De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Domingo de Soto

De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)

De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

First published 1550

Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.


Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I

Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent

Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace

Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature

Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform

Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice

Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works

Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed

Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded

Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin

Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin

Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed

Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good

Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil

Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries

Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin

Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally

Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered

Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments

Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered

Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted

The causes by which these men are stirred to pronounce with such bitterness against this our disposition and preparation of the soul are roughly these. They form the first from that passage of Paul, If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not charity, I have become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. If I have prophecy, and the rest that follows, without charity, I am nothing. Behold, says Luther, art. 6, whatever is outside charity is not from the whole heart, and therefore is hypocrisy; according to that saying, This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. For this reason, he says, Christ calls them hypocrites; but hypocrisy is sin; therefore whatever work is outside charity is sin, and so there can be no disposition to grace. But there is no probability in the consequence: because something is outside charity, it is nothing in the sight of God, [and therefore] it is forthwith sin. For whatever office falls short of that degree of divine grace is reckoned of no weight or price with God; yet it does not immediately follow that it is sin. Nay, Paul's suggestion there is far different. For he chose his example in things which are good in their own kind, in order to teach that although prophecy outside charity is truly prophecy, as it was in that wicked high priest Caiaphas, and dead faith also has its own account and the substance of faith, nevertheless they are nothing in the judgment and estimation of God unto eternal life. But nevertheless they can be in their own kind, that is, morally good. But the Lutheran school, as its master teaches in the same place, reckons it impiety that any natural work should be morally good, as if it were midway between the love and the hatred of God, so as to proceed from neither. And it even denies that faith outside charity is faith. This they strive everywhere to defend. Hence they also infer that whatever work of a sinner, since it is not from love, proceeds from hatred, and therefore is sin. But how they can persuade men of sound mind of this, I do not see. Whom, I ask, will they persuade that one who is guilty of some outrage—for example, one who cannot cast out from his soul a shameful love or hatred of an enemy—whatever he does that is good in its kind, that is, if he is hospitable to the poor, if he is benevolent to his fellow citizens, if he prays, if he confesses the faith with heart and mouth, if finally he eats or drinks, does all these things in hatred of God? What if, terrified by the divine judgment, desiring to vomit out that pus and to return to God with his whole heart, he distributes alms to the poor, macerates his flesh with fasting, perseveres in assiduous prayers before God, in order to be freed from that virulent sickness of soul? Do all these things too, because they are not done from true love of God, consequently proceed from hatred? Surely we ought not to despair so much of human nature that such a thought should enter any free soul. Nor, Luther, is that which you think hypocrisy, if you consider more attentively the definition of Christ our teacher. For our Redeemer calls those hypocrites who display one thing outwardly in effect while bearing another in affection. But one who performs these offices, although on account of an admixture of fault he does not do them from the whole heart, nevertheless does them for the sake of what is honorable, or perhaps, as we have added, with the intention of inclining God to himself, by whose help he may be healed: he, I say, displays nothing outwardly other than what he bears in his heart; wherefore neither is he a hypocrite. If all rational and natural philosophy had not been exploded by you, you would see that not all things done by a depraved man proceed from depravity. For the man whom we are now depicting has an affection of friendship, from which he is filthy and shameless, or a hatred of an enemy, from which he is iniquitous; but he has at the same time another distinct will of doing what is honorable, or even a desire of recovering his senses, fighting against the former affection, from which those works, however good, flow. And by this interpretation the sense of Augustine becomes clear, in his second letter to Sixtus: whose words they accordingly object to us, yet they are no obstacle to us. For he says that no merits precede in the impious for receiving the first grace. Because, he says, to the merits of the impious not grace but punishment is owed. By these words indeed the individual works of the impious are in no way condemned, but only this is discerned, that there are no merits in him except of punishment. For works morally good are merits neither of eternal life nor of punishment. Wherefore the sense of Augustine is precisely this, that he has no merits of grace, but on account of the one mortal sin that he has, he is worthy of eternal punishment.

Next these men bring forward in their own favor that saying of Paul, The law entered in, that sin might abound. Whence, by I know not what art of dialectic, Luther fashions the notion that every work preceding grace, and any detestation whatsoever of sins, makes a man more a sinner. For he says that whatever recollection of sins before grace necessarily engenders hatred of the law, because on account of its prohibition those things are sins. And therefore the sinner has a greater hatred of the law than of sin; since therefore hatred of the law is sin, it follows that such a remembrance of sins makes a man more a sinner. Wherefore, unless faith (namely formed faith, which alone he admits to be faith) precedes, the thought of sins is pernicious. See how unworthy an argument it is, to which any response should be given. First, the law was not given for this, that is, intended to lead men to sin, otherwise it would not be a holy law and a holy commandment, as Paul says; but certainly as regards the moral precepts, it was to make men good (which is the proper office of the law), and as regards the ceremonial precepts, to foreannounce Christ to come. But (as the most common gloss has it) from the fact that it prohibited, yet did not extinguish concupiscence, it was an occasion, not to all, but to sensual men, of sinning: both by multiplying commandments, and because man's appetite strives more vehemently toward what is forbidden. Hence only this is inferred, that whatever works are against the law are sins. And besides, that hatred of the law itself, whether written or natural, because it restrains our desires, also becomes impiety. But not everyone who execrates the sins he has committed because of the loss and damages he has suffered thereby hates the law. Wherefore, not only where living faith does not precede, but dead faith does, and even where no infused faith precedes, but only natural knowledge that God is and is a rewarder, fear of punishment and subsequently hatred and detestation of sins bring no evil at all, but confer very much usefulness toward salvation.

But there is no one who does not wonder to what lengths they violently distort the third passage in order to drag it into their opinion. Now that passage is about the cut-off branch: a most beautiful similitude used by our Savior, If anyone does not remain in me, he will be cast forth as a branch and will wither; and they will gather him and cast him into the fire, and he will burn. For Luther comments, art. 36, that the first two things pertain to free will in this life, namely to be cast forth and to wither; but the remaining three, namely to be gathered, cast into the fire, and burn, pertain to the future age. Whence, he says, whoever here falls away from the grace of God by sin is drawn away by Satan, who does not permit him to strive for good, but compels him to wither and become always worse. Yet this passage first of all pertains wholly to the last judgment. For there, as Christ set forth in the example of the net cast into the sea, the angels will go out and separate the wicked from the midst of the just (which is to be cast forth), withering with fear and expectation of the horrible judgment that awaits them; and so they will gather them as it were into bundles fit for burning, and cast them into eternal fire. But even if we freely grant that those first two members pertain to the present life, far be it that whoever falls from the grace of God should be cast forth to such an extent into the power of Satan that no liberty remains to him of returning into the grace of Christ, who is most ready to stretch out his hand to anyone. For then he would never call sinners to return to him, which nevertheless he continues to do assiduously and most urgently throughout the whole Gospel. But those who never think of returning, but bar the door of the heart against divine mercy with the bolts of their desires, we plainly concede wither more and more day by day, as those whom that fountain of living water springing up unto eternal life does not wash. The remaining arguments of the Lutherans are of this stamp. Nevertheless it does not escape me that the Lutherans now speak somewhat better of the disposition to grace in the imperial book of Ratisbon, although they do not altogether establish the matter plainly; of whose opinion there will be a fuller discussion in chapter 12.

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What faith without works confers

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On the cause of the effect of faith without works

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — On the causes of justification

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the justification of an infant before the use of reason

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the justification of adults in general

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — On the justification of an adult from original sin alone

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the justification of adults from actual sins

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the difference between attrition and contrition

Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — On the difference between baptism and the sacrament of penance

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — Whether another act of charity than contrition suffices

Capitulum XVII: Chapter 17. — On the formal causes: how grace and the virtues are distinguished

Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 18. — On the same formal causes: how they justify

Capitulum XIX: Chapter 19. — On the formal causes of justification against the Lutherans

Capitulum XX: Chapter 20. — On the justice of Christ imputed to us

Capitulum XXI: Chapter 21. — On the interpretation of divine Scripture, in which places faith alone seems to be declared the cause of justification

Liber III: On Nature and Grace, Book III

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the obligation of the just to observe the law

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the exposition of the law

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the fulfilment of the law in general

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On the fulfilment of the law in particular

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — For answering the adversaries

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — On satisfaction

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — On the merit of works that proceed from grace

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On merit against the Lutherans

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Whereby the adversaries' arguments are answered

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the certainty of faith against the Lutherans

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — Whereby the same certainty of grace is disputed with certain Catholics

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — Whereby the same truth is corroborated by the testimonies of Scripture and the saints

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — Whereby the objections of the opposing party are answered

Apologia I: Apology against the Reverend Bishop Catharinus

Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — Whereby the state of the case and the controversy is established

Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — Whereby the true opinion is confirmed

Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — Whereby the first treatise of the Reverend Catharinus is answered

Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — Whereby the second treatise is answered

Decretum I: Decree on Original Sin

Canones I: Canons on Original Sin

Decretum II: Decree on Justification

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the weakness of nature and of the law for justifying men

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the dispensation and mystery of the coming of Christ

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — Those who are justified through Christ

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — The description of the justification of the impious and of its movement in the state of grace is set out

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — On the necessity of preparation for justification in adults, and whence it comes

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — The manner of preparation

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What the justification of the impious is, and what its causes are

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — How it is understood that the impious is justified by faith and gratis

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Against the empty confidence of the heretics

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the received increase of justification

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the observance of God's commandments, and its necessity and possibility

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — That the rash presumption of predestination is to be avoided

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the gift of perseverance

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the lapsed and their restoration

Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — That grace is lost by any mortal sin, but not faith

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — On eternal life, or good works, and the nature of their merit

Canones I: Canons on Justification

Appendix I: Thirty-Five Lutheran Errors Condemned in This Work

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