fifth opinion is proposed and refuted

18. The fifth opinion, which also remains disproved a fortiori from what has been said, is altogether diverse from the two preceding ones, according to its diverse senses; for it says that being divided into the ten predicaments is the adequate object of this science; but this being can be conceived in two ways according to diverse opinions. First, supposing that finite immaterial substances and their accidents are placed in the predicaments, and in this way the object will be finite being, and God alone will be excluded from the notion of object, although he is not altogether excluded from the consideration of this science, at least in so far as he is the first cause of its object; and in this way Flandria defends this opinion, Metaphysics I, q. 1. The other sense can be, if we suppose, according to the opinion of others, that all immaterial substances are placed in no predicament; for this being supposed, all of them will be excluded from an object of this kind, if we establish that it is only being divided into the ten predicaments. Which these authors thus gather from Aristotle; for after he established being as the object of this science in Book IV of the Metaphysics, he immediately divided it in Book V into ten predicaments. They also add the testimony of St. Thomas, who sometimes teaches that God and the intelligences are considered by the metaphysician as principles and causes of his subject, not as its parts. They also bring forward some conjectures, which have partly been solved in treating the third opinion; for those arguments by which it seemed to be proved that God cannot be the principal object of this science unless he is the adequate one are used by these authors to prove that he cannot in any way be the object; but those have already been answered. Another part of them, however, will be solved in examining the true opinion.

19. God pertains to this science not only as the cause of the object of metaphysics, but also as its chief part.—This opinion, therefore, is false and improbable in both senses; and first I leave aside the latter sense, which supposes a plainly false opinion, and very irrelevant to the present matter, namely, that finite immaterial substances and their properties are not placed in the predicaments; for this is said without foundation, since in those things there are true genera and differences, and univocal agreements with inferior things, as we shall show in the following proper places. Nor does this matter at all for assigning the object of the science; for what difference does it make whether a thing is or is not in a predicament, for it to be placed under the object of a science or not? Next, for this reason too God is excluded from this object without cause, according to the former sense, because he is not placed in the predicaments; for that is irrelevant. And consequently it is false that this science does not deal with God as with its primary and principal object, but only as with an extrinsic principle. And the same is to be said of the other intelligences, as is openly gathered from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 7, where he says that metaphysics surpasses natural philosophy because it considers the first substance, namely as its chief object, for as an extrinsic principle it is also considered in some way by philosophy, as is evident from Physics VIII. Moreover, in Book VI, c. 1, Aristotle says that, since besides natural substances there is another, superior one, there is also a science superior to natural philosophy, which considers it. He understands, therefore, that it considers it as its chief object. And all the arguments brought forward in favour of the third and fourth opinions sufficiently prove the same. For God is in some way a naturally knowable object (and let the same always be understood of the other intelligences); therefore he can fall under some natural science, not only as an extrinsic principle, but also as its chief object; therefore this dignity pertains to this science. The consequence is proved, both because this is the first and most worthy of all the natural sciences, which is not to be deprived of this excellence without cause; and also because God cannot be investigated naturally by a higher way and mode than is done in this science. Hence it is confirmed, because this science not only considers God under the prescinded respect of principle, but, after it has arrived at God and found him under the said notion of principle, it inquires absolutely into his nature and attributes, as far as it can by natural light, as is evident from Book XII of the Metaphysics; therefore God falls absolutely under the object of this science. It is confirmed, secondly, because this science is the most perfect natural wisdom; therefore it considers the first and most universal things and causes, and the first and most general principles, which comprehend God himself, such as: Anything whatever either is or is not, and the like; therefore it is necessary that it embrace God under its object.

20. Nor did St. Thomas ever teach the opposite, but only that this science arrives at the knowledge of God under the notion of principle; he does not, however, deny that the same science treats of God as of its chief object, as can easily be evident from the same places, and from what we shall say below. But that Aristotle divided being into the ten predicaments does not stand in the way; for if that division is understood of those things only which are placed directly in a predicament, then it is evident that what is divided in it is not being as it is the adequate object of this science, for that embraces not only beings which are placed directly in the predicaments, but also other transcendental and analogous notions, such as those of accident, form and the like, and also the differences of beings. But if under that division are understood those things which are reduced to those heads, then God too can be said to be reduced to substance; being, therefore, or substance, as it is the object of this science, does not exclude God or the intelligences.

The sixth opinion is proposed, and judgement is passed on it

21. The sixth opinion, which is said to be that of Buridan, is that the adequate object of this science is substance in so far as it is substance, that is, as it abstracts from material and immaterial, finite and infinite. For that this object cannot be more contracted is sufficiently proved by what has been said against the three immediately preceding opinions. But that neither can it be more abstract can be taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 5, where, after the division of being into substance and accidents, having said that substance alone is being simply, he concludes thus: Wherefore we must most of all, and first, and alone (so to speak), speculate about being taken in this way, what it is. By which words he seems to establish substance alone as the subject of this doctrine. Hence at the beginning of Book XII he again writes thus: The speculation is about substance, since the principles and causes of substances are sought. From which places a reason is also drawn, for substance and accident are so compared that substance is for its own sake, while accident is a property of substance; therefore this science treats of substance as of its subject, and of accident as of a property of the subject; therefore the adequate subject of this science is not to be established as more abstract than substance as such. The consequence is evident, because nothing can be more abstract except something common directly or in recto to substance and accident; but this is not to be assigned, because the adequate subject of a science is not common to that subject of which the attributes are demonstrated and to the attributes themselves; but the adequate object is that subject of which the attributes are demonstrated; otherwise the subject and the properties which are said of it would equally fall under the science; but concerning a notion common to both (which would be assigned as the adequate object) nothing could be demonstrated, which is very absurd. Therefore, since substance and accident are related as subject and property, an object of this science is not to be assigned which is more abstract than both, and directly and per se common to them; it will therefore be substance alone as such; for accident cannot be, as is self-evident; but it will be considered by this science as the adequate affection of substance.

22. And this can be declared and confirmed by examples, for the science which considers man and demonstrates his properties of him does not have for its adequate object something common to man and his properties, but only man himself. Similarly natural philosophy has for its adequate object natural substance, of which it demonstrates properties, and not something common to it and its properties. Therefore the same is to be said in the present case of substance and accident as such. But if against this opinion you object that this science considers the notion of being as such, which extends more widely than substance, and demonstrates of it properties which also extend more widely and are common to accidents, it can be answered that all these are analogous, and are converted primarily and simply with substance, and therefore that it is the same to demonstrate these of being as of substance, because being said simply is nothing other than substance, especially if it is true that not one but several objective concepts correspond to being as such.

23. This opinion has something of verisimilitude and appearance; and indeed those who deny an objective concept of being would speak quite consistently in this way, because if there is no common objective concept of substance and accident, nothing real more abstract is conceived which could be the adequate object of this science. Nevertheless, this opinion is simply false and foreign to the mind of Aristotle, because, as will be shown below, it is simply truer that there is an objective concept of being according to a notion abstractable from substance and accident, with which some science can be concerned per se and as such, by explaining its notion and unity, and demonstrating some attributes of it; but this is done in this science, as is evident from its course, nor can it pertain to another, because no science is prior to this one, and none besides it considers the notions of beings which abstract from matter according to being; but the objective notion of being as such abstracts from matter according to being; indeed it is the first and most abstract of all, and therefore it ought to pertain to the first science or philosophy. The notion of substance as such, therefore, cannot be the adequate notion of the object of this science, because it does not contain under itself the notion of being as such, but rather is contained under it; and just as that notion is diverse according to concepts and objectively from the notion of substance, and extends more widely than it, so it has more universal and more abstract principles and attributes; and therefore it cannot conveniently be reduced to it in the notion of a knowable object, because, although it is analogous, it is nevertheless one and common, not only in unity of word, but also of objective concept and of its abstraction.

24. From which it is also understood that in the discourse or foundation of this opinion there is not right procedure. First indeed, because it is supposed that accident is the adequate attribute which this science demonstrates of its subject, which is nevertheless false, both because it first demonstrates of its subject other attributes more universal than accident as such, such as one, true, good; and also because not even of substance as such is accident demonstrated as an adequate attribute; for there is some substance which can have no accident; hence, if that were the adequate object of this science which is as it were the adequate subject of accident, not substance as such, but finite substance would have to be posited as the adequate object of this science, which nevertheless is false, as we have shown. Hence conversely, if substance as such is posited as the adequate object, properties are to be assigned which can be adequately demonstrated of it and belong to all substances; but these perhaps are none besides those which are common to being as being, and belong to it per se primarily; for finite and infinite substance seem to have no common and adequate attribute besides the notion of subsisting and the negation of inhering, which intrinsically accompanies it. Add that, although every accident is called a property of substance in so far as it is an affection of it, yet this property is not always such as follows per se upon the notion of substance; and therefore it is not always considered as a property which is demonstrated of substance as of its adequate subject, because only those properties which follow per se upon the notion of the subject are demonstrated in this way. And finally, although accident itself is something of substance, yet in it as such something can sometimes be considered as it were absolutely; and therefore sometimes some science can be concerned with accidents alone, as mathematics with quantity.

25. Accident can be the subject of some science.—This science, therefore, which is most universal, considers accident not only as a property demonstrable of substance, but as it itself in itself participates the notion and properties of being, although it always participates them in order to substance. Wherefore the examples brought forward there are not similar. Nor are the words of Aristotle repugnant to what he himself taught in other places, as we shall see immediately; for he does not intend to exclude accident, but to prefer substance to it, and to attribute the first and principal place to substance, as St. Thomas rightly explained, and as is taken from the same Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 20, and from the words of the same in the aforesaid place, Book VII, if they are rightly weighed; for he says that most of all and first one must speculate about substance; but when he adds and alone, he subjoins that limitation: so to speak, as if indicating that that was said by exaggeration, because simply one must not speculate about it alone; yet in a certain way it can be said that it alone is to be contemplated, because it alone is sought for its own sake, while accidents are sought almost only for its sake.

What the adequate object of metaphysics is, is defined

26. It must be said, therefore, that being in so far as it is real being is the adequate object of this science. This is the opinion of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, near the beginning, which St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, Scotus, Albert, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and almost all others follow there, and the Commentator there, and in Book III, comm. 14, and Book XII, comm. 1; Avicenna, Book I of his Metaphysics, c. 1; Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, q. 10; Giles, Book I, q. 5, and almost all the other writers. And this assertion has been proved from what has been said so far against the other opinions. For it has been shown that the adequate object of this science must comprehend God and the other immaterial substances, yet not them alone. Likewise that it must comprehend not only substances, but also real accidents, yet not beings of reason and beings altogether per accidens; but no other object of this kind can be found besides being as such; therefore that is the adequate object.

27. An objection against the assertion is dissolved.—But, in order that this assertion may be declared more fully, we must meet an objection which immediately presents itself; for, to constitute some object of a science, it is necessary that it have properties which can be demonstrated of it, and principles and causes through which they can be demonstrated; but being in so far as it is being cannot have properties, principles and causes of this kind; therefore. The major is evident, because this is the function of science, namely, to demonstrate properties of its subject, which it must demonstrate through causes in order to be perfect science, as is evident from Posterior Analytics I. The minor, as regards the former part, is evident, because being in so far as it is being, thus abstracted, is included per se and essentially in every being and in every mode or property of any being whatever; therefore it cannot have a property so adequate and proper, because the subject cannot be of the essence of its property. As regards the latter part, however, it is proved because being in so far as it is being embraces God, who is without principle and without cause; therefore being in so far as it is being cannot have principles and causes, because otherwise such principles and causes would have to belong to every being, because what belongs to the superior in so far as it is such must belong to everything contained under it. And it is confirmed, because this science is the most noble; therefore it must have the most noble object; but being in so far as it is being is the most imperfect object, because it is the most common, and is included even in the lowest beings, and substance, or spiritual substance, or God, would be much more perfect.

28. What properties metaphysics demonstrates of its object.—The answer is by denying the former part of the minor, for in truth being has its properties, distinct if not in reality at least in reason, such as one, true, good; which we shall show immediately in the third disputation, where we shall declare whether being is included intrinsically and per se in properties of this kind; and whether that principle, that the subject is not of the essence of its property, is to be limited either to properties really distinct, or to subjects which do not express transcendental notions, or rather whether it is to be said that these properties are not altogether real as regards what they add to being, and that it is enough that being is not included in them as regards what they add to being, which is more probable, as we shall see. Hence the argument given to the contrary can be retorted, because several properties which this science demonstrates belong immediately to nothing but being in so far as it is being, and in explaining them this science is in great part occupied; therefore that is the adequate object of this science, because that is the subject of the science of which the more common properties are demonstrated in the science immediately and per se.

29. And what principles.—To the latter part the answer is, first, that two kinds of principles can be required in a science: some are called complex or composite, such as are those from which a demonstration is composed; others are simple, which are signified by the terms which are taken in place of the middle term in an a priori demonstration. The former are called principles of knowing; the latter, however, principles of being. In this science, therefore, complex principles are not lacking; indeed, as we shall see below, it pertains to it to explain and confirm principles, and to establish the first of all principles, through which the others are in a certain way demonstrated. But incomplex principles can be understood in two ways: first, as true causes in some way distinct in reality from the effects or properties which are demonstrated through them; and principles or causes of this kind are not simply necessary to the notion of the object, because they are not necessary for making true demonstrations, as is evident from Posterior Analytics I. For God is a knowable object, and attributes are demonstrated of him, not only a posteriori, and from effects, but also a priori, by gathering one from another, as immortality from immateriality, and that he is a free agent because he is intelligent. In another way, that is called a principle or cause which is the reason of another, according as they are objectively conceived and distinguished; and this kind of principle suffices to be the middle term of a demonstration, for it suffices for rendering as it were the formal reason on account of which such a property belongs to the thing. Although, therefore, we grant that being in so far as it is being does not have causes properly and strictly taken in the former way, it nevertheless has some reason of its properties; and in this way such reasons can also be found in God, for from the infinite perfection of God we give the cause why he is only one, and so of the others. Wherefore we can also retort this part of the argument, for being in so far as it is being is of itself a knowable object, having a sufficient formal notion and sufficient principles for properties to be demonstrated of it; therefore some science can be concerned with it, which is no other than metaphysics. But whether being in so far as it is being has in some way true and real causes, we shall say below, in the disputation on causes.

30. How the notion of being is more perfect and more imperfect with respect to its inferiors.—To the confirmation the answer is, from St. Thomas, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2, that, although being, as prescissively taken and distinct in reason, is less perfect than the inferior grades, which include being itself and something else, yet being simply, or esse itself, according as it is found in reality with as much perfection as it can have in the notion of being, is something most perfect. This science, therefore, although in one way it considers the notion of being prescinded and abstract, does not stop in it, but considers all the perfections of being which being can have in reality itself, at least without concretion with sensible matter; and so it includes the most perfect beings, from which the greatest perfection of this science is to be taken, if it is considered in relation to the things which it contemplates. For if we look also to the mode of speculating, and to the subtlety and certitude of the science, it is taken in great part from the abstraction of the object, from which it can sometimes have greater perfection in the notion of the knowable, although perhaps it is not more perfect in its being.