De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

It follows that according to our plan we examine what man in integral nature could naturally do in good morals—namely, with only the general help of God—and what therefore it was for which he needed special help. And yet that state is not to be judged altogether from the endowments and virtues with which Adam was adorned.¹ For he had (as we were just saying) very many peculiar goods which would not afterward be common to his posterity; but the reckoning of that state must be weighed from the common law which was to endure in the whole progeny, unless sin had intervened. And besides, there is one account of the state of original justice if under the same name is included sanctifying grace, and another if it is understood precisely as the justice healing nature in order to a natural end. Wherefore, that the disputation may be clearer, when we ask about the state of original justice we understand only man with the gift healing nature, setting aside in thought the grace elevating him to supernatural things. So also Saint Thomas himself distinguishes,² 1.2, q. 109, where he asks what that man could do from pure natural powers—that is, man both lacking grace and also free of fault, yet having received a strong nature. For that gift of justice was then numbered among natural things, although it was gratuitous, because it so confirmed nature in order to a natural end, as has often been explained. For if he had understood mere nature, of which we spoke in chapters 3 and 4, he would not have asserted that man could keep all the commandments and love God, as we are now about to say. But here Saint Thomas seems to allude to this, that grace and justice are distinguished as two things.³ Unless you say that it is enough for glossing him that they are distinct aspects of the same habit. With these things deliberated, it is most easy to establish how far human powers in that state reached in morals.

This will become clear in five propositions. Let the first therefore be:⁴ In no way could man then, by original justice, if you separate sanctifying grace, do any work worthy of the friendship of God and the heavenly inheritance; nay, neither could he prepare himself for grace except by special help. This assertion is plain. For original justice according to this account would be only the health of nature in order to the end prescribed to its natural faculty, so that man might work according to reason without the trouble of sensuality and the heaviness of the body. But the end which is placed in the friendship and glory of God infinitely transcends the summit of all natural powers, as was said above, and therefore it is properly the work of God. Yet here it must be noted in passing that grace would not then have been necessary for men through the merit of Christ.⁵ For Christ came only to save what had perished, as him whom God set forth as a propitiation for sins, who would redeem us from the slavery of sin; and therefore where there was no sin, there was no need of that redeemer, as Augustine says⁶ in On Correction and Grace, chapter 11. Nevertheless the grace of God and his help were necessary because of the impossibility of any created nature attaining that end.

The second proposition.⁷ Man in that state could by his natural powers both know and will and do all the good proportionate to his nature—for example, act according to reason in relation to God insofar as he is the end of natural good. This is the conclusion of Saint Thomas⁸ 1.2, q. 109, from which no theologian dissents. For there he distinguishes concerning man in integral nature, affirming that he could by his natural powers do all the good proportionate to himself, such as is the good of acquired virtue, but not the good exceeding it, such as is the good of infused virtue, unless supported by grace. Wherefore I wonder at those who twist Thomas’s meaning to say that he cannot do natural good works without special help, because he says that this could not be done without the help of God moving him. For when he says “by his natural powers,” he plainly explains that he is speaking of general help, which (as we set out in chapter 2) is reckoned among natural causes. But what man cannot do without special help he would never have pronounced possible for him by his natural powers. But besides, this assertion is proved from what was said in chapter 4.⁹ Since man is a rational animal, it is implanted in his nature to work according to reason for God’s sake, insofar as by natural light it is known that he is the end of all things. Yet if through the resistance of sensuality he is sometimes held back—and original justice was the medicine of this disease, preserving nature in its vigor—he was therefore able without any other peculiar help to perform all the good that was proportionate to his nature. And so the difference between man in pure natural state and the same man in the state of innocence was that between the weak and the strong: namely, that the former (as we said above) was able by his nature to do some morally good work, but not continuously every good work; whereas in the state of innocence he could do every good work and always.¹⁰ And by the same distinction man fallen differs from the same man in the state of innocence, as Saint Thomas teaches in the cited place, and as we shall dispute more fully in chapter 20.

The third proposition.¹¹ Man could then, even setting aside sanctifying grace, fulfill all the commandments of the natural law—nay, even keep from that prohibition of eating the tree of knowledge—as regards the substance of the works. But since we establish a similar conclusion in chapter 22 concerning fallen man, about which the Lutherans sharply reproach us,¹² namely that we Catholics, like Pelagians, teach that man can keep the commandments by natural powers, the solemn distinction of the theologians has been noted. To fulfill the commandments of God comes about in two ways.¹³ In one way, as regards the substance of the works—namely, insofar as man does just and honorable things which are good in their kind, without any evil end or circumstance. And this man can truly do by the faculty of his nature, namely with only the general concurrence of God, as Saint Thomas says in the cited question, article 4, and all the theologians affirm with one mind. And the reason is that all the works of the law, whether natural or divine, and even human law if it is just, are according to reason; nay, law can be the same as the rule of reason, to which our works must be measured and directed. Since therefore man is a rational animal, he can by his nature do all works of this kind. There is this difference, however: that man in the state of innocence could perform all of them because of the integrity of his nature, but in pure natural state and in the state of corrupted nature he cannot do likewise, except the lighter and fewer ones. But in another way this phrase “to keep the commandments” is used—namely, not only as regards the substance but also as regards the manner. This others call “as regards the intention of God commanding,” from which all laws are derived. And that intention is that, supported by his grace, through the merits of fulfilling the law we should obtain eternal rewards, according to the Gospel saying: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.”¹⁴ And in this way it is taken wherever it is said simply that the commandments of God are fulfilled; for the former manner of fulfilling is imperfect. And in this manner, neither in the state of integral nature, much less in this our state, can man fulfill even the least commandment without grace, which first freely reconciles us with God. The contrary was the error of Pelagius. This is the judgment from which no theologian departs. Since it must be confirmed by us more copiously and exactly concerning fallen man in chapter 22, it will be enough to have stated it here. I would say “the commandments of the natural law,” since man cannot have the knowledge of faith concerning supernatural things, nor indeed can an angel, without the special help of God.

The fourth assertion.¹⁵ Man also in the flower of original justice, with grace set aside, was sufficient to love God above all things with a natural love, but not in such a way that it would be meritorious and acceptable to God for eternal life. This is likewise the conclusion of Saint Thomas in the cited question, 1.2, article 3. I therefore bring forward his testimony alone because there is no theologian who does not subscribe to the same judgment. But it is demonstrated by its own reasoning. In that state, with grace set aside, man could by natural virtue accomplish all the good that is connatural to him; but such is the love of God above all things; therefore it was possible to him by nature. The second premise is thus expressed from the very midst of the nature of things. Any thing whatsoever is so born to desire and act as it is born to be (this is Aristotle’s judgment¹⁶ in Physics 2); but all creatures, each in its own order, exist for God; therefore all love themselves in their own way for God, as Dionysius teaches¹⁷ in his book On the Divine Names, where he says that God converts all things to the love of himself. Hence, since with nature then sound there was no allurement or other thing to hold it back from its inclination, it follows that man would love him and refer all his offices to God, which is to love him above all things. But if you wish to perceive this reasoning more clearly, note that God, who needs not our goods, created nothing for our sake or for the sake of other things outside himself, but chiefly for himself, that he might display his divinity and in some way propagate it in us.¹⁸ For this is the difference between God and created things: that a creature acts by love of concupiscence—namely, for the sake of obtaining or preserving its end; for this reason animals use food for their parts, that they may live, and beget like themselves, in which they perpetually preserve their species. But God does not act thus, but from his own love of benevolence he fashioned the world, that his name might be spread abroad to his own glory.¹⁹ Finally, a creature acts like a student who frequents schools for the sake of acquiring knowledge; but God acts like a teacher who, out of love of his wisdom, eagerly cares for it to be poured out upon others. Wherefore, as God made and loves all things for himself, he implanted in the things he formed from nothing the same propensity—namely, that they should love their author before themselves—and especially man, whom he established as lord of all things. The same truth is usually shown also by an example from the parts of a natural thing:²⁰ namely, of the arm, when it exposes itself at its own peril and loss for the head, when the safety of the whole is at stake. But some contend by two answers that this example is quibbled away. First, that the arm does not expose itself for the head but for itself, since what is endangered in the head is itself. But the falsity of this is clear from the fact that, when the arm perishes to protect the head, it is vain to say that it intends its own proper safety and not rather that of the whole person. The other answer is Scotus’s, 3, distinction 27: that the hand does not expose itself, but man himself exposes his hand to defend himself. Hence the argument is not taken that the hand loves the whole more than itself, but that the whole loves itself more than the hand. To this, however, it is answered that although the whole suppositum is what uses the parts, it is nevertheless a testimony that, just as it is its natural right to command the members, so there is a natural appetite of the members to obey. Just as when water rises to fill a vacuum, it is in no way moved against its nature; nay, that is its own proper nature. Since the whole was made not for the sake of the parts, but the parts for the sake of the whole. And in the same way all good things were created for God, who is the universal good. Nay, from these principles of nature the philosophers were taught that a citizen is bound even to undergo death for the commonwealth. It is gathered therefore that it is deeply implanted in man by nature to love God above himself. This, indeed, in integral nature he could fully do; but in corrupted nature, because of very many obstacles, he is by no means so able to do it as to refer all his works to him. Nevertheless, let not the prudent reader pass over this (which we must repeat in chapter 22): that the love of God above all things is twofold—one natural, the other derived from charity by divine gift;²¹ for so the theologians teach with one consent. Hence Saint Thomas, in the cited place, first forms against this conclusion the following argument: “To love God above all things is the proper office of infused charity, through the Holy Spirit who is given to us, as is had in Romans 5; therefore man in the state of innocence could not do this by his natural powers.” To this he answers that charity loves God above all things more excellently than nature does. For nature loves him above all things insofar as he is the principle and end of natural good; but charity, insofar as he is the object of beatitude and insofar as man has a certain spiritual fellowship with him. Thus he.

The fifth and last proposition is:²² Man in that state could persevere by the gift conferred on him, if he had willed. This is established by Augustine in On Correction and Grace, chapter 12,²³ where he says that to the first man, to whom it was given to be able not to sin, there was also given the help of perseverance: not by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but without which he could not persevere by free will. And a little later: “The first man did not receive this gift of God—that is, perseverance in good—but to persevere or not to persevere was left to his free choice, since nothing resisted his will, established without sin, by way of concupiscence.” Therefore the judgment of Augustine, and it is most true, is that the first-formed man did not receive the gift of persevering always. For he was not confirmed in grace, as the Apostles were, that they should not sin mortally, and the most sacred Virgin, that she should not offend even venially. Nor (what is less) did he have that grace so as truly to persevere. For if he had received it, he would never have fallen.²⁴ Yet the possibility of persevering was committed to his free will. And therefore Augustine says elegantly that, although Adam had received grace so that he could refrain from sinning if he wished, yet the distinguished evangelical saints, such as the martyrs, received a more abundant grace—namely, that they could not only do what they wished, but that they wished more firmly what they could. For Adam, with no one terrifying him, and besides against the command of God who terrified him, using his free will, did not stand in so great a felicity of not sinning. But those others, I do not say with the world terrifying them, but raging to prevent them from standing, stood in the faith. Since the former saw the present goods he was about to leave, while the latter did not see the future goods they were about to receive. Thus Augustine, commending the grace of Christ above that which was in Adam. Here perhaps someone might hesitate.²⁵

Could not other causes and occasions also then arise for sinning besides sensuality, which justice restrained? They could indeed arise for sinning mortally, as was the temptation of the serpent. For the first sin could not be anything but mortal, since by it that most happy state would be lost. For a venial sin was neither enough to cast man down from that state, nor could it occur while that state endured, because no evil at all could then befall him. Saint Thomas²⁶ 1.2, q. 89, says this opinion is the common teaching. And although there are some who think otherwise, it is nevertheless proved from the effect of venial sin above all, which cannot but deserve some punishment. But in that most happy state, as Augustine teaches²⁷ both in the cited places and also in The City of God 14, chapter 10, nothing evil could be present that would ever offend the mind of man living happily. Nay, he expressly adds that there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, and while that remained, no evil at all from elsewhere could rush in to sadden him. If therefore there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, there could be no venial sin. But this is further deduced from the causes of venial sin, which would then have no place:²⁸ for there would then be neither sudden motions of sensuality, nor sudden motions of reason without deliberation. Nor could there be any weariness in the body, since it was always vigorous and sound, and most apt to obey the soul. Nor indeed could any danger threaten at all from without, otherwise that state would not be most happy, as is signified by the name of paradise. And let these things concerning the second of those four states which we have proposed be enough. The rest will be treated more copiously in chapter 20 and the following.