De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)
De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
First published 1550
Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.
Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I
Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent
Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature
Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform
Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice
Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works
Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed
Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded
Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin
Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin
Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed
Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good
Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally
Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments
Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered
Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted
Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God
Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity
Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out
Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out
Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What faith without works confers
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On the cause of the effect of faith without works
Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — On the causes of justification
Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the justification of an infant before the use of reason
Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the justification of adults in general
Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — On the justification of an adult from original sin alone
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the justification of adults from actual sins
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the difference between attrition and contrition
Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — On the difference between baptism and the sacrament of penance
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — Whether another act of charity than contrition suffices
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 17. — On the formal causes: how grace and the virtues are distinguished
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 18. — On the same formal causes: how they justify
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 19. — On the formal causes of justification against the Lutherans
Capitulum XX: Chapter 20. — On the justice of Christ imputed to us
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 21. — On the interpretation of divine Scripture, in which places faith alone seems to be declared the cause of justification
Liber III: On Nature and Grace, Book III
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the obligation of the just to observe the law
Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the exposition of the law
Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the fulfilment of the law in general
Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On the fulfilment of the law in particular
Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — For answering the adversaries
Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — On satisfaction
Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — On the merit of works that proceed from grace
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On merit against the Lutherans
Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Whereby the adversaries' arguments are answered
Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the certainty of faith against the Lutherans
Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — Whereby the same certainty of grace is disputed with certain Catholics
Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — Whereby the same truth is corroborated by the testimonies of Scripture and the saints
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — Whereby the objections of the opposing party are answered
Apologia I: Apology against the Reverend Bishop Catharinus
Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — Whereby the state of the case and the controversy is established
Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — Whereby the true opinion is confirmed
But with this explanation prefaced, I proceed to confirm what I have said before: not indeed with many arguments, since in my own treatise I have heaped up very many. But with you, most learned father, I shall deal by this one question alone.1 When Paul teaches that the Holy Spirit bears witness to our spirit that we are sons and heirs, does he think this of all who are in the grace of God? I believe you will not deny it, since he seems to speak generally. Indeed, in your exposition of a certain passage of Saint Bernard, and further on in reciting another testimony of Saint Ambrose, and often in this matter you observe against me, you openly assert that this is understood of all who exist in grace. This objection, therefore, which you hurl at me, I most willingly accept, so that I may either most openly vanquish you or betray my own ignorance. I ask therefore at once: do you contend that as many as are in grace have such great faith that they are in grace that they have no doubt at all, but are altogether certain and even secure that at that very instant they are acceptable to God? If you, most circumspect father, grant me this, I no longer dispute with you, but confess that I have lost the case. But besides the fact that such an error is now expressly condemned by the holy Synod, as I shall openly prove below from the decree, I shall send you to the whole of Christendom, to see whether it would tolerate you preaching thus. For very many are in doubt; indeed there are scarcely any who do not have some little doubt and fear about the state in which they stand before God. There are, I say, very many of outstanding holiness, yet scrupulous, who are never without fear, being rather too attached to Gregory’s saying that it belongs to a timid mind to recognize fault where there is no fault. I pass over other lukewarm men struggling with the flesh, now falling, now rising again, who are sometimes in grace and yet most rightly doubt their state until they make further progress. Go, then, and preach thus among them: “As many as are in grace are certain without any doubt that they are in such a state; and therefore as many as doubt are outside grace.” For the consequence is most evident, from the contrary of the consequent to the contrary of the antecedent. I believe, most prudent father, that you will never preach thus; for I think the people would drive out such a preacher with clubs. Certainly, if all who in any way hesitate about their grace are deprived of it, human condition would be most miserable in this respect. You will never grant this, I believe. But what I can assume with the best right, you also grant: namely, that very many are in grace concerning which they nevertheless doubt in some way. Let us therefore gather the argument from these two assumptions: As many as2 are in grace receive some testimony of the Holy Spirit, greater or lesser; but not all have certainty of their grace that removes all doubt; therefore the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not universally valid for generating properly faith, that is, faith that expels every doubt. Do you wish to hear the matter openly from Augustine?3 What Paul said, that the Holy Spirit testifies to the sons of God, Augustine himself says means that charity casts out fear; but he does not say “all charity,” but “perfect charity casts out fear.” Nothing therefore prevents charity from being with some fear, and therefore with some doubt. This argument of yours is therefore broken, so that you may no longer conclude from this sole means that some assent is properly faith removing all doubt because it has been produced by the Holy Spirit. Nor will you divert us any longer from that passage of Paul. Before I descend to your other proofs, therefore, I shall repeat your Achilles, which I mentioned above.4 For at the very beginning of your former treatise, citing Paul’s passage, “The Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit,” you add: “But this testimony we receive beyond doubt by faith.” If you understand that we receive Paul’s word by faith—namely, that the Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit—it is most true, for we receive all the sacred Scriptures by faith; but this is nothing to the purpose. If, however, you say that the assent which the Spirit suggests by the common law is properly faith, it is false, and you will never prove it. For you add: “And since it is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is valid.” Here now your reasoning collapses; for if you understand it universally, as you do, that every testimony of the Holy Spirit is valid for generating faith that eliminates every doubt, we have already proved that this is false. And you certainly suspected it was false. For you add: “And since it is valid, it makes the believer certain, who knows it, and so certain that to waver is a matter of unbelief.” There you do not simply infer that it is of itself valid to make every just man certain, but the one who knows it. This I frankly concede; but yet in the way in which one knows the testimony to be of the Holy Spirit, he recognizes that he is in grace. I add nevertheless against you that, since no one is altogether certain that that internal testimony is from the Holy Spirit, neither is he altogether certain that it is true. Wherefore there is no unbelief in wavering for one who has grace. For although the testimony of the Holy Spirit cannot be false, it is not established that it is of the Holy Spirit.
But you say that not every divine testimony is so far valid, nor does it make5 such faith, but only when a man examines his conscience and weighs all the circumstances and conjectures of grace present in him. For then, according to Augustine, perfect charity casts out fear. First, this is not consistent for you: since on one hand (as we cited before) you repeatedly say that the Holy Spirit testifies to all who exist in grace, and on the other you now take refuge in certain circumstances. Moreover, not even this refuge is safe enough. For there are very many, like those whom theologians call fools, who do not perceive in themselves conjectures so full that every reason for wavering is removed from them.
But let us proceed to the point where you think to pierce me through. At least in the more advanced, who have vehement conjectures and indications of the Holy Spirit, the divine testimony is efficacious to remove every cause of wavering, and therefore to produce most certain faith. For here lies the point of controversy. To this I answer that, although a man may by the grace of God advance so far in holiness and in things done in a Christian manner that he has a peaceful mind, believing himself to be in the grace of God, that is nevertheless never anything but moral certainty—which I called human, that is, which so calms the mind, like that most intense opinion which we men call faith, examples of which I gave before. For we who live at Trent are now said to believe with certainty that Rome exists. And in this way perfect charity casts out fear, by the common law. Indeed, who among men, even of the rarest holiness, would grant that he has attained so high a degree of certainty concerning the grace he has obtained? Nor is any other argument needed besides experience. For we have learned by experience that some heretics, on account of their levity and ignorance and the holiness they display, are of such serenity of mind and certainty that they are in grace (this I called certainty on the part of the subject) as many Catholics are. For in what way can greater charity be signified than that a man lay down his life for Christ? And yet there are many who, persevering in their heresy, fell by the sword. Furthermore, we have hitherto heard of no prudent Catholic who would assert with such certainty that he is in grace as you say. Indeed, you yourself, when asked (as I have heard) whether you were so certain about yourself, did not dare to affirm it. But you will answer that you kept silent out of modesty. Certainly, if anyone could attain by that certainty that he is now just, which would remove every doubt, it would be no pride to affirm it of oneself—especially since (as you say) this certainty can be had short of the greatest holiness. Yet, on the contrary, as I said in my treatise (to which argument I wish you had responded), I am of the mind that not even among the Lutherans, apart from the stupid, is there anyone who judges himself to be in grace with as great certainty as they preach that all the just have.
Nay, come, let us weigh what you say in the second treatise: namely, that those who have this certainty of theirs concerning their own grace are not required to expose themselves to martyrdom for it,6 or to assert it by oath. If anyone is certain without any doubt that he is in grace, why will it not be lawful for him to swear? Certainly, if someone threatened me with death unless I asserted by oath that I was in grace, and your opinion were true, it would be lawful for me to swear it in order to save myself, just as it would be lawful for him to whom it was established by a special privilege that he had grace. Yet no just and prudent man in the world would swear thus. Indeed, all would say that they believe it, but not so certainly that they could swear it. Again, if a tyrant threatened me with death unless I denied that I was in grace, should I not rather die than lie? If your opinion were true, however, denying it would be a lie. Therefore I should then have to be a martyr. The remaining arguments lie very broadly open in my own treatise.