De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

But that I may descend to my cause, I would have preferred that it had been permitted me through you never to have contended with anyone (which I have always hitherto held most firmly resolved) rather than to engage with you, most excellent father; whose person, on account of your religion and episcopal dignity, I would always rather revere than ever read or hear your opinions. But, as I said a little before, you think yourself so assailed by everyone that you have been able to move me even from my purpose. And yet I have long consulted with myself whether I should answer you or rather keep silence. For indeed scarcely can any contest be entered upon where the very style of contradicting does not produce something of bitterness, or at least of harshness; which, as it ought to be far from a Christian mind, so is it certainly most unpleasant to mine, especially against a bishop. For I am not unaware how great honor is to be given to your order, from the greatest to the least. And I could, besides, have pardoned all your reproaches against me by your own disposition, since you think it religion to write with such ink against all whom you consider to have erred. And yet in your judgment all err who in any way disagree with you. Especially since, as I said a little before, this contest of ours among Catholics, which you have set on foot, does not altogether bring about the harmony of minds that it ought. Nevertheless, since in this judgment of mine (however much inferior it is to yours) you still cling to the same false opinion about the certainty of grace,¹ which the holy Synod condemned, I could not, and I do not believe I ought to, ignore your censure without an answer. Especially since, when you have so defamed me as one who falsely imputed to certain Catholics things that none of them ever said, I thought that this scandal given by you would be done away with by me—among those, namely, who were not present at the Synod (for with the synodal fathers the matter against you is most clear-sighted)—unless I washed away these stains: namely, by making plain that I invented nothing, but narrated a public and manifest history, to which even you yourself openly testify still. Finally, this our apology, if you receive it with that Christian heart from which it comes on my part, could bring it about with you (which I most desire) that you would either lay aside that contemptuous disposition of yours, or at least moderate your style. Permit me for a little while, while I show what I have said: that you persist in a sense condemned by the Synod. For I do not count you among the Lutherans, an old man whom I have always revered as a Catholic; but you retain another sense: milder indeed, yet false. But to begin the matter from the first line:² our book On Nature and Grace, brought to your tribunal, wholly displeased you. But in the last four chapters of the third book I had treated of the certainty of grace, which was the longest of all discussions and the most troublesome in the holy council. And because the controversy was not simple but twofold, I distinguished two senses, as clearly as I could according to my ability. The first was that of the Lutherans, who therefore assert that each one is certain of his grace by the certainty of faith because they teach that the same grace depends on none of our works, nor as on dispositions, but is apprehended by faith alone—by catholic faith, by which we believe that the promises of Christ are true and certain. And therefore, with as great certainty as we are bound to believe that God is truthful, they say that individual just men are also bound to believe that they are in grace. No one in the council ever doubted that this sense was false; nor was it discussed except that it might be condemned more explicitly. The other was the sense of those who, as Catholics, confessed that grace depends in the said manner on our works, and that nevertheless a man could by the common law be made certain, with a certainty excluding all doubt whatsoever, that he was disposed and consequently established in grace. And that indeed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit, of which Paul speaks to the Romans, chapter 8, where he says that the Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit that we are sons of God.³ Of these Catholics, since you so greatly usurp this title for yourself, by way of honor, we gladly grant that you were the leader. But I not only marked out the Catholics with a different and milder note than the Protestants, but I also used different arguments against them. You, however, have published two little treatises, both indeed directed against me, but the first, you say, you completed before you saw our book; the second is that in which you properly plead the cause against me. In both your complaint and indignation is that I have defamed Catholics with the greatest scandal and injury.⁴ For not only in the first member do we agree against the Lutherans—namely, whose sense we refute with the greatest consent—but in the second also, you say, there was no disagreement among Catholics. Except that I, speaking confusedly and inconstantly, wished to differ in words from others. And therefore in the first treatise you immediately propose that you easily divined that most would take the words of the decree otherwise than was the mind of the holy Synod. And in the second you say against me properly that I impute to Catholics what was always alien from their mind and thought. And you add that you grieve that it was not permitted you through us to see our book before it was published. For you would have understood that in nothing do you and we think differently. And beginning from there, you prepare a most bitter fight against us.⁵ But I, most reverend father, before I answer the individual points in order, shall try to explain how much difference there has been between us, and, as I see, still exists. And then I shall most briefly show (confirming those things which I have gathered most copiously in our book) that the sense in which you persist is false, and, as I believe, different from the mind of the Synod. Finally, in the third place, I shall pursue either the individual or the chief heads of your argument by dissolving them.

Therefore, to dismiss the sense of the Lutherans, in refuting which our agreement is greatest, the disagreement which you think is none between your mind and mine except in words is in the greatest matter.⁶ For you think that a man can be made certain of his grace with a certainty which, although it is not equal to catholic faith, is nevertheless true faith, that is, excluding all doubt whatsoever; and that indeed by the common law—namely, by that testimony which, according to Paul, the Holy Spirit gives to our spirit that we are sons of God. But I, with your leave and authority, believe this to be altogether false. I cannot otherwise enunciate the holy truth as I think it. But if you continue, as you do, to affirm this of all the just universally, you openly fight against the common sense of Christians. Nay, again and again I say: apart from those most holy men to whom God has specially granted this privilege, no one is certain of his grace by an assent that deserves the name of faith, that is, that altogether removes every doubt and extinguishes every fear, down to the least particle. If I explain these things, it will become clear how gratuitously you have reproached me with so many perplexities, falsehoods, and ignorances, wondering so often about me; and how much more advisable it would have been for you to withdraw from your own opinion, as all others have done, and simply to listen, as it stands, to the decree of the Synod.

In this explanation, however, I shall not repeat many of the things I brought forward in my treatise—for it would be tedious to hear—but only those which will be especially worthwhile for your sake. Not, I say, so intent on asserting the truth, since it is sufficiently confirmed there, as on repelling your reproach. You therefore, reverend father, because you cannot by any reasoning tear from your mind the opinion you have once conceived, persist especially in that passage of Paul⁷ where he says that the Holy Spirit gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons and heirs. For from there you immediately construct this paralogism in the first treatise.⁸ “We receive this testimony of the Holy Spirit by faith; and since it is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is valid; and since it is valid, it makes the believer certain, who knows it; and so certain that to waver is a matter of unbelief. For falsehood cannot be subject to the testimony of the Holy Spirit.” Wherefore it is concluded, you say, that a man can be certain of his grace, and that by the certainty of faith, and of that faith to which falsehood cannot be subject. Your words are to the letter; and although you place them among the arguments for proposing the question, you nevertheless most firmly believe that the syllogism concludes, so much so that in both treatises you repeat it with most frequent inculcation. And therefore you distinguish two assents of faith in this way:⁹ namely, that one is the assent of faith whose certainty is taken from the object—namely, which is about those things that are proposed by the Church to be believed, such as are all things written in sacred Scripture. And this faith we all acknowledge to be catholic, that is, universal, necessary for all. But the other is the assent of faith whose certainty is taken from the internal light of the Holy Spirit testifying that we are sons of God. And this, you say, although it is not as great as catholic faith, is nevertheless true faith, altogether excluding all doubt, because it is from the Holy Spirit. And since in this little word “as great”¹⁰ there lies, best father, either your fallacy or mine, see how you deny that this faith is as great as the catholic faith. For by this sole reason you deny it, because it is not so universal that its obligation embraces all. Likewise it is not as great because its certainty is not taken by the same way—namely, from the object proposed by the Church. But it is as great in effect: namely, because it removes every doubt and wipes it from the mind, just like catholic faith. Since your reasoning is that it is from the same divine cause as catholic faith—namely, from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if you weigh the matter well with yourself, you only deny that it is as great extensively (to use the words of the philosophers); you nevertheless concede that it is as great intensively—or, if you prefer, effectively. For the intention even of catholic faith can be more abundant in one than in another, according to that saying, “Increase our faith.”¹¹ But if these words do not please you, you at least retain equality in this effect, that it leaves not the least scruple of doubt, just like catholic faith. For so you expressly say in your declaration, in these words: “And therefore we do not call this faith catholic, that is, universal, as blessed Athanasius takes it, but it is the faith of particular propositions.” And you add: “And it is most false that a man from the light of faith cannot know anything else than what has been determined by the Church.” Thus you. Therefore in your view this faith differs only as particular from universal, but in certainty they are equated. And so, to equate the faith of one’s own grace by the common law with that which is from privilege, I, however—and, as I think, as many as have examined the matter most clear-sightedly—think very differently. For beyond catholic faith and that special revelation which was made by privilege to the most sacred Virgin and to certain other most holy persons, no assent, even if it is inborn by the common testimony of the Holy Spirit, reaches that degree so as to take away all doubt whatsoever. And therefore I say that it does not deserve the name of faith except in the human way—namely, as men speak civilly of faith and of security. I shall explain myself still further, for I would rather seem prolix to you than entangled. I acknowledge with all Christians (otherwise I should be a heretic) that to anyone coming into the grace of God the Holy Spirit gives some testimony of his regeneration in Christ: now less, now greater, according as each one advances in the way of God. But the assent instilled by the Holy Spirit¹² is sometimes, for example in men lukewarmly converted, so remiss that the opinion is not great but slight. But it grows as the indications grow—for example, inward sweetness of divine things and firmness of purpose in good, etc. Yet never (apart from a special privilege) is it so confirmed as to erase wholly every scruple, unless we are certain in the human way of speaking, or (as the moral philosophers would say) morally. For men in civil conversation are said to believe firmly and most certainly when there is no probable reason for doubting. For example, I most certainly believe and am secure that Rome exists; nevertheless I would not affirm it by oath, because it can happen that it now no longer exists. I am also secure and most safe, speaking in the human way, that a friend whom I saw healthy an hour ago is alive now; yet I would not have sworn it, though I would do so concerning articles of faith. Nor, if someone told me the contrary, would I affirm it without any doubt, because that credulity does not wash away every suspicion. And therefore Aristotle did not distinguish this faith from opinion. So I say precisely of the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the common law, that we are sons of God. Nay, would that I might one day attain to as great certainty as I have that Rome exists—which nevertheless is only a most intense opinion.

The Privilege of Revelation.— But before you call me a heretic¹³ for denying that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is efficacious for engendering faith that deletes all doubt, consider, I pray, my explanation, which I wrote most clearly in my treatise. For the assent of faith that removes all hesitation to be generated in us, it is not enough that it be from the Holy Spirit, but it is required that we have certainty that it is from the Holy Spirit. And therefore, as I there reported from Saint Thomas and the theologians, two things concur to the assent of faith: namely, the internal light inclining us, and besides, the divine authority of someone proposing that this has been revealed by God—such as is the authority in the Church proposing the sacred Scriptures. But when the Holy Spirit inwardly reveals to each one by indications and what you call circumstances the state of grace, there is indeed the first cause of certainty—namely, the internal light, from which the assent that flows cannot be false. Yet because we cannot have certainty that this inward revelation is made by the Holy Spirit (since there is no authority of the Church proposing it, nor of God certainly affirming that he himself is the one who reveals), that assent does not remove all doubt. Not that the Holy Spirit could not do so if he wished—far be so great a blasphemy—but because he speaks to us in such a way that it is not established for us that he is the one speaking. Since the angel of Satan transforms himself into an angel of light. Nor does he reveal more certainly that we are in grace than through conjectures, which heretical men sometimes have so apparent to themselves from levity and ignorance. Take another example: if Christ our Savior should now appear to me, most unworthy, in human form, and before he revealed to me that he was Christ, should affirm some truth, certainly he would make nothing in me but opinion, although whatever he said would be most true. But after he had certainly disclosed that he was Christ, I would believe all things he said to me just as the articles of faith themselves. Hence the falsehood of what you say in the second treatise appears: that nothing prevents someone from having knowledge of a matter with the certainty of faith, and yet the same person not knowing whether it comes from the light of faith. Nay, I say that in those things which consist solely in God’s revelation, no one can know more certainly that this is true than he knows that it has been revealed by God. And hence the difference plainly appears between those who have the privilege and those who by the common law receive the testimony of the Holy Spirit that they are in grace. For the former perceive the revelation in such a way that it is most certain to them that it has been revealed by God, God then doing through himself what he now does through the Church—whether the revelation be of inherent grace or of another thing, such as a future victory. But for us, to whom the revelation is made by the common law, it is not established with a certainty of faith greater than that had through conjectures that the spirit who speaks to us is the Holy Spirit. And this is the point of difference between us,¹⁴ that you make the common revelation equal to that which is from privilege. I do not care about the intensity; for even that was greater in the Virgin than in Paul. But at least in this, that it drives out every doubt. To which I say: nay, the Synod utterly denies it.

Wherefore, that I may come closer to the cause, wherever I affirm that no one can be made certain of his grace with as great certainty¹⁵ as is catholic faith, but only in the human way, I not only deny concerning that extensive quantity on the part of the object—namely, that certainty about this cannot be as universal as about those things which are proposed by the Church (for about this there was no dispute)—but I say that in effect it cannot be as great, that is, such as to remove altogether every doubt, which is the effect of catholic faith. And this was the sense at issue entirely between the theologians and the Fathers, and in which we now disagree, with you denying it. Therefore you posit two faiths by the common law: namely, the catholic faith and this special faith; and since in your view it removes every doubt, it is faith in the most proper sense. But I posit only one—namely, that which is catholic—and whatever other faith is from privilege, where God certainly reveals that the testimony is his; and this indeed does not differ from catholic faith in certainty, but in this, that it is not universal, unless perhaps it has been proposed by the Church, as is that “Hail, full of grace.” But the particular faith you posit concerning each one’s grace by the common law is not faith but opinion, more or less intense; and in advanced saints it removes doubt, so that in the human way we are called certain by it. Whence it comes about that when I, with all the theologians, said that only that faith is properly faith to which falsehood cannot be subject,¹⁶ I did not understand (as you imagine) that it must be about a necessary object, but that in the composite sense, even if it is about a contingent matter, it does not stand that anyone assenting in this way is deceived. Which means that such an assent altogether removes doubt, making a man most certain. And that opposites placed side by side may shine more clearly:¹⁷ the ancient Greek philosophers dispute whether the accident of quantity is a thing distinct from substance, as color is. Now that proposition is necessary if it is true, and impossible if it is false. But because that assent—“quantity is a thing other than substance”—does not remove all doubt, we say that one assenting thus, or in a contradictory way, can be deceived. Wherefore either side is opinion. In the same way we speak of this contingent proposition, “I am in grace.” For if God should reveal this to me by a special privilege, as to Paul, it would be most certain faith, to which falsehood could not be subject. But when the Holy Spirit reveals it to me by the common law through the sweetness of mind which he instills in me, or through other conjectures by which I conjecture that the same Spirit dwells in me, although—speaking conditionally—it is necessary that if the assent is from the Holy Spirit, it is true, nevertheless because we do not certainly know that it is from him, we say that falsehood can be subject to this assent. For I could be deceived by similar conjectures. And that this was the sense of the holy Synod we shall make manifest below. Let the last particle of our exposition be¹⁸ that when I call the assent of the Holy Spirit human faith, I do not mean human on the part of the cause (which is most manifest to everyone but you; for I see that the cause is the Holy Spirit). In which respect, if anyone says that it is divine and comes about in a divine manner, I refuse nothing; but I call it human because it has certainty and removes doubt in the human and civil way of speaking—or, as the Scholastics would say, faith morally, except that the word is not quite so Latin in this signification. For in order that it be called simply divine in the manner of removing doubt, it is required, besides that it be from God, that it be established that the revelation is made by God.