De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Exposition of the common opinion.— Resolution of the author’s opinion.— But before I satisfy the testimonies of Gregory, I shall explain my opinion more plainly: and that not only on account of the Gregorians, but because it is also worthwhile against the Lutherans. When we affirm that a good work in the genus of morals is done by natural faculty, we first understand this where no evil end is set before it and no depraved circumstance is attached to it. Then we do not judge or call a work of this kind simply good or virtuous, but on the contrary (and, as they say in their schools in their own idiom) in a certain respect—namely, a work good by its kind, or morally good. And therefore I deliberately concealed the particle¹ which Gregory includes in his definition, saying that a morally good act is one that has all the circumstances so as to be truly virtuous. For a morally good work is indeed zealous, yet does not deserve absolutely the name of virtue. His failure to consider this immediately misled Gregory in the definition. For Augustine,² wherever he speaks simply of a good work or of virtue, comprehends only those offices which are done in charity, which alone is the form of the virtues. His express judgment is in On Grace and Free Will, chapter 18, where he says that whatever a man thinks he does well, if it is done without charity, is in no way done well. And therefore he never judges that there were true virtues among the Gentiles, not only because for the most part they did everything for vainglory, but because they lacked the knowledge and charity of the true God. This he argues most excellently both often elsewhere and in book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, confirming that no one is truly just unless he lives by faith, and that there is no true justice except where the kingdom of God is, and no true virtues except where there is the true wisdom and charity of God. And therefore there were none among the Romans and Greeks who should be judged truly wise and zealous. Nevertheless I can except perhaps some very rare men (which I do not believe Augustine denied), to whom God specially brought help, as they legitimately observed the natural law, so as to reconcile them with himself. And from this it follows, thirdly, that the knowledge of God which we said anyone can naturally attain in moral matters—we by no means understood it of true prudence, since that does not exist except where the virtues are truly connected. But when Augustine denies that there are true virtues outside charity and faith, and when he calls them false, he does not mean that they are therefore sins, but only that they do not have the legitimate degree of virtue. But they are such in a certain respect. Just as orichalcum, although it is false gold, is nevertheless a good thing in its own kind. And so Saint Thomas glosses him in 1.2, question 62, article 2. And besides, we do not grant that those works, however good, can be done by man for a long time, or in more or more difficult matters. For man after sin is too weak and infirm to be able to persevere in good, even in what is natural, without the help of God. For in unbelievers and in lost Christians we say from experience how men deprived of divine favor slip headlong into various abysses of evils. Nor finally do we altogether deny that sometimes, lying in sin, they receive certain peculiar inspirations and favors. For Saint Thomas says in the place cited above, 1.2, that God sometimes by his grace instructs some even about those things which can be known by natural reason. Nay, I would add that sometimes they receive certain supernatural aids by which they are in some way softened and disposed for grace. But we wish only to establish this: that without special help a sinner can do many works which are not sins, nor merits of grace, but in a middle way morally good; and that they are not a proximate disposition to grace, but a very remote one. In this sense that saying runs: “The first virtue is to flee vice.”

The mind of Saint Thomas is explained.— With these moderating principles and temperaments explained, it is most easy to answer all the testimonies of Gregory. But if I may add also what concerns Saint Thomas, I would never have thought such a thing of his opinion. For under the same title by which he asks in article 1 of that question 109 whether man without grace can know good, he also asks in article 2 whether he can will and do good without grace. And he answers by comparing our state with that first state of the innocence of our first parents, saying: “First, that according to either state human nature needs divine help to do or will any good whatsoever, as the first mover.” This word both Capreolus and those who follow him gloss as special help, although the mind of Saint Thomas is clearer than light that it concerns general help. First, because when he disputes there what man can will and do naturally, and what it is for which he needs more particular help, as he had done in the preceding article concerning knowledge, he answers in like manner with the foundation already laid: that as we can know nothing, whether in speculative or in practical matters, so we can neither will nor do anything without the help of God. And therefore he adds the philosophical phrase “as the first mover,” by which general help is expressed; and he adds “as was said,” namely in the preceding article. And the same is most clearly had in the following words. But when he adds the difference, that in the state of integral nature by that same general help man could by his natural powers will and work the good proportionate to his nature, such as is the good of acquired virtue, but not the supernatural good of infused virtue;³ “yet in the state of corrupted nature man fails even from this which he can according to his nature, so that he cannot fulfill all good of this kind by his natural powers.” Yet because human nature is not totally corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived of all good of nature, he says that even in the state of corrupted nature he can by the power of his nature do some particular good, such as build houses, plant vines, and other things of the kind, but not all the good connatural to him. As a sick man can by himself have some movement, but cannot be moved perfectly with the movement of a healthy man unless he is healed by the help of medicine. These are the words of Saint Thomas, than which what can be said more perspicacious and evident for the explanation of our opinion? For he says that man of corrupted nature can by the power of his nature do some particular good. What is “by the power of his nature” (even if freedom of invention is granted) except with only the general concurrence of God?⁴ Since special help is sufficient for no one except for supernatural offices. And so man of corrupted nature differs from man of integral nature in respect of natural good in the matter of morals, not as a dead man from a living one, so that the former can do all things from his natural powers and we nothing, as Gregory and Capreolus imagine, but as the sick and weak from the healthy and strong. Moreover, that the former has power for all good, while we cannot do all—that is, universally all natural goods—yet we can do some. And he adds the example of Augustine in book 3 of the Hypognosticon,⁵ that we can by natural powers build houses, plant vines, and the rest. But some try to elude this example, saying that these works, when done naturally, are not morally good. There is nevertheless nothing probable in this evasion. Since to plant vines and build houses, when by their kind they are not sins but honorable works, are therefore good even outside grace—especially in the way of Saint Thomas, who does not posit indifferent acts. Hence below in article 5 he says that man by his natural powers cannot merit eternal life, yet can do works leading to some good connatural to man, such as labor in the field, have a friend. Who doubts that to have a friend is a morally good work? And when he says that man can do this by his natural powers, he most manifestly understands it without special help, with only the general concurrence which God established with nature. Wherefore what he adds in the same article 2—namely, that Adam needed the help of grace not to heal nature but to work supernatural good, while we need it not only for supernatural works but to heal nature—must be understood as regards the exercise of all natural goods, so that we never fail.

And there is altogether equal evidence in Augustine,⁶ who was certainly of the same judgment. And that we may not become more burdensome by prolixity, it will be enough to have brought forward that passage which we were just now citing from the Hypognosticon, book 3, whose words concerning fallen man are these: “We confess that free will is in all men, having indeed the judgment of reason, but not such that it is fit by it to begin or certainly to accomplish the things that pertain to God without God, but only in the works of the present life, both good and also evil. Good, I say, which arise from the good of nature—that is, to will to labor in the field, to will to eat and drink, to will to have a friend, and very many of this kind.” What could he say more clearly to confirm our opinion? For he distinguishes between the things that pertain to God—namely, supernatural things—and the works of the present life, namely those which are not worthy of the reward of eternal life. And he says that free will is not sufficient by itself for the former, but is indeed sufficient for the latter, as also for evil works. To accomplish these, certainly, no favor of God is needed beyond general help. And among those things which we can do naturally he mentions to have a friend, to marry a wife, to learn an art, and finally to will whatever good pertains to the present life. “All these things,” he says, “subsist not without the divine governance.” This he undoubtedly understands not of special help but of the general influence by which he governs all things in his providence, as is clear from the authority subjoined. “For from him,” he says, “they are, and through him they began to be.”⁷ Alluding, namely, to that saying of Paul in Acts: “In him we live and move and are.” And it is a manifest passage which we cited from chapter 19 of On the Spirit and the Letter, where he asserts that the wicked do some good works, although they profit them nothing for merit. Since therefore this judgment of Augustine is clear, all his authorities which seem to make against it are to be interpreted through it. The first which Gregory opposes is⁸ that in On the Predestination of the Saints:⁹ “No one,” he says, “is sufficient of himself to begin or perfect any good work, but our sufficiency is from God.” If, however, he had looked circumspectly at the words before and after, he would see that this passage has no weight against us. For there the cause of the Pelagians is treated, who said that with respect to our justification we are the ones who begin, but God is the one who perfects. And therefore he says that those who confess that the wills of men are prevented by the grace of God, and that no one is sufficient of himself to begin or perfect any good work, differ greatly from the error of the Pelagians. And a little below: “For not only is the increase of faith not from us, but neither is its beginning.” I therefore cannot sufficiently wonder that Gregory took “good work” to mean a moral work, since the very dispute that was being conducted with the Pelagians is the clearest interpreter that it is understood of works pertaining to justification. Wherefore what he said, “any,” is not referred to any kind of goodness, but to that which is to begin and to perfect—for example, to think, to will, and to work.¹⁰ See how Augustine himself openly explains himself in the Hypognosticon, book 3: “Whoever says that free will is such that without God it can neither begin nor perfect a good work—that is, one that pertains to his holy purpose—is a Catholic.” Thus Augustine. So that wherever he says “good work,” it is understood of that which pertains to holiness. Hence he adds: “For to these it is said, ‘You are my friends if you do what I command you.’” For a morally good work (as we noted above) is not, for Augustine, absolutely good. Likewise in On Correction and Grace, when he had said that without grace men do no good at all, he adds: “Not only that, with grace showing it, they may know what is to be done, but also that, with grace supplying it, they may do with love what they know.” Note “with love,” that is, meritoriously. And in book 2, chapter 5: “We are not helped by God to sin,” he says, “but we cannot do just things, or fulfill the precept of justice in every part, unless we are helped by God.” Note “in every part,” that is, perfectly.¹¹

The second testimony, and one which Gregory thinks admits no exception at all, is in the letter to Paulinus among the condemnations of Pelagius. There, among other things, this is condemned: that our victory, when we overcome temptations, is not from the help of God. And we are commanded to confess that when we fight against temptations and illicit desires, although we also have our own will there, nevertheless our victory comes not from it but from the help of God. From this Gregory constructs this irrefutable demonstration: “He who succumbs to temptation sins; no one can vanquish it without the help of God; therefore without such help we cannot avoid sin, and therefore neither can we do a work good in any way.” But although we should grant¹² that where temptation assails we cannot naturally do moral good, Gregory would still have no triumph. For there are other works which we can do when no temptation opposes us: for example, to speak the truth when it profits us nothing, to give a small coin to a poor man, to obey one’s parents in a small matter, and other things of the kind. But I would add besides that although we cannot overcome vehement temptations without the special help of God, we can nevertheless overcome slight ones: not indeed so that our victory is acceptable to God for eternal life, but so that we avoid a new sin. For our nature remained weak after sin, yet was not altogether extinguished. And therefore, since it is rational, it can sometimes be held in the citadel of reason against temptations. But what was condemned in Pelagius is most evident: it is nothing other than what that blasphemer himself affirmed—namely, that we could resist temptations in such a way that our victory would please God and be worthy of an eternal reward. It is a wonder that Gregory did not attend to this in the other authority which he himself cites from Augustine,¹³ book 21 of The City of God, chapter 16, saying: “Then are vices conquered when they are conquered by the love of God.” With this Saint Thomas most harmoniously agrees¹⁴ in 2, distinction 28, question 1, article 2, reply to the sixth argument. “For it is one thing,” he says, “to resist sin, and another to have victory over sin. For whoever avoids sin resists sin. Whence this,” he says, “can be done without grace.” And whatever others invent, he undoubtedly understands it without the help of grace. “Nor is it necessary,” he says, “that a man then merit an eternal reward by resisting sin. But he properly conquers sin who can attain to that against which the struggle with sin is directed—for example, to the merit of eternal life. And this cannot be without grace.” Thus he. But if someone objects to us the daily prayer¹⁵ by which we ask God not to lead us into temptation, where we likewise profess that unless by his peculiar help we cannot keep ourselves from being carried into them, we answer that we do not ask only for victory over certain temptations but over all; nor for any victory whatsoever, but (as we were just saying) to conquer from the love of God; and yet we can overcome neither all of them in any way, nor any of them in that way, without special help. And besides, that we overcome some by a merely morally good act, we are also bound to reckon acceptable to God, as the author and universal governor of nature. For we ask from him rain and other favorable seasons and temporal goods, which nevertheless he bestows on us through secondary causes with only general help.

And Gregory brings forward another condemnation from the same letter to Paulinus,¹⁶ for it is the sixth condemnation of Pelagius, who said that help is not given for individual acts. Hence he infers that those are condemned who deny special help for morally good acts—namely, from the fact that it is said “for individual acts.” But it is most perspicacious that the word “individual” refers only to the three acts which are to think, to will, and to work, insofar as they look to justification. For Pelagius said that at least the thought and the beginning of faith are from us. And this is condemned in him. But nothing is said of a morally good work, since it pertains nothing, or most remotely, to justification.

Finally, the last argument of Gregory¹⁷ is that if God worked with us by general influence alone for morally good works, he would no more move us to goods of this kind than to contrary evils, since the same influence concurs to both. But there is no such inference. For in evils of fault he concurs only (as we said above) as the author of that material act insofar as it is a thing of nature; but in good works not only that, but insofar as they have the form of virtue consonant with reason. For he gives us laws, example, and natural light, showing us goods. In these ways God is not efficacious for us to turn aside obliquely from the path of reason. And for this reason Augustine reproves Julian for attributing to men whatever good they have, since we owe all things, even natural ones, to God.

From sacred Scripture there is certainly nothing of any weight that these men can expound to us. For that saying of John,¹⁸ “Without me you can do nothing,” if it is objected in the sense in which it can designate general help, no one denies that it is necessary for entering upon any office whatsoever. But if in the sense in which it signifies special help, then it is to be understood only of a work either meritorious or disposing for grace. And this is the genuine sense of that passage. For our Redeemer had premised: “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it remains in the vine, so neither can you unless you remain in me.” There the discourse concerns the works of grace, which are the fruits of his passion. And therefore he adds: “I am the true vine, and you are the branches: he who remains in me, and I in him, bears much fruit. Because without me you can do nothing.” To which a morally good work pertains nothing. For it is the custom of Scripture to reckon as something only the works pertaining to justification, but the rest as nothing. As in Corinthians:¹⁹ “Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the observance of the commandments of God.” And yet James says of those same heavenly goods:²⁰ “Every best gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.” But from that word in 1 Corinthians 10, “Do all things for the glory of God,” no strength accrues to Gregory’s opinion. For if he wishes to claim glory so strictly, neither are those things which are done with special help by one who persists in sin done for the glory of God, since no work of a sinner pleases him. You have the gloss of this passage in chapter 23.

I have tried to press these things more closely than perhaps anyone would judge necessary, because I confess I cannot but grieve that some in this age have so cast down human nature, affirming that free will can do nothing at all good in morals with the general help of God, but that whatever proceeds naturally from man is sin. This I have always judged most absurd. Although I esteem the authors nonetheless, and especially the Lord of Ross,²¹ a man truly distinguished both for excellent learning and above all for all the piety of religion even unto death, who nevertheless against Luther, article 16, thinks that this opinion which we have rejected was the judgment of the Fathers, but that the scholastic theologians are the ones who in this part think against the Fathers. He perhaps persuaded himself of this from Gregory’s disputation. For concerning Augustine I think I have shown abundantly according to my slender ability that he was not of such an opinion. And what Chrysostom²² and the other Fathers repeatedly say—namely, that good morals or a good life are found outside the grace of God, but by no means outside faith—we readily concede. First, because unbelievers for the most part do their works from their false faith or from some other evil end. Then, because if there are any morally good works outside grace, they are mixed with many other faults. And finally, because works, however good they are without charity, nevertheless do not deserve the name of true virtue.