De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Instructed by these things that have been explained, we can easily dispatch the three remaining questions which I brought forward in ch. 20: namely whether man can from pure nature love God above all things, keep his commandments, and finally avoid all sins perseveringly. For this is what the Lutherans everywhere scourge us for,¹ and as it were expose us as Pelagians: they have always threatened us with this disgrace, that we persist in asserting that man has from nature freedom together with the power to love God above all things and to keep the commandments without his special favor and help. For this reason, they say, we institute monasteries, and invent other human laws and Pharisaic ceremonies, relying on them as if on our own merits, we trust to be reconciled into friendship with God and to obtain eternal happiness. This has never occurred to anyone among us, but all theologians everywhere fight most openly against Pelagius. This calumny we will again and again purge in book 3, ch. on the merit of congruity, and book 3, ch. on the fulfillment of the law through the help of grace. Therefore, to return to what was proposed, I will begin from the fulfillment of the commandments,² concerning which in ch. 6 we made a division solemn among theologians, and indeed necessary. Further, the commandments are fulfilled in one way only as to the substance of the works. But in this way we there established that man in the state of innocence was able by his nature, as being clothed with original justice, without other special help, to fulfill all the commandments, because of the health and strength of nature at that time.

And so let this be the first proposition concerning fallen man.³ A man existing in sin, whether before receiving faith, or with dead faith, can by his natural endowments, that is, by the general help of God alone, sometimes fulfill the commandments, namely of natural, divine, or human law, as to the substance of the act. Which is to say, so that that work is not a merit of friendship with God, nor therefore simply good, but yet in no way sin: but a morally good work, by which a new sin is avoided. The proposition is not only St Thomas's 1-2 q. 109 art. 4, but also Scotus's and all theologians' without exception, 2 Sent. d. 28. Although Gregory, for a work to be morally good, requires his special help. But in another way the commandments are fulfilled,⁴ namely not only as to the substance of the work, but as to the manner and end of the one commanding: namely that this be done from charity, as a merit of eternal life. And concerning this we have already said there that neither would Adam in the state of innocence suffice to fulfill the least commandment without the grace of God making him pleasing: so far is it from us being able to do the same. Concerning this second member of the conclusion, therefore, there is no need for us to dispute: indeed concerning it there is unanimous consent with us among the Lutherans. But it is the first member from which they recoil from us, saying that no sin can be avoided by man without the special grace of God. Which although we have partly demonstrated in the two preceding chapters, must now again be corroborated.

In the commandments a distinction must be made between the substance of the commandment and its end.⁵ God has commanded us (for example) those things by which the law of nature bound us, namely to worship one God, to honor dear parents, not to kill, and the rest: and indeed these things so that through them we might keep the charity of God, which, according to Paul, is the end of the commandment.⁶ But under the commandments of the other virtues (whatever may be the case with the singular commandment of charity) the end is not included, but only their substance: as the theologians agree with St Thomas, q. 100 in p. 2.⁷ Further, to help parents, when and where it is fitting, to abstain from thefts, killings, and the remaining outrages. Since therefore the works of any law (as we said in ch. 6) proceed from reason, and man is of a rational nature, it follows that he can naturally perform works of this kind, insofar as they fall under a commandment. Namely to the extent that he is not guilty of violating the law, but frees himself from that new guilt.

But take more explicitly⁸ the force of the argument, in the part where it fights against those who say that all obedience of the law outside grace is sin. If we are obliged to do any one commandment in grace and charity (which charity nevertheless we cannot attain by human effort), that obligation would arise either from the precepts themselves, which are diverse in their proper matters, or from the singular commandment of charity: not from the others: since by them we are only commanded to honor parents, to help the miserable, not to commit theft, not homicide, not adultery: whose nearest and intrinsic end is that to each his right be given, and that we be a help and support to others. Nor indeed are we bound to this by the peculiar commandment of charity. For that, since it is affirmative, does not oblige at every time, and therefore it is not necessary that at the same moment of time it concur with any other: but it is only the external and supreme end of all the others: and therefore it is necessary to this extent, that the observance of the others be pleasing to God and accepted by him as a merit of eternal life. Otherwise if whenever the necessity of another precept occurred, the obligation of charity would immediately concur, whoever sinned against another would also sin against this: so that as often as someone (for example) did not honor his parents, or committed theft, he would be guilty of two commandments: which would be asserted beyond the truth. And this doctrine, most received by all Catholics, is further confirmed from the dogmas of the Lutherans themselves:⁹ who in their colloquies and apologies (as we said in ch. 19) grant us that the free will of fallen man suffices for those works and natural offices which we listed there: for example to cultivate fields, feed a family, do good to friends, and similar things. But these are precepts and counsels of natural law. Why therefore can we not by the same powers of nature also sometimes fulfill the precepts of the Decalogue? At least to this extent, that we preserve ourselves unharmed from new guilt. But they answer in the Augsburg Apology that although those external civil works of the second table can be done by us in some part without Christ and without the Holy Spirit, not however those which are properly of divine law: for example to love God inwardly from the heart, which pertains to the first table. And so they accuse and insult us, because we look only at political and external precepts, which pertain to the second table, in which they say the justice of the philosophers consisted, but not the internal, which pertains to the first: in which properly the divine law consists. But of this division of works they can rightly boast themselves the authors. For it was always deservedly unknown before them.¹⁰ For the first and second tables are not distinguished by internal and external works, but by part of the object, because the first table contains those offices which are owed to God in himself, both external and internal. But the second, those which are owed to the neighbor likewise both in affection and in effect. For he who is commanded to honor parents, to assist the needy, not to steal, and the rest, is at the same time commanded to have such a will as the work itself that is commanded. For we are commanded not only to abstain from another's bed and another's goods, but not to covet the wife or property of the neighbor. Nor is he alone impious who does not defer external honor to parents, but he who hates them inwardly. And conversely, in the first table we are not only commanded to love God in mind above all things. Indeed this is not a precept contained within the Decalogue, but a preamble to the whole Decalogue, as it were a genus distributed and explained through the particular precepts of the Decalogue.

But the first¹¹ precept of the first table is to worship one God. By which we are commanded to have no other for God besides the true one, and to have divine honors for him alone: not only inwardly in the mind, but outwardly in deed. And in its own way the same must be judged of the rest. Nor indeed do we acknowledge only the justice of natural philosophers and of external works, but the true divine justice and of the whole Decalogue. But this only we teach, that we can fulfill such precepts, both inwardly in affection and outwardly in effect, as to the substance of the works sometimes naturally, in the manner already explained. Yet as to the manner and intention of the one commanding, so that our obedience be acceptable to God unto eternal life, in no way, unless first truly freed from sin through the gratuitous benefit of Christ. For so all our theologians hold, although some, with many others crying out against them (as will presently appear in book 2), bring forward some words about the love of God above all things, and the merit of congruity: which need a sound exposition. How easily the adversaries themselves would see this, unless they had already begun to regard us as Pelagians. Indeed I would add finally at the close of this conclusion that one who fulfilled the commandments out of fear of hell, or of infamy, or of any temporal punishment, would not sin, nor be a transgressor of the commandment: since those circumstances are good and lawful in their kind. For to fear evil is nothing else than [to fear] good. Nor do I listen to certain theologians who assert that obedience to the law out of fear of punishment is sin. For if they understood that when someone is so affected that he says in his mind, Unless fear of punishment stood in the way, I would do nothing for God's sake, I would confess that that affection is sin. But when fear of punishment keeps someone who does not thus despise God from transgressing the law, there is no guilt in it. Although that obedience is more imperfect.

Therefore, to return to the diversity: the second proposition of this chapter is that neither as to the substance of works can we, in this nature wounded by sin, always fulfill all the commandments.¹² Concerning this conclusion, as also the preceding, there is some disagreement among theologians. For Gregory, as he holds that no moral good is possible to fallen man without the special help of God, so he is immediately forced to deny that any commandment can be kept in any way without that same help. For the work of a commandment, even if done outside charity, is morally good. And therefore he reckons false the conclusion just asserted by us; yet his opinion has already been more than sufficiently refuted. But Scotus and Durandus, d. 18 book 2, incline to the other extreme contrary to Gregory: indeed they thought that fallen man could, as to the substance of works, do all the commandments, although not with such promptness and facility as a man of integral nature: since by whatever reason he can do one, he can do another, and thus all. Although Durandus excepts the precepts of faith and of the sacraments, which (as he says) have grace as their companion. Concerning these we will speak immediately in the following chapter. But St Thomas¹³ takes the middle position, saying that although in the state of integral nature man could from his natural endowments keep all, nevertheless nature now wounded is by no means able. But he is like a man sick from weakness, or half-blind, who can walk a few steps straight, but cannot go further. We do not indeed deny that man can fulfill any kind of precept as to substance, but he cannot fulfill all:¹⁴ that is, he cannot long endure without falling, unless God brings special help. And truly experience abundantly proves it. For with our eyes we see men alienated from the grace of God frequently falling, and not strong against temptations. Whence it does not follow: if man can withstand one or another incursion of sensuality, that he can withstand many. Or if he can [do] some offices, that he can [do] all. As is found in the example of the sick man. And concerning venial sins, even in one who is in grace, all deny the consequence. Hence Augustine, in the book On Heresies, says that it pertains to the heresy of the Pelagians to believe that man can without grace do all the divine commandments. All, he says, not some. And to the same pertains the fifth canon of the Council of Milevis,¹⁵ by which anathema is pronounced on whoever says that the grace of justification is given to us for this reason, that what we are commanded to do by free will we may be able to fulfill more easily through grace, as if, even if grace were not given, we could still, not indeed easily, but nevertheless without it, fulfill the divine commandments. But where "commandments" is said, "all" is understood. Wherefore it was condemned against Pelagius not only that we can fulfill the commandments meritoriously, but also that we can fulfill all as to substance, as we said in the preceding chapter when answering Gregory. For indeed, as we set out in ch. 13, we received both wounds from the fault of Adam: namely in supernatural things, that we cannot merit grace and glory by our own powers, and in natural things, that we cannot perform all the offices of reason as Adam could: whence Augustine, On the Manners of the Church book 2 ch. 5: To act justly, he says, or to fulfill the precept of justice in every part, we cannot unless we are helped by God. And thus is to be understood Paul's passage, The Gentiles who have no law do naturally the things that are of the law. Namely, not that they can do all, but some. And this indeed through morally good works: for nothing can be done meritoriously without the help of God. And thus are to be understood canons 9 and 20 of the Council of Orange,¹⁶ where it is decreed that man does no good things which God does not grant him to do. Namely that he grants moral good things through general help, but meritorious things through special help. Namely that we may be able to do all things as is fitting: as is had in can. 6.

But concerning the love of God,¹⁷ which is the other member of the inquiry of this chapter, the doubt is more involved and more perplexed. Namely whether this distinction of works, as to substance and as to manner, also has a place in the love of God above all things. Which is to say, whether man can, in a human way, with only the general help of God, have a love of God above all things, at least as to the substance of the act: and thus by it fulfill the commandment of love so as to free himself from new guilt, yet not suffice to obtain divine grace. For at first sight a contradiction appears: that there be a love of God above all things without sanctifying grace: since neither is love anything else than charity, nor can charity exist otherwise than with grace. And since this is the place, as we were saying a little before, where the Lutherans, having taken occasion from certain words of Scotus, make us out to be manifest Pelagians, no one will reproach me if I discuss this matter somewhat more broadly than usual in the scholastic manner. For among Catholics, even those who have written so far, the clarity of this involved place is always desiderated. First of all, to open the point and nerve of this inquiry, theologians use this word, love of God above all things, in two or three ways.¹⁸ In one way for a singular act of love toward God, such as is expressed in this prayer: I will to please God in all things and through all things. And this they call imperfect and objective love, and thus natural: because it can exist with mortal sin. Another is perfect and executive, and efficacious of the commandments of God. Which indeed does not mean only a singular act, but the universal observance of the commandments. Which is therefore supernatural, arising from grace. This distinction could perhaps be founded on that of John:¹⁹ He who says that he knows God and does not keep his commandments is a liar. But he who keeps his word, in him the love of God is truly perfect. As if there were another imperfect love: namely the sole act of the will by which someone says, I will to please God in all things: which act nevertheless is not efficacious. And, Not everyone, says Christ,²⁰ who says to me, Lord, Lord, will enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father. As if to say, There are those who say in affection, Lord, Lord, and in effect do not obey the will of the Lord. And that the first act can be had naturally is a common argument. Someone can have such an act toward a parent, toward a son, toward any friend at all: what therefore prevents him from being able to have the same toward God? Especially since, as we were saying in ch. 4 and ch. 20, man can naturally know that God is the end of all things. Indeed as we said above in ch. 6, the natural inclination of man is to love God above himself. By this argument²¹ some conclude that God can be loved by us above all things naturally. Which is truly abhorrent to Christian ears, and gathered beyond reason. For granted that that act can be had naturally by one even who is in mortal sin, it is by no means to be called the love of God above all things. Indeed the love of God above all things, as the very word at first sound presents to the ears, is that by which one so loves God that he prefers him to all things, and refers himself and all his things to him: at least admits nothing contrary to divine friendship: according to the Gospel word,²² With the whole heart, with the whole mind. Contrary, I say: because venial sins do not stand in the way of the love of God above all things.

But I confess that this love is twofold:²³ namely one natural, and the other supernatural. Wherefore most learnedly and most thoughtfully St Thomas, 1-2 q. 109 art. 3, asking whether man can naturally love God above all things without the help of grace, answers affirmatively concerning man in the state of integral nature, and simply denies it concerning fallen man. And the reason is that man in the state of innocence, considered by reason of his nature established with original justice, even without sanctifying grace and other special help, since he had no cause of sinning, could perseveringly fulfill all the commandments as to substance through morally good works, and by like reason in one act truly refer himself and all his things to God, as to the end of natural good. But fallen man is not so, because he cannot naturally, not even as to the substance of works, keep all the commandments, wherefore neither can he in one act of mind truly refer all things to him: since without special help he cannot fail to fall into guilt, which is against divine friendship. And for that reason that act of loving God mentioned above is not to be reckoned the love of God above all things. Yet in a third way love is taken²⁴ for true friendship with God, so pleasing to God that it is the merit of eternal life: namely that by which God is loved not only as the natural end of things, but as the supernatural end, beatifying intellectual and rational persons. And this not only in the state of fallen nature, but not even in that of integral nature could exist without the help of grace. Wherefore in the same art. 3, in the solution to the first, St Thomas²⁵ distinguishes two loves of God above all things in Adam, namely natural and supernatural: the one by which all things are referred to God insofar as he is the end of natural good: the other by which he is loved as the object of beatitude. By these things the doctrine of the same doctor is most openly understood, 1-2 question 100 art. 10. Where, disputing whether the manner of charity falls under a precept, he denies it of the others: but affirms it of the precept of charity itself. For he says, as we said above, that we are not bound, as often as the matter and time of other precepts occurs, to do them from charity: since charity is the extrinsic end of the others: that is, outside their substance. But whenever the singular precept of the love of God occurs, we are bound to refer all things to him, since it is within its substance to love with the whole heart. Whence he concludes that we can fulfill the others naturally, in the manner explained in the first conclusion: but this one by no means, except by special help: which nevertheless God is most ready to bring to us if we consent. With these things premised, the conclusion is²⁶ the third of this chapter. Fallen man cannot love God above all things from pure nature. Which is thus demonstrated. To love God above all things is to refer all things to him: for example to do all his commandments, so that no contrary guilt be admitted: according to that, He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me.²⁷ And, If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him. But fallen man cannot do these things by natural power alone: both because of the weakness of nature, and because of the many dangers which were cast upon us by the transgression of the first-formed man: therefore neither can he love God above all things.

Hence Augustine, in the letter to Vitalis: We have lost free will for loving God by the greatness of sin. And in On Grace and Free Will ch. 18, where he treats this place expressly, he altogether condemns as Pelagian the view that the love of God is not his own gift: in these words. Whence is the love of God and neighbor in men, except from God himself? For if it is not from God but from men, the Pelagians have won: but if it is from God, we have won over the Pelagians. And he adds the words of John:²⁸ Beloved, let us love one another, because charity is from God. The first, he says (namely, let us love one another), is the law: but what is added, Love is from God, is grace. So Augustine. As if to say, To love God and neighbor is the same as to fulfill the law: and therefore he who commands gives that we may be able to fulfill, and thus to love. And in On Rebuke and Grace, as was cited above in ch. 20: Without grace, he says, men do no good at all. Not only that, with it showing what is to be done, they may know it, but also that, with it giving, they may do with love what they know. And in the Council of Milevis can. 4,²⁹ anathema is struck on one who denies that through the grace of Christ not only is understanding of the commandments opened in us, but it is also granted that we love and are able to do what we have known is to be done. And in the Council of Orange can. 25: It is wholly a gift of God to love God. In short,³⁰ everywhere love and faith are asserted by equal reason to be gifts of God: because as we cannot certainly and firmly believe all supernatural things without the divine will, so neither can we do all: whence the reason for love is established. Sacred Scripture agrees. For as Paul everywhere repeats that faith is not from us, but a gift of God,³¹ so, he says, the love of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.

But here there is a principal doubt.³² Whether there is a particular precept of the love of God. And then what is it that we are commanded by it? Moreover, when its necessity occurs. For someone may perhaps think that it is not a singular precept, but a kind of genus contained by virtue in all the precepts of the Decalogue, and explained in particular. So that to love God above all things is nothing else than to keep his commandments, as we seem to have said so far: according to the Gospel words, If anyone loves me, he will keep my word. And Paul, after he has recounted the catalogue one by one, concludes,³³ Love therefore is the fulfillment of the law. Especially since the other subject, the commandment of loving the neighbor, does not seem to have a singular matter beyond that which is distributed through the precepts of the second table. And therefore neither does it appear what it is to love God other than to worship him, not to swear vainly by him, to sanctify his sabbaths: which are written in the first table. Nevertheless, none of these things standing in the way, no one must doubt that there is a peculiar precept of the love of God. Since it was issued under the form and tenor of law, You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart,³⁴ and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind, and with your whole strength. Where not only love is commanded, but also the manner of love. And the reason and cause why a proper precept of love had to be established is that, as Paul says, the end of the commandment is charity.³⁵ And Christ: On these two commandments the whole law depends, and the prophets.³⁶ Namely because the whole law is placed in this, that charity between us and God, and therefore between us and one another, be established. But it is not enough that precepts be given about the means by which one comes to the end, unless the precept of the end itself be first established, as the scope to which the rest are to be intended and referred. And concerning this there is no disagreement among theologians, but concerning its matter and time. For there are those who think that by this precept only the internal act of love is commanded, by which we refer ourselves and our actions to God. And therefore since it is affirmative, not obliging for all time, Scotus³⁷ determines, book 3 d. 27, the times of fulfilling this precept to be feast days: for on those days, he says, we are bound to recollect ourselves, ascending in mind to God. Yet it is not similar, he says, concerning the precept of loving the neighbor. Here however there is no place to dispute whether by that third commandment of the first table, You shall sanctify the sabbath, we are bound to have this kind of act of love: but there are very many who cannot be persuaded of this, because by that precept only rest from every servile work is enjoined in the literal sense. And although the end of the Church obliging us to be present at sacred things was that, meditating on heavenly things in mind, we might give praise to the immortal God, both because of his infinite divinity and because of his beneficence toward us give thanks, nevertheless the end of the precept, as we said a little before, does not fall under the precept. Just as although the Church intends by the Lenten observance to weaken us in the flesh, so that the mind may be more free for spiritual things, nevertheless that end is not in the precept, but only abstinence from foods. Marsilius,³⁸ a man indeed singularly learned among theologians, book 2 q. 18, holds that by this law of love men are obliged to preserve grace and friendship with God, and to recover it when lost. Both because this itself seems to be the notion of this word, love, and especially because otherwise one who is in mortal sin, while keeping all the divine commandments, would remain always in sin: contrary to the saying of the Gospel,³⁹ If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. But he persuades himself of the inference from this, that, as he believes, anyone in sin can keep all the commandments of the Decalogue as to the substance of works, by avoiding new sins. If therefore there remains no singular precept for him of recovering grace, it would follow that by keeping all the commandments he would be forever exiled from the kingdom of heaven. Yet this opinion is not of such great probability⁴⁰ as perhaps appears to the common sort: since the precepts of the law are not about habits, and less about those things which are given to us by God, and much less about grace. For we are not commanded to pay debts from the habit of justice or liberality, but only to pay what is just, although the habit is engendered by custom. Much less is there a precept for us properly of acquiring or retaining grace, which is a gift of God, but only of doing those things which the precepts themselves explain. Yet that obedience is followed by an increase of grace, through which we are accepted unto glory: according to that: If you know these things, you will be blessed if you do them. And likewise⁴¹ it must be judged of the precept of love, namely that some action is commanded us there.

We do not indeed deny that we are bound to live⁴² in the grace of God: but that is not by a proper precept, but by consequence. We are bound, I say, to preserve ourselves in divine friendship, by not stealing, not committing adultery, and thus by passing over no other precept. For if a peculiar law of persevering in grace had been established, the argument we made a little before would return: namely that as often as someone by sinning against any of the other commandments fell from grace, he would commit not one but two sins. And (which carries greater incredibility) as long as someone persisted in one sin, he would continually accumulate new ones, from the fact that he did not repent.

Let us say therefore that the observance of this precept of love is placed⁴³ not only in an act of the inmost will, but sometimes also in other offices that are due. Nor indeed once in life, which some think is enough, but it can and usually does occur many times, where it is due. For the law would be almost superfluous, and especially the law of the love of God, which through the whole of life would have only one legitimate moment of time: and that not certain. But if you ask what these contingent times of this precept are?⁴⁴ First, I surely do not doubt that at some time man is bound by the obligation of this law to dedicate himself to God in mind, and to refer his own plans of living to him, at least in general, by proposing to act well. There is no reason why I should contend more stubbornly that this is necessary as soon as one comes to the use of reason, namely when he already has knowledge of God and discernment of good and evil: as St Thomas is the author. Although this (except that time does not allow explaining it) is not without probability: but I affirm only this, that at least at some time around the beginning of life, by the precept of love derived from the law of nature, man is bound to do it. For what most say, that the time of this precept is especially that which is the moment of death, is to me entirely improbable, from the fact that since the precept of love is a precept of friendship to be conciliated and preserved with God through the whole of life, it seems ridiculous that it should not oblige until the end: when already no time remains for meriting well of God. Therefore as a prince demands an oath from a soldier, and the faith of friendship: even, if need be, of facing death: and whoever receives someone into his household first requires that he promise him his faith, love, and diligence: so God has altogether bound us by this precept of love. And this is the ceremony of baptism: where we give our names for the service of Christ. But you say, then this precept is already fulfilled there. I do not indeed deny it, but first I say that this was also a precept of the natural law before baptism: and now I infer that after a Christian has grown to the use of reason, he ought at some time to have this act of love: which by its virtue he professed in baptism. Nor does the argument that is objected against this assertion have so much strength: namely that those who do so are rare: but most rare are those who have repented of this negligence and omission. For on the contrary I say that it is the custom of Christians continually to refer themselves and their obedience to God, and to confess the guilt of such omitted religion. Besides this case there also occur times⁴⁵ of this precept, when the necessity of martyrdom is offered, either among unbelievers or against heretics: where faith and religion are in peril. Nor then only, but as often as someone hears a blasphemous man speaking against God, he is bound not only by the precept of correcting the neighbor, but certainly by the love of God,⁴⁶ to answer for God, and for his honor and glorious name. For this is the true law of friendship. Indeed also the precept of loving the neighbor, of which we made mention above, besides those things which are guarded in the Decalogue, brings with it other obligations. For when we see the life, honor, or substance of a neighbor to be in great danger, from which we could rescue him without great loss to ourselves, we are surely bound to it by virtue of this precept. Indeed we are sometimes constrained to expose even life itself, at least for the commonwealth: which nature itself has taught the philosophers.

Therefore let us descend to the proposed question to be unravelled concerning the love of God.⁴⁷ Namely whether this precept also can be fulfilled like the others, as to the substance of the act, outside the grace of God. To which there is not a simple but a threefold answer. First. The precept of love can sometimes be partly fulfilled as to substance. For example, when the necessity occurs of doing some particular external work: as to answer for God, and defend his honor, which properly pertains to the precept of love: and if there is anything else similar. For then nothing else falls under such a precept. The second member of the answer is that one can have that singular act by which God is objectively (if I may speak in the scholastic tongue) loved, outside grace, indeed outside faith: as has been sufficiently demonstrated above. For someone can naturally have that affection of mind which is, I will to please God in all things and through all things: even while he does not do all that he ought, so long as he does not set an obstacle to divine grace and help: for example one who labors by his own fault in some error. For an unbeliever, a heretic, or a usurer can be so affected toward God, and nevertheless think that his law or sect is true, and his manner of life lawful. And this can be reckoned and called the fulfillment of love, as to substance. For which reason St Thomas says, 3 Sent. d. 27 q. 2, that no virtue is true virtue without grace: nor is charity itself. Where he signifies that the act of charity can exist as to substance without grace, and therefore without the manner of charity. Therefore the third proposition is. When the time of the precept of charity occurs, that is, of the act of internal love, it is not enough to avoid sin that it be fulfilled in this way as to substance, as in all the other precepts, but it must also be fulfilled as to manner. For in this this precept differs from the others, that the very manner of charity falls under the precept: namely, to love with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind: which is so to refer oneself and one's things to God that one has no contrary obstacle in the heart, by which one would less assent to and cooperate with the help of God. Yet do not understand that the precept of love is the same as the precept of fulfilling the whole law: for that is not one, but many: as, Worship one God, You shall not kill, etc. but it is the precept of that act which does not admit sin with itself: and therefore it has, as a circumstance, the observance of the other commandments. Wherefore as, with nature fallen, we cannot keep all the commandments without special help, so neither can we have that kind of act of lawfully referring all things to God: which nevertheless Adam could. Wherefore since he could have two loves of God above all things: namely the natural, by which he would have avoided all sins, and the supernatural, by which he would merit eternal glory, we can have only one, the supernatural. And this is the understanding of St Thomas, 1-2 q. 100 art. 10. Where he says that this precept cannot be fulfilled except by an act by which man by special help disposes himself for grace. Nor does it follow from this that God commands us something impossible, since he offers us most ready help. Nor again does it follow that the precept is about having grace, which we rejected above, but it is a precept about our office: which, divinely aided, grace follows.

From these things three corollaries are drawn that must by no means be passed over in silence.⁴⁸ First, that the other individual precepts can always be fulfilled outside grace: even where no grace follows: not indeed so that the obedience is acceptable to God, but so that man may free himself from new guilt: since the manner, namely from the whole heart, is not of the essence of the other precepts. And indeed concerning the precepts of the second table it has already been explained. But this is also asserted against Durandus⁴⁹ concerning the precepts of faith and of the sacraments. For someone can in this imperfect way fulfill the precept of baptism outside grace, as if he is baptized, thinking that he sets no obstacle, when nevertheless by his own fault he labors in some ignorance of some sin in which he is: not applying the diligence he ought to tracing out the truth. And if he so disposed approaches confession, I believe he will likewise be immune from new guilt of the omission of that precept: although because of the hidden obstacle, he is not fit to receive grace. I do not deny that a revelation of faith was necessary, either in the recipient, or in another who began to preach: but I say that someone can receive the sacrament without grace: when he is baptized or confesses with such an obstacle.

The second thing that is drawn from the above is⁵⁰ that there is absolutely no single singular act in a just man of which a similar one as to substance cannot exist in one who is outside the grace of God. Indeed since that most celebrated axiom is known through itself, that good is from an integral cause, but evil from the defect of any necessary circumstance, there is no act so heroic that, with the circumstance changed, it does not become evil. The very act, I say, of the love of God, to take from the highest judgment of lower things, if it is done when it ought not, will be sin. For example if when someone is bound to attend to another necessary office, as to help a poor man suffering extremities, to preach, or to administer any other public duty, he then prefers to remain quiet in the contemplation of God, and for that reason deserts his due office: certainly that act of love is sin, because it is a cause of sin. Wherefore there can be no act of love so perfect that it is essentially good in the individual, but every one can lack the company of the grace of God. But then it wins the name of love simply, when there is present no work that is contrary to divine friendship.

Finally, from these things we gather in turn⁵¹ that no one, apart from the special privilege of revelation, can be certain of his own state: for example whether he is in grace or not. For since the mercy of God requires from us works which, as we were just saying, can be similar in the justified man and in one who through some ignorance is outside the grace of God, there remains no ground for him to have such certainty as is that of science or Catholic faith. For the unbeliever and heretic experiences in himself an altogether similar love of God, as to substance, as the Catholic, and with the same fervor and effort faces death for his faith. But concerning this we have made a proper treatise in book 3.

With these things concerning the fulfillment of the commandments and the love of God dispatched, there readily opens up, without difficulty, the question of avoiding every sin:⁵² which is the fourth conclusion of this chapter, No one in the state of fallen nature can without the special help of grace avoid every sin. It is clear from the second proposition asserted above, because if he cannot through the weakness of nature fulfill all the commandments, it follows that he cannot avoid all sins, not only venial but also mortal. Since venial sins cannot all be avoided even in grace: as we will say in book 3. The distinction of some between past and future sin is superfluous here: namely that we cannot avoid past sin without grace, but well can avoid future sin. For we are not said to avoid the guilt of past sin, but to be freed from it: which it is most certain cannot be done except through the grace of Christ: but to avoid and guard against is said with respect to the future. And concerning that, this fourth conclusion is established here: which is St Thomas's in the same q. 109, 1-2 art. 8.⁵³ For man, he says, before grace can avoid individual mortal sins, but cannot long remain without mortal sin. And there is indeed a beautiful analogy which he supposes for this conclusion. Namely that just as from the fact that the sensitive appetite is not fully subject to reason, man cannot, even in grace by which he is subject to God, avoid all venial sins: so from the fact that outside grace reason is not entirely subject to God, who is the end of our actions, man cannot fail sometimes to offend concerning the means against that same end: which is mortal. Hence Gregory on Ezekiel:⁵⁴ Sin which is not soon deleted by repentance draws by its own weight to another. And Chrysostom⁵⁵ on that of Matt. 21, Loose and bring them to me: As a ship, he says, with its rudder broken, does not go where it wills, but where the storm drives it, so man, with the help of divine grace lost, does not do what he wills, but what the devil intends for him. And this same opinion the Church also pronounced against Pelagius in the Council of Milevis and in that of Carthage,⁵⁶ as Augustine reports to Paulinus: namely that free will is not firm and valid for not sinning without the help of God: as we were saying above in ch. 21.

Finally the last conclusion⁵⁷ of this chapter is an appendix from the foregoing, that without special help man cannot persevere in grace: but this, because it is a statement about man already justified, pertains to the third book.