De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

We have therefore completed the first book, with God's help, in which we disputed according to the narrowness of our ability concerning the threefold state of man. Namely, if he had been created in pure and naked nature, what offices he could perform by free will with the general influence of God, and where he would need special help. And if he had persisted in original justice, what he could do even by his own nature, and for what he would need grace. And finally, how far the natural faculty of fallen man suffices in good morals, and in what it fails. It follows immediately that we speak of the justification of the same man through Christ our Savior. For we have undertaken to set forth these four states of man in the present work. But since justification is one thing by which the unjust man, with his mind changed, is received into the grace of God: and another by which the just man is still justified by just works, in this second book we shall speak of the first: in the third, finally, of the other. Namely, that in this we may elucidate the causes, reasons, manner and order by which fallen man is justified: and in the third we may weigh the power and faculty of the justified man. Wherefore in the narration both are placed nearly in the apology of the sixth session of our holy Synod of Trent,¹ which is on justification. And although in the former books the incursions of the Lutherans were not lacking to us, with whom we had therefore frequently to contend, these nevertheless are the books in which greater contests with them must be undergone by us. For here the whole matter turns on that inextricable and most troublesome question, whether we are justified by faith alone: and nearly the whole third book on that, whether it is faith alone by which we fulfill the law. For that little word, faith alone,² has been so deeply thrust into their minds by I know not what angry god, that now the battle is fought over it not with words but with arms, the whole world being shaken. Wherefore, as we said in the vestibule of the work, we shall be occupied in this place principally with this, to narrate the manner in which FAITH WORKS THROUGH CHARITY. This meditation on justification³ is therefore divided into three members. Since we must consider works: first, those which precede justifying grace: then, those which come together in the very moment of justification: and finally, those which follow in the man already justified. For the Lutherans say that the preceding works are all evil: that the concurrent works have no efficacy for recovering grace: and that the subsequent works are of no merit for eternal life. Concerning the first kind we have spoken in the first book: concerning the third we shall speak in the last: and concerning the second in this middle book. But the preceding works are some merely natural, which are not done as proper dispositions for grace: concerning which it has been shown that they are not all sins, but some are morally good: but others are those by which we are prepared for the grace to be entered. And from these the present disputation must begin. Concerning them there is a threefold⁴ question to be examined. Namely, whether man can prepare himself for grace: whether indeed he can do this without the special help of God: and finally, whether works of this kind, which precede grace, are some merit of the same grace, at least of congruity. The first question has been defined among Catholics without controversy on the affirmative side, although whether he can do it naturally is not agreed among all. But it was Luther⁵ who, as we began to report in ch. 19, under I know not what pretext of extolling the grace of Christ, rejected all disposition and preparation in us. His words have already been brought forward by us in ch. 15 from his article 36. Where he says: Free will after sin is a thing of mere title: and while it does what is in itself, it sins mortally. And article 6: Contrition, he says, which is prepared by the discussion, collection and detestation of sins, by which one reconsiders his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity, multitude and foulness of sins, the loss of eternal beatitude and the acquisition of eternal damnation: this contrition makes a hypocrite, nay rather a greater sinner. This is Luther. But from this position his family has never to this day yielded, but they abhor to hear the name of disposition or preparation: crying out in all their colloquies and apologies that from this the grace of Christ is shamefully diminished. But we have already in good part established this position in ch. 15, where we showed that we are freely moved by God while he works our salvation in us. And then in ch. 19, where we made clear that not all works outside grace are sins, nay rather that some can be done in a certain way good: wherefore the dispatch will now be shorter and easier. Especially because below there will be discourse in particular and in the individual about dispositions. The Catholic conclusion,⁶ therefore, contrary to the Lutheran, is that no one using the judgment of his own will is reconciled to God unless disposed and prepared by the motion of free will: as the holy Synod has just defined. The first reason for this⁷ shines forth to me from the nature of things. For faith (which must never cease to be inculcated against these men) does not reject the virtues which nature teaches, but perfects those which by themselves do not suffice. But no other right is more deeply implanted in the minds of mortals than that in reconciling friendships, penance for injuries is first necessary in him who inflicted them: so that in him who received them, forgetfulness may follow, by which hatred, torn up by the roots, may make room for love: therefore God, the perfecter of nature, requires the same preparation of mind from sinners. Except that he, the inspector of hearts, cannot be deceived by any outward feigned appearance of penance, unless there be true penance within the mind. Nor indeed is anything taken away from the grace and mercy of God by this: not only because the proximate disposition is made in us by prevenient God, as we shall say in the following chapter: but also because we do not so establish preparations of this kind that there is any true account of justice between us, while we are his enemies, and God, until by his mercy our works are accepted by him. Wherefore, without money, says the prophet, you shall be redeemed.⁸ And: Come, buy without money, and without any exchange, wine and milk. But you say,⁹ Christ has already died for us, paying the price of the sins of the whole world: what need is there of any disposition of ours? Namely, that as our works would have been of no value unless he had paid the price, so that precious blood washes no one except the one who assents and cooperates: except little children, who from the original fault, which they contracted by another's will, are washed without their own will by the sacrament. This we have supported in the cited chapter 15 of the previous book¹⁰ by several testimonies and reasons. Namely, that since we are men, and therefore free, we are moved by God according to our nature. For this reason no irrational creature is capable of the grace of God: because it is not fit to be led by reason. And therefore as he moves those creatures to their own ends naturally, according to their nature (wherefore it is neither praise to them to be moved, nor blame if they are not moved), so he draws us to himself, who is our end, freely according to our disposition: so that our assent and the cooperation of those obedient to him may be given to us for praise: but refusal for blame and reproach. These and other causes of this kind we have most copiously enriched in their place. But unless God were to open the assent and cooperation of our free will, why does he persist in knocking at the door of our heart?¹¹ Could he not break the iron bars of our breast? Could not he who made the sun out of nothing with that power to illuminate the air without its assent and nod, when the true light itself came, unless he awaited our spontaneous cooperating will, suddenly flood the whole human race with his grace? Surely there would be no need to call us to penance, to entice us to come, and to be converted to him, and even to strike with errors those who are rebellious. Nor would he have said that "woe" to Jerusalem, because, though he wished so often to gather them as a hen gathers her chicks,¹² they resisted: unless he had established this preparation of our mind as necessary (as it was in the natural law). Nor would the obstinacy of our heart otherwise be our fault, unless our disposition were necessary. But because the patience and expectation of God, as Paul is the author,¹³ does not compel us to penance but leads us: therefore those who are not converted treasure up wrath and anger for the day of wrath. Whence¹⁴ Chrysostom, Homily 9 on John, says: God, he says, compels no one, but persuades us to do rightly: and whoever assent to him, he both entices and draws. Therefore when he came into the world, some received him, others neglected him. God wills no servant unwilling, none compelled: but only those who of their own accord desire him, embrace him, and understand that they have the grace of God and of virtue. For men (since they necessarily need the works and service of servants) restrain wicked and disobedient servants by the right of possession: but God, since he is sufficient to himself and needs nothing, works all things only for the sake of our salvation, and freely permits us to be of our own judgment and right. But if he should drag the unwilling to serve, he would owe them no differently than if they had rendered no service. This is Chrysostom. Whence that canon 4 of the Council of Orange,¹⁵ that God does not await our will so that we may be cleansed from sin, is not so to be heard as that he does not work our assent, but that he does not precede himself in us, but rather he precedes us. And in the same way Augustine answers,¹⁶ book 1 against the two epistles of the Pelagians ch. 19, to the argument which can be made from the word of the Gospel, No one can come unless the Father¹⁷ draw him: where, since he does not say "lead," Christ seems to suggest that men are drawn unwilling, and therefore not assenting. For one is drawn unwilling, but led willing. He answers, I say, that it was said "draw," not because God draws anyone by force: nay, no one, he says, comes unless willing: but lest from the word "lead" an occasion be given to suspect that we will first, it was said "draw." Not that he compels the unwilling, because it is impossible, he says, that anyone believe unwillingly: but because he makes the unwilling willing. Whence, as we noted in book 1, ch. 15, Luther¹⁸ most falsely and most shamefully, in article 36, cites Augustine in the same book, that God converts the unwilling and reluctant. Therefore our assent, cooperation, and so our disposition for our justification is necessary. For which cause the Apostle to the Philippians¹⁹ says: Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for his good will. As if he had said: Although it is God who moves your will, nevertheless you ought with trembling to cooperate through free will. This Augustine wisely noted in ch. 9 of On Grace and Free Will.

But if the motion of our will to penance, as we showed in the first argument, is a necessary preparation for grace: it follows that all things which move us to this most wholesome affection are also in some way preparations, although not so proximate and necessary. As the terrors of hell and of the judgment of God: nay, the fear of disgrace among men, and of the other punishments which are decreed by law for the guilty and criminal. The testimonies of this are more common in both pages of sacred Scripture than that there is need for us to be troublesome here with such prolixity. For it is recorded in very many histories of the Old Testament that God often restrained that hard and fickle people by the fears, threats and other scourges of enemies, and recalled them to life. Whence David says: When he slew them,²⁰ then they sought him, and returned: or as another reading has it, they feared. And again: They cried to the Lord when they were in tribulation. But the same craftsman of medicinal penance says: The sorrows of death surrounded²¹ me, and the torrents of iniquity troubled me. The sorrows of hell surrounded me: the snares of death prevented me: in my tribulation I called upon the Lord. But it is superfluous to beg for these things, since the Gospel is open. For its preaching began with penance and with the striking of the fear of hell. For so John: Brood²² of vipers, who will show you to flee from the wrath to come? And Christ our redeemer himself bids us fear him who can cast body and soul into hell, and even the most dreadful signs of that last day. These things are common.²³ But let us weigh how our Protestants strive to mock all these things. They indeed confess in the Augustan Confession, and everywhere, that evangelical preaching convicts sins, so that terrified hearts may flee to faith. But Melanchthon²⁴ adds in his Apology that before we overcome those terrors through faith, they are themselves sins. And Bucer²⁵ in that book in which he came forth as composer of the controversies says that whatever works of preparation, even contrition itself, before faith is present (and he means before grace is present), are sins. In the same rut the heretic always persists with his accomplices, that he who is in sin, and therefore a son of the wrath of God, can do nothing except what is also worthy of the wrath of God. But I wish to bring these men to this point. If Christ brought those terrors of hell, which our sins threaten us with, to this end, that through them we might be recalled to his faith and grace, how are they sins even before one arrives at grace?²⁶ Did God not know how to move us from our iniquities by another compendium than by throwing us into new crimes? Suppose it does not at once obtain its effect: is it therefore to be judged a sin? If a man of crude breast, hearing the words of God in a sermon, cannot yet be sufficiently softened, is it therefore a sin for him to have heard the word of God? Have you never considered that if those terrors are sins, it will also be a sin to strike men with them? And so (not to utter such blasphemy against Christ who strikes them) at least John, when he terrifies the brood of vipers with the wrath to come, and Peter and Paul and the rest of the apostles, when they preached penance to sinners, involved themselves in fault and crime, stirring the people to evil? Surely this new theology, which taught you these fictions, is deservedly to be judged. For there is no inference, if you know dialectic, that if a man is a son of wrath, whatever works he does are worthy of wrath.²⁷ For on this point I believe we have sufficiently driven you off in ch. 19 of the previous book: and we shall answer you again on the same matter in book 3, ch. 4. Surely punishments would have been established in vain, whether eternal from God or temporal from men: the admonitions and counsels of the young, and finally all remedies for restraining the wicked: nay, such institutions would be pernicious if the fear of them were sins before men arrive at grace. Truly God, most clement and most benign toward us, as is often said by Chrysostom and the other Fathers, did not will the punishments of hell principally for this, that he might torture lost men (although this too is his justice), but certainly that by the fear of hell he might keep from sins those whom he would mercifully reward. Nay, civil punishments too were decreed with a similar intention. But from that prodigal son²⁸ of the Gospel a manifest argument is taken against these men, since after he had squandered his father's goods, compelled by want, and by the foulness and shame of feeding swine, he thought of returning. Unless perhaps they wish to defend that that confusion and horror which he conceived, and the affliction of beggary, before his father received him into grace, were all sins. Therefore although the fear of hell, and other things of that kind into which our sins cast us, are not, in the absence of grace, absolute virtues: nevertheless it does not immediately follow that they are sins, but they are useful goods. This is conspicuous in the example of Augustine, tractate 9 on the epistle of John, concerning the bristle introducing the thread.²⁹ For the bristle is more fragile and weak than that it could sew leather, yet it does not follow that if it does not have the strength and firmness of thread, it is therefore bad: for it is useful in introducing the thread, which, when the bristle is excluded, holds the leather. So altogether, although the fear which precedes charity does not sufficiently glue and join us to God, nevertheless it is useful for introducing that which, when fear is cast out, accomplishes it. Wherefore, as the beginning of wisdom, the fear of the Lord is good.³⁰ Besides, it is wonderful that to mourn the deaths of dear ones and other calamities is not a sin even for those who are in sin: and yet to bewail the miseries into which our own crimes have brought us is imputed to us as sin and hypocrisy. Further, the pains of a woman in labor, however much they torment her, are not reckoned evil, when they open the way by giving birth. Whence Isaiah according to the Hebrew truth: As she who has conceived, when she has drawn near to birth, cries out in her pains: so have we been made before thy face, O Lord.³¹ We have conceived, and as it were been in labor: and we have brought forth the spirit. Where Jerome says: As a woman approaching birth is compelled by pain to cry out, so we in anguish seek thee, and from the face of thy strength we have conceived and been in labor and brought forth, not children of the flesh, but of the spirit.³² Nor was it by any other nod that God once announced that terrible judgment to the Ninevites through the prophet, except that he might dispose them for grace by terror.³³ Wherefore it would be blasphemy to say that that terror was a sin for them. Nay, as we said in book 1, ch. 18, he took care to soften both Nebuchadnezzar and Pharaoh by the same plagues, except that the one heard and learned, while the other saw and refused. All things are full of testimonies of this kind, most common, of our preparation. And all those things which I have most widely devised in the last eight chapters can be brought to this place. Concerning this, therefore, enough. For below there remains to be treated by us what this preparation is, and how many are the acts of which it consists.