De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

This disputation with the Lutherans having been held, it follows in the second place that we discuss whether this disposition can be made by human powers, or whether special help of grace is necessary. Here it is worthwhile to note beforehand how many meanings this name grace has.¹ Grace in general (as the word itself openly sounds) borrows this name from its cause, as we said at the beginning of the previous book. For it is a gift which is not owed to the receiver, but is given by gratuitous will. Otherwise, as the Apostle says, if it is from works, it is now not grace.² Yet when under some general name a species or supposit has some peculiar quality beyond others, from which it can obtain its own nomenclature, the general name itself becomes, as it were, special to the others. Each of the divine persons is the Holy Spirit: but because the Father and the Son have proper notions by which they are named, the name Holy Spirit is attributed to the third person. In like manner, every grace of whatever kind is so called because it is freely given: but because there is one special grace by which God formally makes us grateful to himself: according to that saying, Being justified freely by his grace,³ this is properly denominated from its effect "sanctifying grace": the rest retaining the generic name, so that they are called graces freely given.⁴ But the graces freely given, which are set apart over against sanctifying grace, are those gifts which are conferred not for the good of the receiver but for common utility: which therefore nothing prevents being given to wicked men, such as the gifts of prophecy, of tongues, and of healings, and the rest which Paul recounts to the Corinthians.⁵ The account of sanctifying grace is different: as that which is bestowed for the proper good of the possessor. But the concurrence and assistance of God preventing and converting us to himself, although it is counted among graces freely given, nevertheless has the peculiar name of special or gratuitous help,⁶ namely by which he raises us above nature. So that it is distinguished from the general influx by which he moves and fosters natural things.

Next it must be considered in the second place that the disposition to grace can be twofold:⁷ one, if you please, improper and most remote, neither sufficient nor altogether necessary: namely, any morally good work which is done from pure natural powers with the general help of God for the sake of what is honorable, or for the sake of certain reasons and human necessities which are good in their kind. Yet these offices, insofar as they are works of some virtue or other, cannot but in some way pave the way of themselves to charity. And especially if a sinner exercises himself in such works with the intention of bending God to soften his hard heart to penance. Which end, as also other honorable ends, he can naturally set before himself. But these natural works are not those which justification follows as its proper disposition by established law. The other is the proper disposition, and necessary for justification. And concerning this is the question, whether a man can so dispose himself to grace from his natural powers that grace always certainly and infallibly follows. And there are many among theologians who have persuaded themselves of this.⁸ Scotus, 2 Sent. d. 28 (as we were saying a little before), when he speaks of those things which a man can do naturally concerning the divine commandments, brings forth these words concerning the precept of loving God above all things: Whenever the will performs the act of this precept, even if it is unformed, it disposes itself by congruity to sanctifying grace; when that is offered, it will either resist and sin, or consent and be justified. Where he seems to affirm three things. First, that the disposition sufficient for grace can be the love of God above all things, which we must repeat below in the dispute. Second, that the disposition can be made from pure natural powers: of which we are about to make examination here. And third, that such a disposition is meritorious of congruity: of which we will discuss in the following chapter. And in book 4 d. 14 q. 2 he says: A man can from natural powers with common influence have attrition, which is a disposition and merit of congruity for the remission of mortal sin. But concerning at least the second and third points, namely that there is some disposition to grace from natural powers, and that it is a merit of congruity, many have adhered to him. For almost all the nominalists⁹ except Gregory of Rimini. Adrianus follows him besides in Quodlibet 7 q. 4, and Durandus in the same distinction q. 5. Nevertheless the answer to this question is negative. Namely, that no one by human faculty can sufficiently dispose himself to grace, unless supported by special help in that disposition which grace follows infallibly and by certain law. And lest we glue different questions into one: I say nothing now about the merit of congruity, but I affirm even this, that although that disposition were not called a merit of congruity, nevertheless it is not to be admitted that a man can dispose himself to grace by such a disposition. Nor indeed is this negation (unless my scruple deceives me) to be reckoned merely the opinion of St Thomas or of any theologian: but a conclusion¹⁰ which is so gathered from the sacred passages that it cannot be refuted by an orthodox man. Nor does St Thomas hold this conclusion only as an opinion, but truly as the faith of Christ:¹¹ where he says, No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. Let us begin therefore from his words in 1.2 q. 109 art. 6. He says: The preparation of the will for good is twofold. One indeed for acting well and enjoying God, which cannot be made without habitual sanctifying grace, which is the principle of meritorious work. Moreover this first conclusion is the common consensus of theologians against Pelagius. But the other is the preparation for obtaining and receiving habitual grace itself: which preparation is not through another preceding habit. For otherwise before this second another prior would be required, and so there would be a going to infinity. Nor is there any disagreement of theologians concerning this second. But, he says, some gratuitous help of God must be presupposed, moving the soul inwardly, or inspiring a good purpose. And concerning this third the doctors disagree (as has been said). The reason which St Thomas brings is a certain natural similitude. For since, he says, every agent acts for its own proper end, such as is the order of ends, such also is that of agents: namely, that the more superior the agent, the more it refers its actions to a higher end. As in an army the first agent is the leader or prince, whose proper end is therefore that which is supreme, namely to conquer: but the tribune who acts under the leader has as his proper end and scope only to govern a particular legion by the command of the supreme leader: and therefore it pertains to the first leader to dispose all the parts of the army, insofar as it better contributes to victory. Since therefore God is the first cause of infusing grace, by which we are converted to the last end, it pertains to him to dispose and prepare our souls for receiving that same gift. But Durandus¹² and the rest say that this reason does not conclude, asserting against it another natural example. For God is the one who infuses the soul in the generation of a man, and yet the matter is disposed by a lower agent, namely by natural causes. And in like manner, although God alone is the one who infuses grace, nothing prevents a man from disposing and accommodating himself by natural power to the same grace. But indeed the first similitude destroys nothing; nay, it rather corroborates the reasoning of St Thomas. Because the power of the seed disposing the matter for the infusion of the rational soul is also the power of the rational soul, namely of the man generated: and therefore the disposing cause has a proportion with the form to which the disposition is ordered. But besides, whatever may be the case with natural reason: this is where these men are deceived, that they think St Thomas relies on that natural reason alone, when the matter is far otherwise. For he presupposes that truth as evangelical, which is stronger than every natural reason. But he brings the reason only for the sake of explanation. Whence when in 2 Sent. d. 27 and 28 he had followed the common opinion and affirmed both that a man could dispose himself to grace from natural powers, and that that disposition was a merit of congruity, afterward in the Summa, examining more attentively the sacred utterances and the sentences of the Fathers, especially Augustine, he retracted both.¹³

The first reason of the conclusion therefore is: For a man to dispose and prepare himself for grace is nothing else than to move his soul away from iniquity and turn it to God, from whom he receives grace: as if one who had his face turned away from the sun should look at it, so as to be flooded with light. But conversion is attributed in sacred Scripture to God preventing: according to that saying,¹⁴ God of hosts, convert us. And, Convert me, Lord, and I shall be converted. And, Convert us, Lord, to you, and we shall be converted. But if we read in the reverse order also, Be converted to me with your whole heart,¹⁵ and, Be converted to me and I will be converted to you: there only it is signified that it stands with us that we are not converted by God continually knocking at the door, as we set forth more fully in the previous book, chapters 16 and 18. Besides, the same preparation, because it is made spiritually, after the likeness of bodily motion, is called drawing, and yet no one (says Christ)¹⁶ can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. Nor indeed is the answer safe which some devise for their security: namely, that these and similar testimonies are referred to the infusion of grace. Nay, this is what chiefly moves me against them, that the infusion of grace is not drawing or conversion, but the terminus of that motion. Wherefore if the disposition were made naturally by us, with God only infusing grace, God would not properly be the one who draws or converts us, but we ourselves by our own power would return to him, about to receive grace. Just as when I turn my face toward the sun, it does not turn me itself, but enlightens me. But to God is attributed not only illumination, which is the terminus, but the motion itself, which is drawing and conversion: according to that saying of Augustine in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5: Unless it were a gift of God, even our very conversion to God would not be said to him, Lord God of hosts, convert us.

Second. The sufficient disposition, which¹⁷ grace certainly and infallibly follows, is a certain beginning of justification. But Paul denies even that beginning to us who admit it: where he says that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as from ourselves.¹⁸ And by the name of thought he designates the first disposition and beginning of motion, which is the right way to grace. As if expounding the word of Christ,¹⁹ Without me you can do nothing. For Christ speaks there of the fruit which we bear in Christ, as branches in the vine: whose first beginning also is from the vine. And therefore against Pelagius (as is clear in the Council of Milevis, and in the Palestinian, as Augustine reports to Paulinus)²⁰ it was defined not only that grace is given without any merits of ours, but that there is no beginning in us, but that God is the beginner: concerning which Augustine himself corrected himself in book 1 of Retractations:²¹ who had once been in that error, that at least the beginning of our justice before God was from us.

Third, this is chiefly proved from Paul,²² where, when we are justified, he reckons us as clay in comparison with God. But clay is not only formed by the potter, but is made soft, prepared, and fitted by him.²³ Add (from which this is chiefly confirmed) that the disposition of which we speak is an effect of predestination:²⁴ but the effects of predestination, which indeed had no cause in us, are all preceded by God, as supernatural effects. To this at last is added the express sentence of Augustine,²⁵ wherever he conflicts with the Pelagians. Especially in book 3 of the Hypognosticon, where concerning the wound and infirmity of free choice he so expressly determines that it can neither begin nor suffice to complete, unless it is preceded by medicine, that is, unless it is healed by the grace of Christ: subjoining that testimony,²⁶ I will give you a new heart and a new spirit. Which (he says) signifies nothing else than that the fallen wills of men are repaired and prepared through Christ. And he concludes that the will is prepared by God: according to that saying of the Psalm,²⁷ Create a clean heart in me, O God: and renew a right spirit in my inmost parts. Thus far Augustine, subjoining the example of Peter,²⁸ whom, unless the Lord had looked upon him, never moved by penance would he have wept bitterly. Ambrose also noted this in book 9 on Luke.²⁹ Wherefore when the Wise Man says,³⁰ It is man's part to prepare the soul, he immediately adds, And the Lord governs the tongue. And where he says, The heart of man disposes his way, he forthwith adds, But it is the Lord's to direct his steps. Namely, that he may plainly teach us that the preparation for grace is the work of God and also ours: of God indeed preventing by his special favor, but ours of those consenting and cooperating. Whence the same Augustine, who wisely foresaw all these things, in book 2 Against the Two Letters of Pelagius, chapter 8, since that wicked man said that at least the desire of good begins from us, beats back that very word most sharply. For then (he says) merit would have begun without the grace of God, to which the help of grace would come as if from debt. Against that saying, Without me you can do nothing. And that of Paul, He who began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ.³¹ And, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as from ourselves.³² Wherefore far be it (he says) that one who reads in Proverbs, It is man's part to prepare the heart, should be deceived so as to think this can be done without the help of the grace of God. For therefore it is added, that it is the Lord's to govern the tongue, as if he himself begins. And at last he concludes: Who can prepare the heart for good by a good thought? Far be it that they understand it so, except the proud defenders of their own free choice and deserters of the catholic faith. Thus Augustine. Than which I know not what could be said more effectively to conquer and refute the sufficient disposition to grace without the preventing help of God. The conclusion of this chapter therefore is that the preparation and disposition sufficient for grace is the work both of God and of ours. Of him indeed preventing, but ours of those consenting and cooperating. For he who says, I will take away from them the heart of stone, and I will give them a heart of flesh, nevertheless knocking at free choice, says, Today if you hear his voice, do not harden your hearts. Augustine well noted this in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 14. Whence it happens that he is the first cause of our dispositions, but we are the whole cause of our hardening: according to that saying, Your destruction, O Israel: only in me is your help. He said help, to designate the cooperation of free choice. For he hardens only by permitting, as we said in book 4, chapter 18. This is the confession of the present holy Synod of Trent, which immediately in chapter 5 declares that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from God through Christ Jesus by preventing grace, by which grace, exciting and helping them to convert themselves, men are disposed to their own justification by freely assenting to the same grace and cooperating. In which confession it must be noted that none are properly called dispositions except those which are made by God preventing and by us assenting. For it says that without the grace of God a man cannot move himself to justice before him. Although canon 7 has decided that not all works before justification, in whatever way done, are sins: because even if they are done naturally, they are at least morally good: as was said in the previous book.

But this divine disposition in us is made not in one way only, but in two. For (as St Thomas is the authority in 1.2 q. 112 art. 2) one is imperfect, the other perfect. Imperfect indeed, not because every motion of God is not perfect in relation to its end, but because God through it calls us not proximately to grace, but to other preceding goods, through which he may lead us gradually and little by little in time to grace itself. Which disposition is indeed meritorious neither of grace nor of glory. But the other is that which is at the same time with grace, preceding it only in nature. Just as in fire there are some dispositions preceding the form to be generated, and others coming together at the same time, yet prior in nature. And this second is always necessary, as is made clear from the sudden conversion of Paul: but the former is not so. Add that this necessary preparation, although it is not meritorious of grace, is nevertheless meritorious of glory, insofar as it is informed by grace. But concerning this a little later more fully.

Finally, two words remain for us to say: one to the Lutherans, the other with the Catholics. These our adversaries, as we began to say before, in their imperial book of Ratisbon seem to approach closer to this matter than they were instructed by their patron. For they say that it is clear that adults do not obtain the benefit of reconciliation unless by the preventing motion of the Holy Spirit, by which their mind and will are moved to detestation of sin: according to that word of Augustine, It is impossible to begin a new life unless we repent of the former. And according to the institution of John the Baptist and of the Apostle Peter, nay, of Christ, preaching penance for the remission of sins. Which article Bucer³³ in his concord of justification explains in exactly the same way as we were just saying: namely, that a salutary penance for sins must precede justification in us: although not in time, at least in nature. Which, he says, cannot be stirred up in us except through the Holy Spirit. Let us therefore ask these men: if justifying grace never follows unless this affection of our free choice precedes, what more do they desire in order plainly to confess that a disposition is required in us for grace? Especially since in fact (as will be clear in all places where we need this confession of theirs) it is the same as admitting a disposition, or affirming that that motion is necessary in us. For if it is necessary, they cannot deny that our justification depends on it in some way. But concerning works preceding in time they persist in condemning them all as sins. Against them a very great argument is taken from the distinction made above. For to name as sins those things which are done by the nod of God and his help in a sinner is blasphemy.

Therefore, to return to those Catholics³⁴ who are the authors of this natural disposition: their chief argument is this. From natural powers we can know that sin is an offense of God and contrary to his will: therefore under this account we can repent of it, and detest it on account of him, as on account of any other cause, so that that penance of ours is a morally good work. But such a work, especially a detestation of this kind, is a disposition to grace: therefore we can dispose ourselves to grace (as they say) by congruity. But this argument is broken at the very threshold. For since the grace of justification is not comprehended within the bounds of nature, but is a supernatural gift, owed neither to the person nor to nature, although natural reason seems to conclude something to which we do not know how to answer, nevertheless by faith, which is above nature, we are taught that God alone bestows that gift in such a way that we can do nothing from which that gift follows by any necessity, certainty, or infallibility. Otherwise it would necessarily follow that we were in some way its cause: as will become still more fully clear in the following chapter. Yet God everywhere ascribes to himself to be the first cause, so that nothing precedes in us: according to that saying, You did not choose me, but I chose you.³⁵ And, Who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him?³⁶ Whence the Fathers against Pelagius used no natural reason, but fought with the sacred Scriptures alone, to establish that there is no beginning in us for grace. Wherefore it must be answered that although we can know that sin is an offense of God, and so from natural powers have a detestation which is a remote preparation, as we said at the beginning of the chapter, nevertheless to dispose ourselves sufficiently in such a way that grace certainly and infallibly follows, we truly cannot without divine help. Because that certainty could not exist except on account of the law of God. But there is no law of conferring grace except to him whom God has drawn to himself.

In the same way it is answered to the other argument³⁷ concerning one who, coming to the use of reason, and before he admits any deadly sin either by himself or by the instruction of others, would know that there is one God who is to be served, as a rewarder of good and evil: it must be answered, I say, that although such knowledge could perhaps be natural, yet the motion of the will toward God, which is the final and proper disposition to grace, could not happen to him without special help. And the same must be thought concerning man³⁸ in whatever state: whether created in pure natural powers, or persevering in original justice.

The third and likewise common argument is this. God commands us nothing impossible: but he commands that we be converted to him: Be converted, he says,³⁹ to me, and I will be converted to you: therefore conversion, which is the same as disposition, is possible to us from nature. Likewise fourth, it is a common saying and most received by all that God does not fail one who does what is in him: according to that saying,⁴⁰ God gives a good spirit to those who ask him. And, Whatever you ask the Father in my name, he will give you. But for a man to do what is in him is to do what is in his power: therefore a man can sufficiently dispose himself to grace. The arguments are in the same place of St Thomas. To the first of them⁴¹ he answers that insofar as the cooperation of our free choice is necessary, we are commanded to be converted. Which, although we cannot do without the help of God, is nevertheless not impossible to us, because he is most ready to help us unless we resist. But to the second he answers, and the answer is indeed to be meditated on, because it is most true and is understood to be necessary. Namely, that for a man to do what is in him⁴² is not understood before the help of God, but rather with God preventing. For then a man does what is in him when he cooperates by responding to God inspiring him, and then by a most certain law grace follows.

But I would add a last argument,⁴³ perhaps of greater weight. When someone contrite approaches the sacrament, say without an obstacle, but nevertheless bringing no such disposition as would suffice for grace without the sacrament, then that disposition seems possible from natural powers, since it is not sufficient for grace, but is such as would perpetually have fault with it: yet if such a contrite person receives the sacrament without any other change of will, he will receive grace: therefore a disposition to grace can be made from natural powers. Concerning this there will be speech again in what follows. Meanwhile, however, we will answer that, with all the parts of the argument granted, nothing is concluded against us, because God works there not through the disposition, but through the sacrament, which he uses as an instrument to infuse grace into a man, if not disposed, at least not opposing an obstacle.