De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)
De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
First published 1550
Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.
Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I
Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent
Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature
Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform
Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice
Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works
Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed
Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded
Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin
Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin
Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed
Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good
Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally
Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments
Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered
Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted
Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God
Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity
Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out
Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out
Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What faith without works confers
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On the cause of the effect of faith without works
Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — On the causes of justification
Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the justification of an infant before the use of reason
Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the justification of adults in general
Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — On the justification of an adult from original sin alone
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the justification of adults from actual sins
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the difference between attrition and contrition
Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — On the difference between baptism and the sacrament of penance
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — Whether another act of charity than contrition suffices
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 17. — On the formal causes: how grace and the virtues are distinguished
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 18. — On the same formal causes: how they justify
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 19. — On the formal causes of justification against the Lutherans
Capitulum XX: Chapter 20. — On the justice of Christ imputed to us
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 21. — On the interpretation of divine Scripture, in which places faith alone seems to be declared the cause of justification
Liber III: On Nature and Grace, Book III
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the obligation of the just to observe the law
The part which was left in the distribution of the work to this third book was that concerning the power of the justified man. For in each of the four states which we undertook to set forth, we followed this order, that first we establish man in such a state and condition, and then explain what his faculty was for the works of virtue. For in this way we have discoursed concerning man: first in pure nature, then in the flower of integral nature: and finally in the case of corrupted nature. But because concerning man restored to grace a fuller discourse had to be held,1 we spent the whole of the next book explaining the nature and manner of reconciliation: but the first part of this [book] will be occupied with the disputation concerning the faculty of the just man, and the latter part concerning the certainty of grace. Moreover the threefold faculty2 was always acknowledged and confessed by the holy Fathers and theologians, of man made just through the grace of God, and leaning on his favour and help. Namely for fulfilling the works of the law, and for satisfying by the fruits of penance for sins remitted: and finally for meriting eternal life. Which threefold power the Lutherans strive to deny and abjure. But that we may descend to the first member, it must be foreseen whether perhaps they bring forth contradictions concerning the divine commandments in the case of the just man. Luther, in that little book which he entitled On Christian Liberty,3 so extolled a man of this kind, endowed with liberty through faith alone, that he freed him entirely from the whole law. And at the same time nevertheless on the same page he teaches that all the commandments of the law are impossible to be fulfilled by us. Nay, he says, from the fact that they are impossible to us, it comes about that by the single act of faith we fulfil them all. Consider whither that madness has gone4 which we have therefore condemned in many places in book 1: namely that concupiscence after remission in baptism always remains sin, and that it is forbidden by that commandment, You shall not covet. From this he gathers that the concupiscence of the flesh is an unavoidable transgression. Nay, since it inclines man against all the commandments, it is by the power of all of them (even without the consent of the will) the transgressions which we cannot avoid. But yet he who believes, he says, certainly that all things are pardoned through CHRIST, by that faith alone not only obtains that those sins are not imputed to him, but fulfils the whole law. And therefore he who believes, he says, is now freed from the law. From which he immediately concludes that there is no virtue except faith,5 nor any sin except unbelief: according to that,6 God has concluded all things in unbelief, that he may have mercy on all. But these monstrosities of words betray by their own explanation how absurd they are.7 For first, if believers by faith alone fulfil all the commandments, how are they impossible to be fulfilled? Martin answers: because God himself, who commands, fulfils them. This is certainly most false. For (as we shall report a greater explanation in the following chapters) it is not he who believes himself: but we are the ones who believe him. For faith, although it is made by him, is nevertheless in us, not in him. Whence Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations: Although God, he says, works all things in all, yet he does not believe all things in all. If therefore the commandments are fulfilled by faith, we are the ones who fulfil them with the help of God, and therefore they are not impossible for us to keep. But concerning this a little later. For now we take pains only to prove this, that the just man is not forthwith exempted from the obligation of the law. For so Luther says that the just man does not work from obligation, but from love alone: according to that of Paul,8 Owe no one anything, except to love one another. Whence he set down that antithesis.9 A Christian man is the freest lord of all, subject to no one, but yet the most dutiful of all: and therefore subject to all. But we confess the contrary conclusion.10 A Christian, however great the sanctity with which he is endowed, is by no means freed from the obligation of the law. And first of all Luther most foully confuses and mingles different liberties. For it is one thing, and far different, for a man advanced in every duty and sanctity to be free from the resistance and trouble of sensuality,11 and another to be free from the bond of the law.12 For let us grant a man not only in some way in the grace of God, but so advanced that he dares with Paul to say, Who shall separate me from the love of CHRIST?13 He will surely work from charity and filial fear, with all fear far removed: but nevertheless he is not therefore freed from the bond of the law. For the obligation of the law14 consists in this, that he who transgresses it is guilty of it, and therefore incurs the indignation and wrath of God: but whoever, however just, should act against the law, would be held guilty before God: therefore although one does the things commanded by the law with the greatest liberty, he is not therefore exempted from the law: but he has only attained this, that its commandments are most light and sweet to him. Nay, even the apostles confirmed in grace were bound by the law. Otherwise, why did Paul so sharply chastise his body,15 and bring it into servitude, lest, while he preached to others, he himself should be reprobate, and why did he ask to be saved from the angel of Satan who buffeted him? But also the most holy Virgin, who was not only confirmed so as not to sin even venially, but experienced no tumult of the flesh or temptation to evil, was bound by the law, which if she had transgressed, she would have been guilty, and in fault before God. And yet Luther, who not only acknowledges the struggle of the flesh with reason, but says it is unavoidable sin, wishes not only the most perfect men, but any just man whatsoever, in whom besides natural concupiscence, from the corrupted habit and force of evil custom, he wishes him to be free from the law: and to do all things from love. Is not this most pestilent dogma, smeared with the rouge of love, to the ruin of all virtues? How many among even just men would you find who, if they were loosed from the law, would perform the works of the whole law from love? CHRIST alone was one, who had no need of any obligation of the law, because since he was man and God, it was repugnant that he should do any human work even except according to the divine rule.
Receive another contradiction of this absurd dogma.16 The sacrament of faith is nothing other than the profession of keeping the law: according to that,17 Going, teach all nations, baptizing them, and teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: what then is it that Luther clamours against, that a man is freed from the law by faith? Did not CHRIST say to the other professors of the law,18 If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments: You shall not commit murder: you shall not commit adultery, etc.
For the Decalogue is so inscribed by the law of nature in the minds of men that it has never failed to oblige any mortal: how then would CHRIST, more perfect than nature, not have proclaimed it to the professors of faith? Whence Paul says: Do we therefore destroy the law by faith?19 Far be it, but we establish the law. And:20 This is the will of God, your sanctification, that you abstain from fornication, etc. And he adds: Not as the Gentiles who do not know God. As if he had said: those whom faith advances more deeply into the knowledge of God, it binds by a greater bond to the keeping of sanctity. For, as the very teacher of truth says: That servant who knew the will of his lord, and did not prepare himself, and did not do according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he who did not know, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. See how far it is from faith to free from the law, that rather from the knowledge of faith there comes an addition of guilt to the transgressor. And furthermore the conclusion is confirmed.21 The law of the Decalogue is nothing other than: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and your neighbour as yourself. For in the first are contained the commandments of the first tablet, and in the second, the commandments of the second: but faith by its own nature teaches us this, and calls our minds to this, that we love God and neighbour: therefore the evangelical law also binds us to this: and therefore no Christian is freed by faith from the law, but is rather bound to its most holy keeping.
Finally therefore, and most evidently, the argument22 to prove this error is that if the just man were free from the law, he could no longer lose justice: since it cannot be lost except through transgression of the law. To this argument we can think of two ways for them to answer. First, that he who is once in grace by the received washing of regeneration cannot sin any more. But this was the heresy of Jovinian, as Augustine reports in the book On Heresies,23 chapter 82, which also now the holy Synod of Trent24 condemns in canon 23. Nor is it necessary to spend time in refuting an error so manifest. For we know that not only two chief friends of God fell, David I mean from the Old Testament, and Peter from the New, but also Adam, established in so great a degree and height of happiness, and even the first angel, as Lucifer risen: as being bright with divine knowledge and burning with divine love, we read that he fell. Wherefore I cannot understand what Bucer25 wishes by that screen with which he strives to protect his master in the Concordance of this controversy. Saying that justifying faith frees the just man from the law for this reason, that he who believes with living faith can do nothing else than seek the glory of God, and by this necessarily measures all things. For first it is most false that venial sins can be referred to the glory of God, from which nevertheless no one of the just is free. And besides, although while the just man perseveres in justice he cannot commit sins which are at the same time with grace, he is nevertheless always in danger of sinning. For justifying faith does not free a man from the possibility of sinning: and therefore there is no reason why it should free him from the law forbidding sins. Wherefore what draws them more strongly into suspicion of the crime of Jovinian is that they cite in testimony of their opinion that word: Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin,26 because his seed remains in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. For from this they argued that the just man cannot sin. To which nevertheless Augustine, and according to him St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 24, art. 11,27 answers that there is a threefold consideration of charity. The first, insofar as it is the motion of the Holy Spirit. And from this part charity can admit no sin. And to this pertains perseverance: which is the gift of the Holy Spirit himself, upholding us. The second consideration of charity is according to its own proper nature. From which part also sin is repugnant to it, as cold is to heat. And in both ways is understood the word of John, that he who is born of God cannot sin, if only the nature of the seed which is in him is considered. But the third consideration of charity is on the part of the subject: namely of the man in this life. And for this reason charity can be lost: because since faith is an obscure knowledge, not showing us the divine essence itself, it does not so establish our will in God that it is always intent on him: and therefore it is not of such vigour as to be able to overcome in every part the struggles of this our warfare: and therefore the just always need the bridle of the law. But that facial vision is what so transforms the blessed, now stripped of the trouble of the flesh, into divine love that they need no compelling law. But our Protestants wish to attribute to faith justifying [them] what is proper to that vision of the blessed.
But the other answer28 of the Lutherans to the proposed argument is what they have learned from their master: namely that although the just man can lose grace and justice, he nevertheless cannot do so except by one sin of unbelief: just as justice is not acquired except by the one virtue of faith. For so we reported in book 1, chapter 5, from Luther29 against Carlstadt. There is no sin except unbelief, no justice except faith. And in On the Babylonian Captivity: No sins can damn a man, even if he wishes, except unbelief alone. Nor must he who has faith doubt of his salvation, because the promise made there is not changeable by any sins except unbelief alone. And in On Monastic Vows: No works are so evil to one who believes in CHRIST that they can damn and accuse him. Here therefore the intention of these men must be seen, and the point of contradiction30 between us and them weighed. They intend that since God has promised us salvation simply and without dependence on our works, we are only bound to give faith to that promise nakedly and absolutely, without respect to the fulfilment of the other commandments. And therefore Luther said on the letter to the Galatians that faith alone is necessary, and all other works are most free, neither commanded nor forbidden. But the catholic confession is that the evangelical promise is not naked and absolute, but salvation is promised to sinners on this condition, that being repentant of their past life they propose to keep the commandments. Wherefore as faith alone does not suffice for justification, so neither does it absolve the just man from the bond of the commandments. And therefore the Synod31 has just now condemned the mind of these men, fully understood. For in canon 19 it pronounces anathema on those who say that there is no commandment in the Gospel besides faith, and that the rest are indifferent. And in canon 20 on those who say that a justified man, however perfect, is not bound to the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, but only to believe, as if the Gospel were a naked and absolute promise of eternal life, without the condition of observing the commandments. In these last words the root of this Lutheran error is touched to the point. For the commandment of faith is not the whole evangelical law.32 Indeed that doubt does not escape the theologians, whether unbelief is the cause of all sins. Nor do they deny that many sins flow from the weakness and languor of faith. For since from faith both our hope has its origin, and dutiful charity is nourished, the firmer faith is, the stronger hope is, and the more ardent charity. Whence Paul, after he had seen the secrets of God, feared nothing in things which could tear him from his charity.
But nevertheless, these things notwithstanding, a threefold conclusion is set down here.33 Namely, that neither are all sins unbelief or incredulity, as these men think, nor is unbelief the cause of all, nor is faith expunged by any sin whatsoever. The first member is manifest. For although this is the common nature of every sin:34 namely that it is a word or deed or desire against the law of God, and therefore an aversion from his goodness, yet vices differ in species35 by reason of conversion to different objects, which are intended by the one who sins. For no one does evil looking at it as evil, but led by the appearance of good. Just as the virtues themselves differ among themselves by reason of the objects which are proposed to each. Wherefore, as virtues, so also vices are distinguished first of all by their objects. And the first difference of all is that those vices which are directly against God differ in species from those which are against neighbour. As the three theological virtues [differ] from the moral. Nay, on account of the different reasons by which those three objects differ in God, namely truth, which is the object of faith: and our beatitude, to which hope tends, and his goodness in himself, which is the object of charity, faith, hope and charity are different virtues, and the crimes of impiety are also different: unbelief, despair and hatred of God. Moreover neither are all sins concerning temporal goods of the same genus. For everything that is in the world36 is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. By which words the Apostle, according to the threefold good of the philosophers, distinguished the species of vices. For there is one natural concupiscence, which pertains to touch, either of foods and other things by which the individual is preserved, or of sexual things by which the species is propagated. Another is animal: namely of those things which please by apprehension and possession alone, or rather by use: such as money, and useful goods of that kind. The first of these the Apostle called the concupiscence of the flesh, and the second the concupiscence of the eyes. But the third appetite is for sublime and more spiritual goods: such as honours: and this he named the pride of life. But under these three genera Gregory37 in the 31st of the Moralia recognized the seven species of capital vices, most received by theologians, nay by all Christians, which Paul commemorated in Romans38 and Galatians.39 To what purpose are these things? Surely to show that not all crimes are sins of unbelief, but have most diverse objects. From which is most easily gathered the second member of the asserted conclusion:40 namely that not all sins arise from unbelief, but as they are diverse by their objects, so they are perpetrated from diverse affections and sicknesses of the mind. Indeed he who, stirred by anger, kills, or, taken by foul love, slips, or, through avarice, grows foul, does not sin against faith: for he is certain that he acts evilly. Whence the third member of the conclusion follows:41 namely that faith is not extinguished by any sin whatsoever. For as in the other virtues, whoever sins from anger does not lose temperance concerning the delights of touch, nor does he who sins against temperance lose liberality: so neither is the habit of faith lost by any mortal sin whatsoever, by which we truly believe all things divinely revealed to us, and therefore the very promise of the remission of sins, if we wish by the grace of God to tear our hearts away from our iniquities. But if the matters42 of the virtues and vices, about which our different affections are exercised, are different, other commandments also are most different from the commandment of faith, and different obligations, such as are expressed separately in the most distinct Decalogue. And therefore, what is the intent of this chapter, faith by no means exempts the just man from the law, but rather subjects him to the law.
There are one or two passages of Scripture43 which the adversaries can raise against this catholic truth, namely that word of Paul,44 The law is not set for the just man, but for the unjust, the disobedient, the ungodly, and sinners, etc. And that:45 If you are led by the Spirit of God, you are not under the law: but all the just are led by the Spirit of God: according to that,46 Those who are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God. To which is added also that:47 Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But to these the answer of all the theologians is most easy, most true and most plain,48 unless these men have rejected them all. For there are two powers in the law. The first, that it is the rule of our actions, whose transgression is sin, and from this power of the law no one is excepted. For let every soul (says Paul)49 be subject to the higher powers, nor can anyone be subject to God or to his powers unless he is subject to the laws. But there is another, coercive power of the law, which compels the incontinent man to act against his appetites, and in this way the just man, namely he who already has calm and peaceful turbulent passions, is not subject to the law, because he obeys the nod of the Holy Spirit with all fear of the law far removed.