De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)
De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
First published 1550
Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.
Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I
Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent
Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature
Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform
Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice
Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works
Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed
Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded
Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin
Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin
Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed
Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good
Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally
Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments
Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered
Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted
Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God
Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity
Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out
Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out
Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What faith without works confers
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On the cause of the effect of faith without works
Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — On the causes of justification
Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the justification of an infant before the use of reason
Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the justification of adults in general
Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — On the justification of an adult from original sin alone
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the justification of adults from actual sins
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the difference between attrition and contrition
Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — On the difference between baptism and the sacrament of penance
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — Whether another act of charity than contrition suffices
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 17. — On the formal causes: how grace and the virtues are distinguished
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 18. — On the same formal causes: how they justify
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 19. — On the formal causes of justification against the Lutherans
Capitulum XX: Chapter 20. — On the justice of Christ imputed to us
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 21. — On the interpretation of divine Scripture, in which places faith alone seems to be declared the cause of justification
Liber III: On Nature and Grace, Book III
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the obligation of the just to observe the law
Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the exposition of the law
Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the fulfilment of the law in general
Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On the fulfilment of the law in particular
Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — For answering the adversaries
Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — On satisfaction
Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — On the merit of works that proceed from grace
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On merit against the Lutherans
Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Whereby the adversaries' arguments are answered
Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the certainty of faith against the Lutherans
Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — Whereby the same certainty of grace is disputed with certain Catholics
Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — Whereby the same truth is corroborated by the testimonies of Scripture and the saints
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — Whereby the objections of the opposing party are answered
The arguments of the opposing party are mostly drawn from various passages of sacred Scripture. Although besides testimonies of this kind, those who before it was decided by the Synod opposed this opinion also brought forward certain reasons. But the chief passage of the Lutherans is that, Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise might be firm:1 which we have already explained in ch. 10. But all the other testimonies, both of the Lutherans and of our own men, sin by a perverse interpretation. Which sins are reduced to three or four.2 For first they err by taking faith not for anything other than living faith. Hence, because we can be certain that we have faith, they think they are certain that they have charity. Hence Luther, art. 14 of his assertions, says: The priest ought not to demand contrition from the penitent: because we cannot be certain of it, but faith, which he can most certainly feel in his heart, if he has it, as Augustine says. Hence Paul says:3 Test yourselves whether you are in the faith: prove yourselves. Do you not know yourselves, that Jesus Christ is in you: unless perhaps you are reprobate. But all these things have been wrongly understood. First we confess with Augustine,4 13 On the Trinity, that one can evidently know that he has faith. His words are: Each one sees faith itself in his heart, if he believes: or that it is not there, if he does not believe. Which St Thomas also acknowledged, 2-2 q. 1 art. 4 to the second argument. For although I do not have evidence, but only believe, that Constantinople exists, nevertheless I evidently know that I have such a belief. And likewise it is evident to me that I believe God to be three, although the Trinity is not evident. It is evident to me, I say, that I believe, whether through acquired or infused faith. Since it is evident to no one that he has an infused habit: but only that he has belief. But that evidence is of faith according to its substance: namely insofar as it is an assent of the mind. But whether faith lives through charity I do not know so certainly. Otherwise, if the account were the same of faith and of living faith, I would have not only certainty that I am in grace, but surely evidence such as I have that I believe. Hence the Apostle's word, Test yourselves whether you are in the faith, designates doubt rather than certainty. And therefore (as St Thomas and all interpret) it must be understood of living faith, namely that each one prove himself whether he is in charity. And this is what is subjoined: Do you not know yourselves? Because Jesus Christ is in you, unless perhaps you are reprobate. For in those in whom it was certain that Christ existed through faith, he affirms under doubt that he exists through charity: saying, unless perhaps you are reprobate. And so Jerome5 expounds it, as if the Apostle reminded the Corinthians to examine themselves: not indeed whether they had faith, but whether they had it informed by charity. Indeed Erasmus himself,6 whom Bucer in the preface of his book On the True Reconciliation of the Churches recognizes as the standard-bearer and light-bearer of the Lutherans, expounds it thus: Unless with faith somehow sound, an impure life has deserved that you be rejected by Christ. Man therefore can be certain of his faith, but not likewise whether he lives through charity. The reason for this difference is most manifest:7 since the assent of the intellect does not depend on any divine acceptance, and therefore it is most known to each one that he is persuaded of the Gospel; but grace and friendship with God consist in divine benevolence and acceptance, which is unknown to us.
But on the contrary someone can cite Augustine,8 8 On the Trinity, whose words are: He who loves his brother knows more by the love by which he loves than the brother whom he loves. Whence it is apparently gathered that not only unformed faith, but also formed faith can be certainly known. But all the doctors interpret this passage of the act of charity as to substance. For someone can have the most certain experience that he has some act of loving God. But whether he does all things which God commands, and has a firm purpose from a true heart on account of him never to sin, this we cannot know certainly: especially where there is depraved ignorance. Concerning which we were saying in book 1 ch. 22 that every act as to substance which is in a friend of God can also be in a sinner. But if someone presses the matter further in this way: Those things which God commands us are manifest through faith: therefore we can certainly know when we fulfill them. Hence Augustine in the book On the Grace of Christ ch. 13 says: God teaches those who are called according to his purpose: at once granting both to know what they should do, and to do what they know. To this replication we already answered above in the previous chapter, that although in general faith shows us the law, nevertheless whether I keep it with a pure heart, and whether no ignorance holds us, this indeed we cannot know certainly, although we can have such probability that we keep our consciences at peace. And to this pertain the words of Augustine,9 which he inculcates not only in the cited place but often elsewhere. Intending precisely what was sanctioned in the Council of Milevis can. 4. Namely that the grace of Christ assists us not only to not sin in this way, that through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, but that through it it is granted that we love what we have known, and are able to fulfill what we love. And so the sense of Augustine is not that through grace, by the common law, someone knows in particular whether what he does he does justly and in grace: but that what he does is good in its kind, according to the revelation of faith. For example, to pray, to give alms, etc.
Therefore the second sin of these men10 is that the remission of sins and the gifts, of which we have been made more certain through the Catholic faith, were given through Christ to his beloved Church: that is, to those who are truly joined with him in charity, they think is known through the same faith to each individual, that he has really received such gifts. But this is not necessary. Because such promises (as we have very often said so far) are proposed not absolutely, but under a condition: He who has believed and been baptized. He who loves me will be loved by my Father. If he has repented of his impiety, etc. By this teaching is solved that, But we have not received the spirit of this world,11 but the Spirit who is from God: that we may know the things that have been given us by God. To which St Thomas answers in the cited place, 1-2 q. 112, that it is understood of the gifts of glory, which have been given us in hope: to which we are to arrive through grace. Which gifts, although we know them most certainly through faith, nevertheless we do not know with certainty that we have grace, through which we can merit them. So he. Therefore when the Apostle says, That we may know what things have been given us by God, he does not understand that any individual knows this about himself, but that we all through faith believe that those rewards are set before the just: which God certainly offers through himself, and is most ready to bestow on all who do not wish to resist the Holy Spirit.
The third sin12 not only of the Lutherans, but also of our own men whom we have refuted, is that they think every testimony of the Holy Spirit gives us the certainty of faith. When nevertheless sometimes he testifies that he dwells in us in such a way that he does not make certain faith, to which we are constrained to give firm assent, as to the Catholic faith: but a certain conjectural knowledge, which although it suffices to make peaceful the consciences of those who with all care and diligence strive to purify their hearts through the grace of God, nevertheless we cannot be entirely safe that indications and conjectures of this kind proceed from the Holy Spirit: knowing that often the angel of Satan transforms himself into an angel of light. From these second and third foundations the sense of Paul to the Romans is more clearly elicited, in which place the Protestants, and especially Bucer in the reconciliation of this controversy, think to crush and utterly vanquish us. For Paul says: For you have not received13 the spirit of slavery again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry, Abba, Father. But Paul by these words does not signify that wherever the Holy Spirit is, he altogether takes away fear, making most certain the faith of his assistance, but he explains his power and inclination. Since his office is to advance man so that he works not by servile fear of punishment (whose image the old law bore) but by filial fear, by which a son reveres his father. But whether he is present, he reveals to no one so certainly as the Catholic faith is revealed. But yet he shows some indications of himself, greater or lesser, according to the different progress of man and degrees of holiness, by which, with faith working through charity, we are advanced. And this is what he immediately subjoins: For the Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit, that we are sons and heirs: heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ. Yet if we suffer with him, that we may be glorified together. But Bernard14 recognized the mystery of this testimony, sermon 1 and 2 in the octave of Easter, in those three which give testimony on earth, namely the spirit, water, and blood. For the testimonies15 of the grace of God are either to have no conscience of sin after baptism, or to wash away their filth with a fountain of tears: then to afflict the body with continual fruits of penance, and as if by a bloody martyrdom to destroy depraved affections, and finally to be exercised in spiritual works. But yet neither are these most plain testimonies, as in that epistle cited a little before the same author says. There is also another testimony, the eagerness to hear the word of God.16 For he who is a son of God hears his words. And that sweetness of mind of which John says: To him who conquers I will give hidden manna,17 which no one knows except he who receives it. But all these suffice indeed to calm consciences and confirm hope, but they do not reach as far as the certainty of faith.
But it is to be wondered that Bucer18 thinks to censure us from the fact that in the same chapter to the Romans the Apostle subjoins: If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare even his own Son, but delivered him up for us all. How has he not also with him given us all things? Who will accuse against the elect of God? God who justifies: who is he who condemns? For he hears these words in this understanding, that no past life, no remorse of conscience ought to terrify us. For even if we think that the things which we now do or think are sins, nevertheless we are certain through faith that all things have been forgiven us through Christ: who, since he fights on our side, no sins can condemn us. But who does not see that the sense of these words is referred to the certainty of the whole Church in general, and not to the certainty of individuals? For Paul explains how God has given us all things with his Son, namely to those who are made his members. But that one is truly a member through lively charity: this is what we cannot know certainly. Although man ought by holy offices to make his calling certain, as Peter says,19 so that he can say with Paul in the same place: Who then shall separate us from the love of Christ? Tribulation? Or distress? Or famine? Or nakedness? And the things that follow. But here Bucer piously begs the reader to consider with how much manifestation Paul uses to confirm the certainty of grace, affirming that there is absolutely nothing which can separate the just man from the love by which God loves us. For Bucer thinks that this love is signified here. But we do not need so much consideration to see with what blindness these men read such testimonies. For first Paul does not speak of the love by which we are loved by God, but by which he loved, and all of us ought to love, God. For divine love, as it is prior to ours, so it does not cease unless ours first ceases. And therefore there could be no composition or fitting of words, that tribulation or distress could not move God from the love with which he pursues us: because these dangers do not fight against God, except insofar as they assault and overcome us ourselves. But whether he spoke of this love or of that, who could bear the monstrosity of a man imposing on Paul that he affirmed that the just man cannot for any cause be separated from the love of God? Since justice does not take away the freedom to sin, nor does it confirm all in good so that they cannot sin: and therefore although no thing of itself has the power to compel us to evil, we ourselves are free for this. Therefore Paul either had then a revelation of his confirmation, or (which is more likely) he exaggerated how firm and robust in God he himself was, and those Romans to whom he wrote, and all Christians ought to be. For those who contemplated the inestimable love of God toward us, his Son, and with him all things forgiven us, surely for none of those things which Paul mentions ought they to be moved from the love of God. But although someone burns with such a heart, nevertheless he does not have such security of his salvation that he cannot be deceived. Besides that not all can conceive such confidence, but those who, imitating Paul, have applied themselves by every kind of office to the increase of divine grace.
The fourth sin indeed20 of these men is that they distinguish nothing between faith and confidence.21 For in the sacred letters, although we are commanded to have faith in the words of God, no one is nevertheless commanded to have faith: that is, a firm persuasion of his salvation, but confidence, which can exist without the certainty of particular faith. For from the fact that one believes that God is most desirous of our salvation, which he offers to all who wish to receive it, although he hesitates in some way whether something in himself stands in the way, nevertheless, if after a vigilant examination of conscience he is conscious of no guilt of which he does not repent, he can and ought to trust in the mercy of God, who will not permit him to err, nor despise a contrite and humbled heart. And this is the consolation which sinners ought to use. Hence Paul: In whom we have confidence and access through faith in him.22 And, Beloved, if our heart does not reprove us, we have confidence toward God.23 If our heart, he says, does not reprove us. And in the cause of confidence he places not only faith, but the works of charity, by which confidence is strengthened. Because, he says, we keep his commandments, and do those things which are pleasing before him. And this is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another. Which confidence Christ demanded from the Apostles, where he said, Do not fear, little flock.24 And concerning this confidence all the saints speak wherever they console the minds of penitents. But if here Bucer25 complains of us as of calumniators, that we no longer persist in saying that faith and confidence are the same thing, but affirm only this, that faith cannot exist without confidence. We answer first, that wherever they assert that we are justified by faith alone, they take faith for particular confidence, as it is distinguished against historical faith. Yet they are so slippery and changeable that they never persist in the same opinion. Secondly, even what they now say is most openly false. For faith can exist without confidence. For faith is the assent of the mind by which we believe that the revelations of God are true, and thus the promises themselves. But confidence, although it begins to arise from there, is nevertheless not strengthened except from charity and the just things by which God has commanded us to cultivate justice. For Scripture does not say that faith casts out fear,26 but charity.27 And therefore however much faith anyone has given to the words and promises of God, if he has not applied works, he will indeed have Catholic faith without confidence: but however great the confidence, it will never reach the certainty of faith in the particular assistance of grace. Someone may perhaps object to us the word of James:28 If anyone lacks wisdom, let him ask of God in faith, nothing hesitating. But we explained this in book 2 ch. 6. For the Apostle speaks of petitions pertaining to justification, which must be believed with certain faith to be obtained, unless the obstacle of our will stands in the way. But yet because we can never be altogether without fear of such an obstacle, we will never have the certain persuasion that we have obtained salvation. Yet we can have confidence which can pacify us according to the word of Paul: Being justified therefore by faith, we have peace.29
Besides these testimonies of Scripture, the supporters of this opinion concerning the certainty of grace devised I know not what reasons,30 by which they thought to establish that at least in some cases such certainty could be had. But these are indeed so slight that they could have been passed over for the present without injury. First, among the scholastics there is one who was openly of this opinion, namely a certain John Bacon, a Carmelite.31 Yet, that we detract nothing from his authority, his reasoning brings nothing of probability. For he says that when an adult is baptized without any obstacle of sin, he has the certainty of faith that he is in grace: by this syllogism, Baptism confers grace where it finds no obstacle: I have no obstacle, and I receive baptism with a right intention: therefore I am reborn a son of God. The major is a proposition of faith: but the minor man experiences in himself: therefore the conclusion is of faith. But this syllogism has no strength, because of the known weakness of the minor. For neither of a legitimate disposition nor of a true reception of the sacrament can there be such knowledge as equals the certainty of faith. But concerning disposition32 there was a great dispute. For they argued thus. The preparation for baptism is sufficient, that is, to bring no obstacle, which only means the negation of an evil purpose with the intention of receiving baptism: but this affection can be most known and most evident to one who has it. But that this alone is required seems to be the opinion of Scotus in 4 Sent. d. 1 and d. 14. And although some sorrow is required, it also can be most known, because (as we explained in book 2 ch. 15) contrition is not required, but any sorrow suffices. But the fault33 of this argumentation is first that it does not distinguish between the certainty of faith and the probability of opinions. For the disposition in an adult for baptism which is expressed in sacred Scripture as of faith is nothing but penance, as, Repent,34 for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Which penance Peter also required in the Acts of the Apostles before baptism:35 for, Repent, he says, and let each of you be baptized; and Augustine: No one can begin a new life unless he has repented of the past. But what kind of penance is required neither St Thomas nor Scotus nor indeed any of the doctors can know certainly with the certainty of faith, but only with the probability of his own opinion. And therefore although Scotus (which we showed to be false in the cited place) or anyone else believed that it sufficed not to have an evil purpose, and thence inferred that he was in grace, he would not have the certainty of faith, but the certainty of his own opinion. For although all agree that baptism confers grace where it finds no obstacle, it is not certain with the certainty of faith that true contrition, which is sorrow truly on account of God, is not required to remove the obstacle; nor would he who so taught be held a heretic. Whatever therefore may be the case with the opinions of doctors, no one can have the certainty of faith that such a disposition is sufficient. But the second fault of this argumentation is worse. For how can anyone have the certainty of faith that he does not labor under some crass ignorance, either of law or of fact, or of some Catholic virtue, or through his own animosity, or perhaps negligence in investigating the truth, which persevering ignorance is an obstacle to grace? But besides the doubt about disposition, who can become altogether more certain that he who baptizes has the intention of baptizing? He indeed who immerses a little child before the use of reason has the certainty of faith concerning the salvation of the little child. For his own intention is certain to him, and that there was no obstacle in the little child is manifest. But he who baptizes an adult does not have knowledge of the disposition of the recipient: just as neither can the recipient have knowledge of the intention of the one conferring. Although that belief suffices so that he remains safe. But on the contrary baptism in desire suffices for conferring grace (as was established above in book 2), indeed the determination of the Council under Innocent 3 concerning a priest not baptized,36 chapter Veniens, is express: namely that one is made a member of Christ not only through the sacrament of faith, but also through the faith of the sacrament: therefore he who is certain of his disposition will also be certain of the grace of baptism. The answer is that faith and the desire of the sacrament do not suffice for salvation without the sacrament in reality, except when true and legitimate contrition is present; but that it is true contrition, for example sorrow on account of God, cannot be clearly established. But if the contrition is not sufficient, although he asks for the sacrament, and the priest pretends to administer it, if in reality he does not baptize, no grace will be conferred, because neither did the disposition by itself alone suffice, nor is grace conferred ex opere operato (as they say). If therefore neither concerning a disposition which by itself alone would suffice, nor concerning the sacrament which confers first grace, can the certainty of faith be had, it follows that neither can it be had concerning grace itself.
By these things is exposed the ignorance of others,37 whom we rejected in book 2 ch. 15. For they say that whoever thinks he has done what is in him to delete sin is already in grace: but this each one can most clearly know about himself, namely that he thinks he has no sin: therefore he will be certain of his justice. The ignorance of these men, I say, is exposed. Indeed they think that no culpable ignorance can lie hidden here, as in other matters: when nevertheless it is most manifest that someone can lightly believe that he has made sufficient diligence, both to examine his conscience and to investigate some truth under whose ignorance he labors, which diligence nevertheless he has not made. Indeed he can believe that he has sorrow on account of God, as we were just saying, when it is not such. It is therefore most false that whoever thinks he has done what is in him is free from sin. For then whoever thought he was in grace would have it. And when we would grant this opinion of theirs, they would not thence infer the certainty of Catholic faith: since it is not even for them anything but an opinion. Besides, from these things the answer is gathered to the argument of Caietanus,38 1 q. on contrition, of which we made mention in book 2 ch. 16. For he denies that in the same instant in which man through the special help of God is most sufficiently disposed, grace is always infused: but God, he says, waits more or less according to his pleasure. And he brings this as the whole reason and cause, that otherwise man could be certain that he is in grace. Since concerning such a sufficient disposition, he says, certainty can be had. But this opinion, as we were saying there, is not only opposed to all theologians, who consentiently teach that the last disposition and grace concur in the same instant, but is also ill consonant with sacred Scripture. As,39 I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and you have forgiven, etc. And, The impiety of the impious shall not harm him, in whatever day he is converted: where Augustine and the Fathers always understand, in whatever hour and whatever moment. And St Thomas, 1-2 q. 112, where he disputes the question in form, expressly answers that grace is given by necessity, not indeed of compulsion, but of infallibility, to one prepared through the help of God. And there is besides an argument,40 that if such an opinion were true, it would be certain how long God would delay the penitent. For to say that sometimes he waits more, sometimes less, would be ridiculous. But if in the middle of that time the death of the penitent should intervene, then one legitimately disposed would die without grace. In short, gratis and without any probability a law is denied in the works of grace which God established in the works of nature. Namely, that the form accompanies the last disposition at the same time. Nor in any way does it follow from this that the certainty of grace can be had. Since no one can be certainly conscious of his legitimate preparation.
Another argument of the certainty of grace41 one might meditate on concerning him who suffers martyrdom in testimony of the faith. For it is the doctrine of the saints (as was said in book 2) that there all crimes are forgiven. But nevertheless the argument is easily solved by that teaching which we were expounding in book 1 ch. 20. Namely, that there is no act having the species of charity which is not as to substance common also to those who are in sin: especially those who are held by some ignorance. Who doubts that a heretic with the same strength of mind and ardor (as he thinks) of charity offers himself to martyrdom as a true Christian? And therefore although the martyr has very great confidence of his salvation, nevertheless he does not have the Catholic faith that he sets no obstacle in the way: unless he is made more certain by special revelation. But this answer is especially confirmed from this, that concerning almost all the martyrs we either read or believe that God specially revealed to them that their sacrifice was pleasing to him. Which revelation would not have been necessary if the act itself were an infallible testimony. There are other arguments, all weak and cold, in enumerating which discourse would therefore languish very much. Concerning which therefore enough, and thus concerning the whole work, which with God as author, to his own glory, we have brought thus far. Would that I have made some profit for his Church, for reconciling the controversies which have now for the thirtieth year tossed the Christian world. Nor do they only scatter the sheep of Christ into different symbols, but even now compel them into arms. Although what things were necessary and holy, which God put on Caesar for the defense of the faith, whose cause is at stake, he has made clear by his most illustrious victories. May he himself, whose works are perfect, bring it about that if there is no other more suitable way, at least by this we may be led back into the sheepfold under one shepherd, through whom the Holy Spirit may deign at last both to compose these discords and also to calm the tumults. Who with the Father and the Son is one God, to whom be praise everlasting.
THE END.