De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

How great and of what sort is the faculty in the justified man, through grace and divine help, of keeping the law, of satisfying for the punishments of sins remitted, and finally of meriting eternal life—which was the first part of this book—we have treated as far as seemed sufficient according to our measure. There follows therefore, according to the division set out at the beginning, that in this second part we continue to speak of the certainty of grace. Concerning this article we have a contest not only with the Lutherans but with some Catholics,¹ who have given us great trouble, contending that it can and ought to be maintained that in certain cases a man can have certainty, even of faith, concerning his grace and friendship with God. Wherefore the disputation will be twofold.² For in this chapter we shall first lay open the mind of the Lutherans, and then impugn it. In the following chapters we shall do the same against the Catholics. The question therefore is whether a man, apart from a special privilege of revelation, can by the common law have as great certainty that he is in the grace of God as is catholic faith.³ We have excluded privilege, because no one is so devoid of mind as to doubt that God can do this for whom it has pleased him to reveal it. Nay, this is to be believed not only of the most sacred Virgin, the mother of the giver of grace himself, and of the apostles, but in the authentic histories of the saints, as of Francis and certain others, the same is read. But the question concerns the common law. And the inquiry is only about certainty as great as that of catholic faith, since there is no one who suspects that the certainty of knowledge, which has clarity annexed to it, is possible for man in this life concerning his state, since not even the other mysteries of faith are known to us by such a reason. Nor on the other extreme is there any doubt that faith can be had concerning this matter as great as what we can attain by the greatest conjectures short of catholic faith, as will appear more fully later. The question therefore is established only about the certainty of catholic faith, or one like it. And because this controversy depends entirely on the understanding of this—catholic faith, as is most firmly established among all Christians, is a certain and firm assent, obscure indeed, yet one to which falsehood cannot be subject.⁴ And so this composition cannot be possible: that anyone by the assent of faith should have persuaded himself of something that is deceptive. Nay, in this certainty faith surpasses knowledge itself, although in clarity it is inferior. Concerning this supposition there is no dispute. For since faith is God’s persuasion, if anyone could be deceived through it, he himself would deceive us, which is contrary to his nature. But that the matter may become still clearer: certainty can be estimated from two things, either from the object or from the subject.⁵ Certainty on the part of the object is that just mentioned: namely, when one assents and cannot be deceived, or when one’s assent cannot be false. But certainty on the part of the subject is the firmness of assent to a thing which one persuades oneself of, with all doubt driven out, on account of the truth appearing to oneself. But the present question is not contested about certainty on the part of the subject—although we have seen some laboring under a childish error in this respect during the disputation. For no one doubts that from levity one can have an assent as firm, and as certain in one’s own judgment, about a false thing as a Christian has about catholic faith. Nay, all heretics have as great certainty about their errors, which they think are catholic truths, as we have about the articles of faith.⁶ But the doubt is about certainty on the part of the object: whether one can have such certainty that he is in grace that such assent cannot be false, any more than if it were of catholic faith. I am indeed most certain that for one to whom this explanation has been made clear, this question will bring little difficulty. But the question can have besides two senses: the first according to the present state, whether one is now in grace; the other, whether one can have certainty of perseverance to the end of life and of obtaining glory.⁷ Of this second we shall speak afterward; but now an indubitable negative conclusion is established concerning the first: no one can be as certain of his own justification as a Christian is of the articles of faith.⁸ The reason for this is as follows, which we shall explain more fully, here briefly. Certainty of this kind—that each one is in the grace of God—depends on two things: namely, on the firmness of the divine promise, which is catholic faith, and on our disposition—namely, if we have done those things which he himself requires of us. But of this second member we cannot have faith as great as catholic faith; therefore no one by the common law can have as great certainty that he is in grace.

But there are two parties who, rejecting this reasoning, maintain the affirmative part.⁹ For the Lutherans deny the first assumption: namely, that certainty of this kind depends in any way on our works, since they say it depends only on faith and the promise of God. But the Catholics denied the second proposition. For they contended (would that no one now persisted in it) that although it depends on our works, a man can nevertheless sometimes have as great certainty, either of his disposition or of the sacrament received, as is that of orthodox faith. Therefore, to begin with the Lutherans: certainty of grace is for them the daughter of that fabricated faith of theirs, by which alone they imagine they are justified.¹⁰ For from the fact that they have persuaded themselves that by faith alone—that is, by the assent of the mind by which the evangelical promise is believed to be true—mercy and grace are so apprehended that justification depends in no way at all on any work of ours, they judged it consequent that by one and the same certainty of faith we ought to assent that the promise made through Christ, who cannot lie, is true and firm, and to assent that we obtain that grace. Wherefore as we are bound to believe without any condition that God is faithful, so also we are obliged to believe the fact itself: namely, each one concerning himself, that he obtains the promised benefit, with no respect or account had of his own works. Otherwise, they say, one who doubted this about himself would be in the same crime of heresy as if he doubted the firmness of the divine promise. Nay, as it has pleased them, they call that catholic faith by which each one particularly believes with certainty that he obtains the remission of sins through Christ.¹¹ Hence among the articles of their faith in the Augsburg Confession, with that severity of censuring of the holy councils of the Church, they say in article 5: “Those are condemned who command consciences to doubt whether they obtain remission,” and they add that this doubt is not sin. And in article 20 they sharply rebuke us, saying that when we say that justification depends in some way on our disposition, we corrupt the doctrine of faith, because we cannot set before consciences a firm consolation, and therefore they are commanded to doubt the remission of sins. And below: “For if the promise depended on the dignity of our works, it would become uncertain.” And Melanchthon in his Apology¹² (with his accustomed gravity) says to the adversaries: “They counsel men unhappily when they command them to doubt whether they obtain the remission of sins. How will these men, doubting, endure at death?” And he heaps together many things of this kind to this judgment: that we ought to place no confidence in our works, but all of it in the sole promise of God. He teaches the same in his Didagma, folio 43. And Calvin treats it much more broadly in his book On the Christian Institution, and Bucer¹³ calls us sophists and enemies of the ecclesiastical reformation, because we depravedly corrupt that saying,¹⁴ “No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love,” as if we were not certain of our salvation. But however much they may hold, or pretend to hold, this article as most firmly established, I nevertheless hold it more certainly that whoever has perceived their mind and sentiments will judge this sacred certainty of theirs incredible. So immediately does the source and origin of the error offer itself to the eyes. Nor is there reason why they should fear in this place that we call them sophists (as they charge us).¹⁵ For if anywhere else, here especially (if they will only grant me this leave) they display no greater knowledge than what they carry within. And because a full understanding of this error will be its most efficacious refutation, I shall insist especially on the explanation.

The purpose¹⁶ here, therefore, is to demonstrate that the certainty which each one has of his disposition and state before God depends not only on the divine promise considered absolutely in itself, but also on the quality of his own works.¹⁷ Now this we have almost accomplished in book 2, chapter 7, where I argued that no promise was made in sacred Scripture in particular and absolutely concerning this or that man to be reconciled, but in general: if they have believed, if they have hoped, if they have loved, and finally if they have repented—that is, if, with God breathing upon us by his power, we have cooperated and given assent. From which it plainly follows that particular certainty, that this man, for example, has obtained the gift of justifying grace, depends not only on divine faith but in some way on our works—not indeed as on merits, but as on dispositions and advances which God works in us through our free will. Nor is this particular faith catholic faith, but that general faith by which all are bound to hold one and the same thing universally, and by which they are Christians, and lacking which they are held to be unbelievers. But concerning this particular faith, he is rather the heretic who reckons it heresy for anyone to doubt his place in the sight of God.

The second¹⁸ argument, which we have restored to the place left cut off and truncated until now, is founded on their own confession. For they now admit, as we reported there, that the benefit of reconciliation is bestowed on no one unless repentance precedes. Let us therefore dispute nothing about this, because it is not now our concern whether that repentance is a disposition or in any way a cause or not. For their confession is enough for us: namely, that it is necessary. From this, then, the argument arises in this way. No one is justified without true repentance; but that repentance is true and sincere sorrow for offending God is not an article of faith, nor is it so certain a knowledge; therefore neither can such particular certainty be had of each man’s reconciliation. Nay, let us weigh the words of the book presented by them at Ratisbon and examine¹⁹ whether they, convicted by the truth, think the same as we do. For they say in article 5: “Since renewal is imperfect and infirmity remains in the renewed, it must nevertheless be taught that those who truly repent should always establish with most certain faith, on account of Christ the mediator, that they please God.” And in the exposition of the same place, Bucer²⁰ says that this article commands only the penitent—and truly penitent, and having living faith—to establish with most certain faith that they obtain grace. Here, I pray, let all readers be attentive to how these men, who from a beginning so different from ours have removed this controversy, now mock us with mere differences of words. Who doubts that the truly penitent, having living faith, obtain salvation through Christ? But who is truly penitent and has living faith—this is what we say cannot be grasped with the certainty of catholic faith. See the ambiguity.²¹ They say that it is certain that all are justified through Christ the mediator alone. If they mean that as many as are justified are justified through him, we all confess it as catholic faith. But if they mean that it is certain that these or those have now been justified, then we utterly deny thrice and four times that certainty of faith is had of this. For although justification is the work of God without our works—that is, without the merit of our works—it is nevertheless not altogether without them, since, as they themselves admit, unless they truly repent, they in no way obtain this divine benefit. There is an example in Augustine’s exposition²² of “God wills all men to be saved.” For he says that the distribution is accommodated: namely, that as many as are saved are saved through Christ; not that all are simply saved. And according to the other exposition, which we judged in book 1 to be most true, the example is perhaps more apt. For God so promised, desires and intends salvation for all that it does not stand with him that all should not obtain it; yet nothing prevents many from not being saved.

The third argument is that of the expositors of this error.²³ Although no good works of ours were necessary for our justification as cause or disposition, and divine motions—at least those which are depraved—were no obstacle to the grace of God, yet no one can have the certainty of catholic faith whether he persists in some iniquitous work or at least thought; therefore neither can anyone be certain of the divine grace existing in him. This is the argument from which this error with its offspring is chiefly drawn, if you, good reader, attend well. For Luther, as may be seen in article 14 of his assertions, acutely foresaw that the certainty of grace cannot be maintained unless he consequently taught that whatever our works are, nevertheless by faith alone we are certain that sins are not imputed to us. And therefore he says: “No one ought to answer the priest that he is contrite, nor ought the priest to require it.”²⁴ For Paul said that he knew nothing against himself, yet was not thereby justified; and David: “Who understands his offenses?” Therefore even if our works are sins, we ought not to scrutinize this, because through faith those sins will not be imputed. “For not he who commends himself is approved, but he whom God commends.” Thus he. Observe therefore, candid reader, that the assertors of the certainty of grace not only deny that justification depends on works as on dispositions, but also that it can be impeded by sin. Otherwise, since we are by no means certain—at least with the certainty of faith—what sort our works are, especially where we labor under some vincible ignorance, we could not be certain of our state. With you, therefore, Bucer,²⁵ I wish to enter into this conversation. This is your complaint about us in this concord on the certainty of grace: that we, as sophists and enemies of the reformation, impose on you that you teach men, however impurely and wickedly they live, that they ought nevertheless to establish that they are pleasing to God through Christ. But is this not so? Does not the argument we have just made so convince? Does not Luther in the cited place, and in On Christian Liberty and other places, as we cited in book 2, chapter 5, so affirm that whatever our works are, provided faith is fixed and firm, we are certain of our salvation? But do not you yourself in your commentary on Romans 2 expressly teach that since our works are all uncertain—nay, are of themselves nothing—no account is to be made of them? Otherwise how will you sustain the certainty of grace? Nay, in the same concord, explaining your certainty, you say that since no one in this age can always exclude all doubt concerning his salvation and the fatherly care God has for him, and this doubt is a vice and a sin, every Christian must certainly strive to confirm his confidence both by the faithful consideration of God’s promises and by continual prayer for the increase of faith. Hear yourself. You say not only that even with sin present we are certain of grace through faith, but that since no one can be free from the sin of doubt, man is nevertheless certain that that sin is covered by faith. And your companion Melanchthon says the same in the Augsburg Apology. How these things cohere, you may see: that a man cannot be without doubt whether he is in sin—nay, without manifest sin, since doubt itself is sin—and yet is certain that through faith sin is not imputed to him, although faith itself teaches that God hates sin and does not spare the offender—that is, the one who persists in sin. But for a greater explanation of this contradiction, let us form the fourth argument.²⁶ Let us suppose here a man who has long hesitated in some vice—for example, who has practiced hatred or kept a concubine, whose depravity repeatedly returns to his memory; or a man whom ambition or any other reprobate affection bends, so that it casts doubt on him whether he has torn those desires, which are usually most deeply fixed in his vitals, out of his heart by the roots, and whether he abstains from them for God’s sake, as is required for true repentance, or only for temporary respects. Those who bear such fearful consciences (as you call them)—nay, most rightly doubtful ones (as I think)—you admonish only this: that they strive to fortify themselves in faith against these fears and to assert, praying with the apostles, “Increase our faith,” and trusting that through all these things their sins are covered, with no respect had to works. For so you teach in the imperial book, article 5. But what is this, if not a contradiction and a most open repugnance of words? For how can faith make a man certain that he is in grace, unless it altogether removes doubt, which diametrically fights with certainty? But if so, certainty depends not only on the faith of the promise but also on our works and affections. Wherefore it is contradictory that, while doubt exists, faith makes us certain. Especially since you here add another falsehood: namely, that doubt itself is sin. Certainly the holy Fathers admonish us otherwise how to deal with troubled consciences—namely, not as if fighting with specters and repeating in the heart, “I believe and am confident,” but certainly that, with the occasions of evils cut off before all things, we insist in prayers to God that he bring us help, and nevertheless apply ourselves to studious exercises, by which, with fear diminished, certainty may grow in us, trusting that it does not stand with God that we should not be freed from all evil. For that faith which²⁷ the apostles asked to be increased in themselves by no means pertains to the confidence of conscience, but to the revelation of those mysteries which Christ announced to them. Of this our Redeemer himself immediately adds: “If you have faith like²⁸ a grain of mustard seed, you shall say to this mulberry tree, ‘Be rooted up and transplanted into the sea,’ and it shall obey you.” Nay, here I call the reader as judge: these men tear the same Scriptures into contrary senses.²⁹ When Paul says, “If I have faith so as to remove mountains, but have not charity,” etc., lest they be compelled to confess that faith can exist without charity, they say that the faith of miracles is not the faith that justifies. But when afterward they contend that justifying faith makes a man certain of the friendship of God, they cite “Increase our faith,” in which place the discourse is manifestly about the same faith of miracles, which is truly catholic faith. See how the same faith which in one place they deny to be true, in another they concede not only justifies but produces this kind of certainty.

Here next follows the fifth argument³⁰ against their assertion: namely, that not only can a man, but everyone is altogether bound to believe that he is in grace. No one is bound to things that are natural. But that doubt and fear arise in a man about the state in which he stands before God is a natural thing, especially in those who have at some time lived wickedly, or suffer vehement incursions of the demon, the world, or the flesh; therefore such doubt is not sin. Nay, sometimes it arises from a man’s natural complexion. For there are those who have little blood, and who therefore, as in other things, so also in this matter are fearful. Add that we have often found by experience that men of approved life, the more care they take to purge their conscience, the more they are in fear or scruple, as Bernard says expressly in his sermon On the Four Modes of Praying, according to Gregory’s word: that they fear fault to be present where there is no fault. How then can such doubt be sin?

Nevertheless the sixth argument³¹ is one that gave Bucer great trouble at the last Diet of Ratisbon. For the Spanish interlocutor Maluenda, a learned and eloquent man, argued that if justifying faith makes a man certain of the justification he has obtained, then faith is lost by any mortal sin, and so lost that by whatever kind of sin a man becomes a heretic, denying the whole faith. For if faith remained with sin, it would deceive, certifying a sinner that he is in grace. But here Bucer was judged more liberal and generous than was right, since he conceded the consequence and the consequent, to which he was not compelled. For although any mortal fault would exclude the faith which they consider confidence, it would not nevertheless destroy all the assents of faith which a man has to sacred Scripture, by the denial or doubting of which he becomes a heretic. But certainly the argument at least proves that whoever sins mortally loses the whole true faith. For that historical faith (as they call it) is not true faith for them, since it can admit sin with itself. But if every mortal sin excludes true faith, then the argument strongly presses that by any mortal sin a man becomes a heretic. For who else, I ask, is a heretic but one who does not have true faith? And therefore they are compelled to say that one existing in sin does not believe the articles of faith with true infused faith, but with acquired faith, as we say of a heretic in some articles who believes others. But what the argument truly proves is that their faith—that special confidence—is not of the substance of faith, since its privation does not make a man a heretic.

But the argument could have been framed otherwise in the conference,³² and let this be the seventh. For we ask of them whether there can be mortal sins that proceed from ignorance—namely, whether a man can be so disposed that if he knew what he does to be a sin, he would never commit it, yet nevertheless sins from ignorance. They will by no means be able to deny us this postulate, so received is that division of sins from ignorance, from passion, and from malice. And Paul says³³ that he was worthy of mercy because he did it ignorantly. And Satan sometimes transforms himself into an angel of light.³⁴ And heretics, and some usurers, and very many sin in this way. Nay, ignorance is itself a sin, as in the heretic. Let us grant, therefore, a man with that certainty of grace which these men imagine, who commits some mortal sin from this kind of ignorance, deceived by the appearance of good. Nothing of his certainty has been worn away or diminished—but he believes as certainly that he is in grace as before, for he thinks he is performing obedience to God—and yet he is deceived. Therefore this—that a man is in grace—is not the infallible truth which we called above certainty on the part of the object; and therefore neither can the certainty of faith be had of it. For on the part of the subject the same certainty can remain when the thing is false. Who doubts that the Anabaptists adhere to their opinions with as firm an assent as the Sacramentarians, and that these believe as certainly that they are in grace as the other Lutherans, and they as we do? And nevertheless it is most evident that some are deceived, since they think differently. But Bucer’s³⁵ solution there was splendidly amusing: namely, that faith makes a man certain that he is in grace when it is had through the motion of the Holy Spirit. Who could ever doubt this, provided he was certain that that motion is made by the Holy Spirit? But when that motion is from the Holy Spirit—on this, we say, the certainty of catholic faith cannot be had. For although he sometimes gives testimonies³⁶ of himself where he dwells, it is nevertheless not evident, nor as certain as catholic faith, as will be said more fully below in dissolving the objections.

The eighth argument indeed³⁷ makes against that which they say: that the certainty of grace is only strengthened by faith, and in no way increased by works. For this dogma fights with common sense. For who is so mad as to deny that one who has passed his whole life innocently has greater tranquillity of conscience and security, and therefore greater certainty of grace, than one who, after living most wickedly, believes by a motion of faith and trusts that all his crimes and shameful deeds are forgiven him? And of two who recover from an unclean and wicked life, who of sound mind doubts that the one who has taken care to expiate his crimes by more fruits of penance becomes more certain of his salvation in that respect than the one who has only ceased from sins? They accuse and charge us with this iniquity: that we command fearful consciences to doubt. Yet they are the ones who flatter sinners with the vainest security, and indeed, however wicked their morals, they counsel them nothing else than to beware of sins thereafter. Because³⁸ Christ said nothing else than “Go, and sin no more.” But we, with the Church, are most certain that when anyone has first turned his mind away from iniquity, he obtains the grace of God.³⁹ Yet because it is not certain to anyone with the certainty of faith whether he has truly left a depraved heart, we counsel that one should so trust in the divine mercy that nevertheless by the exercise of good works he makes his calling certain, as Peter says,⁴⁰ and so becomes more certain day by day of his salvation. For⁴¹ Christ promised life only to those who keep the commandments; and “He who loves me,” he says,⁴² “will keep my word.” And Paul commands us to exhibit our members to serve justice, as we exhibited them⁴³ as weapons of iniquity to serve uncleanness. Nor is it only said in Ecclesiasticus: “Son,⁴⁴ you have sinned, do not add again,” but there is added: “but even for the former things pray that they may be forgiven you.” Therefore it is not enough to cease from sins to establish the certainty of our salvation, but certainty must be confirmed from works. Hence Paul to the Corinthians: “Our glory is this,⁴⁵ the testimony of our conscience.” Therefore we cannot have certainty unless our conscience is quiet. And for this reason I do not know with what face these men say that when conscience stings, we ought to oppose to it nothing else than the faith of Christ. For this is not what Paul means to the Corinthians, where he says:⁴⁶ “Try yourselves, brothers, whether you are in the faith”—namely, in living faith; for of dead faith we can have certainty. And to make an end at once, these men who hunt for the certainty of grace by faith alone seem to me to be those to whom John says: “Little children,⁴⁷ let us not love in word, nor with the tongue, but in deed and in truth.” For what is it to love in word but to say persistently, “I believe and am confident”? And he adds: “For in this” (namely, because we love in deed) “we know that we are of the truth, and in his sight” (namely, God’s) “we shall persuade our hearts.” And it follows: “For if our heart reprehends us, God is greater than our heart.” Thus Bucer⁴⁸ and the rest cunningly truncate this authority so as to twist it into a sinister sense: namely, that when conscience accuses, we ought to oppose to it nothing else than the faith of Christ, who is greater than our heart. But although for fearful men, otherwise upright and of timorous conscience—nay, for all—the meditation of God’s mercy is most healthful, yet in this place John’s sense is very different, as is clear from the words subjoined: “If our heart reprehends us, God is greater than our heart, and knows all things”—that is, when the heart reprehends, it is to be feared that God, who knows all things better than our heart itself, will more justly reprehend us. Whence it immediately follows: “Most beloved, if our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God,” etc. Since therefore he said first, “if the heart reprehends,” and then, “if it does not reprehend,” a great argument is taken that our certainty is greatly confirmed by our conscience, which without doubt depends especially on works. Hence Chrysostom⁴⁹ in the first chapter of Matthew, Homily 5, says: “Let each of us place his hope in nothing else, after the mercy of God, than in holiness of morals.” And Bernard says the same in the sermon On the Four Modes of Praying, treating the miracle of the paralytic healed, who was commanded to take up his bed and walk: “For from this,” he says, “our confidence is increased, that we are sound, if, rising with desire for heavenly things and lifting our body from earthly pleasures, we take care that the soul rule the body and not be ruled by it, and thus by working we see that we profit.” But there is no need to pour out more words in a matter so universally received and so known by the voice of nature itself. For as each one judges of the holiness and merit of others’ morals before God, so also concerning himself he cannot have a more certain confidence in God than that which is begotten from the conscience of works. Yet I would note here that it is not so proper and exact a Christian way of speaking to distinguish two confidences:⁵⁰ the former of the remission of sins, which rests wholly on the one and only Lord Jesus Christ and his merits, and the latter of a good conscience—unless it is expounded in a sound and right way. For there is properly only one confidence, which rests principally on the merits of Christ, and then on our own works. To this sense: that we firmly believe that sins are freely forgiven us by God, without our merits; but because justice is not conferred on adults unless we cooperate, nor increased except through merits in us springing from the same merit of Christ, in this way the same confidence is increased from works. But nevertheless we must finally cast it all back upon the grace of Christ.

(The ninth argument,⁵¹ which I am accustomed to meditate on against these men, and against any Catholics whatsoever who assert as great a certainty of grace in a particular person as is that of faith, is taken from experience. For never hitherto could I persuade myself to believe that anyone—even among the Protestants themselves, the introducers of this opinion, unless he is most rude, or blinded by the obstinacy and perversity of his opinion—who does not understand how great the certainty of faith ought to be, is as certain that he is in grace as that God is three and one, or that Christ is God and man. So manifest is the difference: namely, that these are articles of faith about which it is in no way lawful to doubt, but death must be undergone in testimony to them; whereas this—that I or that man is in grace—is not in that degree of certainty. See how my mind recoils from the mind of the adversaries concerning this certainty of grace. For I think,⁵² according to my slender ability, that when there were no other argument, this alone—that it would follow that one is sometimes certain that he is in grace—would be a reason for denying that we are justified by faith alone. So great is the evidence that faith makes no one certain of his salvation. And yet the adversaries, by a perverse argumentation, reason especially from this: that otherwise no one would be certain of his justification—so evident do they hold it that everyone ought to be certain of his salvation.

But that we may add a last word concerning the second sense⁵³ of this kind of certainty noted at the beginning of the chapter: they affirm not only that each one can, but that he ought to be certain of his salvation according to the present state, but also that he can and ought to be certain of his perseverance up to the obtaining of glory. Hence Bucer,⁵⁴ in the concord on this article, reporting that word of Augustine in 11 of The City of God, chapter 12, where he says that the just are certain of the reward of their perseverance, yet are found uncertain of their perseverance itself, interprets it as speaking of the uncertainty and ignorance which is opposed to knowledge. What more is there to dispute against such an interpreter?

I ask you, Bucer, when in the first member⁵⁵ Augustine says that the just are certain of the reward of their perseverance, of what certainty, I ask, was he speaking? Of the certainty of knowledge? You will not be able to affirm this, because we do not have evident knowledge of that eternal reward, but faith. Therefore when he subjoins the negation—that we are uncertain of perseverance itself—he was speaking of the uncertainty contrary to faith, since there was no question of knowledge. But what need is there of Augustine’s testimony? Do you wish to say that by faith a man is most certain of his predestination? Where, I ask, did faith ever reveal to anyone his predestination, unless perhaps to someone by privilege? Paul,⁵⁶ where he discourses of those twin brothers, one of whom God loved and the other he hated, reckons the mystery of predestination so inaccessible that he admires from it the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God. And yet our men wish that anyone can and ought to have his perseverance certain. But this argument is invincible to the contrary:⁵⁷ he to whom God would reveal his predestination (let us grant, for example, the most sacred Virgin, of whom it is not to be doubted that she had such a revelation)—he, I say, can have no fear, not even the least; nay, I believe such a one would count the whole world as nothing, but would be far happier and firmer than Paul when he said, “I live, now not I,”⁵⁸ or when he said, “Who shall separate me from the love of Christ?”⁵⁹ But if this is so, let these men answer, I pray, how many men they have known in such great tranquillity of mind and security of conscience. Therefore as this second member is concerned, that canon is excellently written in the Synod, session 6, canon 16:⁶⁰ “If anyone says that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance to the end with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he has learned it from a special revelation: let him be anathema.” But the other condemnations of certainty we shall report in the following chapter.

These men bring forward many testimonies of Scripture for their side,⁶¹ but they are common also to other Catholics, who affirm the same certainty for another reason; to these we shall therefore answer a little later. But the place proper and most peculiar to the Lutherans is that one: “Therefore by faith, that according to grace the promise might be firm.”⁶² For they interpret this place to mean that we must therefore believe that we are justified by faith alone, so that each one may have firm faith of his own salvation. Learn all from one charge. The promise of salvation made by God through Christ is to be considered not in one way but in two.⁶³ First, concerning the promise in general, by which God promised to Abraham, and then through the prophets, to send his Son as universal redeemer to every believer, without distinction of Jew and Greek. In another way it is understood particularly of salvation to be conferred on anyone through him. Concerning the first, the Christians converted from Judaism thought wrongly: namely, that Christ had been promised to them because of the merit of keeping the law. Paul beats down their swelling and drives away their blindness, showing that neither was the promise made to Abraham because of any merits of the law, nor was Christ given to us as a reward of any works of the whole world; but as the promise was made freely and without any condition, so Christ came for this sole cause: to make the promise certain, with no respect at all to the works of the human race. And this is what the Apostle treats there. “For not through the law,” he says, “was the promise to Abraham or to his seed, that he should be heir of the world, but through the justice of faith.” And he adds: “Therefore by faith, that according to grace the promise might be firm to all the seed: not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham.” Here therefore he makes no mention of the certainty of anyone’s promise, but of the promise of the coming Christ and the remission of sins in general, which depended on no work of the law at all, as the Jews thought.

This promise is therefore considered in another way as the promised benefit is applied to individuals,⁶⁴ and according to this consideration, apart from little children who are justified before the use of reason, the promise depends on each one’s works. Since in this way the promise was not made to anyone absolutely, but under a condition: if we have repented, if we have heard his voice. For “he who hears, and has learned, comes to me.”⁶⁵ This has already been explained very fully above. And these things concerning the certainty of grace with the Lutherans.