De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

The second treatise is that in which you properly provoke me, tear me, accuse me, and refute me. You give it the title, A Defense of the Catholics who argued for the possible certainty of present grace. But you did not need to defend all. For very many now think otherwise than you. Nay, I do not know who else persists with you. But immediately in the dedicatory epistle to the Fathers you say that after the completion of the former interpretation of the decree, there was brought to you a book of a friend and most dear brother in the Lord, naming me, in which, you say, there are many things which you do not approve, and which you think deservedly should be greatly disapproved by the learned and those skilled in sacred letters. Either you would not have called me a most dear friend, or you would not have immediately cast me down so gratuitously. But so you are wont to treat friends.

There follows in your Epistle: “That, however, displeased me most, and most deservedly, that in the question of the possible certainty of grace he testifies that we defended (I, namely) those things which were not only always alien from our mind and thought, but even diametrically opposed to those things which we pronounced in clear words, and even recited in writing in your presence.” As I see, you are speaking of yourself alone: but whether you speak of yourself and your companions matters little. But how I imposed nothing on you, but rather the things which you were long defending, and which you, Reverend father, still hold with tooth and nail, I shall immediately make clear while discussing the title of my question, which you keep rubbing again by pressing it. But what you add, that I attack you yourself with your name suppressed in that disputation, believe nothing less. For I was disputing in general against those who had defended that opinion, in order to explain the reasons of the Synod. Nor did I remember you, if there is any faith in a Christian: nor indeed could I think that anyone of the Catholics would rise again against me after the holy decree of the council. Although I prayed that no one would any longer persist in that opinion. In the matter itself you again ask marvelously that we (you namely and I) agree concerning the question defined by the Synod. Wherefore you grieve that it was not permitted to you to see our book before it was printed, so that I might understand that you think nothing other than I think. To which I answer that we disagree so much that, as I conjecture from your recent writings, even if I had conferred the matter with you, it would have agreed no more. And these words are words altogether.

Let us come therefore to your apology, which you immediately begin with a protestation.¹ For, you say, “it would have been too laborious and very burdensome to censure all the things which offend me in that book,” and you do not approve the rest which you do not reprehend. Good God, how great was the danger if you had approved all things, since you thought it a holy thing to send such a protestation before. What if you had reprobated all things? Would the whole authority of my little book therefore be shattered? So you alone reckon with yourself: but to me you would have cast no care by protesting against it. Books were indeed sent to the Illustrious and Reverend Legates: who affirm that they found nothing in it² which does not savor of chaste, entire and Christian doctrine. The words are in the form of one of them. But I was not mindful of you, who would subscribe. Although I am not so stupid as not to understand how many things of mine can be reprehended. Especially because not even all the things of others could have been approved by me. Nor indeed of those whose shoelace I am not worthy to untie.

You add that I give no small scandal when I said that the contest with the Catholics is ours, and still remains. For I said, “The contest exists”: when³ it has now (you say) been defined by the Synod, I ought to have said, “It existed”: as if there were now no question. I could answer that I used the word of the present sincerely, and perhaps too securely, which is the word of disputants. And besides, that the question still exists with the Protestants, who do not yet obey the council. But that you may see how sometimes a spark leaps into the face of those who dig under fire with a sword, I say again that the contest now exists with you, who are a Catholic. Wherefore you, my lord bishop, are the one who has given scandal⁴ in the judgment of all. For to say that it was disputed in the council contrary to what has been defined, and indeed to say it for the sake of explaining the decree, was no scandal: but an excellent praise of the holy Synod, which freely permits all to bring forward their evidence, from which the truth might be elicited. But you, who come forth against the Catholics in order to retain your own opinions, are the one who casts scandal and stumbling block.

For let us see the title of the question, concerning which you assert that there is no difference between us.⁵ My words are these: “The question therefore is whether a man, without the special privilege of revelation, can by the common law have as great a certainty that he is in grace as is catholic faith.” And below: “The question therefore is established only concerning the certainty of catholic faith, and of that which is similar to it.” You contend that a question was never agitated among Catholics under such a title. But I was never present in the congregation of the Theologians, but I say that I myself, in your presence, in the congregation of the Synod, when I spoke on this matter, explained the question thus. And even if it had not been formally discussed under this title, nevertheless the very sense which you still persist in defending is plainly reduced to these words. I shall therefore repeat what I said a little before: these little words “so great”⁶ and “similar” are those which, being wrongly understood by you (if you pardon me, most worshipful father), deceive you. For according to the two senses of the question I placed two particles in the question: the first against the Lutherans, namely whether we can by catholic faith be certain of our grace; the other for the Catholics: namely whether we can be certain by as great or similar certainty as is catholic. Nor did I understand concerning quantity or similarity in extension, that is, which would extend to all things proposed by the Church with the universality of obliging all: which is what “catholic” means. For in this I well see there is no difference among Catholics, since all deny it. Nor was there need to mention this sense. But whether by a similar certainty, or as great in this effect which is most similar to the effect of catholic faith, and therefore so great that it altogether takes away and expunges every doubt, one can be certain of obtained grace. This I acknowledge only where there is a special privilege: but you hold it in all those things by common law through those circumstances of yours from an internal light. Why then do you beat me about this matter gratuitously, my father? Can you deny that there has been a very long controversy on this point, who strive to maintain the same? But it ought not, you say, to be called equal or similar to catholic. You would not call it so, who dissemble the true revelation of faith, if you do not ignore it. For properly there is no faith except that which in the manner explained⁷ is equal to catholic faith. But if in disciplines of this kind, the handmaids of theology, it had ever been your leisure to engage in scholastic matters, you would never have produced this business for us. Aristotle, 6 Ethic., for this reason did not place faith among the habits of virtue, because there is no human faith which transcends the line of opinion. And therefore the true account of faith, which he himself did not know, cannot be expressed — namely, that which takes away all doubt — except by this, that it is similar to catholic faith. And so between moral or human faith and catholic faith, or that which is similar to it, there is no middle ground among theologians who are worthy of the name. But I do not wish anything to be taken away from the authority of one Bacon, however much he hallucinated here.⁸ For he concludes (which is a most approved inference for you) from one proposition of faith and another which is not of faith, a conclusion as if of faith, by this syllogism: Whoever is baptized receives grace: I am baptized: therefore I receive grace. Not considering that the conclusion follows the weaker part. Which is an axiom most known of itself in the Analytics. For if that on account of which each thing is such is more so (as the philosopher says), where both premises are necessary for the inference, the conclusion cannot become more certain than the weaker premise. But that by the common law no one has faith that he is baptized stronger than moral faith is most evident. Whether we speak of those who were baptized as infants, or of adults, to whom the intention of the baptizer is not most certainly established: which is plainly necessary where there is not in the baptized sufficient contrition and disposition, which would suffice without the sacrament. But concerning that disposition no greater certainty can be had than conjectural. And these things concerning the title of the question.

You persist thereafter in contending, in corroboration of your conclusion, that man by the light of faith can not only believe those things which have been determined by the Church to be believed, but that its light extends even to those things which are in contingent matters of fact. With what ears that was received in the congregation of theologians, I dissembled in my treatise: because he who brought it forward is certainly a Catholic, learned in religion, and most dear to me, who said it with the best zeal: although some believed that it was your suggestion. But I think it has been sufficiently refuted by me. And because you answer nothing to me, I make no reply. Except that, besides the fact that your opinion strongly favors the Lutherans, the proper object of faith is altogether things to be hoped for, as Paul says, namely those things which the Church proposes as divinely revealed. Whence St. Thomas and the theologians place two things necessary for generating faith in us⁹ (for we say nothing of the manner in which revelation was made to the Prophets and Apostles). These two are the internal motion of light, and likewise the authority of the Church proposing that these things have been revealed. For otherwise, what certainty would Christians have that this or that has been revealed by God? I speak apart from special privilege. But wonderful is your eloquence. For you say that this assertion of yours needs no disputation or answer: since to deny it is against the most evident Scriptures. But after this hyperbole you bring forward no Scripture: surely because all would have cried out against you. But you add the testimony of Augustine and St. Thomas, saying¹⁰ that by the very light of faith a man can certainly know that he has infused faith. Which, namely, is not proposed by the Church. In the first place you cite the authors most falsely. For that word “infused” which you mention, you impose on them. For Augustine and Thomas only say that one can see that he believes, if he believes: and that he does not believe, if he does not believe. Where the discourse is not about the habit, but about the act. For Augustine never dreamed that anyone sees a habit, whether it be infused or acquired. Nay, Scotus rightly says that infused habits are not seen. But they only affirm this, that when one believes, he sees that he believes: as one who opines sees that he opines, and one who is angry sees that he is angry: and so of other acts or affections of the soul. But this evidence he by no means thinks is begotten by the light of faith, but from evident experience. For what we hope for (as Paul says), and by like reason what we believe, we do not see. For faith is the argument of things not apparent. See whither this ignorance of dialectic precipitates you, which by publicly despising it you confess was very little cared for by you. Answer, I pray, whether I see that God is three? Not certainly, but I believe by faith: unless with Paul you strictly say that we see through a glass and in an enigma. But do I see that I believe that God is three? I see it indeed, and that most evidently. Yet I do not see by what faith I believe, but I hold by faith that it is by infused faith. That is, by a divine motion. Therefore that evidence of which Augustine speaks, that I see that I believe if I believe, is not from the light of faith. For I have as much evidence that I opine under some doubt that the Pontiff is alive at Rome and the Caesar at Augsburg, as that I certainly believe that God is three. Note the words of Augustine: I see that I believe if I believe, and that I do not believe if I do not believe. Does a Turk, who sees that he does not believe in Christ, see this by the light of faith? Not certainly: but it is an evidence natural to him, as it is to me that I believe. How then can you apply this to your contingent proposition, that faith engenders in you an assent that you are in grace, so firm that it takes away all doubt: as if it had been proposed by the Church? Besides, I ask you to attend to another thing: namely, how you here suggest to us that catholic faith, whose object the Church proposes, and whose assent Augustine says is seen by us, is the same faith which makes that certain assent of yours to received grace. Why then do you so sharply reproach me for having imposed on you when I said “by as great or similar certainty of faith as is catholic”? But especially, who could keep silent at this? You cite St. Thomas, prima secundae, question 112, article 5, to the second, saying that a man can certainly know that he has faith: and yet you prudently suppress his explanation, lest it harm you. For he adds that because certainty pertains to the intellect, which has faith, one is certain that he has faith (namely, that he believes) by whatever habit that is done. But, he says, the reason is not similar concerning grace and charity and other such things which perfect the appetitive power. Where he expressly denies that anyone can by the common law have certainty of grace and charity. This he teaches far more clearly in his exposition of Paul, 2 Corinthians last, namely that we can certainly know that Christ dwells in us by unformed faith, but cannot certainly know that he dwells in us by formed faith; but this more broadly in our book. The other more minute things which you heap up here, with your remarkable slander, namely that I have defamed you with reproach and scandal, I refer to the fair reader who will judge between us, whether perhaps they are not rather returned to their author.

But let us come to those four things in which you say we agree.¹¹ I confess the first agreement, namely that no one can have certainty of his grace by catholic, that is, universal faith. If only you understand it, as you seem to, in the sense of the Lutherans, who say that by that faith which is commanded to all, namely by which we believe the promises of God to be true, when we are justified we are also made certain of our justice. For in another sense, even yours, we disagree very much. For you say (as I noted a little before) that the same faith extends itself not only to those things which are proposed by the Church (which is truly catholic), but to those things which are in contingent matters of fact, namely to begetting the assent of peculiar grace. Which I most holily reprobate. It will also have been agreed between us secondly that the certainty of one's own grace is not so great on the part of the object as catholic faith: because an object of this kind is not proposed by the Church as revealed. But this pertained in no way to the matter. But in that in which you say we agree thirdly,¹² namely that we both understand the decree in the same way — suppose that where it says that a man cannot be certain of obtained grace by the certainty of faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, it is understood only of catholic faith — in this, I say, we are diametrically distant. For the very thing which you say, I deny. Since if I granted it, I would seem to myself openly to deny the decree. For (as I noted a little above) when the holy Synod places as the cause of this affirmation — “Everyone, regarding his own infirmity, can fear and be afraid about his grace” — that contrary negation, “since no one can know with the certainty of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God,” without any ambiguity it speaks not only of catholic faith, but most manifestly of every faith which is contrary to fear and dread. Wherefore since your faith takes away all doubt, it is most openly condemned there. But these things have already been explained most clearly by us above. Wherefore neither do we agree in the fourth, as you think, namely that a man can be certain of his grace. For you think this of a certainty taking away all doubt, as if it had been divinely and certainly proposed to us that this has been revealed by God: but I, and I believe all Catholics listening to the holy decree, deny it. But we concede only moral certainty in the manner most widely expounded by us above. Nor could you gather anything else from my writings, unless you were to spew out that black bile you are about to read. But this I frankly confess, and I thank you for having been admonished by my own words. For in our seventh argument, chapter 10, reporting these words of Bucer, “Faith makes a man certain that he is in grace, when it is had by the motion of the Holy Spirit,” I added this concession: “Who could ever have doubted this?” Where now you exultantly cry that I am conquered. Surely you who in clear words have granted me your opinion. I confess, I say, that to guard against such subtlety I should have said more cautiously: “Who could ever have doubted that whatever has been suggested to us by the Holy Spirit is most true” — for this was my mind — and not that the whole thing is certain to us with the certainty you think. Yet you could have perceived my mind from the words immediately following. For these words were subjoined by me: “But nevertheless when that motion is by the Holy Spirit, we say that certainty of catholic faith cannot be had concerning it.” Where I most clearly signified that although for the truth of assent it is enough to be instilled by the Holy Spirit, nevertheless for certainty it does not suffice: but it is further required that it be certainly established for us that the same has been revealed by the Holy Spirit. And so I meant to say: “Who could ever have doubted this?” namely that faith makes a man certain that he is in grace when faith is had by the motion of the Holy Spirit, and it is established for us that it is had from the Holy Spirit. For the name of faith embraces all this. Wherefore I immediately added that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is sometimes not so certain as catholic faith: namely, when it is not certain whether the testimony is of the Holy Spirit.

Far be it from me to pursue all the arguments you heap up against me, and the contradictions you continue to extract from my words, seasoned abundantly with your oil: lest I cause others the nausea which I suffered when I read your little book. For when I first perceived your hallucination, namely that you were unwilling to understand my mind when I denied that a man could know his grace with as great certainty as is in catholic faith, or similar, and when I said that human certainty could be had (that is, speaking civilly), all the rest which you derived in great number from this hallucination I swallowed like an unpleasant medicine. Wherefore since I have laid bare those roots, I think I have sufficiently cut down your branching tree. But all those holy Fathers — Bernard, Chrysostom, and the rest — with whose testimonies you think to press me,¹³ I understand to establish for the just that certainty of their obtained grace which men call certainty and security in a human and civil manner. Otherwise they would contradict themselves. Which far be it from us to think. For they say in other places, which we have reported in our treatise, that such certainty as you think cannot be had concerning this. Except where they speak of a special privilege. Besides that, they often in this sense extol the divine testimony, which cannot deceive, as human testimony can. For although it were most certainly established for me that a testimony concerning any matter whatsoever proceeded from a man, however truthful he might be, it would not be established for me with the same certainty that the same is true. But when the Holy Spirit reveals to me that I am a son of God, if it were established for me that the testimony is divine, I would by no means doubt that it is true. And this is what Chrysostom says where you cite him: “When the Spirit testifies, what ambiguity remains to us? But if some man, or an angel,” etc., “or any other created power should promise something, one might deservedly doubt: but concerning that supreme essence, who can doubt?” This is he. Nevertheless according to these words, where the matter cannot be known except by revelation, it will never be more certainly established to anyone that this is true than when it is established that the testimony is of the Holy Spirit. For I ask you, Reverend father, do you wish to bring forward the testimonies of the Fathers in this matter to persuade men that whoever is in grace, if he has diligently examined his conscience, will become certain of his friendship with God without any doubt at all? What men do you think can be found who could give you credence against what they themselves experience? For many will answer: I am conscious of nothing, but neither am I justified in this. But if you are unwilling to admit this sense of Paul, nevertheless even the best man will answer: I have no probable reason why sin remains in me: yet how will you persuade me that I am so altogether certain that I would now appear in the sight of God without any fear at all, when I experience the contrary? I omit others of lesser perfection: and also others recently converted. Do you wish to deny the experience of nearly all who depart this life: whom even the wisest men can scarcely make secure and peaceful without any fear? Why delay? For I have already sent you above on this matter as one preaching to the people.

But good God, how you press us with that passage, 1 John 3:¹⁴ Dearly beloved, if our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence with God. As if confidence could not exist without faith, taking away, in your manner, all doubt. Do you wish, then, that men who are beginning, whatever they may be in charity, cannot nevertheless fail to waver — do you wish, I say, that they be without confidence? Therefore all sin against the precept of hope. But Christians do not think so. But where our heart does not reprehend us, that faith which, in the manner expounded by us, calms our consciences, is sufficient to generate and nourish confidence in us.

Besides these there are certain things¹⁵ to which I cannot fail to answer individually. In the first place, what you often urge against me, why that faith which by the common law is begotten by the Holy Spirit in the just, that they are in grace, is not divine: I have already answered repeatedly that if you wish to restrict the name, so that it is called divine on the part of the cause, it matters nothing to me: nevertheless it is not simply divine, but in its manner retains the name of human custom, from the fact that the revelation is not simply in this divine manner: namely, that it be altogether revealed that that testimony is divine. Which is required in order that every doubt be utterly taken away: but after the manner of human speech it makes us certain.

But what you vehemently wonder at,¹⁶ that I called catholic faith that which is given peculiarly to certain saints by privilege of obtained grace, is from your miracles, not from divine ones. For I wonder at nothing, since you have read me and all of me. For I never said that it was catholic, but that it was of as great certainty. For when I had asked whether we can be certain by catholic faith, or by as great a one, I granted as to the second part concerning that which is by privilege, whether it be of obtained grace, or of obtaining victory, or of any other matter whatsoever. But you do not distinguish between divine and catholic. For I regard these privileged ones as divine (which you elsewhere calumniate me for denying), and indeed divine not only on the part of the cause, as is that faith of yours from the common law, but simply, also as to the manner of taking away doubt. Because, namely, then it is certainly revealed that the testimony is divine. Yet I do not judge them simply catholic, that is, universal. Nay, in ch. 11 art. 3 I said most clearly that the account of the object of catholic faith extends only¹⁷ to those things which have been proposed by the Church to all to be believed. Such are not those peculiar ones. But when I say that the object of catholic faith altogether comprehends those things which have been proposed by the Church, I speak now according to the truth of the matter, since faith has been written. Why then do you deflect to those things which were revealed to the prophets before they were written? For I do not deny that once there was faith without Scripture, but now nevertheless it has been prescribed for us. You gather a little below (of which you do not doubt) that my fallacy¹⁸ depends on this, that when I hear from Paul that the Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit, I think that this testimony depends on our works. In this indeed I am not deceived, best father. But I say that the Holy Spirit testifies this to us, not with that certainty which takes away doubt: since he does not certainly reveal to us that that testimony is his, as he does to others by privilege, but he reveals this by suggesting to us a good purpose of acting rightly, and a sweetness of mind, and other things of that kind, from which we can conjecture that he dwells in us. Yet not so certainly as you think.

Then you come forth in consideration of me,¹⁹ who make the certainty of faith greater than the certainty of knowledge: not distinguishing, with St. Thomas, that faith is more certain in itself, but knowledge as to us. You should have read the next line of St. Thomas, where he teaches that nevertheless, simply and absolutely speaking, faith is more certain than knowledge. Add that the firmness of faith (which is sometimes designated by the name of certainty) is and ought to be greater even in us than that of knowledge. For I ought rather to deny that of which I seemed to have knowledge, than what faith teaches. For the philosophers would have reckoned this inference evident, without any distinction: This divine essence is the Father, and the same is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father. Which nevertheless we deny by faith.

In like manner you mock me for having assumed this proposition as a dignity: “No one is obliged to those things which are natural,”²⁰ opposing to me the precepts of the Decalogue, to which, although they are derived from the natural law, we are nevertheless obliged. Further, I wonder at nothing, that that distinction which is most ready to philosophers did not occur to you so easily. For in one way that is called natural to which we have a natural inclination: but in another way as it is distinguished against free, namely what is not in our power. And that the discourse there was of this second mode was clearer than light. But these things are of less moment.

But concerning that which at the end I finally complain of to all who will read us, honored father: how gratuitously you have twisted me into a sinister sense, namely that I compared the martyrdom of a heretic with the Scriptures and the holy Fathers; but with martyrdom as regards fullness of heart and affection of charity — as if I had been so alienated in mind as to attribute true charity, which is in the lawful martyr, to a false martyr. Was it not for this reason that I distinguished concerning the certainty of grace on the part of the object and on the part of the subject? Therefore what we did not say is altogether that which all know by most manifest and irrefragable experience, who have seen heretics burned with their eyes. For we have seen very many hasten to the pyre with far greater alacrity than perhaps some Christian in charity would go condemned by the Turks. Can you deny that that man is as certain in himself, and as secure (although not safe) that he dies in the grace of God, as perhaps some one of the Christians existing in charity? Otherwise how would he rejoice so exultantly to be burned alive and plunged into boiling oil? That I call certainty on the part of the subject. Why then do you say that I speak against the Scriptures and against the Fathers, who merely report the histories of things done? Or why do you suppose as known of itself that no one²¹ can be called certain of any matter which is false, except according to the scholastics, who devise many things unlearnedly? For you think it so advisable for you if you mock the scholastics. Is not he called certain both by the common people and by all wise men, who is secure and believes something without any doubt? Those heretics will affirm to you by oath that they are as certain of their errors as they are certain of catholic faith. And whatever may be the case with the name, that experience is enough for us to convince that there is no conjecture which suffices to wipe away every doubt that we are in grace, since that which is the greatest, namely that someone lays down his soul, is not an irrefragable testimony of charity. Further, that you accuse me of negligence, that the fifth decree was not printed in good faith at the end of our book, was no fault of mine. For the printer seized what copy he could, and it was corrected without my knowledge. Which when I perhaps saw here at Trent, I immediately took care to have it remade and reformed. Especially because in the first canon “created in grace” had been misprinted for “constituted in grace.” Furthermore you say that I profess that I hold the whole matter, and can at the same time teach heretics and Catholics. From what source indeed you have gathered this insolence of mine I do not know, unless because I wrote against heretics and sometimes turned aside from certain opinions of Catholics. Yet by this reasoning you could accuse any writers whatsoever of the same crime: and, observing the gospel order, cast the mote out of your brother's eye. But wherever you speak more bitterly against me, you excuse it by saying that I have thrown out bitterer things against Catholics: which indeed I can bear the less, the greater evil fault is than punishment. I can, I say, I ought at least to suffer injury from anyone: but what I have done to anyone in my book, I have not yet known to this day. Surely I have vomited no bitterness or harshness even against the Protestants. So far am I from having injured any Catholic by even the least word. Unless you think it harshness that when I could not descend into their opinions, I took care to confirm my own according to my ability: also by exposing the fault of theirs. Nor indeed have you now, by whatever words you have inveighed against me, provoked me more than to answer for the catholic faith and for the exposition of the decree and (as you say) the glory of the Synod. For the rest, you will always have me most obedient in Christ, and therefore more ready for your commands than eager to litigate with you: which may it be always free for me through you. Farewell.