Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There are various opinions on this matter, which are to be noted and examined one by one and briefly, so that we may understand exactly about what things we must discourse in the course of this doctrine, in such a way that we neither transgress its bounds nor leave untouched anything contained within them.

The first and second opinions are set out

2. The first opinion, then, is that being taken most abstractly, in so far as it embraces under itself not only all real beings, both per se and per accidens, but also beings of reason, is the adequate object of this science. This opinion is urged, first, because being so taken can be the adequate object of some science; therefore most of all of this one, which is the most abstract of all. The antecedent is evident, both because being in that whole breadth is presented to the intellect; therefore it can also be presented to one science, for the reason is the same; and also because, just as the intellect understands all those things, so this science discourses about all of them, namely, about beings of reason and real beings, and about beings per se and per accidens; therefore, if for that reason they are contained under the object of the intellect, for a similar reason they ought to be contained under the adequate object of this science; therefore being, as it is presented to this science, must be taken under that abstraction and breadth by which it directly comprehends all these things; and in the same way are to be taken the common attributes of which this science treats, such as unity, multitude, truth and the like. Hence I argue, secondly, because it pertains to the perfection and breadth of this science that it separate and distinguish all these things, and teach concerning all of them whatever can be known about them with certain knowledge, for this pertains most of all to the notion of wisdom; therefore all these beings, according to their common notions, are directly contained under the adequate object of this science. Thirdly, because, if anything prevented being so taken from being the object, it would be most of all that it is not univocal; but this does not matter, for it is enough that it be analogous; otherwise it could not be common to real accidents and to created and uncreated substances; but being, in so far as it is analogous, also embraces beings of reason, as can be taken from Metaphysics IV, text 2, where Aristotle subjects privations, negations or non-beings to the analogy of being, in so far as they are intelligible; therefore being so analogous can be the adequate object of this science, all the more because all those things are comprehended under the adequate abstraction of this science, which is from all sensible and intelligible matter; for all those notions of beings can be found without matter of this kind. Finally, in the very properties which are demonstrated of being in common in this science, beings of reason are so included that without them the properties cannot be understood, as we shall see later; therefore it is necessary that this science dispute about them.

3. Nor is it enough if someone says that this science does indeed discourse about these beings, yet not per se and by design as about its object, but incidentally and while doing something else, either in order better to explain its objects, or because the knowledge of these is easily obtained from the knowledge of the object; this (I say) is not enough, because the arguments given seem to prove more; otherwise the same could be said of accidents, indeed also of created substances. Especially because beings of reason of this kind and the like are knowable per se, and many things about them are naturally known and demonstrated; but there is no other science to which this belongs per se. For although some attribute this to dialectic, yet neither can this be said universally of all beings of reason, but at most of certain respects which follow upon the operations of the intellect; nor does the dialectician inquire per se about them how they participate the notion of being and its attributes, but only touches upon them incidentally, as far as is necessary for explaining the conceptions of the intellect and the denominations arising from them.

4. The second opinion can be that the object of this science is real being in its whole breadth, in such a way that it does not directly comprehend beings of reason, because they do not have entity and reality, but embraces not only beings per se, but also beings per accidens, because these too are real and truly participate the notion of being and its attributes; and of these the arguments given in confirmation of the preceding opinion proceed more urgently. And it can be confirmed because some particular sciences have beings per accidens for their objects; but the object of this science directly embraces all the objects of the particular sciences; therefore.

The first two opinions are refuted

5. These two opinions, however, are manifestly repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics VI. For in the first place, as regards beings per accidens, in so far as they are such they cannot fall under science, as Aristotle proves in the same place, text 4; for being per accidens is here so called not in the character of an effect, but in the character of being, that is, not that which is effected by accident or contingently and beyond the intention of the agent, but that which in itself is not truly one, but a certain aggregate of many; concerning which distinction we shall say more below in treating of unity. Since, therefore, this being per accidens is not one but an aggregation of many, it can neither have a proper definition, nor real attributes which are demonstrated of it, and therefore it does not fall under science. But if such a being is considered in so far as it is in some way one, and its unity is in some way in the thing, it is then no longer considered as altogether per accidens, but as in some way comprehended under the breadth of being per se, although perhaps it holds some imperfect grade in it; for there are various modes of being per se and per accidens, as we shall declare in its place when treating of unity. For this reason I said that the discussion is of being per accidens in so far as it is such, for that, as such, is not a being but beings, and therefore it is directly comprehended not under the object of one science, but of several, to which the beings per se of which such a being per accidens is composed can pertain, as St. Thomas noted in the said Book VI of the Metaphysics, lect. 4. But if that unity is not in the thing, but only in apprehension or conception, such a being as such will not truly be called real; hence the reason concerning it will be the same as concerning the other beings of reason. These, however, are excluded from the direct consideration of this science by the same Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, at the end, as all the interpreters noted in the same place. And the reason is that such things are neither truly beings, but almost in name only, nor do they agree with real beings in the same concept of being, but only through a certain imperfect analogy of proportionality, as we shall see below; but the adequate object of a science requires some objective unity.

6. Why beings of reason are excluded from the object of this science.—Hence it does not matter that Aristotle sometimes declared the analogy of being as it extends to these beings, because there he was not assigning the object of this science, but explaining the signification of the word in order to remove equivocation. Afterwards, however, in the proper place, he taught that being is not the object according to that whole analogy, which consists more in the unity of the word than of the object. And for this reason too there is not a similar reason concerning real accidents, for those are truly beings and are in some way comprehended under the unity of the objective concept of being, as we shall see later. Nor is it necessary that all the things which are in some way considered in a science be directly contained under its adequate object, for many things are considered incidentally through a certain analogy or reduction, either that by their knowledge the object itself may be more illuminated, or because, the object being known, the other things are known by analogy to it, and perhaps cannot be known otherwise. Likewise it is not necessary that the properties of the subject, which are demonstrated of it, be directly contained under the object itself, at least according to all that they include. Thus, therefore, although this science considers many things about beings of reason, nevertheless they are rightly excluded from the object per se and directly intended (unless someone wishes to contend about the name), for both of the reasons stated. For in the first place beings of reason are considered in some way in this science, yet not per se, but on account of a certain proportionality which they have with real beings, and in order that they may be distinguished from them, and that it may be better and more clearly conceived what in beings has entity and reality, and what has only its appearance. Hence (so to speak) these beings of reason are considered rather in order that they may be known not to be beings, than in order that science or knowledge of them may be acquired. Then they are considered in order to declare the properties of real being and of the object of this science, which are not sufficiently conceived and explained by us except through beings of reason of this kind; for thus this science deals in some way with genus and species in order to explain the unities of things, and so of the others, as is taken from Metaphysics IV, cc. 1 and 2, and from Books VI and VII, and it will be more evident from the course of the matter. Again, these beings are often treated by reason of some real foundation which they have in things, or certainly because the foundation itself cannot be sufficiently known, nor its reality declared by us, unless we first explain what denominations of reason are mixed in there.

7. The foundations of the preceding opinions are resolved.—The arguments of the preceding opinions, therefore, prove indeed that beings of this kind are considered in this science, but not that they are parts directly contained under its object. Indeed, as I judge, they pertain to no science per se and primarily, because, since they are not beings, but rather defects of beings, they are not knowable per se, but in so far as they fall short of the true notion of beings, which is considered per se, or in so far as they seem in some way to accompany it. In the former way the Philosopher deals with blindness, and with darkness and the void, in so far as they are defects and privations of sight, of light and of real place. In the latter way many treat of relations or denominations of reason. The dialectician does so in so far as it pertains to him to direct and order the real concepts of the mind, from which denominations of reason are taken, and in which these relations of reason are founded; but they are also considered, or can be considered, by the Philosopher, in so far as he himself per se properly speculates about the operations of the intellect, not only direct but also reflex, and about their objects. In this science, however, they are considered for the reasons already stated.

The third opinion is set out

8. Leaving aside, then, these opinions, which enlarged the object of this science too much, there are many others which restrict it too much. The third opinion, therefore, and the one opposed at the other extreme, makes the supreme real being alone (namely God) the adequate object of this science. Albert reports this opinion at the beginning of the Metaphysics from Alpharabius, in the book On the Division of the Sciences, and it can be attributed to Averroes, Physics I, last comm.; for he reproves Avicenna because he said that it pertains to the first philosopher to demonstrate that the first principle exists; but (Averroes objects) no science demonstrates that its object exists; but God, or the first principle, is the object of the whole of philosophy. Aristotle too, in Metaphysics I, at the beginning, says that this science contemplates the first cause of things, and therefore is most divine; wherefore, as we saw, he calls it theology; but theology is nothing other than the science of God; God, therefore, will be the object of this science, for a science receives its dignity and excellence from its object, and those attributes or names by which such dignity is indicated; but the most excellent object is God; therefore this ought to be the object of the most excellent and most worthy science.

9. An objection is met.—Nor will he satisfy who answers that God is the principal object of this science, and that this is enough for that dignity and appellation of the science, although he is not the adequate object. For against this the argument is pressed. First, because it is more noble and more excellent to have God for the adequate object than only for the principal one; but this science is the most noble of all which can be acquired by the natural light of the intellect; therefore God is its adequate object. The first antecedent is proved, because God according to his proper notion is something more noble than any notion common to God and creatures could be, as is self-evident, because God according to his proper notion is an infinitely perfect being; but every other more abstract notion of itself neither expresses nor requires infinite perfection; but that science which has God for its adequate object tends immediately and per se primarily to him according to his proper notion; whereas that science which regards God only as its principal object can at most be concerned per se primarily with some notion of being common to God and creatures; therefore the former science will be far more noble, because the nobility of a science is taken from that object to which it tends per se primarily. Which can also be declared and confirmed by examples, because the divine intellect is the most noble of all, and therefore has God alone for its adequate object, and attains nothing else except in so far as it is manifested in God himself or through him. Similarly the beatific vision is more noble having God for its adequate object than if it attained God immediately and something else under some common notion. And finally for this reason supernatural theology is judged to have for its adequate object God alone as supernaturally revealed; therefore by the same reason God, as knowable by the natural light of our intellect, will be the adequate object of this natural theology. Indeed, rather, we can argue that God cannot be the principal object of this science if he is not the adequate one, because God and creature cannot agree under some common notion of knowable object; therefore either God must be said to be the adequate object of this science, or he must be altogether excluded from its object. The antecedent is evident, first, because God is an intelligible object of a far different and more eminent notion than every created object is, and God is more distant from any created object, in abstraction and immateriality, than all created beings are distant according to their proper notions; but all created objects cannot agree according to their proper notions under one adequate object of this science; therefore much less can God and the other created beings agree. Next, because a common object is prior in nature to those things which are contained under it, because it is superior to them and is not convertible with them by consequence of subsisting; but nothing can be prior in nature to God; therefore he cannot be a principal object contained under something common; he will therefore be the adequate one.

10. The objection is resolved.—And if you object that this science discourses not about God alone, but about many other things, they answer that other things are not treated in this science per se or for their own sake, but in so far as they can contribute to the knowledge of God. And so Aristotle in Book XII of the Metaphysics concludes the science about God, while all the things which he hands down in the preceding books are referred to that last one as to the conclusion chiefly intended. Hence St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, and Cajetan there say that this science is concerned with that which is last with respect to the whole of knowledge, and judges about all principles by resolution to the first causes, which Cajetan interprets of the first or highest cause, which eminently contains the first notions of causing, which both are universal and pertain to perfection simply, such as are end, efficient cause and exemplar; for matter and form are not universal, and include imperfection.

The third opinion is rejected

11. Nevertheless, this opinion is not to be approved; for it is repugnant to Aristotle and to almost all the other philosophers and his interpreters, as we shall see; it is also repugnant (so to speak) to experience itself, and to the doctrine which is wont to be handed down in this science and is judged necessary for its perfection and completion; for in it many things are contained and taught which are per se necessary for knowing other things besides God, and for the perfection of the human intellect, in so far as it can be concerned with things of this kind, or with knowing common notions and principles; and they contribute either nothing or little to knowing God, nor are they referred to this by the mode or notion of such a science, whatever may be the case with the intention of the knower. The a priori reason, finally, is that this science, since it proceeds by natural discourse, does not attain God as he is in himself, but as far as he can be manifested from creatures by the natural light of the human intellect; and therefore there can be no natural science which attains him and regards him as its adequate object, because the notion under which he is attained is always common to other created things. Hence it is evident that it was rightly said, in treating the foundation of the preceding opinion, that God is contained under the object of this science as its first and chief object, but not as its adequate one.

12. To the instances or rejoinders, however, the answer is as follows. To the first indeed: we grant that it is a great excellence of a science to have God for its object, to which alone it tends per se and primarily, and through it to the rest; we say, however, that this perfection exceeds the natural powers of human talent and of the science which can be acquired through them; and therefore, although this science is most noble within its order, so great a perfection is not on that account to be attributed to it. Nor in this is it to be compared with the divine intellect and the beatific vision; nay, nor with supernatural theology, which proceeds under a higher light and from higher principles. Although it is not certain even of supernatural theology that God alone is its adequate object; for many judge that not God, but revealed being, is the adequate object of that doctrine; because divine revelation, which is the formal notion under which of that object, can fall equally upon God and upon other things, as regards the force and notion of knowing, although in the notion of end and in the excellence of the thing revealed God surpasses all things, and therefore he is wont to be called either the principal object, or simply the object, when things are considered practically and in order to morals. But of this elsewhere.

13. Whether God can agree with creatures in the notion of object.—To the last the answer is that it is not repugnant that God, as known through creatures, should agree with them in some common notion of object; for although in his being and according to himself he is more distant from any creature whatever than they are among themselves, nevertheless, according to those things which can be manifested of him by natural science, and according to the notion and mode in which they can be manifested from creatures, a greater proportion and agreement can be found between God and creatures than between some creatures among themselves. Nor, for constituting an adequate object of this kind, which comprehends God under itself, is it necessary that there be something, or some notion of being, which is prior in nature to God; but it is enough that there be such according to the abstraction or consideration of the intellect, which is not repugnant, as we shall show below in treating of the concept of being. For just as some agreement or imperfect likeness between God and creatures can be understood in the notion of being, of substance, or of spirit, so there can be some concepts prior to God according to reason in universality of predication; but this is not a priority of nature, nor by reason of causality, as is self-evident, nor by reason of independence or priority in subsisting, for every notion, however abstracted, common to God and creatures, is so compared to God that it cannot exist in the nature of things except in God himself or dependently on God, and therefore it cannot be prior in nature to God himself.

The fourth opinion is refuted

14. Two testimonies of Aristotle are brought forward for this opinion.—And from what has been said against the preceding opinion two others, certainly hardly probable, are easily excluded. Let the fourth opinion, then, be that substance or immaterial being, as it includes in itself God and the intelligences alone, is the adequate object of this science. This opinion is wont to be attributed to the Commentator, Physics I, last comm. But there he only says that the intelligences pertain per se to the object of this science, not that they are its adequate object. This opinion, however, can be urged from the course or partition of the sciences; for, leaving aside the rational sciences, which are rather certain arts and treat of words or concepts, and the mathematical sciences, which deal not with substance but with quantity alone, among the sciences which deal with substances, philosophy treats of all generable and corruptible substances, and of incorruptible corporeal substances also, and of substance composed of matter and an immaterial¹ form, such as man is, and of the immaterial form itself, namely the rational soul, and finally of the five grades or orders of material substances, namely of simple bodies, of inanimate mixed bodies, of those merely vegetative, of those merely sentient, and of rational ones, and of all their properties. Nothing, therefore, remains to be known in things except immaterial substances; these, therefore, complete the adequate object of this science. This whole discourse can be confirmed, first, by a twofold testimony of Aristotle. One is Metaphysics IV, text 4, where he says that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are substances. Hence, just as substance is twofold, namely material and immaterial, so the science which philosophizes about substances is twofold; whence he concludes that that is first philosophy which contemplates the first, that is, immaterial substance. The other testimony is Metaphysics VI, text 3, where Aristotle says that if there were no substances abstracting from matter according to being, natural philosophy would be first, nor would there be any other science necessary besides it; therefore the whole objective notion of this science, which constitutes it in its own way and distinguishes it from the others, is immaterial substance; this, therefore, is its adequate object. It is confirmed, secondly, because natural philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics are commonly distinguished from the abstraction of their objects; for physics considers things consisting of sensible matter; mathematics abstracts from that matter according to reason, but not according to being, and therefore it is said not to abstract from intelligible matter; but metaphysics abstracts from both sensible and intelligible matter, not only according to reason, but also according to being; but immaterial substance alone abstracts from matter according to being; therefore it is the adequate object of this science.

15. This opinion, however, as I said, has no greater probability than the preceding one; hence there is no weighty author who defends it, for in the whole discourse given it proceeds deficiently. That discourse proves rightly indeed that immaterial substances pertain most of all to the object of this science. It also proves that, of the things subsisting in the nature of things, no others fall per se and according to their proper notions under the object of this science besides immaterial substances, as we shall say a little below against Giles. It does not, however, prove, nor rightly conclude, that immaterial substance as such is the adequate object of this science, because in immaterial substance itself other more universal and more common notions or objective concepts can be considered, concerning which, according to their adequate notion, some science can be handed down, for to these notions proper principles and properties correspond; but no other science besides metaphysics contemplates these notions; therefore the adequate object of metaphysics is to be designated under some more universal notion. Although, therefore, we grant to the discourse and induction given that all material things, according to those notions in which they do not agree with immaterial things, are sufficiently known through other sciences distinct from metaphysics, it is not rightly concluded that immaterial substance as such is the adequate object of this science, because there still remain notions common to both things or substances, in which proper demonstrations can be made.

16. The testimonies of Aristotle brought forward for the preceding opinion are explained.—What it is to abstract from matter according to being.—And therefore from the testimonies of Aristotle too nothing to the contrary can be gathered; for he himself, as we shall see immediately, often assigns to this science a more universal object than immaterial substance. In the former place cited, however, he only says that material and immaterial substances according to their proper notions pertain to diverse sciences, and that the science which contemplates immaterial substances is prior in nature and dignity; and each of these is most true, even if immaterial substance as such is not the adequate object of such a science, but in some way its proper object, in so far as it is considered by this science alone, both according to its immediate notion, and according to every superior notion included in it, and also according to every inferior notion or subjective part which can be considered under such a notion. In the latter place, however, that conditional: If there were no other substance superior besides material ones, natural philosophy would be first, nor would any other science be necessary, is most true, not because immaterial substance is the adequate object of first philosophy, but because, if this substance were taken away, both the proper and the adequate object of first philosophy would be taken away, because not only would immaterial substance be taken away, but also all notions of being or of substance common to immaterial and material things; and, that hypothesis given, just as there would be no immaterial beings, so neither would there be any notions of beings abstracting from matter according to being, and therefore another distinct science would not be necessary. From which it is also evident that the second confirmation does not rightly conclude, because not only immaterial substance as such, but also every notion of being more abstract than it or superior to it abstracts from sensible and intelligible matter according to being; for to abstract from matter according to being is nothing other than to be able to exist in the nature of things truly and really without matter; and this is true not only of immaterial substance as such, but also of any superior notion whatever, which, since it can sufficiently exist in immaterial substance itself, can evidently also exist in things without matter.

17. You will say: granted that this is true, this kind of abstraction nevertheless belongs in a diverse way to immaterial substance as such and to the superior notions, for to immaterial substance or being it belongs per se, positively and necessarily, because neither the common notion of immaterial substance nor anything contained under it can exist in matter; but the more common notions, such as the notion of being, of substance, of accident and the like, participate that abstraction only permissively (so to speak) and as it were through another; for they can exist without matter by reason of one part subject to them, yet it is not repugnant to them to be in matter by reason of another part. The answer is that this in no way prevents those notions from being contained under the object of this science and from sufficiently participating its abstraction, because, by the very fact that those notions can exist without matter, they cannot pertain to a lower philosophy or science, as is self-evident. Nor do they require another science besides this one; for either it would be prior to metaphysics, which is not to be asserted, since metaphysics is first philosophy, as we saw from Aristotle, and since there is no more noble knowable object than immaterial substance, as it comprehends God; or it would be some posterior and inferior science, and this too cannot be said, both because the science which contemplates immaterial substances according to their proper notions can much more contemplate other notions which are in them, even if they are common to other inferior things; and also because human and natural science can scarcely attain immaterial substances except by beginning from notions which are common to those substances and to other things. Wherefore, for the object of this science it is enough that in its objective concept it does not include matter, neither sensible nor intelligible. But that it should also include something repugnant to matter may pertain to a certain greater excellence or property of the object, yet it does not constitute the adequate object. And to this and the preceding opinion can be reduced that which Avicenna touches upon at the beginning of his Metaphysics, namely, of those who said that the first cause or causes of things are the adequate object of this science. Which opinion, taken thus absolutely, is of itself improbable; but in what way the knowledge of causes pertains to this science will be said in the following section.

The fifth opinion is proposed and refuted

18. The fifth opinion, which also remains disproved a fortiori from what has been said, is altogether diverse from the two preceding ones, according to its diverse senses; for it says that being divided into the ten predicaments is the adequate object of this science; but this being can be conceived in two ways according to diverse opinions. First, supposing that finite immaterial substances and their accidents are placed in the predicaments, and in this way the object will be finite being, and God alone will be excluded from the notion of object, although he is not altogether excluded from the consideration of this science, at least in so far as he is the first cause of its object; and in this way Flandria defends this opinion, Metaphysics I, q. 1. The other sense can be, if we suppose, according to the opinion of others, that all immaterial substances are placed in no predicament; for this being supposed, all of them will be excluded from an object of this kind, if we establish that it is only being divided into the ten predicaments. Which these authors thus gather from Aristotle; for after he established being as the object of this science in Book IV of the Metaphysics, he immediately divided it in Book V into ten predicaments. They also add the testimony of St. Thomas, who sometimes teaches that God and the intelligences are considered by the metaphysician as principles and causes of his subject, not as its parts. They also bring forward some conjectures, which have partly been solved in treating the third opinion; for those arguments by which it seemed to be proved that God cannot be the principal object of this science unless he is the adequate one are used by these authors to prove that he cannot in any way be the object; but those have already been answered. Another part of them, however, will be solved in examining the true opinion.

19. God pertains to this science not only as the cause of the object of metaphysics, but also as its chief part.—This opinion, therefore, is false and improbable in both senses; and first I leave aside the latter sense, which supposes a plainly false opinion, and very irrelevant to the present matter, namely, that finite immaterial substances and their properties are not placed in the predicaments; for this is said without foundation, since in those things there are true genera and differences, and univocal agreements with inferior things, as we shall show in the following proper places. Nor does this matter at all for assigning the object of the science; for what difference does it make whether a thing is or is not in a predicament, for it to be placed under the object of a science or not? Next, for this reason too God is excluded from this object without cause, according to the former sense, because he is not placed in the predicaments; for that is irrelevant. And consequently it is false that this science does not deal with God as with its primary and principal object, but only as with an extrinsic principle. And the same is to be said of the other intelligences, as is openly gathered from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 7, where he says that metaphysics surpasses natural philosophy because it considers the first substance, namely as its chief object, for as an extrinsic principle it is also considered in some way by philosophy, as is evident from Physics VIII. Moreover, in Book VI, c. 1, Aristotle says that, since besides natural substances there is another, superior one, there is also a science superior to natural philosophy, which considers it. He understands, therefore, that it considers it as its chief object. And all the arguments brought forward in favour of the third and fourth opinions sufficiently prove the same. For God is in some way a naturally knowable object (and let the same always be understood of the other intelligences); therefore he can fall under some natural science, not only as an extrinsic principle, but also as its chief object; therefore this dignity pertains to this science. The consequence is proved, both because this is the first and most worthy of all the natural sciences, which is not to be deprived of this excellence without cause; and also because God cannot be investigated naturally by a higher way and mode than is done in this science. Hence it is confirmed, because this science not only considers God under the prescinded respect of principle, but, after it has arrived at God and found him under the said notion of principle, it inquires absolutely into his nature and attributes, as far as it can by natural light, as is evident from Book XII of the Metaphysics; therefore God falls absolutely under the object of this science. It is confirmed, secondly, because this science is the most perfect natural wisdom; therefore it considers the first and most universal things and causes, and the first and most general principles, which comprehend God himself, such as: Anything whatever either is or is not, and the like; therefore it is necessary that it embrace God under its object.

20. Nor did St. Thomas ever teach the opposite, but only that this science arrives at the knowledge of God under the notion of principle; he does not, however, deny that the same science treats of God as of its chief object, as can easily be evident from the same places, and from what we shall say below. But that Aristotle divided being into the ten predicaments does not stand in the way; for if that division is understood of those things only which are placed directly in a predicament, then it is evident that what is divided in it is not being as it is the adequate object of this science, for that embraces not only beings which are placed directly in the predicaments, but also other transcendental and analogous notions, such as those of accident, form and the like, and also the differences of beings. But if under that division are understood those things which are reduced to those heads, then God too can be said to be reduced to substance; being, therefore, or substance, as it is the object of this science, does not exclude God or the intelligences.

The sixth opinion is proposed, and judgement is passed on it

21. The sixth opinion, which is said to be that of Buridan, is that the adequate object of this science is substance in so far as it is substance, that is, as it abstracts from material and immaterial, finite and infinite. For that this object cannot be more contracted is sufficiently proved by what has been said against the three immediately preceding opinions. But that neither can it be more abstract can be taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 5, where, after the division of being into substance and accidents, having said that substance alone is being simply, he concludes thus: Wherefore we must most of all, and first, and alone (so to speak), speculate about being taken in this way, what it is. By which words he seems to establish substance alone as the subject of this doctrine. Hence at the beginning of Book XII he again writes thus: The speculation is about substance, since the principles and causes of substances are sought. From which places a reason is also drawn, for substance and accident are so compared that substance is for its own sake, while accident is a property of substance; therefore this science treats of substance as of its subject, and of accident as of a property of the subject; therefore the adequate subject of this science is not to be established as more abstract than substance as such. The consequence is evident, because nothing can be more abstract except something common directly or in recto to substance and accident; but this is not to be assigned, because the adequate subject of a science is not common to that subject of which the attributes are demonstrated and to the attributes themselves; but the adequate object is that subject of which the attributes are demonstrated; otherwise the subject and the properties which are said of it would equally fall under the science; but concerning a notion common to both (which would be assigned as the adequate object) nothing could be demonstrated, which is very absurd. Therefore, since substance and accident are related as subject and property, an object of this science is not to be assigned which is more abstract than both, and directly and per se common to them; it will therefore be substance alone as such; for accident cannot be, as is self-evident; but it will be considered by this science as the adequate affection of substance.

22. And this can be declared and confirmed by examples, for the science which considers man and demonstrates his properties of him does not have for its adequate object something common to man and his properties, but only man himself. Similarly natural philosophy has for its adequate object natural substance, of which it demonstrates properties, and not something common to it and its properties. Therefore the same is to be said in the present case of substance and accident as such. But if against this opinion you object that this science considers the notion of being as such, which extends more widely than substance, and demonstrates of it properties which also extend more widely and are common to accidents, it can be answered that all these are analogous, and are converted primarily and simply with substance, and therefore that it is the same to demonstrate these of being as of substance, because being said simply is nothing other than substance, especially if it is true that not one but several objective concepts correspond to being as such.

23. This opinion has something of verisimilitude and appearance; and indeed those who deny an objective concept of being would speak quite consistently in this way, because if there is no common objective concept of substance and accident, nothing real more abstract is conceived which could be the adequate object of this science. Nevertheless, this opinion is simply false and foreign to the mind of Aristotle, because, as will be shown below, it is simply truer that there is an objective concept of being according to a notion abstractable from substance and accident, with which some science can be concerned per se and as such, by explaining its notion and unity, and demonstrating some attributes of it; but this is done in this science, as is evident from its course, nor can it pertain to another, because no science is prior to this one, and none besides it considers the notions of beings which abstract from matter according to being; but the objective notion of being as such abstracts from matter according to being; indeed it is the first and most abstract of all, and therefore it ought to pertain to the first science or philosophy. The notion of substance as such, therefore, cannot be the adequate notion of the object of this science, because it does not contain under itself the notion of being as such, but rather is contained under it; and just as that notion is diverse according to concepts and objectively from the notion of substance, and extends more widely than it, so it has more universal and more abstract principles and attributes; and therefore it cannot conveniently be reduced to it in the notion of a knowable object, because, although it is analogous, it is nevertheless one and common, not only in unity of word, but also of objective concept and of its abstraction.

24. From which it is also understood that in the discourse or foundation of this opinion there is not right procedure. First indeed, because it is supposed that accident is the adequate attribute which this science demonstrates of its subject, which is nevertheless false, both because it first demonstrates of its subject other attributes more universal than accident as such, such as one, true, good; and also because not even of substance as such is accident demonstrated as an adequate attribute; for there is some substance which can have no accident; hence, if that were the adequate object of this science which is as it were the adequate subject of accident, not substance as such, but finite substance would have to be posited as the adequate object of this science, which nevertheless is false, as we have shown. Hence conversely, if substance as such is posited as the adequate object, properties are to be assigned which can be adequately demonstrated of it and belong to all substances; but these perhaps are none besides those which are common to being as being, and belong to it per se primarily; for finite and infinite substance seem to have no common and adequate attribute besides the notion of subsisting and the negation of inhering, which intrinsically accompanies it. Add that, although every accident is called a property of substance in so far as it is an affection of it, yet this property is not always such as follows per se upon the notion of substance; and therefore it is not always considered as a property which is demonstrated of substance as of its adequate subject, because only those properties which follow per se upon the notion of the subject are demonstrated in this way. And finally, although accident itself is something of substance, yet in it as such something can sometimes be considered as it were absolutely; and therefore sometimes some science can be concerned with accidents alone, as mathematics with quantity.

25. Accident can be the subject of some science.—This science, therefore, which is most universal, considers accident not only as a property demonstrable of substance, but as it itself in itself participates the notion and properties of being, although it always participates them in order to substance. Wherefore the examples brought forward there are not similar. Nor are the words of Aristotle repugnant to what he himself taught in other places, as we shall see immediately; for he does not intend to exclude accident, but to prefer substance to it, and to attribute the first and principal place to substance, as St. Thomas rightly explained, and as is taken from the same Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 20, and from the words of the same in the aforesaid place, Book VII, if they are rightly weighed; for he says that most of all and first one must speculate about substance; but when he adds and alone, he subjoins that limitation: so to speak, as if indicating that that was said by exaggeration, because simply one must not speculate about it alone; yet in a certain way it can be said that it alone is to be contemplated, because it alone is sought for its own sake, while accidents are sought almost only for its sake.

What the adequate object of metaphysics is, is defined

26. It must be said, therefore, that being in so far as it is real being is the adequate object of this science. This is the opinion of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, near the beginning, which St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, Scotus, Albert, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and almost all others follow there, and the Commentator there, and in Book III, comm. 14, and Book XII, comm. 1; Avicenna, Book I of his Metaphysics, c. 1; Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, q. 10; Giles, Book I, q. 5, and almost all the other writers. And this assertion has been proved from what has been said so far against the other opinions. For it has been shown that the adequate object of this science must comprehend God and the other immaterial substances, yet not them alone. Likewise that it must comprehend not only substances, but also real accidents, yet not beings of reason and beings altogether per accidens; but no other object of this kind can be found besides being as such; therefore that is the adequate object.

27. An objection against the assertion is dissolved.—But, in order that this assertion may be declared more fully, we must meet an objection which immediately presents itself; for, to constitute some object of a science, it is necessary that it have properties which can be demonstrated of it, and principles and causes through which they can be demonstrated; but being in so far as it is being cannot have properties, principles and causes of this kind; therefore. The major is evident, because this is the function of science, namely, to demonstrate properties of its subject, which it must demonstrate through causes in order to be perfect science, as is evident from Posterior Analytics I. The minor, as regards the former part, is evident, because being in so far as it is being, thus abstracted, is included per se and essentially in every being and in every mode or property of any being whatever; therefore it cannot have a property so adequate and proper, because the subject cannot be of the essence of its property. As regards the latter part, however, it is proved because being in so far as it is being embraces God, who is without principle and without cause; therefore being in so far as it is being cannot have principles and causes, because otherwise such principles and causes would have to belong to every being, because what belongs to the superior in so far as it is such must belong to everything contained under it. And it is confirmed, because this science is the most noble; therefore it must have the most noble object; but being in so far as it is being is the most imperfect object, because it is the most common, and is included even in the lowest beings, and substance, or spiritual substance, or God, would be much more perfect.

28. What properties metaphysics demonstrates of its object.—The answer is by denying the former part of the minor, for in truth being has its properties, distinct if not in reality at least in reason, such as one, true, good; which we shall show immediately in the third disputation, where we shall declare whether being is included intrinsically and per se in properties of this kind; and whether that principle, that the subject is not of the essence of its property, is to be limited either to properties really distinct, or to subjects which do not express transcendental notions, or rather whether it is to be said that these properties are not altogether real as regards what they add to being, and that it is enough that being is not included in them as regards what they add to being, which is more probable, as we shall see. Hence the argument given to the contrary can be retorted, because several properties which this science demonstrates belong immediately to nothing but being in so far as it is being, and in explaining them this science is in great part occupied; therefore that is the adequate object of this science, because that is the subject of the science of which the more common properties are demonstrated in the science immediately and per se.

29. And what principles.—To the latter part the answer is, first, that two kinds of principles can be required in a science: some are called complex or composite, such as are those from which a demonstration is composed; others are simple, which are signified by the terms which are taken in place of the middle term in an a priori demonstration. The former are called principles of knowing; the latter, however, principles of being. In this science, therefore, complex principles are not lacking; indeed, as we shall see below, it pertains to it to explain and confirm principles, and to establish the first of all principles, through which the others are in a certain way demonstrated. But incomplex principles can be understood in two ways: first, as true causes in some way distinct in reality from the effects or properties which are demonstrated through them; and principles or causes of this kind are not simply necessary to the notion of the object, because they are not necessary for making true demonstrations, as is evident from Posterior Analytics I. For God is a knowable object, and attributes are demonstrated of him, not only a posteriori, and from effects, but also a priori, by gathering one from another, as immortality from immateriality, and that he is a free agent because he is intelligent. In another way, that is called a principle or cause which is the reason of another, according as they are objectively conceived and distinguished; and this kind of principle suffices to be the middle term of a demonstration, for it suffices for rendering as it were the formal reason on account of which such a property belongs to the thing. Although, therefore, we grant that being in so far as it is being does not have causes properly and strictly taken in the former way, it nevertheless has some reason of its properties; and in this way such reasons can also be found in God, for from the infinite perfection of God we give the cause why he is only one, and so of the others. Wherefore we can also retort this part of the argument, for being in so far as it is being is of itself a knowable object, having a sufficient formal notion and sufficient principles for properties to be demonstrated of it; therefore some science can be concerned with it, which is no other than metaphysics. But whether being in so far as it is being has in some way true and real causes, we shall say below, in the disputation on causes.

30. How the notion of being is more perfect and more imperfect with respect to its inferiors.—To the confirmation the answer is, from St. Thomas, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2, that, although being, as prescissively taken and distinct in reason, is less perfect than the inferior grades, which include being itself and something else, yet being simply, or esse itself, according as it is found in reality with as much perfection as it can have in the notion of being, is something most perfect. This science, therefore, although in one way it considers the notion of being prescinded and abstract, does not stop in it, but considers all the perfections of being which being can have in reality itself, at least without concretion with sensible matter; and so it includes the most perfect beings, from which the greatest perfection of this science is to be taken, if it is considered in relation to the things which it contemplates. For if we look also to the mode of speculating, and to the subtlety and certitude of the science, it is taken in great part from the abstraction of the object, from which it can sometimes have greater perfection in the notion of the knowable, although perhaps it is not more perfect in its being.

1. Reason for doubting on either side.—From what was said in the preceding section, it seems to follow that it pertains to this science to discourse about every being and according to every notion of being, because a science which treats of some genus as of its adequate object also treats of all the species contained under it, as is evident of philosophy. And the reason is that otherwise there will not be an adequation between such an object and such a science; for more things will be contained under the one extreme than under the other; therefore by parity of reason a science which speculates about being as its adequate object considers all things contained under it. On the contrary, however, is the fact that, if this were so, all the other sciences would be superfluous, especially those which inquire into the proper natures of things, since metaphysics alone would sufficiently accomplish all this.

2. The first opinion.—In order to declare this difficulty and the matter with which metaphysics is concerned, and to lay open more clearly and distinctly its bounds and limits, the present question has been proposed by us. In which Giles, Metaphysics I, q. 22, and at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, affirms that metaphysics considers all things and their properties down to their last species or differences. Which opinion Antonio Mirandulano defends, in Book XIII De eversione singularis certaminis, sects. 6 and 7. He consequently affirms that the other sciences are not totally diverse from metaphysics, but are its parts, or rather that all are parts of one science; but that by common usage they are distinguished and counted as several for the sake of convenience and their use in learning, because they are taught and learned as if they were distinct, and this on account of the variety of things.

3. This opinion can be further founded, first, on the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2, who says that metaphysics is a universal science because it disputes about all things. And in Book IV, at the beginning, he says that this science disputes universally about being; and at the end of text 2 he adds that, just as there is one sense of one object and of the things contained under it, so this one science speculates about being in so far as it is being, and its species, and the species of the species; and in Posterior Analytics I, c. 23, he says that it belongs to the same science to consider the whole and the parts, that is, the genus and the species, or universal and special predicates; and in Metaphysics VI, c. 1, he says that metaphysics considers the quod quid est of all things.

4. Foundation.—Secondly, I argue in this way, because it is not repugnant that there be one science which considers all things in this way; therefore such a science is to be posited, both because sciences are not to be distinguished and multiplied without cause, and also because the intellect acquires sciences in the more perfect way in which it can; but it is more perfect to acquire the science of all things united rather than divided; therefore. But a science of this kind can be none other than metaphysics, which is the most worthy and most universal of all those which can be had naturally. The first antecedent is proved, because there is one faculty of understanding which is concerned in this way with being in so far as it is being, descending to all the proper and specific notions of beings; therefore it can acquire one habit of science, by which it is rendered ready and prompt for knowing the whole of being in the same way; for this habit must be as universal as the power itself is, otherwise that power cannot be perfectly well disposed to all its acts necessary for perfect science. As, for example, for perfect science it is not enough to know what each thing is, but it is necessary to distinguish it from the others, as, for example, man from the lion and from the angel, and so of the rest; which, however, no science can accomplish except one which considers all things universally according to their proper notions, by which they are distinguished, because the distinction between extremes cannot be known unless both are known according to the proper notions in which they are distinguished, as is self-evident and as Aristotle teaches, De Anima III, c. 2.

5. Hence I argue, thirdly, because, if anything stood in the way of this universality of metaphysics, it would be most of all that not all notions of beings abstract from matter according to being; but this does not stand in the way, because it must necessarily be said that metaphysics descends to consider several notions or quiddities of beings which cannot exist without matter. For metaphysics distinguishes finite being into the ten first genera of the predicaments; and again it distinguishes substance into material and immaterial; for it could not descend to the immaterial unless it discerned it from the material, nor could it do this unless it first handed down the proper notion and quiddity of material substance as such; this, therefore, belongs to the function of metaphysics; indeed, since we know immaterial things only after the manner of privations, we must first know what material substance or matter is, so that through its lack we may apprehend immaterial substance. And so Aristotle, in Metaphysics VII and VIII, disputes professedly about material substance and its intrinsic principles, which are matter and form.

6. And again the same argument can be made in accidents, as in qualities, relations and the like. But a peculiar difficulty is raised by certain first genera which altogether concern matter, such as quantity, habit and position, whose proper notions metaphysics hands down in order to make up the adequate division of being, which can pertain to no other science. Fourthly, either we suppose that metaphysics is one simple habit, or a collection of several quasi-partial ones. If the first is said, it is necessary consequently to say that metaphysics considers precisely the notion of being as such, and descends to no particular or less universal notion of being, which is plainly false, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section and will be more evident from what is to be said. The consequence is proved, because the same simple habit cannot attain the common notion according to itself and prescinded, and descend to particular ones, as we shall declare in the following section. But if we say the latter, namely, that it is only one habit by a collection of several partial ones, there will be no greater reason for making up one science which is concerned with being as such and with certain beings, than with all in particular; because each can be done equally conveniently by a collection of several.

7. The preceding opinion is refuted, first of all by the testimony of Aristotle.—This opinion, however, is rejected by almost all writers as foreign to the mind of Aristotle and to the truth; for Aristotle himself expressly, in Book I, c. 2, having said that the wise man knows all things, adds, as it is possible to know them without having the science of them singly; and below, declaring this, he says that he who has universal science in a certain way knows all things which are subject to the universals. He says, however, in a certain way, because he does not know them simply and according to what is proper to them by virtue of such science, but in so far as they are contained under the universal. More clearly, in Book IV, at the beginning, he distinguishes this science from the others, because it speculates about being as being and the things which belong to it per se; but none of the others considers universally about being as it is being, but, cutting off some part of it, they speculate about what befalls it (that is, belongs to it), as the mathematical sciences do. He distinguishes this science, therefore, from the others, which are concerned with particular beings; this, therefore, does not consider that part of being which the others cut off. He repeats the same in Book VI, from the beginning, where he distinguishes three speculative sciences, philosophy, mathematics and natural theology, which he distinguishes both from the abstraction of their objects, and also consequently from the things of which they treat, and finally from the mode in which they proceed and demonstrate, as we shall declare below. And this division of the speculative sciences all the interpreters of Aristotle have followed, and almost all philosophers, as is handed down more fully in Posterior Analytics I.¹

8. Metaphysics is not the only science.—The other sciences have complete evidence from their proper principles apart from metaphysics.—It is proved of mathematics.—There is, therefore, a second opinion received by all these, that metaphysics does not consider all beings according to all their special grades or notions, as they are considered by the philosopher or the mathematician. Hence Averroes, Physics II, comm. 22, says that metaphysics considers matter only as it is a certain being; but physics considers it as it is the subject of form; and he repeats almost the same in Metaphysics IV, comm. 9, and on the other places of Aristotle cited. And St. Thomas in the same places, and on Boethius, De Trinitate, in the question on the division of the sciences, a. 4, ad 6. The argument against the former opinion can also be explained thus: because it can be understood in three ways that this science contemplates all things according to their proper notions. First, that not it alone, but other sciences distinct from metaphysics speculate about them, yet in such a way that the knowledge of them which is had through the other sciences is not truly and properly scientific, but of some lower order, and is only called science in a common way, because it has some certitude, either from sense, or from some human faith, in the way in which a subalternated science, when it is without the subalternating one, is called science. And this way of declaring this opinion is false; for first it supposes a false opinion about the subalternation of the other sciences to metaphysics, concerning which we shall speak a little later. Secondly, it supposes that the other sciences, metaphysics being set aside, do not have their own evidence from their proper principles, which is plainly false. The consequence is evident, because if they have this evidence, nothing is lacking to them for the true and proper notion of science; it is falsely denied, therefore, that their knowledge is truly and properly scientific. The minor is evident, because it is against experience, for mathematics has its own evident and self-evident principles, from which it proceeds by evident demonstrations, nor does it rest on any testimony or human faith, as is self-evident, but on evidence compelling the intellect. Nor does it rest on sense, for, speaking per se, it abstracts from sensible matter, and consequently from sensible effects. And if sometimes it uses visible figures, it is only so that the mind may perfectly apprehend the terms of the principles, in order that it may perceive their intrinsic connection.

9. Of philosophy.—Philosophy, however, although it does not have as much evidence as mathematics, nevertheless has an evidence proper and accommodated to itself, because it too is not founded per se on human authority; and if in some part it proceeds thus, as regards that part it is not science, but mere faith and opinion; nor will it change its notion, or become more evident, on account of its connection with metaphysics; it is founded, therefore, per se on the evidence of its principles, which it also does not have primarily from metaphysics, but from the habit of principles. But if anyone says that this evidence in philosophy is only a posteriori, and from effects known through sense, the answer is by granting that in us indeed it happens so for the most part on account of our imperfection; yet this makes no difference to the matter at hand; for those physical things which are known so imperfectly by us through philosophy are not known more perfectly or more evidently through metaphysics. But if some natural things can be known in a more perfect way by the human intellect conjoined to a body, as in truth they can, in these no greater evidence is expected² from metaphysics, but it can be had per se in philosophy itself; for although it begins through sense, it is not always founded on it; but it uses it as a servant for perceiving the natures of things through the intellect, and when these are known it composes an a priori demonstration through principles evident to the intellect per se and from their terms; nor can another mode be feigned by which a more perfect or more evident science of natural things of this kind would be had through metaphysics; this way of speaking, therefore, is gratuitously invented.

10. Otherwise, therefore, it can be understood that metaphysics treats of all beings according to all their notions, namely, because metaphysics, as the most universal science, embraces all these by its power and efficacy (so to speak), even if other particular sciences can attain some part of this object in a proper and particular way, although scientific and perfect in its genus. Therefore, just as the particular and the universal cause, the particular and the universal sense, are distinct, and the universal attains whatever the particular does, although not conversely, so it might be judged of this science and of the others. Nevertheless, this way too has no probability, first, because, as can be taken from the discourse just given, there is no possible natural mode of demonstrating the proper physical or mathematical things higher or more perfect than that which the particular sciences themselves observe; therefore distinct particular sciences are posited superfluously and without cause, if there is one universal science which descends to all those things. Next, because these sciences are not to be thought out as distinct faculties or powers, but as habits of the same faculty, to be acquired by its proper acts, in order that they may render it ready for eliciting similar acts; therefore, if metaphysics speculated about, for example, natural things according to their proper notions as such, it would not be acquired through acts more noble than those which philosophy could exercise about the same things, because neither as regards that part would they have greater evidence nor higher principles; therefore there could be no reason for multiplying these habits about the same things; nor would the power need a habit facilitating it for those acts about which it would already have philosophical science.

11. In a third way, therefore, that opinion can be understood by confounding all the sciences into one metaphysics, so that we understand these denominations or concepts of mathematics, philosophy and metaphysics to be only inadequate denominations or concepts of the same science. And this sense pertains rather to the question about the distinction of the sciences, as they are certain habits or qualities, than to the question about the object, which we are now treating. For it is certain from what has been said that metaphysics, according to that objective concept which corresponds to this word, is not concerned with all things in particular, because, by the very fact that the mind is understood to be concerned with natural or mathematical things as such, it is already understood to leap over the bounds of metaphysics, and to use philosophy or mathematics. Just as, although memory is not distinguished from the intellect in reality, but by a formal objective notion, it will not properly and formally be said to be concerned with things as present, but only with past things as such. I add next (whatever may be the case with those three sciences, philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics, in what way each of them is one per se, which we shall touch on briefly a little later) that it is of itself incredible that they all should truly and properly be one single human science. First indeed, because this has seemed self-evident to almost all philosophers. Secondly, because they deal with altogether diverse things, and have almost no connection among themselves, as regards the things which are proper to each. Thirdly, because they differ much in their mode of proceeding; for the philosopher scarcely withdraws from sense; the metaphysician proceeds through the most universal and most abstract principles; the mathematician proceeds in a certain intermediate way; which modes of proceeding arise from that commonly known threefold abstraction from matter. And if these sciences are distinct, metaphysics is no less distinguished from the other two than those two among themselves, because the things separated from matter of which it treats are no less, indeed more, distant from the rest than all the rest among themselves, both in the perfection of being, and in abstraction, and also in the mode of reasoning and the difficulty and subtlety of the science itself; since, therefore, mathematics is distinct from philosophy by the consent of all, on account of its diverse abstraction and altogether diverse mode of proceeding, the same is to be judged with greater reason of metaphysics with respect to them; therefore it is not concerned with all the things which the other sciences consider, according to the proper notions by which they are considered by them.

The opinion to be held, and the first conclusion for it

12. Being can be conceived both as an actual whole and as a potential whole.—This latter opinion is true and to be held; in order that we may propose and confirm it more distinctly, and that it may be more clearly evident about which things we must treat in the course of this doctrine, some propositions are to be subjoined. I say, therefore, first: although this science considers being in so far as it is being, and the properties which belong per se to it as such, it does not, however, stop at the prescinded and as it were actual notion of being as such, but descends to consider some inferiors according to their proper notions. This whole assertion is evident from what was said in the preceding section; and as regards the former part, about being in so far as it is being, it can be confirmed from the things adduced in reporting the second opinion. As regards the other part, however, it can be confirmed from what was said about the first opinion; and it will immediately be declared more fully. It is only to be noticed that what the dialecticians say, that a genus can be considered either as an actual whole or as a potential one, or (what is the same) can be considered either as abstracted by prescissive abstraction, that is, according only to what it includes in act in its formal notion in its objective concept thus prescinded, or by total abstraction, as it is abstracted as a potential whole including its inferiors in potency—this (I say) which is said of genus can in its own way be applied to being in so far as it is being; for it both has its formal notion, as it were actual, which can be considered prescinded according to reason, and has inferiors, which in its own way it includes in potency according to reason. When, therefore, some common notion is assigned as the adequate object of some power or habit, it is not always assigned as it is something actual and altogether prescinded by formal abstraction, but as it includes its inferiors in some way; just as natural being, or material substance, is said to be the adequate subject of philosophy, not only according to the prescinded notion of material substance as such, but also according to the proper notions of the inferior material substances, corruptible or incorruptible, etc. Thus, therefore, when metaphysics is said to be concerned with being in so far as it is being, it is not to be thought that being is taken altogether and formally prescinded, so that inferiors are altogether excluded according to their proper notions, because this science does not stop at the consideration of that formal actual notion alone; that notion, therefore, is to be taken as it includes the inferiors in some way.

13. Which notions metaphysics speculates about in particular, and which not.—I say secondly: this science does not consider all the proper notions or quiddities of beings in particular, or as they are such, but only those which are contained under its proper abstraction, or in so far as they are necessarily conjoined with it. This is the mind of Aristotle, and of the authors whom I cited in the second opinion, and of others who have written about this science. All of whom distinguish a threefold abstraction in the speculative and real sciences, such as are the three enumerated above, physics, mathematics and metaphysics; for concerning the other sciences, whether moral or practical, there is another reason and mode of considering the unity of the object, either from the end of the science or from the mode of proceeding, concerning which elsewhere. Those three sciences, therefore, agree in some abstraction, for all consider things in the universal; they differ, however, in abstraction as it were formal and prescissive from matter, for philosophy, although it abstracts from singulars, does not abstract from sensible matter, that is, matter subject to sensible accidents, but rather uses it in its mode of reasoning. Mathematics, however, abstracts according to reason from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter, because quantity, however much it is abstracted, cannot be conceived except as a corporeal and material thing. But metaphysics is said to abstract from sensible and intelligible matter, and not only according to reason, but also according to being, because the notions of being which it considers are found in reality itself without matter; and therefore in its proper and objective concept it does not include matter per se. Concerning this threefold abstraction and the partition of these three sciences through these abstractions it is discussed professedly in the books of the Posterior Analytics. For now let it suffice us that up to now no more apt reason for distinguishing these sciences has been found, and that on other grounds this seems sufficiently fitting; for, since these sciences are about things themselves, and are most of all speculative, and therefore use abstraction in order to constitute a knowable object about which demonstrations can be made, it is rightly understood that the knowable object as such varies from the diverse mode of abstraction; and therefore this abstraction, in so far as it has a foundation in the object itself, is wont to be called the formal notion under which of such an object in the notion of the knowable. Likewise, because things are the more perfectly intelligible the more they abstract from matter; and similarly knowledge, the more it is of an object more immaterial and consequently more abstract, the more certain it is; and therefore the variety of knowable objects and of sciences is rightly considered from the diverse grade of abstraction or immateriality. From this received doctrine, however, the assertion posited is easily understood and proved, because a science does not transgress the limits of its formal object, or of the formal notion under which of its subject; but it considers whatever is contained under it; therefore this science considers all beings or notions of beings which are contained under the aforesaid abstraction; and it does not proceed further, for the rest pertain to physics or mathematics.

14. Metaphysics considers the notion of substance as such, and of accident as such.—What it is to abstract from matter according to being.—In order, however, that this may be more clearly understood, I say thirdly: this science considers, under the notion of being, the notion of substance as such, and also the notion of accident. Concerning this assertion no one doubts; and it is easily evident from the principle posited, because those two notions abstract from matter according to being; for, as we said above, and as St. Thomas rightly noted in the prologue to the Metaphysics, not only are those notions of beings said to abstract from matter according to being which are never in matter, but also those which can be in things without matter, because this is enough for them not to include matter in their formal notion, nor to require it per se. Add also that these notions are knowable, and can have attributes as it were adequate and proper, and do not pertain to another science; they pertain, therefore, to this one; for the human intellect, if it is perfectly disposed, cannot lack a science of this kind. Hence, just as philosophy, in considering the various species of material substances, consequently considers the common notion of material substance, and its adequate principles and properties; and again, dealing with the various species of living things, considers the common notion of living thing as such, and its proper principles and properties; so human science (so to speak), in considering the various grades and notions of beings, must necessarily consider the common notion of being. Likewise, since it speculates about various substances and various accidents, it must necessarily consider the common notions of substance and accident; but it does not accomplish this except through this universal and princely science.

15. Which other notions under being pertain to metaphysical consideration.—And hence it is evident (not to repeat the same things) that the same is to be said of all the common notions which under being, substance and accident can be so abstracted as to be in things without matter; of this kind are the notion of created or uncreated being, of finite or infinite substance, and similarly of absolute or respective accident, of quality, of action, of operation or dependence, and the like. Concerning which it is to be observed that many common notions can be abstracted from material and immaterial things, whose consideration, according to the principle posited, ought strictly to pertain to this science, such as the common notion of living thing, which can be abstracted from material and immaterial things; likewise the common notion of knower and understander, just as the common notion of necessary or incorruptible being is also considered by this science; yet, because many of the aforesaid notions, as they are known by us, could only be known from the diverse grades of souls, therefore nothing can conveniently be said about them here besides what is said in the science of the soul; and therefore we relegate to that place those predicates which are taken from the operations of life and are common.

16. Predicates common only to immaterial things belong to this consideration.—Secondly, it is further inferred a fortiori that it pertains to this science to treat in particular of all beings, or notions of beings, which can be found only in immaterial things, such as the common notion of immaterial substance, the notion of the first or uncreated substance, and also of the created spirit, and of all the species or intelligences which are contained under it. It is only to be attended to that these substances, especially the created ones, can be known naturally very imperfectly, at most according to certain common notions and negative concepts, but not according to their proper and specific differences; yet, in the way in which they can be known, their contemplation pertains most of all to this science, as was said above. For it does not pertain properly and per se to physics, except perhaps according to a certain common extrinsic notion, and one not sufficiently certain, namely, in so far as the angels are movers of the heavenly orbs; per se, however, and as regards the knowledge of the essence and properties of the intelligences which can be had naturally, they exceed the physical faculty, because they are most remote from the senses, and therefore their knowledge is more difficult and higher. It pertains, therefore, to this science, which perfects man according to that which is most excellent in him, and in which his natural happiness in great part consists, that is, in the contemplation of the highest things, as Aristotle said, Ethics X, c. 7.

17. The common notion of cause, and the four genera of causes, and the chief causalities among them pertain to metaphysics.—Thirdly, it is gathered from what has been said that it pertains to this science to treat of the common notion of cause, and of the individual genera of causes as such, and of the first and chief causes or notions of causing of the whole universe. I declare each, because, first of all, the notion of cause and effect as such is of itself common to material and immaterial things, for in God, who is supremely immaterial, the notion of cause is found, and in the angels the notion of effect, and it is common and essential to all created beings, in so far as they are finite beings, that they emanate from some cause; and to created beings themselves also, whether material or immaterial, according to the common notion, some genus of operation or causality pertains. Again, this notion of cause, not only according to the common notion of cause, but also according to the special and distinct modes of causing, of itself abstracts from matter according to being, for the notion of efficient cause as such does not per se require matter, and much less the notion of end. Likewise this notion of a free agent, acting from purpose. Likewise the notion of exemplar cause, or the notion of a cause acting through its own exemplar or idea. Again, the material and the formal cause, although, as they are found in substances, they do not seem to abstract from matter, nevertheless, in so far as according to their common notions they abstract from substances and accidents, are also separated from matter; it pertains, therefore, to metaphysics to distinguish these genera of causes, and to explain the notions of each. And because it is wisdom itself, and the supreme natural science, it pertains to it to consider the first causes of things, or rather the first notions of causing in the first cause; and such are the notion of efficient and of final cause; for these, according to their supreme perfection, neither require matter, nor suppose it or another genus of cause, nor require imperfection, but are conjoined per se and primarily in the first cause, which is God; but it is otherwise with the notion of matter and form; for these necessarily suppose another prior cause, from which they arise at least efficiently and finally, and therefore they are not counted among the causes or notions of causing that are simply first; and therefore their exact knowledge does not pertain to the metaphysician except according to the common notions of such causes, not, however, according to those things in which such notions of causing are found, which are matter and substantial form. For although these are attained by metaphysics, nevertheless the integral science of them is handed down by the philosopher.

18. Finally, it is to be considered concerning this that this consideration of causes pertains to the metaphysician by various titles or reasons; for if the power of causing, or causality itself, or the relation resulting from it, is considered as they are certain beings, they pertain to this science as its object—not indeed as the adequate object (as some falsely said, which we touched on above), but as a part of the object, because these are only certain beings, or modes of beings, but do not in themselves enclose the whole breadth of being. But if the notion or power of the cause is considered in order to the cause itself, namely, in so far as it is a property or attribute of that thing which is called a cause, then it pertains to this science to consider the cause, not as its object or part of its object, but as a certain attribute of the object or of its part; and in this way, because this science considers God, it consequently considers in him the notion of first final, efficient and exemplar cause; and considering the angels, it inquires what power of causing they have with respect to the other beings; and treating of substance as such, it speculates about what causality it has with respect to accidents, and so of the others. Finally, if the notion of cause is considered in order to the effect, that is, in so far as its knowledge is necessary for the exact knowledge of the effect, then too the knowledge of causes pertains to this science, not as its object, nor as a property of the object, but as a principle or cause of the object or of its part.

19. Whether the consideration of the rational soul is the office of the metaphysician.—Two difficulties, however, remain concerning what has been said. One is about the rational soul, whether its consideration pertains to the metaphysician, whether it is considered in the notion of being or in the notion of cause. For this soul is a certain immaterial substance, and consequently abstracts from matter according to being, whence it also abstracts in its proper notions. For this reason, therefore, the proper and specific consideration of this soul can seem to pertain to this science. Which Aristotle seems to confirm, On the Parts of Animals I, c. 1, indicating that the physicist does not consider every soul. On the contrary, however, is the fact that the rational soul, even as rational, is a natural form having an essential order to matter, and as such is the principle of its operations, even of those which it exercises through the body, even according to that peculiar mode in which they are exercised by man. But this controversy is wont to be treated professedly at the beginning of the book On the Soul, where Cardinal Toletus can be seen, q. 2 of the prooemium.

20. For now it is briefly said that the consideration of this soul is to be referred to the last and most perfect part of natural philosophy. First, because the science of man as man is physical; but it belongs to the same craftsman to consider the whole and its essential parts. Next, because, although the soul has a subsisting being, separable from matter as regards actual conjunction, yet not as regards aptitude, nor as regards order to matter, and consequently neither as regards the perfect knowledge both of its essence and of its properties and operations; but all knowledge through matter is physical. There is no doubt, therefore, that the knowledge of the soul, as regards its substance, and the properties which belong to it per se, and the mode or state of existing or operating which it has in the body, pertains to the physicist. But to consider the state of the separated soul, and the mode of operating which it has in that state, some think pertains per se to the metaphysician; which is probable, because according to that notion there seems to be complete abstraction from matter, and nothing about the soul, as it is in that state, can be known except through a certain analogy and proportion to the other immaterial substances; nevertheless, because it pertains to the perfection of a science to consider its subject integrally and completely, all these things are more conveniently treated in philosophy, especially because this consideration of the soul and its states, divided as it were into parts and handed down in diverse sciences, produces prolixity and confusion; and therefore in the course of this work we shall abstain from the consideration of the rational soul, both conjoined and separated. Especially because about the angels too, for the same reason, we shall say very little, because their integral consideration and contemplation has already rightly been taken over by the theologians, and to transfer it all here would be foreign to natural science, and consequently to our purpose; but to touch on things in passing, or to treat them imperfectly, would be of either no usefulness or little. And almost the same reason holds for the knowledge of God, although, because more things can be known naturally about God than about the intelligences, and because the natural knowledge of him is more necessary for the perfection of this science, we shall say some things about him, in so far as they have either been touched on by the philosophers or can be found by natural reason.

21. The other difficulty was about the common notions of material substance, and others, which include matter or cannot be without matter; this, however, is touched upon in the arguments, and will be dispatched in their solutions.

22. The arguments of the opposite opinion are satisfied.—To the first reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, the solution is evident from what has been said. For it is not necessary that a science which considers a universal notion descend in particular to all the things which are contained under such a notion, but only to those which participate the same notion of the knowable, or the same abstraction. Wherefore, although, considering the real agreement in the common notion of being, there seems to be no greater reason concerning some particular beings than concerning others for them to fall under this science according to their proper notions, yet, considering the agreement in abstraction from matter according to being which exists between certain special notions of beings and the very common and most abstract notion of being, there is a sufficient reason on account of which this science descends to certain particular beings and not to others.

23. A difficult place of Aristotle is explained.—To the first foundation of the first opinion, taken from the testimonies of Aristotle, the answer is evident from what has been said; for this science is said to consider universally about being because it considers the most abstract notion of being in so far as it is being, and all the things which agree with it in the same abstraction and knowable notion. And in the same way it is said to treat of all things, namely, in so far as they are beings, and because it teaches general principles, common to all things. But those words of Book IV, text 2, seem to have a special difficulty, where it is said that it belongs to this science to consider being and its species, and the species of the species. Some answer that that distribution is to be understood accommodatedly, namely, of the proximate and remote species of being contained under the same abstraction of the knowable. But St. Thomas and other ancients, whom Fonseca follows, answer this better by construing the letter of Aristotle otherwise, which according to the ancient version runs thus: To speculate whatever species there are of being in so far as it is being belongs to one science in genus, and the species of the species. In which words those two, and the species of the species, are equivocal; for they can be joined so that the one determines the other, and they are referred to being and to the species of the species of being; and the version of Argyropoulos clearly indicates this sense, and the explanation given proceeds in it. Otherwise, however, those two words can be disjoined and referred to diverse things, namely, to the species of knowable things and to the species of sciences; and Fonseca rightly indicated this, translating thus: It belongs to one science in genus to contemplate as many species of being as there are, and the species of the species; and so the sense will be that it belongs to one science in genus to contemplate the species of being in common and in genus; but that it belongs to various species of sciences to contemplate the various species of being according to their proper and specific notions of the knowable. And from this sense our opinion is confirmed; for if by one science we understand strictly the common genus of science, from this place it is had that it does not pertain to any science in species to contemplate all beings according to all their specific notions, but that this pertains to the genus of speculative science in common; but that particular knowable objects according to their proper notions pertain to the specific sciences. But if by one science in genus we understand a science general by reason of its object, such as metaphysics is, then too it is had from this place that a science of this kind considers all the species of being only under the common notion of being or of substance; but that the special sciences consider the species of being under their proper and specific notions.

24. One acquired human science cannot embrace all knowable things according to their proper notions.—To the second the answer is that there cannot be one human science, acquired by the proper acts of human talent, which universally perfects it as regards all knowable things according to all their notions; otherwise not only those speculative sciences, philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics, but also the moral and rational ones, and finally all, would coalesce into one, which would be the adequate perfection of the human intellect, which is incredible, because, since the acts and discourses of human talent are so various and so particular and distinct, and independent among themselves, it is not probable that it could happen that all should concur to generate the same science. Nor is this necessary for the effect which is mentioned in the argument, namely, for judging about the diversity of distinct things, which are said to pertain to diverse sciences, because each science, in handing down the knowledge of its object, sufficiently renders the intellect ready to distinguish it from the rest, provided, however, that the rest are known; hence two sciences can help each other and concur for judgements of this kind, especially if one provides as it were the formal middle term, while the other as it were ministers the matter to which that middle term is applied. For this is almost what happens in the case at hand; for in order that the intellect may judge and demonstrate that one thing is diverse from another, for example, the horse from the lion, it takes the formal middle term from metaphysics, which is the notion of diversity, or what it is to be diverse, and applies or attributes it to the horse and the lion, whose concepts or notions it takes from philosophy; yet, because the middle term is as it were the formal element of the demonstration, such a demonstration is therefore judged metaphysical, and in this way it is said to be the function of metaphysics to show diversity in things; and in the same way it is said to demonstrate the quiddities of things, because the middle term for demonstrating a quiddity in the notion of quiddity is metaphysical, since to know the notion of quiddity as such is proper to metaphysics.

25. To the third some answer that a twofold notion is to be distinguished in metaphysics. One is that of a particular science, under which notion they deny that it attains material things as such. The other is in so far as it is a common art, and presides over the other sciences or arts; for Aristotle attributes this function to it in this prooemium, and in Posterior Analytics I, c. 17, text 23, where by the science that is mistress of all he understands metaphysics, as all explain; under this notion, therefore, they say, metaphysics knows material things as they are material, indeed also that matter, in so far as it is pure passive potency; and if you object that a science cannot transgress its object, they answer under the same distinction that this is true of science as it is a particular science, but not as it is a common art. Nevertheless, the distinction and the answer need greater declaration. For those two notions are not distinguished from the nature of the thing in the habit of metaphysics, as two parts of it distinct in reality itself, but only by consideration, and by our prescissive abstraction through inadequate concepts; for metaphysics is said to be a universal science, and to hand down universal principles, and therefore to be able to help the other sciences, only by reason of its most abstract and most universal object; therefore it cannot accomplish those two functions separately, so to speak, or through diverse parts of itself, but at the same time, while it treats its proper object perfectly, it attains whatever perfection it has over the other sciences, and confers all the usefulness which it can provide to them; that partition, therefore, is only according to our reason. Therefore it cannot happen that metaphysics transcends the formal notion of its object, either according to the one notion or according to the other. And it is confirmed, for if metaphysics, as it is said to be universal, transcends its abstraction, and is concerned with material things in so far as they are such, then in this it has no term or limit, but will descend to all the objects of the other sciences according to all their notions, and so one falls into all the inconveniences which we inferred against the other opinions. The consequence is evident, both because if such a term is not assigned from the formal notion of the object, there is nothing whence it may be assigned; and because if the metaphysician attains the proper object of philosophy, for example, in order to constitute it, he would also attain the objects of all the sciences, and in philosophy itself he would have to contemplate all the species of natural beings, in order that, if perhaps there are several philosophies, he may separate their objects; or, if there is one, he may declare how its one object is made up out of so many things.

26. I think, therefore, that metaphysics, considered under no notion, properly leaps over the formal notion of its object, nor attains material things except by in some way concerning its abstraction, nor, finally, is universal or serves the other sciences except under that notion under which it perfectly exhausts its object. In order to declare this, however, I say first of all that metaphysics does not attain the notion of material substance, and other similar notions which are not found without matter, except in so far as their proper knowledge is necessary for handing down the general divisions of being into the ten supreme genera, and other similar ones, down to prescribing the proper objects of the other sciences; for this is the proper function of this science, as is taken from Metaphysics VI, VII and VIII, and because this can pertain to no other science, as is easily evident of itself; likewise, because without these divisions metaphysics could not know its object exactly, neither according to the common notion of being, which, since it is analogous, is not sufficiently distinctly known without distinguishing the modes in which it can be contracted, nor according to those proper and special notions which are to be contemplated by metaphysics per se and exactly, because it cannot perfectly attain these notions unless it separates and distinguishes them from the others.

27. Secondly, it is said that, since the universal notions which metaphysics considers are transcendental, so that they are imbibed in the proper notions of beings, hence it comes about that, while the metaphysician attains some grades of beings which include matter, in order to separate from them the other grades which pertain to him directly and per se, he considers abstractly about them the notions and properties which are common to beings abstracting from matter, and belong specificatively also to the material beings themselves, even as they are such; as, for example, metaphysics distinguishes substance into material and immaterial, either in order to take up the proper notion and consideration of immaterial substance, or because it pertains to a science to consider in some way the proper parts of its object, as is said in Posterior Analytics I, c. 23. But once a division of this kind has been handed down, it considers immaterial substance per se and directly, treating universally all the things which can be known about it; material substance, however, it does not contemplate in this way, but only in so far as is necessary for distinguishing it from immaterial substance, and for knowing about it all the metaphysical predicates which belong to it as it is material, such as, for example, to be composed of act and potency, and the mode of this composition, and that it is a certain being one per se, and the like.

28. Thirdly, the answer in form to the argument is that metaphysics therefore does not consider all beings in particular because it does not transcend the proper abstraction of its object; but that it considers certain generic grades, which attain matter, without omitting its abstraction, both because it abstracts those very grades from matter in so far as it is subject to motion and sense, and considers them only according to the common notions of act or form and potency, and the like; and also because it attains their proper notions only indirectly, in order to its proper abstraction, namely, in order to declare how the common and transcendent predicates are found in them, and how from them are distinguished the other grades or genera which truly and in reality abstract from all matter. And this is what Aristotle indicated, Metaphysics IV, text 5, when he said: It belongs to the philosopher to be able to speculate about all things; for if not to the philosopher, who will it be that will consider whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same, or whether one thing is contrary to one? etc. For he calls metaphysics philosophy by antonomasia, to which he says it pertains to consider the diversity of things in common, because the same and the diverse are attributes of being; and he declares this by the aforesaid example, which he placed in a certain individual perhaps for the sake of affecting obscurity, since it is evident that science does not descend to individuals, from Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, and Metaphysics III, c. 13.

29. The fourth argument is truly difficult; for it touches upon the difficulty about the unity of science, of what kind it is, which cannot be treated exactly in this place; we shall, however, touch upon it briefly in the following section.

1. Metaphysics is truly and properly a science.—The definition of metaphysics.—The object of metaphysics having been explained, it will be easy to set out its essential notion; but since the essence and the unity of a thing are either the same or intrinsically conjoined, its unity is therefore to be explained at the same time, especially because the discussion is about specific unity; for about numerical unity there is no question, since it is evident that this science is multiplied according to number in diverse subjects, as are the other accidents also. In the same subject, however, it is certain that it is not multiplied in order to the same things; but whether with respect to diverse things it too is distinguished, and consequently can be multiplied in the same subject, depends on the prior question about its specific or essential unity. But since this unity is rightly declared through genus and difference, because the species consists of genus and difference, we therefore suppose what is certain and self-evident, that metaphysics is truly and properly a science, as Aristotle taught at the beginning of the Metaphysics and in innumerable other places; and it is evident from the definition of science, which is taken from Posterior Analytics I and Ethics VI, c. 3, namely, that it is a knowledge or habit affording certain and evident knowledge of necessary things through their proper principles and causes, if it is perfect and a priori science. All these things, however, are found in this doctrine, as far as depends on the force and notion of its object, and therefore there is no doubt that this is in itself a science, although perhaps in us it does not always, or not as regards all things, attain the state or perfection of science. It is evident, therefore, that this science is contained under the genus of science. Indeed, from what has been said it can easily be evident that it is contained under the genus of speculative science, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics I, c. 2, and Book II, c. 1, because it is concerned with things most speculative, and which are not ordered to operation, as we shall declare more conveniently below in explaining the attributes of this science. Next, it is evident from what has been said that this science is essentially distinct from the other speculative and real sciences, such as philosophy and mathematics; whence it also follows that it has, as such, some unity, by reason of the object explained by us. Under which notion it can be defined that metaphysics is the science which contemplates being in so far as it is being, or in so far as it abstracts from matter according to being.

2. Whether metaphysics is one in a subaltern species, or in a lowest one.—There remains, therefore, the difficulty to be treated at present, whether this unity is generic or specific, and consequently whether that difference which is taken from the relationship to the adequate object set out by us is subaltern, so that under it several specific ones can be designated, or rather is one indivisible and last difference. For many think of it in the former way; whose opinion can be urged, first, because in the object established by us various abstractions can be assigned; for first of all there is that twofold abstraction from matter according to being, either necessarily or only permissively, which seems sufficient to vary the knowable object as such according to species, and consequently the science. Again, among things which exist necessarily without matter, the abstraction of God, who is altogether pure act and abstracts even from all metaphysical composition, seems at the least very diverse from the abstraction of the other intelligences, which, although they lack matter, are nevertheless composite, and far diverse attributes belong to them. Under the general unity of metaphysics, therefore, at least three sciences distinct in species can be constituted. One which is concerned with being in so far as it is being, and descends at most to the common notions of substance and accident, and to the nine genera which are contained under the latter; a second, which contemplates the created intelligences; and a third, which contemplates God alone. For, just as natural beatitude consists in him alone, so there seems to be a natural science to be posited which according to its last and specific notion attains God alone. Nor perhaps will there be lacking one who would divide this science into more members, according to the diverse grades of abstraction in the very common notions of being in so far as it is being, or of substance in so far as it is substance, and so of the others.

3. Secondly, I argue principally in this way: because if this science is one, it is most of all as regards the judicative habit which is left in the mind from its acts. For it is certain that the intelligible species which this science uses are very many, and not one only; and similarly it is evident that its acts are various and manifold, differing not only in number but also in species. For who would doubt that the act by which we judge that every being is one, or that unity is an attribute of being, is diverse from that by which we judge that the intelligences are immortal, or something similar? If, therefore, specific unity can be thought out in metaphysics, it is only as regards the judicative habit. But it cannot be established in that either. Therefore it can be in nothing. The minor is proved, because if that habit is one in species, either it is altogether simple in its entity according to its order to the object (leaving aside for now the composition, if there is any, through intension alone, or through rooting in the subject), or it is a composite quality. But neither seems able to be said. The first is proved, because, since the habit of metaphysics inclines to various judgements, and about most distinct things, so as to be as it were commensurate with the acts themselves, it does not seem able to incline to all of them, or to produce all of them, through one and the same simple quality.

4. Which is declared secondly thus: because the habit of metaphysics is first acquired through one act about one object, for example, about this conclusion: Every being is true, or another similar one; then through other acts it is increased and extended to other very diverse conclusions, in which increase it is necessary that something of reality or entity be added to it, because it is impossible to understand a real increase without a real addition. But this addition cannot be sufficient by way of intension alone, because this increase is not only from the diverse participation of the subject according to greater and greater rooting of the form itself in it, but is on the side of the habit itself through greater extension to the object; therefore an addition is required on the side of the habit itself, in so far as something is added to it by which it regards a new object or a new conclusion, as St. Thomas openly taught in dealing with habits in common, I-II, q. 52, aa. 1 and 2. A habit of this kind, therefore, cannot be altogether simple, as it regards the whole breadth of its object. But that neither can it be composite and yet be truly one in species is proved, first, because that which is first acquired in the habit through acts of one species, and that which is added through an act distinct in species, are also distinct in species among themselves; therefore they do not compose one habit according to species. The antecedent is evident, both because the acts by which they are generated are distinct in species, and also because they incline to similar acts distinct in species; and moreover because there is no greater reason for distinction among the second acts themselves than among the inclinations which remain after the manner of first act, inclining to acts similar to those by which they were generated, and consequently commensurate and proportioned to them; and finally because, if there were no specific distinction between those two, neither would a numerical one be necessary, but an increase by way of intension would suffice. The former consequence, however, is proved, because from two qualities distinct in species one quality of one species cannot be composed.

5. It can be answered that those two are distinguished not by a total, but by a partial species, and that therefore an integral quality, simply one, can be composed of them as of heterogeneous parts. But against this: for I ask what this mode of composition is; for either it is through a true and real union of those qualities (which are called partial) not only in the same subject, but also among themselves, or it is only through their being brought together in the same subject. Neither can be said, for the first does not seem able to be sufficiently understood or explained; for I ask what that union is. For either it is through the immediate conjunction of one with the other, and this not, because such a union intervenes only between those things which are related as potency and act, or as form and matter, accident and subject, term and terminable thing; but those two are not compared to each other in any of these ways, as is self-evident, because each per se regards its own object, and does not require the other in order to be terminated or actuated by it. Or they are united after the manner of a certain continuation in some common term, as the degrees of intension are believed to be united; and this mode of union too is most difficult to understand. First indeed, because there is no sufficient reason for feigning it. Secondly,¹ because some indivisible term must be assigned in which those two are united. Which, however, does not seem able to be done, because that term too must regard some object; but there is none to which it could tend, because it neither tends at the same time to both objects of those partial habits, or of the acts by which they were generated, nor is there any reason why it should tend to one rather than to the other; nor can a new object be feigned to which it would tend, since no other has been known or judged through the acts. Thirdly, because in the acts such a union cannot be required, nor such an indivisible term in which they are united; otherwise all the acts of the science of metaphysics could coalesce into one and be really united, which is unintelligible; therefore neither is there such a union in the habit, because there cannot be anything in the habit which was not in the acts. But if the acts have no union among themselves, they have nothing whence or by which to effect it. And these arguments proceed even if those two particular habits are feigned to be of the same notion and species. But if they differ in species, a fourth argument can be added, namely, that things which differ in species cannot be continuous per se, nor have a proper common term.

6. Finally, if on account of these arguments it is said that those qualities compose one habit only by being brought together in the same subject, it follows, first, that there is no true unity in this science, but only a unity per accidens by reason of the subject, especially if (as seems more probable) those qualities are distinguished in species. It follows, secondly, by the same reason, that from all the habits of the sciences one science is composed by their being brought together in the same subject.

7. Two difficulties or questions are touched upon in the arguments proposed. The first is proper and special to this place, whether metaphysics is one science in species or not. The second is general, and of the same notion in all sciences and in almost all acquired habits: whether they are simple qualities, or composite according to extension to their objects.

8. Various opinions on this matter.—Concerning the former part, which is proper to this place, some think that metaphysics is not one science in species, but in genus, and contains under itself at least those three aforesaid species, namely, one about God, who abstracts altogether both from matter and from every vestige of matter, such as all composition can be judged to be, and likewise from all change and vicissitude; one about the created intelligences, which abstract neither from all composition nor from all change, both local and of intellect and will, yet abstract intrinsically and essentially from matter and physical motion; and one about being, which abstracts from matter according to being only permissively. Nor is this against the division of speculative science given by Aristotle into physics, mathematics and metaphysics, because that is not a division into lowest species, but into subaltern ones, as is evident of mathematics, which contains several sciences under itself.

9. Metaphysics is one science in species.—Nevertheless it is to be asserted, with the common opinion, that metaphysics is simply one science in species. For this seems to be the clear mind of Aristotle in the whole prooemium, or cc. 1 and 2 of Metaphysics I, where he always speaks of this science as of one species, and attributes to it as to one and the same the names and attributes which belong to it partly according as it is concerned with God and the intelligences—for thus it is called theology, or divine science, and first philosophy—and partly as it is concerned with being in so far as it is being, and its first attributes and principles, by which reason it is called universal science and metaphysics. But it is called wisdom in so far as it embraces all these things, and contemplates the first principles and the first causes of things. Likewise in Book IV, where he seems to treat professedly of the object of this science, he says that it is one, and considers all things which are separated from matter. Hence, in the course and mode of handing down this doctrine, he sufficiently indicates that it is one science in species, and often says indifferently that being in so far as it is being is the adequate object of this science, and that its chief part is substance, either simply, or immaterial and first, as is evident from Book IV, cc. 2 and 3, and Book VII, c. 1, and Book XII, in which he hands down the knowledge of God and of the intelligences, and says that it is the chief part of this doctrine, to which in a certain way the others are ordered. And finally, in Book VI, c. 1, and Book XI, c. 6, he establishes abstraction from matter according to being as the adequate formal notion under which of the object of this science. But if the science which dealt with being as being were distinct from that which treats of immaterial being, and being separated from matter in reality, the former would not properly and perfectly participate an abstraction of this kind, nor would it deal with the first causes of things, nor have the other things which Aristotle attributes to metaphysics; and by almost this argument St. Thomas concludes, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, that natural wisdom is only one, whereas the habits of the other sciences are several, where it is necessary to speak of specific unity; for according to genus the other sciences too have unity; but this wisdom is none other than metaphysics; nor can it be said that only that part, or last science, of metaphysics which deals with God is called wisdom, because that, taken prescissively, does not consider the first principles common to all the sciences, nor does it corroborate and confirm them, which pertains to wisdom; just as, conversely, that former part of metaphysics which deals with being as such does not by itself alone consider all the highest causes, and therefore that too, taken prescissively, does not have the proper notion of wisdom; it is necessary, therefore, that one and the same science embrace all these things. And the same St. Thomas taught this very thing on the cited places of Aristotle, and especially in the prologue to the Metaphysics, and the other expositors, ancient and modern, think the same.

10. The reason for this opinion, however, is that there is no sufficient foundation for this multiplication of sciences; and moreover all the things which are treated in this science are so connected among themselves that they cannot conveniently be attributed to diverse sciences. All the more because, by reason of the same abstraction, all agree in the same notion of the knowable. For although God and the intelligences, considered according to themselves, seem to be placed in a certain higher grade and order, nevertheless, as they fall under our consideration, they cannot be separated from the consideration of the transcendental attributes. Hence it is also confirmed, for a perfect science of God and of the other separated substances hands down the knowledge of all the predicates which are in them; therefore also of the common and transcendental predicates. Nor is the reason the same with the lower sciences, for example philosophy, which, although it considers material substance, does not on that account contemplate the common and transcendental predicates which are also in it, because, since it is a lower science, it cannot ascend to knowing more abstract and more difficult predicates, but supposes them known through a higher science. But the science of God and the intelligences is the supreme one of all natural sciences; and therefore it supposes nothing known through a higher science, but includes in itself whatever is necessary for the perfect knowledge of its object, as far as can be had by natural light; the same science, therefore, which treats of these special objects, considers at the same time all the predicates which are common to them with other things; and this is the whole metaphysical doctrine; it is, therefore, one science.

11. The first reason for doubting is answered.—And by these things the first reason for doubting posited at the beginning has been satisfied; for it has been declared how that abstraction from matter according to being, which is called permissive or necessary, does not vary the specific notion of the knowable object, both on account of the necessary connection of such things and predicates among themselves, especially in order to knowledge, and also on account of the same order of doctrine and certitude. Finally, because that diversity of abstraction is only according to diverse concepts of reason, which diversity alone does not of itself suffice to constitute a diverse science, unless another greater reason for distinction occurs. Otherwise as many sciences would have to be multiplied as there are common predicates abstractable from their inferiors, and as many sciences differing in species as there are species of things, which is not commonly admitted.

12. Whether metaphysics is one habit.—To the second reason for doubting we cannot give satisfaction professedly in this place, because, as I said, the question which is touched upon there is common to all sciences, and perhaps we shall examine it below in treating of quality. For now I say briefly that it seems to me most difficult to wish to defend that the habit of metaphysics is either one simple quality, or so composite that it arises from various partial entities united among themselves by a true and real union; which difficulty the things proposed in that argument sufficiently show. Wherefore it seems easier to say that a science of this kind includes partial qualities or habits, which are said to compose one science not by aggregation alone per accidens in the same subject in which they inhere, but by a certain subordination and dependence which they have among themselves through order to the same subject with which they are concerned; for it is not necessary that the same order of unity be found in all things. And if anyone inquires what this order of subordination and dependence is, it can be answered that it consists in the relationship to the same object, which, although it embraces various things and has diverse properties which are demonstrated of it, yet these are so connected among themselves that the knowledge of the latter depends on the former, and they mutually help one another in knowledge under the same notion and mode of science and doctrine. But this matter, as I said, demands a more accurate inquiry and disputation, to be handed down in its place.

1. What the material cause of metaphysics is.—What the formal.—What the efficient.—The object and essence of this science having been explained, it was fitting to say something about its causes; but since nothing proper and peculiar occurs to be said about the material, formal and efficient causes, we shall therefore speak only of the final cause. For the material cause of this science is none other than its subject, which it is evident is the intellect, unless someone wishes to reduce the matter about which it is concerned to the material cause; that matter, however, is none other than the object of the science, about which enough has been said. Again, since the science itself is a certain form, it has no other proper formal cause, but it has its essence, or formal notion; it has also an object, which, in so far as it gives the species, is said to have a certain notion of form, at least of an extrinsic one. Finally, since this science is acquired, it comes to be through its proper acts as through its proximate efficient cause, in which it has nothing special besides what is common to the other acquired habits. There remain, therefore, only the end and the function of this science to be explained; for these two are so conjoined in the present case that they seem rather to be one; this science, however, as regards the habit, is for the sake of its operation, which it proximately elicits; for this is common to every habit, nor does the habit of this science have anything in particular which needs new declaration. But concerning the operation or act of this science itself, it must be explained what kind it is, and what end it has, and from this it will be evident what the necessity or usefulness of this science is.

2. What the end of metaphysics is.—I say, therefore, first, that the end of this science is the contemplation of truth for its own sake. So Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics XII, c. 2, and Book II, c. 1, where he proves it, first, a priori, because that science is most of all for the sake of the knowledge of truth and for its own sake which considers the first causes and principles of things, and the most worthy things; for such things are most apt to be known, and their knowledge is most desirable; but this science is concerned with the knowledge of the highest things and causes, as is evident from what we have said about its object; therefore this science is most of all for its own sake, and for the sake of the knowledge of truth. Secondly, because this science does not inquire into the knowledge of truth for the sake of operation; therefore for its own sake; for there is no middle to be found between these. The antecedent, however, is proved by Aristotle by a twofold sign: one is that men began to find this science on account of wonder and ignorance of causes; therefore they sought it for the sake of knowledge, and not for the sake of some other work. The second sign is that men investigated this science when all things necessary for this life were available to them; they sought it, therefore, not for the sake of some other use, but to drive out ignorance, and thus for the sake of the very knowledge of truth. Thirdly, we can prove it because a science which orders knowledge to operation disputes proximately about things operable by man; but this science does not treat of things of this kind, but of the most noble beings, and of the most universal and most abstract notions of being.

3. But if anyone considers rightly, both the assertion posited and the things we adduced from Aristotle in its confirmation are common to all the speculative sciences, and most of all to natural philosophy; and so from the reasons given Aristotle rightly infers that this science is speculative and not practical, because it is not proximately ordered to work, but rests in the knowledge of truth, which (as I said) is common to the whole of natural philosophy; in order, therefore, that the proper end of this science may be declared in the assertion posited, it must be understood that it is for the sake of the knowledge of those truths which can be demonstrated about being itself as such, and about things which abstract from matter according to being. And so its proper end is to declare the nature, properties and causes of being in so far as it is being, and of its parts, in so far as they abstract from matter according to being.

4. And hence is gathered the first necessity or usefulness of this doctrine, namely, that it perfects the intellect according to itself (so to speak), and for the sake of knowing the most perfect things and notions of things. For the human intellect, although it is in the body, and therefore needs the ministry of the senses and of phantasms, is nevertheless spiritual according to itself, and has the power of perceiving all things, even spiritual and divine ones, on account of which it has been called in a certain way divine by Aristotle, De Anima I, text 82. Natural philosophy, therefore, seems to perfect the intellect as it uses the senses and is concerned with sensible things. The mathematical sciences seem to perfect it as it abstracts in some way from the experience of the external senses, yet with dependence on the imagination or phantasy. But this doctrine illuminates the intellect according to itself, abstracting, as far as can be done in the body, from the senses and the phantasy, and contemplating spiritual and divine things, and the notions and principles common to all things, and the general attributes of beings, which are considered by no lower science.

5. Secondly, however, it must be added that the science of metaphysics is not only fitting for its own sake, but is also very useful for perfectly acquiring the other sciences. This assertion is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2, and Book III, c. 2, where among the other conditions of wisdom he posits that the other sciences minister to it, while it presides over the others, and (says Aristotle) commands them, not by practical command, which pertains rather to prudence or the moral sciences, but by speculative direction; and he adds that metaphysics is of this kind with respect to the other sciences because it disputes about the most excellent things, and about the first causes of things, and about the last end and the highest good. He adds also, Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, that metaphysics alone is concerned with the first principles of the other sciences. For there are two kinds of principles of the sciences, as he teaches in the same book, c. 8: some proper, which are declared in each science; others common to many, or rather to all sciences, because all use them as the subject matter demands, and in so far as the other particular principles depend on them, as the Philosopher says in the same place, and in Metaphysics IV, text 7. Since, therefore, all the sciences depend most of all on these principles, it is necessary that they be most of all perfected by this science; because, as was said above, the knowledge and contemplation of these principles can pertain to no special science, since they consist of the most abstract and most universal terms. Thus, therefore, this science is very useful for the attainment and perfection of the others. Hence St. Thomas, at the beginning of the Metaphysics, and In II, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 2, says that metaphysics is ordinative of the other sciences, because it considers the notion of being absolutely, while the others consider being according to a determinate notion; and In II, dist. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4, he says that metaphysics directs the other sciences. Finally, from what we have said about the object and matter with which it is concerned, this can easily be proved, because this science considers the supreme notions of beings and their most universal properties, and the proper notion of essence and of being, and all the modes of distinction which are in things; but without the distinct knowledge of all these a perfect knowledge of particular things cannot be had. Which can also be known by experience; for all the other sciences often use the principles of metaphysics, or suppose them, in order to be able to proceed in their demonstrations or reasonings; whence it often happens that from ignorance of metaphysics errors are made in the other sciences.

6. Something is useful for another in many ways.—You will say: since this science of metaphysics is sought most of all for its own sake, how can it be useful for the others? For what is useful for other things is for their sake. The answer is: something happens to be called useful for another in two ways: in one way as a means ordered to another; in another way something is called useful for another as a superior and more eminent cause, influencing the other in its own way. In this latter way, therefore, metaphysics is useful for the lower sciences, and therefore it is not repugnant, but rather very consonant and consequent, that it be most of all for its own sake and very useful or profitable for the others. But in the former way the other sciences are ordered to metaphysics, in so far as all other knowledge, both speculative and practical, is ordered to the supreme contemplation in which the natural happiness of man consists. So, almost, St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III,¹ c. 25, sixth argument, where he speaks thus: But first philosophy is related in this way to the other speculative sciences: for all the others depend on it, as receiving from it their principles and their direction against those who deny the principles; and first philosophy itself is wholly ordered to the knowledge of God as to its last end.²

7. But in order that these functions of metaphysics may be more exactly understood, it is necessary to declare in particular what the offices are which it exercises with respect to the other sciences, and how it carries them out.

How metaphysics is concerned with the objects of the other sciences, or whether it demonstrates them³

8. First, then, it is wont to be attributed to metaphysics that it prescribes its object to each science, and, if necessary, demonstrates that it exists; which Averroes indicated, De Caelo III, comm. 4, saying that it belongs to metaphysics to defend and verify (for so he speaks) the subjects of the particular sciences. The reason, however, can be that, as Aristotle teaches in Posterior Analytics I, a science does not prove, but supposes, that its object exists and what it is; therefore it must take this from elsewhere; therefore, since this is not always self-evident, and often needs some declaration and proof, it must take it from some superior science, which can be none other than metaphysics, to which it pertains to consider the notion of essence, of quiddity, and of being itself.

9. Objection.—You will say: how can metaphysics demonstrate about the objects of the other sciences that they exist? For if the discussion is of actual existence, this is not required in order that things be objects of a science, but is related as it were per accidens; whence it cannot be demonstrated, especially of created beings, since it does not belong to them necessarily; and if it can be proved in some way from effects, this seems rather to pertain to the natural philosopher, who philosophizes from sensible effects; but if the discussion is of being in aptitude, or in potency, this cannot be demonstrated of a subject, because there is no middle term by which it could be demonstrated; just as it also cannot be demonstrated of the subject of a science what it is, because there is no middle term by which its proper essence belongs to each thing, but it belongs to it immediately and of itself. Add that this science cannot descend to the particular objects of the individual sciences, because it cannot transcend its proper abstraction; just as, therefore, for this reason it cannot demonstrate their properties, so neither can it show whether they are or what they are. Moreover, if the other sciences needed the aid of this one in order to take their objects from it, they could not be learned before this science; which is false, as is evident from experience; for although this science is first in dignity, it is not first in generation. Finally, if it is necessary that this science demonstrate the objects of the others, another science will be necessary which serves this one in showing its proper object, because it itself cannot demonstrate that its object exists, but must suppose it, nor is that so self-evident as not to need some showing.

10. Answer.—To the first difficulty the answer is that this science helps the others to show that their objects exist, or what they are, in the same way as they themselves suppose this about their objects. But sciences, speaking per se, do not suppose that their object actually exists; for this, as the argument given proves, is accidental to the notion of science; I except that science which is about God, whose being is of his quiddity; but in other things their existence is not necessary for science and demonstration, except perhaps sometimes on our part for inquiring into and finding science, because we receive science from things themselves. This science, therefore, does not demonstrate that the objects of the others actually exist, but it can be said to show that the other objects exist only for this reason, that it provides principles for showing in which grade of beings such objects are placed, and what quiddity they have. This doctrine accomplishes this, however, by declaring, first of all, the very notion of being and of essence or quiddity, and in what it consists, and then by distinguishing the various grades of beings under which all the objects of the sciences are contained. Wherefore, although a priori and in itself it cannot be demonstrated through a proper intrinsic middle term that the object of a science exists and what it is, nevertheless as regards us it can be shown from signs or effects, by declaring, first of all, what is required for the notion of being, and in what the notion of essence consists, and what connection it can have with such signs or effects; all of which are exactly shown only through the principles of this doctrine.

11. Add also that through extrinsic causes, such as the final and efficient, it can sometimes be shown that some object exists, which is done most of all through the first and universal causes, about which this science considers; as we can show that angels exist, both because they are necessary for the perfection of the universe, and because they are of such a nature that it was not repugnant for them to be made by God.

12. And so it is also evident how this science can exercise such a function with respect to the objects of the particular sciences, even if they seem to be below its abstraction. For, first of all, as we touched on above in the second section, although metaphysics is not per se concerned with all things according to their proper notions, it nevertheless attains them in some way, namely, in so far as is necessary for explaining the proper notions, or handing down the divisions, and separating the proper metaphysical grades from the others; which metaphysical divisions serve the other sciences much for prescribing their subjects and separating them from the others. And next, it is not always necessary that metaphysics show the objects of the individual sciences immediately by itself, but it is enough that it provides the principles and declares the terms which the other sciences can use for supposing or showing, as far as is necessary, their objects.

13. Metaphysics is prior to all the sciences in the order of doctrine.—Why it is learned last.—Hence it must consequently be admitted that, if the order of doctrine is regarded according to itself, metaphysics is prior to the others, which can be gathered not only from this function, but also from another which we shall explain immediately; for it confirms in some way the principles of all the sciences. Next, it declares the transcendental notions of being, without the knowledge of which scarcely anything can be exactly treated in any science. And finally it has a certain singular connection with dialectic, which I shall declare below, by reason of which it has perhaps come about that a great part of this doctrine is treated confusedly by modern dialecticians. Nevertheless, by reason of our mode of knowing, this science has claimed for itself the last place, as is evident from the usage of all, and from the very title given by Aristotle; for on this account he called this science transphysical or post-physical. And the reason is that which St. Thomas touched upon, In Metaph. I, c. 1, lect. 2, and Avicenna, Book I of his Metaphysics, c. 3: because things which abstract from matter according to being, although according to themselves they are most intelligible, are nevertheless found by us only through motion, as is evident from Metaphysics XII. And similarly the most universal and most abstract notions of being, although according to themselves they are better known, especially as regards the question whether they are, nevertheless what they are, and what properties they have, is known by us with difficulty; and often it is necessary to begin from particular and sensible things in order that we may be able to reach them; and in this way Aristotle said, Metaphysics I, c. 2, that the most universal things are the most difficult to know. Hence, speaking of the order as regards us, it is not always necessary that this science be placed before the others; yet some principles of this science, or metaphysical terms, are always supposed, in so far as they can be known in some way by virtue of the natural light of the intellect, and as far as is sufficient for discoursing and proceeding in the other sciences, although not so exactly and perfectly as is done once this science has been acquired.

14. How a science supposes its object.—To the last confirmation it is said that this science surpasses the others in this, that it not only supposes that its object exists, but also, if necessary, shows that it exists, using its own proper principles, speaking per se; for per accidens it sometimes uses foreign and extraneous ones, on account of the excellence of its object and the defect of our intellect, which cannot attain it perfectly as it is in itself, but only from lower things. But when it is said that a science supposes that its object exists, this is understood speaking per se, as Cajetan noted, I, q. 2, a. 3; per accidens, however, it is not unfitting that some science should demonstrate its object as regards us. And if that science is supreme, it does not need the aid of another, but can accomplish this by its own power; and such is metaphysics in the order of natural sciences, just as theology too has this in the supernatural order.

How metaphysics confirms and defends the first principles

15. First reason for the difficulty.—Second.—Third.—The second chief function which is attributed to this science is to confirm and defend the first principles. Aristotle attributes this function to this science, Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, and Physics I, c. 1, and he hands it down and exercises it professedly in Metaphysics IV, c. 3, where all the commentators hand down the same; and Proclus, Book I of his Commentary on Euclid, c. 4, where he also says that metaphysics supplies principles to the mathematical sciences. But what kind of function this is, and why or in what way it pertains to this science, is not easy to explain. And the reason for the difficulty is, first, because the first principles are known per se, naturally, and without discourse; but this science, since it is essentially a science in all its parts, can in none of them be concerned except through discourse, and consequently with conclusions and mediate propositions; therefore it can exercise no proper function with respect to the first principles. Secondly, because otherwise the habit of metaphysics would be confounded with the habit of first principles, because metaphysics would usurp the proper function of that habit; whence it would not be necessary to distinguish them, contrary to Aristotle, Ethics VI, c. 3, where he distinguishes five virtues of the intellect, and among them places understanding, that is, the habit of principles, and wisdom, which it is evident from the same Aristotle, in the prooemium of this work, is metaphysics. The first consequence is evident, because it pertains to the habit of principles to give assent to the first principles with greater evidence and certitude than all science, since all the evidence of the sciences depends on that habit; therefore metaphysics cannot confirm the first principles, or add some strength to the assent to them, unless it usurps the function of the habit of first principles. Thirdly, because either this science exercises this function only by explaining the terms of which the first principles consist, and this is not the function of a science, nor is some judicative habit necessary for it, but only fitting apprehension and explanation of the terms; or it exercises this function by demonstrating the principles themselves in some way; and again I ask whether this is understood of a priori or a posteriori demonstration. And the first cannot be said, because the first principles as such are immediate, whence they cannot be demonstrated a priori. But if they are taken as they are not immediate as regards us, such as is that principle by which the first attribute is predicated of the thing defined, then it is not the function of one science to demonstrate such principles, but each science in its own matter demonstrates those which pertain to it, nor can metaphysics descend to each in particular, as is evident from what was said in the preceding sections. Therefore nothing proper can be attributed to metaphysics in this respect. But the second, about a posteriori demonstration, cannot more fittingly be said, because this kind of demonstration and science does not pertain to wisdom, such as metaphysics is, but pertains either to experience or to a posteriori science, which they call science of the fact, which is without doubt inferior, and a habit distinct from perfect science, because perhaps it is not one with respect to the first common principles and the proper principles of the individual sciences. Hence, just as there can be joined in us to perfect wisdom or metaphysics some imperfect habit demonstrating a posteriori the first common principles pertaining to metaphysics, so there can be joined to the individual particular sciences a similar proportioned habit, demonstrating the principles of each a posteriori; what is it, then, that metaphysics has proper and singular in this function?

16. The reasons for doubting proposed are resolved one by one.—We cannot answer this question and declare this function more conveniently than by briefly running through the difficulties proposed. And the first indeed is easy; for we grant that the function of this science with respect to the first principles is not to elicit that evident and certain assent which the intellect, led by natural light, gives without any discourse to the first principles sufficiently proposed; for that argument proves this rightly, and the second also confirms it. It will pertain, therefore, to this science to use some discourse about the first principles themselves, by which it confirms and defends them in some way; but in what way it accomplishes this will be declared in the second and third difficulties.

17. Concerning the second, some are wont to treat in this place whether the habit of principles, which Aristotle called understanding, is a quality distinct in reality itself from the intellective power, and whether it is a quality congenital by nature, or rather acquired. For those who deny that this habit is any quality besides the natural light of the intellect itself—which, in so far as by its nature it is sufficiently inclined to the assent to the first principles, is called their habit, and is distinguished from the faculty of understanding not really, nor from the nature of the thing, but by reason alone—those (I say) who think thus will easily dispatch the difficulty proposed, saying that metaphysics is distinguished from the natural light of the intellect, but not from another habit which could confer on the intellect some facility with respect to the assent to the first principles. To others, however (and indeed more probably), it seems that this question does not depend on that one; for whether the habit of principles is a distinct quality and acquired through acts, or not, it is necessary that metaphysics be a habit distinct from it, because, as I was saying in the first difficulty,⁴ the function of metaphysics cannot be to give simple assent, or assent without discourse, to the first principles. But those who posit that habit as a distinct quality say that its function and usefulness is to elicit together with the intellect, more promptly and more easily, the very simple and immediate assent to the first principles; therefore, even if we posit that the habit of principles is acquired by its proper acts, we ought not on that account to confound it with the habit of metaphysics.

18. These questions, therefore, are not connected, nor does one depend on the other. And (as I think) Aristotle posited both, namely, that the habit of principles is a virtue distinct from wisdom, as is evident from the cited place, Ethics VI, c. 3,⁵ and that it is a habit which we acquire by our acts, as can easily be taken from the same place and from Posterior Analytics II, last chapter. For in the former place he manifestly places it among the habits or virtues of the intellect; but if it were not a thing distinct from the faculty of understanding itself, it would be most improperly, indeed falsely, said to be a habit of the intellect. In the latter place, however, he thinks more openly that it is a habit, not implanted by nature, but acquired, not through discourse, but through simple acts gained from the mere proposition and understanding of the terms. And in truth this latter follows from the former. For if this habit were not some facility acquired by use for eliciting similar acts more promptly, there would be no reason or foundation why it should be judged to be some quality distinct from the nature of the thing from the natural light of the intellect, or from the faculty of understanding itself; both because, as Aristotle said, De Anima III, c. 4, the intellect by its nature is pure potency in the order of intelligibles, and as it were a blank tablet; and also because, if nature itself had given the whole power which is necessary on the part of the power for eliciting these acts, not only as regards their substance, but also as regards promptness and facility, it would have been superfluous to multiply entities in the faculty of understanding itself; rather, it could and should have been constituted stronger and more efficacious in its own intrinsic entity, nor would there be any indication for gathering that distinction of entities. Just as, if the will by its nature is so prompt and ready for loving the good in common that it cannot be rendered more prompt and ready through acts, it is the best argument that it does not have that promptness through an innate habit, but through its own entity. And similarly sight, because from its nature it has the whole inclination and efficacy which it can have on its part for eliciting the act of seeing, we rightly gather that it has that whole power and inclination through its intrinsic faculty and indivisible entity, and not through some other implanted by nature. Hence St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 1, thought that this habit is not natural according to itself, but as regards a certain beginning, namely, because the acts through which it is acquired are not had through discourse, but flow immediately from the very light of nature, although in the beginning and before the habit they do not emanate with as much promptness and facility as after the habit has been acquired; concerning which matter we disputed at length on Posterior Analytics II, and perhaps we shall add something in what follows.

19. How metaphysics is concerned with the first principles, and how the habit of principles.—This opinion, therefore, being supposed, to the second difficulty the consequence is denied. For metaphysics is concerned with the first principles otherwise than the habit of principles. For, first of all, metaphysics is not concerned with the first principles formally, as they are principles, but as they are in some way conclusions. But the habit is concerned with the principles formally, as they are such, and immediate truths; and therefore this habit attains them without discourse, but metaphysics by means of some discourse. Hence, again, the habit of principles does not properly add some evidence or certitude to the assent to the principles, which can be had from nature alone, but adds facility and promptness in exercising that evidence and certitude; but metaphysics adds certitude and evidence, because it makes one assent to the same truth in a new way and through a new middle term. It is, however, to be considered attentively that this increase is not intensive but extensive. First indeed, because metaphysics does not increase the evidence or certitude, nor even the intension, of the very assent which the habit of principles elicits, because, as I said, metaphysics in no way operates about that assent, but about its object or matter provides a new mode of assenting, by a distinct act, of course. Secondly, because if we compare these acts among themselves, the assent of metaphysics is not in truth more certain or more evident than the assent of the habit of principles, as the argument given proves, because it is always necessary that the assent of metaphysics rest on some first principles as self-evident. And for this reason we say that metaphysics does not increase intensively the evidence or certitude about the first principles, but only extensively, by providing a new evidence and certitude of them.

20. The knowledge of the terms contributes most of all to knowing complex principles.—Concerning the third difficulty, another question is touched upon, namely, in what ways metaphysics is concerned with the first principles, by helping and confirming the intellect in its assent to them. In which it must be said briefly that this doctrine accomplishes this function in the two ways indicated in the third difficulty. For, first of all, it hands down and declares the notion of the very terms of which the first principles consist. Which is evident almost by experience itself in the course of this doctrine, both in Aristotle, especially in Books V, VII, VIII and IX, and also in other authors, and it will be evident from what we shall say in the following disputations. For in this science it is handed down what being is, what substance, what accident; what a whole, what a part, what act, what potency, of which terms, and of others similar, the first principles consist. For since these principles do not have in reality an intrinsic and as it were formal middle term by which their extremes are connected, they are known of themselves from the knowledge of the terms; whence nothing can help more toward their knowledge than a scientific and evident knowledge of the terms, or of their notions, such as is that which is handed down in this science. For it is not true, what was assumed in the aforesaid third difficulty, namely, that this function does not pertain to science, which proceeds by discoursing and judging, but to the simple apprehension of the terms; for although, speaking per se, on the side of simple things and terms demonstration is not required, nor even composition, in order to understand what each thing is or signifies, nevertheless as regards us this can often be demonstrated, especially by using a division consisting of opposite members, and by demonstrating what the thing is not (which is frequently better known to us), and thence concluding what it is. Often also this is done by handing down some descriptions of the simple notions which are better known as regards us, and using them as middle terms for making demonstrations, which sometimes suffice for acquiring human science. And hence, finally, it is understood that this mode of illuminating the first principles is exercised chiefly and immediately in this science with respect to those first principles which are most universal and consist of more abstract terms, that is, terms signifying things, or notions of things, which can exist without matter; for, as we said, these are the ones which, speaking per se, are contained under the object of metaphysics; and since it is the supreme science, it is per se sufficient for handing down and explaining the notions of all the things and terms which are enclosed under its object. But it does not descend so proximately and immediately to the proximate and particular principles of the individual sciences, and to the terms of which they consist, but attains them only in one of the two ways explained above, namely, either in so far as is necessary for handing down the proper definitions and explaining the proper terms, or in so far as general, and especially transcendental, notions are included in them, without whose knowledge and aid no notion or quiddity of any thing whatever can be explained in particular.

21. The most universal principles cannot be demonstrated through causes.—The other way in which this science is concerned with the first principles is by demonstrating them, or their truth and certitude, which it can accomplish in various ways. First, some say that metaphysics demonstrates the principles a priori, not indeed through an intrinsic formal or material cause, because (as the argument given rightly proves) in these immediate principles such a kind of demonstration has no place, but through an extrinsic cause, final,⁶ efficient and exemplar; for since metaphysics considers the first causes, even God himself, who, as he is the first truth, so is the cause of all truth, at least an extrinsic cause in all the aforesaid ways, it can at least through this cause demonstrate the truth, not only of the first principles, but also of the conclusions. This mode of demonstrating, however, is very rarely or never exercised in this doctrine, and if it is considered more attentively, it can scarcely have a place. For, first of all, as regards the efficient cause, this has no place in the most universal principles consisting of terms common to God and creatures; for just as with respect to God no efficient cause can be given, so neither with respect to those principles which have truth in God himself, such as that: Anything whatever either is or is not, and: It is impossible to affirm and deny something of the same thing. And hence it is also evident that these principles cannot be demonstrated through the final cause, because the final cause is in order to effecting and operation, and therefore things which abstract from the efficient cause abstract also from the end. Again, hence it seems to come about that even those principles which are common only to creatures, in so far as they fall under science, cannot be demonstrated through the efficient or final cause, because as such they abstract from actual existence, and consequently from efficiency; for all efficiency is about an existing thing, or one which is brought to issue; as, for example, every whole is greater than its part is true, all efficiency being set aside, and so of the rest. And hence, further, proof through the exemplar cause does not seem possible here, both because what abstracts from the efficient cause abstracts also from the exemplar; for the exemplar is that to whose likeness the efficient cause operates, and it is compared as art, or the notion of operating, with respect to an intellectual efficient cause; if, therefore, the truth of these principles abstracts from the efficient cause, it also abstracts from the exemplar cause; and also because the essence of things as such does not depend on the exemplar cause; therefore neither does the truth of the first principles. The antecedent is evident, because man, for example, is not a rational animal because God knows him as such, or because he is represented as such in the divine exemplar, but rather he is known as such because of himself he demands such an essence.

22. An objection is met.—But to these things it can be said that these principles abstract indeed from actual efficiency, but not from possible efficiency, and consequently do not altogether abstract from the efficient, exemplar and final cause; for, as we shall say below, although the essences of creatures can be abstracted from being, they cannot be abstracted from order to being, without which a true and real essence cannot be understood; by the same reason, therefore, the first principles common to true and real created beings, even if according to their necessary connection they abstract from time and actual existence, do not abstract from order to being, namely, because with such a connection they could exist, and not otherwise; and in this way they can also have a respect to the aforesaid causes, and be demonstrated through them. As if someone proves that every whole is greater than its part because it can be made so by God, and not otherwise; or that the essence of man is rational animal because it can be established by God in that essence, and not in another. And similarly from the final cause it can be shown that man is a rational animal, because he can be instituted for knowing and loving God. Or from the exemplar cause, because he is represented as such in the divine idea. For man would not have such a real essence unless he had such an exemplar in God; nor is it repugnant that under diverse notions both be true, namely, both that God knows that man is of such an essence because he truly is such, and that man has such an essence because he has such an idea in God.

23. This answer indeed declares that this mode of demonstrating is not always impossible nor useless. For although these modes of demonstrating do not all have a place in each first principle—for it is not necessary that three and four being seven should have a final cause, and so of the other principles in which there is truth from the connection of the extremes, not indeed ordered to some end, because the predicate does not declare some property or essence of the subject, but rather identity, or the repugnance of opposites, as is evident in this: Anything whatever either is or is not, and the like, in which the said modes of demonstrating through extrinsic causes have no place—nevertheless they can be applied to many principles, especially that demonstration which is through the final cause; for the essences of things and their properties have a final cause, through which they could be demonstrated, if such a cause were otherwise self-evident, or could be shown through another better-known principle; for this is necessary in every demonstration.

24. Natural light cannot demonstrate through the first efficient cause, end and exemplar.—I add, however, further, that this kind of proof often exceeds the power of the natural light of the human intellect, and pertains rather to a divine (so to speak) or supernatural metaphysics than to a natural one. For the divine exemplars, unless they are seen in themselves, cannot be the reason or means of knowing some truth; but they cannot be seen in themselves through natural metaphysics; indeed, this science cannot show that God has these or those exemplars of things except a posteriori from the things themselves, just as from the workmanship effected in a thing⁷ we know what idea the craftsman had. And the reason is the same concerning the first efficient cause; for as long as we do not know the power of God in itself, we cannot know from it what things can be made by it, but rather we investigate the power of God from the things made, although, once the power of God has been known from certain effects, it can be demonstrated through it what he can do in others. And similarly from his perfection and efficiency we can investigate the end and perfection of his works, as that it belongs to him to establish all things for his own sake, or to make the universe perfect. From which we can further gather what natures he has attributed to the things known; which mode of philosophizing Aristotle touches upon, Metaphysics XII, at the end.

25. Demonstration by reduction to the impossible is the function of the metaphysician.—Besides these modes of demonstrating, which are little used, there is another, by reduction to the impossible; and in this way all principles are shown by reduction to that one: It is impossible to affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing at the same time. And because this is the most general principle, proper to this doctrine, this kind of demonstrating therefore pertains to this wisdom; but about that principle and its use we shall say more below, Disp. III. Finally, for increasing this certitude about the first principles, the consideration of the intellectual light itself, by which the first principles are manifested, can contribute very much, together with reflection upon it, and reduction to the source from which it flows, namely, the divine light itself. For thus we rightly gather that the first principles are true, because they are shown to be true immediately and per se by the natural light itself; because in this mode of assenting this light cannot be deceived, or incline to the false, since it is a participation of the divine light, perfect in its genus and order. Whence that saying of Psalm 4: Who sheweth us good things? The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. Hence Aristotle, at the beginning of the science of the soul, judged that science to be very certain because it contemplates the intellectual light itself; in which this wisdom surpasses that science; for it considers in a higher way the power and perfection of this light according to itself, in so far as it abstracts from matter according to being, and in so far as it participates the certitude and infallibility of the divine light.

26. How reduction to the impossible is an a priori demonstration, and how a posteriori.—You will say that a showing of the first principles of this kind is not a priori, but only a posteriori; for these principles are not true because they are known through an infallible light, but rather, because they are true and immediate, therefore they are manifested through such a light. I answer by granting that this proof is not a priori, if the truth of the principles is considered in the being of the thing (so to speak); it can, however, in some way be called a priori in the notion of the knowable, or of the evident and certain; for it is rightly shown a priori that some proposition is certain because it is revealed by God, or that it is evident because it is proved by demonstration. Thus, therefore, it can be shown that these principles are most evident, because they are manifested immediately by the natural light itself. And this proof and reflection contributes most of all to confirming the intellect and increasing its certitude, at least on the side of the subject, in the assent to the principles.

27. Inference.—From these things, therefore, it has been sufficiently declared how the first principles are contained under the object or matter with which this science is concerned, and what function it exercises with respect to them. And it can also be gathered in passing that this is indeed true of the first and most universal principles, but not of them alone, as Soncinas and Javellus and some others would have it; because, although, speaking per se, this doctrine is concerned more immediately with the former principles, and demonstrates them in more ways, as is evident from what has been said, nevertheless it also extends itself to the others, because some of the aforesaid modes are general and common to all. And therefore Aristotle spoke absolutely of all, saying that metaphysics demonstrates the principles of all the sciences, as is evident from the prooemium, cc. 1 and 2, and from Metaphysics IV, text 7, and from Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, and from Topics I, c. 2, and Physics I, c. 2, where he says that if anyone denies the first principles of geometry, it does not pertain to geometry⁸ to prove them, but to the first philosopher. And it is the open opinion of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, especially ad 1 and ad 2. And by reason it can easily be shown from what has been said, for the modes of showing the first principles have a place also in the particular and proper principles of the other sciences. Indeed, St. Thomas adds in the cited place that it pertains to this science not only to confirm the intellect in its assent to the principles, but also to the conclusions; which can be understood remotely and mediately, because by confirming the principles it also virtually confirms the conclusions; or only materially (so to speak), because sometimes wisdom can show through higher causes conclusions which are demonstrated through other lower middle terms in the other sciences.

That it is not the function of metaphysics to hand down the instruments of knowing

28. The opinion of some.—There are those who think that this function too pertains to metaphysics. For although the dialectician teaches to define, to divide, etc., he nevertheless cannot declare instruments of this kind from their proper principles and render their reason, but can only hand down and set out instruments of this kind as regards the question whether they are; but it pertains to the metaphysician to discourse about them, declaring their first roots and causes. Which can be set out of each thus: for definition declares the essence of the thing; but to declare the notion of essence pertains to metaphysics. Therefore to hand down the perfect notion of definition too is the function of metaphysics. Again, division declares distinction; but to deal with the distinctions of things is the function of metaphysics; therefore to explain the notion of division too pertains to it. Moreover, the whole force of argumentation, if we look to its form, consists in one of these principles: Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other. The same thing cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same thing. But these principles are proper to the science of metaphysics, to which it pertains to treat of the same and the diverse, and of being and non-being, which are explained through affirmation and negation; therefore on this head too it pertains to the metaphysician to hand down the instrument of knowing. Finally, science is a spiritual quality; therefore as such it is comprehended under the object of metaphysics; therefore by the same reason it pertains to metaphysics to hand down the notion of acquiring science, and to declare by what modes or instruments it is acquired; for to deal with the end and the means belongs to the same doctrine; but all these are ordered to science as to their end.

29. It is rejected.—But this opinion, unless it is declared more fully, confounds metaphysics with dialectic, for it is the proper function of dialectic to hand down the mode of knowing, which it does in no other way than by teaching the instruments of knowing, and demonstrating their force and properties. Wherefore, in order that we may set out what the truth of the matter is, and attribute to each science its proper function, it is to be noticed that these instruments of knowing are found properly and formally in the thoughts of the mind, or the internal acts of the intellect, but are founded in things, and explained by words. For science consists in some act of the intellect, or in a habit, according to the diverse acceptations of science, namely actual and habitual; and therefore it is necessary that the proper instruments of knowing be placed in the intellect itself and in its acts; for, since man acquires science through discourse, and needs other prior operations or conceptions of things in order to complete discourse, therefore conceptions of the mind of this kind, so disposed and ordered as to contribute per se and directly to acquiring science, are called instruments of knowing; instruments of this kind, therefore, are formally in the operations of the mind. Since, therefore, the operations of the mind, in order to be right and true, must be proportioned and commensurate to things themselves, it is therefore necessary that instruments of this kind be founded in some way in things themselves; they are explained, however, by words, which have been given by nature for expressing the thoughts of the mind, according to that saying of Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias I: Those things which are in the voice are signs of the passions which are in the soul; and that of Cicero, De Oratore I: In this one thing we excel the beasts, that we speak among ourselves, and that we can express our thoughts by speaking.

30. The true opinion on this.—It belongs to dialectic to treat whether the instruments of knowing are, and what they are.—Thus, therefore, it must be said that it does not pertain to the metaphysician directly to hand down the instruments of knowing, and to teach the mode and disposition which they must have in the concepts of the mind in order to be apt for generating science. This is proved by the argument indicated above, because this pertains to the function of dialectic; for which reason Aristotle said, Metaphysics II, c. 3, that it is absurd to seek at the same time science and the mode of science. By which words he wished to teach (as all the expositors hand down) that dialectic is to be acquired before the other sciences, especially before metaphysics, because it pertains to it to hand down the mode of knowing; which is nothing other than to teach the instruments of knowing, and to lay open the mode of treating and proving things accommodated to science. Nor is it true that dialectic explains these things only cursorily, and as regards whether they are (as they call it), both because it is evident from experience that dialectic hands down not only the laws of rightly defining, arguing or demonstrating, but also the reasons of these things; for it also demonstrates a priori why a right definition and argumentation require such conditions and properties, and similar things; and also because otherwise dialectic would not be sufficient for acquiring science, but it would be necessary also to place metaphysics before it, which is plainly false, and against the sense and usage of all. The consequence is evident, because true science is never acquired unless one knows that one knows; for science must be a perfect intellectual light, which manifests itself, otherwise it will not be altogether evident; but one cannot know that one’s knowledge is true science unless one knows that one’s reasoning is a true demonstration, which one cannot know unless one knows what a true demonstration is, and why it must consist of such principles and such a form of reasoning. If, therefore, dialectic did not render the reason of all these things, but rather demanded a certain faith in them, it could not serve, or be sufficient, for acquiring true science. And it is confirmed, because a demonstration is not an apt instrument of knowing unless it is known as a demonstration, that is, as a reasoning necessarily concluding from certain and evident principles. For if someone composes an argument which in itself is a demonstration, but is not known as such by him, but is thought to be a probable argument, or one proceeding only from certain, but not evident, premisses, it will not generate true science in him, because such a demonstration so proposed is either an inept instrument, or not sufficiently applied to such an effect. Hence dialectic hands down the mode of knowing in such a way that it teaches it scientifically; on account of which those who think rightly about it judge it to be not only the mode of knowing, but also a true science; this function, therefore, pertains properly and per se to dialectic, and not to metaphysics.

31. Corollary.—And hence it also comes about that it belongs to the same dialectic, and not to metaphysics, to hand down or direct instruments of this kind as they can be expressed or composed by words (under words, however, we include writings, because as regards this they differ only materially); indeed, not even dialectic itself is concerned with these directly and by design as with its proper object and matter, but accomplishes this consequently, and as it were by a certain concomitance. For since words arise from concepts, while dialectic directs and orders the concepts, it consequently teaches by what words, or by what form of words, they are to be expressed in order that they may have the force of persuading and demonstrating; which whole matter is both clear of itself and perspicuous from the very use of dialectic.

32. Metaphysics illuminates the instruments of knowing very much.—It must be added, however, that, in so far as these instruments of knowing are founded in things themselves, their science and knowledge is very much perfected through the science of metaphysics, so that what we said metaphysics accomplishes with respect to all the sciences and their principles has a place by a certain peculiar reason with respect to dialectic and its functions. The reason for doubting posited at the beginning proves this, and it is declared in this way. For the knowledge of essence and quiddity as such pertains peculiarly to metaphysics; but definition, whose notion and form dialectic hands down, if it is perfect, explains the essence and quiddity of the thing; and therefore, while metaphysics hands down what the essence and quiddity of each thing is, it contributes very much to the perfect mode of defining. Especially because metaphysics hands down not only the notion of essence in common, but also, within its abstraction, declares the various grades and modes of essences; on which it most of all depends to know of what parts the definitions of things ought to consist, or what mode of defining it is necessary to hold in distinct things (for example, in substance or accident, and in a simple or a composite thing). Thus, therefore, metaphysics very much perfects the art of defining, although it does not hand it down directly and by design. In a similar way it happens with respect to another instrument of knowing, which is division, whose laws and conditions dialectic hands down; but all of them are founded in the distinction or opposition of things; but to deal with the various distinctions of things pertains to metaphysics; for the same and the diverse are reduced to the properties of being, as are one and many; and therefore, while metaphysics exactly declares the various distinctions of things, it also illuminates the art of dividing. But concerning argumentation or demonstration the reason does not seem similar, because it is not founded proximately in the essence, or in some property of being, as definition and division are; nevertheless by another way metaphysics helps dialectic in this function too, both on the side of the matter and on the side of the form. On the side of the matter indeed, because, while metaphysics distinguishes and separates the notions of almost all beings, and declares in general what the thing is in its essence, and what its properties are, what is a thing and what a mode, it ministers the matter for demonstrating and arguing, or rather declares exactly what both the extremes and the middle terms of a demonstration must be; on the side of the form, however, because this doctrine exactly declares and shows all the principles on which every right form of arguing rests, such as those: Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other. The same thing cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same thing, and the like.

33. The arguments for the opposite opinion are solved.—To the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning the answer is easy from what has been said. To the first, about definition, the answer is that the metaphysician indeed declares in common what essence is, and also what kind it is, whether simple or composite, within the breadth of his object and his abstraction; but the dialectician treats of the mode in which the essence and nature of the thing is to be conceived by us and declared distinctly through definition, or of what concepts or words the definition is to be composed, or what properties it must have in order to be apt; these functions, however, are distinct, although they help each other mutually; for dialectic helps metaphysics as the mode of knowing helps science; but metaphysics helps dialectic as a general science which discourses proximately and exactly about things, which dialectic either supposes or attains only remotely. And almost the same answer is to be applied to the other part, about division;⁹ for metaphysics treats of the distinctions of things as they are in things themselves; but dialectic of the mode of conceiving and explaining the partitions of things. Similarly, to the third member, about argumentation, it must be said that, although metaphysics in some way demonstrates those principles, and reduces them to that most universal one: Anything whatever either is or is not, or: It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be, dialectic too supposes a similar principle as self-evident, namely, that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied of the same thing, to which it reduces almost the whole force and form of right argumentation, in order to demonstrate its properties and conditions.

34. To which science the treatment of science pertains.—To the last member, about science, the answer is that the consideration of science, as it is a certain spiritual quality and habit of the mind, or an operation of it of such a condition and nature, can be manifold. One is merely speculative, by which we contemplate what such a thing is, and what properties it has; and this consideration pertains either to that part of natural philosophy which treats of the rational soul, if the discussion is only of human science, which is not without phantasy; or, if we speak abstractly and absolutely of science, it will pertain to metaphysics, for it is a thing or property abstracting from matter according to being. Another consideration of science is as it were practical and artful, which is not about the habits but about the acts of science; for art is concerned with operations; and this consideration has a place only in human science, which is completed through composition and discourse; for art is not concerned with simple things, but with composite ones; for the aim of art is to direct some composition or harmony, whence the artful form arises from the due proportion and composition of parts or simple things; this direction and consideration of science, therefore, pertains to dialectic, which is the art of knowing, and not to metaphysics. In order, however, that dialectic may exercise this function, it is not necessary that it speculate exactly about the whole nature and essence of that quality which is science, but it is enough that it suppose that it is an operation of the mind, and hand down some of its properties which it requires for manifesting truth exactly and without error, such as that it be evident, certain, and the like. And this knowledge of science is handed down by the dialectician, as is evident from the books of the Posterior Analytics, and it suffices for the dialectician in order that he may direct his art and method of knowing to it as to his end. Finally, another consideration of science can be called moral, in so far as the use or exercise of science can be worthy of praise or blame; which function pertains to moral philosophy or prudence.

1. In explaining the final cause and usefulness of this science we have at the same time declared its effect; for its whole usefulness is placed in its operation and effect; it remains, therefore, that we say a few things about its attributes, which can easily be gathered from its subject matter and from its end.

2. First conclusion.—I say, first, that the science of metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science of all. So Aristotle teaches, Book I, c. 2, and Book II, c. 1, and Book III, c. 2; and all the interpreters. And this assertion has been sufficiently proved from what has been said. For in the preceding section we showed that the end of this science is the knowledge of truth, and that of itself it rests in it; but a science is called speculative from this end, as Aristotle teaches in Book VI, and as will be treated below in its place. And in the first section it was shown that the object of this science is the most noble, both in the being of object, on account of its supreme abstraction, and in the being of thing, on account of the most noble beings which it comprehends. But every science has its nobility from its object; this science, therefore, is the most excellent speculative science of all.

3. A small question.—Someone will perhaps ask, however, whether this science is purely speculative, or also practical; for, as I now suppose, it is not repugnant that the same science or knowledge should at the same time by an eminent notion be speculative and practical; for the theologians attribute this to divine science, not only as it is in God himself, but also as it is participated by us, whether through clear vision, or through obscure theology and faith; therefore also among acquired and natural sciences there could be some which participates this eminence, and is at the same time speculative and practical. And if this is to belong to any, it ought most of all to belong to this doctrine: first, because it is the supreme science of all, and commands all, as Aristotle said in the prooemium. Next, because it perfects the natural knowledge of God, as far as can be done by the light of nature; but right judgement about things to be done depends on the knowledge of God; therefore this judgement too is directed by this science, and so on that side it is practical. And it is declared in this way: for this science demonstrates the divine attributes which can be demonstrated by the light of nature, among which are to be supremely good, to be the last end of all things, to be the first truth; therefore this science demonstrates all these things; therefore it will also demonstrate that God is to be loved above all things, because this is due to him in so far as he is supremely good and the last end. Again, this science demonstrates that God has providence over all things, and is most wise and most just; therefore it will consequently also teach that he is to be feared, and trusted, and similar things, all of which pertain to morals and practice. Finally, infused theology is rightly judged to be eminently practical and speculative for no other reason than because under a higher light it considers in God that notion of the last end to be attained through moral and practical means; therefore the same will hold of natural metaphysics, as it proceeds under a lower light, proportion being kept.

4. Answer.—Nevertheless, it must be said that this doctrine has nothing of practical science, but is only contemplative. So it is taken from Aristotle and the other expositors; for although they do not expressly touch upon this question, nevertheless, while they teach simply that this science is speculative, and either are silent about practical science or certainly deny it, they plainly think it is purely speculative. Add that Aristotle, in the books of the Ethics, disputed professedly about the happiness of man as the first rule of moral actions. But the happiness of man consists in God as he is the last end of all things, and in a singular way of the rational creature; that consideration, therefore, does not pertain to metaphysics; therefore no other consideration remains under which this doctrine could be practical. For if it is practical, it would most of all be moral; for it is self-evident that it is not factive or directive of the operations of art, nor even of intellectual actions, as was said in the preceding section; but it is not moral, because the consideration of the last end in order to morals is not its function, but that of moral philosophy, as has been said.

5. Why theology is speculative and practical, metaphysics only speculative.—The a priori reason, however, can be given from the difference between supernatural theology and this natural one; which is to be taken from the difference of the light under which each proceeds. For the former proceeds under the light of the divine revelation of faith, in so far as it is applied mediately and through discourse to the conclusions contained in the principles of faith; but faith not only reveals God as the last end of all things, but also teaches specially that the happiness of man consists in him; and consequently faith reveals not only speculative truths about God, but also practical ones; indeed it also reveals almost all the first principles of morals; and it is concerned with all these with the same certitude and of itself in the same way; from which theology discourses, considering in God not only speculatively the notion of last end, but also morally in order to the means by which it is to be attained. But metaphysics proceeds only under the natural light, which does not embrace all its objects in the same way nor with the same certitude; and therefore metaphysics is not a habit adequate to it, but under a certain special notion and abstraction it perfects the natural light with respect to those objects which abstract from matter according to being, as we have said. And therefore concerning God it considers only speculatively the notion of last end and supreme good, namely, in so far as he is such in himself, and can be known as such by the light of nature, rather as regards whether he is than as regards what he is. But it does not consider practically how this end is to be attained by man; indeed, it does not even attain or inquire in particular into the mode in which God is the last end of man, or in which man himself can attain God, as he is his last end; because this is already below the metaphysical abstraction and contemplation, and pertains to philosophy; indeed, it supposes the physical consideration of man, or natural philosophy, which is merely speculative; and it pertains to moral philosophy, which in a certain way, and (so to speak) inchoatively, is a practical science; concerning the distinction of which sciences this is not the place to speak. I admit, however, that if a natural metaphysical science could be had of the angels as they are in themselves, it would pertain to it not only to contemplate their nature, but also how they would be capable of their last end, and in what their happiness would consist, and by what means they could arrive at it; which science would be partly moral, and would join some practice with speculation; and it would be wholly metaphysics, because it would wholly abstract from matter according to being. Nevertheless, a science of this kind would be angelic rather than human; for we can investigate scarcely anything about the happiness of the angels except by analogy to our own; and therefore metaphysics, as it is in us, is merely speculative in every respect, and does not descend to moral or practical matters.

6. Second conclusion.—I say, secondly: metaphysics is not only a science, but also natural wisdom. Aristotle posits this assertion and proves it professedly, Book I, cc. 1 and 2, and Book III, c. 2. He first supposes that there is in us some intellectual virtue which is wisdom; which the same Aristotle also taught, Ethics VI, c. 2 and following. And it is the common consent of all the wise; for if no habit of man were wisdom, no man could be called wise, for the wise man is and is called so from wisdom; for man is not wise by nature, nor from the power or faculty alone, as is self-evident, otherwise all men would be wise; but man becomes wise by some use, and habit or virtue; wisdom, therefore, is a habit. Again, from the word itself and the sense of all it is evident that it signifies a habit pertaining to the intellect, not any whatever, but a perfect one, which is an intellectual virtue, and a very perfect one. Which Aristotle proves by an excellent discourse in the prooemium, c. 1, distinguishing experience from art, and art from science, which is sought for its own sake and is concerned with the knowledge of causes and principles; and concluding that wisdom must be some science of this kind.

7. The manifold acceptation of wisdom.—It is to be noticed in this place, however, that if we attend to common speech, sometimes by this name of wisdom there seems to be signified not one determinate habit of the intellect, but a certain intellectual rectitude for judging well about all things, arising from the perfect attainment of all the sciences, in the way in which justice in one acceptation does not signify one singular habit, but the harmony and rectitude of all the virtues of the will. And to this acceptation of wisdom those descriptions of Cicero seem to be excellently accommodated: Wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by which these things are held together.¹ And in the same sense the ancient philosophers seem to have spoken of wisdom, who said that it belonged to the notion of wisdom that it be a knowledge of all things, even down to the lowest species, and all their properties; for this is not done by one science, but by the collection of all. Indeed, if the discussion is of man, he does not attain so exact a knowledge of all things even through all the sciences taken together; and therefore they themselves said that there is in man not true wisdom, but a counterfeit one; we, however, say more truly that there is in man a true wisdom, even a natural one, but human, and consequently very limited. In another way, however, and one more used among the wise, wisdom is taken for some peculiar habit, and this in two ways; for there is one which is called wisdom simply, another which is so only in a certain respect; the former is in a certain way universal, not by predication, or by the collection of all, but by eminence and power, as we shall declare immediately; the latter is particular, not only in habit, but also in matter and power. Concerning this latter wisdom there is a long discourse of Socrates in Plato, Dialogue III, or On Wisdom, where he distinguishes the wisdom of craftsmen and of pilots, and the like. And in this same way Paul seems to have said, 1 Cor. 3: As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation. For one is called wise in some genus or matter who knows perfectly the science or art which is concerned with it, and through the supreme causes of that genus, as St. Thomas noted, II-II, q. 45, a. 1. Finally, in another way (as St. Thomas says in the same place) a certain particular science or intellectual virtue is called wisdom simply; and in this way Aristotle used this word, Ethics VI, in the place cited, and in the present one; and in this sense he attributes this dignity of wisdom to metaphysics.

8. Some properties of wisdom.—Secondly, to prove this Aristotle subjoins, c. 2, the conditions of wisdom, of which some are common to it with the other speculative sciences, while others are proper to it; and those which seem to be common are to be so taken that they belong to wisdom according to a certain eminence and singular perfection. The first condition, then, is that wisdom be concerned with all things, and be the science of all things, as far as is possible. This condition has been sufficiently set out by us in Sect. 2. Its reason, however, will be evident from what is to be said.

9. The second condition of wisdom posited by Aristotle is that it be concerned with more difficult things and things more remote from the senses; for to know those things which are obvious to all, or which are perceived by the senses, pertains not to the wise, but to any common men whatever. This condition, however, seems to be understood of the knowledge of more difficult things, as far as is possible for man; for it does not pertain to the wisdom of man to seek things higher than himself, and which cannot be known by natural light, such as are the outcomes of future contingents, and the like, which to wish to know through human science is not wisdom, but rashness. Human wisdom, therefore, is concerned with higher and more difficult things according to the capacity of human talent.

10. The third condition is that it be the most certain knowledge; under which condition evidence and clarity² too are comprehended, because the natural certitude about which the discussion is arises from evidence and is commensurate with it. The perspicuous reason for this condition, however, is that wisdom signifies perfect science and an exceptional knowledge; but the greatest perfection of human knowledge is placed in certitude and evidence.

11. The fourth condition is that it be more apt for teaching and for handing down the causes of things. Aristotle had indicated this very thing in c. 1, saying that the sign of the wise man is to be able to teach, and that it pertains to the wise man to know and hand down the causes of things. Likewise in each art or science we judge him wiser who comprehends the causes of things more intimately and more universally. Finally, human knowledge is more perfect when it attains the cause, otherwise it is always imperfect; a sign of which is that the mind of the inquirer does not rest until it finds the cause. That, therefore, will be wisdom simply which attains the higher and more universal causes of things; whence it will also come about that it is more apt for teaching.

12. The fifth is that such wisdom is most worthy to be desired for its own sake and for the sake of knowing; for this pertains to dignity, as is self-evident; since, therefore, wisdom holds a certain dignity and excellence among the sciences, there is no doubt that it is to be placed in that genus of sciences which are sought for the sake of knowing itself; and that in it it holds a certain supreme and excellent grade, and thus that it is most of all desirable for its own sake.

13. The sixth property of wisdom is to preside over the others rather than to minister to them; which is also consonant with its dignity; but in what sense this is to be taken I shall declare immediately. I only notice concerning these properties that Aristotle, in assigning them, speaks for the most part not of wisdom but of the wise man; he understands, however, that that science is wisdom by reason of which these conditions belong to the wise man. And if anyone says that these properties do not belong to the wise man by reason of one science, but by reason of all or several together, the answer is that it now remains to be shown, by proving that these conditions are found in the science of metaphysics, and at the same time it will be shown that there is some one science which excels the others in all those attributes, and is therefore wisdom, and that that is metaphysics.

14. It is demonstrated that the said properties of wisdom are found in metaphysics.³—In the third place, therefore, Aristotle proves, in the said c. 2, that all these conditions are found in metaphysics. The first indeed, because he in a certain way knows all subjects who is endowed with universal science; but metaphysics is the most universal science; therefore it is the science of all things in that way which wisdom requires, namely, as far as is possible. Concerning this condition enough was said above, Sect. 2, and from what was said there it may be gathered that metaphysics deals with all things in two or three ways. First, confusedly and in common, in so far as it deals with the notions of being common to all things, or to all substances or accidents, and consequently with the first and most universal principles, on which all the principles of the other sciences are founded in some way. Secondly, in particular about all things down to their proper differences and species; which is true in some way, yet not equally nor in the same way in all; for in things, or notions of things, which abstract from matter according to being, it is simply true on the side of the things themselves; it is limited, however, by the imperfection of our intellect. And so human metaphysics (of which we are treating) demonstrates and discourses about these as far as human talent can by natural light. But in things which concern sensible or intelligible matter or quantity, it is not simply true, even on the side of the science itself, but only in so far as transcendental predicates are found in them, or metaphysical notions and middle terms abstracting from matter are applied to them in some way, so that something may be demonstrated of them through these. Thirdly, we can add that this science deals with all things not in themselves, but in their causes, because it disputes about the most universal causes of all things, and especially about God.

15. It could, therefore, be inquired which of these modes suffices for the notion of wisdom, and consequently on which side metaphysics is wisdom, or whether it is wisdom only as it comprehends all these modes. To which it seems briefly to be said that metaphysics requires that whole breadth and knowledge in order to be absolutely and simply wisdom. For if someone knows from metaphysics the common notion of being in so far as it is being, and its attributes and principles, he has indeed an inchoate wisdom, since he holds universal principles by which he can confirm and judge other principles. Likewise, because he has a certain science, or part of science, very desirable of itself, and most worthy to be known, and most useful and in a certain way necessary for all the other sciences; it would, therefore, be some sort of wisdom. It could not, however, be called wisdom simply; for what is wisdom simply without the knowledge of God? Likewise, because being in so far as it is being, when one stops precisely at it, although in the notion of a knowable object it is sufficiently perfect on account of its abstraction, subtlety and transcendence, nevertheless in the being of thing it has the least perfection, for there is greater perfection in determinate beings; but for the notion of wisdom a knowable object is not enough without the dignity of the things which are known. Indeed, if we lay stress on the name, certainly metaphysics, if it stopped at the most abstract notion of being, would not be a sufficiently savoury science to be able to be called wisdom simply. Conversely, however, if a metaphysics were feigned which treated of God and not of being, it would indeed have something more of the notion of wisdom, both on account of the nobility of its object, which in reality is no less abstract than being, although not in predication or universality; and on account of the delight which such contemplation has most of all joined to it; and finally on account of its virtual containment and causality, from which it comes about that such knowledge of God easily brings forth the knowledge of other things. Nevertheless, an exact and demonstrative knowledge of God of this kind cannot be obtained through natural theology without the common notions of being, substance, cause and the like first being known, because we do not know God except from his effects, and under common notions, with negations added by which we exclude imperfections. And therefore it cannot happen that metaphysics be wisdom under the latter notion unless it also includes the first. But if a metaphysics were feigned which, from the first and second modes of knowing, had whatever is necessary for knowing God, and primarily attained and contemplated him, it could indeed be called wisdom absolutely, even if it knew little or nothing about other things in particular; it would, however, be a very imperfect and mutilated wisdom, which would necessarily be ignorant of many things even about God, or attain them imperfectly; because, since God is known from his effects, the chief effects being unknown, the knowledge of God himself too would necessarily be diminished. And for this reason Aristotle rightly called not a part of metaphysics, but the whole of it, wisdom simply, which he said is only one, Ethics VI, c. 7; and St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2.

16. Aristotle proves that the second condition of wisdom is found in metaphysics because it treats of the most universal things, and those most remote from sense; but these are most difficult for us to know; for since our knowledge arises from sense, what is farthest removed from sense falls with difficulty into our understanding. Taking occasion from this, however, the interpreters are wont to dispute whether our intellect in this state knows singulars directly, or universals only; and whether among universals themselves it more easily knows those which are less common, such as the lowest species, and whether therefore what Aristotle says in this place is true, that the most universal things are the most difficult to know. Nevertheless, the former of these questions is altogether foreign to the present purpose; for what does it matter for declaring the dignity of the science of metaphysics, or for understanding the aforesaid text of Aristotle, whether the singular is known directly by the intellect or not? This question, therefore, is altogether to be referred by us to its proper place, that is, to the science of the soul. For we hope that, God helping, we shall at some time hand down the disputations of that science too, worked out according to our powers. And if we cannot achieve this, what has been handed down hitherto on the aforesaid question by the weightiest authors will suffice; for I have determined to discourse about nothing outside its proper place, or altogether outside method, even if such a disputation must be omitted altogether; for I judge it a lesser inconvenience to be silent about something than, by importunely summoning foreign questions from elsewhere, to obscure and confound a lucid and distinct method.

17. Whether our intellect knows universals or singulars more easily.—And almost the same reason holds for the latter question, which I shall therefore also omit, touching only on what is necessary in order that the sense of Aristotle in the cited place may be understood, lest he seem to contradict himself. For in Physics I, immediately at the beginning, he says that in science one must proceed from more universal things to particular ones, because one must begin from things better known to us, and more universal things are better known to us; but here he says that this science is about the most difficult things, because it is about the most universal ones, which are most difficult for men to know. Which apparent contradiction St. Thomas, In Metaph. I, c. 2, lect. 2, reconciles thus: that we understand Aristotle in Physics I to have spoken only of simple apprehension and imperfect knowledge of universal things, but here of scientific and complex knowledge, by which we distinctly know the proper notions of universals and demonstrate their properties of them. For it is not always the case that things which come to mind more easily through simple apprehension are also more easily penetrated intimately and known; for what do we apprehend more easily than time, motion and the like? But what is inquired into with more difficulty as regards exact knowledge, both of the formal notion or entity, and of the properties of such things? Thus, therefore, more universal things are said to be better known to us as regards simple and imperfect apprehension, as regards whether it is (so to speak); for who would not more easily conceive that this is a tree than whether it is a pear tree or a fig tree? For these more universal, confused and imperfect concepts we need fewer things, and therefore we form them more easily. But when we inquire into their exact knowledge, we attain it with more difficulty, because they are more remote from the senses, as Aristotle said here.

18. I see only this standing in the way of this exposition: that Aristotle in Physics I does not seem to speak only of that rude and imperfect apprehension of universals, but of scientific knowledge; for from that facility of knowing more universal things he gathers the order to be observed in science; but science ought not to proceed from things better known as regards apprehension, but as regards that knowledge which can be had through science; for if scientific knowledge is more difficult, it will contribute almost nothing that simple apprehension is easier, for one to begin from things of this kind according to a fitting method. Add that it is evident from experience itself that even in scientific knowledge common notions are known more easily than proper ones, as mobile or natural being more easily than the heaven or man, and the notion of being more easily than the notion of substance or accident. And reason too urges this, for in science there is intended per se and directly the distinct knowledge both of the essence and of the properties of each thing or formal notion; and universals themselves are not treated or known, speaking per se, as they are total or potential universals, under which notion their distinct knowledge depends on the knowledge of inferior things; for this is as it were reflexive and dialectical knowledge, because that property or notion of a potential whole belongs to them through the intellect rather than in reality itself; for universals of this kind are known in the proper and real sciences according to their proper actual essences, and the properties consonant with and adequate to them; but in this way more universal things are known more easily, because the knowledge of less universal things depends altogether on them, and not conversely, because more universal things are of the notion of the inferior, and not conversely. And this objection seems to conclude not only that Aristotle in Physics I spoke of the scientific knowledge of more universal things, but also that it is false that these more universal things are more difficult to know.

19. Wherefore some would have it that Aristotle in this place spoke not of universal notions, but of universal causes, that is, not of the universals which they call universals in predicating, of which he had spoken in Physics I, and of which the discourse given proceeds, but of universals in causing, such as God and the intelligences. Of which the reason of Aristotle also seems rightly to be understood, namely, because universals are most remote from the senses; for this is true of universals in causing, but not at all of the others; for since these are also in material singulars, they do not seem remote from sense; for this being, or this substance, is presented to sense, just as this animal or this man; whence more universal predicates are more easily presented to the senses by reason of their proper singulars than less universal ones; and therefore animal falls more easily into our intellect, at least on our part, than man, and substance than animal, and so of the others; because, speaking regularly, and according to the ordinary mode in which sensible objects are applied to us, the singulars of these more easily impress species or phantasms on the senses.

20. Nevertheless, this exposition is commonly rejected by the interpreters of Aristotle; for although they admit that the saying of the Philosopher is true also of universal causes, they teach, however, that he spoke properly of the more universal predicates, both because these are properly and simply called universals, and also because in truth even on that side on which metaphysics treats of being and substance as such it is more difficult than the other sciences. And the reason of Aristotle applies also to these predicates, namely, that they are farther removed from the senses according to their abstraction and prescinded notion; for these common notions do not have proper singulars, but descend to singulars by means of less universal notions.

21. The mode of reconciling adduced from St. Thomas is explained and approved.—The expositors bring forward other answers, both on this place of the Metaphysics and on that of the Physics, and on Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, and Book II, cc. 15 and 18, where Aristotle also says that universals are better known by nature, singulars to us. Omitting these, I think one must persist in the former answer, if, however, it is explained a little. I think, therefore, it must be said that Aristotle in Physics I spoke of the order of doctrine, in which he says one must begin from more universal things, because they are better known to us as regards the simple and confused knowledge of them, in so far as they are certain potential and universal wholes. Nor does it matter that in the sciences confused knowledge is not intended, but distinct, because Aristotle does not say that more universal things are better known by that knowledge which is intended through science, but rather by that imperfect knowledge which is supposed in order to be perfected through science. But in this place of the Metaphysics Aristotle is not dealing with the order of doctrine to be observed by us, but with obtaining the perfect science of the objects themselves, and in this way he says that more universal things are more difficult to know. Which, however, he did not assert simply, but with this limitation, for the most part; because it sometimes happens that more universal things are better known to us even as regards perfect knowledge, because the difficulty which is in them on the side of abstraction can be compensated from elsewhere; in which way natural being as such is better known to us than the heaven, and being than the angel. Notwithstanding that limitation, however, Aristotle concludes that this science is about the most difficult things, because in it there is so great an abstraction that it altogether prescinds from matter, and from sensible actions and properties as they are such, and therefore there can be nothing in its object whereby the difficulty arising from so great an abstraction might be removed; and let these things suffice about that second condition.

22. Doubt.—Concerning the third condition of wisdom, it can rightly be doubted how it belongs to this doctrine, namely, to be the most certain. And the chief reason for the difficulty arises from the mathematical sciences, which seem much more certain, since they proceed from most evident principles, indeed from principles best known to sense. Whence the same Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 3, text 16, indicates that the mode of proceeding of mathematics is the most accurate and most certain, because it abstracts from matter and change, from which philosophy does not abstract; and although metaphysics seems to abstract, if the things of which it treats are considered, nevertheless, as it is in us, it does not seem to abstract, because it considers those things only from sensible effects, which are concerned with matter. Whence the same Aristotle, Book II, text 1, says that things most known by their nature are unknown to us, because our intellect is related to them as the sight of the bat to the light of the sun. And it is confirmed, for human knowledge begins from sense, whence it receives clarity and certitude through sense; the more remote from sense, therefore, knowledge is of things, the less certain it will be; just as, therefore, from this principle Aristotle gathered above that this science is the most difficult, so he could have gathered that it is the most uncertain. Indeed, these two seem always to be conjoined, namely difficulty and uncertainty, or lesser certitude; if, therefore, this science is most difficult, it will consequently be less certain.

23. Answer.—Two parts of this doctrine seem to need distinguishing: one is that which discourses about being as it is being, and its principles and properties. The other is that which treats of some peculiar notions of beings, especially of immaterial ones. As regards the former part, there is no doubt that this doctrine is the most certain of all, which is enough for this property to be attributed to it absolutely and simply; for whenever a comparison is made between habits, it ought to be made according to what is best and greatest in them, as is taken from Topics III, c. 2; thus, therefore, Aristotle in the said prooemium says absolutely that this doctrine is the most certain, and he seems to speak of it as it is in us. And his reason is excellent, and proceeds of this science as regards this part, namely, because that science is most certain which is concerned most of all with the first principles, and which makes up its matter from fewer things; but this science is so related, because such a science is more independent, and has better-known principles, from which other principles receive strength and certitude, as has been declared; for thus the things with which the mathematical sciences deal include the common and transcendent predicates about which metaphysics discourses; the mathematical principles also include metaphysical ones, and depend on them.

24. But concerning the other part of this science, which is concerned with determinate notions of being, a distinction must be made; for a science can be more certain either according to itself or as regards us. The science of these things of itself, then, is undoubtedly most certain, and surpasses the mathematical sciences. For the certitude of a science in this way is to be weighed from its object; but things of this kind and immaterial substances are of themselves apt to generate the most certain knowledge of themselves, because, just as they are more perfect beings and more necessary, simple and abstract, so there is in them greater truth and greater certitude of principles. But on the side of our intellect this science in us is, as regards this part, less certain, as experience teaches, and as the reasons for doubt posited at the beginning prove. Especially that one, that, since our knowledge arises from sense, we attain more obscurely, and from the nature of the case less certainly, those things which abstract from all sensible matter.

25. Some doubts are proposed and dissolved.—First.—You will say, first: therefore this science, as it is in us, is always less certain in this part than mathematics; therefore it is simply less certain, because the metaphysics of which we are treating is none other than human; but this is only in us; what does it matter, then, to the nobility of metaphysics that according to itself it is more certain? For that will be true of angelic metaphysics, not of ours. Whence, in treating of ours, a repugnance seems to be involved in that distinction, according to itself and as it is in us; for this distinction, accommodated to objects or things known, fits excellently, and so Aristotle often used it in Posterior Analytics I, and at the beginning of the Physics and the Metaphysics; but accommodated to our acts or habits it seems in no way able to have a place, for the reason given; here, however, we are speaking not of objects, but of the thing itself. Some answer that it is enough that metaphysics in the angels is more certain, because it is of the same notion as ours, because it discourses about these beings under the same notion or abstraction. But this is not rightly said, because that angelic science is of a higher notion: first, because it is either a priori and perfect, namely as it is concerned with created things, or, if it is a posteriori, as about God, it is through a perfect knowledge of more noble effects. Next, because sciences differ in genus from their mode of proceeding; but the mode of understanding of the angels is higher, simpler and essentially more perfect.

26. A comparison between metaphysics and the mathematical sciences in certitude.—The answer, therefore, is, first, that perhaps in some state human metaphysics can be more perfect and more certain than the mathematical sciences are; for although, acquiring this science by natural powers alone and in the ordinary human way, it cannot be obtained so perfectly, yet if our intellect were helped by some superior cause in the natural discourse itself, or if the science itself were produced in a supernatural way, although the thing itself is natural, it could perhaps be so clear and evident as to surpass the mathematical sciences. But since this answer is more theological than philosophical, I add further that, although metaphysics in us is always, as regards this part, inferior to mathematics in certitude, it is nevertheless simply and essentially more noble; to which it contributes much that according to itself, and on the side of its object, it is more certain; for the dignity of the object pertains most of all to the dignity of the science, and it is that which per se redounds to the science; but the imperfections which are mixed in on our side are rather per accidens; and to this the distinction given tends, in which sense it involves no repugnance.

27. Second doubt.—Someone will doubt, secondly: for hence it follows that this science of metaphysics, in so far as it deals with God, is less certain as regards us than as it treats of the intelligences, which, however, does not seem true. The consequence is deduced thus from the reason given: for if this science is less certain as regards us as it is concerned with things abstracted from matter, because our knowledge begins from material things, then the more a thing of which metaphysics treats is removed and remote from this matter, the less certain will metaphysics be as it is concerned with it; but God is supremely distant from material and sensible things; therefore. The answer is by denying the consequence, absolutely speaking. For one thing can be understood to be more distant from another in two ways, namely, in perfection or entity, and in causality or the connection of effect and cause. In the former way God is more distant from material things than the created spirits; but in the latter way the created spirits are more distant from all created things than God. For all things depend essentially on God, not on the other spirits, and, speaking per se, all things imitate God, and bear some likeness or vestige of him; but that some likeness or agreement with the angels should result from this is secondary and accidental. Since, therefore, we ascend to contemplating the separated substances from sensible things, not considered in any way whatever, but as effects, hence it comes about that we naturally attain the knowledge of God more certainly than that of the angels; which will be more evident from the very use and experience of what is to be said.

28. Third doubt.—Thirdly, it can be doubted, especially concerning the former part posited, whether this science surpasses the others only as regards the certitude of its principles, or also of its conclusions. For the reason given seems to proceed only about principles; but if this is said, it follows that not this science, but the habit of principles, which is distinct, is more certain than the other sciences. Hence it can also be doubted in passing whether this science is more certain than the habit of principles. For if this is said, the difficulty posited is easily dispatched, as is self-evident; but this very thing seems most difficult; for this science rests on the first principles themselves; how, then, can it be more certain than their habit, since here too that axiom is true: That on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so?

29. Beginning from this latter part, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2,⁴ indicates that wisdom is more noble and more certain even than the habit of principles itself; for thus he says: Science depends on understanding as on something more principal, and both depend on wisdom as on the most principal, which contains under itself both understanding and science; St. Thomas, therefore, thinks that wisdom is more principal and more perfect than understanding, or the habit of principles. And he indicates the reason: because wisdom has whatever there is of perfection in the habit of principles, and that very thing in a more noble way, and moreover something more; it is, therefore, more perfect. The antecedent is declared, because understanding is concerned with the first principles by bearing judgement on them; but wisdom has this very thing, as was shown above, and beyond this is concerned with many other things which are inferred from the principles, and with the most noble things and the first causes of things, as was shown above. Again, wisdom is concerned with the first principles themselves in a more noble way, because understanding is concerned with them only in a simple way, bearing judgement from the natural and immediate efficacy of the natural light of the intellect; but wisdom, making a reflection upon that very light, and contemplating its origin, from which it has its whole certitude, takes it as a middle term for demonstrating the truth and certitude of the principles; but this mode of judging seems higher and more comprehensive; wisdom, therefore, has more perfection than understanding, and whatever nobility there is in understanding it has in a more perfect way. Hence the difficulty indicated to the contrary also seems to be satisfied; for although wisdom, in its beginning and as it were in the way of generation, depends on understanding, because it must suppose some principles, nevertheless according to itself, if it is perfect, it does not depend on it essentially, but is per se sufficient for assenting to the principles through proper middle terms and reflection upon the intellectual light itself; and perhaps it can come to such perfection that it now gives assent to its principles without any formal discourse. And Albert holds the same opinion, in the book De Apprehensione, part 5; and it has a great foundation in Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, text 23, where he indicates that metaphysics is the prince of all because it demonstrates its own principles; and Ethics VI, c. 7, where he speaks thus: The wise man must not only know the things which are known from the principles, but must also speak truly about the principles. Wherefore wisdom is both understanding and science, and (being as it were the head) the science of those things which are held in the highest honour. He could not, however, have understood that wisdom is an aggregate of understanding and some science, since he distinguished these one by one as diverse virtues; he understands, therefore, that it is understanding and science according to a certain eminent perfection, as the expositors there also understand; and Buridan disputes it, q. 12, who indicates this opinion in the last question of the same Book VI of the Ethics.

30. Whether metaphysics is more certain than the habit of principles.—Nevertheless some probably think that this opinion is to be limited, so that wisdom is preferred to the understanding of principles as it is concerned with the principles of the other sciences, but not as it is concerned with the principles of metaphysics itself. Which limitation seems to be taken from the words which St. Thomas subjoins above, saying that wisdom is the most principal and contains under itself understanding and science: As judging (he says) of the conclusions of the sciences, and of the principles of the same; where the relative of the same is to be noted; for it refers to the other sciences distinct from wisdom; therefore wisdom is compared to understanding only as it is concerned with the principles of the other sciences, and because it judges of them, and therefore it is said to be more noble. But it seems to happen otherwise in the same wisdom compared to understanding as it is concerned with the principles of wisdom itself; for from it, as from its proximate source, it has its whole certitude. Likewise, that habit is concerned with the same things in a more noble way, because that habit does not stop at the most abstract first principles pertaining to being as such, and to other abstract terms, such as that: Anything whatever either is or is not, and the like, but is also concerned with the first principles of substance as such, and of God, and of the intelligences as such; whence it properly pertains to it to contemplate their quiddities; for the quiddity of a thing is understood by simple knowledge, or an immediate principle is constituted from it, if it is known by us through composition; but it will pertain to wisdom to demonstrate the properties of these things from their quiddity. And indeed it does not seem able to be denied that the knowledge of those principles on which this science rests is simply more certain than the science itself, since it depends on it as on its proper cause, of another and superior notion in the mode of assenting. Nor does it matter that metaphysics reflects upon its principles in order to demonstrate them; for it is always necessary that, according to its proper notion, it proceed through discourse and rest on prior principles, which it takes as better known and more certain; for it is not to be said that the same acquired habit assents through discourse and without discourse. Therefore, absolutely and universally comparing the principles of metaphysics to the science itself, their knowledge is more certain. And experience confirms this very thing; for nothing is demonstrated in metaphysics which under that notion is as certain as this principle, Anything whatever either is or is not, in so far as it is self-evident.

31. How wisdom is more excellent than all the other intellectual habits.—When, therefore, wisdom is preferred to all the other intellectual virtues, even to the understanding of principles, it can be understood, first, of wisdom as it includes its principles, and is compared to the other sciences as they too include their principles and conclusions; for that the sciences are wont to be considered thus is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2, text 5, where Fonseca notices it. But metaphysics is said to surpass the other sciences as regards the certitude both of its conclusions and of its principles, not only by comparing principles to principles and conclusions to conclusions; for thus it would not be a proper comparison of science to understanding, but of science to science and understanding to understanding; in which sense even a particular science can be said to be more certain than the understanding of principles, because it can have more certain principles. It must be understood, therefore, that even comparing the conclusions of metaphysics to the proper principles of the other sciences, metaphysics is said to surpass them in certitude, because its discourse rests on principles so known and certain that it can generate a more certain assent than is the simple assent to some principles in other matters; and on account of the other reasons given above.

32. A less evident habit can be more noble than a more evident one, and a less certain than a more certain.—Or, secondly, and perhaps more clearly, it can be said that wisdom is preferred to the understanding of principles in nobility and excellence simply, but not always in certitude or evidence, especially with respect to us, or as it is in us; for the nobility of a habit, or its dignity, or that of a science, is not always convertible with certitude or evidence; for Christian faith is simply, in its substance or species, more noble than natural metaphysics, although it is not so clear and evident; and natural philosophy is more noble than mathematics, although it is less certain, on account of the nobility of its object, which contributes more to the dignity of an intellectual virtue simply, as St. Thomas indicated, De Anima I, c. 1, and I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1, where he adduces that saying of Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I, c. 5: Although we can touch but lightly on higher things, yet on account of the excellence of that kind of knowing we are more delighted than when we hold all these things which are joined to us. And he has almost a similar opinion in De Caelo I, c. 12. Wisdom, therefore, or metaphysics, although it is not more certain in us than understanding, at least as regards its principles, is nevertheless simply more noble and higher, because it attains more noble beings and the supreme causes of beings, namely God and the intelligences, which the understanding of principles does not attain according to their proper notions, but only according to the common notion of being and substance; for although many principles about God and the intelligences are self-evident according to themselves, nevertheless with respect to us nothing is self-evident; for if it is not self-evident to us that God exists, as we shall show below, much less the rest, which are demonstrated about these things in metaphysics. And so it comes about that about these things we know nothing immediately through the understanding of principles, but only through wisdom; and therefore wisdom is more noble, even granted that it is not more certain than its principles, as it exists in us; because for greater nobility it is enough that it be about simpler things, and things more certain according to themselves, with that certitude and evidence which can be had through the natural light of human talent. Hence the natural happiness of man (which confirms this most of all) consists not in some act of the understanding of principles, but in the act and contemplation of wisdom, as Aristotle says, Ethics VI, c. 12, that just as health is a certain happiness of the body, so wisdom is the happiness of the soul; and therefore in the same place he prefers it to prudence; for prudence is referred to wisdom as to its end; for prudence (as he says excellently) is the procuress of wisdom; for it so rules the mind as to render it peaceful and free from perturbation, which is most of all necessary for the contemplation of wisdom; and he teaches the same in Ethics X, cc. 7 and 8.

33. And from these things the resolution of the third doubt is also evident as regards its former part; for it must be said that this doctrine is more certain than the other sciences, not only as regards its principles, but also as regards its conclusions. Which indeed, if it is understood proportionately, is undoubted, as I said, namely, that the principles of this science are more certain than the principles of the other sciences, and the conclusions of this one than the conclusions of the others; for this latter follows from the former; for those conclusions are more certain which follow from more certain principles by the same kind of inference. But that the principles are more certain is evident, because they are more abstract and more universal, and the first of all, as we shall see below; whence they can serve for demonstrating in some way the principles of the other sciences, as has been declared. But if that comparison is understood absolutely, and without the said proportion, that is, that this science according to its whole self, even according to its conclusions, surpasses the other sciences in certitude according to all that is in them, even as regards their principles, then the comparison is less certain, and not necessary for the nobility and perfection of wisdom. Nevertheless it is probable, if we speak of the proper and particular principles of the other sciences as they are known by us; for you will scarcely find one which becomes known to us from the mere knowledge of its terms with as much certitude as can be manifested from the principles of metaphysics.

How metaphysics is more apt for teaching

34. The fourth condition of wisdom, which is to be more apt for teaching, Aristotle demonstrates thus: because that science is more apt for teaching which is concerned more with the knowledge of causes; for those teach who bring forward the cause of each thing. Tacitly, however, he subsumes that this doctrine is concerned most of all with the knowledge of causes; and so he concludes that it is most apt for teaching, and therefore is wisdom. Aristotle declared this same condition through almost the whole of c. 1 of this prooemium, or first book. For in order to conclude that it pertains to wisdom to investigate the supreme causes of things, he begins from a principle taken from afar, and says that men naturally desire science; for it is chiefly for this reason that they love the senses; and that in the other animals there is only the knowledge of the senses, and some of them have also memory, and a certain innate prudence, or rather natural instinct and sagacity, and some also participate a certain mode of discipline, yet never attain perfect experience; but that man knows singulars through the senses, which he not only holds in memory but also compares among themselves, and so little by little acquires experience, which is concerned only with singulars. Through experience, however, he proceeds further, and inquires into art, by which he now knows universals and inquires into their notions and causes; and therefore he who has attained art is judged wiser than one who is only experienced, because he knows not only that the thing is, as the experienced man does, but also the reason why, and the cause of the thing. And therefore (he says) in any art whatever we judge the master-builders more noble and wiser, who are not only active (which in its own way is common to inanimate things), but also know the causes and reasons of things. And immediately he subjoins the property with which we are concerned, saying: And in general the sign of the wise man is to be able to teach; which he can accomplish who knows the causes of things, but not he who has experienced effects alone.

35. Doubt.—Concerning this condition, however, it can first of all be doubted why this science is judged more apt for teaching than the rest; for every proper and a priori science (for the comparison must be made among these) demonstrates the thing through its causes; therefore each science is as apt for teaching in its own matter as this one in its. Nor does it matter for this that this science treats of more noble things; for this will indeed contribute to its being more noble, but not to its being more apt for teaching; for to this the proportion of the effect to the cause contributes more than the nobility of each; for a lower effect is taught as fittingly through its own proper cause as a higher one through its own; this condition, therefore, either is not special in metaphysics, or is not distinct from the nobility of the object. And if this property can be attributed to any science, it should certainly rather be attributed to dialectic; for it teaches how to learn, and teaches how to teach; therefore it is more apt for teaching than any other. And so Plato accommodates this function to dialectic in the dialogue on Being, or the Sophist, and therefore in the same place, and in Book VII of the Republic, he prefers it to all the sciences.

36. Solution of the doubt.—To the former difficulty the answer is that, although the other sciences demonstrate their properties or effects through proper causes accommodated to them, nevertheless, because those causes are not first, nor independent, but subordinated to higher ones, the other disciplines are therefore not so apt for teaching as metaphysics, which considers the first causes and principles of things. And so metaphysics excels not only in the nobility of its object, but also in the independence and superiority of its causes and principles. From which it comes about that this science by itself alone, and without the aid of another, teaches fully and exactly all the things which fall under its object, while the other sciences in many things depend on this one in order to be able to hand down the exact knowledge of causes; and therefore this science is said to be more apt for teaching.

37. To the confirmation the answer is that there are two things which help toward teaching, namely, the method and mode of teaching, and the comprehension of things and causes. As regards the former, the function of teaching pertains to dialectic, and in that sense it can be said to be most apt for teaching, or rather for learning, since it hands down the form and method of teaching. But as regards the latter, metaphysics is most apt for teaching, since it teaches higher and more efficacious middle terms of demonstrating, and most of all a priori ones. Since, therefore, this is the chief and most difficult thing in science, and since dialectic itself, in so far as it is a science and demonstrates through causes, depends in this in some way on metaphysics, this is therefore simply the most apt for teaching. Nor did Plato think otherwise, who often understands metaphysics under the name of dialectic.

38. How metaphysics demonstrates a priori.—Secondly, concerning the same condition, or its proof, it can be doubted how this science can demonstrate through causes, since it has a most simple object, which cannot have proper causes. For being in so far as it is being, neither according to itself nor according to the most noble object contained under that common one, can have proper causes; therefore metaphysics cannot demonstrate through causes, at least in its supreme part, nor in that which considers the most universal notions of being. The antecedent is evident, because God has no causes, and consequently neither has being as being, which comprehends God. The answer is that causes are twofold: some proper, which in reality influence the effect; and others more broadly so called, which are rather causes of knowing the thing a priori than of its existing, and are properly called the reasons of the attributes or properties which are demonstrated of the subject. Speaking, therefore, of the subject of this science according to its most abstract notion—most abstract (I say) either according to our reason, as being in so far as it is being, or according to the thing itself, as the first being, or being itself by essence—in this way it is true that this science does not have proper causes of the thing, through which it demonstrates something of its object; it has, however, reasons and middle terms distinct from the extremes according to our mode of conceiving, by which it composes a priori demonstrations; for for demonstrations of this kind, since they are composed in a human way, the distinction of concepts with some foundation in the thing suffices, and that a property known through one concept be the reason of another attribute demonstrated; and in this way we demonstrate that God is a perfect being because he is a being necessary from within, and we demonstrate one property of being, or of substance, in the same way through another. And Aristotle comprehends this mode of demonstration when he says that this science teaches the causes of things, that is, the principles and roots and reasons of things, whether they are proper physical causes or metaphysical reasons, which are also wont to be called formal causes in a broad sense. And in this way St. Thomas explains, In Metaph. VI, text 1, what Aristotle says there, namely, that the principles and causes of beings in so far as they are beings are inquired into in this science. But as regards the other parts, or beings, which metaphysics comprehends under its object, such as created beings, the intelligences, etc., in this way it has proper real causes, or causes truly influencing in the thing itself, through which it can compose demonstrations, as is self-evident.

Through how many genera of causes metaphysics demonstrates

39. It demonstrates through the final cause.—Through the efficient.—A third question, however, immediately occurs: whether this science, as it is concerned with these beings, demonstrates through all the genera of causes, or only through some. And first of all it is certain that it demonstrates very often and most of all through the final cause, as is evident from its very use, and because this is the first and most noble of the causes, and the one which is wont to contribute most toward investigating the natures and properties of things, indeed the other causes of a thing. Again, it is also certain that this science demonstrates through the efficient cause, for it considers the first being, which is the chief efficient cause of all the others, on which all the others depend essentially. And under that cause it also considers the intelligences, which have some causality over these lower things, and finally the other causes of things, in so far as they can be comprehended under its object.

40. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: the causality of the efficient cause is concerned with the existence of things; but science abstracts from existence; therefore it cannot demonstrate anything through the efficient cause. The answer is, first, that although actual dependence on the efficient cause, as it is in exercised act (so to speak), does not fall per se under science, because it is not simply necessary, but contingent and free, the intrinsic relationship to the efficient cause, especially the first, is necessary, and is considered in science, and many properties of things are gathered from it. For from the fact that a creature has essential dependence on an efficient cause, it is gathered that it is not a being by essence but by participation, and that being is not of its essence, and that it is a finite being, and the like. Next it is said that, granted that science does not consider the existence of a thing in exercised act, it nevertheless considers it in signified act, that is, what existence itself is, and how it belongs, or can belong, to each thing; and to this the consideration of the efficient cause contributes most of all. Hence it also comes about that concerning those things which are in some way necessary beings, science contemplates actual and exercised existence itself; which is most of all true concerning God, who is simply a necessary and actually existing being, whose necessity of existing is considered not through an efficient cause, but through the negation of an efficient cause. Concerning other things, too, it is inquired in science whether they are eternal, and how they emanate from their efficient cause. Many things, therefore, are demonstrated in metaphysics through this cause.

41. Through the exemplar.—And hence it is also evident that this science can use the exemplar cause in its demonstrations, if, however, it can attain the truth and property of the exemplar itself in itself; which, however, is rare, and in the divine exemplars, which they call ideas, naturally impossible, because those divine exemplars cannot be beheld in themselves unless God is seen in himself. In whatever way, however, the exemplar cause is known, it is an excellent middle term for demonstrating, and most proper to metaphysics, for of itself it abstracts from matter, and is found more properly in spiritual and intellectual things, and is in a certain way the notion or form through which the agent operates; and so the reason concerning it is the same as that concerning the efficient cause.

42. How through the material.—Concerning the material cause, finally, Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, q. 15, absolutely denies that metaphysics demonstrates anything through this cause. His reason is that metaphysics abstracts from matter on the side of its object; therefore the principles of metaphysics also abstract from matter; therefore so do its demonstrations. But this opinion needs limitation, for the material cause as such, and taken in its whole breadth, extends more widely than sensible matter, or intelligible or quantitative matter, from which the object of metaphysics abstracts. The assumption is declared, for in spiritual things there is truly material causation (so to speak); for created spiritual substance is truly the material cause of its accidents, and many think that essence is the material cause of existence, and nature of personality, and the term of the action which tends to it. Although, therefore, we grant that metaphysics does not use matter most properly so called in its demonstrations, it cannot, however, be denied that it often uses the material cause, either for affirming or for denying something. In the former way it demonstrates, for example, that the accidents of an angel are immaterial, indivisible, and whole in the whole and whole in any part, because they are in a spiritual subject, etc. In the latter way, however, it demonstrates that those accidents are not created, because they depend on their subject in coming to be and in being conserved; and similarly from the proper definition of the material cause it demonstrates that essence cannot be compared to existence as a subject. Finally, the causality of passive potency as such is material; but it pertains to the metaphysician to consider passive potency and to demonstrate through it; therefore also through the material cause. I add further, from what was said above about the object of this doctrine, that, although it does not treat per se and by primary design of physical matter, it nevertheless treats of it in some way, namely, in so far as is necessary for completing the treatment and consideration of its object, and for distinguishing act from potency, and complete form from incomplete, and both from matter, and finally for placing matter in that grade of being in which it is truly to be placed; and in this treatment it can gather and demonstrate many things from the common notion of the material cause, as seems self-evident, and will be evident from use itself. Demonstration through the material cause, therefore, is not altogether foreign to this science, although the others occur more frequently and seem to be more proper to this doctrine.

43. Concerning the fifth property nothing occurs to be added to what was said in the former conclusion and in the preceding section. For it has been shown that this science is most of all speculative, and is concerned with things most of all to be desired and known for their own sake; whence it is most evident that this science is to be desired and sought for its own sake. Likewise it has been said that natural happiness is placed in some act of this science; but happiness is most of all desired for its own sake.

Metaphysics is easily the prince of the other sciences

44. And from this condition it is easily understood that the sixth condition of wisdom also belongs most perfectly to metaphysics; whence Aristotle demonstrates it in this way. That science is most of all the prince, and is set over the one which ministers, which considers the first causes of things, especially the final and last one, for whose sake things come to be; but this is the function of metaphysics; it is it, therefore, which will have dominion over the other disciplines; therefore by this title too it is wisdom. But some say that not this, but moral science, especially political science, has this principality, and as it were command over the other sciences, as Fonseca learnedly noted on this place of Aristotle. For to command and have dominion among the intellectual virtues is to be attributed to the practical rather than to the speculative ones; for to command is a practical act; and moral philosophy is practical, and in it the chief part is politics, which commands all things in order to the common good of the commonwealth; therefore. And it is confirmed, for according to the due order of reason, good morals are not to be referred to science, but science to good morals; that science, therefore, which procures good morals ought to command that which rests in the mere speculation of things. But these reasons, if they prove anything, proceed rather of prudence than of moral philosophy, for to command pertains to prudence, not to philosophy; but to intend good morals belongs properly neither to philosophy nor to prudence, but to the will and its virtues. Next, those reasons indeed prove that prudence is more perfect in the notion of a moral virtue, and under that notion commands practically; and consequently we can also grant freely that in order to good morals moral philosophy in some way goes before the other speculative sciences; but those reasons do not prove either that prudence is absolutely and simply more perfect than metaphysics, or that in the genus of intellectual virtue moral philosophy has the primacy.

45. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish two things in the sciences, namely, the contemplation or judgement of truth, and the infallible power or rectitude of attaining it; and the good use of such a science and of its acts, in so far as they are free, and can be done or not done well or badly, and for an honest end, and with due circumstances. The former notion is essential to science as such; indeed, universally it belongs per se primarily to every intellectual virtue, although a practical virtue further orders the very knowledge and judgement of truth to work, which does not pertain to the greater perfection of science as such, but is rather an indication of lesser perfection, as Aristotle taught here in the prooemium of the Metaphysics; and perhaps we shall touch on it below in treating of qualities and habits of the mind. The latter notion, namely the use of science—that it be honest, or useful to the commonwealth, or for other ends—is accidental to science as such, although it is most necessary for man. To command the use of science in this latter way, therefore, pertains proximately to certain virtues and to prudence, and the moral sciences contribute more to this same command than metaphysics; and this is properly called practical command, because it regards the work of science more as it is a work of the will than of the intellect; for use is actively in the will, although sometimes the execution is in the intellect. But to direct the sciences under the former notion, namely to the knowledge of the true, pertains per se primarily and most of all to metaphysics, from which they receive in some way their principles, and the knowledge of their terms, and their objects, or the quiddities of their objects, according to what has been declared above. And by reason of this direction and independence metaphysics can be said to command the others, by a command speculative rather than practical; by reason of which it itself is simply eminent in the notion of science and wisdom. I add, finally, that if metaphysics is considered in so far as the natural happiness of man consists in its most perfect act, then not only the other sciences but also the moral virtues and prudence are ordered to it as to their end; for all these are ordered to the happiness of man, and all actions are excellently referred to this end, namely, that they may dispose man and render him apt for divine contemplation, which formally or elicitively pertains to this science, although it must have joined to it the love which is wont to arise from such contemplation. And by this reason too Aristotle concludes that this science commands all, because it contemplates the supreme good and the last end simply; for just as among arts which are subordinated to some end, that one is architectonic and commands the others which considers the supreme end in that order, so metaphysics, which absolutely contemplates the last end of the sciences and of all arts and of the whole of human life, is said to command all, and to be the prince of all, not because it commands properly and practically, but as it were virtually and eminently. For metaphysics does not proceed by showing practically how that end is to be obtained, or how other things are to be directed to it; and therefore it does not command properly and formally; it shows, however, the end to which all things are to be directed, and shows that that end is the last end of all things; and therefore, on the side of the thing known, virtually and eminently, as far as depends on itself, it commands all things, and directs all things to that end and supreme good.

The doubt about the subalternation of the other sciences to metaphysics is dispatched

46. The opinion of some.—Here, however, a doubt occurs concerning this condition: whether this command or direction of metaphysics over the other sciences is such that all the sciences are to be said to be subalternated to metaphysics by reason of it. For there have not been lacking those who have so thought about this command of metaphysics that by reason of it they said that all the sciences are subalternated, but that metaphysics alone is simply, or only, subalternating. Which opinion some attribute to Aristotle, Physics I, c. 2, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 7; and to Plato, Republic VII, where he disputes about metaphysics under the name of dialectic. And St. Thomas indicates it, in the opuscule De natura generis, c. 14. Others, however, simply deny this subalternation; and this is the common and received opinion, as may be seen in Javellus, Metaphysics I, q. 2; Soncinas, Book IV, q. 9; Soto, Physics I, q. 11. Others, finally, use a distinction, and teach that under one notion or use of the word subalternation metaphysics can be called subalternating, at least in some way, but deny it simply. Read Fonseca, Book IV, c. 1, q. 1.

47. What a subalternated science is.—But lest we be involved in the ambiguity of names, let us suppose that that science is properly called subalternated to another which essentially, or necessarily from the nature of the thing, depends on it in the being of science, so that it cannot be a science unless it is joined to the subalternating science and takes from it the evidence of its principles. The reason for this, however, is that a subalternated science does not have self-evident and immediate principles, but conclusions demonstrable in a higher science; and therefore, just as every science depends essentially on the habit of principles, so the subalternated depends on the subalternating properly so called, because each takes the evidence of its principles from a higher virtue. You will say: whence is it evident that a subalternated science cannot have self-evident principles, but that conclusions demonstrable elsewhere are principles to it? The answer is that this can pertain only to the signification of the word; for in reality it is evident that there are some sciences which use principles of this kind, such as medicine, music, etc.; these, therefore, we say are signified by the name of subalternated sciences. For those which have immediate principles are subordinated proximately and per se to the habit of principles; and therefore there is no reason why they should be said to have subordination with respect to another science, since they do not depend on it per se; this dependence, therefore, of one science on another is signified by the name of subalternation.

48. What conditions are required for subalternation.—From which it comes about that true subalternation is only between diverse sciences; for even if within the same science there is a dependence of one conclusion on another down to the principles, the science cannot on that account be said to be subalternated either in whole or in part, since absolutely the whole science is subordinated not to another prior science, but immediately to the habit of principles; at most it can be said that one conclusion is subordinated or subalternated to the demonstration of another. It is necessary, therefore, that the sciences be distinct, and that they have the aforesaid dependence and subordination among themselves. It sometimes happens, however, that some science has the said dependence on a higher science not in all its principles, nor in the demonstrations of all its conclusions, but in some; and then it is said to be subalternated to it, not in whole, but in part, or by a partial, not a total, subordination; in which way geometry is said to be subalternated to natural philosophy, because, although it uses many indemonstrable principles, it nevertheless has some which are demonstrated in philosophy, such as that one: From any point to any point a line can be drawn, which is demonstrated in physics, because no indivisibles are immediate, since continuous quantity cannot be composed of indivisibles.⁵

49. Whence the subalternation of one science to another arises.—This dependence of one science on another, however, is wont to arise from the subordination of the objects; for, just as the being of a science consists in its order to its object, so also its principles are proportioned to it. Wherefore, if the objects of two sciences are not subordinated to each other, as when they are genera or species altogether co-divided, there cannot be subalternation between those sciences. It is necessary, therefore, that this subalternation be founded in the objects, namely, in this, that the object of one is the same as the object of the other with some accidental difference adjoined, which in the being of being is per accidens, but in the being of the knowable is in some way per se, and constitutes a special knowable object. For when two objects of science are subordinated per se even in the being of the thing, namely as genus and species, or as essentially superior and inferior, the sciences of those objects cannot be subalternated, at least totally; because either they pertain to the same science, if they are altogether in the same abstraction, or certainly, if the sciences are diverse, each will be subalternating, because each can have its own principles taken from the proper difference of the object which it considers, or from its first attribute, and through them it will be able to demonstrate the other conclusions which are composed about the posterior attributes. For the science of man does not consider the things which belong to man as he is an animal, but only as he is rational, and in these it is not subalternated to the science of animal, because to be rational belongs immediately to man, and from this principle arise the other attributes of man as man. But if there is some attribute which depends in some way on the sensitive grade as such, or on the special conjunction of the sensible with the rational, the science of man will be partially subalternated to the science of animal as regards that, but not altogether and totally.

50. For absolute and total subalternation, therefore, it is necessary that the subject of the subalternated science add an accidental difference to the subject of the subalternating science, as visual line adds to line, sonorous number to number, the curable human body to the human body; for from this conjunction it comes about both that the science which specially considers the properties flowing from that conjoined thing as such is diverse from the science which abstracts from that composition and considers the subject according to itself, and also that the principles of such a science are conclusions of the higher science, namely because the properties of such a composite arise from the components themselves and from the properties which they have according to themselves, and which are demonstrated in the higher science. Concerning all of which it is discoursed more fully in Posterior Analytics I, c. 11; here, however, they have only been indicated and as it were tasted, in order that we may explain briefly how metaphysics is disposed toward the other sciences, even as regards this property.

51. None of the properties of a subalternating science belong to metaphysics.—From what has been said, therefore, it is gathered not obscurely that no property of a properly subalternating science belongs to metaphysics with respect to the other sciences. For, first, the other sciences do not depend altogether on metaphysics in the being of science, because they do not depend on it for all the evidence and certitude of their principles. For they have their own immediate principles, indemonstrable ostensively and directly; which is enough for them to be able to have their evidence immediately from the habit of principles, which suffices for generating science. For although metaphysics can in some way demonstrate those principles, that demonstration is nevertheless not simply necessary for the evident judgement of such principles, since they can be known evidently from their terms, and that demonstration is not properly a priori, but by reduction to the impossible, or at most through some extrinsic cause. Metaphysics, therefore, is not simply necessary for the evidence of these principles; therefore neither in order that the habit generated from them be true science; therefore such a habit is not a science subalternated to metaphysics. Again, the objects of the lower sciences are not subordinated to being or to substance per accidens, but per se and essentially, as is evident in natural being, which is the object of philosophy, and in quantity, which is the object of mathematics. And the reason is that nothing is contained under being per accidens, but per se; and if there is some science which deals with some being of reason, it is in no way subordinated to metaphysics in so far as the latter deals with real being, because being of reason as such is not contained under real being, but is primarily diverse; but in so far as metaphysics deals with being of reason, then any being of reason whatever is contained not per accidens but per se under being of reason as such, which the metaphysician considers; there does not intervene, therefore, a proper and total subalternation. Which use itself also teaches; otherwise metaphysics would have to be acquired before all the sciences, since without it no science could exist; but use has the opposite, for the reasons touched on above, and nevertheless true demonstrations are made from self-evident principles without metaphysics, and especially in the mathematical sciences; there does not intervene, therefore, a true subalternation. But that it sometimes intervenes in one or another conclusion is not repugnant, as can easily be understood from the principles posited.

52. But if anyone, by extending the word, wishes to call subalternation that excellence and as it were command which metaphysics has over the other sciences, in so far as it can in some way establish and confirm their principles, and in so far as it brings great light to all, or in so far as it attains the last end or happiness of man, one should not contend with him, since the dispute is about a name; especially since weighty authors sometimes use that kind of expression, as may be seen in Simplicius, Physics I, text 8; and Themistius, in his Paraphrase of Posterior Analytics I, c. 2; Aristotle, however, never used that manner of speaking, nor did he require that property for the notion of wisdom, but only that it have dominion in a certain way over the other sciences, which is far different, as is evident from what has been said.

53. A question is answered.—Up to this point, then, the second assertion has been sufficiently proved, namely, that metaphysics is true wisdom. Someone will ask, however, how the former and the latter assertion cohere; for Aristotle in the Ethics places science and wisdom as co-distinct species under the genus of intellectual virtue; but we make this doctrine at the same time science and wisdom. This, however, is dispatched with easy effort if we say with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1, that wisdom is co-distinguished from science not because it is not science, but because in the breadth of science it has a special grade and dignity. Whence it comes about that science is taken in two ways: in one way generically, as it signifies a habit acquired through demonstration, as it is defined in Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, where for this reason no mention is made of wisdom in particular, because science is treated only under that general notion under which it embraces wisdom; and in this way the former assertion posited by us proceeds. In another way science is taken more strictly, as it signifies a habit which is concerned only with demonstrable conclusions, and not with the principles themselves, that is, for a habit which is only science and in no way understanding, in that sense, namely, in which Aristotle said that wisdom is understanding and science; and in this sense science is distinguished from wisdom; and so we say that metaphysics is not a science of this kind, but wisdom.

1. The reason for proposing the question.—I propose this question chiefly on account of Aristotle in the prooemium of the Metaphysics, in order that on its occasion we may declare some things which remain to be declared from that prooemium, lest we either pass over them altogether or find it necessary to return to them again. The exposition of this doubt also contributes to commending more fully the dignity of this doctrine, from the fact that it is most of all conformed to the nature of man as he is rational, or rather is his supreme natural perfection.

2. Aristotle, then, in Metaphysics I, cc. 1 and 2, seems directly to intend the affirmative part of this doubt, namely, that the natural appetite of man is most of all drawn to metaphysics. In order to persuade of which he premises that axiom: Every man naturally desires to know.

What the sense of that pronouncement is: Every man naturally desires to know

3. What innate appetite is.—What elicitive appetite is.—Concerning which it is necessary first of all to set out the sense of Aristotle, then the truth of the proposition. Three terms, then, are to be declared in that proposition: the first is to desire or to long for. Concerning which, first, the common distinction of a twofold appetite, innate and elicitive, is to be supposed. The former is called appetite improperly and metaphorically; properly, however, it is nothing other than the natural propensity which each thing has toward some good; which inclination in passive powers is nothing other than the natural capacity and proportion with its perfection, but in active powers is the natural faculty of acting itself. And so in all these appetite adds nothing beyond the nature of the thing itself, or the proximate faculty, by reason of which such an appetite belongs to the thing. Nor in this appetite can first act and second act be distinguished, because to desire in this way is not to do something, but only to have such an innate propensity, such as heaviness has toward the centre, even if it does nothing. Elicitive appetite is properly appetite, because it is borne to the good as good, and can desire it by its proper act. Hence there are two things in this appetite (we speak of creatures): one is the faculty of desiring, the other the desiring itself. The first has now retained the name of appetite, which is divided into sensitive and rational; and this appetite as such is also innate, if we speak of the innate in general, because it has been given with nature itself, and has a natural propensity toward its object and its act. But because it is so innate that it is also elicitive of the actual desiring by which it tends to the good formally and in so far as it is good, and so is most properly appetite, it is therefore co-distinguished from the purely innate and metaphorical appetite; for in this way the former division is to be taken. The second, that is, the act of desiring, which is properly called desiring, or elicited appetite, is nothing other than the act elicited by the eliciting appetite, which loves or desires the good; and this appetite is never innate, at least in us, of whom we are treating at present; sometimes, however, it is natural, as I shall declare more professedly below.

4. In how many ways natural is said.—The second term, then, to be set out was naturally; for natural appetite is said in many ways; for sometimes that is called natural which has been given by nature itself, and has not been effected by the proper, for example, action or effecting of the man himself. And in this way every innate appetite is natural, and the elicitive appetite itself too; not, however, the elicited appetite or act, as is sufficiently evident from the exposition of the terms given. Sometimes, however, that is called natural which comes about necessarily from the intrinsic propensity of nature, even if absolutely and in itself it has not been given by nature, but made by the one desiring; and in this way the appetite which is hunger or thirst is natural to man when food or drink is lacking; by which reason an elicited appetite can be natural, and in the sensitive appetite it is always so of itself; but in the will, although such an appetite is sometimes natural, it is not always so, because the will is free. I omit that natural is sometimes taken as it is distinguished from supernatural, in which sense among natural philosophers, or when proceeding from the light of nature alone, as we are now speaking, every appetite is natural, for the supernatural mode of desiring, which comes about through grace, cannot be investigated by natural reason. Sometimes also natural is taken as it is opposed to violent, as is frequent in philosophy. And in these two ways too an elicited appetite, even if it is free, can nevertheless be natural, as is self-evident. Indeed, sometimes an elicited appetite is called natural by the very fact that it is consonant with nature, and it is opposed to what is preternatural as dissonant with nature, even if it is not violent; in which way the appetite for virtue is natural, but that for vice not at all. Whence it finally comes about that that appetite is much more called natural to which the very propensity of nature brings necessity; and therefore a necessary appetite, even though elicited, can rightly be called natural.

5. A twofold necessity of this appetite, however, is wont to be distinguished, namely, as regards exercise and as regards specification. The former is when the vital appetite elicits or exercises the act of desiring of necessity; which necessity is easily found in the sensitive appetite; in the rational, however, it is not found in this life, but only in the blessed and supernatural life, which does not pertain to our consideration. The latter consists in this, that, although the will does not exercise the act of desiring of necessity, yet, if it exercises it, it necessarily desires and does not shun such an object; and such an act is called necessary as regards species, not as regards exercise; and according to that necessity it is called natural, and departs from an act free on every side, namely as regards exercise and specification, in the way in which the will desires the good in common. From these things, then, the ambiguity of that word remains sufficiently clear.

6. In how many ways science is said.—The third word is science or to know, which is taken indefinitely by Aristotle; and it can be taken generally for any knowledge or understanding of truth whatever, but especially for that which is perfect and has the proper notion of science, as to know is said to be to know a thing through its cause with evidence and certitude. And of science taken in this way too we can speak either indefinitely, or abstractly, or distributively of all the sciences, or singularly of some one; which modes of speaking of science differ not a little among themselves.

7. Man desires all the sciences.—Beginning, then, from this last term, it is certain that Aristotle in that general dogma does not speak of some singular science, as is evident both from his words, and from the proof, which is general, and finally from his intention; for he takes this general principle in order to descend thence to this science in particular. And this reason further concludes that, although Aristotle’s words are indefinite, nevertheless, since they are doctrinal, they are equivalent to universal ones, so that the sense is that all men naturally desire any science whatever: both because this appetite does not arise from the peculiar notion of some science as it is such, but from the notion of science as such; and also because otherwise one would not proceed sufficiently efficaciously in that discourse from indefinite speech to singular. This, then, is the mind of Aristotle; and that that opinion is true in that sense will easily be evident from what is to be said.

8. With innate appetite.—Again, many expositors here, especially Scotus and his followers, think that Aristotle speaks of innate appetite; nor does St. Thomas shrink from that opinion; whence Javellus and Flandria follow it. Nor is there doubt that in that sense the proposition is most true, which St. Thomas confirms by various reasons. The sum of them is that every thing naturally desires its perfection, operation and happiness; but science is compared to man in all these ways; for it is a great perfection of his, and his operation, and his happiness consists in it. In which reason the first two members are common to all the sciences, but the third is proper to this one, as we shall say. Hence I also think that Aristotle did not exclude this sense, but rather supposed it. But that he spoke in that sense alone seems neither necessary nor true. Which can be gathered from the propriety of his words; for from the delight and love of the senses he gathers the appetite for science; but he speaks openly of the love of the senses through an elicited act; for love properly signifies this, and below he similarly says that we prefer the sense of sight to the others, namely in elicited love. And although it could be said that it is true that Aristotle in that reason speaks of the elicited act, and from it gathers natural appetite, certainly that inference would not be good unless he supposed that that elicited love is also in some way natural, because natural appetite cannot be gathered from any elicited appetite whatever; for sometimes by an act of the will we desire things which are repugnant to nature itself, such as, for example, death; therefore, if Aristotle gathers natural appetite from elicited appetite, he supposes that the elicited one too is natural; and if the elicited love of the senses is natural, much more the love of science.

9. With elicited appetite too.—It must be said, therefore, that man loves science with elicited appetite too. The reasons indicated from St. Thomas prove this; for they proceed equally of elicited appetite and of the weight of nature, because man also by this appetite naturally desires his perfection, operation and happiness; but science is the most perfect operation of man, and is either happiness itself, or most necessary for happiness and the advantage of this life. For if it is contemplative science, happiness consists in its most perfect operation, as is said in Ethics X, c. 6; and the other speculative sciences serve that higher one, and in all there is a certain great delight; for to contemplate is best, Metaphysics XII, text 39. The practical sciences, however, are necessary, or very useful, for the advantages of this life too.

The doctrine of Aristotle about the love of sight and of the other senses is explained

10. Moreover, the discourse of Aristotle taken from the love of the senses, and especially of sight, is excellent for confirming the same thing. Aristotle takes two things in that discourse: the first is that in the love of the senses we prefer sight; the second, that the cause of this is that it serves science most of all. From which he infers a third, namely, that the love of science is greater and more natural than that of sight itself and the other senses. Which inference seems self-evident, and founded on that principle: That on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so. The first proposition assumed, however, is first of all to be understood with prescission, in order that the comparison may be made rightly; for touch can be found without sight, but not conversely, because touch is the first of all the senses and the foundation of the others. Whence, touch being destroyed, sight cannot naturally remain, because neither is life preserved without touch, De Anima III, c. 12, and De Sensu et Sensato, c. 1. In so far, therefore, as sight in a certain way includes touch, sight will be more desirable than touch alone; and in the contrary sense, in so far as the loss of touch includes the loss of sight, and not conversely, touch is preferred to sight, because a man will rather choose the conservation of touch than of sight, if at the loss of touch sight must necessarily be lost. But this comparison understood in this way is of no moment, because the individual senses are not compared among themselves, but two to one which is included in them; the comparison, therefore, is to be made precisely in what each contributes per se.

11. Sight and hearing are compared.—Next it is to be observed that Aristotle here indicates a twofold love of the senses. One is on account of usefulness; the other on account of knowledge. The former is most self-evident, and under usefulness can be comprehended every advantage of the body, pertaining either to its conservation, or to pleasure, or to the other operations of human life. The latter love is most proper to man, and in order to this love sight is chiefly compared here with the other senses and preferred to them. Which Aristotle proves by experience, because (he says) even when we are about to do nothing, we prefer sight itself to the others. But he gives the a priori reason, and the one which pertains most to the present matter, in the other proposition. Concerning which it is to be noted, thirdly, that there are two modes of acquiring science, namely, instruction and discovery. For the former mode hearing is most useful, as is self-evident, because words are signs of concepts; but hearing alone perceives words, and although it does not itself perceive their signification, but the mind does, it is enough that it is the proper organ by means of which such a sign reaches the mind. This excess, however, is both per accidens and very small. Per accidens indeed, because the mode of acquiring science through instruction is as it were per accidens; for it both supposes the other, speaking according to the natures of things, and is only for supplying the imperfection or negligence of men in devoting themselves to finding the sciences. But I call the excess very small, because sight too serves very much for instruction; for writings too are signs of concepts, and they are perceived by sight; whence many more things seem to be learned by reading, which is done by sight, than by hearing.¹ There is, however, this difference, that almost the whole usefulness of writing can also be perceived by hearing, but not conversely; for that energy, force and clarity which is in the voice for expressing one’s own concepts cannot be supplied by writing alone or by sight; whence we read that some lacking sight were most learned, partly by hearing only the writings of others, partly also by explanations or teachings proposed to them by the living voice; but that someone altogether deaf turned out most learned, I do not remember having read, and I scarcely think it can happen. These senses, therefore, are not compared here by Aristotle as regards this function, but as regards the mode of acquiring science through discovery. In which there is no doubt that sight and touch surpass both hearing and the other senses, which is so well known that it does not need proof; it only remains to say briefly about the comparison of sight and touch between themselves.

12. Comparison of sight with touch.—It is to be noticed, therefore, fourthly, that it is one thing to speak of the sign (so to speak) of a better faculty and greater aptitude for acquiring science, another of the more apt instrument for finding science; for touch surpasses sight by the former reason, because touch is a universal sense on the side of the subject, for it is diffused through the whole body, and is a sign of the best and most temperate complexion; whence that saying: Those of soft flesh are apt in mind; concerning which more fully in De Anima II, text 24. But sight per se, and as an instrument for science, surpasses touch in many ways. First, in the breadth of its object; for it perceives more differences, as Aristotle said here, and ranges over heavenly and earthly things, and knows the motions, actions and figures of things more perspicaciously than any other sense; but these are as it were the first signs and indications which we use for knowing things. Secondly, it perceives more quickly than the other senses, although it extends itself even to things most distant; and the cause is that it completes its operation in a purer and more immaterial mode, and without material alteration. Thirdly, it impresses what it perceives on the phantasy more vehemently, which is evident by experience; for such things inhere more tenaciously in memory, and occur more easily afterwards. The cause, however, seems to be that its operation, as it is more spiritual, so is performed with greater force and effort of the soul, and with greater cooperation of the phantasy itself. Fourthly, the experience of sight seems more certain than the experience of touch, speaking per se; for although Aristotle, History of Animals I, c. 15, says that touch in man is most exquisite, he there does not compare the senses of man among themselves and with respect to man himself, but with the senses of other animals; and in this way he says that man surpasses the other animals in touch and taste, although in the other senses he is surpassed by many, at least in many conditions of sensing, as by the eagle in the perspicacity and strength of sight; he does not, however, say that the touch of man surpasses his sight in certitude. Rather, in Problems XXXI, q. 18,² he says that touch rivals sight. And so each of these senses has its certitude in order to its proper adequate object; but sometimes it fails with respect to the common sensibles from insufficient application; and perhaps because sight senses from afar and touch does not, it therefore happens more easily that the object of sight is unduly applied and sight is deceived; if, however, other things are equal as regards the application of the object and the disposition of the power, deception does not happen more in sight than in touch. And on the other side sight, on account of its immateriality, perceives its object more acutely, and on this side is more certain; and therefore it is wont more frequently to be used for receiving certitude about sensible things. For these causes, therefore, sight is simply more useful for the sciences, and for this reason it is naturally loved more; it is a sign, therefore, as Aristotle concludes, that science itself too is naturally loved by man.

Of the elicited appetite for science

13. But in what sense it is to be understood that man naturally desires science with elicited appetite remains to be explained. For this cannot be taken in the sense that man of necessity always exercises love or desire of science whenever he thinks of it, nor that he cannot despise it and be unwilling to seek it; for each is against experience; this elicited appetite, therefore, cannot be natural as altogether necessary, either as regards exercise or as regards specification. First, then, it is certain that this appetite is rightly called natural because it is very consonant with the nature of man and with his natural inclination, in so far as he is man. Whence Cicero rightly says, De Finibus II: Nature (he says) has implanted in man the desire of finding the truth. Secondly, it is called natural because it is in some way necessary as regards specification; because, although man can neglect science, or be unwilling to seek it as regards the efficacious appetite of seeking it, this can happen only on account of extrinsic causes or impediments which are adjoined to science by accident, namely on account of the labour and difficulty which the study of science has, or because it impedes the pursuit of other things which man either needs or is attached to, or for other similar causes; whence those of ruder talent seem to desire science less on account of the difficulty, which Aristotle even called impossibility, Politics V,³ last chapter. But of itself science cannot displease, and so, impediments being set aside, it is loved by a certain necessity, at least as regards specification. And this indeed is most of all true of science in common in so far as it is science; yet it is also in its own way true of any science in particular, if in it the knowledge of truth in such a matter is regarded per se; for that perfection is always per se desirable to man. And if it happens that a man does not love one science in order to attend to another, this too is reduced to the extrinsic impediments of which we have spoken; for because man cannot acquire both sciences, and by the study of one would be impeded from the perfect pursuit of the other, he therefore omits the former in order to obtain the latter. And in this way certain men from their individual and proper complexion are more attached to one science than to another; per se, however, and impediments being set aside, or (what is the same) if one did not impede the other, we would naturally desire all the sciences, nor would we despise one by reason of another.

14. Inference.—And hence it is also easily evident what this appetite in man is; for if the discussion is of elicited appetite, it is evident that it is an act of the will, either efficacious, or at least inefficacious and by simple complacency, which is most natural, and remains even in those who do not efficaciously intend or choose to devote themselves to science. But if the discussion is of the natural weight, it can be considered as terminated immediately at science itself, and thus it is nothing other than the intellect itself and its capacity, by which it regards science as its proper perfection. For just as in prime matter the appetite for form is not something other than the matter itself and its natural capacity, and similarly in every other power the appetite for its act is not something added to the power itself, but its natural constitution and aptitude, so the appetite for science stands in the intellect. But if the weight of nature is considered as it is terminated at science by means of an elicited appetite, it is nothing other than the will of man, which in this way is naturally inclined to all the perfections of man; for the will does not desire to have science, but it naturally desires to will science for man or for the intellect; and in this way we say that this weight of the will is terminated at science by means of an elicited act.

That the natural appetite for knowing is greatest toward the speculative sciences

15. From these things, then, that general axiom remains sufficiently explained, that a natural appetite for science is innate in man; under this principle, however, it is to be taken that this appetite is greatest toward the speculative sciences, which are sought only for the sake of knowing the truth. Aristotle seems tacitly to have intended this in the whole discourse of that first chapter of this prooemium. To explain which he distinguishes all these things, and their order among themselves, namely, sense, memory, experience, art, science, which he tacitly distinguishes into that which is sought for the sake of work or usefulness and that which is sought for its own sake, and in the last place he adjoins wisdom.

16. Some sayings of Aristotle in the prooemium are explained.—He says, then, first of all, that sense has been given by nature to all animals; he does not, however, explain what it is, because this does not pertain to the present matter; nor does he say that every sense has been communicated to all animals, but sense indefinitely; and he intends only to suppose that this is the most imperfect grade of knowledge. Secondly, he adds that brute animals sometimes have, besides sense, memory, and a certain natural prudence as it were; and that some extend to this, that they are also teachable, but participate little or nothing of experience. Where notice that by the name of sense Aristotle understands also the sensitive knowledge which comes about only in the presence of the object, whether through the internal senses, or through the interior common sense or phantasy; for whatever is necessary for sensing in the presence of the object he comprehends under the name of sense; but in all something of phantasy or imagination is necessary even for sensing externally; and therefore, just as to sense, so also to use imagination is common to all brutes. Memory, however, adds an interior power of preserving species and using them in the absence of the objects, so that in this way one can remember those things which one perceived by sense, even when one does not have them present according to the external senses. This faculty, then, Aristotle says certain animals have, but not all; he does not, however, declare which are these or those.

17. It is commonly judged, however, that those animals have memory which can properly and perfectly be moved from place to distant place, whether by progressive motion over the earth, or by flying through the air, or by swimming in the water; for memory seems to have been given to animals for this end, that they may be able to be moved to a distant place, either fleeing harmful things or seeking useful things which they have in some way experienced. Nor does it matter that a brute can sometimes be moved to a distant place not from some memory, as is evident in the newly born; because either it is then moved by an object somewhat distant, or it wanders, and roams as it were by chance.

18. Whether flies have memory.—But what Aristotle says here of flies, that they do not have memory even though they are moved to distant places, is quite uncertain; for the sign by which Aristotle is moved to assert this, namely, that flies, when struck and driven from a place, immediately return importunately, is insufficient, since this can rather happen from the memory of the delight which they take there, and from vehement appetite, or because that object is always in some way present through sight or smell, and therefore moves more vehemently. Only of those imperfect animals, then, which possess only the sense of touch, or also of taste, can it certainly be affirmed that they lack memory, because they have no sign or effect of it, nor use for it.

19. What kind of prudence there is in brutes.—But what Aristotle says, that certain brutes with memory have prudence, is to be understood not properly but by transference; for they do not use discourse, nor acquire a habit by which to judge about things to be done; but because by natural instinct they often so operate as is expedient to such a nature here and now, and so provide for the future as if they truly reasoned, they are therefore called prudent by metaphor. You will say: therefore this prudence of brutes is nothing other than the instinct of nature; but all animals have this instinct accommodated to themselves, even those which lack memory; why, then, does Aristotle attribute this peculiarly to certain brutes? To this Javellus, Book I, q. 7, seems to distinguish nothing between natural instinct and the prudence of brutes, and to concede all that the reason given seems to prove, namely, that this prudence is in all brutes; and he ascribes this opinion to St. Thomas. But, although perhaps it is a question about a name, that manner of speaking is nevertheless foreign to the mind of Aristotle, as the reason given shows; and it is beyond the notion of metaphor; for some animals are so stupid that they cannot be called prudent even by metaphor; not only of all those which lack memory, but perhaps also of those which are endowed with memory. Whence Aristotle said not that all, but that certain ones with memory have prudence. Others, taking this metaphor with too much rigour, say that only those animals are called prudent which operate from the memory of the past, either to provide for the future, or as it were to choose some means. So Fonseca holds here, reporting others. But this limitation seems excessive; for so much propriety is not necessary in metaphors. For when Christ said: Be ye prudent as serpents, he said it not on account of operation with memory of the past, but on account of natural sagacity, by which the serpent guards its head, as the Saints explain. And the ant is judged prudent when it gathers grain for the winter, even if it does this without memory, as when it first operates thus. This prudence of brutes, therefore, is the special sagacity of certain ones, which are so ruled by the instinct of nature that they seem to imitate the reason and prudence of man, as Aristotle said in general, History of Animals I, c. 5, and in particular of many, Book IX, c. 6 and following; and in c. 7 he says that this kind of prudence is found more frequently in the smaller kind of animals than in the larger; and there he recounts many things which he says pertain to this prudence, not because they proceed from the memory of past things, but because they proceed from a certain natural ingenuity as it were, by which they imitate the reason of man. And in this way this natural prudence is not found in all; yet the brutes which are endowed with it always have memory too, not because this prudence is always founded in memory, but because these animals are always so perfect as to participate memory. We can also add that these very animals, prudent by their nature, become more prudent through the memory of the things which they have experienced. And in this way it could be said in favour of the second opinion that natural sagacity itself most of all deserves the name of prudence when it has been as it were cultivated and perfected by the memory of things; but these things are enough said about the use of the word.

20. Which animals are teachable.—Whether bees hear.—Aristotle adds that certain animals not only have memory but are also teachable, but others not at all. Of this latter kind he says are those which, although they have memory, lack hearing, because hearing is the sense of instruction; and although sight too helps toward instruction, and we sometimes see certain brutes, such as puppies, taught and instructed even by certain external signs, nevertheless this never happens without some cooperation of hearing, by which they are aroused and called in order to perceive the signs. Aristotle, however, gives an example in bees, about which there is nevertheless a great controversy whether they hear, as Aristotle himself teaches, History of Animals IX, c. 40; and Pliny, Book XI, c. 20, affirms that they hear, which absolutely seems more probable, considering the signs and experiences which these authors report. For they teach that bees are soothed and attracted by certain sounds; likewise that they utter certain sounds among themselves when they wish to take flight, or are aroused from sleep, or are called together to sleep. Whence Albert here uses a certain probable distinction of hearing; for there is hearing of sound as such, or of voice as it is articulated sound; and he says that bees have hearing in the former way, but not in the latter; and that this latter mode is necessary for instruction.

21. Of the former kind of animals, namely the teachable ones, nothing occurs to be noted, except that this instruction too is to be understood metaphorically, like prudence; for those animals are said to be capable of instruction which by a certain use grow accustomed either to approach when they are called by a certain name, or to gather together when they hear such a sound or voice, or to flee when they perceive another sign. Whence some are taught to dance after the human manner, others to speak, and the like. All of which are done by these by natural instinct alone, memory and experience of such a sign or voice being supposed. Aristotle says, however, that all animals which have hearing are teachable. Which is perhaps true; it would, however, be difficult to believe that this is evident by experience in all animals; and without experiment I do not see how it could be affirmed of all both winged and aquatic animals. It can more easily be said that all animals which are teachable have hearing, and perhaps also sight, memory and metaphorical prudence or sagacity.

22. Aristotle concludes, therefore, that brutes live by imaginations and memory, and participate little of experience; indicating three grades, of which the posterior includes the prior, whence the prior are understood with the exclusion of the posterior. For imperfect animals live only by imperfect imagination, which they have together with the sense of touch or also of taste; others, more perfect, have memory alone with imagination; others, however, which are more capable of instruction than these, are said to participate a certain imperfect experience, since by use and custom they grow accustomed, as it were by a certain experiment; but why that experience is called imperfect we shall declare more fully immediately. But he says that men live by art and reason, which he declares in the rest of the chapter in order to arrive at his purpose. And rightly does he join those two, because neither seems to suffice without the other, at least for the perfect governance of man; for reason, which is natural, does not suffice unless it is cultivated by art; but art always needs the use of reason and attentive consideration in order to be applied to the work.

23. Experience is concerned only with the singular.—Experience properly so called is peculiar to man.—Thirdly, then, he says that in men experience is generated from memory: For many recollections of the same thing (he says) complete the force of one experience. In which place the occasion offered itself of declaring at length what experience is, and whether it pertains to sense or to intellect; likewise whether it is a judicative habit or an apprehensive one, and how it is generated, or to what it inclines. But because these things pertain rather to the science of the soul, and are touched upon here by Aristotle only in passing, it is to be noticed briefly that Aristotle here plainly teaches that experience is not concerned with the universal but with the singular; for thus he says: To have found that this helped Callias, suffering from this disease, and likewise Socrates, and in the same way many one by one, belongs to experience; but that it helped all those who suffer from a certain disease, this now belongs to art; and below he proves that experience is more useful for actions than science or art alone, because actions are concerned with singulars. The universal collection from singulars, therefore, does not pertain to experiment, and much less universal assent, but only a firm and prompt judgement about singulars. For experience taken broadly can be said of any perception of one singular, in which way someone can be said to have experienced that wine inebriates, even if he has undergone it only once, or seen it in another; but since, as Hippocrates said, experiment is deceptive, it is not properly taken for the knowledge of one singular only, but of many singulars, as Aristotle said. Indeed, it is not even enough for proper and perfect experience to experience the same effect often; for even brute animals can do this, of whom Aristotle said that they participate little of experience, because they have only the simple memory of those singulars which they perceived by sense; but for perfect experience there is further required a certain comparison of the same singulars among themselves, which is proper to man; and therefore Aristotle said that experience comes to man from memory, because many recollections of the same thing complete experience. Of the same thing, he says, not individual and singular, so that it would suffice for experience to remember often one and the same singular effect perceived by sense; for this repetition will produce a readier memory of such an effect, but not experience. He understands, therefore, of the same according to likeness and agreement of circumstances; and for this is required a comparison of singulars through recollection, namely, that such a medicine helped Peter suffering from this disease, and Paul similarly; for if there is not sufficient likeness, it will often seem to be experience, and in truth will not be. Whence it comes about that experiment is often deceptive. In this way, then, experience is proper to man, which, although it begins in sense, is completed by the mind and reason, as has been declared. Whence it does not consist in apprehensive knowledge, but in judicative, from which a certain ability is generated, by which man is rendered prompt for judging that this effect is wont to come forth from such a cause; which ability is perhaps nothing other than the memory of such singular effects, not in any way whatever, but as they have been compared among themselves and found similar, and are discerned to have emanated with those circumstances from the same or a similar cause. And let these things now suffice about experience, as the opportunity of this place allows.

How much experience serves art and science

24. Fourthly, Aristotle adds that art is generated through experience, and brings a more perfect knowledge than experience, even though without experience it is less sufficient for action. Where it is first necessary to notice that Aristotle here uses the names of science and art indifferently, as is evident from the context; and this because, although elsewhere they are distinct virtues, nevertheless according to a certain notion art is a certain science, or at least, as regards the present matter, the reason is the same concerning it and concerning science. Next it is necessary to notice that science or art is twofold: one they call of the fact, which only demonstrates that this is so; the other of the reasoned fact, which gives the cause. Of the former it is easily understood that it is generated through experience, because it only gathers from effects perceived by experiment that a thing is such, or has such a property. But Aristotle here speaks not of this science, but of the perfect science of the reasoned fact, as is manifestly evident; for when he had said that craftsmen are wiser than those who have the power of experience of things, he gives the reason: because the former know the cause, the latter not; therefore by art and science he understands that which attains and teaches the cause of the thing. And although he declares by many words and signs that craftsmen are preferred to those operating from mere custom or from experience, nevertheless all tends to this, that craftsmen know the reasoned fact and the cause of the thing. When, therefore, he says that art is generated by experience, he understands it of architectonic art and of the reasoned fact.

25. Which, however, is difficult, because human experiment is deceptive, as I said from Hippocrates; and although we grant that it is sometimes certain with the certitude of sense, that certitude nevertheless seems less than that which is required for science; especially because experiment is not universal, or about absolutely all singulars, but science is simply universal, and embraces even those singulars which have not fallen under experience. And although it is sometimes permitted from the things we experience to gather the same about singulars which have not fallen under experience, this collection nevertheless seems very weak, and at most will suffice for science of the fact, but not of the reasoned fact. Again, there occurred here the difficulty whether that proposition of Aristotle, that art is generated from experience, is only indefinite, as it sounds, or is to be taken as doctrinal and universal, so that it never happens that science or art is generated in us otherwise.

26. How science of the reasoned fact is caused by experience.—To the former part the answer is that the argument concludes that experience cannot be the proper and per se cause of art, or of a priori science, but is an occasion, or a certain necessary condition, by which the way is prepared for acquiring science. Which will easily be understood by noticing that two things are required per se in science, namely, the truth which is known and demonstrated, which is called the conclusion, and the principles through which it is known and demonstrated. The science of the conclusion, therefore, depends per se only on the principles; for, since it is a priori science, as we said, the middle term from which it is deduced per se is not experience, but the cause of the very effect which we experience; whence, if the principles which contain the cause of the conclusion could be known or understood clearly without experience, the science of the conclusion would in no way depend on experience. But the evident knowledge of the principles, which is proper to them, arises not from some middle term, but immediately from the natural light itself, the signification or notion of the extremes being known. We are dealing, however, with first and immediate principles; for if they are mediate, they will be demonstrated conclusions, about which the reason will be the same as about all other truths which are known a priori. Therefore neither are immediate principles known per se through experience as through their proper middle term; for in this way they would not be known as principles, but as conclusions demonstrated a posteriori, and known through science of the fact; but as such they could not be sufficient to generate science of the reasoned fact of the conclusion, because a cause cannot produce an effect more noble than itself. It remains, therefore, that experience is required for science only in order that our intellect may be led by the hand through it to understanding exactly the notions of the simple terms; which being understood, the intellect by its natural light sees clearly their immediate connection among themselves, which is the first and only reason for assenting to them.

27. Whether science can be generated without experience.—The other part of the difficulty is more extensive, but has its proper place in Posterior Analytics I, cc. 14 and 18; and therefore I shall briefly set forth what I think. For some⁴ think absolutely and without any restriction or distinction that experience most properly taken is necessary for science or art on the side of the judgement of the principles, so that the experimental knowledge of one or another singular never suffices, but it is necessary to experience many things and compare them among themselves, and find them all uniform and without difference. For before the intellect applies all this diligence it cannot assent with all natural certitude, as is necessary in first principles, because, since the very light of our intellect is weak and imperfect, unless it is helped by experience it can easily go astray; just as, conversely, experience itself too is of itself deceptive, unless the intellect keeps watch with its light to behold in themselves the notions of things and the connection of the terms. And this opinion is thought to be that of Aristotle in various places, namely, Prior Analytics I, c. 31, and Book II, c. 23, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 14, and Posterior Analytics II, last chapter, where the ancient interpreters seem to think so. Nevertheless, if the discussion is of experience properly so called, it seems to me that a distinction must be used, both in the principles themselves and in the mode of acquiring science. I said, if the discussion is of proper experience, because, if one deals generally with any sensible knowledge necessary for the apprehension and understanding of the terms, it is clear that this is necessary for the knowledge of the principles, because all our knowledge begins from sense; but this is not properly experience, which, as is evident from what has been said, consists in judgement or in a judicative habit; and of this without doubt Aristotle spoke. Speaking of this, then, a distinction must be used: for the principles are not all equal. For there is first of all one or another most general and most known, namely: Anything whatever either is or is not; It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be; and for knowing these no experience is required, but only the apprehension, understanding or explanation of the terms; indeed, these principles can scarcely be reduced to positive experience; for although of any singular whatever we can experience that it is, nevertheless that it does not at that time lack existence we cannot experience positively by an experiment distinct from that by which it is seen to be, but it is perceived by understanding alone, the terms being explained. And this seems so self-evident that it does not need other proof. We can, however, use an example for greater explanation; for if we wish to induce a rustic man, who through ignorance of the terms does not know how to assent to those principles, to assent to them, we shall certainly use no new experience, but shall only try so to explain the terms that he may understand that the thing which he sees to be cannot absolutely not be.

28. Besides these most known principles, however, concerning which there can scarcely (as I think) be controversy that they do not require proper experience, there are others also very universal and common to almost all the sciences, such as: Whatever things are the same as one third thing are the same as each other, and Every whole is greater than its part, and If from equals you take equals, the remainders are equal. And concerning these it is necessary to distinguish when the knowledge of such principles is acquired by discovery, or by instruction. For in this latter mode I think that experience properly taken is not necessary, but, that being supposed which suffices for distinct knowledge of the terms, and the notions of the terms being sufficiently explained through doctrine, the intellect can assent by its own light with sufficient evidence and certitude without other experience. And the reason is that the things which are required for such evident assent, whether it be experience or any other declaration of the terms, are not required as the formal reason of assenting, nor as the principle per se effecting or eliciting the act of assenting, but as the sufficient application of the object, as has been declared in the former part of the difficulty. But there is no sufficient reason which persuades that experience rigorously taken, as it includes the intuition, comparison and induction of many singulars, is necessary for the sufficient application of these principles, through sufficient apprehension of the terms, and understanding of their notions, and apt composition. For why can this not be supplied through doctrine, one or another sensible example being used at most, which being sufficiently penetrated by the intellect, the truth of the principle immediately appears self-evident? And experience confirms this very thing; for in admitting these principles in teaching, no one waits for the induction of many singulars, or for experimental knowledge, but each one understands the notions of the terms with the easiest effort, and immediately beholds their truth with the mind, the teacher having applied moderate diligence.

29. For the discovery of the sciences experience of the principles is regularly necessary.—But those who acquire the sciences by discovery alone need experience for the knowledge of these principles, because without it, and without the exterior help of a teacher and of doctrine, these principles cannot be sufficiently proposed, nor the notions of the terms sufficiently known, so that evident assent may be given to them. And the testimonies of Aristotle confirm this, and use itself sufficiently teaches this very thing. The reason, however, is that our intellective knowledge is very limited and imperfect, and depends too much on sense; and therefore without its sufficient aid it cannot proceed with sufficient certitude and firmness; and hence it often happens that those who trust much in the intellect, deserting sense, easily err in natural things, as Aristotle noted, Physics VIII, c. 3. It is necessary, however, to apply a limitation here, namely, that this is to be understood regularly; for someone could be so powerful in talent, and weigh so attentively and considerately the notion, for example, of whole and part in only one singular, that he would immediately draw out from it the truth of the whole principle; just as the theologians say that the soul of Christ, from the mere efficacy of natural talent, without special supernatural aid, drew out many truths or principles from one phantasm. For the medium of experience is not so per se necessary that it cannot be supplied from elsewhere.

30. There are, finally, other principles, particular and proper to the individual sciences, and concerning these it is probable that experience and the comparison of many singulars is necessary for firm and evident assent to them, not only by way of discovery, which is most known, but also by way of instruction, because the notions of the terms in these principles are not so known and easy that any proposition of them whatever suffices, unless the one who learns compares them with the singulars which he knows and sees that they agree rightly with them and with all the things which he has experienced about such matters; likewise that such principles have never suffered an instance (as they say). Finally, in these there is almost always so great a difficulty that one scarcely arrives at the proper assent of principles, or at having them self-evident, but one stops at induction and a posteriori knowledge; it is a sign, therefore, that for obtaining evident assent from the notions of the terms themselves well known, much experience is necessary; greater indeed by way of discovery, but some by way of instruction; although according to the diversity of talents greater or less suffices.

31. Various partitions of science.—In the fifth place Aristotle tacitly proposes the division of art or science (for we have already noted that these names are taken here indifferently) into practical and speculative science, which he distinguishes in this, that the practical are referred to the use and advantage of life, the speculative only to the knowledge of truth. He also tacitly subdivides the practical; for some contribute to the necessities of life, others to pleasure (sensible, of course). Of the former kind are either the mechanical arts, such as shoemaking, etc., or medicine and the like; of the latter kind seem to be the arts which are called liberal, such as music, the art also of painting, and finally all those which pertain to delighting the senses. From all these, then, he separates speculative science, which rests in the contemplation of truth and is only for its sake, so that, although the greatest pleasure follows upon it, nevertheless according to the right and best order of nature it is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but for its own sake; but pleasure only so that it may help toward enjoying the very consideration and contemplation of truth with greater quiet and perseverance. From which he rightly gathers that this kind of science is preferred to the other, and that those are held wiser who intend the contemplation of truth for its own sake. For what is for its own sake is more noble than what is for the sake of another; likewise, because the best thing in man is the contemplation of truth; but this is the more excellent the more it is about higher things and things which are not ordered to operation. Thus far Aristotle.

32. The conclusion from all the sayings of Aristotle now explained.—From which, as I said, he seemed tacitly to conclude that that appetite for knowing which nature has given to man inclines most of all to the contemplation of truth for its own sake, because this is the supreme operation of man. And consequently hence is concluded what was proposed, namely, that this appetite is more inclined to the speculative sciences than to the others, because they are ordered to contemplating truth for its own sake. Whence it is not excluded that we are borne to the practical sciences by the appetite for knowing, but only that we are borne more vehemently to the speculative ones.

33. The practical sciences can be desired for the sake of the knowledge of truth alone.—But you will ask whether the practical sciences too can be desired for the sake of the knowledge of truth, resting in it, without the usefulness of their use. For some seem generally to deny that men can desire the practical sciences only for the sake of knowing, but only for the sake of the work. Nevertheless, although practical science differs from speculative in this, that it is ordered per se to work, while the latter is not, as will be said in its place, this nevertheless does not exclude that practical science proximately and immediately confers the knowledge of some truth; indeed this is necessary, otherwise it would not be science. But every knowledge of truth is lovable per se, even if it brings no other usefulness; for it is per se a great perfection of intellectual nature. Whence the angels know these arts, even though they do not serve them for their use. And therefore the practical sciences too are desirable for the sake of the knowledge of truth, even if one rests in it, and it is not ordered to use. And it is confirmed, because otherwise they would not in truth be desired by virtue of the appetite for knowing, because they would be desired only as means; but a means as a means is not desired except by virtue of the propensity toward the end; and so music would not be desired except by virtue of the appetite for pleasure or gain, and so of the others, but not by virtue of the appetite for science as such, although they are true sciences, perfect in their genus. Which experience also teaches; for many are refreshed in the exercise of these sciences not for the sake of use or usefulness, but only in order to know. Regularly, however, they are sought only for the sake of some human usefulness, both because this is more conformed to the institution and end of such arts, and because sensible advantages or necessities or pleasures move more frequently, and because, if science were to be sought for the sake of truth alone, it would be sought in other more noble sciences, especially since man cannot devote himself to all at once. If, therefore, the practical sciences are indeed desirable, the speculative ones are much more so, if the appetite of man as he is man is regarded, and it is not impeded by other human advantages or necessities.

Resolution of the whole question

34. Finally, from all that has been said the assertion intended is concluded, namely, that metaphysics is most of all desirable by man as he is man, both with natural appetite and with rational appetite best ordered. It is proved tacitly by Aristotle at the end of the same chapter, because among all the speculative sciences this one most of all deserves the name of wisdom, since it is concerned with the first causes and the principles of all things, which has been sufficiently declared by us in the preceding section. If, therefore, the speculative sciences are most of all desired among all, among which this is the supreme, it will certainly be of itself most of all desirable. Finally, the greatest appetite of man is toward his natural happiness; but this is acquired through this science, or rather consists in its perfect attainment. For, as is handed down in Ethics X, this happiness is placed in the contemplation of God and of the separated substances; but this contemplation is the proper act and chief end of this science; therefore natural happiness too consists in an act of this science; this appetite, therefore, is most of all consonant both with nature and with right reason. It remains, therefore, that we investigate this most perfect science with all diligence and study.

1. What the formal and the objective concept are, and in what they differ.—First of all the common distinction of the formal and the objective concept is to be supposed. That is called the formal concept which is the very act, or (what is the same) the word, by which the intellect conceives some thing or common notion; which is called a concept because it is as it were the offspring of the mind; and it is called formal either because it is the last form of the mind, or because it formally represents to the mind the thing known, or because in truth it is the intrinsic and formal term of the mental conception, in which it differs from the objective concept, so to speak. That thing or notion is called the objective concept which is properly and immediately known or represented through the formal concept; as, for example, when we conceive man, that act which we effect in the mind in order to conceive man is called the formal concept; but man, known and represented by that act, is called the objective concept—a concept indeed by extrinsic denomination from the formal concept, through which its object is said to be conceived; and therefore it is rightly called objective, because it is not a concept as a form intrinsically terminating the conception, but as the object and matter about which the formal conception is concerned, and to which the eye of the mind directly tends; on account of which it is called by some, following Averroes, the understood intention; and by others it is called the objective notion. Hence is gathered the difference between the formal and the objective concept, that the formal is always a true and positive thing, and in creatures a quality inhering in the mind, whereas the objective is not always a true positive thing; for we sometimes conceive privations and other things which are called beings of reason, because they have being only objectively in the intellect. Likewise the formal concept is always a singular and individual thing, because it is a thing produced by the intellect and inhering in it; but the objective concept can indeed sometimes be a singular and individual thing, in so far as it can be presented to the mind and conceived through the formal act, but often it is a universal or confused and common thing, such as man, substance and the like. In this disputation, then, we chiefly intend to explain the objective concept of being as such, according to its whole abstraction, according to which we said it is the object of metaphysics; but because it is very difficult, and depends much on our conception, we take our beginning from the formal concept, which, as it seems to us, can be better known.

Various opinions are reported

2. The first opinion absolutely denies that there is one formal concept of being which is in truth one in itself, and prescinded and distinct from the other concepts of particular beings. So thinks Cajetan, opusc. De nominum analogia, cc. 4 and 6. For although he speaks obscurely, and distinguishes concerning a perfect or imperfect concept, that distinction nevertheless coincides with another of Fonseca to be treated immediately; whence, if he is read attentively, he in truth thinks this; and Fonseca said that he had attained the truth, or come nearer to it, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 2, sect. 3. The foundation is that otherwise being would be univocal, and not analogous, which we shall see below to be false. The consequence is proved, because those things are univocal whose name is common, and the notion of substance accommodated to the name is the same, on the testimony of Aristotle at the beginning of the Categories; but the name of being is common to all beings; therefore either the notion of the name is one and the same, and so being will be univocal, or it is not one, and so neither will the formal concept of being be able to be one, because the formal concept has its unity from some one thing or notion conceived, which it adequately regards. Whence, if that concept is also adequate to the word or name of being, it cannot be more one than the notion of being signified by that name is one.

3. The second opinion, which is rather an explanation of the preceding, is that of Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 34, who distinguishes a twofold concept: one he calls what the name means, the other what the thing is; the former, he says, can be one in the concept of being, but the latter not at all; and he founds both on the analogy of being. And it is explained in this way from the common notion of analogues; for they can be conceived in two ways: in one way, by the proper real concept signified by the name, and in this way, in so far as they are analogous, they do not have one real concept but several, as is evident both in analogues of proportionality and of proportion or attribution; for if, on hearing this name, laughing, the proper concept of the thing signified is formed, not one but a twofold concept is formed: one of man, who is properly and formally laughing; the other of the meadow, which is so called only through a certain proportionality. But if not both of these concepts but only one is formed, that word is not conceived according to its whole analogy or common signification with respect to those things, but either only as it is univocal with respect to men, or only as it is transferred and metaphorically signifies the meadow. And it is similar in analogues of attribution, for example, healthy; for if the proper concept of the thing signified is formed, it is not one but manifold: one of the animal, which is formally and properly healthy; others of the other things which are called healthy extrinsically through various relationships or denominations from the health of the animal. But in each of these analogues one very confused concept can be formed, which pertains rather to the signification of the word than to some thing, as if, on hearing the name healthy, you conceive that which has order to health. So, then, in the present case, on hearing the name of being, a confused concept can be formed, comprehending whatever has being or a relationship to being; but this is only a concept of what the name means; yet, if the things signified by that name are truly conceived, not one concept is formed but several.

4. The opinion of Fonseca, closely akin to this.—Nor does Fonseca, above, differ much from this opinion, distinguishing a threefold concept of being, namely distinct, confused and intermediate, that is, partly confused and partly distinct. The distinct is that which determinately and expressly represents all the simple entities which being immediately signifies, and this is not one but several. The confused is that which represents all things confusedly and indeterminately, and this is one. But the intermediate, which is partly confused and partly distinct, is that which determinately represents one nature, for example substance, but the others, namely quantity, quality, etc., implicitly and indeterminately, in so far as all agree with substance by a certain proportion; and this too is said to be one.

5. That so great a diversity of distinctions hinders clarity rather than helps it.—But distinctions of this kind seem to me to be multiplied without cause, and rather to confuse the matter than to explain it. For we ought to speak of the formal concept of being not according to what can be known and comprehended about all the things comprehended under this word, as they are in themselves, but as they are signified by this word; otherwise the discussion will not be about the concept of being in so far as it is being, but about the concept of all things both existing and also possible, in so far as they are such and are distinguished among themselves, in which way they can be distinctly conceived by one formal concept by no one except God alone, as the same author rightly noted. But in this sense even the concept of substance or of living thing, if it is explicit and distinct in that way, will only be that by which all substances or all living things, in so far as they are, are distinctly conceived, in which way God alone too will be able to have a distinct formal concept of them—of substance, of living thing, etc.

6. You will say that substance, living thing and similar names do not immediately signify these or those substantial or living natures, but the notion of substance, of living thing, etc., and therefore, for forming a distinct concept corresponding to the significate of such a word, it is not necessary to descend to the particular natures; but that it is otherwise with being, because it immediately signifies entities, at least simple ones, that is, those not composed of a common nature and a contracting difference. But this is in truth false, as will be more fully evident from the following section, and is now briefly evident from the common mode of conceiving. For who would say that being immediately signifies God as he is God, even though God is most simple and not composed of a common nature and a contracting difference? Finally the same can be asked of substance, accident, and the other genera or simple concepts. Likewise, why will being be said to signify immediately simple entities rather than those composed of a common nature and a contracting difference, such as animal, habit, etc.? For being as such comprehends all things generally under itself, and just as in the concept of substance or of quality nothing is included which is not being, so neither in the concept of animal or of habit. But that a composite concept can be resolved into several, of which neither includes the other, but not a simple concept, matters little for mediate or immediate signification. For who would believe that being immediately signifies rational, and not man, because rational expresses a simple concept and man a composite one? And so, stopping properly and precisely at the formal concept of being as such, it does not pertain to it that through it particular beings should be distinctly conceived according to their proper and determinate notions; and therefore the concept of being as such, if one stops at it, is always confused with respect to particular beings as they are such. And therefore St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 6, says that if God knew other things than himself only in so far as they are beings, he would know them only in common, confusedly and imperfectly; whence he concludes that he knows them not only according as they communicate in the notion of being, but also according as one is distinguished from another; he thinks, therefore, that the concept of being as such, stopping precisely at it, is always confused with respect to any determinate notion of being, as it is such in itself and is distinguished from the others, whether it be composite or simple.

7. The manner of speaking of the others is not approved.—Wherefore that member about the concept partly confused and partly distinct is also superfluous for explaining the present matter. First indeed, because the concept of substance is improperly said to be implicitly or confusedly the concept of accident, and universally the proper concept of the first analogate is most improperly said to be a confused concept of the other analogates, which are secondary, although many speak thus, saying that, just as the same name, although it immediately signifies the first analogate, secondarily signifies the others, so the formal concept of the first analogate confusedly represents the others, in so far as they are similar or proportional to that first one; for what distinctly represents something seems consequently to represent, at least confusedly, other things similar to it. But although this is of small moment, and perhaps about the manner of speaking, it does not meet with my approval, because such a proper and distinct concept of the first analogate is only one, and formally represents only the first analogate itself; in which it is not rightly compared with the name, because a name signifies only by imposition, and therefore the same name which primarily and properly signifies one thing can by transference be imposed to signify other things secondarily; but the concept of a thing only naturally represents the thing itself, and therefore, if it is the proper and adequate concept of the first analogate according to its proper notion, it cannot represent the rest; whence neither does it of itself make them known, but at most can be as it were the origin or occasion for the others to be conceived and denominated according to some proportion or relationship to the first analogate; which is not enough for the special and proper concept of the first analogate to be called implicit or confused with respect to the others. Next, I ask whether that concept of the first analogate is altogether the same as the concept which corresponds to the proper name of the same thing or nature, for example substance, or whether it is diverse. This latter cannot be said, because, if each is the proper concept of substance, it cannot be understood in what the diversity consists, such that one is said to represent accidents and not the other. But if the former is said, then that concept can no more be said to represent accidents than the proper concept of man represents other animals; indeed it can be said less, since there is less likeness. Likewise, because otherwise it would have to be said that substance has one formal concept in some way common to substance and accident, which is in truth most improper and rigorously false; because, although accident expresses a relationship to substance, the concept of substance nevertheless in no way represents that relationship, but only its term, and that not formally under the notion of term, but according to its absolute notion; therefore this is not enough for that concept to be called an implicit or confused concept of accident. And the same can easily be considered in the other analogates or their concepts; for the formal concept of a laughing man as such is in no way a confused concept of the meadow, nor is the proper concept of a healthy animal the concept of medicine, and so of the others. And the reason is that what founds an analogy of this kind is either some real agreement or likeness between the analogates, as we shall say below of being, and that is not represented through the proper concept of any analogate; or it is not a proper likeness, but only a certain proportion or attribution, and this too is not enough for the proper concept of one analogate, as such, to represent in some way the others, but only that form through order to which the others are denominated such; which form is represented through such a concept absolutely and as it is such in itself, and not with a relationship to the others.

8. I add further: whatever may be the case with this manner of speaking, that the determinate concept of substance is called confused with respect to the other genera of beings, or accidents, it nevertheless still cannot be called the formal concept of being as such; both because it is the proper formal concept of substance as substance, whereas the proper concept of being must be diverse from the concept of substance, since being is rightly divided into substance and accident; and also because being does not immediately signify substance, as I shall show below; therefore neither does it immediately express the proper formal concept of substance. It remains, therefore, that the formal concept of being as such, compared to determinate beings as they are such, is always a confused and indistinct concept in representing this or that being. I say, however, with respect to particular beings as they are such, because with respect to that object which it immediately and properly represents (whatever that may be), it can be said to be, and truly is, a proper and distinct concept; just as the same concept of animal, which is confused with respect to man, is proper and distinct with respect to animal as such, although under this same comparison the same simple concept is wont to be called confused with respect to that composite concept by which animal is conceived through its definition. And in a similar way, either in diverse men or in one at diverse times, one concept of being can be more distinct than another, and conversely one can be called confused with respect to another more distinct one, in so far as it happens that the very notion or quiddity of being as such is known more or less perfectly; which distinction of formal concepts is nothing to the purpose, because it is rather on the side of the one conceiving, and from a perfect or imperfect light or mode of conceiving, than from the relationship to the object, which we chiefly consider here.

The true opinion

9. These distinctions, then, being passed over, it must be said that the proper and adequate formal concept of being as such is one, prescinded in reality and in reason from the other formal concepts of other things and objects. This is the common opinion, as Fonseca, above, confesses; Scotus and all his disciples hold it, as we shall see in the following section; Capreolus, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, concl. 1 and 9, and in the answers to the arguments against them; and Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 1, q. 2, who cites St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 7, aa. 5 and 6; Soncinas, In IV Metaph., q. 1; Javellus, q. 1; Flandria, q. 2, a. 6; Hervaeus, Quodlibet II, q. 7; Soto, on the Categories, c. 4, q. 1; and it is plainly gathered from St. Thomas, in the places to be cited in the following section. And it is proved, first, by experience; for on hearing the name of being, we experience that our mind is not drawn apart or divided into several concepts, but rather gathered into one, just as when it conceives man, animal and the like. Secondly, because, as Aristotle said, De Interpretatione I, we express our formal concepts by words; but the word being is not only materially one, but also has one signification from its original imposition, by virtue of which it does not immediately signify some nature under a determinate and proper notion under which it is distinguished from others. Hence neither does it signify many things as they are many, because it does not signify them according as they differ among themselves, but rather as they agree among themselves, or are similar; it is therefore a sign that to this word there also corresponds in the mind one formal concept, by which what is signified by this word is immediately and adequately conceived. Or rather, conversely, by this sign we gather that the imposition of such a name proceeded from such a mode of conceiving things by one concept. Thirdly, we can argue from the concept of existence; for it seems self-evident that there is one formal concept of existence as such, because whenever we speak and dispute about existence in this way as about one act, we in truth form not several concepts but one; therefore also the formal concept of the existent as such is one, because, just as the abstract is conceived after the manner of one, so also the concrete as precisely so constituted; therefore similarly one formal concept corresponds to being as such; for being either is the same as existent, or, if it is taken as existent in aptitude, its concept has the same notion of unity. Hence also the concept of being is wont to be called not only one but also most simple, so that the ultimate resolution of the other concepts is made to it; for through the other concepts we conceive this or that kind of being, but through this one we prescind all composition and determination; whence this concept is also wont to be called of itself the first which is formed by man, because, other things being equal, it can more easily be conceived of any thing whatever; all of which St. Thomas hands down, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1; and Avicenna, Metaphysics II. Wherefore concerning the unity of this most common and confused concept there is almost no one who doubts; but we have shown that no other concept can truly and properly be called the concept of being as such which is not confused with respect to particular beings as they are such. Finally, if the formal concept of being is not one, there will therefore be several; how many, then, will there be? There is no greater reason for two than for three, or for any other number; because, if these concepts are multiplied, it is necessary that they be multiplied according to some diversity of the things or entities comprehended under the breadth of being; but these entities can be multiplied to infinity, and be distinguished according to their proper notions; and if once it is posited that the concept or concepts of being as such represent determinate natures of being, even as distinct, there is no reason why one should stop at two rather than at three or four, etc., as will be more evident from what we shall say in the following section about the objective concept; for although the formal concept, in so far as it is made by us and in us, can seem better known by experience, the exact knowledge of its unity nevertheless depends much on the unity of the object, from which acts are wont to take their unity and distinction.

10. From which it is understood, first, in what sense and for what reason this formal concept is said to be prescinded according to the thing itself from other concepts, namely because in reality it is really distinct from the concept of substance as such, of accident, of quality, and the other similar ones; for we are speaking of the human intellect, which, while it divides in the mind even those things which are not distinct in reality, divides concepts within itself, forming really distinct concepts of the same thing according to the diverse prescission or abstraction of the thing conceived; in which way the formal concepts of divine justice and mercy are in us really prescinded or distinct, although mercy and justice are not distinguished in themselves. So, then, the concept of being as such, since in representing it prescinds from the proper notion of substance as such, of accident, and of all the others, must necessarily be really prescinded and distinct in itself from the proper concepts of such notions or natures as they are such; and this too all easily confess.

11. Secondly it is gathered from what has been said that this formal concept of being, just as it is one in itself according to the thing, so also according to its formal notion, and according to that too is prescinded in reason from the formal concepts of particular notions. It is evident, first, because this concept is in itself most simple, as objectively, so also formally; therefore it has in itself one simple adequate formal notion; therefore according to it it is prescinded from the other formal concepts. Secondly, because, just as our mind, by prescinding things which are not distinguished in reality, really distinguishes its formal concepts within itself, so conversely, by confusing and joining things which are distinguished in reality, in so far as they are similar in themselves, it unites its concept, forming it one in reality and in formal notion; but in this way beings are conceived by this formal concept of being; for the mind takes all those things only as they are similar among themselves in the notion of being, and as such forms one image, representing by a single formal representation that which is; which image is the formal concept itself; that concept, therefore, is simply one in reality and in formal notion, and according to it prescinded from those concepts which more distinctly represent particular beings or their notions.

12. The formal concept of being as such is not multiplied according to the multitude of particular objects.—Thirdly it follows that this formal concept of being is not only one, but also cannot be several according to its relationship to more determinate objects, or objects more distinctly conceived on the side of the objects. These formal concepts can indeed be multiplied, either according to number in diverse subjects, or in the same subject at diverse times, perhaps also according to species on the side of the one conceiving, in a higher mode or with greater clarity and more distinct apprehension of the very formal notion of being as such (although perhaps this whole distinction is only according to more and less within the same species, especially stopping at the concepts which can naturally be formed by man); but from the greater or lesser determination of the object the concept of being as such cannot be multiplied; because, as has been shown, by the very fact that one does not stop at the common conception of being as such, but descends to this and that being as they are such, although formal concepts are multiplied, the concept of being as such is not, but the concept of substance, or of accident, etc., is adjoined.

13. This concept is not of the name only, but also of the thing.—Fourthly it is gathered from what has been said that this concept is falsely called a concept of the name only, and not of the thing signified by the name of being, and according to that notion by which it is signified by it. First, because, as I said, this concept is prior to the word and to its imposition for signifying things in such a way. For although as regards us concepts are often formed by means of words, nevertheless in itself and simply the concept is prior, which of itself brings forth the word by which it is expressed, and is the origin of its imposition; such a concept, therefore, is simply and absolutely a concept of the thing according to itself, and not only in order to the signification of the word, such that for this reason it would be called a concept of the name, or of what the name means. Secondly, because this concept is after the manner of a certain simple image naturally representing that which is signified by the word at pleasure; but in this alone consists its being a concept of the thing; although, because that concept is most simple, and therefore its object cannot be declared by a proper definition, we are wont to use descriptions to explain it, which seem only to declare the signification of the name more distinctly; and in this way it can be said in a good sense that that concept is of what the name means, provided it is not excluded that it is the proper and adequate concept of the thing immediately signified by that word.

14. Of which analogues there is one common notion.—The foundation of the first opinion (for enough has already been said about the second) touches upon the matter of the analogy of being, to be treated below, and depends also on what is to be said about the objective concept; for many think that the unity of the formal concept is not repugnant to analogy, but the unity of the objective concept is, of which afterwards. For now it is briefly said, from St. Thomas, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, that among analogues of attribution there are some which signify a form which is intrinsically only in the principal analogate, but in the others only through relationship or extrinsic denomination, such as healthy and the like; and to these the unity of a formal concept is repugnant, because the analogates do not have proper likeness and agreement among themselves. But there are others which signify a form or nature intrinsically found in all the analogates; and of this kind is being, as we shall see below, for accidents are not beings by extrinsic¹ denomination, but by the intrinsic nature or notion of being which they participate; and in analogues of this kind it is not unfitting that there should be one formal concept, simply and absolutely one in itself in reality and in adequate formal notion; but in what its analogy consists will be explained below.

1. The first reason for doubting.—The reason for doubting is twofold. The first was touched upon in the preceding section, and is founded on the analogy of being; because, if its objective concept is one, it is either by the unity of univocation, and so analogy is taken away, or by an analogous unity only, and so either it is not in truth one, or there is a contradiction in terms, because analogy intrinsically includes either several notions having only a proportion among themselves, or several relationships to one form, by reason of which the objective concept of an analogous name cannot be one. Which is declared and confirmed, because in order that being have one objective concept, it is necessary that all beings agree in one formal notion of being, which is immediately signified by the name being, because the unity of an objective concept requires the unity of a thing, or at least of a formal notion; but if all beings agree in one formal notion, then as such they have one and the same definition, as well as one objective concept; because, if the objective concept is one, its definition too can be one; therefore nothing is lacking to being for perfect univocation.

2. The second.—The second reason for doubting is that, if the objective concept of being is one, then according to itself it is prescinded and abstracted from all its inferiors, or the determinate notions of beings; the consequent is impossible; therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is evident, because, if the concept of being is one, then formally and actually it does not include in itself the determinate modes of beings; for these are intrinsically opposed and effect distinction; whence it is impossible that they should be actually included in one objective concept; therefore, in order that the concept of being be one, it is necessary that it prescind from all these; but that this is impossible I show thus: because, if being as such prescinds from the determinate notions of beings, then, in order that it be contracted or determined to them, it is necessary that something be added to it; therefore what is added is either being or nothing; if nothing, how can it really determine being and constitute some proper notion of being? But if it is being, then being as such cannot be prescinded from it, for what is prescinded from another is not included in it. For it cannot be understood that being is prescinded from the modes by which it is contracted, and that it is nevertheless intrinsically included in them; nor, conversely, that the mode contracting being includes nothing but being, and yet determines it to a special notion of being. For contraction and determination are not understood without addition; but addition cannot be understood unless what is added is such that it does not include that to which it is added, either according to the thing or according to reason, according to the mode in which it is understood to be added. And it is confirmed, for on this account Aristotle said, Metaphysics III, text 10, that the genus is outside the notion of the differences, namely because it abstracts and prescinds from them; therefore, if the objective concept of being is prescinded and one, it is necessary that it not be included in the contracting ones.

3. The reason of the difficulty on the contrary side.—But on the contrary is the fact that to one formal concept one objective concept necessarily corresponds; but it has been shown that there is one formal concept of being; therefore one objective concept must necessarily be granted. The major is evident, because the formal concept has its whole notion and unity from the object; therefore, in order to be one, it is necessary that it tend to an object in some way one; but the objective concept is nothing other than the object itself as known or apprehended through such a formal concept; therefore, if the formal concept is one, it is necessary that the objective concept also be one.

Various opinions are reported

4. The first opinion.—In this question, those who deny that there is one formal concept of being consequently also deny that there is an objective one.¹ And so thinks Cajetan, in the places cited in the preceding section, in the first opinion; and Ferrariensis, in the place cited. But of those who admit one formal concept of being, Soncinas denies one objective concept, Metaphysics IV, qq. 2 and 3; and Hispalensis, In I, dist. 3, q. 1; Hervaeus and Flandria, in the places cited in the preceding section. It is also attributed to Capreolus, but in truth he does not teach it, as I shall say below. St. Thomas too is cited for this opinion, I, q. 13, a. 5; De potentia, q. 7, a. 7; De veritate, q. 2, a. 11; in which places he indicates that to words which are common to God and creatures there corresponds not one notion conceived or signified, but several. The foundations of this opinion were touched upon at the beginning; for although many arguments are brought forward by these authors, the force of all of them is placed in the two difficulties touched upon. The aforesaid authors do not agree, however, in explaining the concept, or rather the objective concepts, which correspond to being. For some say that through the formal concept of being all the genera of beings are immediately represented, in so far as they have some proportion or relationship among themselves, as Ferrariensis; and Cajetan thinks the same. Others say that through the formal concept of being this disjunct is immediately represented, substance or accident, as Soncinas, Hervaeus and others. Again, others say that all the genera or notions, or simple concepts, are represented absolutely, not copulatively nor disjunctively, but² simply, as Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 2, sects. 4 and 7.

5. The second opinion.—The second opinion, altogether contrary, is that there is an objective concept of being simply one. Scotus holds this, In I, dist. 3, q. 1, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1, and In II, dist. 3, qq. 3 and 6; Javellus, Metaphysics IV, q. 1; Soto, on the Categories, c. 4, q. 1; and Capreolus is of the same opinion, In I, dist. 2, q. 1. There is, however, a diversity among these authors, for Scotus posits this concept as prescinded from the nature of the thing from the inferior natures and the modes contracting being. Others, however, posit this unity of the objective concept only from our mode of conceiving, without prescission and distinction which would be in the things; of which diversity of opinions we shall speak in the following section. But of the other difference, which also exists among these authors as regards univocation or analogy, we shall speak below.

6. The third opinion, intermediate between the aforesaid, uses a distinction, and is explained in various ways. For some say that the objective concept of being, taken in itself and absolutely without its inferiors, is one, and prescinded from them in reason; but that, compared to its inferiors and as included in them, it is not one; and so they reconcile the reasons for doubting adduced at the beginning; for, because through the formal concept of being being is conceived according to itself and without any comparison to its inferiors, it is necessary that at least under this consideration that objective concept have unity. But when this concept is considered as existing in the inferiors themselves, it cannot have unity; for the inferiors themselves, for example substance and accident, differ by that very thing by which they are beings; therefore they cannot have unity in it as such, because they cannot agree and differ according to the same thing; and the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning also confirm this latter part. Otherwise Fonseca, above, supposing that distinction of the confused, distinct and intermediate concept, or partly confused and partly distinct, says of this third concept that it can indeed be one, but not prescinded from its inferiors, but that it is the concept of, for example, substance; and of the distinct concept he similarly says that it is not one adequate to being, except perhaps in God, but in us includes the concept of substance, quality, etc. But, as I said, these are in truth not concepts of being as such. Finally, of the confused concept of being, which bears on the matter, he says that it is in a certain way one and prescinded, yet not simply but in a certain respect; that it is indeed in some way prescinded, because it does not expressly and determinately contain what is proper to the inferior members; but that it is not simply prescinded, even according to reason, lest it follow that it is univocal. He declares, however, that this prescission is in a certain respect and not simply, because this confused concept of being so excludes the things which are proper to substance and the other simple entities that its essence is nevertheless not other than the essence of such entities.

7. But these distinctions, as I touched upon in the preceding section, do not seem to me to serve for explaining the matter; but the more they are multiplied, the more the matter seems to be obscured and confused. Omitting, then, the distinct or particular concepts of substance and of the other genera or members dividing being in common, we deal here only with that objective concept which immediately and adequately corresponds to that formal concept which we said in the preceding section corresponds in the mind to this word being and to the thing immediately signified by it; for the other particular concepts, taken according to themselves, are not concepts of being in so far as it is being, but as they are such or such beings.

The former assertion

8. There is one objective notion of being.—I say, therefore, first, that to the formal concept of being there corresponds one adequate and immediate objective concept, which does not expressly signify substance, nor accident, nor God, nor creature, but all these after the manner of one, namely in so far as they are in some way similar among themselves and agree in being. In this conclusion the authors of the second opinion agree, and Fonseca does not dissent, and St. Thomas very much favours it, in the places cited above, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1, in so far as he says that the concept of being is most simple and the first of all, and is determined to substance, quantity, etc., through a certain determination and expression of such a mode of being, where it is necessary that the discussion be of the objective concept; for the formal is not determined nor contracted. Whence more openly, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1, St. Thomas says: Substance, quantity and quality contract being, by applying being to some quiddity or nature; but contraction cannot be understood without some unity and community of the objective concept. And in the same way Aristotle favours this opinion, Metaphysics IV, text 7, where he says that metaphysics considers being in so far as it is being, under which the other genera are contained; where St. Thomas says that first philosophy considers common being and the things which belong to it as such. By reason this opinion can be proved thus. It is necessary that the formal concept of being have some adequate object; but that is not an aggregate of various natures of beings according to some determinate notions of them, however simple; therefore it is necessary that that concept be one according to some agreement and likeness of beings among themselves. The consequence is evident from a sufficient enumeration, because we suppose (what is self-evident) that that objective concept is not one by real unity, that is, numerical or entitative; for it is evident that this concept is common to many things. The major assumed is likewise evident, because that formal concept is an act of the intellect; but every act of the intellect, as every act, in so far as it is one, must have some adequate object from which it has its unity. But the minor is proved, because, if that adequate object is from an aggregation of several natures of being, I ask what these natures are, and how they are aggregated in that concept; for this can in no way be conceived and understood. Which will also be evident by excluding all the modes in which this has been asserted, or can be thought out.

9. Being does not immediately signify substance and accident.—For, first, what Soncinas says, that that concept consists of substance and accident as such, is plainly false; for either those two are included in that concept copulatively, and this he does not say, nor can he say it; otherwise it would falsely be said that substance is being, or that quality is being, because neither is substance substance and accident, nor is quality, and so of the others. Or those two are included disjunctively, as Soncinas himself says; and this, besides being against experience, as I shall say immediately, implies the univocation of being, which he himself intends to avoid; for this disjunct, substance or accident, belongs as truly, simply and equally primarily to accident as to substance; because, just as for the truth of a disjunctive proposition the truth of one part suffices, so for a disjunct predicate to be predicated equally primarily and simply it suffices that one part of it belong equally primarily and simply to the subject; but accident is as truly and as properly accident as substance is substance; therefore that disjunct belongs as truly and properly to accident by reason of one part as to substance by reason of the other. Which can be seen in all similar predicates; for to be God or creature, for example, is said as truly and properly of man as of God, and so of others. Or finally those two are included simply, that is, without conjunction or disjunction, namely substance accident. And this is first of all against experience, because what is conceived is perceived by the mind, and in this way falls under experience; but we, on hearing the name of being, and conceiving precisely what we understand to be signified by this word, do not perceive with the mind substance as such nor accident as such, as anyone can experience in himself.

10. Next, that formal concept is simple and limited, and in reality prescinded from the proper formal concepts of substance and accident as they are such; therefore through it substance and accident are not represented properly and distinctly, as they are represented through the two concepts of substance and accident. For it cannot be said that that one concept of being contains in a more eminent mode that whole formal representation which is in those two concepts taken together; for this mode of universality in a formal concept is foreign to the human intellect, of which we are treating, and is scarcely found in the angelic; that concept, therefore, is not universal through the eminent representation of many as they are many, but through the confusion of many as they are in some way one. But if through that concept substance and accident are not represented as properly and distinctly as through the two proper concepts of substance and accident, no medium is understood as to how they could be represented according to what is proper to them, but only as they are in some way similar among themselves; therefore that concept does not consist of substance and accident represented even in the said mode absolutely and simply.

11. Add moreover that according to such a concept it is scarcely understood what is definitely predicated of something when it is said to be being; for what is predicated is the objective concept; if, therefore, that concept is this whole, substance accident, this predication, this is, is equivalent to this: this is substance accident; but a predication of this kind cannot be made determinately, or truly, or falsely, unless each part of the predicate is understood to be predicated copulatively or disjunctively, since those two parts are not joined after the manner of substantive and adjective so as to be predicated after the manner of one; although, even if it were done in this way, the sense would return copulative, and a false proposition would result. Again, against this whole opinion there is added that, if each of these, substance and accident, is found in that concept in any of the aforesaid modes, I inquire further what concept of substance is included there; for substance there is taken either for created substance, or for uncreated, or for some objective concept common to both. The first and second cannot be said, because being, of which we are now speaking, is common to created and uncreated being, as we said above that it is the object of this science; but if the third is said, an argument ad hominem arises thence against the aforesaid authors; both because substance is something analogous to uncreated and created substance; therefore if, notwithstanding the analogy, there is one objective concept common to created and uncreated substance, there will also be able to be a concept of being. And also because created substance is more distant from uncreated than accident from created substance; it would be necessary, therefore, speaking consistently, to add something to that concept, saying that it consists of the determinate notion of created substance and of accident, which is nevertheless incredible in itself, and can be attacked more efficaciously by the arguments given. And there still remains a similar argument on the side of the other member, namely accident; for this too, according to the aforesaid authors, is analogous, and at least with respect to some accidents it is perhaps true, as I shall say below; I shall inquire, then, similarly, whether accident enters the concept of being according to some common concept, or (so to speak) according to part of an objective concept common to all accidents; and against each the arguments given can be applied, and finally it can be concluded that this member too must be divided into several others.

12. The concept of being does not include all the first genera.—For this cause, then, perhaps, others have said that the adequate object of that formal concept of being is, or includes, all the first genera, or all the simple entities which proximately divide being. But against this opinion the former arguments proceed in the same way. First, because such natures can be included in such a concept neither copulatively, nor disjunctively, nor simply and without any copula, as is evident by applying the discourse given in the same way; for it has the same force, as will easily be evident to anyone considering. Second, from experience, because by virtue of the conception of being we do not perceive all these definite natures of being as they are such, and as they are distinguished among themselves; and it would be much more difficult to perceive so many natures than substance and accident only; and it is much more incredible that there should be one formal concept in us which distinctly represents all these natures than substance and accident alone; and if the formal concept of being does not so distinctly represent these natures as they are such, and as they are distinguished among themselves, it is concluded that it represents them only as they agree among themselves, and are in some way similar, which is what is intended. The consequence is evident because, as I declared a little before, between these two no medium can be found in the present case. Third, because by almost the same reason by which this objective concept of being is said to include all the first genera, or all simple entities, it would have to be said to include all entities, however composite, man, lion, etc., according to their proper notions, which no one has said hitherto. The consequence is evident, because, if being includes all the genera, or simple natures, in its concept, it is either because the notion of being as such does not prescind from them according to the thing, or because they add nothing to being which is not being, or because the notion of being is understood according to reason to be immediately determined, or contracted, to those natures. But the first and second of these reasons proceed in the same way in any entity whatever, even in the lowest species; for according to the thing the notion of being no more prescinds from the notion of man or horse, etc., than from the notion of substance and accident; nor does man add to being something which is not being, any more than substance or quantity, etc. But the third reason is not brought forward consistently, because, if being as such does not express one objective notion or concept, there is nothing in being as such, as regards the thing conceived, which can properly be divided, determined or contracted, either immediately or mediately; therefore that reason in no way prevents all entities, whatever they may be, from being included in the concept of being, if some are said to be determinately included; nor can a sufficient reason be assigned for some more than for others.

13. The concept of being does not include substance explicitly and the others implicitly.—Therefore, finally, it can be said otherwise that in the adequate object of the formal concept of being there are included not several determinate and distinct natures of being according to what is proper to them, nor all under some one common nature, but only one determinately and expressly, and the others implicitly and confusedly, for example, the nature of substance as such determinately and expressly, but the natures of accidents implicitly. But this mode too can be attacked no less efficaciously than the preceding ones. First, because I showed above that through the formal concept explicitly and determinately representing substance as substance, accidents are in no way represented, neither implicitly nor confusedly, if we speak properly, as I declared at length in the preceding section. Secondly, here too the argument taken from experience can be urged, from Soto, for we experience that we conceive of some thing that it is being, and doubt whether it is substance or accident; as, for example, of quantity we know evidently that it is a reality; but whether it is substance or accident we either doubt or are in opinion; therefore in that concept of being substance as substance is not included, that is, expressly and according to its proper notion. Thirdly, because otherwise the objective concept of being and the objective concept of substance would be the same; because the objective concept of substance is nothing other than the notion of substance determinately and according to its proper mode conceived by the intellect; but in the same way the notion of substance is said to be conceived through the concept of being. Again, if in the notion of substance so conceived the concepts of accidents are included confusedly or implicitly, whether it is signified by the name of being or by the name of substance, they will be included in the same way; because the notion conceived is the same, and the mode of conceiving it is the same, namely expressly and determinately; the objective concept of substance and of being, therefore, will be the same; but the consequent is plainly false and against the common mode of conceiving; for this predication, substance is substance, is identical, but this one not at all, substance is being; they differ, therefore, not only in names, but also in the objective notions which are predicated. Likewise, otherwise it would be the same to distribute every substance and every being. Likewise this proposition, accident is being, would be as false as this, accident is substance; all of which are plainly false.

14. An a priori proof of the conclusion.—Finally, from the thing itself and as it were a priori, our opinion is proved against all the aforesaid, because all real beings truly have some likeness and agreement in the notion of being; therefore they can be conceived and represented under that precise notion by which they agree among themselves; therefore they can constitute one objective concept under that notion; therefore that is the objective concept of being. The antecedent seems self-evident from the terms; for, just as being and non-being are primarily diverse and opposed, on account of which it is said to be the first principle of all, anything whatever either is or is not, so any being whatever has some agreement and likeness with any being whatever; for the intellect finds a greater agreement between substance and accident than between substance and non-being or nothing; the creature too participates in some way the being of God, and therefore is said at least to be his vestige on account of some agreement and likeness in being; by which reason we investigate the being of God from the being of the creature, and similarly the being of substance from the being of accident. Finally, by this reason we attribute to them some common properties or attributes, such as to have some goodness or perfection, to be able to act or communicate oneself, and the like; there is therefore in the thing itself some agreement and likeness between all real beings. The first consequence too is sufficiently clear of itself, both because all beings are knowable under that notion and agreement; and also because by this reason other things which have some agreement among themselves are conceived under it unitedly and conjointly, more or less in proportion to the greater or lesser agreement; and finally because in the thing there is a sufficient foundation for this mode of conceiving, and in the intellect there is not lacking the power and efficacy for such a mode of conception, for it is supremely abstractive and prescissive of all notions. And hence the second consequence too is easy, because, as we have said, the unity of an objective concept does not consist in real and numerical unity, but in formal or fundamental unity, which is nothing other than the aforesaid agreement and likeness. But the last consequence is evident, the others being presupposed, because, if such an objective concept is possible, it is transcendent, most simple, and in this way the first of all, which are the attributes of the concept of being. Likewise, that agreement is founded in the act of being, which is as it were the formal element in the concept of being; whence the argument is also taken that, just as the objective concept of being itself or existence is one, so also the concept of being. Finally, all things are founded on what we adduced above from St. Thomas, that the analogy of being is not in some form which is intrinsically in one analogate only and extrinsically in the others, but in being or entity, which is intrinsically participated by all; in that notion, therefore, all things have a real agreement, and consequently an objective unity in the notion of being.

The latter assertion

15. The objective concept of being is prescinded from every particular notion.—I say, secondly: this objective concept is prescinded according to reason from all the particulars or members dividing being, even if they are most simple entities. This conclusion seems to me to follow necessarily from the preceding one; because, since all determinate beings in some way dividing being are distinct among themselves and objectively many, they cannot be understood to agree in one objective concept unless at least according to reason a prescission and abstraction is made from the proper notions in which they are distinguished. But because the whole difficulty consists in this abstraction and prescission, it must first be declared, and afterwards the conclusion proved per se and from its proper principles.

16. It is to be noticed, therefore, that the abstraction or prescission of the intellect does not require a distinction of things, or the prescission of some notion or mode which, from the nature of the thing, precedes in the thing itself the prescission of the intellect; but that in a most simple thing a prescission of this kind can be made in various ways, namely, either after the manner of form from subject, or conversely after the manner of subject from form, or after the manner of form from form; as in God we prescind God as such from his act of will, and the act of will from God, and the act of will from the act of intellect; and similarly we prescind the subsistence of God from the nature of God as its mode, not that the intellect affirms it to be a mode, but that on its own side it conceives it after the manner of a mode. So, then, the intellect abstracts and prescinds something from something as the common from the particular, not on account of a distinction or prescission which precedes in the thing, but on account of its own imperfect, confused or inadequate mode of conceiving; by reason of which in the object which it considers it does not comprehend all that is in it as it exists in reality, but only according to some agreement or likeness which several things have among themselves, which are considered after the manner of one under that notion. From which it comes about that for an objective concept prescinded according to reason from other things or concepts a prescission of things according to themselves is not necessary, but a certain denomination from the formal concept representing that objective one suffices; namely, because through it that object is not represented according to all that is in the thing, but only according to such a notion of agreement; as is evident in the objective concept of man as such, which is said to be prescinded according to reason from Peter, Paul and the other singulars, from which it does not differ in the thing. But that prescission according to reason is a denomination from the formal concept; because, namely, man, as he is presented to such a concept, is not represented according to every mode in which he exists in the thing, but according to the agreement which several men have, who are conceived after the manner of one under that notion.

17. The reason for the conclusion.—This prescission of reason in the objective concept having thus been explained, then, it is not difficult to show that it is found in the objective concept of being; because through the formal concept of being neither God, nor created substance, nor accident is represented according to the mode in which they are in the thing, nor as they differ among themselves, but only as they in some way agree among themselves and are similar; therefore that which is immediately and adequately presented to this formal concept is prescinded according to reason from the proper objective concept of substance or accident. The antecedent has been proved in the preceding conclusion, adding also what was said in the preceding section; but the consequence is evident, because prescission according to reason consists in nothing else, as has been explained. And it is confirmed, first, for the objective concept of being is not according to reason the objective concept of substance, or of accident, or of any other determinate genus; nor is it an aggregate of all of them; therefore it is something one prescinded according to reason from them. The major and minor have been proved above; the consequence is evident, because this prescission according to reason consists only in a distinction of reason in order to the formal concepts. It is confirmed, secondly, for on account of this prescission this is not identical: substance is being, nor this: accident is being, and yet each is true, because in them something is understood to be predicated which is common to both and according to reason distinct from both. And by this reason too, as we argued above, it can happen that after conceiving something under the notion of being one doubts whether it is substance or accident, which cannot be understood without at least a distinction of reason. It is confirmed, thirdly, because for no other reason is there an objective concept of substance prescinded according to reason from all substances, and of accident from accidents, except on account of the agreement which they have, and according to which they can be precisely conceived; therefore the same must be said of the concept of being.

18. An evasion is refuted.—Perhaps someone will answer that there is not a real agreement between all beings in the notion of being, as there is between all substances in the notion of substance, or between accidents in the notion of accident. But either the sense is that between beings as such there is no real agreement, or that it is not as great as between the others. The first is plainly false, nor can it be understood except by those who think that accident, for example, is not called being except by extrinsic denomination, as medicine is called healthy, as Cajetan sometimes seems to indicate, opusc. De nominum analogia, c. 2; but it is not likely that he thought so, as will be said more fully below in treating of the analogy of being; and expressly the same Cajetan, I, q. 13, a. 5, teaches that being, although it is said analogically of God and creatures, is said of them intrinsically; and it indeed seems self-evident that something cannot be a real being by extrinsic denomination; for this is the proper notion or foundation of beings of reason, as will be said afterwards; it is necessary, therefore, that what is a real being be such really and formally through its intrinsic entity, which is the same as itself, and inseparable from it, even if all other things are understood to be prescinded or separated from it; and so accidents too, although the entity of substance is separated from them, are understood to retain intrinsically their entity, by which they are real beings; and therefore above we said with St. Thomas that the analogy of being does not exclude that the formal notion signified by being is found intrinsically in all the analogates. Hence, however, it necessarily follows that they have among themselves some real agreement according to their intrinsic notion of being, as has also been proved above. But that this agreement is perhaps not as great as that between substances or accidents among themselves in their proper notions matters nothing for the present point, for at most it concludes that the unity of the concept of being is not as great, but not that it is none, or not sufficient for the prescission of the objective concept according to reason. Just as the agreement between substances as such is not as great as that between men, and nevertheless each suffices for the unity and prescission of the objective concept.

19. It can be answered otherwise, and a difference assigned, because the notion of being is intimate to all, and therefore does not seem able to be prescinded even according to reason from any, whereas the other notions are not so intimate to things. But this difference too is none, if taken with proportion; for the notions of substance and accident too, taken most commonly, are intimately in all substances and accidents, under whatever notion they are prescinded and considered. This, therefore, in no way impedes the prescission of the objective concept, especially since it has been shown that this prescission is not always founded in some distinction of the thing, but only in such a mode of conceiving, by which the thing is considered under one aspect and not under another.

20. Another evasion is refuted.—Many things can be objected against this doctrine, which partly touch the analogy of being, partly its distinction or inclusion in all the things or modes determining it, of which we must speak in what follows. For now this alone is objected: that it follows from what has been said that the predicaments are not primarily diverse, because they agree in some common notion. The answer is that the predicaments are not called primarily diverse because they agree in nothing, since it is evident that several agreements or likenesses intervene between various predicaments; for the predicaments of accidents, besides the notion of being, agree in the notion of accident; some also agree in the notion of absolute accident and are distinguished from the respective, etc. They are called primarily diverse, therefore, because they agree in no genus, as Porphyry indicated in the chapter on species. Likewise, because they do not differ by proper differences, but by themselves, as will be evident from what is to be said in sect. V.

Corollaries from the preceding doctrine

21. The intrinsic mode of substance or accident is not included in the concept of being.—From these things I infer, first, that in this objective concept of being, so prescinded, the intrinsic modes of substance or of the other members dividing being are not actually included. It is evident, because they would be included either as constituting that concept of being, or as dividing it. Not the first, because it is impossible that one, as one, be constituted by opposite modes or differences. Nor the second, because that concept would then already be actually divided into two, and so that concept would not be one, the opposite of which has been proved. And I confirm it, for I ask what it is to include those modes actually; for either it is that in the thing itself that common concept of being actually includes those modes in the things in which it exists; or it is that in the mind, or in that objective concept, as precisely terminating such a formal concept, those opposite modes are actually included. The first of these is true, but not to the point, because this objective concept is considered as prescinded and adequate to the formal concept of being as such, and not according to the whole reality which it has in the thing in all its inferiors; for in this way the concept of being can neither be prescinded nor one, since it actually includes all that is necessary for the distinction of all the genera and concepts; nor can it properly and truly be called the concept of being as such, but they are rather several concepts of all beings according to their whole realities, from which the prescinded concept of being is not distinguished in reality. It is confirmed, for in this way the concept of man too can be said actually to include all individuals, because the objective concept of man, as it exists in the thing itself, really includes the individuals themselves and their proper modes, nor is man distinguished in the thing from his individuals any more than being is divided from substance, accident and the other genera, as will be evident below; but it will very improperly be said for this reason that the objective concept of man actually includes all individuals or their individuating principles. But speaking of the prescinded concept of being in the other sense, which is more to the point, it is false that it actually includes the opposite modes of the inferior genera, because as such it includes only what is represented through its formal concept; but through that formal concept these modes are not represented expressly and distinctly according to their proper notions, because the intellect, conceiving as such, perceives none of these, as is known from what has been said and from experience itself, and from other similar cases; for for no other reason is man said not to include the individuals actually, but only potentially, except because, as he is represented through the prescinded concept of man, no individual notion is considered in him, but only the notion of man.

22. Being does not immediately signify substance or accident.—Secondly it is inferred that this word being does not immediately signify substance or accident, or the other genera or simple entities according to their proper notions, but the objective concept of being as such, and by reason of it the genera or entities in which it exists in the thing itself. So think all the authors cited, both here and in the conclusion of the preceding section, especially Scotus, In I, dist. 3, qq. 1 and 3; Avicenna, Metaphysics I, c. 4, is also cited; Algazel, c. 6; and it is taken from St. Thomas in the places cited, and De ente et essentia, c. 1, where Cajetan in reality thinks the same, although he differs from Scotus and constitutes in this a difference between being and other names signifying determinate genera or species; but in truth there intervenes none which pertains much to the present matter, except that which is to be treated in the following section. Whence this is rather declared and proved: first, by the example of man (and the same holds of similar cases); for it immediately signifies man, and mediately Peter, in whom in reality the notion of man is found; therefore similarly being, etc. The consequent is proved from parity of reason, because in both cases the name is common, and in both the objective concept is prescinded according to reason from the inferiors, and the name does not signify them except on account of some agreement which they have among themselves.

23. Secondly it is declared a priori, because, just as words express the formal concepts of the mind, so also they immediately signify the objects which are immediately represented through concepts of this kind; for they serve to express concepts in so far as what the concepts naturally represent, words signify by imposition; and therefore a word is sometimes imposed in common, because the concept which it expresses is also common; therefore that very thing which is the immediate object of the formal concept is the immediate significate of the word adequate to that concept; but such is this word being with respect to the formal concept of being.

24. Thirdly this is declared more fully, because this word being so signifies many things that it comprehends them all from a single and first imposition; it is therefore a sign that it does not signify them immediately, but by means of some objective concept common to all of them. The antecedent is declared from the difference between the analogy of this word and of others which are analogous only through proportionality or an extrinsic relationship to one; for in the others the word always from its original imposition signifies only one thing, but afterwards through some metaphor it has been transferred to signify another; whence it comes about that it immediately signifies both as it were by a double imposition and signification. In which they agree with equivocals, and differ only in that in equivocals each imposition is equally first and does not emanate from the other, as in the aforesaid analogues. Examples are: laughter from its first imposition signifies only a certain action of man; but afterwards this word was transferred to signify the pleasantness of a field; similarly healthy from its first imposition signifies only the health existing in an animal; but afterwards it was transferred to signify other things which have a relationship to the health of the animal. And the reason is both that this manifold signification and imposition did not arise from one concept but from many, and also that it is not founded in a real agreement of the things signified, but only in an extrinsic relationship or proportion. But the name being, from its proper and original imposition, has a signification common to all beings, as is evident both from the common use and apprehension of such a word, and from its formal or quasi-formal significate, which is to be, which of itself is common and intrinsic to all real beings; and finally because that imposition arose from a single formal concept of being as such. And hence the first consequence too remains proved, because one word cannot by virtue of one imposition signify many things as many, but as they are in some way one; and therefore it is of the notion of a common word that, at least according to reason and in order to the concepts which words express, it does not immediately signify many things as they are such. Which can be shown in the present case, for being does not immediately signify substance alone, otherwise accident would not be intrinsically being; nor does it signify at once substance as substance nor accident as accident, as can easily be declared by running through those three members posited above, namely that it can immediately signify them neither disjunctively, nor copulatively, nor simply, as will easily be evident by applying the arguments given above. For these three, the formal concept, the objective concept, and the word, keep a proportion among themselves, and therefore we often argue from one to another, not indeed committing a vicious circle, but taking of each what is better known to us, or seems more easily conceded by others.

25. Fourthly I argue: because on account of this immediate signification of the common concept or notion of being, being can most properly be distributed, by saying, every being is good, and divided, for example, into substance and accident; for not only the word is divided there, but what is signified by the word. On this account too a comparison is excellently made by saying that this is a more perfect being than that, which Aristotle also makes, Metaphysics VI, c. 1. And finally we excellently use this word as an extreme or middle term of a syllogism, for the unity of the word would not serve for reasoning except by reason of one proximate and immediate significate. And in this way that common reason is excellent, that being in so far as it is being is the object of the intellect, or of the science of metaphysics; whence it is necessary that there be something one immediately signified by that word; for this reason can be efficacious in so far as that is not only an object in some way, but is also a subject about which demonstrations are made and a middle term for demonstrating something of the inferiors. Finally the experience often touched upon is added, because on hearing the name of being we conceive something, and not substance nor accident. For it cannot be said (as some indicate) that we then stop at the concept of the word, because this is against experience; for he who knows the signification of the word being forms another concept than he who is ignorant of it; for the latter conceives the word and stops there, or doubts what is signified by that word; but the former besides the word conceives the thing signified and in no way doubts about the signification, and yet does not conceive substance nor accident; this word, therefore, has another more immediate significate.

26. But Soncinas objects some reasons which we shall bring forward in the following section; for they prove only that being does not signify some medium distinct from the nature of the thing from substance and accidents, not that it cannot be distinguished by reason through a confused concept of the mind. He objects next Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 8, saying that being signifies the ten predicaments, which Averroes explains of the first signification and without a medium, whom Alexander of Hales follows there. He objects, secondly, Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 4, saying that if there are no beings abstracted from matter, natural philosophy is first philosophy, that is, the science of metaphysics can in no way be distinguished from it; which consequence would not be good if being as being signified something common to substance and accident, for that could be the object of metaphysics even if there were no immaterial beings. Thirdly we can object Aristotle, Physics I, text 25, where he indicates that being does not signify something one which can be the middle term of a syllogism; for on this account he rejects that reasoning of Parmenides: Whatever is besides being, is non-being; but non-being is nothing; therefore whatever is besides being, is nothing.

27. Fourthly Aristotle can be objected, Metaphysics VII, c. 4, text 15, saying that being itself is said of all the genera or predicaments, yet not similarly, that is, not according to the same notion and concept. Fifthly the same Aristotle is cited, Metaphysics VIII, c. 6, text 16, saying that being itself this indeed, that is, per se and as it is such, is at once substance, quality, quantity, etc., and therefore is not placed in the definition, as if he said that being descends immediately to the first genera; in which places Averroes, Alexander and St. Thomas so explain and think. Sixthly Aristotle is brought forward, Prior Analytics I, c. 28, where he indicates that the first genera are such that nothing is said of them, as Alexander and Philoponus seem to explain.

28. Solution.—To the first testimony the answer is that Aristotle says nothing there about immediate signification, but only about the general and equal predication of being and one; for they are found equally in all the predicaments, and thence he concludes that they are the same among themselves. For the efficacy of which reason it is not necessary that every medium of reason be taken away in this signification. Whence St. Thomas says there that being signifies the natures of the ten genera according as they are in act or in potency, in which he sufficiently indicates that it does not signify them immediately according to their proper notions, but according to some common one. The exposition of Averroes, therefore, is not necessary to us, although he himself sufficiently declares that he excludes only a medium which is a genus, and which signifies a definite and properly contractible nature, of which we shall speak afterwards. To the second some answer that the argument of Aristotle is good, yet not founded on this, that being cannot signify a concept common to substance and accident, but on this, that if there were no thing abstracting from matter according to being, the notion of being as such would not abstract from matter any more than the notion of body or of natural being, and therefore the consideration of being as such would not transcend the limits of natural philosophy, because then material substance would be the first being; but the science of the first being and of common being is the same, as he had said at the beginning of Book IV, and St. Thomas and Scotus notice in the said place of Book VI.

29. This common answer, however, needs greater examination. For it can first of all be doubted whether, even if there were no immaterial substances, a science of metaphysics distinct from physics and mathematics would have to be granted. For it seems it should be so asserted, for then there would be a notion of being abstracting from material substance and from quantity and the other accidents. There would also be common properties, such as true, one, same, diverse, whole, part, etc., of which neither physics nor mathematics now treats, nor would they then treat, since they are more common and exceed their proper objects. Therefore a third science superior to both would be necessary, which would accordingly be metaphysics. Whence it can secondly be doubted whether that science would then be prior to natural philosophy; for it seems it should be so said, because it would be about a more abstract and prior object.

30. It is indeed probable to me that, even with that hypothesis granted, there would still remain room for the science of metaphysics; for now only one part of it is that which disputes about spiritual substances; as regards the other parts, therefore, it could then remain, and dispute about being and the other transcendentals, and about the ten predicaments, and about the universal principles and causes. This being posited, however, nevertheless according to the mind of Aristotle, in the place cited, natural philosophy would be the first science or philosophy, at least in dignity and excellence, since it would treat of the most noble object, namely of substance as such, and of every substance; and consequently it would also treat of the first causes and principles of things, not indeed according to the abstraction of the mind, but according to the thing.

31. Whence finally it is said that it seems more probable that in that case a special science of metaphysics distinct from natural philosophy would not be necessary. The reason is that then philosophy would treat of every substance, and consequently of all accidents, even of quantity as it is a property of substance, and as regards its entity and essence, and in so far as it is distinguished both from substance itself and from all its other properties, because this whole consideration of quantity would not abstract from sensible matter nor exceed the breadth of the object of philosophy. And by the same reason the division and consideration of all the predicaments would pertain to the same philosophy, because there would be nothing in them not founded in reality in sensible substance; for the predicaments of accidents would not extend more widely than the predicament of substance. Again, the consideration of all essences and of all real causes would pertain to philosophy, for the same cause. And finally by parity of reason it would treat of the predicates common to substance and accidents, nor would it be necessary on account of these alone to constitute a special science, because they would not abstract from sensible matter, and the concept of being would not be other than the concept of material being. Nor would it stand in the way that the notion of being and similar common notions would be common to mathematical and physical things, because that community would only be according to real agreement, not according to some peculiar abstraction pertaining to the constitution of the object of a science. Just as now too continuous and discrete quantity agree in the common notion of quantity, and yet there is not one common mathematics, because physics sufficiently treats of that agreement and common notion, in which no special abstraction constituting a peculiar knowable object is found; so, then, it would be in that case.

32. To the third testimony, omitting the exposition of Soto and others, who say that that proposition is false, whatever is besides being, is non-being, because being said simply is taken for substance—for this is rigorously false, as I shall show below, and moreover, the proportion of predicate and subject being kept, it would still be true to say that whatever is besides being is non-being—omitting (I say) this exposition, the answer is that Aristotle does not deny that being can be the middle term of a syllogism, nor does he reject the reasoning of Parmenides on this account, but both because he took being to be one properly and rigorously, although it is only analogous, and also because he used the word one equivocally; for thus from the premisses posited above he concluded that that which is, or being, is one; therefore whatever is besides one is nothing; so as to conclude that all things are one, which is a manifest equivocation, for he intended that all things are one in the thing itself; but being, if it is taken precisely, and as it were immovably, is not one in this way, but only in reason; but if it is taken distributively and for individual beings, then indeed each being is one, but all things are not one.

33. To the fourth that exposition is denied; for when Aristotle says that being exists in all, but not similarly, it is not rightly explained as not by one concept, but as not in the same mode, because it is said of substance simply, but of the others in a certain respect, as St. Thomas explains. The fifth proves only that being is not such a medium as is properly contracted to its inferiors by something which is not being, but by simple determination, by which each genus is of itself being, and such being, which is most true, as we shall see more fully, sects. 5 and 6; it does not, however, exclude a medium concept from our confused mode of conceiving. To the sixth I answer first of all that Aristotle makes no mention there of the ten first genera; but he says absolutely that there are some things which are predicated of others, but nothing of them; which we can explain of the transcendentals, of which nothing is predicated as superior, for so that proposition seems to have to be restricted; for as an equal, there is nothing of which something cannot be predicated, since the transcendentals themselves are predicated properly of one another, and not altogether identically. Whence if anyone wishes to explain that member of the ten genera, he must restrict it otherwise to superior predicates which are genera or species; for absolutely how can it be true, since it is evidently established that many things are predicated of the first genera? Indeed Aristotle himself, Posterior Analytics II, c. 14, indicates that some superior or more universal predicates are contained within a genus, but others are said of others even outside a genus, which all the expositors understand to have been said on account of being and the like.

34. The concept of being, even as it is compared to its inferiors, is prescinded from them.—Finally it follows from what has been said that being expresses a concept one and prescinded not only as it is considered absolutely abstracted, but also as it is compared to its inferiors in order to be predicated of them, or is considered as existing in them. It is proved, because after any abstractive knowledge of a common concept from particulars the intellect can make a comparative one; therefore that very thing which is abstracted in being it can compare to its inferiors; for there is no greater repugnance in the concept of being than in other common ones, but rather the same reason, namely because that whole concept is in the inferiors themselves, whether it is distinguished from them in reality or in reason only, for this matters nothing; indeed, the less the distinction between them in reality, the more truly will one be attributed to the other; for thus, although we prescind the wisdom of God, and distinguish it from God by reason, comparing it to God we truly and properly say that wisdom is in God. In this manner, then, the notion of being precisely conceived is rightly compared to substance and accident and is said to be in them, and in this way these predications are made, substance is being, and accident is being. Whence it is confirmed, because every such comparison or composition is made from simple concepts; therefore, after the intellect has conceived being precisely, it can at the same time conceive substance or accident according to their proper concepts, because these simple concepts have no repugnance among themselves, as is self-evident; therefore similarly the intellect can then compare being to substance as existing in it, and similarly to accident; therefore the concept of being, even as compared to the concept of substance and accident, is prescinded from them according to reason.

35. You will say: therefore the concept of being, even as included in its inferiors, is prescinded from them, which is repugnant to what has been said above, because as included in its inferiors it is nothing other than they themselves, since there is nothing in them which is not being. The consequence is evident, because being cannot be compared to its inferiors or predicated of them except as it is in them; therefore, if as expressing a prescinded concept it is compared to its inferiors, then also as it is in them it will be prescinded. The answer is that there is an equivocation from our mode of conceiving to the thing itself, and conversely. Rigorously, therefore, the consequence is denied, because, although the concept of being, which is prescinded by us according to reason, is in its inferiors, nevertheless as it is prescinded, formally speaking, it is not in its inferiors; that is, it does not have in them that state or mode of being which it has by extrinsic denomination from the prescission of the intellect. But when it is said that this concept, even as prescinded, is compared to its inferiors and attributed to them, the sense is not that according to that prescission or denomination it is attributed to its inferiors, but only that that notion so conceived, compared to its inferiors, is found included in all of them. Wherefore, if that reduplication is not made of the notion of being as prescinded, but the discussion is simply of the notion of being precisely conceived, it is true that that notion is in the inferiors and is altogether and intimately included in them, and nevertheless is prescinded by reason, although in the thing it is not prescinded.

36. But at once a difficulty presses, because according to these things nothing seems to be lacking to the concept of being for the notion of a proper universal, for it will be one in many and of many. But this difficulty depends on the two reasons for doubting posited at the beginning of the section. One is about the univocation of being, because if being is not univocal, that reason suffices for it not to be properly universal; but how it does not follow from what has been said that it is univocal, and what it lacks for univocation, is to be treated below in its proper place, in dealing with the divisions of being; for now I only assert that all the things we have said about the unity of the concept of being seem far clearer and more certain than that being is analogous, and therefore that the unity of the concept is not rightly denied in order to defend analogy; but if one of the two had to be denied, it would rather be analogy, which is uncertain, than the unity of the concept, which seems to be demonstrated by certain reasons, that would have to be denied. In reality, however, it is not necessary that either be denied, because for univocation it is not enough that the concept be in itself in some way one, but it is necessary that it regard many with an equal relationship and order, which the concept of being does not have, as we shall expound more fully in the place cited. The other difficulty was about the mode in which being descends, or is drawn, to its inferiors according to reason, concerning which matter we shall make a proper section a little below, because it both has an obscure difficulty and depends on other things to be said first.

1. Explanation of the question.—This question can seem common to all superior grades or concepts with respect to their inferiors, of which we must treat in Disp. V, sect. 1, and Disp. VI, sect. 2. But here it has a special difficulty on account of the transcendence of being, and therefore it must be briefly dispatched here, supposing that, besides the perfect real distinction which intervenes between entities mutually separable, another lesser one can be found in things before the intellect, such as is wont to be between a thing and a mode of the thing, as we shall say more fully below. Here, then, we suppose as certain that the notion of being is not really distinguished in the former way from the inferiors in which it exists, which is self-evident in every common predicate, and will be evident a fortiori from what is to be said.¹ We inquire, however, whether to be such or such being adds some mode distinct from the nature of the thing and before the intellect from being itself, so that being, and such being, for example substance, are distinguished from the nature of the thing in their formal notion, in so far as substance adds some mode which being does not express.

Arguments for the affirmative part

2. The first.—It seems from what has been said to follow that this should be affirmed. First, because the notion of being is the same in the thing as is conceived in the mind; but as conceived in the mind it does not include the mode of substance or accident; therefore neither in the thing itself; but the notions of substance or accident include their modes; therefore the notion of being in the thing is distinct from them. The major (for all the rest are known) is proved, because we do not say that the notion of being is in the thing in the same way in which it is conceived, as regards, namely, the mode which it has from the prescission of the one conceiving; but we say that that notion conceived is the same as is in the thing; and this seems self-evident, because the intellect in this concept does not feign the thing or the notion conceived; therefore it conceives the same one which is in the thing.

3. The second.—Secondly, things which are separable in reality are in some way distinct in reality, because these two include negations of the same notion, or equivalent ones, especially in finite things; but the notion of being is separable in reality from the notion of substance, for it is preserved in accident, and conversely it is separable from the notion of accident, because it is preserved in substance alone; therefore it is in some way distinct in reality from them. You will say that the notion of being which is in substance is not separable from it, nor that which is in accident from it, and therefore a distinction from the nature of the thing between them is not necessary. But on the contrary, for the aforesaid mode of separation suffices for a distinction from the nature of the thing, namely, that somewhere one notion can be found without another; because, if in the thing they are altogether the same, it does not seem intelligible, especially in finite things, that they should not always accompany each other, because things which are altogether the same in reality are the same everywhere; but in accident, for example, the notion of being and the notion of substance are not the same; therefore neither are they the same according to themselves and absolutely.

4. The third.—Which is declared thirdly in this way, because substance in reality is not substance by the same thing by which it is being (and the same holds of accident); therefore there is some distinction from the nature of the thing between the objective concept of being and of substance, even as they are in the thing in substance itself. The antecedent is evident, because substance is being by the same thing by which accident is, for in the notion of being they are one; therefore substance is not substance by that by which it is being, otherwise whatever was constituted in the notion of being by that reason would also be constituted in the notion of substance. But the first consequence is proved, because a distinction from the nature of the thing is excellently gathered from distinct formal or constitutive effects; since, therefore, something other is constituted by the notion of substance than by the notion of being as such, it is necessary that in the thing they have some distinction.

5. The fourth.—Fourthly, it is wont to be judged a difficult argument that it seems impossible that the same thing according to the same should agree with another and differ from it; but substance in reality and before any intellect agrees with, or is similar to, accident in the notion of being, but differs from it, or is dissimilar, in the notion of substance; therefore these two are distinguished from the nature of the thing in some way in substance itself; otherwise according to altogether the same it would be similar and dissimilar to accident. That this is impossible is proved because these two include a contradiction, for agreement and likeness express some notion of unity; for likeness is founded in unity, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics V; but dissimilitude rather expresses a notion of multitude. And the contradiction is confirmed and explained; because, if in substance the notion of substance and of being is altogether the same, then whatever is of the essence of substance is of the essence of being, and conversely; otherwise they would differ essentially, for when anything whatever is added or taken away the essence is changed; but if they differ essentially, then in the thing itself they have some distinction, for the essential notion consists in the thing itself. But if whatever is of the essence of substance is of the essence of being, it follows both that the notion of substance is found in accident, with which it agrees in the notion of being, and that it is not found, because in truth accident is not substance, but dissimilar to it. It follows also that substance is similar to accident in the notion of being, because this is supposed, and not similar, because the notion of being in substance is not of the same mode as the notion of being in accident. And consequently it also follows that the notion of being is affirmed of accident on account of its agreement with substance, and can be denied on account of the disagreement which it is said to have in the same notion. Finally, agreement and disagreement express essentially diverse relations; therefore they require in the thing essentially diverse foundations and reasons of founding or terminating.

6. On account of these and similar arguments some think that being expresses an objective concept distinct from the nature of the thing and prescinded from all its inferiors and from the concepts, however simple, contained under it, such as substance, accident and the like; and this is commonly judged to be the opinion of Scotus, In I, dist. 3, qq. 1 and 3, and dist. 8, q. 2, and In II, dist. 3, q. 1; and the Scotists follow it, who a fortiori think the same of all universal predicates, of which more fully below.

The true opinion

7. Nevertheless it must be said that the objective concept of being, as it exists in the thing itself, is not something distinct from the nature of the thing and prescinded from the inferiors in which it exists. This is the common opinion of the whole School of St. Thomas, which first of all all those necessarily teach who deny that the objective concept of being is prescinded in reason, as Soncinas, Cajetan, Ferrariensis; and Cajetan specially declared it in the said opusc. De ente et essentia, c. 1, q. 2; and Fonseca holds the same, in the place cited, although he seems to think otherwise about the distinction between superior and inferior essential predicates, Metaphysics II, c. 2, text 11, and elsewhere, of which below in its place. The same also a fortiori all hold who deny that the genus is distinguished from the nature of the thing from its species, or the species from its individuals, as Gregory, In I, dist. 8, qq. 2 and 3; Capreolus, q. 4, a. 3, in the answer to the arguments against the second conclusion; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 36; Soto, on the Logic, q. 3, a. 26.² Capreolus specially holds the same opinion, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, in the answer to Scotus’s arguments against the last conclusion. And it is the open opinion of St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, c. 26, fourth argument; indeed Scotus too, Metaphysics X, text 3, seems to hold this opinion; for he constitutes a difference between being and one; for being (he says) predicates the same nature really and formally of the genera of which it is predicated quidditatively; but one, although it predicates the same nature really, does not predicate it formally, because one expresses an attribute, not an essence. Although perhaps Scotus spoke there in another sense, namely that being expresses the essence of all the genera, yet not the whole, whereas one is altogether outside the essence. And this opinion is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, last chapter, text 16, where he says that being itself is determined by itself, without anything added, to substance, quantity, quality, and therefore is not placed in definitions, because it does not express a determinate nature contractible through some difference. And so the Commentator, St. Thomas, and Alexander of Hales explained it there; but Scotus explains that Aristotle excludes differences really distinct, but not formally distinct. But this is both openly against the mind of Aristotle and is not said consistently even by Scotus himself, because the inferior genera too are not really distinguished from their differences, but at most formally, according to the doctrine of the same Scotus; therefore Aristotle excludes this distinction and composition too in the determination of being to its inferiors.

8. The first reason.—It is proved by reason, first. If being and substance are distinguished from the nature of the thing, they are related either as whole and part, or as including and included, or as altogether co-distinct. This latter no one says, nor can it be apprehended; otherwise substance, taken precisely and formally as co-distinct from being, would not include being, which is impossible, since it is of the essential concept of substance to be being simply. But that the first too cannot be said is proved, for if being and substance are distinguished in that way, substance can be resolved into two concepts distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore in any singular substance there is that distinction from the nature of the thing which precedes the intellect, and must be in the singular things themselves; those two concepts, therefore, will be distinguished not only as they are apprehended by us, but also in the thing itself. But that this is impossible can be shown on the side of each concept; first on the side of the concept of being itself, for if in the thing itself it prescinds and is distinguished from the mode contracting it to the being of substance, I ask what kind of being is that which is understood to remain when that mode is prescinded. For either it is common being, abstracted from all singularity, or being determined to singular being. The first is evidently false, both because otherwise there would be in the thing itself a universal thing, universally, which is repugnant, because that being is existing and produced in reality; therefore it is intrinsically determined and singular; and also because it is incommunicable to another besides this substance, if we speak in the individual. The second, therefore, must necessarily be said, and then I ask whether in being so prescinded from the mode of substance there is some distinction from the nature of the thing between the common notion of being and such being, or not; for if there is a distinction, the same argument returns; for it will be necessary to resolve that concept into two, and so proceed to infinity; but if there is no distinction, then, in order that the common notion of being be determined to such being, it is not necessary to feign a distinction from the nature of the thing between them; therefore neither in order that being be determined to substance; for the reason is the same, and all the arguments made at the beginning can be applied to that concept of being which is said to be prescinded from substance as it really exists in it, and must necessarily be solved in it, and so no foundation will remain for feigning such a distinction. Besides, a real and singular entity can scarcely be conceived by the mind which nevertheless, in its intrinsic and essential notion, most formally does not include the notion of substance or accident.

9. Next, the same can be shown on the side of the other concept, or mode contracting being; for I inquire whether being is intrinsically included in it or not; if it is not included, it is nothing; substance, therefore, adds nothing over being, nor can that effect a distinction between being and substance; indeed, neither can it determine or contract being or constitute substance; for how will that which is nothing accomplish all these things? But if it is included, then that mode too includes the whole concept of substance, and of it the question returns whether it is distinguished from the nature of the thing from being or not; for if it is not distinguished, the same can be said of substance; but if it is distinguished, it will be necessary to resolve it into two other concepts distinct from the nature of the thing, and so proceed to infinity. It could be answered to this argument by denying the two-membered partition posited at the beginning, namely, that being is distinguished from substance as part from part, or as part from whole, but rather as a simple common concept from a simple particular concept, so that the common is included in the particular, although not conversely. But although this answer perhaps takes something true, as we shall expound more fully below, nevertheless it manifestly follows from it that there cannot be a distinction from the nature of the thing between the concept of being, as it really exists in its inferiors, and those inferiors. For if the inferior concept, for example of substance, is simple, so that it cannot be resolved into two concepts distinct among themselves from the nature of the thing, how can it be understood that there is in it a distinction from the nature of the thing between it and something included in it? This very thing, therefore, sufficiently declares that this mode of distinction is not actually in the things themselves, but only as in its foundation, and is completed through the prescission of reason.

10. The second reason.—Secondly, the concept of being is prescinded not only from creatures, but also from God; but in God the concept of being as such is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the concept of such being, namely uncreated or infinite; therefore neither in the other beings. The major is evident from what has been said, and the minor too is certain, both from the supreme simplicity of God, for if there were in him any distinction from the nature of the thing, he would not be supremely simple; and also because otherwise there would be in things some real notion distinct from the nature of the thing from all others, of itself and by its nature prior to God as he is God, namely that notion of being which in God would be distinct from the notion of God; but this is impossible, because God as God is essentially the first being in duration, in perfection and in nature. Finally, because that very notion of being which is in God essentially has the divine properties, such as to be independent and uncreated; whence also according to that notion of being as it is in the thing God is infinitely distant from creatures. By which arguments Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, q. 2, contends to prove that being does not express a prescinded objective concept; but they prove it of prescission according to the thing, not of prescission according to reason. But the first consequence of the argument is proved, because, although the concepts inferior to being in creatures are not as simple as the concept of God, and therefore their reason can seem unlike, nevertheless in the present matter it is the same; both because, if the reasons made at the beginning showed a distinction from the nature of the thing between being and its inferiors, they would show altogether the same in God, for they can be applied in the same way, as will be evident in the solutions; and also because with respect to being as such the inferior concepts of creatures too are simple, and in them no reality can be understood prior in nature to the proper entity of each according to its determinate notion. For how can it be conceived that in substance there is really or from the nature of the thing some entity prior under the notion of being than under the notion of substance?

11. The third reason.—Finally I argue: because the mere distinction of our concepts, by which we conceive something after the manner of common and particular, does not sufficiently indicate a distinction from the nature of the thing in the thing conceived; therefore neither does it indicate it in the concept of being with respect to its inferiors; therefore there is no such distinction. This second consequence is evident, because no other indication or vestige of such a distinction can be thought out, which is not to be asserted not only without a sufficient, but also without a compelling reason, because, speaking universally, distinctions are not to be multiplied without cause, and especially and specially this one, which can scarcely be conceived by the mind. But the first consequence is evident, because there is no greater reason concerning the common and particular concept in being than in the others; indeed in being, on account of its transcendence, there is less reason for distinction. But the first antecedent is evident first of all in divine things alone, for the concept of divine person is common to the three divine persons, which agree in that common notion and are distinguished in their proper ones, and yet in each of them the notion of person and the notion of such a person are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, but by reason only. Next it is evident also in notions common to God and creatures, as has almost already been explained in the notion of being as it exists in God. And it can also be declared in the notion of wisdom, for example, in which created and uncreated wisdom agree in some way, and yet neither in uncreated wisdom are the common notion of wisdom and the proper notion of such wisdom distinguished from the nature of the thing, on account of its supreme simplicity and perfection; nor can those two notions be distinguished from the nature of the thing in created wisdom, because, however much you prescind the notion of wisdom, if you consider it existing in the thing in created wisdom, you will understand it as intrinsically created, and consequently in the thing itself undistinguished, and in no way prescinded from the nature of the thing from that mode by which it is determined to the being of created wisdom; otherwise it would be necessary to understand in created wisdom some real notion of wisdom which not only according to reason but also according to the thing would abstract from the notion of created and uncreated, which is both most absurd and cannot be conceived by the mind, because whatever there is of entity in created wisdom is made and dependent. Finally, the same can be shown in notions common to created things alone, which we shall do at length below in disputing about universals; now it is briefly declared, because from the subtlety and mode of conceiving of the human intellect these superior and inferior concepts can be varied and multiplied in infinite ways; it is therefore a sign that this is not always founded in a distinction which is in the things, but in our mode of conceiving, some foundation of likeness, agreement or eminence of the things themselves being supposed; otherwise it would be necessary to feign in each thing infinite modes distinct from the nature of the thing, by which it would be fully constituted in itself and fully distinguished from others. Which is declared by one or another example, for the common sense, for example, has the power of perceiving the objects of all the external senses; therefore there can be abstracted a concept common to sight and the interior sense, namely of a sense perceptive of colour, and another common to hearing and the common sense, namely of a sense perceptive of sound, and so of the others. But who would say that in the common sense the power of perceiving colour or sound is distinguished from the nature of the thing between themselves, or that the power of sensing in common is distinguished in that sense from the proper power and mode by which it attains its objects, and not rather that there is there one simple power which attains all those objects, which the intellect, conceiving inadequately, compares with other things, and so abstracts common concepts, distinct not in the thing but in reason? The same holds in the light of the sun, in so far as it has both the power of illuminating, in which it agrees with the brightness of fire, and of heating, in which it agrees with heat, and of drying, in which it agrees with dryness; and from all these the intellect can abstract various concepts, all of which it is frivolous and without foundation to think distinct from the nature of the thing in the light.

Solutions of the arguments

12. The first is answered.—To the arguments posited at the beginning, then, the answer is, first in general, that in all of them there is a great equivocation, arguing from the objective notion as prescinded by the intellect to it as it is in the thing, and attributing to the things themselves what belongs only by extrinsic denomination to the notions conceived and prescinded, as they are under such a consideration and prescission of the intellect. And this is most of all to be considered in all these argumentations, which are founded only on the mode of speaking and conceiving. For as we conceive, so we speak; whence, just as our concepts, even if they are true and not false, are nevertheless not always adequate to the things themselves, so also words are commensurate with our concepts; and therefore we must beware lest we transfer our mode of conceiving to the things themselves, and on account of a diverse mode of speaking think that there is a distinction in the things where there truly is none.

13. To the first, then, the answer is by denying the first consequence; for the notion of being is said to be the same in the thing as is in the mind because in truth all beings have in the thing that likeness and agreement under which the intellect conceives them when it conceives being; and because this mode of conceiving being is inadequate with respect to beings as they are in the thing, therefore the notion of being so conceived is said not to include the determinate modes of beings; in which expression the discussion is no longer of the notion of being absolutely and as it is in itself, but as it is under the denomination of the intellect; whence it is the same as if it were said that through that concept being is not considered under the express notions of the inferior beings, but only by a common and inadequate concept; and therefore it is not rightly inferred that in the thing itself too the notion of being as it is in individual beings does not include their proper notions or modes. The major proposition assumed could also be distinguished, namely that the notion of being is the same in the thing as is conceived in the mind; for it is the same really, yet not in reason; and this is enough for it to be able in the thing to include the proper notions of the inferior beings, although as precisely conceived it does not include them; just as divine wisdom is the same in the thing as is conceived in the mind, although as conceived in the mind it is not understood to include justice, which in the thing itself it essentially includes; because that it does not include it as conceived means only that it is not expressly and distinctly considered as including it, by that prescissive concept, not a negative one.

14. To the second.—To the second it was rightly answered there that the notion of being in substance is not separable from substance, and similarly in accident; and hence rather identity and indistinction from the nature of the thing is gathered, because things which are so related in the thing that they neither are really distinguished nor can one be separated from the other, nor conversely, there is no reason why they should be distinguished in the thing itself, unless from elsewhere there is some sufficient principle of distinction, of which none is found in the present case. Whence to the rejoinder the answer is that the notion of being which is found in substance is not found the same according to the thing in accident, nor conversely, but only the same according to reason, that is, according to a certain agreement and likeness which reason can precisely conceive after the manner of one; and for this it is enough that such a notion, which is conceived in this way as common, be distinct according to reason from the proper notions of substance and accident. For what is proper to an infinite thing is only that the same thing in number be communicable to many really distinct things, through perfect identity with each and all of them, although each of them is incommunicable. But that the same thing, which is really simple in itself, that is, not composed of grades distinct from the nature of the thing, should be really incommunicable to another with which it has some likeness and agreement, by reason of which some notion common to both is conceived in them, this does not exceed the perfection of a finite thing; indeed in any thing whatever, however imperfect, something of this kind can be found.

15. To the third.—To the third the answer is, first, that substance in the thing itself is being by the same thing by which it is substance, and conversely, namely through its intrinsic nature and entity which it has in the thing; and the same holds, proportion being kept, in accident. Wherefore in the same sense substance is not being by the same thing by which accident is, nor conversely; for accident is being through accidental entity and in order to substance; but substance is being through substantial entity, absolute in itself from order or relationship to a subject; nor in this way (speaking in the same sense) are accident and substance one in the notion of being, as they are constituted in the thing itself. Secondly it is said that, if we speak not according to the thing, but according to prescinding reason, then substance is not substance by the same thing by which it is being—by the same thing (I say) according to reason; but from this sense it can only be concluded that the notion of being and of substance are distinguished by reason in substance itself, and similarly the notion of being and of accident in accident. And in the same way substance and accident can only be said to be constituted by the same thing in the notion of being in the way in which they are one in that concept, namely according to reason. Whence it can only be concluded that that notion common to both is distinguished from their proper ones through the prescission of the intellect.

16. How the same entity can agree and differ through the same most simple notion.—To the fourth: it seems impossible to some that the same thing according to the thing, without any distinction from the nature of the thing which it has in itself, should be the principle or foundation of agreement and distinction from another, on account of the argument given. Others, however, think that this is indeed repugnant in univocal agreement, but not in analogous, which would be enough for us. I, however, think that even in univocal agreement it is not repugnant, as is evident from examples, both in divine and in created things. For the Father and the Son agree univocally in the notion of person; for who will deny that there is some unity and agreement there, or affirm that it is analogous, since in the notion of person one is as perfect as the other? And yet in the individual persons no distinction from the nature of the thing can be feigned between the foundation of distinction and of agreement. For the same paternity, most simple in itself in its relative entity, is really distinguished from filiation and agrees with it in the common notion of relation or personality; and it is similar as it were generically and dissimilar as it were specifically, although in it these grades or concepts are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. In creatures, quantity and quality (as is probable) agree univocally in the notion of accident, and yet in each of them the notion of accident is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the proper one, as will be said more fully below; and I think the same is the case with all species with respect to their individuals, as will be said in its place. The reason, however, is that if distinction and agreement are of diverse orders, it is not repugnant that they be founded in the same thing; for thus one does not involve the negation of the other, indeed in a certain way it requires it. And so it is in the present case; for the distinction is real, but the agreement according to reason only, and therefore it is not repugnant that two simple things which are really primarily diverse according to the thing should according to reason have a unity founded in the real likeness or agreement which they have among themselves. For things which are diverse in the thing can be similar in that very thing in which they are distinguished; indeed likeness intrinsically demands distinction according to the thing with some unity of reason, or formal, or fundamental unity, for the same thing is not properly similar to itself. But if this agreement or likeness is imperfect, such as it is in the analogy of being and the like, it is more easily understood how things, however primarily diverse among themselves, can nevertheless have some imperfect agreement; for they are not called primarily diverse because they are in no way similar among themselves—for this it is not necessary to find in any real things or notions—but because they are primarily distinguished by themselves; with which distinction the aforesaid imperfect agreement stands. An example of this matter is in God, in whom no distinction of grades from the nature of the thing can be thought out; whence that most simple nature by itself is altogether distinct from created nature, and yet at the same time is the principle of some analogous agreement in a certain respect with the same; these two, therefore, are not repugnant.

17. To the last confirmation the answer is evident from what has been said. For it has already been said that the notion of substance and of being in substance is altogether the same according to the thing, yet differs by reason, and by the prior consideration has in substance the same essential notion, yet diverse by reason; and the same holds of the notion of being and of accident as they are found in accident; but conversely accident and substance compared among themselves are said to have in the notion of being the same essential notion according to reason only, not according to the thing; and in all the inferences made in that confirmation an equivocation is committed, by not distinguishing the diverse notions and modes of agreement and distinction.