De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)
De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum
First published 1550
Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.
Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I
Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent
Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature
Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform
Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice
Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works
Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed
Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin
Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded
Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin
Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin
Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed
Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin
Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin
Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good
Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered
Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil
Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries
Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin
Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally
Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered
Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments
Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered
Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II
Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace
Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted
Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God
Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity
Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out
Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out
At the very beginning of the disputation, therefore, it is worthwhile to explain these two terms, justification and faith. Justification is taken in three ways (so that in their second proposition we may agree with the Lutherans).1 The first and genuine notion of this name is the acquisition of justice: namely that from unjust one becomes just. As heating is from cold to become hot. For names of this figure signify a change between two contraries. The second notion, close to this, is that it signifies an increase of justice. For in those forms which have degrees, the verbal noun signifies not only the first change, but also progress. For heating is also said to be the intensification of heat. These two acceptations are indeed most celebrated in the sacred utterances. Of the first Paul says:2 But to him who does not work, but believes in him who justifies the impious. And, He who has died is justified from sin. For justification in this first way is,3 as it is in the gloss on that of Rom. 8, Whom he called, them he also justified, the remission of sins through the grace of the Holy Spirit. Namely, by which grace we are formally justified by the virtue and merit of Christ. Hence Paul to the Corinthians says: Fornicators, serving idols, adulterers, and the rest, you were: but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. Wherefore justification at present is not said from justice as a special virtue: but, as we were saying in the first book about original justice, as it imports the rectitude of the whole man. For in this sense Aristotle also uses the name of justice,4 after the likeness of bodily justification: for then one thing is justified together with another, when both are equalized. And although between us and God, since there is no equality at all, the full nature of justice cannot exist, nevertheless we are justified when, subject to his will, we are measured according to his law and rule, and according to our frailty are referred and conformed to it. For this is the justice which Paul mentions at the very beginning of the epistle to the Romans. For where he says that the Gospel is the power of God, he immediately adds, For the justice of God is revealed in it from faith to faith. Of the second mode of justification5 we read, He who is just, let him be justified still.6 And, Do not fear to be justified even unto death.7 And, You see that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only.8 To which words Paul would have contradicted,9 where he says, We judge that a man is justified by faith, and not by works, unless Paul were speaking of the first justification, and James of the other. Although we will explain in its place how our works also concur in justification. Except that Paul speaks of preceding works. In the third mode10 the name of justification is further used for this, that one is absolved as guilty in judgment, and pronounced [just] by it. Nor is this usage so foreign to the first, but rather entirely akin to it. For as to be justified in a matter before God is for him who was unjust to become just: so in an external forum before men, it is for him who is held unjust, and is made guilty, according to what has been alleged and proved, to be pronounced just. In this sense the Wise Man says,11 He who justifies the impious, and he who condemns the just, are both abominable before God. And, If there shall be a cause12 between some, and they have appealed to the judges, whom they perceive to be just, they shall give them the palm of justice. To render the Greek word it would be, They shall justify him. Nor indeed is that signification of the psalm far from this:13 That you may be justified in your words, and overcome when you are judged: that is, that when men have judged concerning you, you may be found just. In almost this manner, to justify also signifies to commend, or to boast of justice. According to that, But he willing to justify himself.14 And, You are they who justify yourselves before men: but God knows your hearts. But this third signification is nowhere in Paul, nor in Scripture: where there is mention of our justification through Christ. In which the Lutherans (which is their third proposition) are shamefully false, and wickedly deceive. But justification is taken in the first way for the true acquisition of new justice. And where it is taken in the second way, there is also designated a true increase of justice, which is made through our works, emanating from the grace of God, and not merely a reputing or commending of justice, as will be demonstrated more fully in what follows. Paul therefore uses the name of justification (if we may conjecture the matter) perhaps alluding to the original justice in which our first parents were created. For since we all lost it by their fault, he significantly named justification the liberation from this our original contagion: that is, the restitution, and in some measure the restoration, not indeed of that same original justice, but nevertheless of the rectitude of man toward God, which was its form and root.15 Wherefore as St Thomas cleverly noted, 1-2 q. 113,16 although our justification is begun by faith and consummated through charity, it nevertheless takes its name from neither of these virtues: but from general justice. Because faith is a peculiar virtue of the intellect: as charity of the will: but justice designates the whole rectitude of man. Hence it happens that justification is taken only passively for that motion which is in man.17 Nor is that distinction proper which some fashion, that one justification is in Christ, which is the cause of ours, and another in us, which is its effect. For as among the philosophers, motion is not in the mover, but in the thing moved, as heating is not in the fire: but the cause of heating, whence proceeds the heating which is in the water. Nor would Aristotle concede that heating is an action in the fire, but from the fire: for motion, action, and passion are the same, although the respect of action is in the fire. In the same way neither in God nor in Christ is our justification properly, except that in him is the cause whence proceeds our justification.18 Hence Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter ch. 11, expounding that of Paul, The justice of God is revealed in it, etc., says that it is therefore called the justice of God because by imparting it to us he makes us just. And on that of Ps. 30, In your justice deliver me: The justice of God, he says, becomes ours when it is given to us. And these things concerning the first word of the question, namely justification.
But the other, namely faith,19 not only the opposing party, as we reported in their fourth proposition, but also our own men cut up and tear apart into as many meanings as there are words about faith in the Scriptures. So much so that we can scarcely retain in mind such a manifold equivocation of the name. For the adversaries, in order to deny that faith which is outside charity is faith, of which nevertheless Paul says, If I have faith,20 so as to remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing, fabricate I know not what faith of miracles, distinct from the Catholic faith. And in order to defend that we are justified by faith alone, they distinguish another faith of the evangelical history (which they cannot deny can exist outside grace) from their justifying faith, and fabricate I know not what other faiths: as is especially to be seen in Melanchthon21 in the Apology, and more fully in the Commonplaces: and in Bucer22 in his recent reconciliation of the controversy of justification. Indeed Pighius,23 also one of ours, teaches that faith is taken for confidence: likewise for conscience. And I have heard others multiplying [meanings] up to fifteen sections of faith: namely for authority, for promise, for oath, and I know not what other ways. Which variety and diversity, besides that it attributes to a simple thing without reason and art, cuts off all the fringes and nerves of the disputation about faith. For since Christ had laid one Catholic faith24 as the base of the Christian structure, and had endowed it with very many privileges, so as to impress it more deeply on the minds of mortals, any passage of Scripture where such a privilege and power of faith is commended is now easily eluded and rejected. Indeed when anyone fabricates that this or that way is used there, he has once for all torn faith apart. I would not indeed deny that the homonymies and amphibologies must first of all be explained,25 lest the disputation labor under this fault: but they are to be distinguished by judgment and art. I will deal first with our own men. For concerning the notions in which the Protestants use this name, there will be speech a little further below. Therefore, as far as I can meditate, there are only two meanings in this name faith.26 For it signifies both a moral virtue, which is in the will, and an intellectual one, which is in the intellect. Which explanation shines through from the very etymology of the name. For both Cicero earlier, book 2 On Offices, and afterwards Augustine in epist. 19 to Jerome, noted in the two syllables, of which the first is from fio, the second from dico, that faith is so called because what is said is done.27 Hence faith first of all signifies the constancy and truth which ought to be in the words of one asserting or promising something: which moral virtue is also now called fidelity. For which reason Cicero says there, Faith is the constancy and truth of words and agreements: which is indeed the foundation of all justice.28 And for that reason in pacts, where there is mutual promise on both sides, he said, Receive and give faith.29 They are therefore mistaken, unless I am mistaken, who say that faith is taken in one way for a promise or pledge. For a promise is a thing prior to faith. For when anyone promises anything, he is said by that promise to give, bind, and oblige his faith: which he afterwards frees when he fulfills the promise, or violates if he does not fulfill it. Yet he is not said to oblige or give a promise, just as neither is he said to fulfill faith, but a promise. Faith therefore is not a promise, but the firm truth which must be kept because of a promise, and which we as it were pledge by promising. And therefore one who is wrongfully circumvented or defrauded by someone implores the faith of gods and men: that is, constancy and truth. Nor is there need to fabricate another acceptation of faith for the authority of him who is to be believed. Since it falls back into this constancy and truth which we have just mentioned. For from this each one is worthy that faith be given to him, that he is reckoned constant and true, so as to do what he says. Whoever lacks this constancy is said to lack faith. As, There is no faith in the brow. And in this way we are said to derogate faith from him whom we cause not to be believed, and to reconcile faith to him whom we cause to be believed. And anyone is said to act or possess in good faith when he does so without deceit.
In the second way faith is taken,30 as an intellectual virtue. Namely the assent which we give to one announcing or promising something to us. Which notion is born from the former. For when he whom I know to have faith in the first way (that is, constancy and truth of words) asserts anything to me, or promises, he indeed persuades me of what he says: and (which has the same force) makes faith for me: that is, generates in me the assent by which I believe him. Which assent is accordingly called faith. Although those fastidious observers of idioms say that this kind of assent is not so properly called faith. For in Greek it is called πίστις,31 from πέπεισμαι, which is "I have been persuaded," and "I have made faith." And therefore πίστις, they say, should rather be translated into Latin as persuasio than fides. Indeed some very learned grammarians say it cannot be rendered by one Latin word. And on this they fill very long pages. But although Quintilian translated it as persuasion, nevertheless the most celebrated Latin authors also call it faith. And deservedly indeed. For as fides among the Latins, so πίστις among the Greeks is taken as much passively as actively. For among them there is πίστιν διδόναι, καὶ δέχεσθαι, which we translate as to give and receive faith. And therefore that persuasion which is made to me by another is best called faith, which he makes for me, and I have for him. Hence to have or apply faith is to believe. As in Terence, If she believes that this will be preferred to you. And in the Poet,32 I believe indeed, nor is there one faith that they are gods. And Cicero in the Topics: An argument is a reason producing faith in a doubtful matter. And the same in the Offices: We have faith, he says, in those whom we think understand more than we do. And although the holy doctors were the first who gave the matter this name, this notion would have enough authority. For it is received by all ecclesiastics with the highest consent. Therefore if we grant two meanings to this name faith, it is enough.33 Namely that faith be what someone gives me when he asserts or promises anything, and what I in turn give him when I believe. These notions only Augustine teaches34 in On the Spirit and the Letter ch. 31, in these words: For we now speak of this faith which we apply when we believe something: not which we give when we promise something: for that itself is also called faith. But we speak in different ways. "He did not have faith in me": but otherwise, "He did not keep faith with me." For the former is, He did not believe what I said: the latter, He did not do what he said. According to this faith by which we believe, we are faithful to God: but according to that by which what is promised is done, even God himself is faithful to us. For this the Apostle says:35 God is faithful, who does not permit you to be tempted beyond what you can bear. So much Augustine. Let us note therefore that faith is spoken of in two ways. First, that by which God is faithful to us; second, that by which we are faithful to God. In one passage of ch. 3 to the Romans Paul designates both.36 For where he says, What if some of them did not believe? Has their unbelief made void the faith of God? By no means, there faith is taken in the first way for the faith by which God is faithful in his promises: which moreover do not depend on our works, as the Jews thought. And therefore he says that although some did not believe the promises of God, nor kept his law, nevertheless the truth remains firm in his words, so as to do what he said. But where a little further below he says, But the justice of God through the faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all who believe in him, he speaks of faith in the second way: namely by which we who believe are faithful to God, which is indeed the cause and foundation of our justification. From these things it is first gathered that it is not necessary that faith be taken in another way for confidence: as both some of our own men and all the adversaries take as certain. For confidence37 is a thing other than faith and its offspring. Nor is it properly a virtue in itself, but a mode of virtue. For it is, as St Thomas knowingly says, 2-2 q. 129, hope strengthened by some firm opinion: or the strength of hope, pertaining to magnanimity. For from the fact that I have faith in the words of one asserting or promising, I hope and trust that it will be so. Indeed although it is born from faith, it is afterwards increased and perfected by charity. And therefore confidence draws its name from faith, as an effect from its cause. Wherefore firm and certain faith is expressed by the name of confidence: as the cause by the name of the effect. Which is plainly evident from the very examples which these multipliers of the meanings of faith bring forward. For they say that faith is taken in this way for confidence: where James says38 that one who asks anything of God should ask in faith, nothing hesitating; so also as often as in the Gospel Christ demanded faith from those who came to him seeking health: and where he says, If you have faith like a grain39 of mustard seed, say to the mountain, Move from here, etc. And where Paul says, If I have all faith,40 so as to remove mountains, etc. Yet it is most manifest that in all these places faith is taken for the Catholic faith: that is, for the firm, certain, and most constant assent which we owe and give to the words of Christ. Indeed since this faith was the foundation on which our whole salvation rests, that we believe Christ to be God, and thus that all things whatsoever he taught us in preaching the Gospel are true, he performed all miracles for the corroboration of this faith. Which is a doctrine most received by the Fathers and theologians. And it is most certain from that passage where, sending the Apostles to preach the Gospel,41 he instructed them thus: And these signs shall follow those who have believed, namely who have received the Catholic faith. In my name they shall cast out demons, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents, etc. Wherefore I cannot sufficiently wonder, both that our adversaries have devised another faith of miracles than the Catholic faith, and especially that our doctors recognize another where Christ says, If you have faith42 like a grain of mustard seed, say to this mountain, Move from here to there, and it will move: to which agrees that of Paul, If I have faith,43 so as to remove mountains: or wherever in the Gospel, about to perform a miracle, he demanded faith. For that concerning the centurion44 who begged health for his servant, Amen I say to you, I have not found so great faith in Israel, is it not understood of the Catholic faith? As also that to the blind men, Do you believe that I can do this for you? And when they answered, Surely, Lord, he adds, According to your faith be it done. But this is what deceives these men, that, as we were saying a little before, sometimes they explain the very degree of most certain faith by the name of confidence, as in the same chapter, Have confidence, son. Not considering that confidence is commended only as a sign of most firm faith. And therefore the name of confidence is taken for faith, rather than the name of faith for confidence. Wherefore it is the same Catholic faith which he blamed as small in Peter, which was teaching the future head of the Church, and which in the Canaanite woman45 he commended as great, to the confusion of the people of Israel. Nor is it another of which he says, All things whatever46 you ask praying, believe that you will receive. For to believe signifies nothing else than the assent which we give to one promising: whence if it is firm, confidence is begotten. But if someone argues against this, that the persuasion of obtaining whatever one asks is not necessary for asking: since it can be false, and yet confidence is always necessary: therefore faith is taken there for confidence. I too will refute him. Does it have less absurdity that the confidence by which one trusts that he will obtain whatever he has asked of God (if only he asks rightly) can be false, than the faith by which he believes the same? Surely as certain and firm as the confidence of those asking ought to be, so certain ought faith to be. For if confidence is born from faith, how will confidence be firmer than faith? Yet our Savior explains this faith: Amen, amen I say to you,47 whatever you ask the Father in my name, he will give you. Amen, amen is the word of one swearing. But to ask in the name of Christ is to ask those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul, when and where it is fitting. And in such a case both faith and confidence ought to be most certain: in another case both will be false. Hence James,48 where he says, Whoever asks of God, let him ask in faith, nothing hesitating: without doubt he speaks openly of the faith which we owe to God promising: and therefore he adds, nothing hesitating. For by whatever degree one believes, by the same he also trusts. James therefore admonishes49 that no one ask anything unless he certainly believes that it will confer salvation on him, and then let him not hesitate. Or if he is not so certain, let him have no other faith or confidence of obtaining, except under the condition, if what he asks is such.
As for what the same Albert adds, that faith is also taken for conscience: where Paul says,50 Everything that is not from faith is sin, there would be one who would deny it: because perhaps Paul's sense is only that everything which is against the faith of Christ is sin. But yet granting that it is taken there for conscience, it surely differs from faith only as particular knowledge which is applied to the work differs from universal knowledge. For to act against conscience is to act against what faith teaches. But concerning the other division of acquired and infused faith, it will be enough to have noted here that these names do not apply to acts, but to habits: of which the first is infused by God, but the other is acquired by human use. There will be mention of these in ch. 9. But the object51 of the act and of the habit are promiscuously called by the same name of faith among the philosophers, because the act is concerned with the object, and the habit is for the sake of the act. For in this notion we use faith, saying that all things which are in the sacred page are the Catholic faith: namely because they are the object of faith. But concerning those three members, to believe God, to believe God [when he speaks], and to believe in God, the reason will give a place for us to speak.