De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Enough, then—I know not whether more than enough—has been said by us concerning the dispositions which are reduced to the material cause of justification. For although it was not my intention to make a discussion of each individual thing in the manner of the schools most exactly, nevertheless I thought it worth the effort to press the matter somewhat more closely than those who treat this theological matter of our age in an almost oratorical style with clipped testimonies of the Fathers. For in this way not only will the controversies be more openly elucidated, but also, once they are defined, it will be an advantage to have this matter complete in its parts. Wherefore we will follow the same phrase in what follows. There follows, then, [a discussion] concerning the formal causes, which are continuously connected with dispositions of this kind: such as grace and the virtues. Concerning these we must first speak with our own [people], and then with those more alien. Therefore concerning grace and the virtues¹ it was not always a certain matter in the past whether they were infused habits. Nay, even up to the age of the Master of the Sentences the matter was doubtful, except that the affirmative part was more plausible and greatly approved. Whence in the chapter Maiores, On Baptism and its effect,² both parts are simply narrated under a certain probability, except that the pontiff places that one in the last place as more consonant with the truth. And first concerning grace, although it is the catholic faith of all that we are saved by grace through faith, as Paul says,³ yet whether it is a quality of the soul really distinct from the soul, as are the habits of knowledge, is not so established by the praises of the Scriptures. For that very frequent [saying], that we are called, saved, and glorified by the grace of God, is the same as [saying] freely, without our merits. For thus Paul says promiscuously, Being justified freely by his grace. Nor did the ancient Fathers speak so very clearly of grace as of one certain habit and quality. And yet⁴ if the matter were to be conjectured from human grace, the contrary part would rather be more probable. For when someone is received into the grace of a prince or of any friend, no new quality accrues to him: but only by this am I grateful to my friend, because I am the object of his love toward me; and he in turn is grateful to me, not through his love or another form inhering in him, but because I love him through the love that is in me. Now concerning charity the Master of the Sentences⁵ in book 1, distinction 18, thinks thus, that he boldly refutes that it is an infused habit: but charity, he says, is the Holy Spirit himself, who is poured into us. Not that he is so foolish as to think that our acts of charity, which are accidents, are the very substance of the Holy Spirit: but he only judged that the Holy Spirit does not stir and move us to the love of God and the other offices of charity through some habit immanent in us, but immediately through himself: as theologians speak of special help. He induced this opinion into his mind on account of the words of Augustine,⁶ On the Trinity 8, chapter 8, where, in expounding that saying of John,⁷ God is love, he says that whoever loves his neighbor consequently loves love itself: for love is God himself. And below: He who knows his brother whom he loves, knows also love itself, which is God. He repeats the same in book 15, chapter 17, where he says: God is said to be our love, just as God is spirit. And thus it is manifest (says the Master) that there is no other charity in us besides the person of the Holy Spirit himself. Although concerning the other virtues—for example, faith and hope—he expressly teaches in 3 Sent. that they are infused habits: but this he denies only of charity, and perhaps of grace, on account of its excellence.

But by this idiom of Augustine,⁸ not only the Master then but also very many now are deceived: as we shall remind again in chapter 20 concerning imputed justice. For Augustine was imbued from early adolescence with the philosophy of Plato,⁹ who thought that separate ideas were the forms of individuals: which ideas the same Augustine recognized to be the divine essence itself, as theologians profess. And therefore, since whatever perfection is in us, such as wisdom, justice, charity, and other things of that kind, is a certain participation of the perfections which are in God, he frequently uses that Platonic manner of speaking, that we are good by the goodness which is God, and wise by the wisdom which is God. And in the same phrase he says that our charity—namely, that by which we love God—is God himself: as his faithful interpreter St Thomas recognized in 1.2 q. 23.¹⁰ Yet he does not reject, nor indeed is it to be denied, that there is in us an infused habit of charity, as will immediately appear. Wherefore rightly and deservedly the Master has been rejected in this part by all theologians. Indeed, they agree with one mind concerning grace and at least the three theological virtues¹¹ (whatever may be the case with the other moral virtues) that they are infused habits. And they confirm this both by the best reason and by the praises of the sacred writings. But to begin with the reasons for grace and charity, we must first see by what distinction they are distinguished. Durandus¹² in 2 Sent. distinction 26 does not distinguish precisely between grace and charity. Nay, he judges wrongly of them, thinking that just as by grace we are formally grateful to God, so by charity, which is in us, we are dear to him. But if this were true, they would differ not only in reality but not even in account, but only in name, as he himself admits; nay, the one would be superfluous. For to be grateful to God is the same as to be dear to him. Nevertheless the interval between grace and charity is manifest in itself, because grace is the form by which we are loved by God.¹³ And therefore it is peculiarly called grace not only because it is given to us freely (as all the other charisms), but because it formally makes us grateful to God. As (to speak thus) we are objects of divine love, through which (which is his substance) he loves us. But charity is a habit received by us for loving God. So that through grace we are dear to God: not that through it he formally loves us (for he does that through his own love), but that through it he pours into us [something] by loving, by which we may be called loved and grateful to him. But through charity we in turn love him back, and he is dear to us. For charity is (as Augustine defines in book 3 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 10) a movement of the mind to enjoy God for his own sake, and oneself and one's neighbor for God's sake. Whence in Greek the words χάρις and ἀγάπη are different. Since this difference between grace and charity was well and skillfully perceived by Scotus¹⁴ in 2 d. 27, I am indeed amazed why he turned to the same opinion, that charity and grace are altogether the same habit, differing only in account. For concerning Durandus and others to whom this distinction was not perceived, it is rather to be wondered that, since they differ among them only in name, why they posited two in any account. Let us therefore weigh for a while the causes of both opinions concerning this interval between grace and charity. St Thomas¹⁵ thinks that there are two habits, distinct not only in account but also in reality: so that grace is the form which gives us spiritual and divine being, namely that by which we are formally accepted and grateful, in that we are loved by him. But charity is the virtue which makes us lovers and those who love him. For we are first loved (as John the Apostle is the authority)¹⁶ before we love. Whence in 1.2 q. 110 he first proves that grace is something in us, then that it is distinct from charity. The reason for the first member is taken from the difference which we mentioned a little earlier between divine grace and human grace. For a man does not love a friend on account of the goodness which he has produced in him, but on account of that which he sees appearing in him, or on account of any other conceived cause. And therefore one can have someone grateful and acceptable without any good quality which is in him. But God loves no one except on account of the goodness which he himself engenders by loving. Nay, that very thing that he loves us is to make us worthy and just, and so powerful to do just things and to act justly. And therefore, although the grace by which I am grateful to a friend adds no quality in me, yet that by which I am grateful to God is a quality infused into me by him. The reason does not conclude necessity; nor indeed does anyone doubt that God could have us grateful without any infused quality: but with the testimonies of Scripture presupposed, by which the infusion of grace is suggested, as will be seen in the next chapter, it is the best reason. But how grace and charity differ, the same holy Doctor conjectures from the analogy of natural things. For God does not dispose the things of grace with less providence than those of nature, but much more: yet in the order of natural things this is perceived by us, that things first have being through forms, then he not only helps and moves them to act by a general influx, but has also put virtues in each for works of this kind, so that they are natural to them. For this is the genuine sense of that word of the Wise Man,¹⁷ that God reaches from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly. Namely, that since nothing in the universe, not even a leaf of a tree, is moved except with him concurring, nevertheless he has impressed on each its forms and virtues, and so also its weights, by which he sweetly inclines each thing to its end. In like manner, therefore, at that time when he justifies us, through his love toward us he informs us by grace, by which he communicates divine being to us, and, as the Apostle Peter says, through such a precious gift¹⁸ makes us partakers of the divine nature: and so he adds charity and the other operative habits, by which we may act perfectly according to the condition of the same divine nature. And the reason is further confirmed against the Master of the Sentences.¹⁹ For although the Holy Spirit moves us to the works of the virtues, he nevertheless does this (as it is in the Wise Man) by a most sweet disposition. Yet in the offices and works of natural virtues, as all the philosophers and experience teach, the work is not perfect until it proceeds from an acquired habit, which is like a second nature. For by habits works become connatural to us, and so easy, which before the acquired habit were difficult. Whence Aristotle says: Virtue is the disposition²⁰ of the perfect according to nature to the best act convenient to the same nature. Much more therefore is it consonant with reason that the Holy Spirit infuses into us similar habits in the works of grace. Since he compels us by no force, but (which is our nature) freely allures and calls us to the good, and so sweetly advances us to the works of grace as if they were congenial to nature. Hence St Thomas wisely gathers that grace is in the essence of the soul: but the virtues²¹ are in the powers, as faith in the intellect, but hope and charity in the will. Because grace only gives supernatural being, by which we are first by nature accepted and grateful as loved by God. And then follow the habits in the powers for acting worthily, as he teaches the sons of God. Nor does the analogy bring little light, by which St Thomas in 1.2 q. 110 shows how charity and grace are really distinguished. Namely, that grace is as the light of the intellect in natural things. Whence just as the natural habits are those acquired virtues for acting according to the perfection of natural light, so charity and the other habits of the virtues are divinely infused together with grace for acting in due proportion to that supernatural being of grace.²²

It remains, therefore, that we weigh the reasons by which Scotus and those who subscribe to him are persuaded that there is one habit which is both grace and charity. For there are three in number. First, that whatever excellence is attributed to grace is also attributed to charity, and vice versa. For each divides between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition. Second, that each is the form of the other virtues, wherefore neither can be unformed. Third, that each unites us to the last end by the highest union which can be in this life. But indeed it is not difficult to turn these battering rams against their author. For the account of things, where they cannot be separated, must be taken from where they are separated. But among men grace and charity differ so that one can be found without the other. For it very often happens that someone is grateful to another whom he does not in turn love, and a person is accustomed to love another to whom he is not grateful: therefore, although between us and God they are always married, and are so indivisible companions: because,²³ He who loves me, he says, will be loved by my Father: nevertheless the account of them is most diverse and presents a real distinction. For although it is attributed to each to divide between the sons of the kingdom and of perdition, yet in a most diverse way, and by nature grace does this before charity. For from the fact that we are loved and so grateful to God, he bestows on us the habit of charity, by which we love him back: according to the word of John: Not because we first loved him, but because he first loved us. Likewise, although each is the form of the other virtues, and therefore neither can be unformed, yet in this they are distant by a vast interval. For grace is the form of the other virtues by reason of the subject; but charity by reason of the end. That is to say: grace, because it makes a man grateful as the object of divine love, consequently makes his works grateful and acceptable to God: according to that saying,²⁴ God looked upon Abel and upon his gifts: that is, and therefore upon his gifts. But charity, because it has God immediately for its object, has also the works of the other virtues, as queen of all, to refer to the honor and glory of God. And finally, although each unites us to the last end, in this too they differ greatly. For grace is that by which God unites us to himself in love, and makes us grateful and acceptable to himself:²⁵ but charity is that by which we pursue him in love: according to that saying of Augustine in the book On the Morals of the Church: Charity is the perfect virtue of the soul, by which it unites us to God, by which we love him. Most false, therefore, is [the claim] that we either formally love by grace, or are formally grateful by charity. Although grace is increased through the works of charity as through merits. But from this kind of increase²⁶ another argument is taken that charity and grace are distinguished, because they are not increased in the same proportion. For by any most remiss act of charity grace immediately increases. Because to whatever merit there corresponds a certain degree of glory to which a man is immediately accepted: and since we are accepted to glory through grace, grace immediately increases. But charity itself is not immediately increased by more remiss acts: as St Thomas in 1.2 q. 24 and very many theologians confess. Because operative habits, rather, when they operate remissly, are remitted. Wherefore the quantity of grace does not follow in this life the quantity of the habit, but the act of charity. But I have not determined to dispute this here. There is added in testimony of the distinction between grace and charity that grace is nowhere called a virtue, as charity is, but everywhere they are expressed under different names, as will be plain in the chapter just mentioned, where it will also be more clearly shown that they are distinct habits.