De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

We have pressed, as far as our small ability allowed, the Lutherans concerning dispositions of this kind for grace: it remains to resolve certain doubts which remain among Catholics. For we have said that an act of penance is necessary for salvation for actual sins, both in him who is to be regenerated by the sacrament of baptism and in him who, already a Christian, returns to the way through the sacrament of penance. The first doubt, therefore, is whether the act¹ of contrition is required of both, or whether attrition suffices. And besides, whether both are to be prepared with an altogether equal detestation before they receive salvation. To this disputation I think a very brief word must be premised concerning that which is the difference between attrition and contrition. Scotus² and those who adhere to him seem to distinguish nothing between attrition and contrition except that attrition is a detestation of sins through natural faculty supported by general help, which they call merit of congruity: but contrition is the same act informed by grace. The words of Scotus are in 4 d.14 q.2: A sinner can from natural powers, with common influence, consider a sin committed as offensive to God, and as against the divine law, and as turning away from God, and as hindering reward, and as inducing punishment: and under many such aspects. And the will can detest that sin thus considered under some one of those aspects, or under many: and that motion can be continued and intensified before the infusion of grace. And a little below: And if the same motion remains, which was before attrition, in that instant it becomes contrition: because in that instant it is concomitant with grace. Thus on the part of the object he distinguishes nothing between attrition and contrition. Since he asserts that this attrition is sorrow for sin: whether because it is offensive to God, or because it hinders reward, or because it induces punishment. Except that insofar as it proceeds from nature it is attrition, and insofar as it is informed by grace it is contrition.

There are three things here³ which are not approved by others, nor indeed by me. First, what he says, that an act from nature, proceeding without a peculiar help of God, is in any way a merit of justification: concerning which we have said enough above in ch. 4. Second, what he says, that the continuation of the act for some time, and indeed its intensification, is necessary in him who is disposed for grace. For this indeed, saving the authority of the doctor, since he was the first who devised it, he proves by no reason (nor indeed could he by any apparent one), but merely affirms it for free. But from sacred Scripture, not only does no passage support him, but very many oppose him. For if you look at the authorities brought forward in the preceding chapter, you will easily see that. For that of Jeremiah:⁴ If that nation shall do penance, I also will do it: and that of Ezekiel:⁵ If the impious man shall do penance for all the sins which he has wrought, I will not remember all his iniquities, suggests nothing about continuation or intensification, but about the number of sins. Namely, that in whatever hour, and for the same reason, in whatever moment, the wicked man shall repent of having offended God, he will obtain pardon. And in Ps. 31:⁶ I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and thou hast forgiven the impiety of my sin: which words carry before them a sudden action. And: There was made suddenly a sound from heaven,⁷ as of the Holy Spirit coming. Where the gloss says that grace knows not the delays of the Holy Spirit. And therefore St. Thomas,⁸ following the footsteps of the Fathers, who taught us nothing about gradual intensifications of this kind, says 1.2 q.113 art.7 that justification can take place in an instant. But concerning the infusion of grace, not even Scotus himself doubts that it takes place in a moment of time. But also concerning disposition St. Thomas says that although God sometimes disposes us successively — namely, while he does not at once breathe into us the act of charity, which is the proximate disposition to grace, but to other actions of the virtues, through which as through steps he leads us to grace — nevertheless he very often disposes us suddenly. And the reason is that it is not repugnant for an act of the mind, whether of the intellect or of the will, since it is spiritual, to be made in an instant. Especially since a disposition of this kind is made principally by God, whose power is infinite. To which we can accommodate a very apt example of the sun.⁹ For God is as the sun, whose light is grace. And therefore just as when someone first sees the sun he is irradiated with light, so when someone first assents by cooperating with the divine motion, without any interval of time at all he is flooded with the splendor of grace. And of this truth this is indeed the greatest argument,¹⁰ that otherwise, if there is some time in which contrition must necessarily be continued, one time ought to be fixed for all. If therefore it were the tenth part (for example) of an hour, then if someone, assailed by sudden death, should begin to repent and should die before that fixed limit, it would not be possible for him to have a remedy through contrition, which would be impious to assert. Nor is it sufficiently answered that the extension could be compensated by the intensification of the act. For of this there is no foundation. For it would be wonderful to say that if two began to repent with the same intensity, which continued for a certain time would be sufficient, the one who died before that term would perish without pardon for the sole defect of time, while the other by the same act would obtain grace. Therefore intensification or duration is not necessary for the remission of guilt, provided that from its object it is a true act of contrition. Yet each contributes very much to the quantity of grace, as St. Thomas teaches, 1.2 q.89 art.2.

The third thing, which we noted in the opinion of Scotus, is that he does not distinguish attrition and contrition in such a way that they differ by reason of their object, but only from the efficient cause. Namely, that attrition is made naturally, but contrition from habitual grace informing it. For special help, by which we are disposed for grace (as we said in ch. 3 and 4), is nowhere read in him. Therefore, to come to the point of the matter, attrition and contrition differ in two ways.¹¹ First, intrinsically on the part of the object. Namely, that contrition is sorrow for sins on account of God, or (what is the same, and indeed is more significant) insofar as they are an offense against God: but attrition is sorrow for sins, not under the aspect that they are an offense against God, but insofar as they are harmful to us. Namely, because they are the cause of punishment, either in this or in the future age. This distinction is evident from this, that under the name of contrition comes, to all both Fathers and scholastic theologians, the perfect act of penance, by which sins are forgiven. For as has been shown thus far, sacred Scripture attributes remission of sins to penance as the proximate disposition on our part: but the proximate disposition, as we have also established thus far, ought to be an act of charity: but an act of charity is not by its genus attrition: for one who abominates sins for this reason only, because they harm, does not so much love God as hate punishments: therefore contrition alone is the detestation of sins insofar as they are an offense against God: which indeed is a certain love of him: for each is an act of friendship: namely, both to rejoice in the goods of a friend, and to grieve also over injuries done to him. And for this reason St. Thomas says 3 p. q.85 that penance is¹² a certain species of justice: which justice (according to the Philosopher, 5 Ethic.) can exist between us and God. Since its office is to amend life by repairing the injury done to God. But nevertheless its act is commanded by charity, in that it is a displeasure at an injury done to a friend. And more explicitly art.5, when enumerating the dispositions for grace, he says: The fifth act is the motion of charity, by which a sin displeases someone according to itself, and not now on account of punishments. Suggesting that that penance which is begotten by fear of punishment is not an act of charity: because it is not contrition but attrition.¹³ And from this the etymology of the names is clear.¹⁴ For attrition is in bodies, when¹⁵ a mill (for example) grinds the grain of the earth into fragments: but contrition is when it has already been ground into powder. Whence, by an analogy drawn from this, theologians say that contrition is the hatred and detestation of sin above everything that is hateful: but attrition is the hatred of it not above everything hateful. Which is not to be referred to the intensity and fervor of the act. For one can be afflicted with a far greater sorrow from fear of hell than another from the fact that he has sinned against God. But it is to be understood according to what we have said: namely, that by contrition we abominate the offense for the highest and most just reason by which it is to be abominated: that is, in that it is contrary to the divine will. Wherefore it includes the purpose of never again admitting any, for whatever thing in the world, which they call to hate appretiatively above all things. But attrition is not so great an execration. For he who grieves only on account of punishments, as far as is from the nature of the thing, if there were no punishment, would not avoid the offense. Although when the attrite man does not have in his affection what otherwise, unless he incurred punishment, he would not cease to do evil on account of God, attrition is good, as the beginning of penance: but if that exception were added in his affection, it would be altogether evil and iniquitous.

Nor would I pass over in silence that certain of the Nominalists¹⁶ doubt whether in the account of contrition the purpose of avoiding sins in the future is necessary. And they deny it, from the fact that in the sacred Scriptures they find nothing about a purpose of this kind. For which indeed, if my slight judgment had any weight, they should be condemned: not only because it is an error, but because it is pernicious. For it is an ignorance of the name of penance. But penance, as we said above, is the same as a change of mind: and therefore it embraces the respect of both times. Whence, as above we pressed Luther, that there cannot be a repenting and a purpose of a good life for the future, unless where the mind is torn away by penance from past errors, so conversely also against these we assert that there cannot be penance for past things without the purpose of avoiding them in the future. For how can anyone repent that he has offended God, who has not had the intention of changing his life? Or what kind of intention of changing his life can he have, who has not the purpose of turning aside from evil, that he may return to the way? And although the very name of penance openly carries before it a purpose of this kind, the prophet nevertheless did not pass it over in silence when he said: If the impious man shall do penance for all his sins which he has wrought, behold the respect of the past: and shall keep all my commandments, behold the purpose for the future: and shall do judgment and justice, behold the purpose of making satisfaction: He, he says, shall live in life. And Christ himself, the master of penance, said to the woman brought before him for adultery: Go, and do not sin any more. Therefore a purpose of this kind is required of the penitent. For to repent is to reject and execrate sins: but to reject evil is referred not only to the past but rather to the future. Whence St. Thomas, in the passage just cited, 3 p. q.85, proves from this that penance is an act of justice, because its office is to make recompense for an injury done. But the best compensation is the amendment of life: in that the penitent, he says, assumes a moderate sorrow for past sins, with the intention of removing them. His words are in art.1. Therefore contrition and attrition differ by their nature from their diverse object. But nevertheless it must furthermore be noted that either can be elicited by man, either from natural powers with the natural help of God, or from his singular assistance. For not only can someone naturally be affected with sadness because he has merited punishments by sinning, but he can also naturally repent because he has offended God. For since anyone can naturally be led to repentance because he has injured a friend, why also could he not have a similar detestation of sin, because it was committed against the divine will? Since that immense goodness becomes known to us twice, not only by the light of faith but also by nature. Nor do I think it necessary here to persuade this truth by more arguments. Since in the first book, ch. 20 and the two following, I have accomplished it to the best of my ability, that whatever act a man who is in grace can have, a sinner can also elicit from pure natural powers as regards the substance of the work. But an act of penance of this kind, although by reason of its object it is contrition, is nevertheless not a sufficient disposition for grace, but can exist in him who is in sin. At least where some vincible ignorance is present. For someone can grieve that he has offended God, and even propose, as far as is in his knowledge, to avoid all stumbling blocks of vices, who nevertheless does not do what he ought to know the way of truth. As happens with infidels and heretics, and universally with those who labor under crass ignorance. Conversely, one can also have attrition from fear of hell, through special help infused by God, which nevertheless will not be a proximate and sufficient disposition. At least by itself without the sacrament. For concerning the disposition for the sacrament we shall speak at once. From these arises the second distinction¹⁷ between these acts, by the extrinsic account of grace. That every sorrow for sins, whether attrition or contrition, on the part of the object, which is without grace, is in this way called attrition: and every sorrow, even that which is attrition on the part of the object, when it is informed by grace, is in this way called contrition.