De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

1. Conclusion on martyrdom.— The reason of the theologians.— Whether without martyrdom, according to Scotus.— Testimonies of Scripture.— Reprobation.— Answer to the arguments.— But from the foregoing there arises a doubt concerning the preparations for grace. Whether another act of charity, which is formally no detestation of sins, suffices for salvation in one who is guilty of actual sin. To this question first of all the theologians answer with one consent in the first conclusion, that by that illustrious act of charity of martyrdom, without any regard to sins, provided there be no purpose of evil, nor complacency, nor vincible ignorance (as in a heretic), all things, even punishments, are most benignly forgiven: as was cited above from the book On the Ecclesiastical Dogmas. And concerning Cyprian Augustine says¹ that if he had anything to be purged, it was taken away by the sickle of the passion. Whence in On the Celebration of the Mass, ch. "Cum Martha": He does injury to the martyr who prays for him. Further, this privilege is granted to that most illustrious act of fortitude on account of the excellence of charity, than which no one has greater than that a man lay down his soul² for his friends, and therefore for the greatest of friends, Christ. For since penance for sins is an act of charity, the Fathers of the Church judged it consonant with reason that he who is placed in the agony of passion for the confession of the Christian faith (which is a heroic office of charity) should not be bound to the thought of sins. But as Paul says that those washed in the water of baptism die together with Christ,³ and are buried together with him, so the martyr, reddened with his own blood, is reckoned as crucified together with Christ, and therefore as obtaining the same most abundant fruit of grace fully forgiving sins. For this is the reason which St. Thomas, 4 Sent. d. 4 q. 3, and the theologians there assign for this comparison of martyrdom with baptism. Namely, that what baptism represents sacramentally, martyrdom also represents really. And therefore the character, which pertains to sacramental things, is not imprinted on the martyr: wherefore if he had not been a Christian, and should recover, he is to be baptized. But the abundance of grace is bestowed on the martyr not only equal to that of the baptized, but far more copious.

But there is another principal doubt, whether without martyrdom any act of charity whatsoever, however most excellent it be, without formal detestation of sin, suffices for a sinner for salvation. For Scotus appears to affirm this in 2 d. 28, where, speaking of the precept of charity, he says that whenever the will performs an act of this precept, although it be unformed, it disposes itself by congruity for sanctifying grace: to which, when offered, it either resists and sins mortally, or consents and is justified. And although he himself explains nothing whether he who disposes himself is in sin, nor whether the act ought to be of charity or of penance, there are nevertheless those who so think, that an act of charity without formal penance is a sufficient disposition for grace. Although others attribute this not to any act whatsoever, but to a certain excellent one. They can bring no other cause for themselves than if they reasoned thus: Penance is demanded from him who is turned away from God for this reason, because it is an act of charity contrary to enmity: but any act of charity is equally opposed to it: therefore any act will be, if not formal, at least virtual penance. And besides, whatever may be said of every act of charity, it nevertheless seems consonant with reason that someone could be of such excellent love that he admits no sin with it, but drives away every sin. Therefore that act, at least, which he has, will need no other action of penance. To this is added the proverb of the Wise Man: Charity covers all offenses.⁴ Which the apostle Peter also repeats.⁵ And the word of the Redeemer:⁶ He who loves me shall be loved by my Father. And concerning the sinful woman:⁷ Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much. And no penance seems to have preceded Paul's conversion.

There are nevertheless testimonies of Scripture which far more vehemently press the other part, nay (unless I am mistaken) persuade it. And therefore a distinction must be made. For where, after diligent prior investigation, no mortal sin occurs to memory, the matter is clear, that an act of charity suffices for the remission of those sins which have slipped from memory. Nor perhaps did Scotus think that an act of charity suffices in any other case than this. But where there is any memory of sins, or it can be had by legitimate diligence, I would by no means dare affirm that without a formal act of penance, apart from martyrdom, any other act whatever, whether of charity or of any other virtue, suffices. Nor do I believe that any conscientious man, if he is conscious of sin, could ever pacify his conscience otherwise. Nor indeed does St. Thomas move me so much, or any other of his order, as the testimonies of Scripture together with the reasons which we brought forward above in ch. 13 for the confirmation of penance from both Testaments. For besides Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Peter in the Acts of the Apostles, promising remission to the impious in no way except through penance, and indeed Christ saying, Unless⁸ you have penance, you shall all likewise perish — I do not know who could promise salvation without penance. Besides that John, and after him our same Redeemer,⁹ indicated no entrance for sinners into the kingdom of heaven except through one penance. Whence St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 86 art. 2, affirms without hesitation that it is impossible for an actual mortal sin to be forgiven without the virtue of penance.¹⁰ And he adds a clear reason for this from the difference between the grace of God and the grace which exists among men. For the grace of a man does not bring about any goodness in him whom he reconciles to himself, but presupposes a true or apparent one. And therefore a man sometimes restores to his grace an enemy who has been inwardly changed in no way. But God does not presuppose goodness, but by making a man good, makes him a friend to himself. But since the offense of God is diametrically opposed to grace, God receives no one into his grace except by changing his will: namely, by moving it away from the changeable good to which it clung, and turning it to himself. But no one is moved away except through detestation of the sin contrary to the will by which it was committed: therefore penance is necessary. Which is therefore called conversion: according to that of the Psalm: Thou, being converted,¹¹ (according to another reading) shalt give us life. And 1.2 q. 113 art. 5 he establishes the same precisely. Namely, that there cannot be conversion without a motion of free will toward sin: which is the term from which conversion departs. For the act of charity toward God has respect only to the term to which it tends. And arguing that the act of charity alone without formal penance suffices, from that, Charity covers a multitude of sins,¹² he answers that it covers them because it pertains to charity not only to pursue one of the opposites, namely God, but to flee from the other, namely sin, through the act of penance which is commanded by charity.

And by the same answer the first argument made above is dissolved. For we concede that charity is contrary to the enmity of God. But nevertheless this is true for this reason, that where there is no sin, it resists lest it be admitted until it is overcome: and where there is sin, it expels it through the act of penance. And in like manner the other argument about an excellent act of charity is answered. For first I will concede to no one that there can be any act so remarkable of charity that it cannot exist according to its substance in a heretic and in any sinner whatsoever: at least one who is stained with sin through some crass ignorance: as was discussed more fully in the first book, ch. 22. But suppose we grant to the supporters of that opinion that there is some such act which, where it existed, would resist every temptation and admit no fault: this nevertheless remains for them to prove, which they will never accomplish. Namely, that he who lies in mortal sin can come to such an act of charity except through a formal act of penance. And in like manner to the other, He who loves me shall be loved by my Father, it is answered that although every lover of God is in turn loved by him, nevertheless no one, while he is in mortal sin, can ascend to the love of God unless he begins from penance. But if they ask me¹³ whence we have this so certainly, I answer that we who defend the necessity of penance are pleading a cause, as they say, with sealed tablets. Not only because the natural law, and therefore the divine law, demands that he who has inflicted an injury cannot be restored to friendship except by repenting, but also because Christ expressly says: Unless you have penance, you shall all likewise perish. Nor does he promise the kingdom of heaven to any but those who do penance: besides the other testimonies cited above. And (as I said in ch. 10) it is rashness¹⁴ to make any exception from universal statements of this kind without the authority of the Church. But they say that an act of charity is virtually penance. Anyone could say the same of prayer, or of any other excellent act of virtue. Yet the holy Fathers recognized this privilege in martyrdom alone, for that one reason only, that it really represents the passion of Christ: just as it is represented sacramentally through baptism. This belongs to no act of virtue which is not consecrated by endured death. Whence St. Thomas¹⁵ in 4 dist. 4, asking why, although there can be other acts of most excellent charity — as the vow of virginity, or of a strictest religious order, or of traveling to preach the Gospel — yet such acts and offices are not granted this, that they can forgive sins without penance, as martyrdom can: answers that it is because by these we do not die together with Christ, as by martyrdom. Certainly, the more I think about it, the less probability I see in this opinion, that an act of charity without penance suffices. Nay, even Christ,¹⁶ who used excellent power in forgiving crimes without the sacrament of penance, as is evident in the adulteress¹⁷ and in the sinful woman,¹⁸ is never believed to have forgiven unless by inwardly changing the mind through the virtue of penance. For Gregory says in the homily on the Magdalene that he drew inwardly by grace her whom he received outwardly by mercy. And he calls grace the penance which the flow of tears indicated. But concerning the sudden and stupendous conversion of Paul,¹⁹ which Luther objects in article 7, asserting that no penance, he says, intervened there, because, surrounded by a sudden light, he was clothed with charity, saying, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? Concerning that conversion, I say, Augustine says to Boniface, in On the Correction of the Donatists, that fear there preceded love. His words are: The greater fear compelled him to charity; perfect charity casts out fear. This the history itself testifies. For being struck to the ground and astounded, and trembling, he first said, Who art thou, Lord? before, What wilt thou have me to do? Of which the first word is of fear and penance, but the second of love.

Finally I would add that (unless my ignorance blinds me) I do not see how this opinion differs from that error of Luther, article 7 of his assertions, which we took care to refute in ch. 12: namely, The best penance is a new life. For by these words he did not deny that an act of charity is necessary: nay, he affirmed the purpose for the future of obeying God and keeping the law. But he was nevertheless reprehended and condemned for this, that he denied that penance for past life is necessary. But if you say that an act of charity toward God is virtual penance, he himself would have conceded the same. Therefore where it is condemned that penance is not required, it is expressly pronounced that some act of charity does not suffice, which one might feign to be virtual penance, but that formal contrition is necessary.²⁰ For Augustine says, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence ch. 26, on that of Ecclesiasticus 21: that if to desist from sinning, that is, to have no sin, sufficed, Scripture would only admonish us: Son, thou hast sinned, do not add again. But it does not suffice, but it added: And for thy former sins pray, that they may be forgiven thee. Therefore penance for past sins is required. In sum, since the sacrament of penance has been established for the remission of sins, salvation is open to no one except through it, at least in desire: which desire nevertheless by its own nature is not legitimate unless detestation of sin goes before. Wherefore the holy Synod of Trent,²¹ sess. 6 ch. 6, asserts that penance is necessary before baptism, and in ch. 14 expressly says that it does not suffice to cease from sins, but that the required detestation must be present.

From this there arises²² another doubt. Whether besides the act of penance another act of charity is required, because it has been said that the dispositions for grace are always acts of faith, hope and charity. But according to John,²³ He who does not love remains in death. And according to Paul, If I should deliver²⁴ my body to be burned, but have not charity, it profits me nothing. Whence Augustine concludes, in On True and False Penance, ch. 17, that without charity penance is unfruitful. It is nevertheless answered that although very often besides contrition for sins another act of charity having God precisely as its object intervenes, nevertheless that act of contrition alone is simply necessary: because it is itself an act of charity. This Augustine also explains in the same place: saying that he is turned from sin who for whatever cause wishes to dismiss sin: but he is converted who is now wholly and entirely turned: namely, who now not only does not fear punishments, but hastens to strive toward the good of the Lord: that is, who execrates sins on account of God and with the purpose of obeying him. For he reckons this to be an act of charity. And St. Thomas,²⁵ 1.2 q. 113, places only two motions of free will in justification: the first toward God through faith and the desire of justice, which pertains to hope: and the second of detestation of sin. For so he has it in articles 4 and 5. And in 6 he says that four things are enumerated in justification: namely, the infusion of grace, the motion of faith, and the motion against sin, and the remission. And immediately in article 7, to the second, he explains how there can at the same time be one act by which someone hates sin on account of God, just as one body by the same motion recedes from one term and approaches another. And the dialecticians say that by the same assent one assents to the conclusion on account of the premises. The same he says, 3 p. q. 85: namely, that the act of penance is at the same time an act of charity, insofar as it is displeasure at an offense against God, and a species of justice, insofar as it is a recompense for injury. And in article 5 he says most clearly that the first principle of the actions by which we are disposed for grace is the divine operation. The second motion is of faith: the third of fear: the fourth of hope: and the fifth is the motion of charity, by which a sin displeases someone according to itself, and not now on account of punishments. See how he calls contrition itself an act of charity. In the sixth place he places filial and reverential fear of God. But nevertheless it is not always necessary before justification. For contrition itself, as he has it in the same 3 p. q. 89 art. 1, is the last disposition for grace: which other acts, he says, of more excellent charity follow. And so it must necessarily be said. For as we have often said, it is penance to which the remission of sins is attributed. To the sacrament of penance (I say) more principally by the power of the keys: but to the virtue of penance secondarily, as to the proximate disposition on our part, as the same holy Doctor knowingly concludes, 3 p. q. 86 art. 6. Whence that word of the Synod,²⁶ ch. 6, They begin to love, and therefore are moved against sins, is not so to be understood that two acts are always necessary. Since to repent is the beginning of love.²⁷

Therefore, to bring into brief what we have diffusely scattered concerning dispositions, we have called certain ones most remote. Namely, all morally good works which are done by natural faculty. But those, because they do not flow from the special influence of the Holy Spirit, are not properly reckoned among dispositions. But only those works come under this name in the proper sense which we exhibit when the finger of God peculiarly touches us. Among these, however, some are remote and imperfect, nor always necessary: but others are proximate, efficacious and altogether required. The difference between them is taken from this, that, as St. Thomas is the author, 1.2 q. 112 art. 2 and q. 113 art. 7,²⁸ when God gradually and by steps disposes a man in the course of time, not indeed at once moving him to faith working through charity, but perhaps to unformed faith, as Augustine says to Simplician, q. 2,²⁹ concerning catechumens at the beginning of their conversion, or to other works of mercy or of other virtues, by which a hard heart may be softened. But sometimes he moves suddenly to an act of such faith and charity, as in Paul. Therefore those insufficient dispositions are actions of the virtues. Among them servile fear regularly concurs: likewise humility, according to that of James: God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble:³⁰ and often acts of mercy, according to that: By mercy and faith sins are purged.³¹ Nay, sometimes even acts of unformed charity, from which contrition does not spring. But the necessary and proximate dispositions are acts of faith, hope and charity. For neither can salvation exist without these, and when these are present, if they are done with God specially moving, even if no servile fear of hell has preceded, nor any other motion of free will at all, grace follows by necessity in the same instant of time: not indeed by necessity of compulsion, but of infallibility: as St. Thomas is the author,³² 1.2 q. 112 art. 3, and the theologians. Wherefore it is a marvel to me that the most learned and in other respects most considerate Cajetan, in the first question on contrition,³³ where he says that, a most sufficient preparation being posited on the part of man, and with the special help of God, it is not altogether certain that grace is infused in the same moment, but sometimes God, according to his good pleasure, defers justification for some delay of time. For all the testimonies cited above concerning penance are most consonantly dissonant with this assertion. For in whatever moment the sinner has groaned and given assent to God calling him, by a most certain law he is justified. For he who established an infallible law for natural causes, that, sufficient dispositions being posited, the form is introduced in the same instant, established a firmer one in the works of grace. And in truth the cause by which he was moved to this sentence is of less probability than the conclusion. For he says that otherwise, if we had certainty that in the same instant in which we are prepared we also receive grace, we would have the same certainty that we are in grace. For he relies on a most false foundation, that we can have certainty of our legitimate preparation. But concerning both the conclusion and the reason more broadly at the end of the third book, in the chapter on the certainty of grace. But when we establish these motions as necessary, we do not understand them to be always formally in the same instant, but it is enough that they be made virtually. For it can happen that a Christian having unformed faith and hope, who has long been, as it were, in labor, repenting imperfectly, suddenly burns with charity and breaks forth into sudden penance in the power of the preceding motions of faith and hope: although formally he does not then elicit those acts, I believe and hope in God: but it is enough that he remembers his mercy.