De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Domingo de Soto

De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Domingo de Soto (1494–1560)

De natura & gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

First published 1550

Domingo de Soto's De natura et gratia libri III, written for the debates at the Council of Trent, with the Apologia contra Catharinum and the Council's decrees on original sin and justification as printed with it, in Latin with an original English translation.


Liber I: On Nature and Grace, Book I

Praefatio I: Preface addressed to the holy Fathers of the Council of Trent

Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — On the names, nature, and grace

Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — On man conceived in pure nature

Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — What offices man in pure nature could perform

Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — On the state of man in original justice

Capitulum V: Chapter 6. — What man in the state of integral nature could naturally accomplish of good works

Capitulum VI: Chapter 7. — On original sin, namely into whom it passed

Capitulum VII: Chapter 8. — On the cause and reason of original sin

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 9. — Whereby the account of original sin is concluded

There are, therefore, men of this age who, although not all, yet opposing a part of these arguments against the old opinion, have fallen away from it: saying that there are not in individual men individual original sins, but that one [sin] which the first parent committed is the original transgression, of which we are all guilty, and from which we are named sinners. The leader of these is considered Albert Pighius, a man indeed both pious and learned. Who nevertheless hears ill of this, as if he altogether denied that sins are original in us. But neither will he, if he is heard soundly and without prejudice, be condemned of such ignorance, nor, if he had more sharply weighed the sense of the old opinion, would he perhaps have rejected it. First, therefore, if it is fitting to hunt the subject from the name, you would call original sin nothing other than sin transmitted by origin from the first parent to the offspring.

Wherefore from that sin our contagion is to be judged. So that what was in him as the formal nature of sin may be recognized as left in us by way of habit. And the effects which were in him may be the same effects in us. Let us suppose, for example, that the first sin of Adam was the eating of the tree (for whether pride preceded it or not is irrelevant). The formal nature of that crime then was the obliquity and deflection of the soul through the will from the law and order of God. And because Adam bore the person of the whole of nature, which had received in him that benefit of justice, to remain in it as long as he did not sin, the whole in him was made guilty of that transgression, and was made ungrateful and hateful to God. Wherefore the same deordination and deformity (to use the school's words) of that act remained fixed in nature by way of habit: which obliquity accordingly we contract as one with the same nature. Wherefore just as it must be conceded that original sin is in us, so it must not be denied that as to its formal [element] it is the lack of original justice: provided that justice itself is similarly taken as formal. For we have already reported above in chapter 8 from St. Thomas 1st part, q. 95, that the formal signification of original justice is the rectitude of the soul towards God, but the material [significations] are the other rectitudes, namely of the inferior powers of the soul towards reason, and of the body towards the soul. In Adam, if you consider the matter carefully, the privation of justice as to the first order was not an effect of sin, but its very formal nature: but the privation of the same justice as to the other two orders was not the nature of sin, but an effect. In the same way the privation in us of the former rectitude is original sin: but the privation of the others is the effect of the same sin. Which distinction, if Pighius and his followers had examined, they would never have denied that original sin is in us. Yet, to add this word in his favour in turn, if either Pighius or anyone else had so denied that original sin is in us as to say that we contract only the guilt of punishments which we owe for Adam's sin, but not the guilt of fault, he would openly fight not only against Augustine but against Paul: as we demonstrated in the third confession of the preceding chapter, and shall repeat in the next chapter as well. But he who should say that we are defiled, when we are conceived, by no other guilt of fault than that of Adam's transgression, would portend no error, except that he would lightly and without reason deny that that guilt is the lack of justice, in the manner explained. And therefore most truly and most advisedly the holy Synod of Trent decided, session 5, canon 3, that the sin which is one by origin, and is transmitted by propagation, is in all, and is proper to each. Therefore by the things explained here are dissolved the objections which we made in the preceding chapter against the opinion of Anselm. But as far as the matter concerns Augustine, who seems to teach that concupiscence is original sin, he must first be interpreted not of the formal but of the material signification: as his faithful interpreter St. Thomas explained. Since the same [Augustine] says, that the guilt of concupiscence is loosed in baptism, while concupiscence remains: but guilt, at least in original sin, is the same as the form of sin. But neither is concupiscence to be considered as the matter or substratum signified of sin in such a way as the act is in actual transgression. For in actual sin the action is placed beneath the obliquity as its subject: since through the action itself we turn aside from reason and the divine rule: so that the action itself is properly denominated oblique and sin: as snow is white by its colour. But in original sin it is far otherwise: since the form of sin is in no way in concupiscence as in a subject, but in the soul, where original justice was, as we said above in chapter 5, or (as others think) in the will. Wherefore concupiscence is not so properly denominated sin, as the soul itself is sinful, or man a sinner. Yet because in this kind of sin a material [element] cannot properly be devised as in actual sin, and the motion of concupiscence was the first and nearest effect of departing justice, it pleased Augustine to call it in a certain way material sin, so as to show that the thing is evil and harmful. And this especially against Pelagius, who denied that the rebellion of the flesh was an effect of sin: nay, he said it was a natural good: as is seen against Julian. And that this was Augustine's doctrine will become more evident in chapter 12. Where we brought him in interpreting Paul, that he called concupiscence sin in the sense in which it is an effect of sin. For if after baptism sensuality is not reckoned sin except because it is an effect of sin, it is certainly established that neither before baptism is it otherwise sin. Although then, on account of the guilt conjoined in the soul, of which concupiscence itself is the nearest effect, it is called the material signification of sin. And this is what the disputation proves, which we constructed in the preceding chapter to explain his mind against the words of Augustine.

An answer to those who wish original sin to be in us.— But yet it remains for us besides to answer the arguments of those who think that no original fault is formally in us, but that all are called sinners from that fault which was in Adam. First. Paul says that we all sinned in that sin of Adam alone. Whence Augustine, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 1, chapter 10, on that word, In whom all have sinned. If you understand, he says, in what sin, it is certain and most manifest that there are other sins proper to each one, in which they so sin only as they are whose sins they are, and this one other, in which all have sinned, when all were that one man. But if you understand in whom one man, what, he says, is more manifest than this manifestation? For we read that those who believe in CHRIST are justified in CHRIST, on account of the hidden communication and inspiration of spiritual grace, by which whoever cleaves to the Lord is one spirit. Thus far Augustine, leaving to the reader the conclusion of the allusion, that he may understand that all sinned in Adam through the communication of his fault, in whom we were one flesh, as we are justified in CHRIST, in whom we are made one spirit. And in the Hypognosticon, book 2: When man sinned, he says, nature sinned: and nature has now been made sinful, that is, having the vice of sin. To the same point belongs that: By the transgression of one many died. And by the disobedience of one many were made sinners. Whence Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15, says (as we have already cited above) that we are involved in the guilt of Adam alone, by whose will that sin was committed which we draw originally. Therefore we contract by origin that one sin in which all have sinned, and not many.

To these things, however, and the like, we answer by conceding that we all sinned in that sin of Adam alone, as has been clearly shown, since when we receive a soul we do not sin, but are conceived in sin. Nor is anyone to be said to sin originally, but to draw sin originally with nature. Nor is it to be denied that the sin of Adam is that which we contract. Yet this happens through the fact that that guilt of sin (as we have said) has been left in the nature which sinned in Adam. And therefore just as we all draw nature from Adam, each receiving his own, so also we all contract his sin, through the fact that in each one there is that deviation and obliquity of soul from God, whereby accordingly we are all so infected by the contagion of fault that we each contract individual stains. Although that guilt in us is not a positive quality, but a mere privation of justice (as we have said) as to the formal element. Wherefore since in the remission of original sin grace is restored to us in order to God, but not the inferior powers in order to reason, St. Thomas says very well, as we cited above in chapter 5, that original justice is restored in baptism only as to the formal element. But in what way through the will all we then sinned in Adam, the same holy doctor elucidates by a most apt example, 1-2, q. 81, where he says that just as all members are one man, and therefore the will of the whole is reckoned as that of all the members, so we all were in Adam in a certain way one man, wherefore the voluntary inordination of his sin remains in the whole nature which we receive by generation. It remains, namely, by way of habit: just as in a man who has passed through an act of sin, the obliquity of the soul remains, until it is restored to order by grace.

The theologians add here besides an example to explain how we all sinned in Adam, concerning a most munificent king who enrolled a servant adopted as son as heir of a very ample substance, of which benefit all his posterity would obtain possession: yet on this law, that if he persisted in his grace; but as soon as he committed the first crime against the king, he would fall from that inheritance. The example is ancient, and by no means unsuited to the matter. For God had not in a wholly dissimilar way bestowed on our nature in Adam original justice, but Paul is my [authority], who seems to explain the matter best: where he says that Adam bore the figure of CHRIST who was to come. For thence the antithesis of the fault of Adam and the grace of CHRIST shines forth, where, when the new Adam comes to the water of baptism, the heavenly Father says, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. For it is just as if he had said: As Adam was [the one] in whom alone all his nation displeased me, which succeeds him by natural generation, so (as an antidote) this is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased: that is, in whom alone, as many as have been reborn in him by baptism, reconciled to me in grace, shall please me. Which Paul also says: As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many are made just. Therefore that all sinned in Adam is nothing other than that our nature, on account of the participation of his fault, is ungrateful and hateful to God. And therefore all his offspring are born children of wrath. Just as to be justified in CHRIST is that, on account of his grace participated in us, we are all pleasing to God. In whom accordingly we are reborn children of mercy.

By these things finally let it be clear in what way the original stain is transmitted by the perpetual series of generations from Adam. But it is Augustine who, out of hatred of the Pelagians, throws some doubt into the eyes, who frequently says that that concupiscence of the rebellious flesh, on account of its disobedience, is the instrument of propagating this kind of fault. For he says (as cited in the preceding chapter) in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16, that from this disobedience of the flesh straying from reason, and from the bestial and shameful motion of the members, whoever is generated carnally contracts sin, from which he is to be washed by baptism. And book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 24, where he investigates how, since marriage is a good of nature, children are procreated in sin from spouses reborn by baptism, and especially where no sin is mingled with the conjugal act, he answers that it is not from the good by which marriages are good, but from the evil of concupiscence, which the spouses use well, and of which they are nevertheless ashamed, that the devil holds the children born as guilty. And below. From this, he says, concupiscence of the flesh, which although in the regenerate it is now not reckoned as sin, yet has not come to nature except from sin, whatever offspring is born is bound by original sin, unless it is reborn in him whom the virgin conceived without that concupiscence. Therefore when he deigned to be born in the flesh, he alone was born without sin. Everywhere, finally, when Augustine speaks of this matter, he makes that concupiscence rebellious to reason, as it were for the reason that it does not obey reason, the channel of the original stain. But there is an argument which anyone could raise against this opinion. If some men were now created out of nothing, male and female (of whom we spoke in the third chapter), namely in mere nature without fault and grace, these indeed, however much they burned with lust and the rebellion of concupiscence, and blazed with vices, would nevertheless never transmit original fault into the offspring they begot: as is the consensus of all theologians, because they would not then be the offspring of Adam. But if on the contrary two descending by natural seed from Adam were, in the first instant of the infusion of the soul, infused with grace preventing sin (as is said of the most blessed virgin), and concupiscence were cut off from them, or wholly extinguished, so that it could no more insult reason than in the state of innocence, they would nevertheless transmit original sin into the children they begot. I say [this] if the grace conferred on the parents were only personal, and not for the whole succession. Therefore the rebellion of concupiscence is not in the cause of original fault. I do not indeed doubt that it is as these reasons persuade: namely that in whatever way nature is transmitted from Adam after his sin, sin is also transfused. And if nature were not transmitted from Adam, but from a man now created out of nothing, children would be begotten without sin. Nay, the holy Synod of Trent determines this very thing in session 6, chapter 3: that as no one receives his grace unless reborn in CHRIST. Wherefore that concupiscence is the channel of sin means nothing else than that concupiscence and the shameful motion of the flesh are the natural instrument of generation, through which the nature of the prevaricator Adam is propagated. Nor did the wise Augustine mean anything else. But because the flesh would never titillate against reason unless the fault of Adam were in the cause, he says that by the rebellion of concupiscence it is the channel of sin.

Capitulum IX: Chapter 10. — Against the recent Pelagians on original sin

Capitulum X: Chapter 11. — Against the Lutherans on original sin

Capitulum XI: Chapter 12. — Whereby the arguments of the Lutherans are weighed

Capitulum XII: Chapter 13. — On the effects of original sin

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 14. — On the punishment of original sin

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 15. — On free will toward good

Capitulum XV: Chapter 16. — Whereby the arguments appearing to the contrary are answered

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 17. — On free will toward evil

Capitulum XVII: Chapter 18. — On dissolving the arguments of the adversaries

Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 19. — What man can do by free will while he is in sin

Capitulum XIX: Chapter 20. — Whether without the special help of grace man can in any part act well morally

Capitulum XX: Chapter 21. — In which the objections are answered

Capitulum XXI: Chapter 22. — On the love of God and the fulfilment of the commandments

Capitulum XXII: Chapter 23. — Whereby the adversaries are answered

Liber II: On Nature and Grace, Book II

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the disposition for grace

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — Whereby the objections of the adversaries are refuted

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the special help of God

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On merit of congruity

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — Whereby the Lutherans' error on justification is set out

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — Whereby the terms of the controversy are set out

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What faith without works confers

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On the cause of the effect of faith without works

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — On the causes of justification

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the justification of an infant before the use of reason

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the justification of adults in general

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — On the justification of an adult from original sin alone

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the justification of adults from actual sins

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the difference between attrition and contrition

Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — On the difference between baptism and the sacrament of penance

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — Whether another act of charity than contrition suffices

Capitulum XVII: Chapter 17. — On the formal causes: how grace and the virtues are distinguished

Capitulum XVIII: Chapter 18. — On the same formal causes: how they justify

Capitulum XIX: Chapter 19. — On the formal causes of justification against the Lutherans

Capitulum XX: Chapter 20. — On the justice of Christ imputed to us

Capitulum XXI: Chapter 21. — On the interpretation of divine Scripture, in which places faith alone seems to be declared the cause of justification

Liber III: On Nature and Grace, Book III

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the obligation of the just to observe the law

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the exposition of the law

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — On the fulfilment of the law in general

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — On the fulfilment of the law in particular

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — For answering the adversaries

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — On satisfaction

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — On the merit of works that proceed from grace

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — On merit against the Lutherans

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Whereby the adversaries' arguments are answered

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the certainty of faith against the Lutherans

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — Whereby the same certainty of grace is disputed with certain Catholics

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — Whereby the same truth is corroborated by the testimonies of Scripture and the saints

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — Whereby the objections of the opposing party are answered

Apologia I: Apology against the Reverend Bishop Catharinus

Capitulum I: Chapter 2. — Whereby the state of the case and the controversy is established

Capitulum II: Chapter 3. — Whereby the true opinion is confirmed

Capitulum III: Chapter 4. — Whereby the first treatise of the Reverend Catharinus is answered

Capitulum IV: Chapter 5. — Whereby the second treatise is answered

Decretum I: Decree on Original Sin

Canones I: Canons on Original Sin

Decretum II: Decree on Justification

Capitulum I: Chapter 1. — On the weakness of nature and of the law for justifying men

Capitulum II: Chapter 2. — On the dispensation and mystery of the coming of Christ

Capitulum III: Chapter 3. — Those who are justified through Christ

Capitulum IV: Chapter 4. — The description of the justification of the impious and of its movement in the state of grace is set out

Capitulum V: Chapter 5. — On the necessity of preparation for justification in adults, and whence it comes

Capitulum VI: Chapter 6. — The manner of preparation

Capitulum VII: Chapter 7. — What the justification of the impious is, and what its causes are

Capitulum VIII: Chapter 8. — How it is understood that the impious is justified by faith and gratis

Capitulum IX: Chapter 9. — Against the empty confidence of the heretics

Capitulum X: Chapter 10. — On the received increase of justification

Capitulum XI: Chapter 11. — On the observance of God's commandments, and its necessity and possibility

Capitulum XII: Chapter 12. — That the rash presumption of predestination is to be avoided

Capitulum XIII: Chapter 13. — On the gift of perseverance

Capitulum XIV: Chapter 14. — On the lapsed and their restoration

Capitulum XV: Chapter 15. — That grace is lost by any mortal sin, but not faith

Capitulum XVI: Chapter 16. — On eternal life, or good works, and the nature of their merit

Canones I: Canons on Justification

Appendix I: Thirty-Five Lutheran Errors Condemned in This Work

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