De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

After these things which were necessary for the present business, a doubt arose whether altogether the same detestation of sins is required in the preparation for baptism as was required for the sacrament of penance. The first conclusion,¹ in which all theologians agree concerning baptism, is that some sorrow of any kind is necessary for the recipient. For it is Peter's sentence,² Repent, and let each of you be baptized: with Augustine as interpreter, that no one who is arbiter of his own will can begin a new life even through baptism, unless he has repented of the old. And although there are those who brand this opinion on Scotus,³ that it is enough to bring no obstacle: for example complacency in sin, although no detestation is present: namely if the one to be baptized approaches without any act in regard to sin, surely this is nowhere elicited from him. Indeed in 4 Sent. d. 4 q. 5 he expressly says that one who approaches baptism with the obstacle of unbelief, or having some sin which he then actually commits, or which he previously committed and in no way displeases him, in no way receives grace: according to the words of Augustine in On Penance, No one approaching the sacrament of the faithful can begin a new life, etc. But d. 14 of the same book q. 4, although he says that for receiving grace through baptism it suffices to approach without fiction, with the intention of receiving the sacrament of the Church: adding that only the external work is required with the removal of the interior impediment, he declares himself a little further below. Saying that such attrition is not required as that which, according to his opinion, would suffice without the sacrament: but although he is little attrite, even with an attrition which does not have the nature of merit of congruity, nevertheless willing to receive the sacrament, through it he will receive grace. Caietanus,⁴ 3 p. q. 86 on art. 2, might seem to some to say that the reception of baptism itself for the remission of sins suffices in place of penance. Yet in reality he does not intend to deny that some attrition is required to remove the obstacle: but he says that the perfect nature of penance, which includes the purpose of a new life, is completed by this, that one receives the sacrament of baptism for the remission of sins. And so the purpose of baptism may stand for that which is a new life. But if anyone contended that one may worthily approach baptism without any act of displeasure, he would be convicted of manifest error by the testimonies and arguments which we have repeated in the preceding chapters. But perhaps someone will oppose to us that text of the chapter Maiores on⁵ baptism and its effect: Then the sacramental operation imprints the character, when it has not found the obstacle of a contrary will resisting. The answer nevertheless is that for the character of baptism the will to receive baptism is sufficient. And therefore if someone without force being applied is silent while being baptized, that silence and permission is reckoned consent removing such an obstacle. But to remove the obstacle of sin (which is required for receiving grace) means not only a mere negation of complacency in sin, but a detestatory action. But what kind of detestation is required, this is the doubt. Further, Scotus⁶ openly asserts that not only attrition suffices, but that not as much is required as is the disposition for grace. And St Thomas,⁷ 3 p. q. 68 art. 4 to the 2nd argument, speaking of baptism, says that Christ works for grace in two ways: in one way through himself (namely without the sacrament) and thus he prepares the will of man so that he wills good and hates evil. Which he plainly understands of perfect contrition. In another way he works through ministers by applying the sacraments externally: and thus he works by perfecting externally what has been begun internally. And therefore the sacrament of baptism is not to be given except to one in whom some sign of interior conversion appears. By saying "begun" and "some sign," to the difference of perfect interior conversion, he holds that attrition suffices. And so not so great a disposition is necessary for the sacrament as that which suffices by itself. He is consistent with himself in art. 6, where he says that it suffices for the one being baptized that he recognize his sins and grieve over them: according to the word of Augustine, concerning one beginning a new life. Therefore the second conclusion is⁸ that contrition is not necessary for baptism. The reason is⁹ that which he himself explains in 4 Sent. d. 4 q. 2 art. 1. Namely that since baptism is of itself instituted for regenerating man and removing sin, it does not demand detestation as a cause through itself, or as a cause together with itself, but as removing the obstacle: namely complacency in sin, which baptism itself takes away. And therefore, dist. 6 q. 1 art. 3 to the fifth argument, he repeats that neither charity nor contrition is required for baptism: but attrition suffices. But if anyone convicts us of contradiction¹⁰ from what we said above, that for anyone to be reconciled the motions of faith, hope, and charity are necessary: The answer is that without the sacrament an act of charity is required, which is true contrition: but for one asking baptism the beginning of charity through attrition is enough, which is perfected by the ablution itself: by which, as by an instrument of the passion of Christ, charity is infused together with grace.

Yet this little doubt could remain,¹¹ whether attrition would suffice which the one approaching is conscious to be attrition and not contrition. Further, because he knows that he does not grieve on account of God, but on account of fear of hell, and thus openly makes it clear and confesses it to the Church: surely this man seems not to approach as one to whom the sacrament should be administered. For, as we said above, and Augustine often reminds, and the theologians in 4 dist. 4 and St Thomas 3 p. d. 68 admonish, sinners are not to be baptized: but he who is known not to repent on account of God is undoubtedly a sinner. And hence the doubt is increased, that surely one so affected would approach the sacrament of penance, he would by no means be absolved, since he does not accuse himself with a true heart of having offended God. I would nevertheless believe, under the censure of the experts,¹² that such a known attrite person should be baptized, for the reason already stated. Namely that baptism is of itself the sacrament of regeneration ordained for the remission of any sin whatsoever, where it finds no obstacle of complacency. But complacency is sufficiently removed by any sorrow. The authority of St Thomas cited supports this,¹³ 3 p. dist. 68, where he says that it suffices in the one being baptized that some sign of interior conversion appear. He speaks therefore of attrition that is made known. And q. 79 art. 3 to the second, establishing the difference between the Eucharist and baptism, says that since baptism is a spiritual regeneration, ordained to make a just man out of a sinner, he does not fittingly approach it who has a conscience of mortal sin. Otherwise concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which Christ is given as food and nourishment of one already living by preceding grace. Hence the holy Synod of Trent¹⁴ session 6 ch. 6 before baptism requires only a motion against sins. By some hatred, it says, and detestation, that is, by that penance which must be done before baptism.

But you argue. Therefore one may affirm the same of him who approaches penance,¹⁵ since that too is instituted by its kind to remove sin. Concerning this, the judgment of others will perhaps be different,¹⁶ but mine is, unless I am mistaken, that among the three sacraments, namely Eucharist, baptism, and penance, a distinction must here be made: that for baptism attrition suffices, even if it is known, as has been said. But to the Eucharist no one lawfully comes with a conscience of mortal sin, and therefore neither does attrition suffice, but it is required that he believe in good faith that he is in grace. For so St Thomas says in the place just cited, and in the next question 80 art. 4, concerning which there is the highest consensus among the Fathers and theologians: according to that of Paul, But let a man prove¹⁷ himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of the cup: for he who eats and drinks unworthily, eats judgment to himself. Where the gloss says, to eat unworthily is to approach either in crime or irreverently. But the different reason for the use of these sacraments must be taken from the different end to which they were divinely instituted. For since baptism was instituted to regenerate the unbeliever, spiritually dead, it does not require of itself that the one asking be in grace, but that he not set an obstacle. But the Eucharist, since it was established to feed those who already live by grace, either of baptism or of penance, demands that no one receive it unless he believes himself to live by grace. But penance holds itself in a middle way. For although it is a sacrament of the remission of sins, like baptism, that one is like generation, where the acts of the recipient do not concur as part of the sacrament: but this one is like medicine, with the acts of the penitent concurring as matter. And therefore the use of both is not the same. Since for baptism no accusation or confession is necessary: such as is demanded in the sacrament of penance. But he who knows that he does not detest sins on account of God, his accusation in confession would surely not be true: since accusation is only about an offense of God, and insofar as it is an offense. Wherefore he who did not bear this in his breast, but grieved only because of punishments, would falsely say that he accuses himself of having sinned against God. And so if this were certainly established for me, I would fear most gravely to absolve one so affected. Although unless the indications were most manifest, in a doubtful matter one must always believe that the contrition is legitimate: since it is most difficult to judge the reason for sorrow, whether it is on account of God or on account of other causes.

Crass ignorance.— How from attrite one becomes contrite.— This opinion is now especially confirmed by the authority of the Council of Trent.¹⁸ Indeed, since in ch. 6 it had judged that it is enough for baptism that some hatred be brought, nevertheless in ch. 14 it says that penance after a fall is much different from baptismal penance, and contains a contrite heart. Therefore what St Thomas and almost all the doctors say with one consent, that through the sacrament of penance sometimes one is made contrite from attrite,¹⁹ I think must be understood when someone approaches attrite, thinking that he is contrite. For then, although internal attrition does not suffice, nevertheless because he approaches in good faith, he will receive grace through the sacrament. Which also agrees with the sacrament of the Eucharist: as in the cited place q. 79 art. 3 St Thomas is the author,²⁰ where he says that the Eucharist confers first grace on him who, although he is in mortal sin, nevertheless after diligence has been made, remembers none. Or although he is not sufficiently contrite, nevertheless approaches reverently. Understand, because he does not certainly judge that his sorrow is not true contrition. Hence when the holy Fathers establish that the sacrament is not to be conferred on one who is in sin, it is thus to be interpreted. In baptism indeed, concerning him who has the purpose of sinning. But in the Eucharist and penance, concerning those who ask with a conscience of sin. But yet between the Eucharist and penance there is this interval, that before the Eucharist the proving required is through every remedy which is against sin: namely through penance, both the virtue and the sacrament. I am not indeed without fear that someone may object to me St Thomas, 3 p. q. 80 art. 4 to the 2nd argument, where he sets both the sacrament of the Eucharist and both baptism and the sacrament of penance over against one another: reminding that the Eucharist must not be given except to those freed from sin: but the other two can be granted to those feverish with the fever of sin. Because these two, he says, are purgative medicines: but that one is strengthening. From which it appears to follow that the sacrament of penance is to be conferred on the attrite, even the conscious attrite, just as that of baptism. But I would deny the consequence. For it means nothing else than that the sacrament of penance is to be conferred on him who, as a penitent, accuses himself as guilty of sin, just as baptism is to be given to a sinner. But the Eucharist only to him who, absolved through penance, already bears according to his conscience the form of a justified man. Nor indeed am I unaware of the opinion of some Nominalists,²¹ who teach that whoever believes himself to be contrite has in reality already obtained pardon, and thus that no one thinking that he brings contrition to the sacrament receives first grace through it: indeed he has already received it through that good thought of his. And they add no other cause for this than that otherwise that man would be outside a remedy: especially where the sacrament would not be possible. Since if someone believes himself to be contrite, there remains nothing for him to do, indeed he cannot, they say, do anything else, since he believes he has already done everything. I have mentioned these therefore because in the chapter on the certainty of grace this opinion would give us some trouble, if it were true. But indeed I wonder how they are persuaded by such slight reasoning. For I do not know how they do not plainly see that a fallacy can lie hidden in such a belief, as in other thoughts. And that twofold. First in the examination of sins, whether it was legitimate. For example, when a most abandoned man recollects his sins which he has committed, both very many and very grave, he easily and rashly believes that he has made the legitimate diligence which nevertheless he did not make in proportion to the quantity of his crimes and the length of time during which he had ceased to confess. And besides, even if the examination was diligent, perhaps he grieves not on account of God, but on account of hell, or on account of other losses which he has suffered, which sorrow does not suffice for the remission of guilt, but he lightly judges it to be contrition. Surely such men, before they receive the sacrament, will not be in grace. For it is ridiculous that ignorance alone should suffice for remitting past sins: when nevertheless contrition is not an act of the intellect, but of the will. For example, let there be one who in reality has only attrition for sins, and thus believes of himself. According to these men he is not in grace. Suppose therefore that he asks an ignorant doctor whether that sorrow of his is sufficient contrition, and is falsely persuaded that it is sufficient: will therefore, because this attrite man has changed his belief, the same unchanged act of the will, which before was attrition, be made sufficient contrition? By no means. But yet this man, approaching in good faith the sacrament of penance, will receive first grace, through which he will be made contrite from attrite. Therefore the consequence is most fallacious (which must be repeated by us in the chapter on the certainty of grace): This man thinks he has contrition, therefore he is contrite. But if you ask, What else then ought he to do? Surely be contrite, or receive the sacrament, otherwise he will perish because of the sin which he had committed before. Indeed this is one reason why Augustine doubted concerning late penitents. For they are frequent at the point of death, to whom it is represented in mind that they grieve for their crimes, in that God was offended, and yet they do not grieve except that they have fallen into hell. And the same is the cause why the sacraments are then held in such great account, through which often the attrite are made contrite. Indeed I would add that the ignorance of him who thinks he is contrite can be so crass that it is a new sin to approach the sacrament: and then he does not receive grace even through the sacrament: for it would be just as if he approached knowing that he was not contrite. But when ignorance excuses from new sin: further, because there is probability that he has done what he ought, then although the sorrow would not of itself suffice to remit past sins, since it is not contrition, nevertheless because the ignorance is invincible, he approaches in good faith: and thus through the sacrament first grace is received.

There is another genuine doubt from above, how attrition becomes contrition. Namely whether the act itself which was sorrow because of punishment, with grace arriving, changes its object so as to be on account of God. Indeed some, even of the school of St Thomas, imagine so, which nevertheless they cannot understand.

For the gift of grace is wholly to make a man a friend, and then to inform his works as good in kind, so that what before were not pleasing become pleasing. But to change the object of an act is certainly to cast off one and substitute another new one: which although sometimes it happens in the one who receives the sacrament, nevertheless it is not always necessary: but by that very internal act of the will by which one approaches the sacrament, very often he departs: as experience shows. Indeed there is a demonstration that the act is not always changed. For someone attrite can approach the sacrament, who at that very moment of time when he is absolved has entirely ceased to have the act of penance, either through distraction of mind or through interruption of thought. Then certainly it is manifest that the act is not changed: and nevertheless he can escape from attrite to contrite. Therefore attrition becomes contrition extrinsically, through this, that the same sorrow because of punishments, with grace arriving, is made pleasing to God through the sacrament. Although sometimes also by the help of God the end of the sorrow is changed. For which reason we established above that one contrition is intrinsically [so] from its object, and another only extrinsically, by reason of grace informing it. Just as he who is already just can repent meritoriously not only on account of God, but sometimes also mindful of hell. But what St Thomas says in 4 dist. 17 q. 2, that attrition is not made contrition, but that through different acts one is made contrite from attrite, he understands of contrition which is intrinsically contrition by reason of its object, and is elicited from the infused habit of charity, and of attrition which can be naturally elicited from fear of hell. For since these acts differ in species, neither passes into the other.