De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

BUT so that these things may be firmer and clearer, I descend to your arguments, best father. In the former treatise, after by that syllogism which I weakened a little before you gather your conclusion—namely, that a man can by the common law be certain of his grace with a certainty removing all doubt—you immediately attach the exposition of the ninth chapter of the decree on justification. Although it makes entirely and most openly against you, you nevertheless take up the last little part to be expounded according to your judgment.¹ Let us first look at this; then I shall note the words you have omitted. At the end of the chapter the decree says: “As no pious man ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments, so each one, while he regards himself and his own infirmity and indisposition, can fear and be afraid about his grace.” Thus far (you say) there is no controversy among Catholics. But I shall show that your opinion is opposed to this part. But there is added (you say): “since no one can know with the certainty of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God.” And because you began from this last member, let us follow your own order. First, then, for the sake of exposition you argue by asking: since many by privilege had such certainty, as the blessed Virgin and other most holy persons, why were they not excepted? All without doubt except you alone will answer that no exception was needed, because it was most known of itself that such power exists in God. Indeed, in sacred Scripture privileges of this kind of revelation are expressly had, as “Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee,” and of the Magdalene, “Many sins are forgiven her,” and other things of that sort. But the Synod defined only those things about which some doubt can exist; about privilege no one can doubt. But you, to consult your own case, having rejected by I know not what reasons the answer that was the mind of all the Fathers, have devised a new and unheard-of interpretation.² Namely, that the Synod did not remember those privileges, nor was there need, because faith of this kind arising from privilege is not faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, since it is about a contingent matter. Wherefore although the saint to whom such revelation is made is not deceived, he could nevertheless be deceived. Since therefore the Synod holds that no one can be certain of his grace by faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, the decree (you say) does not touch them. And this answer you have prepared for yourself, so that you might similarly answer concerning your peculiar faith, which you assert every justified man can have by the common law: namely, that it is not excluded by the words of the Synod. But you will never make anyone believe this fabricated answer of yours.

For who would doubt that the holy Synod openly denies every faith that drives away all contrary opinion?³ For by saying “to which falsehood cannot be subject,” it does not designate (as we explained above) the necessity of the proposition, but such faith by which the one assenting is certain that it is not possible for him to be deceived while he assents by it; which is to say, faith removing every doubt. In this way divine faith, when it is established that the revelation is God’s, is most certain. And therefore there is not suggested or permitted there, as you think, another faith to which, although falsehood can be subject, nevertheless makes the present believer most certain. Nay, that particle is definitive and expressive of the nature of true faith. As if it had said: No one can be certain by the common law (for the question was about this) that he is in grace with the certainty of catholic faith, or of faith equal in effect. For that alone is faith to which falsehood cannot be subject. Otherwise, if it wished only to deny the certainty of catholic faith, why did it not express it so? For it was easier to say “of catholic faith”; but because not only that faith was excluded, but every faith that would have the true and legitimate nature of faith, the Fathers used that circumlocution “to which falsehood cannot be subject” to explain the true and proper nature of faith. Your opinion does not cohere with this most true sense. But why do I labor over the exposition of the words of the decree? Are they not most clear of themselves? For when it adds the reason why any just man can fear and be afraid—that no one can know with the certainty of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God—it most manifestly excludes every assent of faith that is opposed to fear and dread. But you assert an assent so certain that it drives out all doubt and fear and love of the present; therefore that assent is expressly condemned. And therefore wherever in your treatises you complain about me that I never said anyone is certain of his grace by faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, consider the answer now given to you. For what you say—by faith removing all doubt—is in force the same as by faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, that is, by which he is certain who so assents that he cannot be deceived by such faith.

But let us go back to the preceding member of the text, about which, Reverend father, you acknowledge no controversy among Catholics.⁴ For in the first place you read that passage stealthily, as if fighting against yourself: namely, that the holy Synod most cautiously pronounced that each one, while he regards himself, etc., can fear and be afraid about his grace. For you do not say “it said he ought to fear,” but “he can.” And yet if the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the common law does not wipe away every doubt, it should have been said (you say) that he ought to fear, so that men would be obliged always to be in fear. But before I answer your “ought,” answer, I pray, our “can.” For “he can” is as much as “he can by right and lawfully.” I therefore resume the argument made above from your concession—nay, from the truth itself. The testimony of the Holy Spirit by the common law is present to all the just. But if, as you think, such testimony is everywhere valid to tear out all fear, no just man is permitted to doubt that he is in grace. Yet the holy Synod says: “A pious man can fear and be afraid” (and without doubt it understands every pious man by the common law). Wherefore neither is this particle without controversy, if you persist in your opinion; certainly it conflicts with your opinion, and the judgment of the Synod is beyond controversy true; therefore your opinion is beyond controversy false. Yet the Synod did not add “he ought to fear and be afraid,” because a man can attain to such grace that, in the ordinary human way of speaking, he has either no doubt or certainly a very slight doubt of his salvation, but is of a calm and peaceful mind, as happens to men who have advanced in heroic virtue. And this is what John says:⁵ “Perfect charity casts out fear.” But let us repeat, if you please, the words of the decree from the beginning, which are these: “Although it is necessary to believe that sins are not remitted, nor ever have been remitted, except freely by divine mercy for the sake of Christ, nevertheless it must be said to no one who boasts of confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins and rests in that alone that his sins are forgiven or have been forgiven. Since among heretics and schismatics there can be, indeed in our time there is, and it is preached with great contention against the catholic Church, this vain confidence, remote from all piety.” Consider, most clear-sighted father, the reasoning of the decree. There not only your opinion but the reasoning itself is struck down. For you say that by the common law a man who examines his conscience and weighs all the circumstances of inborn charity can have most certain faith, without any doubt, that he is in grace. But the Synod denies this. “Since among heretics,” it says, “and schismatics” (deceived, moreover, by similar conjectures) “there can be” this confidence. Not, I say, similar on the side of the cause (for true conjectures are from the Holy Spirit, but false ones from Satan), but similar, because the angel of Satan transforms himself into an angel of light. No one therefore can be certain by the common law with your certainty, best father. And it follows in the decree:⁶ “But neither must it be asserted that those who are truly justified ought to establish with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified unless he believes with certain and most firm faith that he is absolved and justified.” What could be brought more clearly against you? You say that as soon as anyone is justified, by the testimony of the Holy Spirit he is made certain of his grace (if he carefully weighs the circumstances) with a certainty removing all doubt. Let us not care whether it is catholic or not, or whether falsehood can be subject to it or not; you nevertheless say that without any doubt at all the just man is at once certain of the present. The Synod formally contradicts these words: namely, that it must not be asserted that those who are truly justified ought to establish with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified. I confess that it pronounced this against the Protestants, but nevertheless the dogma of certainty is generally condemned, whether such certainty is said to depend only on faith, as they say, or also on our disposition, of which a certain faith is had, as you say. For this reason I proposed at the beginning that you are stuck in the same difficulty⁷ that the holy Synod condemned. God is my witness that I have not deliberately brought any calumny against you; whether it was my ignorance, let others judge. I omit answering individually the examples and reasons that you heap together for this cause of yours; for I thought that those who read this our apology will most easily judge how far outside the choir, as they say, you dance.

The Sense of the Synod.— A Second Refutation.— Yet I cannot silently pass over that which near the end you make into an argument from other words of the council. There is the twenty-sixth canon: “If anyone says that the just man ought not⁸ to expect and hope for an eternal reward from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ for the good works that have been done in God, if he has persevered in doing well and keeping the divine commandments to the end: let him be anathema.” From this you introduce an argument. “The canon therefore manifestly wills,” you say, “that the just are specially bound to hope for good works; the just therefore are obliged to this.” And you add: “But if no one can know that he is just, consequently no one can know of his works whether they are good, that is, meritorious of eternal life. But if so, then no one will be bound to this precept of hope which peculiarly regards the just.” And indeed this consequence seems to me manifest. Thus far you, and you add many things in sequence to confirm that the holy Synod has established a peculiar precept of hope for the just. Wherefore it is not enough (you say) that a man recognize himself as just with probability, but he must hold it with most certain faith. I confess, most Reverend father, that when I came upon this passage in reading, the little book fell from my hands.⁹ For what am I saying? That with this Reverend father I should pour out words? For it has pleased him so much with this certainty of faith of his that for its sake he has meditated such things: namely, that the holy Synod by a peculiar law obliged the just to hope, besides the divine precept of hope which is set for all Christians universally. For I ask you, best prelate, do you wish the holy Synod to prescribe some human precept for the just concerning having hope, besides the divine one? To whom will you make anyone believe such a thing? For the Church, in precepts of this kind concerning the theological virtues, has never thought of anything else than to explain the divine law. But the precept of hope, like that of faith and charity, is it not prescribed to all Christians just as the Decalogue is? Is not the sinner bound to hope in God, just as he is bound to believe in God and love him, in the same way as the just man? Not indeed to hope that, persisting in evil, he can obtain eternal life. But I mean that by the same precept the sinner is bound to hope for the grace of God, and that through his works, with divine help going before, he will obtain eternal life, as also the just man is. Or do you suspect that the sinner is in better condition in this respect than the just man, so that because he is in sin he is exempted from this obligation? I confess indeed that confidence grows from works, but that there is a new precept of hope in some Christians that is not in all is new in the Church of God. But what the holy Synod wished to define—nay, openly defined—is that anyone is bound to hope that, if he has been just and has persevered, through good works, with grace going before, he will obtain eternal rewards. So that the obligation regards all without distinction; but the act of hope is borne toward the whole hypothesis, if he has done well perseveringly. As was said to Cain: “If you do well, you shall receive,” etc. Although perhaps the holy Synod there makes no mention of the precept; but because the Lutherans say that the works of the just are not meritorious of eternal life, it says: “If anyone says that the just ought not,” etc. But by another reason also, Reverend father, I join issue with you over these words. For you think that every just man is bound by a singular precept of hope, which nevertheless he cannot fulfill except by the certainty of faith excluding all doubt. Therefore according to you every just man is bound to have certainty of his grace. But whether this conclusion of yours most openly contradicts the words of the ninth chapter, where it is said “that those who are truly justified ought not to establish with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified,” and again “that a pious man can fear and be afraid about his grace,” you may see. Acknowledge therefore that for having hope it is not only enough for the just and pious to have faith, in the manner we have expounded, that they are in grace, but it is enough for all to believe by catholic faith that it does not stand with God that he should fail to supply grace and strength to all for keeping his commandments, by the observance of which, in the same faith, we are bound to attain eternal happiness.