De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

We have said before that there are two different ways, by either of which all who defend the opinion of the certainty of grace enter. For since the knowledge of each thing arises from the knowledge of its causes, no one can have a firm assent to his own justice and grace before God unless he has an equal assent to the causes and to all actions which are in any way necessary for justification. And for that reason those who assert that anyone can have as much certainty of his justification as there is of the catholic faith are indeed mistaken, either because they think that justification in no way depends on anything else than on the catholic faith alone, whatever our works may be; or because, although they confess that it depends in some part on the quality of our works, they nevertheless think it possible that someone may believe with an assent as firm and as infallible that he has been disposed by the help of God and has not opposed an obstacle to him, as we Christians are certain that the promises of God are true and infallible. The first is the Lutheran error, which we refuted in the previous chapter, and perhaps we have already defeated it. The other is the opinion of certain other Catholics,¹ with whom we now enter into disputation. Against them this conclusion is established: Although a man in this life can have very great conjectures of his state in the sight of God (as we began to say in the preceding chapter, and will explain more fully a little later), nevertheless no one, apart from a special privilege of revelation, can attain as great a certainty of his legitimate action, by which he cooperates with God moving him, or of the legitimate reception of a sacrament, as to judge with an equal assent that he is in grace, [an assent] equal to that by which a Christian assents to the articles of faith. In confirming this conclusion, although it is not hidden from me that most worthy, most solid, and most powerful arguments are to be drawn from the divine fountain of the Scriptures, I will nevertheless begin with the reasons by which the sense of the Scriptures is chiefly opened. And the first reason,² which fights against this second way of maintaining the certainty of grace, is the very confession of the Lutherans. For their most frequent and most powerful argument, by which they assert that we are justified by faith alone, is that otherwise no one can be certain that he has received the benefit of remission promised through Christ. For thus they understand that saying: Therefore by faith, that the promise might be firm.³ They confess, therefore, as an evident thing, that if justification depends in any way on works, there can in no way be certainty of grace, such as is [the certainty] of the catholic faith, because neither can such knowledge of the condition of our works before God be had. And therefore no middle course can be devised for asserting the certainty of grace which does not fall back into the opinion of the Lutherans. But these Catholics, against whom we dispute, contended for the contrary.

The second argument⁴ is that which St Thomas makes in 1.2 q. 112 art. 5, where he properly disputes this question. To it the following conclusion is answered. Suppose that such certainty can be had by privilege, but not by common law, although a man can have the greatest conjectures of this matter. And he proves the second part, which we establish here, by this reasoning. Certainty cannot be had of anything unless it can be judged by its proper principle. But the principle and object of grace is God himself, who is unknown to us; therefore we cannot know with certainty when we have his grace; he understands that God is the principle, through his gratuitous will accepting us to glory, which is not made known to us except through our works, which are sometimes fallacious. But there are not lacking those who interpret this passage and reasoning of St Thomas as speaking only of knowledge, namely that no one can know that he has grace. For the title of the question is proposed under the same terms, and in the course of answering he interposes the example of knowledge which proceeds from first indemonstrable principles. And perhaps this response, if rightly understood, does not stray from the mind of St Thomas. But nevertheless our conclusion is thereby proved no less. For St Thomas omitted as manifest in itself the conclusion concerning the certainty of faith. For he had never suspected that anyone could think that the revelation of the catholic faith extends to the particular and proper state of this or that man. But neither did he doubt concerning the evidentness of knowledge. For nothing is more evident than that the grace of God cannot be known evidently. And therefore he asked only about the certainty of knowledge, that is, of cognition in general: whether one could judge as certainly that he is in grace as the certainty of knowledge is. When he determines the negative part, he not only concludes that there can be no evidentness (for the question was not about this), but that there can be no certainty to which falsehood cannot underlie; whence it follows by greater reason that the certainty of the catholic faith cannot be had, which is greater than the certainty of knowledge. And that this was the sense of St Thomas is made clear from the fact that he defines that there can be had precisely that certainty of the friendship of God which one can hunt out from indications and conjectures.

The third argument⁵ is that which we have already formed above, not in one place only. A habit does not generate assent except concerning its own proper object (which is a most celebrated axiom of all philosophers, and likewise of theologians); but the object proposed to faith is not other than God and those things which pertain to our hope, already revealed in sacred Scripture or derived and expressed from it by the authority of the Church; therefore the assent of faith concerns only those things. But Scripture nowhere promises remission except in general: He who believes and is baptized. And, If the impious turns himself, etc. But in particular it nowhere asserts by common law that this or that singular person has been sufficiently prepared by God, and has not opposed an obstacle to his mercy; therefore no one can by the catholic faith have such an assent about himself that he has been received into the grace of God, apart from those who by privilege have had such a revelation about themselves. As many Fathers note concerning Abraham in that word of Genesis, Now I have known, that is, I have made you to know, that you fear God; and concerning Paul, My grace is sufficient for you.⁶ Indeed those who acknowledge that our cooperation is necessary for justification, I do not know by what color they can repel the force of this argument.⁷ For to say that the infused habit of the catholic faith extends and goes out beyond the lines of its own proper object is to deny the very nature of faith. For most properly St Thomas, at the very beginning of 2.2,⁸ explains the nature of the habit of faith: namely, that God infuses it in us wholly in order to incline and move us to assent precisely to those things which he has revealed to us as pertaining to beatitude. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. And I believe this to such an extent that if God should reveal to someone in a peculiar way another truth of another kind (for example, a future victory), that assent would not pertain to the catholic faith, although it would have equal certainty. Nay, if their own salvation were revealed to certain persons, such a revelation would not be made through the assent of the catholic faith, which is common to all, but through another peculiar [assent]. And the confirmation of this argument is that one who does not now by common law certainly believe that he is in grace is in no way judged a heretic.

Now in the fourth place it is argued⁹ that for this or that person to obtain the benefit of both grace and glory is an effect of predestination; for glory is its highest end, and grace is the means ordained of itself to glory, even in those who will not persevere. But the effect of predestination is not known in particular to individual persons by faith, but only in general: namely, that to one who does what we are commanded by faith, salvation will come through the grace of Christ; therefore no one by faith alone is certain of grace and of his salvation.

The fifth and principal argument¹⁰ is taken from that distinction of the preceding chapter, where we distinguished between certainty on the part of the object and that which is on the part of the subject. And the argument is as follows. The certainty of the catholic faith is discerned not only on the part of the subject but also on the part of the object. For it is an assent not only so firm that there is no fear in it, but so infallible that falsehood cannot underlie it. But no one by common law can have such an assent that he has done what he ought to obtain grace, without being able to be deceived; at least such deception does not conflict with the nature of such an assent; therefore such an assent cannot be of the catholic faith.

And from this a sixth argument¹¹ is drawn: that such an assent can neither equal the catholic faith in certainty, nor merit any other name than that of human faith, that is, of a most intense opinion. For there is no middle between human and divine faith. For divine faith (if we speak of that most certain faith of which we dispute here) is a revelation to which we are bound to give assent. For there can also be a certain attestation of the Holy Spirit through certain indications, of which there will be speech in the final chapter. But apart from divine revelation there remains only that faith which relies on probable natural testimonies, to which indeed falsehood in the object is not repugnant. For this reason the natural philosophers¹² recognized no habit below knowledge so certain to which falsehood could not underlie. Wherefore they established no habit of faith midway between knowledge and opinion, as we disputed in chapter 11 on the first book of the Posterior Analytics. Nor does Aristotle¹³ number the habit of faith among the six intellectual virtues, because human faith, however much certainty it may possess, can be false. Let us therefore come down to the matter. If the assent by which each person judges that he is in grace is not elicited from the catholic faith, nor infused by a special privilege of revelation, it cannot be so certain as to drive away all doubt, because falsehood will not be repugnant to such an assent. And the force of the argument is further explained. Apart from divine revelation, which a man is bound to believe, no one can be persuaded with a firmer and more certain assent that he is in grace than I now have that I am at Constantinople, which indeed is a faith so certain and firm to me that it is not in my power not to believe it, or than I know that there is in Spain the city of Segovia, in which I was born; and yet falsehood can underlie such faith, because nothing prevents me from having falsely believed that there was a city which I have not seen, or that there now exists one which I once saw. But I was further refuting¹⁴ those who affirmed that nothing prevents anyone from having an assent as fixed and firm that he has not opposed an obstacle to grace as there is concerning the articles of faith, by an argument which is here the seventh. Namely, that such a man would be either frivolous or a heretic. For if he judged that there is no means as efficacious for persuading him that he is in grace as the revelation of faith, and nevertheless adhered to this with as much firmness and certainty as to an article of faith, he would be frivolous and rash, as one who gave equal faith to a disparate and lesser argument and to the revelation of God. But if he judged that some other argument, or conjecture, or authority was of as much weight for persuading him this as the authority of God revealing the catholic faith, he would plainly be a heretic.

The eighth and final argument,¹⁵ by which both the foregoing may become clear and we may open the way to dissolving the arguments that are objected against us, is as follows. In order that a man may pass a certain judgment about himself that he is reconciled to God, he must have his own heart thoroughly examined and explored, [to see] whether anything lies hidden there which stands in the way of divine friendship; but this he cannot altogether infallibly perceive; therefore neither can he certainly pass sentence that he is a friend of God. The second proposition is manifest from the fact that although there can be very many judgments of this matter, nevertheless none is so evident that it is not also common to those existing in mortal sin. For the chief testimonies of all are two. The first is to offer one's life for Christ.¹⁶ For no one has greater love than this, that a man lay down his soul for his friends; and yet a heretic will give his life in obedience to (as he thinks) Christ with as firm and as lofty a mind as a legitimate Christian. The second testimony is to have absolutely no consciousness of mortal sin; and yet neither does this produce as great faith as the catholic [faith], both because, as Paul says, I am conscious of nothing, but not even in this am I justified;¹⁷ and also because a man can be without consciousness of mortal sin, and even without consciousness of venial sin, at least for a short time; and yet he cannot then certainly affirm that he has no sin, lest according to John's sentence he deceive himself.¹⁸ And by this one must answer another argument which the defenders of the certainty of grace thought great.¹⁹ Among men it is clear to a servant when he legitimately does the master's commands; therefore a man can also know when he justly obeys God. Otherwise he would have laid down dangerous commands, if it could never be certain to us when we execute them justly, as he himself commands. It is answered, I say, that there is a difference between the obedience rendered to men and that which is owed to God. For all the obedience owed to men is concerned with external work. But to God it is necessary to serve also with the inmost heart; and the nature of the heart is such that it lies open to God alone, and is inscrutable to us. And therefore it is by nature itself that it cannot be certain to a man when he has the grace of God, which by his gratuitous will he bestows on us through our internal actions. But these answers pertain to the final chapter, where the objections are to be solved.