De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

After it has seemed good that grace and the virtues be distinguished, which was necessary for understanding the different way in which they concur in justification, two things remain to be established concerning them. First concerning infusion, and the second concerning the formal reason by which it justifies. And that they are infused habits, although perhaps not so constantly before, nevertheless from the time of the Council of Vienne it is held as certain among the Fathers and theologians, as was decreed there. Which is most consonant with very many sacred testimonies. The first is to Titus:¹ According to his mercy he saved us through the laver of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior. Similar to which is also that:² The love of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. For the word "infusion" and "gift" designates something besides the motion of God, which remains in us. Except that the first passage more closely regards sanctifying grace.

For to save us through his mercy is the same as through the love by which he loves us. But the second speaks expressly of the love by which we love him. For so Augustine says in On the Spirit and the Letter ch. 32:³ The love of God is said to be poured into our hearts, not that by which he loves us, but that by which he makes us his beloved things. The third passage is in the first canonical epistle of John:⁴ Everyone who is born of God does not sin: because his seed remains in him. The word "remains" carries the signification of an inherent habit. And although the virtues can also now be called seeds of good works, since they are their principles, nevertheless more significantly and properly the name of seed signifies grace, by which we are born of God Christ: as by natural seed from the first Adam. And besides, because grace is the sowing of fruits, namely whence our works are merits of glory. To this is added that:⁵ If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and we will come to him, and make our dwelling with him. Which the same Evangelist expounding in his canonical epistle says:⁶ In this we know that we remain in him, and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit. Since therefore God, besides that general way in which he is everywhere by essence (as they say), presence, and power, is said singularly to persist in us through his Spirit and love, another mode is inexplicable than through the habit of grace and the virtues, by which he divinely informs us. So much so that the holy Fathers do not fear to say that as the soul is the life of the body, so he himself is the life of the soul. Namely, that one who remains in love remains in God in some measure: as matter in the power of form, and God in him, as the power of form in matter. To the same pertains what Peter says:⁷ He has given us the greatest and precious promises, so that through this you may be made partakers of the divine nature. And that of Paul:⁸ Whoever of you have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ. For to put on Christ is to be joined to him as a member, so that one who is reborn in him may show forth his image in his conduct through grace and the virtues received by such a birth. And to the Corinthians:⁹ God has sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts. Which he repeats to the Ephesians,¹⁰ where he says: You are sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance. The sacred page is filled with such eulogies. For besides these concerning grace and charity, we have gathered very many above in ch. 8 concerning faith: and the judgment concerning hope is the same. Wherefore concerning grace and the three theological virtues there is the highest consensus among theologians, that they are infused habits.

But the greatest argument¹¹ for this opinion is taken from baptized infants: namely, since they are truly born sons of God by the blood of Christ, it is certain that they participate in such aids for the spiritual life: and since they are not mature so as to receive them by way of acts, it is more than conjecture that these are imparted to them by way of habit. Hence when there were once those who thought the contrary, saying that little children, because they are not capable and fit for the use of such habits, are by no means infused with them, but only receive remission of sins, and when they come to the use of reason, at that time by the power of the character they receive the same habits, the Council of Vienne,¹² under the title On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith, added new and great weight of authority to the constitution of Innocent in the chapter Maiores, in these words: But we, attending to the efficacy of the death of Christ, which is applied through baptism equally to all the baptized, have judged the second opinion, which says that informing grace and the virtues (it distinguishes between grace and the virtues) are conferred in baptism on both little children and adults, as more probable and more consonant and agreeable to the sayings of the saints and of modern doctors of theology, with the sacred Council approving, to be chosen. Consistently the holy Synod now¹³ says in ch. 6: By the merit of the most holy passion of Christ, in justification itself justice is infused: that is, faith, hope, and charity, which is as the first evangelical garment, which, in place of that lost through Adam's disobedience, the reborn are commanded to keep white and spotless, so that bearing it before the tribunal of Christ they may receive eternal life. And can. 11 more explicitly decrees under anathema that grace and charity are poured into the hearts of the reborn. Although it deliberately makes no mention of the name of habits. And although the Synod pronounced only concerning the virtues in general, the same must also be held concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which the Prophet foretold¹⁴ under the number seven would rest upon the flower of the root of Jesse, and then according to each one's measure and degree in each of his members. For St Gregory recognized these at the beginning of Job in his seven sons, distinguished from the three theological virtues designated by three of his daughters. Indeed although there is not so unanimous a judgment of all concerning this, nevertheless if St Thomas is to be believed,¹⁵ four cardinal virtues besides are infused with the grace of Christ: who is that divine wisdom of which it is written that¹⁶ she teaches sobriety and wisdom, and justice and virtue. With these things premised concerning infusion, which was the first member of this chapter, in the formal causes of justification¹⁷ the number, order, and mode are carefully to be observed: and finally in what way they are interwoven with the material dispositions. For as we established four in the discourse of material causes: namely first, on the part of God moving, special help, and then three motions of our free will: namely of faith, hope, and charity; so in the same instant of time there immediately follow four others, which are formal causes divinely infused: namely grace remitting sin through divine love toward us, and the three habits of the same virtues, having God as their object: since by them we worthily and meritoriously believe, hope, and return our love to him. But in whatever order of nature¹⁸ those motions precede grace, in the same order the habits are infused in the same instant: namely faith, hope, and charity. Wherefore the order which St Thomas¹⁹ set in 3 p. q. 85 art. 5 among our dispositions for grace with special help, the same he arranges in 1-2 q. 113 art. 8 in the infusion of grace and the virtues.

But as to the mode²⁰ of justifying, it must be prudently discerned and considered that although grace and the virtues are formal causes of justification, yet not in the same way, but far differently. For we can use this, that we are justified, in two ways: or rather there is a double effect and reason of the same justification. For we are said to be justified because our sins are forgiven us, and thus we are made pleasing and acceptable to God. And we are said to be justified because at the same time we receive the faculty to do just things. The first is attributed formally to grace through itself: but the second to charity and the other virtues. Wherefore whatever one may wish to hold concerning grace and charity, whether they are one or several things, it is not to be held or affirmed that we are justified in the first sense: that is, freed from sins through charity infused into us, except perhaps as it is an effect and minister of grace: as we are about to say. For that (insofar as it is charity) is not that by which we are loved by God: but that by which we love him. And yet God does not forgive us our sins through this, that we love him, but because, as the apostle John testifies,²¹ he first loves us, by infusing the grace by which we are called beloved: as objects (so to speak) of his love toward us. Further Paul teaches the same to the Ephesians,²² where he says that God predestined us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will (not therefore of ours) unto the praise of the glory of his grace: in which he has graced us in his beloved Son. Expounding which discourse, Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints ch. 18 carefully considers that word, According to the purpose of his will. Lest in so great a benefit (he says) of the grace of God we should glory in the purpose of our will. And besides he contemplates how in his will he has graced us. For it is said (he says) "he has graced," from grace. So Augustine. Let us gather therefore that as in the first justification, by which we are made just from unjust, we are not justified by our own justice, so neither by the merit of the love of our will: even if it is infused by God, but by the grace of his will. But we are justified by the habits first by cooperating with our justification: then that we may justly, that is, worthily and meritoriously, believe, hope, and love, and finally work: which no one could do before grace.

But for a fuller understanding of this matter, it must be noted first that charity is opposed to sin for a different reason than grace.²³ For charity is opposed to it as friendship to enmity in the same subject. For he who loves God does not offend him. But grace and sin are contrary by intrinsic formal reason, as diverse objects with respect to God. For a man to exist in sin is to be ungrateful, hateful, and offensive to God: but to be in grace is to be pleasing and acceptable to God. Since the intrinsic nature of sin²⁴ does not consist, as some think, in this, that it is acceptable to punishment: for that is its effect. But even if no decree of punishment had been made against the sinner, he who had acted against his will would be ungrateful to him. Hence it happens that sanctifying grace is diametrically opposed to sin, and thus formally by way of contrariety expels it, as St Thomas is the author,²⁵ 1-2 q. 113 art. 2. Nor indeed can it be expelled otherwise. I do not say that grace is so necessary that it be a quality, for God could have made us pleasing without it, but speaking (as they say) formally of grace, to forgive us our sins is nothing else than to receive us into his grace. I know that Scotus²⁶ in 4 d. 1 q. 6 and d. 14 and 16 thinks the contrary, at least concerning the absolute power of God. Because, he says, as he could create man in pure natural things without grace and sin, so he can forgive sin in such a way that man is restored without grace to pure natural things. But surely the contrary is much more probable. Namely that although man could be established in natural things, free both from guilt and grace (which is a middle between these contraries), in which man, as the first sin would expel no grace, so neither if he received grace first would it expel sin, yet after one has committed it, it is hardly intelligible that it could be forgiven, except through the love by which God loves him who had been offended against him, and thus through this, that he receives him into grace. But it is vain to dispute concerning the absolute power of God.

Therefore to return to the matter. Secondly it must be noted how grace is infused prior by nature²⁷ than the virtues. For by this, that God loves us, he confers on us all good things. Which is a most valid argument that grace is distinguished from charity. For if grace is infused before faith, and faith before charity, how can grace be the same as charity? Surely I could more easily be brought to believe that grace is no distinct quality, than to think that it is the same as charity. With equal ease Melanchthon and the rest now say that grace is not charity, but faith. Which plainly, even if their opinion were true, that we are justified by faith alone, would nevertheless be false. Because if faith is that by which we apprehend mercy, it is the same by which we apprehend grace, and thus faith is not grace itself.²⁸

Thirdly here at last, to add the final word concerning the causes of justification: it must be carefully seen in what way the natural dispositions are related to the formal causes.²⁹ And first, whether the motion of disposition to grace is the same as that by which God justifies us. But according to Scotus and those who introduce the merit of congruity, there is no difficulty: because the motion of disposition is from the faculty itself and the strength of nature through only the general concurrence of God: after which God alone through himself infuses justifying grace. But if it is true, as we strove to establish above in ch. 3, that the disposition itself is the motion of God peculiarly drawing us, it is doubtful whether God by infusing grace moves us at the same time to receive it, or moves us before he infuses. And the reason for doubting on one side is that the disposition ought to precede the form. And so St Thomas, 1-2 q. 109 art. 6, says that the preparation for grace is through special help, as if it were another preceding motion. But on the other side it is difficult to explain, since the disposition and justification itself can be made in the same moment through the infinite power of God (as the same St Thomas is the author, 1-2 q. 113 art. 7), how in the same point of time it is possible that the motion of disposition be prior in order of nature to the infusion of grace. And the doubt is increased from the sayings of the same in the same question just cited, art. 6, where he says that justification is a certain motion by which the soul is moved by God to the remission of sin. To which therefore four things are required: namely the infusion of grace, which is taken on the part of the divine motion: secondly the motion of free will through faith in God: thirdly the motion of the same free will against sin: and fourthly, as an effect, the remission of sins. And the same he repeats still more expressly in art. 8, saying that the motion of God moving is the infusion of grace preceding our motions. From which words it appears to follow that those dispositions of our free will in no way precede the infusion of grace. And besides it is gathered that special help is nothing other than the infusion of grace itself. Behold what the Protestants began at first to execrate in scholastic doctrine: namely that by it the theology of justification is cast into these windings of philosophy, where it cannot be plainly understood: when nevertheless it is a matter which ought to be plain and open to the common people.³⁰

To this, however, because the point of this controversy lies hidden here, we will answer in order through arranged propositions. First,³¹ not all mysteries are to be preached and divulged to the people which are usefully discussed in the schools. But there are nevertheless some things necessary to be believed in the matter of justification which cannot be explained except through philosophy. It must be preached, I say, to the people that as no one in his right mind can be justified except through the grace of Christ, so God compels no one by force, but according to his nature freely draws him to himself. And besides, that since he is of infinite power, he can suddenly make a poor man honest, that is, at once soften the heart of man and tear him from sin, and reconcile him to himself through grace. And this is enough for the people to hear and believe. But the greater ones,³² who are set forth to give an account of the faith which is in us, do nothing else worth the effort than if through philosophy, although not for the crowd, yet for the wise they strive to explain how in one instant these things cohere, that we are moved by God and at the same time receive his grace. As Bucer himself now confesses that penance precedes grace in order of nature through the instinct of the Holy Spirit. Let therefore this be the second proposition. Special help, by which we are disposed for grace, can sometimes precede it in time. For we said a little before that we are sometimes prepared by God gradually before we arrive at true contrition, which is sorrow for sins on account of God. For in the same instant in which this is accomplished through the special motion of God, grace is infused. Concerning the other dispositions therefore that precede in time, it is clear that they are different motions through special help from the infusion of grace,³³ but concerning true contrition, which is at the same time as the infusion itself, such as (for example) was the conversion of Paul, I will submit a third proposition, which I think was both the mind of St Thomas and altogether the truth of the matter. Namely that God by infusing grace at the same time moves and prepares free will to accept it. The words are St Thomas's, q. 113 just cited, art. 3. But it matters little whether there are two motions or one, by which he both infuses grace into us and helps us to be moved toward him, accepting and receiving the same. Wherefore the motion of free will does not precede grace simply in order of nature, but with a limitation: that is, in the genus of material cause. For in the genus of efficient cause, grace precedes. I think a most apt example is that of the wind,³⁴ which when it rushes with force against a closed window, by entering opens it, and by opening enters. Nevertheless in the genus of efficient cause, it does not enter because it opens, but by the motion by which it enters, it opens. But in the genus of material cause, the opening is prior by nature: since unless the window were opened, the hall would not receive the wind. So therefore in the proposed matter it is not to be understood that we are moved by God prior by nature simply, in the genus of efficient cause, than grace is infused, but by infusing he moves us to receive. And this is the sense of St Thomas's words in the same art. 8 and to the 2nd argument, where he says that the disposition with respect to the subject precedes the reception of the form: and in this way the dispositions precede grace: if however we consider on the part of the agent, the infusion of grace is prior by nature, by which he moves the subject to receive. And this is the same as what the philosophers say, that the substantial form brings with it its dispositions: as the substantial form of fire brings with it heat, which remains in the generated fire. For those which preceded in the water, when it is corrupted, are corrupted: if the accidents are in the whole composite.

By these things is solved a notable doubt, concerning which there was no small disputation among the theologians of the Council, whether faith, hope, and charity, which are infused in justification, are to be reckoned formal causes of justification.³⁵ And accordingly, when Paul says, We judge that we are justified by faith, whether the name of faith designates the formal cause, or only the disposition. To this doubt, I say, I answer myself thus. First of all, grace itself, as has been shown, is most properly the formal cause of justification, by which namely sins are forgiven and we are made just from unjust, and thus are denominated and are acceptable to God unto eternal life: as sons unto an inheritance. But the habits of the virtues: namely faith, hope, and charity, are by no means the formal cause in this way, not only because they are infused later in order of nature than grace, but because they themselves through themselves neither remit guilt nor make a man pleasing, but only make him ready, indeed powerful, to believe, hope, and love worthily and meritoriously. For which reason it is most properly called inherent justice. For justice, according to Aristotle, is the virtue³⁶ by which one is fit and more inclined to do all things which are just. But concerning the acts of the same virtues there is a doubt³⁷ whether they can be reckoned formal causes of the remission of sins. For the negative part may perhaps appear more probable to someone: because such acts precede grace in the genus of material cause. But whatever school's way we follow, it must be agreed without controversy that the acts of the virtues are in some way formal causes of remission. Not principal and through themselves, but as ministers or instruments of grace. For no theologian can deny that contrition: for example sorrow, insofar as it is informed by grace, is a cause of the remission of sins. Nor would Scotus have denied it,³⁸ since penance is the virtue of remitting sins. But in the way of St Thomas the matter is clearer.³⁹ For the act itself of contrition: for example sorrow on account of God, follows grace in the genus of efficient cause. Hence in the same q. 113 art. 3, where he says that the justification of the impious is made, God moving man to justice, he clearly teaches that the motion of free will is the formal cause of remission. And art. 6 says that the infusion of grace precedes: then there follows in order of nature the motion of free will toward God through faith: thirdly against sin: and finally fourthly is the consummation or arrival at the term of the motion, which is the remission of sins. And in the 3rd argument he expressly says that the remission of sins follows the motion of free will toward God and against sin, as an effect follows its cause. And the same he repeats in art. 8. Therefore the act of faith, and by the same reason of hope and charity, namely of penance, is a formal cause: through which virtues grace works to remit sins. But if someone hesitates whether the infusion of grace and the virtues is prior, or the remission of sin.⁴⁰ For on one side the infusion seems to precede, because it is the cause of remission: on the other, remission seems to be made first, because sin is contrary to grace. St Thomas answers best in the same place, that as in natural things, when the sun illuminates the air, on the part of the subject air it is prior by nature to be purged of darkness than to receive light: but on the part of the agent, conversely, it is prior by nature to illuminate. For by the light darkness is expelled. Indeed as to substance they are one motion.

By these things it becomes most certain and established, the principal purpose of this our undertaking, which we began to explain in ch. 12: namely how that which justifies us is FAITH WHICH WORKS THROUGH CHARITY.⁴¹ For since justification is a motion to justice, that motion begins simply from God through the infusion of grace, but the first motion in us of virtue, by which we are moved by God to receive the same grace, is of faith engendering hope, then charity detesting sins, which is the last disposition and virtue of the same grace for removing sins. Secondly it is clear that the acts themselves by which, with God moving, we are justified, are merits of condignity,⁴² not indeed of grace, which precedes in order of nature, but nevertheless of glory, to which we are accepted through the same grace received: as St Thomas is the author, 1-2 q. 12 art. 2 to the 1st argument, and q. 113 to the third.⁴³ And so grace is not the reward of works, as Paul says, but nevertheless glory is the reward. Although it is also called grace, because God gives us to will and to work.⁴⁴ For grace, in the same instant in which it is infused, works, as St Thomas says in the same place. Thirdly it is clear how attrition is not properly contrition, as he says in 4 dist. 14 q. 2 art. 4, because that sorrow on account of God, if it is made through special help, was never attrition: but if it was not on account of God, it never becomes contrition from its object: because the same act in number does not change its object, unless it is called contrition extrinsically, with grace arriving.⁴⁵

From these things at last shines forth the understanding of the confession of the holy Synod of Trent ch. 7, where it placed faith, hope, and charity among the formal causes.⁴⁶ For if it is referred to the habits, it is most true, because through them we are made formally able to do just things meritoriously: and if to the acts, through them also in the manner explained we are formally justified: but concerning the Synod we will speak a little later more explicitly.