De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Domingo de Soto

De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)

De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

First published 1550

Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.


Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I

Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent

Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace

Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature

Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform

Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice

Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works

Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed

Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded

Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin

Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin

Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed

Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good

Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil

Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries

Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin

Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally

Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered

Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments

Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered

It remains in this last chapter to answer certain theologians who think otherwise, and finally to satisfy the Lutherans. There was Scotus, and those who follow his authority, from whom the Lutherans took scandal, so as to accuse the whole body of theologians of the Pelagian heresy. For he, in Book 2, distinction 28, while speaking of the commandment which is, You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, says: that whenever the will carries out the act of this commandment, even if it is unformed, it disposes itself by congruity toward sanctifying grace: and when that grace is offered, either it resists and sins, or it consents and is justified. He therefore seems to assert three or four things. First, that man can have love of God, even the love that fulfills that commandment (to use his word), from purely natural powers: since the question there is whether man can, by the natural faculty of free will, avoid every sin. Second, that such love is a sufficient disposition for grace, inasmuch as grace follows it, unless man resists. And therefore that it is a merit of congruity. And thus, on account of his authority, the school of the nominalists holds almost the same. And Adrian, in his Quodlibet 7, q. 4. And finally he seems to answer the question in the affirmative, that man can naturally avoid every sin. And Durandus holds the same, in the same distinction, at least concerning sins that are against the Decalogue and against the whole law of nature: for concerning the commandments of the sacraments he judges otherwise. But first of all, as we would expostulate with the Lutherans, even if some part of the scholastics should fall under suspicion among them of the Pelagian crime, why do they impute it to the whole commonwealth of Catholics? They had St. Thomas and very many others who think otherwise, as has been shown. And besides, Scotus did not assert that the love of God above all things is natural to fallen man, except when speaking of that simple act which we said above is not love simply speaking. For in the third book, distinction 27, where he undertakes the disputation whether infused charity is necessary for loving God above all things, he answers with a qualification, certainly like St. Thomas, namely that man in the state of instituted nature could love God above all things from purely natural powers. And although the opinion of Scotus is not approved by all in this, that that act of love from the faculty of nature is a disposition and merit of congruity for grace, nevertheless he does not thereby fall into the Pelagians, as his own followers interpret. Since in the merit of congruity they acknowledge nothing of debt or justice, as Pelagius said. Although concerning this jingling of words we shall treat more closely a little later in Book 2.

Meanwhile it remains to answer the two arguments which seem properly to stand against us. The first is: If we can fulfill the commandments, as regards the substance of the act, through the natural power of free will, and that mode of supernatural charity is not necessary in all, then it follows that through that same natural power we can merit the friendship of God and the eternal inheritance: which is Pelagian. For in order to merit rewards of this kind, it is enough to fulfill the commandments: according to that word, You are my friends if you do what I have commanded you. And according to that word, If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. But if someone should answer that Christ our redeemer understood obedience to the commandments as that which is from grace and charity, such an answer would surely seem to beg the question: for it would then be the same to say, You will be my beloved and my friends, if you remain in my charity and friendship. Add that, since the grace of God is an acceptance unto glory, it would be the same to say, If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments, as if it were said, If you wish to enter into life, be accepted unto life through grace. And yet Christ intended to make the consequence from the observance of the commandments to grace and glory, as though observance were the means of keeping grace and the way of coming to glory. And therefore whoever concedes that the commandments can be kept by natural powers seems to strike against the rock of the Pelagians. To this it is answered that whoever would concede that all the commandments can be fulfilled, as regards the substance of the act, by natural faculty, could hardly extricate himself from this passage, unless there were some begging of the question. Although that sense would not be entirely a begging of the question, If you do my commandments for love of me, you will be my friends, and you will have eternal life. Nevertheless we answer more easily that neither as regards the substance of the act can we naturally fulfill all things without special help, nor can we fulfill the commandment of love as regards the mode which is necessary. Wherefore it is true that whoever has kept the commandments already relies on divine help and grace. And therefore it by no means follows that anyone can attain grace or glory from natural powers. But there still remains the argument made above from Marsilius, namely that among the commandments there ought to be one, that he who is in sin should dispose himself perfectly for grace: otherwise, by fulfilling the commandments, he would always be journeying outside the grace of God. Here first it is confessed by Christians that it is necessary for one acting in sin to permit himself to God, so that by his favor he may be disposed for grace and reconciled: otherwise it would be superfluous to keep the rest. Necessary, I say, by necessity of end, without which he will be damned for his past fault. But whether it is a singular commandment, so that it is a new fault not to have so great a disposition as suffices for grace, we dispute nothing here: but nevertheless it is not proved by the foregoing argument.

For the genuine sense of that word, If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments, is that he who has never broken any of them in his life will enter into life. For to him who from infancy has done no evil, as that young man in the gospel said of himself, God would not be lacking even under the natural law, so as not to draw him to himself. But he who has transgressed some one thing, even though he has kept all the others, will be deprived of eternal life on account of that past deed, unless he has changed his mind.

Furthermore, against the same assertion, namely that it is not necessary to fulfill all the commandments from charity, at least in order to avoid new fault, that passage is opposed, Do all things for the glory of God. But this saying can be either a commandment or a counsel. And to do something for the glory of God can have not one but two understandings. The first is that the work truly please God and be accepted unto eternal life: the other that the work be good and honorable in its kind, so that those who see it may give glory to God: according to that word, So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven. If glory be taken in the first way in the sense that it is a commandment, then it must be said that, since it is affirmative, it does not oblige (as they say) for always: but for the time when the commandment of love obliges. And this is the exposition of St. Thomas in the cited place, 1. 2. q. 100. art. 10. It can however be taken in the sense that it is a counsel: and this seems closer to the letter: namely, whether you eat or drink, etc., refer all things in act to God. Thirdly, finally, what is perhaps closer to the truth, glory can be taken in the second way, so that the sense is: let your works not be such as cannot be referred to God (such as sins are), and the works which you have done that are honorable in their kind, do not refer to your own vain glory, but such as they are in their kind, so do them that they may redound to the glory of God. To whom alone be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen.

The end of the first book.

Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What faith without works confers

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On the cause of the effect of faith without works

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — On the causes of justification

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the justification of an infant before the use of reason

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the justification of adults in general

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — On the justification of an adult from original sin alone

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the justification of adults from actual sins

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the difference between attrition and contrition

Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — On the difference between baptism and the sacrament of penance

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — Whether another act of charity than contrition suffices

Capitulum XVII: Chapter 17. — On the formal causes: how grace and the virtues are distinguished

Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 18. — On the same formal causes: how they justify

Capitulum XIX: Chapter 19. — On the formal causes of justification against the Lutherans

Capitulum XX: Chapter 20. — On the justice of Christ imputed to us

Capitulum XXI: Chapter 21. — On the interpretation of divine Scripture, in which places faith alone seems to be declared the cause of justification

Liber III: On Nature and Grace, Book III

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the obligation of the just to observe the law

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the exposition of the law

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the fulfilment of the law in general

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On the fulfilment of the law in particular

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — For answering the adversaries

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — On satisfaction

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — On the merit of works that proceed from grace

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On merit against the Lutherans

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Whereby the adversaries' arguments are answered

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the certainty of faith against the Lutherans

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — Whereby the same certainty of grace is disputed with certain Catholics

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — Whereby the same truth is corroborated by the testimonies of Scripture and the saints

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — Whereby the objections of the opposing party are answered

Apologia I: Apology against the Reverend Bishop Catharinus

Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — Whereby the state of the case and the controversy is established

Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — Whereby the true opinion is confirmed

Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — Whereby the first treatise of the Reverend Catharinus is answered

Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — Whereby the second treatise is answered

Decretum I: Decree on Original Sin

Canones I: Canons on Original Sin

Decretum II: Decree on Justification

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the weakness of nature and of the law for justifying men

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the dispensation and mystery of the coming of Christ

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — Those who are justified through Christ

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — The description of the justification of the impious and of its movement in the state of grace is set out

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — On the necessity of preparation for justification in adults, and whence it comes

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — The manner of preparation

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What the justification of the impious is, and what its causes are

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — How it is understood that the impious is justified by faith and gratis

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Against the empty confidence of the heretics

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the received increase of justification

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the observance of God's commandments, and its necessity and possibility

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — That the rash presumption of predestination is to be avoided

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the gift of perseverance

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the lapsed and their restoration

Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — That grace is lost by any mortal sin, but not faith

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — On eternal life, or good works, and the nature of their merit

Canones I: Canons on Justification

Appendix I: Thirty-Five Lutheran Errors Condemned in This Work

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